

New Europe College *Ștefan Odobleja* Program Yearbook 2013-2014



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New Europe College
Ștefan Odobleja Program
Yearbook 2013-2014

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NEW EUROPE FOUNDATION NEW EUROPE COLLEGE

Institute for Advanced Study

New Europe College (NEC) is an independent Romanian institute for advanced study in the humanities and social sciences founded in 1994 by Professor Andrei Pleșu (philosopher, art historian, writer, Romanian Minister of Culture, 1990–1991, Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1997-1999) within the framework of the *New Europe Foundation*, established in 1994 as a private foundation subject to Romanian law.

Its impetus was the *New Europe Prize for Higher Education and Research*, awarded in 1993 to Professor Pleșu by a group of six institutes for advanced study (the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, the National Humanities Center, Research Triangle Park, the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in Humanities and Social Sciences, Wassenaar, the Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences, Uppsala, and the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin).

Since 1994, the NEC community of fellows and *alumni* has enlarged to over 500 members. In 1998 New Europe College was awarded the prestigious *Hannah Arendt Prize* for its achievements in setting new standards in research and higher education. New Europe College is officially recognized by the Romanian Ministry of Education and Research as an institutional structure for postgraduate studies in the humanities and social sciences, at the level of advanced studies.

Focused primarily on individual research at an advanced level, NEC offers to young Romanian scholars and academics in the fields of humanities and social sciences, and to the foreign scholars invited as fellows appropriate working conditions, and provides an institutional framework with strong

international links, acting as a stimulating environment for interdisciplinary dialogue and critical debates. The academic programs NEC coordinates, and the events it organizes aim at strengthening research in the humanities and social sciences and at promoting contacts between Romanian scholars and their peers worldwide.

Academic programs currently organized and coordinated by NEC:

- ***NEC Fellowships (since 1994)***

Each year, up to ten NEC Fellowships open both to Romanian and international outstanding young scholars in the humanities and social sciences are publicly announced. The Fellows are chosen by the NEC international Academic Advisory Board for the duration of one academic year, or one term. They gather for weekly seminars to discuss the progress of their research, and participate in all the scientific events organized by NEC. The Fellows receive a monthly stipend, and are given the opportunity of a research trip abroad, at a university or research institute of their choice. At the end of their stay, the Fellows submit papers representing the results of their research, to be published in the New Europe College Yearbooks.

- ***Ștefan Odobleja Fellowships (since October 2008)***

The fellowships given in this program are supported by the National Council of Scientific Research, and are meant to complement and enlarge the core fellowship program. The definition of these fellowships, targeting young Romanian researchers, is identical with those in the NEC Program, in which the Odobleja Fellowships are integrated.

- ***The Black Sea Link Fellowships Program (since October 2010)***

This program, sponsored by the VolkswagenStiftung, invites young researchers from Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as from other countries within the Black Sea region, for a stay of one or two terms at the New Europe College, during which they

have the opportunity to work on projects of their choice. The program welcomes a wide variety of disciplines in the fields of humanities and social sciences. Besides hosting a number of Fellows, the College organizes within this program workshops and symposia on topics relevant to the history, present, and prospects of the Black Sea region.

- ***The Europe next to Europe (EntE) Fellowships Program (starting October 2013)***

This program, sponsored by the Riksbankens Jubileumsfond (Sweden), invites young researchers from European countries that are not yet members of the European Union, targeting in particular the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Macedonia, Serbia), Turkey, Cyprus, for a stay of one or two terms at the New Europe College, during which they will have the opportunity to work on projects of their choice.

Other fellowship programs organized since the founding of New Europe College:

- ***RELINK Fellowships (1996–2002)***

The RELINK Program targeted highly qualified young Romanian scholars returning from studies or research stays abroad. Ten RELINK Fellows were selected each year through an open competition; in order to facilitate their reintegration in the local scholarly milieu and to improve their working conditions, a support lasting three years was offered, consisting of: funds for acquiring scholarly literature, an annual allowance enabling the recipients to make a one-month research trip to a foreign institute of their choice in order to sustain existing scholarly contacts and forge new ones, and the use of a laptop computer and printer. Besides their individual research projects, the RELINK fellows of the last series were also required to organize outreach activities involving their universities, for which they received a monthly stipend. NEC published several volumes comprising individual or group research works of the RELINK Fellows.

- ***The NEC–LINK Program (2003 - 2009)***

Drawing on the experience of its NEC and RELINK Programs in connecting with the Romanian academic milieu, NEC initiated in 2003, with support from HESP, a program that aimed to contribute more consistently to the advancement of higher education in major Romanian academic centers (Bucharest, Cluj–Napoca, Iași, Timișoara). Teams consisting of two academics from different universities in Romania, assisted by a PhD student, offered joint courses for the duration of one semester in a discipline within the fields of humanities and social sciences. The program supported innovative courses, conceived so as to meet the needs of the host universities. The grantees participating in the Program received monthly stipends, a substantial support for ordering literature relevant to their courses, as well as funding for inviting guest lecturers from abroad and for organizing local scientific events.

- ***The GE–NEC I and II Programs (2000 – 2004, and 2004 – 2007)***

New Europe College organized and coordinated two cycles in a program financially supported by the Getty Foundation. Its aim was to strengthen research and education in fields related to visual culture, by inviting leading specialists from all over the world to give lectures and hold seminars for the benefit of Romanian undergraduate and graduate students, young academics and researchers. This program also included 10–month fellowships for Romanian scholars, chosen through the same selection procedures as the NEC Fellows (see above). The GE–NEC Fellows were fully integrated in the life of the College, received a monthly stipend, and were given the opportunity of spending one month abroad on a research trip. At the end of the academic year the Fellows submitted papers representing the results of their research, to be published in the GE–NEC Yearbooks series.

- ***NEC Regional Fellowships (2001 - 2006)***

In 2001 New Europe College introduced a regional dimension to its programs (hitherto dedicated solely to Romanian scholars), by offering fellowships to academics and researchers from South–Eastern Europe (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Republic of Moldova,

Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia, and Turkey). This program aimed at integrating into the international academic network scholars from a region whose scientific resources are as yet insufficiently known, and to stimulate and strengthen the intellectual dialogue at a regional level. Regional Fellows received a monthly stipend and were given the opportunity of a one-month research trip abroad. At the end of the grant period, the Fellows were expected to submit papers representing the results of their research, published in the NEC Regional Program Yearbooks series.

- ***The Britannia-NEC Fellowship (2004 - 2007)***

This fellowship (1 opening per academic year) was offered by a private anonymous donor from the U.K. It was in all respects identical to a NEC Fellowship. The contributions of Fellows in this program were included in the NEC Yearbooks.

- ***The Petre Țuțea Fellowships (2006 – 2008, 2009 - 2010)***

In 2006 NEC was offered the opportunity of opening a fellowships program financed the Romanian Government through its Department for Relations with the Romanians Living Abroad. Fellowships are granted to researchers of Romanian descent based abroad, as well as to Romanian researchers, to work on projects that address the cultural heritage of the Romanian *diaspora*. Fellows in this program are fully integrated in the College's community. At the end of the year they submit papers representing the results of their research, to be published in the bilingual series of the *Petre Țuțea* Program publications.

- ***Europa Fellowships (2006 - 2010)***

This fellowship program, financed by the VolkswagenStiftung, proposes to respond, at a different level, to some of the concerns that had inspired our *Regional Program*. Under the general title *Traditions of the New Europe. A Prehistory of European Integration in South-Eastern Europe*, Fellows work on case studies that attempt to recapture the earlier history of the European integration, as it has been taking shape over the centuries in South-Eastern Europe, thus offering the communitarian Europe some valuable vestiges of its less known past.

- **Robert Bosch Fellowships (2007 - 2009)**

This fellowship program, funded by the Robert Bosch Foundation, supported young scholars and academics from Western Balkan countries, offering them the opportunity to spend a term at the New Europe College and devote to their research work. Fellows in this program received a monthly stipend, and funds for a one-month study trip to a university/research center in Germany.

- **The GE-NEC III Fellowships Program (2009 - 2013)**

This program, supported by the Getty Foundation, started in 2009. It proposed a research on, and a reassessment of Romanian art during the interval 1945 – 2000, that is, since the onset of the Communist regime in Romania up to recent times, through contributions coming from young scholars attached to the New Europe College as Fellows. As in the previous programs supported by the Getty Foundation at the NEC, this program also included a number of invited guest lecturers, whose presence was meant to ensure a comparative dimension, and to strengthen the methodological underpinnings of the research conducted by the Fellows.

New Europe College has been hosting over the years an ongoing series of lectures given by prominent foreign and Romanian scholars, for the benefit of academics, researchers and students, as well as a wider public. The College also organizes international and national events (seminars, workshops, colloquia, symposia, book launches, etc.).

An important component of NEC is its library, consisting of reference works, books and periodicals in the humanities, social and economic sciences. The library holds, in addition, several thousands of books and documents resulting from private donations. It is first and foremost destined to service the fellows, but it is also open to students, academics and researchers from Bucharest and from outside it.

Beside the above-described programs, New Europe Foundation and the College expanded their activities over the last years by administering, or by being involved in the following major projects:

In the past:

- ***The Ludwig Boltzmann Institute for Religious Studies towards the EU Integration (2001–2005)***

Funding from the Austrian Ludwig Boltzmann Gesellschaft enabled us to select during this interval a number of associate researchers, whose work focused on the sensitive issue of religion related problems in the Balkans, approached from the viewpoint of the EU integration. Through its activities the institute fostered the dialogue between distinct religious cultures (Christianity, Islam, Judaism), and between different confessions within the same religion, attempting to investigate the sources of antagonisms and to work towards a common ground of tolerance and cooperation. The institute hosted international scholarly events, issued a number of publications, and enlarged its library with publications meant to facilitate informed and up-to-date approaches in this field.

- ***The Septuagint Translation Project (2002 - 2011)***

This project aims at achieving a scientifically reliable translation of the Septuagint into Romanian by a group of very gifted, mostly young, Romanian scholars, attached to the NEC. The financial support is granted by the Romanian foundation *Anonimul*. Seven of the planned nine volumes have already been published by the Polirom Publishing House in Iași.

- ***The Excellency Network Germany – South–Eastern Europe Program (2005 - 2008)***

The aim of this program, financed by the Hertie Foundation, has been to establish and foster contacts between scholars and academics, as well as higher education entities from Germany and South–Eastern Europe, in view of developing a regional scholarly network; it focused preeminently on questions touching upon European integration, such as transnational governance and citizenship. The main activities of the program consisted of hosting at the New Europe College scholars coming from Germany, invited to give lectures at the College and at universities throughout Romania, and organizing international scientific events with German participation.

- ***The ethnoArc Project–Linked European Archives for Ethnomusicological Research***

An European Research Project in the 6th Framework Programme: Information Society Technologies–Access to and Preservation of Cultural and Scientific Resources (2006-2008)

The goal of the *ethnoArc* project (which started in 2005 under the title *From Wax Cylinder to Digital Storage* with funding from the Ernst von Siemens Music Foundation and the Federal Ministry for

Education and Research in Germany) was to contribute to the preservation, accessibility,

connectedness and exploitation of some of the most prestigious ethno-musicological archives in Europe (Bucharest, Budapest, Berlin, and Geneva), by providing a linked archive for field collections from different sources, thus enabling access to cultural content for various application and research purposes. The project was run by an international network, which included: the “Constantin Brăiloiu” Institute for Ethnography and Folklore, Bucharest; Archives Internationales de Musique Populaire, Geneva; the Ethno-musicological Department of the Ethnologic Museum Berlin (Phonogramm Archiv), Berlin; the Institute of Musicology of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest; Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin (Coordinator), Berlin; New Europe College, Bucharest; FOKUS Fraunhofer Institute for Open Communication Systems, Berlin.

- ***Business Elites in Romania: Their Social and Educational Determinants and their Impact on Economic Performances.***

This is the Romanian contribution to a joint project with the University of Sankt Gallen, entitled ***Markets for Executives and Non-Executives in Western and eastern Europe***, and financed by the National Swiss Fund for the Development of Scientific Research (SCOPES) (December 2009 – November 2012)

- ***DOCSOC, Excellency, Innovation and Interdisciplinarity in doctoral and postdoctoral studies in sociology*** (A project in the Development of Human Resources, under the aegis of the National Council of Scientific Research) – in cooperation with the University of Bucharest (2011)

- ***UEFISCCDI – CNCS (PD – Projects): Federalism or Intergovernmentalism? Normative Perspectives on the Democratic Model of the European Union (Dr. Dan LAZEA); The Political Radicalization of the Kantian Idea of Philosophy in a Cosmopolitan Sense (Dr. Áron TELEGDI-CSETRI)***, Timeframe: August 1, 2010 – July 31, 2012 (2 Years)
- ***Civilization. Identity. Globalism. Social and Human Studies in the Context of European Development*** (A project in the Development of Human Resources, under the aegis of the National Council of Scientific Research) – in cooperation with the Romanian Academy (Mar. 2011 – Sept. 2012)
- ***The Medicine of the Mind and Natural Philosophy in Early Modern England: A new Interpretation of Francis Bacon*** (A project under the aegis of the European Research Council (ERC) Starting Grants Scheme) – In cooperation with the Warburg Institute, School of Advanced Study, London (December 2009 - November 2014)
- ***The EURIAS Fellowship Program***, a project initiated by NetIAS (Network of European Institutes for Advanced Study), coordinated by the RFIEA (Network of French Institutes for Advanced Study), and co-sponsored by the European Commission's 7th Framework Programme - COFUND action. It is an international researcher mobility programme in collaboration with 14 participating Institutes of Advanced Study in Berlin, Bologna, Brussels, Bucharest, Budapest, Cambridge, Helsinki, Jerusalem, Lyons, Nantes, Paris, Uppsala, Vienna, Wassenaar.
- ***UEFISCCDI – CNCS (TE – Project) Critical Foundations of Contemporary Cosmopolitanism***, Team leader: Tamara CĂRĂUȘ, Members of the team: Áron Zsolt TELEGDI-CSETRI, Dan Dorin LAZEA, Camil PÂRVU (October 5, 2011 – October 5, 2014)

Ongoing projects

Research programs developed with the financial support of the Romanian Ministry of Education and Research, The Executive Unit for Financing Higher Education and Innovation, National Council of Scientific Research (UEFISCDI – CNCS):

- **PD – Project: *Mircea Eliade between Indology and History of Religions. From Yoga to Shamanism and Archaic Religiosity* (Liviú BORDAȘ)**
Timeframe: May 1, 2013 – October 31, 2015 (2 and ½ years)
- **IDEI-Project: *Models of Producing and Disseminating Knowledge in Early Modern Europe: The Cartesian Framework* (Vlad ALEXANDRESCU)**
Timeframe: January 1, 2012 – December 31, 2015 (4 years)
- **Bilateral Cooperation: *Corruption and Politics in France and Romania (contemporary times)***
Silvia MARTON – Project Coordinator, Constanța VINTILĂ-GHIȚULESCU, Alexandra IANCU, Frederic MONIER, Olivier DARD, Marion FONTAINE, Benjamin GEROME, Francais BILLOUX
Timeframe: January 1, 2015 – December 31, 2016 (2 years)

ERC Starting Grant:

- ***Record-keeping, fiscal reform, and the rise of institutional accountability in late medieval Savoy: a source-oriented approach – Castellany Accounts* Ionuț EPURESCU-PASCOVICI**
Timeframe: May 1, 2015 – April 30, 2020 (5 years)

Other projects are in the making, often as a result of initiatives coming from fellows and *alumni* of the NEC.

Present Financial Support

The State Secretariat for Education, Research and Innovation of Switzerland
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The Ministry of National Education – The Executive Agency for Higher
Education and Research Funding, Romania

Landis & Gyr Stiftung, Zug, Switzerland

Private Foundation, Germany

Fritz Thyssen Stiftung, Köln, Germany

VolkswagenStiftung, Hanover, Germany

Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, The Swedish Foundation for Humanities and
Social Sciences, Stockholm, Sweden

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Dissertation: Human Agency in the Interstices of Structure: Choice and Contingency in the Conflict over Roşia Montană, Romania

Marie Curie IEF (Intra-European Fellowship for Career Development) researcher at the University Ca'Foscari in Venice, Italy (2014-2015)

Scientific researcher in the project TIMBRE within the Helmholtz-Zentrum für Umweltforschung – UFZ, Leipzig, Germany, Department of Urban and Environmental Sociology (2011-2014)

Scientific researcher within the Research Institute for the Quality of Life in Bucharest, Romania (2008-present)

Lecturer, University of Bucharest, Faculty of Sociology and Social Work (2010)

Teaching Assistant at the University of Toronto, Canada, Department of Sociology (2003-2006; 2008-2009)

Expert at the Ministry of Labour, Social Solidarity and Family, Bucharest (2002-2003)

Several publications in academic journals and edited volumes published both in Romania and abroad

THE DIALECTICS OF ESTRANGEMENT: A SIMMELIAN INTERPRETATION OF DISPLACEMENT AND RESETTLEMENT CAUSED BY DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

Abstract

With some exceptions, research on development-forced displacement and resettlement has been confined to a theoretical ghetto, virtually severed from explicit social scientific reflection. While the processes accompanying displacements are of staggering magnitude and complexity, the theoretical tools to approach them are relatively rudimentary. This paper suggests that the injection of an explicit theoretical point of view and the articulation of a new argument could revitalize the social scientific imagination in understanding displacement and resettlement. By drawing on Georg Simmel's reflections on the stranger at the turn of the twentieth century, the paper suggests a possible interpretation of displacement in the form of a dialectic of estrangement which, it is assumed, accompanies displacements caused by development projects. The three moments of the dialectic – the making of the developer stranger, the estrangement of the locals and the new strangers – show how discontinuities emerge in the experience of resettlement. The main implication of this approach is that the complexities and ethical issues arising from development-induced displacements could be more adequately understood if resettlers are viewed as individuals capable of performing their stranger roles in highly variable ways.

Research on involuntary displacement and resettlement and social theory: defining the research problem

There is little doubt that displacement and resettlement caused by development projects, is a realm of superlatives. There are at least forty-five thousand large dams in the world today, which have displaced anywhere

between forty and eighty million people (Klingensmith 2007). The scale and acuteness of the problem has grabbed early on the attention of social scientists, especially of those involved in applied anthropological work. Research on development-forced displacement and resettlement emerged with the ambitious dam projects of the Tennessee Valley Authority during the 1940s in the United States (Muggah 2011). Another early case of development-forced displacement and resettlement analyzed by social scientists was that of the Tema Manhean village on the coast of Ghana, which had to be resettled in 1952 to make way for a harbor on the gulf of Guinea (Amarteifio, Butcher and Whitham 1966). In the late 1950s, anthropologists Elisabeth Colson and Thayer Scudder began their long-term field research on the consequences of the construction of the Kariba dam for the local Gwembe Tonga population inhabiting the valley of the Zambezi River (Colson 1960, 1971). Similar anthropological interest was devoted to the resettlement experience of damming the Volta River in Ghana (Chambers 1970). Based on these early ethnographic studies of successive changes undergone by displaced populations, the first musings over the “prospects of a ‘sociology of resettlement’” emerged (Brokensha 1963: 286). What sort of sociology would this turn out to be, a theoretically informed or a predominantly applied one?

The intervening 50 years have witnessed a vigorous growth of social scientific research on displacement, guided by an overriding concern with understanding the negative consequences of displacement and devising ways to mitigate them. This was undoubtedly a valid concern and social scientists have brought, in their roles as consultants and employees of financial and government institutions, a truly respectable contribution to improving the lives of displacees (Muggah 2011). Unfortunately, this stream of applied work has not been accompanied by an equally sustained effort at theorizing the emergent and unfolding resettlement processes. The present paper aims to address this problem by starting from an explicit theoretical perspective and seeking to shed new light on concerns that seem to have grown all too applied to require theoretical attention.

After reviewing the state of the art in the current thinking on displacement processes, the paper will introduce and illustrate the merits of a theoretical lens drawn from classical sociological theory. If the dominant explanatory models in displacement research have been inductively derived from applications of social scientific knowledge, the proposed approach aims to unsettle prevailing ways of thinking by departing from the habitual approaches of development researchers. In a nutshell, we propose

to draw on one of the classical¹ essays of the German sociologist Georg Simmel, published under the title “the stranger” (1908). “The Stranger” is a “sociological form”, conceived as a synthesis between wandering and attachment. Development projects that impose population resettlement can similarly be seen as syntheses of emplacement and displacement: states “wander” from afar and occasionally emplace objects such as dams or mines at specific locations, forcing individuals and communities to become themselves wanderers. In Simmel’s interpretation, the stranger is not simply a “local” who happens to move from his place of origin to other places, where she is seen as a stranger. The sociological form of the stranger is the bearer of distinct qualities apart from mobility (and the attendant “synthesis of nearness and remoteness”, Simmel 1971: 145), namely objectivity, freedom and abstractness. Regarded in this way, the presence of developers (states or companies) in local communities suddenly acquires a different meaning: strangers bring discontinuities in the experience of the locals *because they are strangers*. Moreover, by expanding Simmel’s concept, one can postulate that certain kinds of strangers – which are called here *developer strangers* - have a further peculiar ability, namely that their presence leads to the estrangement of others. In fact, the paper advances a dialectical understanding of how this estrangement can happen, including three moments: the first, in which the developer stranger is created; the second is the moment of estrangement in which places and communities change while the locals remain unmoved; the third moment is the emergence of new strangers – the displacees – who become performers of their newly found stranger qualities.

The primary aim of the paper is to advance a coherent theoretical argument around the idea of the stranger. For this reason, only very brief empirical illustrations will be offered, drawing on the case of displacement and resettlement produced by the Bicaz dam in Romania. The present approach offers a promising way to explore cases such as Bicaz or similar ones, whereby the theoretical articulation of *displacement as estrangement* is the central goal.

The state of the art in theorizing development-induced displacement

The first anthropologists working at the time when the first “man-made lakes” were created in Africa carried out research in an interdisciplinary

context that included geographers, economists, lawyer and international relations scholars (Rubin and Warren 1968). The problem of anthropologists was in one way unique, as their object of study – the social organization of populations that were to be removed by dams – was fast disappearing. H. A. Fosbrooke from the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute was writing in the foreword to one of the first books on resettlement in Africa:

...work commenced on the dam in August 1955 ... In these circumstances speedy action was necessary. As incoming Director in March 1956 I appreciated that if an adequate record of the social organization of the Valley Tonga was to be made available to posterity, there was no time to let an anthropologist grow up in situ: one had to found ready-made (Fosbrooke 1960: v).

That anthropologist was Elizabeth Colson. As the overriding concern was with delivering an account of a threatened form of collective life to posterity, the resettlement itself was discussed only in the last chapter of Colson's book. At that early point, resettlement had not yet become an object of investigation in its own right. However, the magnitude of the changes induced by resettlement was apparent to Colson: the Lusitu area of Northern Rhodesia where the local population was to be resettled was an "alien country" for them (Colson 1960: 196). This first glimpse of the stranger or of estrangement was not pursued, however, and the more general significance of feeling in "alien country" was not problematized by later applied anthropologists.

Faced with the novelty and radical character of uprooting people to make way for development projects, anthropologists sought to convey the dramas of resettlement to their commissioners in direct, action-oriented terms. "Massive technological development hurts" wrote Colson (1971). In describing his career as the first staff-sociologist at the World Bank, Michael Cernea describes his experience as that of a "contact sport" (Cernea and Freidenberg 2007: 339).

Social scientists took a step further: they tried to unpack the problem of why resettlement caused by development projects has in most cases anti-development outcomes: the impoverishment of displaced populations. Their explanations were derived from their direct observations in the field. Together with Colson, with whom he had worked for many years, Thayer Scudder developed a four-stage framework to explain the behavior of resettlers. Following an explanatory logic that appears to

interpret the behavior of resettlers in synchronicity with the requirements and demands of planners, he describes how individuals pass from “the planning and recruitment stage” (1st) via the “adjustment and coping” (2nd) and “community and economic development” (3rd) stages, towards the “handing over and incorporation [or 4th] stage” (Scudder 2005, 2009). The framework is meant to make sense of successful cases of resettlement and thus assumes that the reconstruction following displacement will be the result of the collective efforts of resettlers (Scudder 2005). The four-stage framework seems, however, to face difficulties when dealing with the complexity of actual resettlement experiences (Scudder 2005: 43). The assumption appears to be that if the necessary inputs and opportunities are in place, resettlers will likely be able to simplify the challenges they have to deal with and achieve an improvement in living standards (Scudder 2005: 50). The four-stage framework appears to lead back to a situation which is, again, “normal” for the community that has been resettled: project-specific institutions hand over responsibilities to the second generation and to non-project related institutions and the children of resettlers achieve improved standards of living. This is what might be called a “continuitist” view that assumes, in a profound sense and with due caveats, that communities and ways of life can be brought back to what they were before or at least where they would have been without the development intervention.

The same overall logic applies to Michael Cernea’s well-known impoverishment risks and reconstruction (IRR) model (Cernea 1997). He throws a wider net at complexity and considers different processes affecting resettlers than can be found in Scudder’s model. For example, the IRR models considers the loss of land, of homes, of jobs, of access to common property resources, of food, of good health, the process of being marginalized in project decisions or at the resettlement sites and the disarticulation of social relationships (Cernea 1997). Yet, despite this comprehensiveness and in broad accord with Scudder, the approach to dealing with complexity assumes the reversibility of resettlement experiences: “the risk model [can] be read ‘in reverse’, turned on its head, and thus it maps the way for reconstructing the livelihoods of those displaced” (Cernea 2000: 3667). In this way, complexity is theoretically excluded from social scientific concerns with displacement.

While striving for practical relevance, it seems that both Scudder and Cernea’s models have had the unintended effect of ghettoizing research on resettlement by severing its connections to broader theoretical

perspectives. Dwivedi has forcefully argued with regard to the IRR model that what the model gains as a planning tool for decision makers – by drawing attention towards the risks that need to be addressed – comes at the price of being able to “ask only certain questions” (Dwivedi 2002: 718). In particular, the IRR model is virtually silent on the question of the subjective dimensions of risks and it also lacks a systemic aspect, by overlooking the structures of power that generate displacement (Dwivedi 2002). By ignoring the connections between the agents of development and the subjects of displacement, this model obscures the discontinuities produced by resettlement. More recent attempts at theorizing displacement, in connection with the ethics of development, aim to open up and thus de-ghettoize this area. Interestingly, however, they do so while still working in a continuityist vein.

The theoretical value of the ethics of responsible development (Gasper 2014) is that it broaches displacement problems in terms of broader frameworks of value. The argument starts with Dwivedi’s (2002) path-breaking distinction between two contrary orientations in research on displacement: managerial and movementist. According to this author:

At one end of the spectrum is an applied category of scholars who consider displacement to be an inevitable and unintended outcome of development, and who focus on its consequences. At the other end are action research scholars to whom displacement is a manifestation of a crisis in development; they focus on its causes (Dwivedi 2002: 711).

Dwivedi’s characterization of the two main currents is deemed path-breaking for, on the one hand, it makes explicit assumptions which have long gone unproblematized in research on displacement and, on the other, it helps connect resettlement research with broader debates in the social sciences, such as that between development anthropology and the anthropology of development (Escobar 1991, Edelman and Haugerud 2005). The empirical focus on what are the risks or responses of displacees to resettlement is set in contrast, through this distinction, to the problematization of what development is and through what sorts of processes it is accomplished. But while the distinction helps clarify what kinds of questions researchers animated by managerialism or social movements might ask, it does not aid in offering a constructive response to the issue of how to advance, theoretically, in thinking about development-induced displacement.

The ethics of development perspective seeks to move out of the polarization between the two perspectives. It posits a set of values that have received wide recognition among different actors involved in development – researchers, policy-makers or practitioners – and that are thus used as a unifying framework for further debates (Penz, Drydyk and Bose 2011). Underlying all these is a so-called trump value, which is the “value of non-maleficence”, understood as the minimization of harm and neglect (Penz, Drydyk and Bose 2011: 118). Inspired by the latter approach, Des Gasper (2014: 1) argues in favor of a “global language of human rights, including principles of recognition, accountability and participation”. Based on a case of displacement produced by mining in Peru, he advances a number of concepts that could help bring stakeholders with different interests, such as mining communities and mining companies, around the negotiation table: free, prior and informed consent, voluntary negotiation, intensive citizen participation, and finding ways of acceptable co-existence (Gasper 2014: 12). Both the values exposed by Penz et al. (2011) and the language of human rights articulated by Gasper (2012) seek to elevate discussions of resettlement to a normative level that is sufficiently abstract to allow the search for common ethical ground. This can be seen as a more sophisticated variant of the continuist perspective.

Discontinuity in displacement experiences and Simmel's stranger

In opposition to the ethics-based approaches, we start with the question whether the search for common ground, however much ethically justified, can provide a new understanding of the experiences of development-forced displacement. We posit that highlighting the differences, rather than smoothening them away, is a more promising way to think of the encounter between infrastructural mega-projects and local communities. In other words, we endorse a point of view that brings to light the *discontinuity* of experiences related to resettlement. The theoretical grounds for this can be found in an interpretation of Zygmunt Bauman's *Globalization*, in which “megaprojects [are seen as] part of a remarkably coherent story, the ‘Great War of Independence from Space’” (Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius and Rothengatter 2003: 2).

In analogy to Giddens' (1985) discontinuist reading of modern history, the assumption here is that there is a qualitative difference before and

after a displacement process and, more generally, before and after a development encounter. This perspective can be traced to both the more managerial and the radical-movementist approaches mentioned above. What we propose in addition to this perspective is a dialectic relationship of discontinuity that, in the case of displacement caused by development, we call the dialectic of estrangement.

In the managerial camp, the work of Ted Downing (1996) and Garcia-Downing (2009) comes closest to a “discontinuitist” position. With his concept of social geometry, Downing (1996: 36-41) shows how involuntary displacement disrupts multiple dimensions of the spatial-temporal order. More apposite for this discussion is the cyclical process proposed recently by Downing and Garcia-Downing (2009: 230), in which a community confronted by displacement moves from routine culture, through a “dissonant interval” towards a new routine culture². The new routine culture, reestablished after the perturbation produced by resettlement, is qualitatively different from the pre-displacement culture. Nor is it necessarily stable, as communities can plunge once again into dissonant experiences before re-establishing a new routine culture.

Although not easily subsumable under the discontinuitist positions, de Wet’s concern with complexity or what he call calls the “inherent complexity” of displacement and resettlement (de Wet 2004 as cited in Dear 2008: 40) articulates an increasing awareness that resettlement is not linear but rather open-ended (de Wet 2013). This suggests that, during resettlement, something profound is likely to change in such a way that the outcomes are not always predictable.

From a movementist perspective, discontinuitist positions have been vividly formulated by Arturo Escobar. He uses the concept of difference, which can take economic, ecological and cultural forms, to underscore what characterizes the struggle over natural resources in the Colombian Pacific (Escobar 2006). The sense that displacement creates momentous and irreversible change is shown by his argument that “modernity is essentially about displacement – conquering territories, uprooting peoples from place, restructuring spaces, such as creating plantations and urban sprawl or ghettos” (Escobar 2004). We subscribe to this view that modernity makes it possible to alter places and communities beyond recognition. However, to explore how conquering, uprooting, restructuring and creating actually take place we refresh our view with a concept that is not usually found in the toolkit of development scholars.

Simmel's essay entitled "The Stranger" was published in 1908 [1971]. How is the stranger a useful concept? In the skilled hands of his creator, the stranger is defined and interpreted in a way which makes it highly interesting for exploring what Escobar (1991) calls "development encounters". To the early twentieth century German sociologist, the stranger is a sociological form, which expresses both spatial and symbolic relationships among humans. The stranger can be interpreted (anthropologically) as being simultaneously near (in a spatial sense) and far (culturally distinct from its host community). He has settled in a place but, at the same time, "has not quite got over the freedom of coming and going" (Simmel 1971: 143), which draws attention to her transformability (ability to transform himself and others). The stranger stands inside the group but confronts it at the same time, through his otherness. Also, the stranger has no place in the pre-existing economic structure, therefore he often engages in trade, which "alone makes possible unlimited combinations" (Simmel 1971: 144). Trade also signifies mobility or the ability to "come incidentally into contact with every single element" (1971: 145, emphasis in original) of a place, but without being linked organically to any one of them. The stranger is also objective, unencumbered by "custom, piety or precedent" (Simmel 1971: 146). It is not difficult to see how strangeness defined in this way is part of virtually any development encounter, especially in those cases where the stranger introduces strangeness by means of a material form (dam, mine, canal). Looking at development projects from a stranger perspective might be a stimulating mental exercise –discovering perhaps similarities and differences between different kinds of strangers – but it does not help address the problem of discontinuity. For this reason, this paper deals with the following question: how does the arrival (or making) of the stranger explain the discontinuity in resettlement experiences and what are the consequences of this discontinuity?

To address this question one needs to transform the static characterization of Simmel's stranger into what may be called a dialectics of estrangement. In short, the assumption is that displacement and resettlement experiences are interpretable in terms of three successive moments: (I) the making of the stranger as developer or the "developer stranger"³; (II) the process of estrangement; (III) the birth of new strangers. The first moment indicates that from all the forms of strangers who have been discussed in the sociological literature (McLemore 1970 and Levine 1977), the protagonist of development encounters is singled out as a special kind of stranger, identified as the "developer". The second moment describes how the

arrival of a developer stranger is less innocuous than that of Simmel's generic stranger and this is due to the power of the stranger as developer to transform locals through a process called estrangement. The third moment captures the effects of this transformation, namely how the resettlers-turned-into-strangers can assume two possible forms, which are called the taming vs. the performativity of the stranger.

The dialectics of estrangement

Anthony Giddens identifies in the advent of modernity four institutional clusters: private property, surveillance, military violence and the transformation of the natural world. All of them represent sharp breaks with the past. The latter, which he identifies as the emergence of the created environment, is "quite distinct from anything occurring before" (Giddens 1985: 312). In the early industrializing societies of Western Europe, the commodification of land was intertwined with the development of the absolutist state (Giddens 1985: 148). In societies that industrialized later, such as those of the post-colonial regions and the emerging socialist societies after World War II, the development of productive processes involving land (agriculture and industry) was the task of the national rather than of the absolutist state. In post-war Romania, for example, the consolidation of the socialist state was linked, among others, to the creation of infrastructure in the backward areas of the country (Turnock 1970).

If regarded from the point of view of the backward areas, one can see the states undergoing industrialization as displaying a certain "wandering quality" as they seek the appropriate spatial locations for their modernizing projects. Wandering can thus be seen as movement in relation to any preexisting local communities, which have fixed locations. At this initial moment, there is still no stranger as the pure wanderer is, in Simmel's terms, "beyond being far or near" (1971: 144). It is only when it settles somewhere – in the vicinity or the midst of a human community – that the wandering state becomes a stranger. David Turton (2010) makes a similar observation when he writes that the dams and conservation areas established in the basin of the Omo river in Ethiopia extended the presence of the state in "spaces within its boundaries where its writ did not run [before]".

Simmel contends that the "fundamental fact" about the stranger is that "his position [within a spatial circle] is fundamentally affected by the fact that he does not belong in it initially and that he brings qualities

into it that are not, and cannot be, indigenous to it." This is directly applicable to infrastructure that aims to produce electricity, irrigation or improved agricultural outputs at the expense of "local people [who are] left displaced, disempowered and destitute." (Oliver-Smith 2009: 3). The peculiarities that a dam or similar project introduces into a local community are seen as deeply negative in the literature on forced displacement, but what is important from the perspective discussed here is the element of "strangeness" introduced into these communities. This strangeness is not the mere source of "socio-psych-cultural disruption", which concerns Downing and Garcia-Downing (2009: 225), but, we would argue, an ontological quality of the stranger.

The stranger is the synthesis of wandering "considered as a state of detachment from every given point in space" (Simmel 1971: 143) and attachment to a given point in space. The quality of being simultaneously detached from and attached to particular locales obviously applies to a variety of social forms (individuals, groups, institutions etc.), depending on how attachment and detachment are defined in each context. There is one instance, however, in which the simultaneous attachment and detachment appear as particularly salient: in the creation of development objects. Dams, mines, highways are physically attached to certain places but at the same time detached from them in the intents and purposes of their creators. Using Simmel's words in a metaphorical sense, they are not wanderers that "come today and go tomorrow" but potential wanderers, that "come today and stay tomorrow" (1971: 143). More importantly, for Simmel the stranger is the one who "although he has gone no further, has not quite got over the freedom of coming and going." In a first instance, going no further is associated with a condition that tends towards permanence, a fact which is obvious for any infrastructure project. From a second point of view, having not overcome the freedom of coming and going may suggest that the stranger is both present (through its objective creation) and absent (because the creator moves on). But absolute presence and absence are perhaps not the most fruitful ways to think about relationships with strangers. Simmel offers two relative concepts that are more suitable to the dialectical interpretation pursued here.

The stranger is characterized by the "union of closeness and remoteness: the distance within this relation indicates that one who is close by is remote, but his strangeness indicates that one who is remote is near" (Simmel 1971: 143). One may venture to say that there might be an inverse relationship between distance and strangeness: the closer the

distance, the *stranger* the non-indigenous features of the stranger appear to be. It may further be assumed that the making of the development stranger occurs over a succession of steps, which bring the stranger ever closer to its “host”. Each step is irreversible and highly consequential for the encounter between the stranger and the local group, and will be discussed in the remainder of this section. The second moment of the dialectic, which occurs temporally at the same time with the first, means that the stranger is at the same time an *estranger*. The resettlers become progressively estranged from their local social and ecological matrix, in a process that Giddens (1990) has called disembedding. Without having moved yet, they are rendered *out of place* in the project of the developer stranger. When the distance between the developer stranger and its host is reduced to zero, as it is bound to happen when the stranger gets so close that it displaces and evacuates the locals, something of a qualitative change – akin to the second law of dialectics – will be completed. The estranged hosts become themselves strangers and confront others – host communities but also the development stranger and even themselves – in the terms described by Simmel: attached but also wandering, close and remote, with enhanced capacities for “unlimited combinations”, displaying mobility and objectivity. This third moment completes what we call the dialectics of estrangement (see Figure 1).




Figure 1: A graphic depiction of the three moments of estrangement

Without aiming at an exegesis of Simmel's social philosophy, it seems safe to say that the three moments do not appear to do violence to his conception of the stranger as it is outlined in the essay (1971). In the remainder of the paper the three moments will be fleshed out in more detail, by pointing out what insights could be gained into involuntary resettlement experiences, beyond the dominant reading of these experiences in the literature. For the first moment we draw on Simmel and on James Scott's (1998) discussion of the state as developer stranger. The second moment is inspired by Giddens' (1990) discussion of disembedding as a peculiar feature of modernity. The third moment of the dialectic returns to Simmel but also draws more tentatively on an open-ended interpretation of modernity, in which the experiences of the new strangers span a continuum stretching between what might be called the taming of the stranger at one end, and the performativity of the stranger at the other.

(I) The making of the developer stranger

Many kinds of strangers have been discussed in the sociological literature since the publication of Simmel's essay. Dale McLemore (1970) reviews the works that have identified the stranger either with the "marginal man" or the newcomer. Donald Levine (1977) adds to these two types of strangers a distinction that is only implicit in Simmel, namely that between strangers as individuals and stranger communities. However, McLemore (1970: 93) opens the door to potentially "even broader contribution[s]" in the interpretation of the stranger. In this section we deal with the developer stranger. In addition to his characteristics as a universal stranger, it is argued here, he is also distinguished by the special features of the developer.

When a new coming stranger arrives, argues McLemore (1970: 87), "he is outside the system of social relationships and poses a set of problems for the existing order". The host group will likely be altered to include the newcomer, which suggests that the stranger is always a source of external change. The developer stranger is a special kind of stranger because when he arrives, he brings his own blueprint for change. In development projects that involve dams, Dwivedi (2006) identifies the blueprint approach as one in which infrastructure projects pass through defined and time-specific stages that comprise the project cycle. These stages correspond to specific modes of transformative simplifications undertaken by states aiming at

an administrative reordering of social and ecological relationships (Scott 1998). In the terminology used here, these steps describe the making of the developer stranger and the consequences of this process.

The blueprint itself is made possible by what Simmel calls the objectivity of the stranger and it is made necessary by the ideological commitments of states that assume the role of developer strangers. Objectivity “signifies the full activity of a mind working according to its own laws, under conditions that exclude accidental distortions and emphases” (Simmel 1971: 145-146). How does the stranger developer express the “full activity of a mind working according to its own laws”? In a remarkable interpretation of Goethe’s *Faust*, Marshall Berman outlines the grand scope of the developer stranger’s “mind”:

‘Fast in my mind, plan upon plan unfolds’ (Goethe). Suddenly the landscape around him metamorphoses into a site. He outlines great reclamation projects to harness the sea for human purposes; man-made harbors and canals that can move ships full of goods and men; dams for large scale irrigation [...] (Berman, 2010: 62).

The necessity of the development blueprint is unmistakable for the late industrializing states. The countries of the Eastern Bloc after World War II, especially the less industrialized ones, needed to catch up with the Soviet blueprint. Lenin’s earlier proclamation that “Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country” (Lenin 1920)⁴ might have resounded as an impervious necessity. Gail Kligman and Katherine Verdery (2011: 50) speak of the creation of copycat regimes throughout Eastern Europe, “in a process of technology transfer of almost unprecedented scope.” In the decree of the Romanian National Assembly (*Marea Adunare Națională*) for the expropriation of the properties located in the area of reservoir of the hydroelectric dam “V. I. Lenin - Bicăz” (in force since May 31, 1957), the construction of the dam was justified as “one of the great socialist constructions, being now built in our country, which is meant to constantly improve the living standard of working people in towns and villages” (MAN, 1957).

Development blueprints leave “little room for maneuver” (Dwivedi 2006: 12). This means that their translation on the ground requires multiple operations. The first such operation is the simplification and standardization of measurement (Scott 1998). The measurements that were in use in communities were unquestionably practical, interested

and historically specific, argues Scott (1998). Especially where the aim of the developer stranger was to find a common metric to compensate the inhabitants that it endeavored to relocate, it is quite likely that the attempt at simplification ignited resistance from the residents whose measurements of their own land were rooted in their practical knowledge of the land. The second operation is the achievement of “legible” landscape with which the state could – without understanding the actual use of land – develop its compensation rules:

In an agrarian setting, the administrative landscape is blanketed with a uniform grid of homogenous land, each parcel of which has a legal person as owner and hence taxpayer. How much easier it then becomes to assess such property and its owner on the basis of its acreage, its soil class, the crops it normally bears, and its assumed yield than to entangle the thicket of common property and mixed forms of tenure (Scott 1998: 36).

It is thus to be expected that rules were at variance with the local interests. If we follow Simmel, it should be possible to see that this process is far from innocuous. This is because the objectivity of the stranger is also defined as freedom: “this freedom that permits the stranger to experience and treat even his close relationships as from a bird’s eye view contains many dangerous possibilities” (Simmel 1971: 146). The stranger developer can thus be expected to be authoritarian as his “actions are not confined by custom, piety or precedent” (1971: 146). This claim is supported by the fact that in many development projects requiring involuntary resettlement, the developers frequently resorted to the use of force. This was also the case with the construction of the Bicaz dam, in which the national army was called upon to nominally “help” the resettlers break down their homes. There is, however, a second source of the stranger’s freedom which has, in turn, a different consequence.

“In the whole history of economic activity”, writes Simmel (1971: 144), “the stranger makes his appearance everywhere as the trader, and the trader makes his as a stranger”. How are development projects to be understood as traders? Dwivedi (2006) describes such projects as investments to create productive and tradable assets. Albert Hirschman provides an even more suggestive image: “development projects [...] are privileged particles of the development process” (1967: 1). They may be mere particles for the overall development plans of the state, but true behemoths for the communities in which they are located.

In any “closed economic group”, where “all economic positions have been occupied”, the trader appears as a supernumerary. It can only thrive if it engages in the “unlimited combinations” afforded by trade (Simmel 1971: 144). The trader is also no owner of land. This is an important observation since developers expropriate local communities not for ownership but for trade. Simmel’s characterization of land is also telling for the position of the development stranger in local space: “The stranger is by his very nature no owner of land – land not only in the physical sense but also metaphorically as a vital substance which is fixed, if not in space, than at least in an ideal position within the social environment” (1971: 144). The lack of land ownership corroborated with intermediary trade “gives the stranger the specific character of mobility” (Simmel 1971: 145). For the developer stranger, mobility means that its range of action is located in space rather than in a specific place. In turn, the places touched by the development stranger tend to become “phantasmagoric”. For Giddens (1990: 19), this means that the factors which structure the place are nothing inherently local, but rather distanced relations. For the making of the Bicaz dam, this process can be seen in the unprecedented welter of individuals – engineers, farmers, workers, political prisoners – that have seen themselves set in motion (or obstructed) by the developing Romanian state.

In sum, the making of the developer stranger suggests that there are different processes – measurement, regulation, compensation – that constitute the stranger as developer in a given community. There is nothing automatic about this process, as it is likely to encounter various shades of resistance. The point to underscore here is that the stranger always leaves an enduring mark on its host community.

(II) The process of estrangement

The making of the developer stranger discussed above and the process of estrangement appear as two sides of the same coin. By estrangement we mean the transformation of locals into potential strangers *before* they have actually moved from place. At this stage, before becoming strangers in Simmel’s sense, they undergo a process of estrangement. The steps taken by the developer stranger have the effect of turning them into estranged locals. When this process is completed, which means that the displacement has run its full course and those estranged have become strangers in their

own right, something interesting is likely to happen: the new strangers confront both the developer strangers and the new host communities with their own ways of being strange. They appear as simultaneously close and remote, mobile and economically intermediary, objective and ultimately free. This, however, is the third moment of the dialectic to be discussed in the next section.

Estrangement can be conceptualized using Giddens' notion of disembedding, which "mean[s] the 'lifting out' of social relations from local contexts of interaction and their restructuring across indefinite spans of time-space" (Giddens 1990: 21). One can assume that development projects create a quick form of disembedding, in which the familiar time and space reference of locals break down and are reconfigured as the developer stranger creates his development object, to which he subordinates her hosts. Giddens further distinguishes between two disembedding mechanisms, which he calls the creation of symbolic tokens (such as money) and the establishment of expert systems. For Giddens, both are generally implicated in disembedding, which is a source of discontinuity in the experience of modernity. In this discussion, the aim is to suggest a way in which money and the expert system may work to create a space in which the micro-responses of locals to the actions of the developer stranger bring a discontinuity in their experiences. They become estranged (separated) from their environments of daily practice under the weight of the developer stranger and his creation. This process is irreversible and represents for the locals a compressed form (because of its brevity) of experiencing the discontinuity of modernity.

For Giddens, expert systems are "systems of technical accomplishment or professional expertise that organize large areas of the material and social environments in which we live today" (1990: 27). Our aim is to find out how the construction of such an expert system, for example of a dam, unsettles the previous relationships of the locals in a way that makes the local time and space appear progressively removed from the habitual practices. In short, the aim is to see how the dam as expert system creates the separation of time and space for the locals. For example, as the reservoir behind the dam is gradually filled up, the topography of the valley becomes a function of time: spatial referents change as the lake encroaches on the pre-existing landscape. As disembedding is also linked with trust (Giddens 1990), locals are likely to redefine their trust relationships in ways which makes them more objective.

In the previous section, we have shown how Simmel equates the stranger with the trader. The developer stranger makes no exception. He aims to make money with her development project (dam) and offers money in exchange for the properties which will make the dam and reservoir possible. In the terms proposed here, money creates discontinuity in the time and space relationships in which the locals were involved. In his *Philosophy of Money*, Simmel describes the change as follows (Giddens 1990):

The power of money to bridge distances enables the owner and his possessions to exist so far apart that each of them may follow their own precepts to a greater extent than in the period when the owner and his possessions still stood in a direct mutual relationship, when every economic engagement was also a personal one (Simmel 1978: 333).

Even if money is a disembedding mechanism, its operation is not instantaneous. Before accepting the compensation, in other words, the locals have to find ways to extract their land and homes, tools and draft animals from the matrix in which their daily practice had situated them over the centuries. Exploring the micro-social processes through which this has happened enables an understanding of how estrangement – the setting into motion of local relationships of property before the locals were themselves set into motion via displacement - took place. It is worth inquiring how money, or the financial compensations made available by the developer stranger, have the effect of pushing locals in a cauldron not unlike the modern metropolis (Simmel, 1950[1902-1903]). Not more than a series of conjectures can be formulated in this paper, but these will form the basis for a more extended case study of the construction of the Bicaz dam as a dialectics of estrangement.

(III) The new strangers: between taming and performativity

So far the discussion has aimed to make sense of what happens when a powerful stranger – a stranger who is able to emplace his strangeness through material objects such as development objects – comes into a host community. This section will deal with the implications that this stranger perspective may have on conceptualizing resettlement after displacement. Our argument is that the first two moments of the dialectic,

the making of the stranger as developer and the subsequent estrangement of locals *while they are still* in their community will structure the third moment. The resettlers are thus no merely displaced locals but, we would argue, strangers who confront the development stranger and other host communities in a new way. Resettlers are thus expected to exercise their mobility (the synthesis of closeness and remoteness), the objectivity and freedom, their intermediary economic roles and abstract outlook to varying degrees. There is no predetermined relationship between the estrangement experienced in the community of origin and the subsequent quality of stranger. Indeed, it may be inferred that being a new stranger is a matter of performativity. This refers to the practices in which resettlers engage and which express to a greater or lesser extent the typical features of the stranger (those in Simmel's original formulation).

Recounting the theoretical distinction between continuity and discontinuity experiences of resettlement, the implication of the stranger approach is that resettlers have shed their previous characteristics as locals – bound by localized and contextual habits – and have acquired the potential for being someone else, namely wanderers who settle somewhere else but how have not really got over the freedom of coming and going. This should be a fundamental break in their trajectories as human beings who have been removed from the realm of immediate experiences and have been thrust into the welter of experiences “at a distance” to follow Giddens' interpretation. The extent to which they are in a position to embrace such experiences – or even capitalize on them – is an open question. The empirical exploration of possible trajectories of becoming strangers can flesh out the range of experiences in specific cases of displacement and resettlement. Preliminary research in the area of the Bicaz dam revealed three main directions of movement out of the reservoir area. The first was the relocation to higher elevations within the same valley (the “up-hill” resettlers). The second was the relocation to lowland agricultural areas (“the plains” resettlers), while the third involved movement to nearby urban centers (“the city” resettlers). Each of these choices expresses a specific configuration of stranger characteristics, but these will be fleshed out in a larger paper.

Another intriguing possibility of the perspective sketched here is to rethink the existing research on involuntary displacement and resettlement. Two vantage points seem to warrant consideration, namely the problem of dealing with complexity and the question of ethics in development-induced displacement.

Anthropologists and sociologists have often been at pains to make sense of the complexities involved in practical interventions meant to alleviate the distress and impoverishment of displaced populations. For example, in the introduction to Scudder's study on new land settlements, Cernea claims that "agricultural development through new land settlement is socially one of the most complex development interventions." (1985: 119, as cited in Scudder 2005: 49). A few years later, Cernea (1991: 145, as cited in Scudder 2005: 49) wrote that "*involuntary* population displacement has turned out to be a process even more complex and painful." De Wet (2004) speaks of complexity in resettlement that "arises from the interrelatedness of issues of different orders: cultural, social, environmental, economic, institutional and political issues – all of which is taking place in the context of imposed spatial change" (as cited in Dear 2008: 41). Finally, Scudder (2005: 49) cites Colson who wrote in the margins of an early draft of his chapter: "how many negative cases to you need to establish futility?", thus suggesting a feeling of helplessness due to the inability of planned resettlements to achieve their intended outcomes.

From the perspective advanced here, one could argue that looking only at the resettlers as the problem to be solved, their situation appears to be, indeed, puzzling: few schemes designed to resettle them "successfully" seem to be working. An alternative approach can be suggested. The first step is to recognize that the agents of development (states or corporations) are ontologically distinct from local populations. According to Simmel, the stranger has its own position (near and far), its own specialization (trade), its own outlook (objectivity), all of which sets it in contrast to the local communities in which he comes. Simmel does not refer to the possibility that the stranger might somehow "go native" and take the standpoint of the local. If that would be possible, one would suspect that the complexities of stranger – local interactions would "naturally" dissolve. The fact that they persist prompt us to seek an explanation in a different direction. The second step is therefore to maintain Simmel's (implicit) view that a stranger always remains a stranger. Moreover, a developer stranger is a stranger who not only does not move on, but uses the host community for her development blueprints. This estranges the locals by altering their spatial and temporal coordinates through disembedding mechanisms (money and expert systems). At the end of this process, the developer stranger confronts a new being, different from the one encountered at first: a category of strangers of their own making.

The failure to successfully resettle the displacees might therefore stem from the fact that whom project authorities (the developer stranger) seek to resettle are not pre-modern (embedded) locals anymore, but resettlers who have become much more mobile, objective, free and abstract than before. Moreover, they are likely to perform their new roles as strangers in highly variable ways. Seeking one-size-fits-all frameworks to “successful resettlement” might be ultimately futile if the performativity of stranger roles is not grasped for a variety of particular cases.

Finally, the ethical implication to this view is that it appears questionable to apply an ethical framework that emphasizes the preservation of the status quo – which is “to identify and avoid wrong-doing” (Penz, Drydyk and Bose 2011: 8) – to a group that has experienced a discontinuity in the existential referents (space and time) of its life experience. Perhaps the relevant ethical question is not simply how to smoothen (“make more friendly”) the development process. If one assumes that the stranger developer has irredeemably altered its host communities, the relevant task might be to seek ways to enhance or deepen the stranger experience, rather than tame it. Then, the question is not one of economic and cultural re-establishment, but perhaps of fostering a superior condition of the stranger that we may call cosmopolitanism or the sense of being anywhere at home. The implications of this view certainly need to be worked out in more detail than is possible here.

Concluding remarks and future research

In a general sense, this paper asks whether modernity, or certain features of it, can engender reactions on the part of rural (non-modern) communities that are neither forms of resistance nor instances of wholesale destruction. The assumption is that the state who assumes the role of developer brings into its host communities characteristics which are not simply alien to local ways of life, but rather strange. The stranger is, however, a relationship. The implication is that strangers and locals, developers and those to be developed, displacers and displacees constitute each other as development projects unfold. Perhaps even more ambitiously, the paper suggests that the qualities of the stranger can be somehow transferred – via estrangement – to locals who thus become new strangers. There is no predetermined process through which one becomes a stranger, but rather a matter of agency and performativity.

The value of this idea depends, to a great extent, on how closely it can guide empirical research on resettlement. If the assumptions underpinning the dialectics of estrangement are to generate new knowledge, one needs to be able to reconstruct the three moments of estrangement in a historically and interpretatively convincing way.

At the same time, the proposed approach opens a wide field of possible empirically-based interpretations. The resettlement caused by the Bicaz dam in the Eastern Carpathians could profitably be used as a case in which to explore – over a several-year project – how the state appeared as a stranger, how locals were estranged in this process and whether, indeed, the resettlers were more than simple victims. Estrangement in Bicaz can thus be explored as a specific spatial and social context for development encounters under modernity. This would require extended archival research (for the first moment of the dialectic), the collection of life histories as well as historical and artistic accounts of estrangement (for the second moment) and comparative research among resettlers and non-resettlers (for the third moment).

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NOTES

- ¹ The essay is called classical because it has inspired numerous studies, especially within the Chicago School of Sociology (e.g. Park and Burgess 1921).
- ² Routine culture refers to the sets of rules and constructs through which individuals respond to the primary questions (“who are we? where are we?” etc.) In contrast, dissonant culture is a “temporary reordering of space, time, relationships, norms [etc.]” (Downing and Garcia-Downing 2009: 227, 230).
- ³ The wording is chosen in analogy to the literature that has used the concept of stranger in phrases such as the “Jewish stranger”, the “Polish stranger” or the “Black stranger”.
- ⁴ Thanks are due to Ionuț Anghel for suggesting this idea and reference.

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ONE, TWO, THREE... A DISCUSSION ON THE GENERATION OF NUMBERS IN PLATO'S *PARMENIDES*

Abstract

One of the questions regarding the *Parmenides* is whether Plato was committed to any of the arguments developed in the second part of the dialogue. This paper argues for considering at least one of the arguments from the second part of the *Parmenides*, namely the argument of the generation of numbers, as being platonically genuine. I argue that the argument at 142b-144b, which discusses the generation of numbers, is not deployed for the sake of dialectical argumentation alone, but it rather demonstrates key platonic features, such as the use of the greatest kinds and the generation principle. The connection between the argument for the generation of numbers and Plato's philosophy of mathematics is strengthened by the exploration of a possible reference in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* A6. Taken as a genuine platonic theory, the argument could have significant impact on how we understand Plato's philosophy of mathematics in particular, and the ontology of the late dialogues in general – that numbers can be reduced to more basic entities, i.e the greatest kinds, in a way similar to the role the greatest kinds are assigned in the *Sophist*.

Keywords: Plato, the *Parmenides*, Aristotle, mathematics, generation of numbers, *one*, *two*, *three*, multiplication, *one*, *being*, *difference*, the greatest kinds, even, odd

This paper considers an aspect of Plato's view on numbers which is almost unexplored by scholars, namely the argument for the generation of numbers from the *Parmenides* 142b-144b. In the first Section, I identify Aristotle's references to Plato's philosophy of mathematics in an attempt to isolate possible interpretations of the argument for the generation of numbers. I also provide an outline of the argument for the generation of

numbers by reconstructing step by step the progression of thought as found in the *Parmenides* 142b5-143a2 and 143a4-144a5. Section Two develops possible links between Aristotle's *Metaphysics* A6 and the *Parmenides*, through an exploration of current scholarship. Finally, in Section Three I return to the argument for the generation of numbers providing an analysis of the key features of its construction. In the light of this reading I stress the need for a reevaluation of the argument for the generation of numbers.

Section One - Overview of Aristotle's Testimonies

In several dialogues, Plato showed an intense interest in the definitions, elements of mathematics, and philosophy of mathematics, he dealt with numbers, arithmetic, and geometry, and paid a vivid attention to mathematical methods.¹ But how exactly one should understand the ontology of numbers and the place of mathematics in his philosophy, or if Plato contributed to the development of mathematics on his own remains a rather ambiguous tasks for both ancient philosophers (e.g. Aristotle) and modern readers.² The dialogues do not give us a coherent view on how Plato understood the ontology of mathematical objects, but provide us with rich references to mathematics. Accordingly, the dialogues testify Aristotle's claims that Plato was immersed in the problematic ontology of mathematical objects. However, several of Aristotle's testimonies regarding Plato's philosophy of mathematics are in many regards conflicting and confusing, and complicate substantially any attempt at making sense of how Plato understood the ontology of mathematical objects. Aristotle attributed at least seven partly contradictory views to Plato. Accordingly, for Plato:

- a) numbers are forms (*Met.* 1073a17-22, 1090a16-17),
- b) numbers are intermediary objects between forms and physical particulars (*Met.* 987b14-17, 1028b19-21, 1059b5-14, etc.),
- c) individual instances exist by participation to numbers (*Met.* 987b12),
- d) numbers are the product of the one and the dyad (*Met.* 987b22-35, 1092a23-24),
- e) numbers are generated out of the dyad, except those which are prime (*Met.* 987b23-988a1)
- f) form numbers are only up to ten (*Phys.* 206b33, *Met.* 1084a10, 25),
- g) forms are numbers (*Met.* 991b9, 1081a12, 1083a-1084a, *De Anima* 404b24-25).

All these partially conflicting and competitive testimonies point out that Plato's philosophy of mathematics was from the very beginning a controversial issue. Plato's dialogues give straight support for some of the Aristotelian claims, especially for (a), (b), (c). The number-form theory (a) could fit the views from the *Phaedo* (101b9-c9, 103-106), while the assessment that numbers are intermediaries between forms and things (b) could find some grounds in the *Republic* (509d-511a), depending on how one interprets the divided line (epistemologically or ontologically), and in the *Philebus* (56c-59d). The presumption that things exist by participation to numbers (c) could be traced in the *Timaeus*, where, unlike any of the Aristotelian conceptions, physics and mathematics are related. *Timaeus* exhibits this theory, since mathematics is an essential feature of the physical world, although it is not evident how the mathematical objects from the *Timaeus* can be linked with (a) and (b). However, in the *Timaeus*, Plato does not construct the physical particulars through numbers, but through geometrical objects. Physical bodies are composed of particular geometrical entities. At their turn the structure of these entities is determined by two types of right-angled triangles: isosceles ($45^\circ/45^\circ/90^\circ$) or scalene, ($30^\circ/60^\circ/90^\circ$). Thus the triangles are the ultimate "atoms" of the matter.

The supposition that Plato reduced numbers to one and the indefinite dyad (d) is excessively – and almost exclusively – defended by the Tübingen School as the real system of Plato, and it relies minimally on platonic texts, and mainly on Aristotle's and post-Aristotelian testimonies. That Plato had thought of form-numbers only up to ten (f) and that forms are numbers (g) seems to be a peculiarity of Aristotle's interpretation, and it completely lacks any reference in platonic dialogues.

Despite all these possibilities, the main scholarly controversy in the field is almost exclusively on a) versus b) – whether, according to Aristotle, Plato understood mathematical objects as forms³ (P. Shorey⁴ and H. Cherniss,⁵ or, more recently, P. Pritchard,⁶ or W. Tait⁷) or as intermediaries between forms and things (A. Wedberg,⁸ or M. Burnyeat⁹). The grounds for these two main conflicting views on Plato's understanding of mathematical objects rely heavily on Aristotle's testimonies, which most favored the intermediary position. However, the two views seem to be irreconcilable, and scholars argue for one or the other position; one must add that scholars who support a) or b) assume that Plato had a fixed theory, of the intermediary or of the number-forms, which basically is unchanged from the *Phaedo* and the *Republic* to the later dialogues.

The statement e) in which Aristotle criticizes Plato that he does not generate prime numbers, even if the rest are generated, is very precise and seems to be alien to the dialogues and to the conventional way of seeing Plato as a Platonist regarding numbers. If there is a place in the Platonic corpus where one should look for something that could resemble Aristotle's testimony, it is in the second part of the *Parmenides* (142b-144b), where a generative process for obtaining numbers is presented, an argument which, with few exceptions, is ignored by scholarship. The whole argument, divided in two parts (142b5-143a2, and 143a4-144a5), aims to prove that the *one is multiple*, and, accordingly, there is a *generation of numbers*.

An outline of the argument of the generation of numbers as developed in the *Parmenides* 142b-144b is offered below:

(142b1,5) Parmenides returns to the hypothesis from the beginning (ἐξ ἀρχῆς):

(142b) "if one is, can it *be*, but not partake of being?"

I. (142b-c) [if one is, is both one and being]

1. If the/a one *is*,
2. then the one partakes (μετέχειν) of being,
3. the one is not the same as being (as being of the one),
4. „is” signifies something other than “one,”
- 5.> *one partakes of being*.

II. (142d-143a)

1. the one is a whole, being and one are its parts,
2. oneness is not absent from the being(-ness) part, and being(-ness) is not absent from the oneness part;
3. each of the two parts possesses oneness and being, the part is composed of at least two parts, endlessly, since oneness always possesses being and being always possesses oneness.
4. (by necessity) it always comes to be two, it is never one,
- 5.> *the one is infinitely many (unlimited and multitude)*.

III. (143a-b) [the introduction of difference]

1. *one* is not *being*.
2. *one* has a share in *being*.
3. therefore one and *its* being are *different*.

4. *one is not different from being in virtue of its oneness.*
5. *being is not different from one in virtue of being itself.*
6. > therefore the difference of one and being is due to difference.
6. > therefore there is difference and it is distinct from one and being.

IV. (143c-144b) [The argument from one admitting all numbers, from “member of a pair” and “two,” Plato constructs the whole number system]

7. (143c3) if we have three distinct entities we can pick out pairs (τινε)¹⁰ (say being and difference, or being and unity, or unity and difference).

8. (143c4) a pair is rightly called ‘both’¹¹ (ἀμφοτέρω) [“x”, “y” = “both (x,y)”].

9. (143d2) what is called both is two (δύο) [a “pair” is identified as a set with two members corresponding to the cardinal number two].

10. (143d2-3, 4-5) each of the two is one (δύο ἦτον > ἓν εἶναι).

11. (143d7) one added to any sort of pair is three (τρία γίγνεται) [a set off three members corresponding to the cardinal number three].

(if two & three, then all the numbers)

12. (143d8-9) three is odd (Τρία... περιττὰ), and two even (δύο ἄρτια),

13. (143d9-e2) if there are two (δυοῖν), there must be twice (δις), since two is twice one (τῷ τε δύο τὸ δις ἓν)

14. (143e1-2) if three (τριῶν), also thrice (τρίς), since three is thrice one (τῷ τρία τὸ τρίς ἓν).

15. (143e3) from 13. there must be “twice two” (δύο δις).

16. (143e3) from 14. there must be “thrice three” (τρία τρίς).

17. (143e5) from 13) & 14) there must be twice three (τρία δις) and thrice two (δύο τρίς)

18. (143e7) there *will* be even times even (Ἄρτιά ἄρτιάκις), odd times odd (περιττὰ περιττάκις), odd times even (ἄρτια περιττάκις), and even times odd (περιττὰ ἄρτιάκις).

19. (144a3) “and if it is so, do you think there is any number left that does not necessarily exist?”

20. (144a4) if one is, there must also be number (Εἰ ἄρα ἔστιν ἓν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἀριθμὸν εἶναι).

The above can be synthetized as follows:

a. In the first part of the argument (142b5-143a2), Parmenides argues, and his opponent, Aristotle¹², accepts, that if one *is*, it means that one *has*

being, therefore *one* and *being* are *two* distinct entities; and the *is*-ness of *one* can be separated. The parts of one - i.e. *one* and *being* - are at their turn *one* and *being* as well, and so on, *ad infinitum*. The division by two is in the following way:

One Being

One Being; One Being

One Being; One Being; One Being; One Being;

δύ' ἀεὶ γιγνόμενον μηδέποτε ἓν εἶναι

(always becomes two and never one, 143.a.1)

○ B - 2

○ B + ○ B - 4

○ B; ○ B + ○ B; ○ B - 8

○ B; ○ B; ○ B; ○ B + ○ B; ○ B; ○ B; ○ B - 16

○ B; ○ B; ○ B; ○ B; ○ B; ○ B; ○ B; ○ B +

○ B; ○ B; ○ B; ○ B; ○ B; ○ B; ○ B; ○ B - 32

It is unclear whether one should take the division of *one* into two entities as a proper division (as the word itself indicates) or as a progressive multiplication. The multiplication/division implies either:¹³

a) the same number series of multiples of two: 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, etc.

b) divisions by two: $\frac{1}{2}$, $\frac{1}{4}$, $\frac{1}{8}$, $\frac{1}{16}$, etc.

Whether it is a principle of division or of multiplication (or both, as in the cellular division), one can see that the ontological power of division of *one* into *one* and *being* produces only powers of duality.

b. The second part of the argument (143a4-144a5) restates the same division of one, this time introducing, alongside one and being, *difference* – as *the* principle of differentiation between one and being. Thus one is not different from being because of its oneness (of being one), nor because of its being (of being being), but the difference between them is by virtue of difference and otherness (τῷ ἑτέρῳ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ ἕτερα ἀλλήλων, 143b7). Next, the argument switches to the issue of picking up pairs (being and difference, or being and unity, or unity and difference), and concludes that one added to any sort of pair is three. And from this: (143e7) there will be even times even (Ἄρτιά ἄρτιάκις), odd times odd (περιττὰ περιττάκις), odd

times even (ἄρτια περιττάκις), and even times odd (περιττὰ ἄρτιάκις); thus all the numbers (144a4). It is argued that all numbers are generated from these three entities through a necessary process of multiplication. Thus, contrary to what one would expect, namely to derive numbers through addition, Plato used multiplication instead. The rest of the numbers after two and three are products: 2×2 , 3×3 , 2×3 , and so on. The multiplication process leaves out prime numbers (144a4).

Considering Plato's conception on mathematical objects, that numbers are either intermediates or forms, this argument raises several questions. A central one for platonic scholarship is whether Aristotle refers precisely to this argument when he criticizes Plato's generation of numbers.

Section Two - Aristotle and the *Parmenides*

Aristotle claims on several occasions that for Plato numbers are generated, but it is only in one place that he explicitly insists that Plato's process of generation leaves out prime numbers. In *Metaphysics* A6 (987b29-988a1), Aristotle states about Plato:

His divergence from the Pythagoreans in making the One and the numbers separate from things, and his introduction of the Forms, were due to his inquiries in the region of definitory formulae (for the earlier thinkers had no tincture of dialectic), and his making the other entity besides the One a dyad was due to the belief that the numbers, except those which were prime, could be neatly produced out of the dyad as out of a plastic material.¹⁴

The passage, together with the whole chapter A6, is famously problematic. In A6, Aristotle associates quite naturally Plato's philosophy with that of the Pythagoreans¹⁵ showing at the same time where Plato's philosophy differs from that of the Pythagoreans. An obvious idea which occurs from Aristotle's confident testimony is that, as with the Pythagoreans, a central point in Plato's philosophy was to give an account on numbers. At the first view, the generation of numbers from the *Parmenides*¹⁶ cannot be the argument Aristotle had in mind, since, one may argue, "the generation of numbers does not seem to have been a concern of Plato."¹⁷ Furthermore, Aristotle claims that for Plato numbers "could be neatly produced out of the *dyad* as out of some plastic material", but the *dyad* is apparently missing from the *Parmenides*. David Ross thinks

that “the *Parmenides* does not help us, for there is no question there of the indefinite dyad.”¹⁸ Also, in a note to his translation of the *Metaphysics*, he claims that in the *Parmenides* “primes are not there excepted” and “nothing in the works of Plato corresponds exactly to what Aristotle says here.”¹⁹ However Ross does not say more about why he thinks that primes are not missing from the *Parmenides*’ generative process. The claim is quite surprising, and Ross does not provide any further clues. The clue is given only in his edition to the Greek text: “the numbers, including 2, are produced by the ordinary processes of addition and multiplication from 1.”²⁰ However, for Ross, Aristotle’s account in A 6 “is not quite accurate” since in N 1091a9-12 “it is only 2 and its powers that could be neatly produced out of the 1 and the indefinite dyad.”²¹ Indeed, despite of what Aristotle claims in A6, at N3 1091a10 he remarks that Platonists “cannot in any way generate numbers other than those got from 1 by doubling”,²² consequently the dyad generates multiples of two²³ (powers of two), a series of 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, etc.

Ross’ observation that in the *Parmenides* “there is no question... of the indefinite dyad” is too easily assumed since the first part of the argument generates a series of dualities, even if numbers are not explicitly mentioned. Julia Annas argues for the contrary: the specification of the *Parmenides* argument at 142b5-143a2 “resembles the working of the indefinite two”, while at 143a4-144a5 “indicates a process which is reminiscent of the way one works as a principle.”²⁴ Thus Annas considers that one could read and appropriate Aristotle’s remark on Plato’s dyad (not only the instance from A6, but also those from M and N) in the light of the *Parmenides* 142b-144b. According to A. E. Taylor, to whose opinion I submit, it is this very argument from the *Parmenides* that Aristotle had in mind in his “perversion of Plato’s theory of numbers” with the one and ‘indeterminate Duality’.²⁵ If Aristotle had referred to the *Parmenides* this would prove mainly that the argument on generation of numbers argument was an issue which Plato considered as an actual possibility, and we should consider it accordingly.

Section Three – Analysis of the argument of the generation of numbers

The validity of the argument was questioned by Malcolm Schofield, who pointed out its fallacious inferences.²⁶ For the purpose of this paper

the question of the validity of the argument is of secondary importance since I don't aim to discuss if Plato's argumentation is sound, but I am considering the possible intentions, and philosophical conjectures and inferences that can be drawn thereupon.

3.1 - The Origin of the Number Two

In addition to the example of cellular division of the pair one-being into identical cells of the same type (142d-143a), several nuances of duality are used in the second stage of the argument. It is specified that if we have three distinct entities we can pick out pairs (for example, being and difference, or being and unity, or unity and difference). A pair is rightly called 'both' (ἀμφοτέρω) ["x", "y" = "both (x, y)"], and what is called both is two (δύο). Plato takes δύο (which matches the set with two members and the cardinal number two²⁷) as a consequence and derivation of ἄμφο. Accordingly the duality of ἄμφο resists to a reduction to the ordinal or cardinal feature of the number two, and naturally the cardinality of δύο is posterior to the *pair* relation of ἀμφοτέρω.

This is a very peculiar method of inferring that there is a set with two members. One can assume a conceptual distinctiveness of *duality* because there are many pairs which are not countable, and are a *unity* in themselves; for this type of pair it is difficult to define which one is the first in an ordinal way, as in the instance of two eyes, two arms, two legs, two ears – the most common case of dual numeral in the ancient Greek language. Two eyes are a pair, since one cannot decide which of the eyes comes first when counting. In this case, nobody would actually count the two eyes; their quantification is almost *a priori*. The parity of the two eyes is a given; it is a duality, and counting them individually is merely a process of division; its number, as a pair, is prior to the counting of two units. One must add that the one-being pair is not quite like the pair of two eyes, ears, etc. since we don't have a pair of identical things, but a pair of two different entities: one and being. Nevertheless, this ontological pair relation is more powerful than the pair relation of similar and identical things, which can be conceived independently of each other.

Picking up pairs is a certain mathematical operation. But how can one understand it? Is it a mental operation? Is it a metaphysical principle? A linguistic determination given by the dual of the Greek language? Plato's aim to emphasize the priority of ἄμφο compared to that of δύο, if they are taken as dyad and two, could be behind Aristotle's critique against

the theory that the dyad is prior to number two, as it is to be found in *Metaphysics* A9. Here Aristotle develops an argument in which he emphasizes that it is actually impossible to assume that the cardinality of two is posterior to that of the dyad, as Plato thinks. According to Aristotle: “in general the arguments for the Forms destroy the things for whose existence we are more anxious than for the existence of the Ideas; for *it follows that not the dyad but number is first* (my emphasis), i.e. that the relative is prior to the absolute” (990b18-20). The tension is between the indefinite dyad and the forms, which stand here for numbers (number-forms). Aristotle’s argument is as follows:

- i) the dyad is prior to the forms (of numbers);
- ii) the form number 2 is posterior to the dyad;
- iii) but the dyad already contains the cardinality of two;
- iiii) therefore a contradiction.

In spite of the coherence of the argument, it is difficult to think that Plato would have accepted proposition iii) – to have the indefinite dyad as an instance of δύο.²⁸ If Aristotle’s counterargument aimed the *Parmenides* (as Taylor and Annas assumes), it was not a strong argument, since in the *Parmenides* the cardinality of two is obtained with difficulty at a later stage of the argument.

Plato’s insistence on picking up a certain pair (τινε) which “is correctly called ‘both’”²⁹ (ὁρθῶς ἔχει καλεῖσθαι ἀμφοτέρῳ) before saying that they are two shows us that he didn’t consider obtaining δύο as a simple and univocal procedure (ex. 1+1). The procedure of obtaining *two* is the following: we take a τινε (a pair of two eyes, two legs etc.) that we divide into each member (e.g. ἐκάτερος, which will be the opposite of ἀμφοτέρος), and thus we have independent members from which we can have *two*. Thus the *pair relation* comes first, and after that their numerosity, namely that there are two things. The *twoness* of the *one* and *being* is an instance of ἀμφοτέρῳ (*duality*), and not of the cardinality of δύο (number *two*), in the sense that the duality refers to pairs, while two itself refers to only any two things.³⁰ Ross is right in saying that: “Aristotle is not quite fair in assuming that the indefinite dyad is an ordinary member of the class of 2’s”.³¹ The cardinality of the dyad is only an Aristotelian reading, and a sophism.³²

Plato’s elaborated process for obtaining *two* is quite complicated and, to some extent, it might seem gratuitous. There should be a reason why such a waste of concepts around duality, which is not obvious from the

Parmenides alone. Plato could have been also aware of the kind of critique later formulated by Aristotle, so he constructed such a detour argument. The derivation of two from pairs goes straight against *Metaphysics* A9, 990b18-20. *Two is not obtained by the addition of one to one; rather, each member of two is one.* Thus, the reason for which Plato does not derivate cardinal number two directly from *counting* two entities (as one and being, or being and difference), but from a *pair* could have been to avoid the kind of critique that Aristotle later had in mind.

3.2 - The Origin of the Number Three

Contrary to Aristotle's assertion, the argument from the *Parmenides* doesn't stop at δύο, *one* is obtained (ἐν εἶναι) from two (δύο ἦτον), which now stands as a unity for calculations, which is used only once properly (143d7) for generating a set with three members (τρία γίγνεται). Thus the unity for calculations (which is not number one) is obtained via δύο, and not from the beginning, from initial ἐν. This is another peculiar procedure since *one* was already mentioned and used at the start of the argument (142b-c). It could be that Plato thinks that *one* cannot be *one* at all in the beginning ($A = \sim A$) as a unity for calculation, "since it always proves to be two, it must never be one" (143a). *One* cannot exist as a unitary entity, but as a member of the one-being pair. Instead, the first hypothesis (137c–142a) analyses *one* by itself, *one* which is *one* ($A = A$).

The new *one* (which is obtained after *two*!) would be enough for generating numbers, like $1+1+1\dots$ and so on. Yet Plato does not follow what would be for us the obvious way; but offers a surprise. Even if he starts with three entities - "difference is not the same as oneness or being" (143b6-7) referring thus to three entities -, he later develops a numerosity with three members, thus the cardinal three is obtained by the addition of a unity to any pair (143d7). Why was it necessary, in order to obtain three, of such a complex turn (stressing the *one* which is added to any pair)? Is the way of obtaining three from $2+1$ and not from $1+1+1$ a metaphysical necessity? Are not the first three entities (one, being, and difference) enough for obtaining number three or threeness? One can venture that obtaining number three only from counting one, being and difference would not emphasize the oddness as it does $2+1$ (as part of formula $2k+1$).

At *Phaedo*, 105c, Plato explicitly maintains that oneness is the *sine qua non* condition for an odd number to be odd: "if asked the presence of what in a number makes it odd, I will not say oddness but oneness." Three

is the first odd number, if we exclude one as being odd – a controversial issue for ancient mathematicians. The first remark that Plato makes, after generating three, is to say that “three is odd.” In the economy of the multiplicative generation, compared with the rest of the numbers, which are generated by multiplication, threeness is a *product of addition* of one to two. Only this number is obtained by addition, or for this number the process of adding 1 is emphasized, since it is unclear if addition is used or could be used for the rest of the numbers.

3.3 - Multiplication *versus* addition operations

Contrary to what one would expect, namely to derive numbers through addition, Plato used multiplication instead. The rest of the numbers after two and three are products of multiplication: 2×2 , 3×3 , 2×3 , and so on (even if their products are not called numbers, it is obvious that it is about numbers as results of these products). The first occurrence of the term number is in the conclusion: “Then if that is so, do you think there is any number that need not be?” - “In no way at all.” - “Therefore, if one is, there must also be number” (144a4-5). Plato starts with three entities – *one*, *being*, and *difference* – and he infers that from them one can have all the numbers. There could be more entities, as for example, *motion* and *rest*, but only three entities are the necessary ingredients to have all the numbers. It is a question if *one*, *being* and *difference* are the entities for obtaining numerosity, or there could be any three entities. I am inclined to think that they have an ontological priority similar to that of the composition and the generation of the world soul (*Timaeus* 34c-35b) where same, being, and difference are the basic ingredients. Having been given the three ingredients of the *Parmenides*, the numbers two and three come –even if in an apparently complicated manner – as a natural consequence, and the multiplicity evolves from them, since the rest of the numbers are expressions of the first two and three. Probably that Plato thinks that the multiplication operation is inherent to generation of two and three (which stay as proto-numbers), and implicitly of their correlatives - evenness and oddness, since Plato consider that if there are two, there must be twice, since two is twice one, and if three, also thrice, since three is thrice one.³³

The shortcoming of obtaining numbers only through multiplication is that primes remain unreached, since they are not multiplies of two or of three.³⁴ Thus through multiplication alone one cannot obtain the complete

number series; nevertheless at the end of the argument it is claimed the opposite. Why did Plato put so much explicit emphasis on multiplication, and omitted addition? We usually define number series through addition, as $n+1$. Was this not the case for Plato too? It seems to be counterintuitive to generate numbers through multiplication and modern theories of numbers and philosophy of mathematics provide no correspondent at all.

A ground for leaving addition aside may be that multiplication provides a better understanding of numerosity since each number can be reduced to (prime) factors, and it is easier to reduce numbers to basic factors of 2 and 3 than to 1 (e.g. $6=1+1+1+1+1+1$ versus, *simpliciter*, $6=3 \times 2$ or 2×3). Only in this way the primary even and primary odd are proven necessary for number series. Each number, except the primes, is reduced to factorial operation, of the first even and first odd number. The priority of evenness and oddness is not alien to *Phaedo*, where alongside good itself of just itself, even itself and odd itself are given as examples of forms.

But what are the odd and even? Are these qualities? Do they behave like forms? The classification of numbers into even and odd is an important feature of Plato's generation of numbers, and the relation between *three* and *odd*, and *two* and *even* could be analogous to that between *fire* and *hot*.³⁵ Any definition they may be given, one can see that through the identification or classification of the odd and even, one can spot subsequently all the numbers.³⁶ One of Plato's aims within the argument is to arrive at the first odd and even numbers, and thus to proceed to the generation, consistent to his commitment (as in the *Republic* VII 524d, *Theaetetus* 198a, *Gorgias* 453e) that the knowledge of numbers is the knowledge of odd and even.

For Plato, and for some Pythagoreans, the even and odd are not proprieties of numbers, but rather numbers are proprieties and derivations of even and odd. Such a classification is natural in Greek mathematics, and, indeed, as Thomas Heath noticed, "Euclid's classification does not go much beyond this."³⁷ Does Plato think that through the prediction that there will be even times even, odd times odd, odd times even, and even times odd his procedure is exhaustive and the primes are somehow generated too? Here are some hypotheses: The addition is used together with the multiplication process, and thus 5 could be case of $4+1$, similar to that of $3=2+1$; or, if we could take 1 as an odd number, primes could be a case of odd times odd, and thus 5 would be 5×1 ; or primes could be a subgroup of the odd group. Another option, to which Aristotle submits, is that primes remain ungenerated and Plato thought about them as being

ungenerated since one cannot reduce them to a factorial procedure, and primes would be the real form-numbers. All these hypotheses have their limits, and it's not my purpose to discuss them in this paper. I would mention only that regarding the last hypotheses, that of Aristotle, the problem would be that the first prime numbers are generated: 2 generated from the pair relation, and 3 from $2+1$. Nevertheless, any solution given to *the primes problem*, must take into account that Plato's emphasis on multiplication (which cannot exclude the possibility that Plato thought about it as a repeated addition) aims to present the building blocks of numbers (2 and 3), while for the primes there will be always a question who are their building blocks (they themselves?).

3.4 - Ontological or Chronological Generation

In the *Phaedo* (101b9-c9) we find the claim that numbers exist only in virtue of the forms of numbers, which have the same ontological status as the form of beauty or courage.³⁸ Here Plato asserts that *two* participates in the form of *twoness*, and *one* in the form of *oneness*, and we might be inclined to think accordingly with regards to all numbers. Perhaps Plato refers to the fact that there is more than one number 2 (and only one form of *two*), as, for example, in ' $2+2=4$ '. If so, number 2 itself cannot be a form, only just one of the many individual instances that participate in the form of *twoness*. It does not mean that the form of two (the *twoness*) is composed by two (form) entities, but that there is only one unique and uncompounded form for every two things.³⁹ It is not a particular quality (or an adjective) of two, or three, or four, etc. Each number (as a form) is a unit and each numerosity, i.e. what is counted (not as a form), is composed of units. The form of the number is a simple unity and only one entity; the concrete numeral is a plurality, composed by entities. That might entail that numeral 2 consists of $1+1$, but *twoness*, as a form number, is not composed of oneness plus oneness. In other words, numbers *are not generated through addition*, and are abstract entities, an infinite number of abstract and eternal entities.

Given the view that Plato is more or less a Platonist regarding numbers, how should one conceive a possible *generation of numbers*?⁴⁰ Is it a proper generation in action, firstly, from 2 obtaining 1, and from $2+1$ obtaining 3, and secondly, from 2 and 3 by multiplication all the numbers? Could it mean that there was maybe a moment when numbers did not exist? Should one think about the generative process as being one in time, in

which each new number receives *existence* and appears from nowhere, as it would have not existed before, or it's a matter of reducing numbers to an axiomatic frame?

The argument for the generation of numbers should remind us of the Pythagorean understanding of the generation of numbers. In this regard, W. K. C. Guthrie points out that the Pythagoreans didn't perform a sharp distinction between "logical and chronological priority."⁴¹ However, there are scholars who think the opposite, namely that "the generation of numbers was regarded by the early Pythagoreans as an actual physical operation occurring in space and time, and the basic cosmogonical process was identified with the generation of numbers from an initial unit, the *Monad*."⁴² Aristotle (*Met.* 1091a 12-29) also took number generation as a process in time, even if the Academy had not endorsed such an interpretation.⁴³ Annas reproaches to Aristotle's literalism the possibility that the Academy may have not distinguished "between a historical account and a logical analysis"⁴⁴. Thus one should not think of the generation of numbers *per se*, but of the existence of a number series, an existence proof and a classification of numbers.⁴⁵ Robert Turnbull considers that, though *gignomai* is similar with the term used by Plato with the meaning of 'coming to be', involving a temporal meaning, "here is a standard one of Greek mathematicians for the generation of various mathematical series."⁴⁶ At *Parmenides* 153a-b, Plato is speaking of the number one as being older than the numbers which follow after it, which are younger:

So, the least thing first; and this is the one. Isn't that so? (...) But that which has come to be first, I take it, has come to be earlier, and the others later; and things that have come to be later are younger than what has come to be earlier. Thus the others would be younger than the one, and the one older than they.

This understanding of number as being in time is unusual and can hardly be accommodated with a timeless reading of number generation. One would suppose that qualifications such as 'earlier' or 'later' which are attached to numbers of the series do not necessarily refer to their chronological organization.

The notion of generation itself is misleading and in order to properly understand it, one should consider that there is a *hierarchical priority* of entities as *twoness* and *threeness* on the one hand, and the *multiplicity*

on the other hand. Even if there is no generation in time, numbers are generated by a previous *existence* of two (*duoin*) and three (*trion*) and by pairs of the three kinds.

One may ask whether the generation of numbers would be a philosophical problem for Plato, since we think usually that Plato could have numbers conceived of as forms or as intermediates. There is also the debate if Plato kept the theory of forms after the *Parmenides*. Currently, scholars speak about a (1) *Revisionist* position (he rejected the theory of Forms in the late dialogues) and a (2) *Unitarian* one (Plato is consistent in all his dialogues with the theory of forms).⁴⁷ The two interpretations exclude each other, especially when applied to dialogues such as the *Parmenides*, the *Theaetetus*, and the *Sophist*.

I think that the generation process presented in the *Parmenides* should be read through the lens of the generation of the soul from the *Timaeus* (35c-36c), and the *Sophist*. It might be that, with the *Parmenides*, the generation process marks a turning point in Plato's philosophy and that in late dialogues Plato did indeed revised his theory of forms into a *meta-theory of forms and numbers* (3), in which more primitive Forms/Logical Entities (the 'greatest kinds' of the *Sophist*: *being*, *sameness*, *difference*) are at the core of a new ontology, and new philosophical possibilities are explored: in the *Sophist* a new theory of language is formulated, in the *Parmenides* a theory for the generation of numbers, and in the *Timaeus* a theory of the constitution of the soul.

Plato was immersed in the problem of generation, and could have been considering a scheme aimed to support the idea of the generation of numbers (comparable to the Pythagorean generation of numbers); as he often spoke about different types of generations: generation of the world, generation of the soul, generation of the numbers, in which, most probably, the generation process stands for a logical analysis and a description of the structure of what is 'generated'. The reassessment of Plato's philosophy into a meta-theory is coherent with the Revisionist theory (1), and should not contradict the Unitarian theory (2), since, as I think, for looking and constructing an axiomatic system for the theory of forms (and not only), Plato goes beyond his early view on forms (as it is presented and developed in the *Phaedo*, the *Republic*, the *Parmenides*), without necessarily refuting them. The solution that I advance is not merely one of a compromise between (1) and (2), but an attempt to hint towards the reconstruction of a possible ontology of the late dialogues in which unclear, but fundamental passages – such as the generation of numbers

or the generation of the soul – could be harmonized with both the theory of forms and that of the greatest kinds in Plato's late dialogues.

3.5. - The *Parmenides* evaluates *Parmenides*

The second argument from the *Parmenides* could be essential to advance the view, stressed by the Tübingen School, that Plato had an "unwritten doctrine" which is not developed in the written dialogues. The appropriation of the dyad with the division by two at 142b5-143a2 is a vast enterprise and it is beyond the purpose of the article, which insists mainly on the duality of one and the consequences thereupon. Moreover, my aim is not to insist on the implications for a possible oral teaching of Plato, since it is contradictory to reconstruct an allegedly exclusive oral teaching from a written one. I try thus to avoid as much as possible the methodology of the Tübingen School, when interpreting the passage from the *Parmenides*. What is important in the economy of my paper – that Plato's own philosophical position can be recognized in the second argument of the second part of the *Parmenides* – is to emphasize that Aristotle was aware of such perpetual division of *one* into the duality of *one* and *being*, and that he overlaps this division with a function that he attaches to the dyad.

The difference between a possible Tübingen interpretation of the passage and that which is expressed in this paper is that a Tübingen reading makes difficult to follow the development of the greatest kinds introduced in the *Sophist*, while my reading gives to the *Sophist* a more coherent meaning: the greatest kinds of the *Sophist* are thus an elaboration of an ontological project which is only partially elaborated in the *Parmenides*' second argument.⁴⁸ It's not necessary to read the possible relation between the *Parmenides* and A6 exclusively through the lens of the "unwritten doctrine", but that one can have a more nuanced reading of 142b-144b, especially 143a-b, and 143c-143e2, in which several divisions and dualities are at work in order to point to a generative process. The duality of one goes straight against the unwritten doctrine in which the One and the indefinite dyad are the two independent, opposing principles. I take the duality of one as opposing the monolithic feature of one from the first hypothesis (137c-142a). In contrast to the unwritten doctrine, where the dyad is an independent principle from one, the duality (i.e. the dyad) comes from the relation between the *one* and (its) being, and could rather point to the poem of *Parmenides*.

Plato develops a hypothesis-argument immediately after the first hypothesis that concluded with the claim that nothing can be said about, and predicated to the *one*. Both hypotheses are mirroring each other (some of the negation of the first one become affirmation in the second one) and they are meaningful if we consider them as part of a larger philosophical agenda. Even if it is a dialectical exercise or not, the second part of the *Parmenides* is relevant for a reconstruction of Plato's philosophy. As Ross put it, treating the 'second part' as "primarily a gymnastic exercise does not exclude the possibility that in the course of it Plato may hit on positive ideas which will fructify in his later thought."⁴⁹

Most of the scholars, such as Runciman⁵⁰ or Ryle⁵¹ think that it is Plato's form which is under examination in the second part of the *Parmenides*, and, implicitly, in the first hypothesis. However, I think that there are good reasons to consider that what Plato examines in the first hypothesis, and the whole second part, is exactly Parmenides' view. Cherniss,⁵² Guthrie⁵³ or Turnbull⁵⁴ argue also in this regard, that one should keep in mind Parmenides' poem and that the subject matter of the second part of the *Parmenides* is the Parmenidean concept of *one-being*. The second hypothesis could be read as a correction of the non-predicative standing of the Parmenidean being,⁵⁵ while sampling a few of the greatest kinds developed later in the *Sophist*. My claim on the genuineness of the second hypothesis, and its link to the *Sophist*, is even more legitimate if one considers that Plato's account here is part of a larger project which is developed in the *Sophist*, and partially in the *Timaeus*. Thus the question if the conjectures around the derivation of numbers from allegedly some of the greatest kinds have any implication at all to Plato's philosophy could be reformulated as: how a Plato of the *Sophist* would understand the *structure* and the *ontology* of numbers? The most reasonable answer is to look again at the *Parmenides*' generation of numbers.

Conclusion

This paper contributes to expanding the range of interpretative approaches to Plato's philosophy of mathematics, raising some not so obvious questions (such as, for example, why 3 is a derivation of 2+1 and not of 1+1+1) around the argument of the generation of numbers, showing that one may consider Plato's ontology of numbers in a different frame than that given by the current discussion - that Plato either had

numbers as forms or as intermediates (which are conceived as ungenerated in both cases). Gesturing towards the resemblance between Aristotle's testimonies and the *Parmenides*, Section One of this paper establishes that a more detailed exegesis of the *Parmenides* is warranted. On foot of this I proceeded to carry out this exegesis by providing a schematic presentation of the argument for the generation of numbers. After setting the outline of the argument for the generation of numbers I move to Section Two, in which these possible traces are identified in the *Metaphysics* A6. The argument for the generation of numbers, set out in Section One, raises several problematic issues which are explored in detail in Section Three. Different interpretative possibilities are proposed in relation to the origin of number two, the origin of number three, the choice of multiplication versus addition operations, the nature of generation, the subject matter of the *Parmenides*' second part. I advance the idea that Plato intentionally made a loop to substantiate the idea of generation of cardinal number *two* from a duality in order to respond to a possible critique, as later offered by Aristotle, that the cardinal number two is inherent to duality. I argue that in the *Parmenides* (142b-144b), with the help of three entities (*one*, *being*, *difference*), which resemble the greatest kinds of the *Sophist* (to be developed in further studies), Plato constructs possibly platonic arguments for the derivation of the first even and the first odd numbers, from which the rest of numbers are generated.

NOTES

- ¹ Scholars argue that Plato's interest in mathematics had a great impact on the development of the discipline in the Academy and elsewhere. A passage from Proclus' commentary on the first book of Euclid's *Elements*, entitled "Catalogue of Geometers", written probably by Aristotle's student, Eudemus, records that Plato was "greatly advanced in mathematics in general and geometry on particular because of his zeal for these studies. It is well known that his writings are thickly sprinkled with mathematical terms and that he everywhere tries to arouse admiration for mathematics among students of philosophy", Proclus, *Commentary on the First Book of Euclid's Elements*, transl. Glenn R. Morrow (Princeton: University Press, 1970), 54. On the other hand, some argue just the opposite: "Plato's role has been widely exaggerated. His own direct contributions to mathematical knowledge were obviously nil", or "Plato 'directed' research is fortunately not borne out of the facts", Otto Neugebauer, *The Exact Sciences in Antiquity* (New York: Dover, 1969), 152. A similar skepticism is shared by Ian Muller: "It is very unlikely that Plato made substantive contributions to mathematics; indeed, many of the more specifically mathematical passages in his works have no clear and correct interpretation, and many of them can be read as the half-understandings of an enthusiastic spectator", Ian Mueller, "Mathematics and the Divine in Plato", in Teun Koetsier and Luc Bergmans, (eds.), *Mathematics and the Divine* (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, 2005), 99-121, 101. See also Harold Cherniss, "Plato as Mathematician", *Review of Metaphysics* 4, no. 3 (1951): 395-425.
- ² In antiquity, in the third century A.D., Diogene Laertius, *Lives* (3.24) attributed to Plato the discovery of geometrical analysis. Three centuries later, *Anonymous Prolegomena Philosophiae Platonicae* (5.32-35) claimed the same thing. However, these testimonies are doubtful to the modern scholar. See, for example, Harold Cherniss, "Plato as Mathematician", *Review of Metaphysics* 4, no. 3 (1951): 418-419. The role of Plato as a mathematician is problematic too: "the main problem in discussing Plato as a mathematician... is that most of the statements dealing with mathematics are, to the modern reader, at least couched in vague language", Roger Herz-Fischler, *A mathematical history of division in extreme and mean ratio* (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier Univ. Press, 1987), 79.
- ³ Even if Plato, in most of his dialogues, is not explicit concerning the form feature of numbers, and he does not use forms as the most economic explanation for the "existence" of numbers, he is usually charged with mathematical realism by scholars and mathematicians. It is Aristotle, who, in his struggle to reject Plato's assumptions on numbers (or what he thought that Plato assumed about numbers), states that for Plato numbers are forms, criticizing Plato for having separated numbers from things. Aristotle's

- rejection of Plato's philosophy of mathematics is part of his overall refusal to accept any kind of theory of forms, coming thus as a natural objection to Plato's conception of numbers. At the same time, Aristotle extrapolates many features of the forms to numbers, assuming that Plato thought in the same manner concerning numbers. As in the case of forms, Aristotle argues that numbers should not be separated from things, but rather that they are the product of counting things: one cannot have numbers without things which are counted.
- 4 P. Shorey, *The Unity of Plato's Thought* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968).
- 5 H. Cherniss, *The Riddle of the Early Academy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1945).
- 6 P. Pritchard, *Plato's Philosophy of Mathematics* (Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag, 1995).
- 7 W. Tait, "Noesis: Plato on exact science", *Reading Natural Philosophy: Essays to Honor Howard Stein*, ed. D. Malament, (Illinois: Open Court), 11–30.
- 8 A. Wedberg, *Plato's Philosophy of Mathematics* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1977). One of the earliest defense is that of J. Adam, *The Republic of Plato*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1902). For a critique of Adam, see P. Shorey which argues for number-form theory, "Ideas and Numbers Again," *Classical Philology* 22, no. 2 (April 1, 1927): 213–218.
- 9 "For a Platonist the Forms are yet more real and still more fundamental to explaining the scheme of things than the objects of mathematics" M. Burnyeat, "Plato on why mathematics is good for the soul", in T. Smiley, ed., *Mathematics and Necessity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 1–82. See also M. Burnyeat, "Platonism and Mathematics: A Prelude to Discussion", in *Mathematics and Metaphysics in Aristotle*, ed. A. Graeser (Bern & Stuttgart: Haupt, 1987), 212–40. Burnyeat thinks that "none of those who are sceptical of Aristotle's repeated and unambiguous ascription to Plato of a doctrine of intermediates has ever told us how mathematics *could* be about Forms instead". (Burnyeat, *Op.Cit.*, 229).
- 10 It is not clear if there is an exact correspondent in Greek for "pair". Perhaps it should be taken in the following manner: (a,b), (b,c), (a,c).
- 11 Couple.
- 12 It is customarily assumed that the partner of the dialogue with Parmenides is not Aristotle, the philosopher, but one of the Thirty Tyrants who ruled Athens after it was defeated by Sparta, in the Peloponnesian War.
- 13 It is worth noticing that for Aristotle, "the infinite by addition is the same thing as the infinite by division" (*Physics*, 206b3). Accordingly, for Aristotle there should be no significant distinction between progressive infinite (a) and the one by division (b). But is it the same for Plato? In the chapters 4–8 of book 3 of the *Physics*, dedicated to the problems of the infinite, Aristotle mentions

several times how Plato conceives infinity: “the Pythagoreans identify the infinite with the even... But Plato has two infinities, the Great and the Small” (203a10-15). Further, Aristotle takes that Plato “made the infinities two in number, because it is supposed to be possible to exceed all limits and to proceed *ad infinitum* in the direction both of increase and of reduction. Yet though he makes the infinities two, he does not use them. For in the numbers is not present the infinite in the direction of reduction, as the monad is the smallest; nor is the infinite in the direction of increase, for he makes numbers only up to the decad” (Aristotle, *Physics*, 206b30-33). In the *Parmenides* argument it seems that Plato used at least the infinite in the direction of increase, since there is no ending for numbers. It is not clear if “the Small” infinite (203a15) must stop at unity or, as I would like to stress is the other part of the one, its division. Unity is in both directions many. One could take into account an important difference between modern and ancient understanding of mathematical infinity. Compared with modern mathematics, which takes the infinities as gravitating around zero, {..., -4, -3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, ...}, for Greek mathematics and especially for Plato, the two infinities could be something like that (if one accepts that it is possible to go beyond unity, and if we take Zeno’s paradox of motion as a problem concerning the division of unity): ... 1/4, 1/3, 1/2, 1, 2, 3, 4,

- 14 (Ross’ translation). τὸ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἐν καὶ τοὺς [30] ἀριθμοὺς παρὰ τὰ πράγματα ποιῆσαι, καὶ μὴ ὥσπερ οἱ [31] Πυθαγόρειοι, καὶ ἡ τῶν εἰδῶν εἰσαγωγή διὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς λό- [32] γοῖς ἐγένετο σκέψιν (οἱ γὰρ πρότεροι διαλεκτικῆς οὐ μετέ- [33] χον), τὸ δὲ δυάδα ποιῆσαι τὴν ἑτέραν φύσιν διὰ τὸ τοὺς [34] ἀριθμοὺς ἐξω τῶν πρώτων εὐφυῶς ἐξ αὐτῆς γεννᾶσθαι ὥσ- [988^a1] περ ἕκ τινος ἐκμαγείου. Primavesi’s new revised edition of the Greek text does not differ on this passage from that of Ross. See Carlos Steel ed., *Aristotle’s Metaphysics Alpha: Symposium Aristotelicum* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
- 15 For some scholars this association is artificial. See, for example, Harold Fredrik Cherniss, *Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato and the Academy* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1944), 194-195. For a critique of Cherniss see Steel, *Plato as seen by Aristotle* in Steel ed., *Aristotle’s Metaphysics Alpha*, 189-190.
- 16 In general it is thought that Aristotle does not refer at all to the *Parmenides*. For a discussion of the pro and cons arguments see: Donald J. Allan, “Aristotle and the *Parmenides*” in Ingemar Düring and Gwilym Ellis Lane Owen, *Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century: Papers of the Symposium Aristotelicum Held at Oxford in August, 1957* (Elanders Boktryckeri Aktiebolag, 1960), 133-144. Also A. E. Taylor, *The Parmenides of Plato* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934), especially Appendix C: Aristotle and the *Parmenides*, 128-134.
- 17 David Amirthanayagam, “Plato and the Measure of the Incommensurable. Part II. The Mathematical Meaning of the Indeterminate Dyad” in *The St.*

- John's Review Volume XLVI* (2002), 25-62, 43. This is one of the common positions of modern scholarship, namely that Plato never thought about numbers as being generated.
- 18 W. D. Ross, *Aristotle's Metaphysics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924), 174.
- 19 W. D. Ross, *Volume VIII Metaphysica, The Works of Aristotle Translated into English* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928), 987b, footnote 1.
- 20 W. D. Ross, *Aristotle's Metaphysics*, 174. In *Plato's Theory of Ideas*, Ross thinks that "this proof is rather perfunctory, since it makes no provision for prime numbers other than 2 and 3". See William David Ross, *Plato's Theory of Ideas* (Clarendon Press, 1951), 187.
- 21 W. D. Ross, *Volume VIII Metaphysica*, Book A6, 987b, footnote 1.
- 22 This statement contrasts with that from *Met.* 1081a, 14, in which it is stated that: "*Number* comes from the 1 and the indefinite dyad, and the principles and the elements are said to be principles and elements of number". Scholars do not agree if this statement is ascribed by Aristotle to Plato or to some of his followers. Its meaning is problematic and addresses a complicated challenge for historians of philosophy. Instead of clarifying Plato's understanding of numbers, these type of statements create ambiguities: e.g. "but what this apparently simple statement means has remained a mystery until modern times", Ivor Bulmer-Thomas, "Plato's Theory of Number", *Classical Quarterly* 33, no. 02 (1983): 375.
- 23 Even if Ross rejects an appropriation between A6 and the *Parmenides*, he thinks that the indefinite dyad ascribed by Aristotle "might be assigned to 2... such as [it] is expressed in *Parmenides*." Ross, *Aristotle's Metaphysics*, 175.
- 24 Julia Annas, *Aristotle's Metaphysics: Books M and N* (Clarendon Press, 1988), 48. John Dillon is more cautious and argues that, later, with Speusippus an ontological reading of the *Parmenides* starts, which, in the case of the second hypothesis, implies "an account of how One, when combined with the indefinite Dyad (under the guise of 'Being') produces, first the whole set of natural numbers, and then progressively, the various lower levels of reality", John Dillon, Syrianus's *Exegesis of the Second Hypothesis of the Parmenides: The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe Revealed*, in John Douglas Turner, Kevin Corrigan (ed.), "Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage: Volume II: Reception in Patristic, Gnostic, and Christian Neoplatonic Texts" (Society of Biblical Literature Writings from the Greco-Roman World Supplement), 133.
- 25 Alfred Edward Taylor, *Aristotle on His Predecessors. Being the First Book of His Metaphysics, Translated from the Text Edition of W. Christ, with Introduction and Notes by A.E. Taylor* (Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company, 1907), 104.
- 26 "Through confounding the truth and the reference of the statement 'one is' in Parmenidean fashion, Plato treats 'one' and 'is' as belonging to *the one*

- that is, and so by an easy step takes *one* and *being* to be its parts.” Malcolm Schofield, “A Neglected Regress Argument in the *Parmenides*”, *The Classical Quarterly*, 23 (1973), 44.
- 27 Δύο refers to two things and not exactly to *numbertwo*. In Greek mathematics, number (*arithmos*) refers not to abstract entities, but to numerosities. In the *Parmenides*, there is still an ambiguity if one should conceive δύο as a proper abstract number (closer to a more modern understanding of number) or, in a tradition established by Greek mathematics, to a set of units.
- 28 First of all, in a tradition established by Pythagoreans, Plato would think about the indefinite dyad that is a metaphysical principle, while *duo* is a set of two members which would correspond to number two. Also, the *one* of the *one is* (of the pair relation *one-is*) is not the number one.
- 29 Plato, *Parmenides* in *Complete Works*, ed. John Madison Cooper and D. S. Hutchinson, trans. Mary Louise Gill and Paul Ryan (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1997), 377. All references to Plato in this paper are quoted from the John M. Cooper *Plato: Complete Works*.
- 30 R. E. Allen thinks that in English the argument lacks the force that it has in Greek: “The exact force of his argument cannot be reproduced in English. Greek possesses, as English does not, a dual as well as a singular and plural; when Parmenides argues that since it is possible to mention Unity and to mention Being, each of two has been mentioned, the English „two“ is more explicit than the text, which contains only the genitive dual αὐτοῖν. It is from this feature in the syntax of his language that Parmenides goes on to infer that both have been mentioned, and that since both have been mentioned, two have been mentioned.” Plato, *The Dialogues of Plato, Volume 4: Plato’s Parmenides, Revised Edition*, tr. R. E. Allen, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 262. In a presumably genus-species reading, there are two possibilities: a) two (as a species) is derived from ἄμφω (the genera), b) ἄμφω (as a species) presupposes already *two* (as genera). In the case of a) it is taken for granted that cardinality is a derivation of *ampho*, while for b) the cardinality is already there before analyzing ἄμφω. Plato operates a distinction between them, and he grants priority to ἄμφω as opposed to the counted *two*. Even if the pair seems to be a species of the cardinality of two, in this instance Plato conveys a different conception (142d2): ὃ δ’ ἂν ἄμφω ὀρθῶς προσαγορευέσθων, ἅρα οἷόν τε ἄμφω μὲν αὐτῷ εἶναι, δύο δὲ μή; (“Can things that are correctly called ‘both’ be both, but not two?”).
- 31 Ross in *Aristotle’s Metaphysics*, Oxford, 196.
- 32 See Taylor, *Aristotle on His Predecessors*, 120.
- 33 One can note here that Plato takes now 3 as being 3x1, and not 2+1 as in 143d7.
- 34 Cornford thinks that “Plato evidently includes addition and starts with that when he adds one term to another to make two, and two to one to make three”. F. M. Cornford, *Plato and Parmenides* (Routledge, 2000), 141.

- 35 See *Plato's Phaedo* edited with introduction and notes by John Burnet (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), 103.
- 36 For Brumbaugh, since "three is odd, and two even" (143d8), "the proof moves on from logistic or set theory to arithmetic, the theory of numbers treated as classes". R. S. Brumbaugh, *Plato on the One: the Hypotheses in the Parmenides* (Yale University Press, 1961), 97. Nevertheless, Brumbaugh does not insist more on the issue, and he takes the "definition of "twice" and "thrice" as relations between defined numbers." (*Ibidem*).
- 37 Thomas Little Heath, *A History of Greek Mathematics* (Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1921), 72.
- 38 It is most probably that this was an alien claim for his contemporaries, who must have perceived number as the product of addition, subtraction, dividing etc. However, it is an open question if Plato makes the distinction between the form *F-ness* and number *n*. For a short review see David Galoos's notes on Plato, *Phaedo* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 200.
- 39 But what Plato implies is far from clear, just like, for some scholars, "it remains unclear whether the Form of Two, for instance, is a collection of two ideal units or whether it is simply Twoness", John Cleary, "Aristotle's Criticism of Plato's Theory of Form Numbers", in Gregor Damschen, *Platon und Aristoteles-sub ratione veritatis: Festschrift für Wolfgang Wieland zum 70. Geburtstag* (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2003), 6.
- 40 Allen thinks that "Parmenides' argument is silent on the question of whether numbers are pluralities of units, or whether they are Forms, or whether they are, perhaps, 'intermediates'". R. E. Allen, "The Generation of Numbers in Plato's Parmenides", in *Classical Philology* 65, (1970), 33.
- 41 W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy: Volume 1, The Earlier Presocratics and the Pythagoreans* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 240.
- 42 Gerald James Whitrow, *Time in History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 40.
- 43 Criticizing Pythagoreans, Aristotle (*Met. N.* 1091a22-23) thinks that "it is strange also to attribute generation to eternal things, or rather this is one of the things that are impossible". However, for Pythagoreans some numbers are generated, while others not. For Aristotle, the claim that Plato had the numbers generated from *Met. A.* 987b22-35 doesn't seem to contradict a previous statement at *Met. A.* 987b16 that for Plato "the objects of mathematics are eternal and unchangeable". Here two possibilities of interpretation can be formulated: a) either Aristotle did not realize the inconsistency, b) either Aristotle did not see the generation of numbers as opposite to that of the eternity of numbers, the generation being conceived as not being in time – therefore a technical description (but this would contradict his reading of the *Timaeus* – as a generation in time).

- 44 Annas, 211. According to Allen, in this case “numbers are simple essences incapable of analysis into ontologically prior and posterior elements”. Plato’s aim is not a *ratio essendi*, but a *ratio cognoscendi*. Allen, *Plato’s Parmenides*, rev. ed., 266.
- 45 *Ibidem* 265.
- 46 Robert G. Turnbull, *The Parmenides and Plato’s Late Philosophy: Translation of and Commentary on the Parmenides with Interpretative Chapters on the Timaeus, the Theaetetus, the Sophist, and the Philebus* (University of Toronto Press, 1998), 73.
- 47 One of the major questions concerning Plato’s philosophy is whether one can organize the platonic dialogues into a unitary philosophical system built around the theory of forms. Contemporary scholarship on Plato is divided in two apparently irreconcilable positions. On the one hand, there are scholars (Ryle, Robinson, Owen, McDowell, etc.) who argue that one cannot systematize Plato around the theory of forms (1) since consistent references to the theory forms are missing in late dialogues, thus Plato didn’t endorse his theory after the *Parmenides*. On the other hand, there are scholars (Cornford, Ross, Sedley, Chappell, etc.) who think that (2) even if the theory of forms is not pointed out in the late dialogues, the reader should always bear it in mind as the underlying reference system, since Plato did maintain a unitary philosophy throughout all his dialogues. According to the *Revisionist* position (1) Plato consistently revised his philosophical commitments and one cannot resort to the theory of forms as explanatory for late dialogues, whereas with the *Unitarian* view (2), a consistent effort of harmonizing late dialogues with early dialogues is needed, since even if there is no explicit reference to the theory of forms (with the exception of *Timaeus*), it remains the principal structure of platonic thinking.
- 48 In the *Sophist* 255e, Plato gives to *difference* the same ontological power as in the *Parmenides* 143a-b.
- 49 William David Ross, *Plato’s Theory of Ideas* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951), 100.
- 50 Rejecting the idea that the subject matter of the *Parmenides* could refer to the Parmenidean monism, Runciman argues that “although certain arguments of the second part could be construed as referring to Parmenidean monism, it is clearly impossible so to interpret them all; and if Plato wished to discuss Parmenidean monism, he would not have done it in this intermittent way”. Thus “But the ambiguities of the second part do not invalidate the contention that it is nevertheless the form of unity which is under discussion throughout.” Walter Garrison Runciman, “Plato’s *Parmenides*”, *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 64 (1959): 101.
- 51 The presupposition that of course for which “there is no internal evidence whatsoever” that it is discussed *Parmenides’* Monistic theory. Gilbert Ryle, “Plato’s ‘*Parmenides*’”, *Mind*, New Series, 48, no. 190 (April 1, 1939): 143.

- 52 "The quotations from the poem and the references to it are so frequent in Plato's writings that we may be sure when Plato was writing the *Parmenides* he had nothing more vividly before his mind than the poem which he mentions whenever he talks about the paradoxes of being." Harold Cherniss, "*Parmenides and the *Parmenides* of Plato*", *American Journal of Philology* (1932): 130.
- 53 Plato "wanted to clear up the relationship between his own doctrine and the Eleatic thesis of One Being". W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy: Volume 5, The Later Plato and the Academy* (Cambridge University Press, 1986), 57. Plato "wanted to clear up the relationship between his own doctrine and the Eleatic thesis of One Being".
- 54 Turnbull, *The Parmenides and Plato's Late Philosophy*.
- 55 Scolnicov argues that: "As the *Parmenides* will make clear, Parmenidean ascription of being is 'transparent'. As Plato shows in Argument I, nothing is added to the Parmenidean one when it is said to be. To say 'the one' and to say 'the one is' is to say the same thing." See Samuel Scolicov, *Plato's Parmenides* (University of California Press, 2003), 18. Or, "Argument II is, together with the related Arguments III, V, and VII, an explication of μέθεξις, as opposed to Parmenidean being", *Ibid.* 96.

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THE CASTELLANY ACCOUNTS OF LATE-MEDIEVAL SAVOY: A SOURCE-ORIENTED APPROACH

This article focuses on a corpus of late-medieval documents, the fiscal accounts (*computi*) of the castellanies, or territorial-administrative units, of the principality of Savoy. Its aim is to shed new light on the possibilities for interpreting the data of the *computi*. Because of their wealth of detail about institutional reform and socio-economic trends, the Savoyard castellany accounts represent an extraordinary source for medievalists. And yet, although significant contributions in the last two decades have advanced our understanding of institutional reform and societal change in late-medieval Savoy, the *computi* must still be ranked among the least explored medieval manuscripts.¹ In part this is due to the sheer volume of the evidence and the history of its archival conservation in the twentieth century. But in my opinion the underlying cause of this neglect has to do with the challenge of devising an interpretive framework that makes the most of the primary data. This involves analyzing the manuscripts' structure and internal logic in conjunction with the institutional practices based on them, and tracing the effects of the institutional reforms on both the political designs of the House of Savoy and the socio-economic life of local communities. This exploratory essay addresses itself precisely to this task.

The earliest Savoyard *computi* date from the middle of the thirteenth century.² Institutional reforms under Count Pierre II (1263-1268) resulted in the creation of a system of auditing the written accounts of each castellany. The castellany became the fundamental territorial-administrative unit of the Savoyard state; at its head was the castellan, an official appointed by the count for a period of several years. Before becoming count of Savoy, Pierre had followed his niece Eleanor to England upon her marriage to King Henry III, and served the king for several years in England and southern France; his brother Boniface of Savoy was appointed archbishop of Canterbury. The

contact with the Anglo-Norman pipe rolls (fiscal accounts) and Exchequer audits was probably a major influence on Pierre's decision to introduce fiscal records in Savoy. Pierre's more ample reform program also included the codification of legal custom in the Statutes.³ Pierre's brother and heir, Philippe I (1268-1285), and then Amadeus V (1285-1323) expanded the network of castellanies throughout the Savoyard territories and put the practice of audited accounts on firm ground.

Notwithstanding their limitations, the level of detail of the Savoyard records makes them stand out from the more ancient Catalan *computi* and Anglo-Norman pipe rolls.⁴ The typical castellany account, up to the final decades of the fourteenth century, was not necessarily drawn for a period of one year (the period could be shorter or longer), but yearly accounts were becoming increasingly common. A fiscal roll consists of several folios or membranes of parchment sewn together. An annual account might run to ten folios or more; multi-annual accounts are even larger. A *computus* usually covers not only the main town of the castellany but also a couple of other villages. It has several rubrics, grouped under revenues and expenses. The former include dues in produce and cash, property and sale taxes, the income of the lands and productive facilities (such as mills and ovens) farmed out to locals or administered directed by the castellan, and judicial fines. An important rubric concerns the sums raised by selling the produce collected from the populace (the *venditiones*). The expenses consist of the payments and deliveries made by the castellan for the count's military and administrative needs throughout the year (the so-called *librate*), and the costs of running the castellany, including the salaries of the administrators, starting with the castellan. Particularly important are the investments in the local infrastructure, from fortifications to bridges, roads, mills, and market halls. The fiscal accounts were audited by the specialized personnel of the central fiscal administration – the *chambre des comptes* – often in the presence of the count.

While some of the sections of the castellany accounts record only modest annual variations – generally when the dues could not be paid because of economic hardship – others register significant evolutions and thus afford us the opportunity to reconstruct socio-economic trends. In particular, the tax on property transfers and the annual rates at which enterprising locals were farming the count's various facilities and sources of revenue, such as lands, mills, baking ovens, or the sale tax collected at markets and fairs, are quite valuable for reconstructing local socio-economic dynamics. The variations in the price of grains sold locally

have been analyzed to reconstruct the broad trends in late-medieval economy.⁵ The *librate* are an index of the demands made on the local communities by the House of Savoy, while the revenues re-invested in the maintenance and development of the local infrastructure were a stimulus for the local economy.

My research at New Europe College, of which the present essay gives a general account, is part of a broader project that focuses on several castellanies from the bailiwick of Savoy proper – the heartland of the House of Savoy. After a brief historiographical section, in what follows I offer some examples drawn from the texts of how the *computi* might be read so as to shed new light on late-medieval institutional reform and socio-economic trends.

Recent research directions

In this section I focus on a few contributions that stand out from a larger body of scholarship over the last two decades, briefly highlighting their merits and limitations, as a stepping stone towards building an inclusive analytical framework.

While it might seem that the relative historiographical neglect of the *computi* does not extend to their institutional aspects,⁶ the first systematic discussion of Pierre II's institutional reforms came only in 2000, when Guido Castelnuovo and Christian Guilleré published their analysis of the earliest Savoyard *computi*.⁷ Their work marks an important stage in understanding the organizing logic of these documents, moving beyond Demotz's pioneering study of the administrative geography of medieval Savoy.⁸ It traces the steps by which the *computi* evolved as administrative documents during a formative stage from the 1260s to the end of the thirteenth century when the castellany system was consolidated and extended.⁹ Thus, it draws attention to the transition from an initial territorial principle for organizing the contents of the *computi*, according to which revenues were listed for each town and village of a castellany, to a more graduated structure in which the general revenues of the castellany were grouped by kind (e.g., dues in produce, revenues farmed out, etc.), thereby facilitating the assessment of a castellany's fiscal worth. Lastly, the article endeavors to gauge the contribution of the early castellanies to the finances of the House of Savoy. But Castelnuovo and Guilleré's article is more of an overview. The question of the impact of the castellany

system on the Savoyard communities and local elites fell outside the scope of the article. Two major research directions are left unexplored: the comparison between the early *computi* and their most likely model, the Anglo-Norman pipe rolls,¹⁰ and the analysis of the early *computi* in relation to the inventories (*extente*) on which they were based.¹¹

Castelnuovo also pioneered the prosopographical study of the Savoyard castellans, with particular emphasis on the fifteenth century.¹² His 1994 monograph gives an overview of the social background and recruitment pattern of the castellans, highlighting the significant proportion of castellans drawn from the ranks of the bourgeoisie – around one third. The limits of this work stem from its problematic approach to the sources. Castelnuovo's analysis is not grounded in the analysis of the manuscripts, but of the very brief eighteenth-century summaries drawn by the archivists of the House of Savoy, which make no further mention of the documents' contents beyond the name of the castellan and the dates of his term in office. This makes it very hard to ascertain whether administrative efficiency as reflected by the accounts of revenues and expenditure played a significant part in the count's assessment of his administrators' performance. The issue is of interest beyond the confines of Savoyard history, because it relates to a key topic in late-medieval and early-modern studies, the professionalization of the state's administrators.

Nicolas Carrier's monograph on the mountainous region of Faucigny in northern Savoy from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century draws on a variety of sources and makes relatively limited use of the *computi*.¹³ The earliest castellany accounts analyzed date from the second half of the fourteenth century, and Carrier largely replaces thorough analysis with data sampling – often analyzing only one account in ten – and does not attempt a prosopographical reconstruction of local communities. Nevertheless, the volume offers a model for analyzing the socio-economic evidence of the castellany accounts. It has some useful discussion of social strategies: for instance, it argues that the contracts establishing bonds of fictive kinship represented an alternative to the payment of heavy succession taxes in the event of one's death without direct heirs.¹⁴ But Carrier's interest is in reconstructing broad economic trends, rather than micro-economic strategies and the dynamic of social change at the local level. Future research must complement this focus on demographic and macro-economic trends over the *longue durée* with an analysis of the differentiated impact of the general economic trends on different communities and social groups. Such an approach – on which more in the

final section of this essay – would capitalize on arguably the defining aspect of the *computi*, which distinguishes them from similar medieval accounts: their level of detail about the socio-economic life of local communities.

The Savoyard state: professionalization and institutional accountability

The *computi* are a record of the institutional practices of the Savoyard state in the aftermath of the reforms of the 1260s. They are particularly interesting for the study of institutional history because they are part of a broader European context. To begin with, the probable English inspiration for the *computi* brings up the important issue of the transfer and creative adaptation of institutional models. Furthermore, the rise of accountability, a historical development spanning several centuries with important consequences for both institutional consolidation and economic growth, is amply illustrated by the *computi*. The professionalization of the early-modern state has its roots in the transformation of the thirteenth-century land-owning, military aristocracy into a corps in the service of the prince. The Savoyard castellan was seldom appointed for more than a few years (appointments for a year or less were by no means rare), to be subsequently posted at the head of another castellany, sometimes quite some distance away. Furthermore, in order to prevent the castellans from colluding with the local notables they were not normally appointed to castellanies where they had land or family connections. For the bourgeoisie, the possibility of joining the ranks of this emerging corps of professional administrators represented an avenue for upward social mobility.

The challenges of institutional innovation left their trace in the fiscal records. The arduous effort to implement novel record-keeping practices and set an unprecedented standard of accountability entailed a degree of experimentation in the drafting of the *computi*. This is revealed by notes and remarks interspersed throughout the otherwise straightforward book-keeping. The text of the *computi* is organized as if on three columns: on the left margin general rubrics succinctly enumerating the different types of revenues (e.g., *frumentum* – wheat) and expenses (e.g., *salarium* – the castellan's compensation), and on the right the numeric figures for each category (e.g., *v setiers* or *xxv livres*). The largest column, in the middle, includes the subtotals for each category, visually set out from the body of text. But it records much more than this. It is here that most of the text is

found. Aided by the clerks of the *chambre des comptes*, the count took advantage of the auditing of accounts in Chambéry to instruct the castellans about specific aspects of running their appointed castellanies, such as checking information and keeping the records up-to-date. As late as the middle of the fourteenth century, these injunctions were written down in the *computi* (for instance, “iniungitur castellano quod in sequenti computo veniat informatus declarare...” – “the castellan is directed to inform himself so as to state in the subsequent account...”). This practice helped the count’s central administration in their review of castellans’ performance. The frequency of the instructions can be analyzed as an indicator of the inertia which the count and his trained aides had to overcome in order to achieve the success of their project of institutional reform. This brings up the multi-functional role of the castellany accounts. They were an instrument of government not only as part of an auditing mechanism, but also for the more direct purpose of issuing orders.

Similarly, I argue that the ubiquitous presence of the verb *computare* throughout the records might be read as the clerks’ effort to drive home to the castellans – most of whom came from the traditional local aristocracy – the necessity to calculate constantly their revenues and expenses: put plainly, the need to have their income and spending add up. This was a way of inculcating an arithmetical habit of mind through repetition: first of all orally, in the dialogue between the auditors (*auditores computorum*) and the castellans, and then through the written records.

This brings up the essential issue of institutional accountability. The emphasis on rendering an account of one’s actions to one’s social and, increasingly, institutional superior was part of the twelfth-century institutional reconfiguration of medieval polities. *Reddere rationem*, a phrase with Biblical overtones, underlines the moral and social dimension of accountability in the high and late Middle Ages.¹⁵ The received orthodoxy on this topic is that medieval ideas of institutional accountability leaned more heavily towards a patrimonial perspective, in which accounts and audits were relied upon mainly to re-affirm the prince’s rights over lands, revenues, and people. The point was to prevent the erosion of the ruler’s patrimony by corrupt agents or locals determined to assert their customary rights. This scholarly perspective resonates with the idea that medieval rulers were first and foremost interested in the loyalty, rather than the professional competence, of their agents.

But in the Savoyard castellany accounts, as in other European records from the later Middle Ages, one can also detect elements of the more

modern outlook on institutional accountability. This is defined by the use of accounts and audits to increase revenues by improving the collection of dues and taxes and taking some steps towards encouraging trade and raising agricultural outputs. The Savoyard principality made recourse to investments in maintaining and improving the local infrastructure, but mainly relied on a close monitoring of the performance of its agents. This shifts the emphasis towards competence, rather than obeisance and loyalty. While *prima facie* the former, “patrimonial” interpretation seems to carry more weight, the issue can only be decided after a minute examination of the sources.

For instance, the count’s presence at the auditing process is not necessarily a sign of traditionalism – a relic of “charismatic” lordship during a time of bureaucratization and professionalization of the administrative apparatus. Gaining the prince’s favor was not merely a question of loyalty but also of competence. Like the prince’s wrath (*ira regis*),¹⁶ in medieval political culture the prince’s favor could approach the status of an institution, because it was extended or withdrawn not on a whim but as a calculated political move. Consider this example from the 1317-1319 account of Antoine de Barge, castellan of Montmélian and head of the bailiwick of Savoy. Following the condemnation of the notary Jean de Sallanches to a fine of twenty-five *livres* for having forged a notarial document, Antoine was unable to recover more than ten *livres* from the sale of Jean’s goods (specifically a vineyard): “nec adhuc potuit plus recuperare quia plus non inuenit de bonis ipsius magistri Johannis”.¹⁷ The text includes a directive to the castellan to inquire diligently into the matter so that he might seize more of Jean’s goods in payment of the fine, and enter the sum thus recovered in the subsequent *computus*. The entry regarding the failure to collect the entire sum is accompanied by an intriguing marginal note, “Vide”, which sends to a mark on the verso of the last folio of the roll of parchment, where the following terse and powerful notation was recorded: “Vidit dominus et not placet”, “the lord saw this and he does not like it”.

This rare and succinct testimony about the count’s perspective on the administrative matters audited in his presence by the personnel of the *chambre des comptes* might be interpreted as an effort to throw the weight of his authority in support of the work of his central clerks. The count’s point, I suggest, was to make clear to an important castellan that the auditing process was a vital matter and the problems identified by the *auditors computorum* were to be taken seriously. Efficiency, then, not merely loyalty was required for gaining and maintaining the prince’s favor.

Analyzed closely, the *computi* offer some glimpse into the opportunities available to castellans during the auditing process to draw attention to their administrative efficiency. While the terse wording of the accounts poses a challenge for the historian, some examples show that the castellan tried to emphasize those aspects of his management that represented improvements from previous practice. Thus Nicolet François de Chambéry, castellan of Conflans, made it a point at the auditing of his account in 1344 to underscore an increase in revenues during his management, in comparison to the account of a previous castellan. He recorded that a due in oats (*terragium*; modern French: *champart*) yielded almost double the quantity in the ante-penultimate *computus* – a calculated reference to the last annual account of an able administrator, Aymon de La Chambre, who headed the castellany of Conflans for a record nine years (1333-1342).

Terragium -- Recepit eodem anno pro terragio terre domini juxta grangiam domini de Ruppecula ubi mina custoditur, accensatur pro tanto hoc anno [millesimo] ccc xliii^o et computat plus de sex quartis quam in tercio computo precedenti -- xiiii quartes auene.¹⁸

We have to consider that since Aymon's time no castellan administered Conflans for more than one year. The count and his aides were quite possibly searching for a competent castellan to serve a term of several years at Conflans. Thus, Nicolet's point in highlighting his modest achievement was perhaps to indicate that he was quite fit to exercise the office of castellan for another few years (he only got a few more months).

Another illustrative example of how a castellan might try to highlight his achievements in comparison with his predecessors in the office comes from the 1318-1319 account of Raoul d'Herbeys, castellan of Faverges. Under the rubric "denarii census", a cash due paid by the count's customary tenants, an additional mention was made, accompanied by the attention-drawing note "Vide" in the left margin, to the effect that the castellan collected an extra 4.5 *solidi* because he discovered that the count was owed more than the sum given in the earlier *computi*. The auditors duly noted this modest increase in revenue, writing that it had not been recorded in the accounts of Raoul's predecessors in the office – which in all likelihood is just the point that Raoul wanted to underscore.

Denarii census -- Idem reddit computum quod recepit in dictam castellaniam de redditum per annum in predicto festo beati Andree ut in particulis in computo precedenti -- xiii lb. xviii sol. xi den. ob. fortes excucellati.

Vide hic -- Recepit ibidem de redditum per annum eodem termino quos inuenit in dictam castellaniam deberi domino per annum ultra summam predictam et de quibus hactenus non fuit computatum per castellanos predecessores eius -- iiii sol. i. ob. fortes escucellati.¹⁹

That such efforts by the castellans were recorded in the *computi* confirms that the count and his aides were interested in the smallest sources of revenue. Collected from the Savoyard lands stretching on both sides of the Alps and both banks of Lake Geneva, they would come up to the total needed to fund the ambitious projects of the House of Savoy. This conception of combining small but numerous sources of revenues was quite common in the Middle Ages. But did the gestures through which the castellans aimed to highlight their administrative efficiency have a significant impact on their subsequent promotion? Nicolet François's example suggests the contrary. Still, even if the increases in revenue reported by the castellans were modest, they might have created an impression of diligence. But it was the successful completion of other administrative, judicial, and military tasks that seems to have carried more weight in the count's assessment of his castellans' performance. Furthermore, professional competence had to compete with the traditional ideal of loyalty to one's lord, and with the pull of family connections.

To tackle these issues I suggest focusing on the *librate* section of the *computi* to ascertain if it represents a reliable index of the castellan's success on the job. The rationale for this approach is that many of the "deliveries" (*librate*) were made in response to urgent demands by the count, often triggered by the needs of a military expedition. How fully and timely the castellans could acquit themselves of the charge to deliver the much needed moneys, men, and supplies would have been the ultimate test of their effectiveness as administrators. The length of a castellan's term in office and his subsequent appointment to a more important castellany or, alternatively, to a backwater position can be read as indicators of the count's satisfaction with his performance. I hope to trace in my future work the careers of several castellans, using a database to correlate their performance as measured by the figures of the fiscal records with their

terms of office and subsequent promotion or relegation. This will help clarify the extent to which professional competence mattered alongside the older virtue of loyalty.

I do not mean to emphasize competence and professionalization unduly, so as to make the Savoyard administrative practices look more modern than they really were. On the contrary, I am interested in capturing the persisting ambiguities between personal responsibility and institutional accountability. To give an illustrative example, in the account of the *subsidia* (direct taxation) levied from the castellany of Conflans in 1333, Aymon de La Chambre listed alongside the money he owed for the tax levy a sum representing his outstanding debt from several years previously when he served as castellan of Entremont. The outstanding sum was to be paid from the taxes now collected from Conflans:

To which it is added the debt carried over from his past account of the castellany of Entremont, [to be paid] from the tax levied by him in the aforesaid castellany [Conflans] -- 59 *sous* and 11 *deniers gros tournois*.
[Annex: *Pièces justificatives*, II]

Clearly, the Savoyard castellan was given considerable autonomy in running local finances. Thus, for his services as tax collector Aymon received a share of the money raised (it was from this share that his outstanding debt would have been paid). But such arrangements were by no means rare in the late Middle Ages. More importantly, castellanies' finances were seen as to some degree interchangeable. The ideal of the fiscal accountability of the territorial-administrative unit could be substituted in practice by the castellan's personal responsibility for delivering the sums expected of him. Whether the outstanding debt from Entremont was due to the castellan's own failures or to economic hardship in the castellany, the debt was paid back by an *individual* from revenues collected elsewhere. The people of the castellany of Entremont got a break. In an earlier case from Conflans (1305), the castellan's outstanding debt was paid back after only one year; but it was, in this case as well, a debt carried over from his previous term at the head of a different castellany, Saint-Georges-d'Espéranche, in the bailiwick of Viennois.²⁰

The socio-economic life of Savoyard communities

Much of the promise of the *computi* comes from the wealth of detail they offer about socio-economic trends at the local level, in the main town and the villages of each castellany, including data about better-off commoners, notoriously difficult to come by in medieval sources. But the fiscal records do not offer a complete picture of the society, economy, and everyday life of the Western Alps in the later Middle Ages. Not all of Savoy was organized into castellanies. Even within the territory of a castellany, families that did not owe significant dues to the count of Savoy generally escape the purview of the *computi*, surfacing only occasionally in the rubrics concerned with judicial fines because they were subject to the count's jurisdiction. Consequently, the story that the fiscal records are apt to tell us concerns not the workings of Alpine economy and society as a whole,²¹ but the differentiated transformation of local communities under the impact of the expanding institutional arm of the Savoyard principality.

My initial exploration of the sources has highlighted the considerable potential of a dual approach to the socio-economic evidence of the *computi*: database analysis combined with case studies that can verify and flesh out the findings of quantitative research. The database will enable correlations between various socio-economic figures, such as the demands made on the local economy by the count's military expeditions and the portion of castellany revenues directed towards investment in the local infrastructure. Furthermore, I will test the possible correlation between the annual rates at which locals were leasing the count's agricultural land, vineyards, or mills and the tax records that reveal property purchases by prospering locals. At the other end of the social spectrum, I will examine the link between the rate of defaults on tax payments and the records of the judicial fines that can be read as an index of social unrest. These are just a few of the possible ways of investigating the *computi*'s socio-economic evidence through a database.

The case-study, prosopographical research of Savoyard communities involves tracing the individuals and families that surface in the *extentes*, the *computi* (particularly under the headings concerned with sales and acquisitions, leases of the count's lands and revenue sources, and judicial cases), the *subsidia*, and the occasional surviving charters. The benefit of this approach inspired by microhistory is that it sheds light not only on the Savoyard aristocracy but also on the more prosperous commoners who surface in the sources through purchases of land and property taxes.

Obviously, the evidence is particularly rich for the locals who did business with the local administration. The following pages are meant to give a sense, through specific examples from the sources, of the ways in which the analysis of the *computi* can lead to significant findings about socio-economic developments.

Particularly useful are the first *computi*, dating from the year when the territory of a local lordship, now acquired by the count from its aristocratic owners, was organized as an administrative unit under a castellan. These *computi* give a record of the problems pertaining to the collection of revenues during this transitional period and indirectly shed light on how local lords had conducted their business. Thus, they enable us to assess the relative efficiency of the castellany system in comparison with the administration of local lords.

The 1319-1320 *computus* from Conflans is a case in point.²² Owing to the circumstances from which it emanates, this document highlights many of the aspects that make the *computi* invaluable sources for social history, and as such I dwell on it at some length. While this is not the first *computus* from Conflans, it is the first complete one, listing the entire array of revenues collected. Conflans was organized as a *mistralia* or *métralie* (smaller administrative unit) in the second half of the thirteenth century and run by the lord of Conflans on behalf of the count as part of a power-sharing arrangement that turned the head of the leading aristocratic family into the count's castellan. Thus, until 1319 the count's revenues were limited to the proceedings of the administration of justice, the tax on property transactions, and a few other occasional dues. In 1305-1306 the subheadings in the earliest extant *computus* from the *métralie* of Conflans are limited to *Banna intra uillam*, *Banna extra uillam* (fines for small crimes committed in and outside of the town of Conflans), *Laudes et uenditiones* (the tax on land transactions), *Placita* (payable upon the accession of a new count to the Savoyard throne), *Inuenta* (the proceedings of lost and found sales), and *Firma* (the revenue of a tax which in 1305-1306 was farmed out to the castellan himself, as it occasionally happened when no local thought he could meet the price set by the Savoyard administration – here, the round sum of twenty-five *livres* – and still make a profit).²³ In 1319 the count took advantage of the jurisdictional rights over Conflans that he had acquired in the last decades, and passed a sentence against Humbert of Conflans in a local dispute. Humbert realized that some sort of bargain was preferable and agreed to sell to the count most of his lands, rights, and revenues.²⁴

Dating from 1319-1320, the first complete *computus* of what was now the castellany of Conflans illustrates perfectly the complex nature of the Savoyard fiscal records. More than a register of local revenues and expenses, it is a tool of government in the sense that it abounds in written instructions to the castellan. The instructions are recorded in the body of the text, with a note, “Vide”, visually set out in the left margin. The note would have come in handy at the next auditing, reminding the central administrators and the count to look not only at the balance of revenues and expenses, but also to verify the way in which the castellan had acquitted himself of the instructions received in writing. A good deal of the instructions commanded the castellan to gather more detailed information about the families and individuals that, according to the sale deed passed between the lord of Conflans and the count, now owed taxes to the latter. Some of the revenues sold to the count seem to have been rather nominal: Humbert of Conflans had neglected to collect them for some time. The point that emerges from reading these instructions is, not surprisingly, that the Savoyard administration was far more interested in the efficient collection of revenues and in monitoring the performance of its agents than a local lord.

The received wisdom has been that the Savoyard castellanies were first and foremost military units centered on the castle.²⁵ This is not to say that their function was merely defensive, because a castle could serve as a launching pad for raids and expeditions. A corollary view is that the contribution of the typical castellany to the finances of the house of Savoy pales in comparison with the revenues generated by taxing the trans-Alpine trade through tolls in several key places.²⁶ While this emphasis on the military function probably holds true for border castellanies during times of military conflict, more recently the recognition that a good deal of the lands of Savoy were free of major military conflicts for long periods of times has led to more nuanced perspectives on the multi-functional role of Savoyard castellanies.²⁷ Nevertheless, a thorough study of the castellan as an administrator of economic resources has yet to be undertaken. In particular, the correlation between the expansion of the network of castellanies and the granting of franchise charters (with market privileges) to towns needs to be examined more closely,²⁸ because it shows a more subtle way in which the castellany system influenced economic growth, by providing the jurisdictional and administrative framework within which urban life could flourish.

The count was an important landowner in most castellanies, with arable lands, meadows, and vineyards. He held the monopoly of two important productive facilities in the castellany, the mills and the ovens on which the locals depended for processing their wheat, rye, and oats. Another source of revenue were the markets and fairs, on which the count levied a sale tax (*leyda*). As a rule, the castellan was instructed to farm out these resources to locals in exchange for an annual payment.

Farming out made financial sense particularly for those facilities that generated revenues through a tax on each individual transaction, such as the grinding of wheat at the count's mill or the baking of flour at the oven, or particularly the sale tax on every transaction that took place at the local market, the butchers' stalls, and other merchants' shops. The castellan did not have the men effectively to police this daily business which can easily escape the eyes of the administration. The denizens of the castellany would have relied on local solidarities to conduct as much of their business at the market without paying the tax, or would have put pressure on the millers and bakers to under-report the quantities and thus pay less than what was owed to the castellan. That this must have been so is suggested by anecdotal evidence. The 1319-1320 *computus* from Conflans records the revenues of the market and the oven both during a short initial period when they were administered directly by the castellan, and during the subsequent interval when they were farmed out. The difference is striking. Administered by the count's men between 18 August and 16 September 1319, the *leyda* or market tax yielded four *solidi*. Subsequently this was farmed out for nine *livres* and ten *solidi* to be paid annually in two instalments: this comes down to almost sixteen *solidi* per month, or *four times as much* as when the sale tax was collected directly by the castellan. As for the revenue of the ovens, by farming it out the castellan was able to raise it from a monthly average of approximately 7.5 *solidi* to 13.5 *solidi* – a more reasonable increase, but still a spectacular one: 80 percent.²⁹

These anecdotal data suggest that taxing the daily business of the local markets required local knowledge and connections – which the Savoy, at least during their first year of full control over Conflans, understandably did not possess. Furthermore, a local notable whose knowledge and status enabled him to administer such revenues effectively would have been interested in farming them from the count for a profit.

Here is a similar example from l'Hôpital-sous-Conflans, "villa nova Hospitalis Confleti", just across the river from Conflans, a town that

had received a franchise charter from the count in 1287 and was first integrated in the Savoyard administrative structure as part of the castellany of Ugine.³⁰ By 1319, when l'Hôpital-sous-Conflans became part of the newly established castellany of Conflans, the count's oven was farmed by a local notable, Mermet "de Furno", in exchange for an annual payment. Mermet came from a clan that appears to have been a power-house in the near-by village of Saint-Sigismond, holding lands for which dues in kind and cash were paid to the count. Jacob de Furno, who may well have been the clan's leader, is even called "lord" – "donno", from "dominus" – in the *computi*, although he, like Mermet, paid the *taille* to the count. This suggests a family of commoners who over time rose in station. It is tempting to speculate that their name, "de Furno", indicates a tradition of farming the operation of the town's oven from the count, but the earlier *computi* from Ugine are silent on this matter because they generally do not record the name of the revenue farmer.³¹ At any rate, it is significant that a member of this prosperous family was interested in the business opportunities opened up by the Savoyard administration.

The evidence points to real negotiation between the state and the local revenue farmers. The administration seems to have stuck to the price, unwilling to farm out sources of revenues at low annual rates and unable to pressure the locals to pay the asking price. The *computi* record that revenues were exploited directly when no one could be found to lease them; this could happen not only for short intervals as in the examples discussed above, but even for years in a row – for various reasons. For several years after 1319 the castellan could not lease out the mill at Conflans, for all the recent investment in its productive capacity (see below). A brief note in the *computus* submitted in March 1325 provides a hint in this respect: "non inuenit qui ipsum uellet accensare propter inundationes et diluuium aquarum", no one could be found to lease it "on account of the inundations and flood of the waters".³² The entry goes on to note that in the two years covered in the *computus* the mill was put out of business for four months. Presumably such an occurrence had been anticipated by the locals – hence their reservations. What is more, the count's agents were reluctant to adjust down their estimation in December 1320 of the mill's annual revenue at ten *setiers* of wheat, even as the revenues collected during the subsequent years of direct operation came up on average only to around four *setiers* annually, and rose to circa seven *setiers* annually only in 1323-1325.³³ This shows a certain lack of sensitivity to local micro-economics, but it does make some sense if we

see castellanies' contribution to Savoyard finances as more than just a modest addition to the income brought in by the trans-Alpine tolls. Put simply, the count could not allow his revenues from the castellanies to drop significantly. Furthermore, the presence of the more entrepreneurial merchants from northern Italy meant there was a chance that, where locals saw only risks in farming certain of the count's revenues, "the Lombards" might see a way of making a profit – but only by driving a hard bargain.

Here is an illustrative example. According to the Ugine *computus* for April 1314 - July 1315, at l'Hôpital-sous-Conflans Tomasetto the Lombard farmed the tax known as the *métralie*, paying four *livres* for the half-year term ending in September 1314. Subsequently, however, the *métralie* remained vacant ("uacata") for four weeks because no one was willing to farm it ("quod non inueniretur qui ipsam recipet, ut dicit").³⁴ Presumably Tomasetto wanted a lower rate for the term starting in September 1314 and the Savoyard administration was unwilling to go lower. There is a gap in our records about l'Hôpital-sous-Conflans from 1315 until 1319, and we do not know who took over the collection of the tax after those four weeks of vacancy in the autumn of 1314. Quite likely it was Tomasetto himself, but at a lower rate. In 1319 the *computus* of the castellany of Conflans mentions him as the revenue farmer for the *métralie*, at a rate of three *livres* for a half-year term, i.e., 25 percent less than in 1314 (the reference to a preceding *computus* submitted by the castellan of Ugine makes clear that Tomasetto also rented the *métralie* in 1318). The *auditores computorum* felt compelled to add a justifying note for this low rate in the *computus*, stating that no one could be found who would bid more.³⁵ To sum up, it appears that no local was willing to take a gamble and farm at a price that the Italian merchant declined as too high. But it is also clear that the "institutional memory" of the Savoyard state – a function of detailed and well-kept *computi* – kept alive the idea that this local source of revenue might be leased out for an amount approaching the peak of five years previously.

If for several years no revenue farmer could be found it often fell upon the castellans to farm the revenues at the price expected by the count. No doubt this was a burden on their finances, and the fact that castellans accepted it suggests that their office carried benefits that extended beyond the standard annual salary of twenty-five *livres*. The count could put pressure on a castellan to farm the mill or market tax that no one else was interested in, because they both knew that the office of castellan had

sufficient perquisites that made it attractive even with such occasional burdens.

The castellan's role as an administrator of economic resources also involved directing the investments made by the Savoyard state in the maintenance, repair, and expansion of the local infrastructure, from roads and bridges to the mill, oven, market hall and stalls. By shouldering the cost of these investments the Savoyard administration ensured that the various economic facilities continued to generate revenues and locals remained interested in leasing them. At Conflans, the investment in repair and construction in 1319-1320 was considerable, because the erstwhile lord had neglected to look after the local infrastructure. It included the repair of a mill and two baking ovens (in Conflans and l'Hôpital-sous-Conflans) as well as of the market buildings (which housed the butchers' booths, the salt sellers' stalls, and other shops),³⁶ and the building of a new mill next to the existing one, thus doubling its capacity (as discussed above, this did not work out as expected). Together with some woodwork in one of the towers of the count's newly acquired residence in Conflans – and bearing in mind that some of the labor was provided for free by a local carpenter – the grand total ran to almost 60 *livres*.³⁷ This was about 60 percent of the nearly 100 *livres* of revenue yielded by the castellany in that year. But the investment was badly needed: the entry in the *computus* records that the roofs of the market buildings “were threatened by ruin”. This gives a good illustration of the contrast between the previous lord's neglect of the local economy and the state's effort to stimulate local trade and business through investments in infrastructure. While many Savoyard communities faced for the first time a professional fiscal administration, more rigorous and taxing than the earlier attempts of local lords, they also stood to benefit from the count's general policy of encouraging economic development through investments and the granting of franchise charters to towns.

Further research can evince the socio-economic effects over the medium and long term of locals' strategic decision to do business with the administration. As suggested by the anecdotal evidence analyzed here, this research direction has considerable potential, because the *computi* are a particularly useful record of information for precisely such individuals and families. While the castellany accounts do not provide a detailed picture of the entire society of the Western Alps, they can afford us a sense of the differentiated impact of the advent of the Savoyard administration on the local communities.

Because of its avowed preference for long-run, structural developments spanning more than two centuries, Nicolas Carrier's pioneering approach to the *computi* from Faucigny left out some of the more intriguing possibilities for writing local socio-economic history. The approach that I sketch here as a complement to Carrier's perspective capitalizes on the *computi*'s wealth of information about local socio-economic dynamics. It can help reconstruct not just broad economic trends over the *logue durée* but the social developments that are at the heart of all historical change, such as the affirmation of a class of local entrepreneurs who turned the advent of the reformed state administration into an avenue for socio-economic advancement.

Of particular relevance in this context is the evolution of the local land market. The analysis is made possible by the records of the tax on property transactions, under the "Laudes and uenditiones" rubric of the *computi*. Each entry under this rubric gives the names of the seller and buyer, the price of the sale, and the amount paid in tax (generally, one sixth of the price). Flourishing families typically invested their money in land. For instance, of the four land transaction taxed and recorded in the *computus* submitted by Thomas Evian, castellan of Faverges, for a brief, two-month term (June-August 1318), three refer to acquisitions by the same individual, Pierre "Mercatoris" or Marcheant (see **Annex: Pièces justificatives, I**). Pierre's name features under the same rubric of property purchases in the next two *computi* from Faverges, with the acquisition of another land and of a house.³⁸ In total, between June 1318 and August 1320 Pierre spent almost 20 *livres* buying real estate. He must be ranked among the town's notables, his surname indicative perhaps of the activity – viz., commerce – from which he and his ancestors had made their money. In many *computi*, the list of property transactions is quite lengthy, testifying to a vibrant land market. This makes it possible to study the dynamic of socio-economic change at the local level, bringing nuance to the analysis of "structural" economic trends over the long run. This micro-historical approach to the socio-economic evidence of the *computi* can benefit from the lessons of decades of research on the economic records of medieval England.³⁹

The crucial point is to take into account both demographic factors such as the plagues of 1348 and 1362 and political developments like the creation and expansion of the castellany system. The plague's socio-economic impact differed according to the social and political structures in place,⁴⁰ including the regime of property, institutional development, and social mobility. An analysis sensitive to the socially-differentiated

impact of the defining political and demographic events in the history of late-medieval Savoy can problematize the metanarrative of sharp economic decline and slow re-growth across Western Europe. It can also introduce a sense of human agency into the broad picture, looking at socio-economic strategies at the level of the local community, the family, and the individual. This can help to flesh out what would otherwise be an arid analysis of macro-historical trends. Lastly, it bears repeating that this “prosopographical” approach to local socio-economic trends is well-worth undertaking if only for the simple reason that there is abundant material for it in the sources. This is one of the stories that the sources are particularly apt to tell us.

In the examples discussed above the focus is on how locals made use of the business opportunities offered by the Savoyard state to advance their socio-economic position in the community. But just as well, the economic decline of other individuals and families can be tracked through the *computi*. The defaults on the payment of fixed dues and taxes – a clear indicator of economic troubles – are relatively common throughout the various subheading of the castellany accounts.

Certainly, the possibilities for correlating the data from the various subsections of the castellany accounts are not limited to the well-off individuals. The *computi* occasionally record the wages paid to agricultural workers, making it possible to correlate their evolution with that of food prices, and even with the dynamic of land transactions. Specifically, it would be interesting to look at a possible correlation between laborers’ wages and the dynamic of sales of small properties – the kind that modest peasants who relied in part on wages might have tried to purchase during times of higher pay and would have been forced to sell during hard times.

ANNEX: Pièces justificatives⁴¹

I. ADS, Chambéry, SA 11579

Account of revenues and expenses, castellany of Faverges, 1318

Computus Thome Aquini castellani Fabriciarum a die noua mensis iunii anno domini m^o ccc^o xviii^o usque ad diem dominicam, terciam decimam diem mensis augusti anno eodem, uidelicet de nouem septimanis una die, receptus apud Chamberiacum presente domino comite per Johannem dictum Acquibella clericum domini comiti.

De frumento, fabis, auena, turtis, gallinis, feno, palea, nucibus, piper, denarii census non computat quia nichil recepit.

Leyda

Idem reddit computum quod recepit ibidem de exitu magne leyde et parue a die uicesima septima die aprilis anno [millesimo] ccc^o xviii^o usque ad diem dominicam predictam ut in particulis -- lxxi sol. ob. gebennensium. Item recepit in sexdecim quartis frumenti, quatuor quartis et dimidium salis, septem quartis et dimidium auene, et tribus quartis de heray habetis de exitu dicte leyde per dictum tempus per manum dicti Noriont, sibi pro tanto uenditis quarta frumentum - duobus solidis, quarta salis - quatuor solidis decem denariis, quarta auene - decem denariis, et quarta de heray - uiginti denariis -- lxxv sol. iii den. gebennensium.

Item recepit de exitu dicte leyde fromagie in quadraginta nouem paruiss fromagiis habetis de exitu dicte leyde per dictum tempus per manum eiusdem Neriondi pro tanto uenditis -- x sol. x den. gebennensium.

Summa -- vii lb. vii sol. i den. ob. gebennensium.

Pedagium

Idem reddit computum quod recepit de exitu pedagii per dictum tempus, uidelicet de trecentum quatuor uiginti decem nouem bestiis et dimidium transeuntibus per dictum tempus, et leuantur de quolibet bestia quatuor denarii gebennensium, deductis tribus solidis pro salario collectoris -- vi lb. x sol. ii den. gebennensium.

Summa eadem -- vi lb. x sol. ii den. gebennensium.

Alpagium

Idem reddit computum quod recepit pro alpagio propter quam dominus percepit in monte de Aroisa ad alltata de Montouz et ... de Giers -- vii den. gebennensium.

Summa eadem -- vii den. gebennensium.

Laudes et uenditiones

Idem reddit computum quod recepit a Petro Mercatoris pro prato empto a Mermeto de Chambillen. precio centum solidorum -- x sol. gebennensium.

Recepit ab eodem pro terra emptata a Peroneto Cazati precio duodecim solidorum -- ii sol.

Vide -- Recepit a Peroneto Pauioti et eius uxor pro terra emptata a Jaquimeto Comtent precio sex libre, deductis quinque solidis pro precio trium denariorum de redditu et sex denariorum de placito quos ibidem percipiebat dictus Comtent, et de quibus tribus denariis castellanus post ipsum computare debet -- xx sol.

Item recepit a Petro Mercatoris pro terra emptata a Johanne Mitana precio centum decem solidorum -- xviii sol. iii den.

Summa -- l sol. iii den. gebennensium.

Banna

Idem reddit computum quod recepit ab Hugonerio de Fucimagna quia lapides proherat contra quatuor homines -- v sol. gebennensium.

Summa eadem -- v sol. gebennensium.

Vintenum

Idem recepit ab Agnesona uxor Johannis Balli pro uinteno -- vii den. ob. gebennensium.

Item a Jaquerio Quartonis pro eodem -- iii sol.

Item a Johanne Decray -- xvi den.

Summa -- iii sol. xi den. ob. gebennensium.

Escheite

Idem reddit computum quod recepit de bonis Hudriseti Mathrye habitatoris de Sancte Foriuel. usurarii defuncti, et non potuit ultra recuperare quia dimisit castellaniam sed castellanus post ipsum de hiis computare debet,

in duabus vathis efigatis cum illis qui eas tenebant ad commandam -- xxx sol. gebennensium.

Item recepit de bonis eiusdem in pecuniam, deductis duobus solidis sex denariis pro expensis factis in mittendo quesitum dictas vatias in monte de Arclusa -- v sol. vi den. gebennensium.

Summa -- xxxv sol. vi den. gebennensium.

Iterum i firme

Item reddit computum quod recepit a Michaele de Cleyriaco pro medietate firme mistralie domini de Fabricis acquisiti de nouo a Radulpho de Fabricis finiende in festo beate Katherine anno [millesimo] ccc^o xviii^o et de alia medietate computauit in computo precedenti -- xxx sol. gebennensium.

Summa eadem -- xxx sol. gebennensium.

Summa tocius recepte huius computi inclusiue duobus denariis pro rotalibus predictis -- xx lb. iii sol. x den. gebennensium.

Opera castri

Tecto turris castri domini quem Boreas destruxerat, resitiendo undecies centum triginta duabus scindulis emptis ad idem, octo solidis octo denariis gebennensium, duobus miliariis cum dimidio clauini emptis ad idem, sex solidis octo denariis, una duodena ratiarum ferrearum emptis [...], empta duodecim denariis, inclusis octo solidis nouem denariis stipendiis septem carpentariorum ad idem operancium, capiente quolibet quindecim denarios per diem ut in particulis -- xxv sol. i den. gebennensium.

Expense uinearum

Uinea domini comitis de Fabricis liganda et esbratanda in mense julii anno [millesimo] ccc^o xviii^o, stipendiis uiginti sex hominum ad idem operandi capiente quolibet septem denarios, et stipendiis trium hominum... dictam uineam, et stipendiis triginta octo hominum dictam uineam rebinantium eadem mense capiente <quolibet septem denarios> -- xxxix sol. xi den.

[fol. 2] Expense pratorum

Item prato de uinea domini et alio prato nouo, secandis, fenandis, et feno in grangia domino reponendo, et continent prata septem falcatas et aliud pratum de Fauergeges unam falcatam, stipendiis octo falcatorum capiente

quolibet quatuordecim denarios, et stipendiis sexdecim fenatorum capiente quolibet octo denarios, et unius alterius hominis recoperientis grangiam capiente octo denarios ut in particulis -- xx sol.

Item situ furni deiificio reparandis ut in particulis -- xiii sol.

Salarium

Librauit sibi ipso pro salario suo capiente per annum uiginti quinque libras viennenses cursibillum, et allocatur sibi pro nouem septimanis una die, de quibus computat -- iiii <lb. x sol. vii den. viennenses cursibillum>

Summa expensarum et salarium -- iiii lb. xviii sol. v den. gebennensium.

Et -- iiii lb. x sol. vii den. viennenses cursibillum.

Debet -- xv lb. v sol. v den. gebennensium.

Debentur -- iiii lb. x sol. vii den. viennenses cursibillum.

Quoniam viennenses cursibillum uiginti sex denarij pro duodecim denariis gebennensium ualent -- xli sol. x den., qui deducuntur de predictis quindecim libris quinque solidis quinque denariis gebennensium, quas uide supra.

Restant quas debet finaliter -- xiii lb. iii sol. vii den. gebennensium.

Sciendum quod fenum dictorum trium pratorum depositum est in grangiam expeditum castellano successore suo, ut dicit; nescit quantitatem quia non sunt ibi trosse neque thariate, ut dicit.

II. ADS, Chambéry, SA 9004

Account of *subsidia* (direct taxation), castellany of Conflans, 1333

Computus domini Aymonis de Camera militis castellani Conflleti de subsidio concesso domino in castellania Conflleti per quinque annos inceptos in festo beati Andrei anno [millesimo] ccc^o xxxj^o, ut in computo precedenti, et computat hic pro tercio anno, uidelicet pro termino festi beati Andrei anno [millesimo] ccc^o xxxiiij^o, redditus die quinta mensis aprilis anno [millesimo] ccc^o xxxiiij^o. Receptus apud Chamberiacum, presente domino, per Romanetum de Chamberiacum clericum domini.

Recepta

Idem reddit computum quod recepit pro sexcies viginti et octo focis existentibus in castellania Confleti, quorum septuaginta duo sunt de uilla Confleti, in quibus recuperauit pro quolibet foco adiuuante diuite pauperi octo denarios turonenses grossos. Et pro residuis quinquaginta sex focis existentibus extra villa Confleti recuperauit pro quolibet foco adiuuante similiter diuite pauperi quatuor denarios turonenses grossos prout et in computo precedenti, deductis duodecim denariis turonenses grossis pro vacatione trium focorum de munero suprascripto, uidelicet Aymonis d'Elpisiour, Jaquimeti Renil, et Mermeti Ponti de mandamento Confleti, qui hoc anno absque liberis, bonis, et focis relictis obierunt et nichil soluerunt, ut dicit -- lxxv sol. viii den. grossos turonenses.

Recepit pro eodem a liberis Humberti de Confleto quondam pro duodecim focis hominum quos habent apud Nonam et Agreignon pro eodem termino -- iiii sol. grossos turonenses.

Recepit a Petro domino de Feysson pro eodem pro quinque focis hominum quos habet in valle Sancti Ypoliti, tam pro termino predicto quam pro termino festi beati Andrei anno [millesimo] ccc^o xxxij^o, et est sciendum quod castellanus ante ipsum pro focis dictorum duorum nobilium nichil computauit, nec pro focis hominum Johanni domini castri Confleti, quem dictus presens castellanus compellit ad soluendam dictum subsidium in manibus Guillelmi Boni, ut dicit. Et iniungitur quod in sequenti computo veniat informatus declarare si et cui nobiles predicti uel eorum heredes subsidium predictum soluerunt -- iii sol. iiii den. grossos turonenses.

Summa recepte -- lxxiii sol. grossos turonenses.

Librata

De quibus idem librauit Guillelmo Boni burgensi Chamberiacum receptori pro domino et qui de ipsis domino computare debebit per litteram dicti Guillelmi de testimonio et recepta datam Chamberiacum die xiiii^a mensis januarii anno [millesimo] ccc^o xxxiiii^o quam reddit -- lxxiii sol. iiii den. grossos turonenses.

Summa librate -- lxxiii sol. iiii den. grossos turonenses.

Et sic debet -- ix sol. viii den. grossos turonenses.

Quibus adduntur quos debebat de remanencia sui computi olim castellanie Intermontes de subsidio per ipsum leuato in castellania predicta -- lix sol. xi den. grossos.

Summa additi -- lix sol. xi den. grossos turonenses.

Et sic debet -- lxix sol. vii den. grossos turonenses.

De quibus deducuntur quos librauit Guillelmo Boni de Chamberiacum recipienti pro domino et de quibus ipse Guillelmus domino computare debebit, ut per confessionem ipsius Guillelmi presentem in computo de recepta -- ix sol. viii den. grossos turonenses.

Summa deducti -- ix sol. viii den. grossos turonenses -- et sic lix sol. xi den. grossos turonenses.

Respondet in computo castellanie -- et sic hic eque.

NOTES

- 1 This assessment by GUILLERÉ and GAULIN, "Des rouleaux et des homes", p. 51, still rings true today, two decades after it was made. The recent effort to digitalize the manuscripts of the castellany accounts can provide a new stimulus to research on this topic. Many digitalized *computi* can be accessed through the website of the Archives départementales de la Savoie, under the heading "Archives en ligne": <http://www.savoie-archives.fr/2643-archives-numerisees.htm>
- 2 BURGHART, "Account rolls", pp. 2-3.
- 3 CHEVAILLER, *La réception du droit romain*, pp. 353-59.
- 4 BISSON, *Fiscal Accounts of Catalonia*; CASSIDY, "*Recorda splendidissima*".
- 5 The castellan sometimes exercised a pre-emption right when the dues that had been collected in produce were sold locally; CARRIER, "Le rachat des redevances en nature".
- 6 CARRIER, *La vie montagnarde en Faucigny*, p. 434.
- 7 CASTELNUOVO and GUILLERÉ, "Les finances et l'administration".
- 8 DEMOTZ, *La géographie administrative*, which makes very limited use of the *computi*.
- 9 This approach has proven influential. For a recent contribution, see THÉVENAZ MODESTIN, "Une élaboration par étapes".
- 10 This comparison has yet to be undertaken. Cf. DEMOTZ, *Le comté de Savoie*, p. 354, and BURGHART, "Account rolls", p. 3, note 12.
- 11 CHIAUDANO, *Finanza Sabauda*. For a more recent overview, see MOUTHON and CARRIER, 'Les extentes'.
- 12 CASTELNUOVO, *Ufficiali e gentiluomini*.
- 13 CARRIER, *La vie montagnarde en Faucigny*.
- 14 Ibid., 228-230.
- 15 BISSON, *The Crisis of the Twelfth Century*, pp. 322-49.
- 16 See ROSENWEIN (ed.), *Anger's Past*.
- 17 Archives départementales de la Savoie (hereafter ADS), Chambéry, SA 9335, fol. 4. I am indebted to Patrick Stoppiglia of the Archives départementales in Chambéry for sharing with me some of his research material on the castellany of Montmélian.
- 18 ADS, Chambéry, SA 8880, fol. 2.
- 19 ADS, Chambéry, SA 11579, fol. 2.
- 20 ADS, Chambéry, SA 8864, fol. 1.
- 21 Cf. CARRIER and MOUTHON, *Paysans des Alpes*.
- 22 ADS, Chambéry, SA 8867, and transcription in UGINET, *Conflans en Savoie*, pp. 288-311.
- 23 ADS, Chambéry, SA 8864, fol. 1. The tax in question is most likely what subsequent accounts record as *mistralia*, but its nature remains obscure.

- 24 UGINET, *Conflans en Savoie*, pp. 60-62.
- 25 See, e.g., DEMOTZ, *La géographie administrative*, pp. 268-69, and CASTELNUOVO and MATTÉONI (eds.), *"De part et d'autre des Alpes"*.
- 26 COX, "The lands of the house of Savoy", pp. 365, 367.
- 27 CARRIER, *La vie montagnarde en Faucigny*, p. 437.
- 28 See MARIOTTE-LÖBER, *Ville et seigneurie*.
- 29 ADS, Chambéry, SA 8867, fol. 4.
- 30 MARIOTTE-LÖBER, *Ville et seigneurie*, p. 141.
- 31 Furthermore, in 1310 when we have a detailed record the oven was leased to one Jean Chevrot; ADS, Chambéry, SA 12357, fol. 3.
- 32 ADS, Chambéry, SA 8869, fol. 1.
- 33 "extimatum fuit ualere per annum decem sestarios frumenti", ADS, Chambéry, SA 8867, fol. 10; SA 8869, fol. 7.
- 34 ADS, Chambéry, SA 12357.
- 35 ADS, Chambéry, SA 8867, fol. 7.
- 36 UGINET, *Conflans en Savoie*, pp. 154-55.
- 37 ADS, Chambéry, SA 8867, fol. 8. Uginet's transcription in the "pièces justificatives" of his work omits one entry of the list of expenses (concerning the cost of the bread and lunch provided to the workers who transported the wood for the constructions), which I transcribe here: "Pane et prandio date centum et duobus curribus charreantibus fustam necessariam pro predictis operibus de diuersis nemoribus per unam diem, et fuerunt dati baneriis cuiuslibet currus octo denarios fortes escucellati pro pane et prandio -- lxxviii solidos fortes escucellati."
- 38 ADS, Chambéry, SA 11579, fol. 1, 3, 9.
- 39 See RAZI, "The Toronto school's reconstitution".
- 40 FREEDMAN, "Rural society", pp. 91-92.
- 41 Lacunae in the manuscripts and illegible words are indicated by suspension points; where it proved possible to reconstruct missing words this is indicated between angle brackets. Three currencies are used in the *computi* transcribed here, following the Carolingian system of money of account in which a *livre* (lb.) was subdivided into 20 *sous* or *solidi* (sol.), each worth 12 *deniers* (den.; a further subdivision was the *obolus*, worth half a *denier*): the currency of the bishop of Geneva (*gebennensium*), of the Dauphin of Viennois (*viennenses cursibilium*), and of the king of France (*turonenses* or *tournois*).

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BEFORE AND AFTER THE REVOLUTION: MODERNISM, POLITICAL MODERNISM AND POST-MODERNISM IN THE FILMS OF MIKLÓS JANCsó

Abstract

Focusing on Hungarian film director Miklós Jancsó (1921-2014) and tracing the development of his thinking, as evidenced by the formally distinctive and politically charged body of work that he built over 50 years, the essay investigates issues related to international cinematic modernism, its various national versions, its late-1960s political vanguard and the particularities of Jancsó's contribution to this vanguard from his position as a filmmaker in an officially Socialist country.

Keywords: Miklós Jancsó, films studies, avant-garde, modernism, political modernism, long takes, montage.

David Bordwell's influential *Narration in the Fiction Film* (1985) contains a note drawing attention to the author's avoidance, throughout the book, of the words "modernist" and "modernism",¹ although Bordwell admits that three of the "modes of narration" analyzed in his book could very well be described by those terms. The first of these modes is what Bordwell prefers to call "art-cinema narration", Bordwell inviting his readers, there and elsewhere, to see the so-called "art film" as a "distinct mode of film practice" with a "definite historical existence", possessing not only specific institutions (film festivals, art cinemas, cinephile journals), but also "a set of formal conventions" (shared by *auteurs* who are otherwise encouraged to develop highly distinctive individual styles) and "implicit viewing procedures".² A second cinematic mode of narration that the eminent historian of film style avoids calling "modernist" was developed,

according to Bordwell, by the great Soviet filmmakers of the 1920s, who attempted to fuse revolutionary politics with a revolution in cinematic forms, before Stalinism broke their élan. According to Bordwell, who calls this mode of narration “historical-materialist” and differentiates it from “art-cinema narration”, some of its principles were resurrected in the late 1960s by left-wing filmmakers for whom revolutionary politics also entailed a revolution in cinematic forms. Finally, *Narration in the Fiction Film* identifies a third “mode” that it refrains from labeling “modernist”; Bordwell calls it “parametric narration” and describes it as a mode in which storytelling is paralleled by the autonomous, abstract play of formal parameters, by an intricate stylistic patterning which is not subordinated to narrative and dramatic, to expressive and thematic demands, but is completely independent of them.

Bordwell acknowledges that, insofar as it’s indebted to the line of great literary and theatrical innovators “running roughly from James, Proust, Joyce, and Kafka through Faulkner, Camus and the Theatre of the Absurd, to Cortázar and Stoppard”, art-cinema narration could be called modernist. Bordwell continues:

If we take modernism to be more closely allied with the experimental work of political artists like Grosz, Lissitzky, Heartfield, Brecht, and Tretyakov, then historical-materialist narration will be a better candidate for the label. And if we consider parametric narration as a distinct mode, its modernist pedigree can be traced back to the work of the Russian Formalists – a movement deeply involved with contemporary avant-garde poetry and fiction – and to the continental serialism and structuralism of the 1950s and 1960s. Thus parametric films might be considered modernist.

The reason given by Bordwell for his reluctance to use the term is that some of the filmmakers whose work he cites as exemplifying his third “mode” were active within cultures and/or historical periods that may seem remote from the influence of European modernism. Bordwell’s reluctance probably also owes something to the fact that “modernism” and “avant-garde” are terms that have been defined in different, sometimes conflicting ways, and that’s before they were even applied to the cinema, where their application created new contradictions.

For example, Bordwell’s 1985 study anatomizes modes of cinematic *narration*, thus leaving aside non-narrative cinema; for the most part, so does András Bálint Kovács’s *Screening Modernism: European Art Cinema*,

1950-1980, which benefits from (and gratefully acknowledges) Bordwell's mapping of modes of narration, without sharing his qualms about labelling them "modernist".³ On the other hand, for theorist Peter Wollen, writing in 1982, "the impact of modernism has been delayed [in cinema] till the [late 1960s] advent of [the non-narrative film genre or movement known as] «structural film»".⁴ The particular "modernism" that Wollen has in mind in this passage is "Greenbergian modernism" – modernism as defined by influential American art critic Clement Greenberg, who, writing about painting, equated it with a movement (begun with the Impressionists and Manet, radicalized with Cubism and culminating in Abstract Expressionism) away from representationalism or mimesis, and towards the foregrounding of painting's material substrate (the materiality of paint itself, the materiality of the canvas), the turning of the materials of painting into its only "proper" subject, resulting into art about art,⁵ or, in András Bálint Kovács's words, art as "the aesthetic self-criticism of art".⁶ Although Wollen considers that it is only with the "structural film" movement of the 1960s (first in the US, then in the UK) that cinema starts reflecting on its own material means, he notes that, back in the 1920s, the growing tendency towards abstraction in painting was already being mirrored in the work of the cinematic avant-garde – films by Hans Richter, Man Ray, László Moholy-Nagy and others. But work like that – adds Wollen – treated cinema like a mere extension of painting: painting plus movement, painting plus time, painting that uses light directly. What was new in the "structural film" of the 1960s, according to Wollen, was the effort to be true to Greenberg's dictum that each art should turn upon its "unique and irreducible" self, discovering and spotlighting it. So, no longer a simple extension of painting, but a displacement of its (Greenbergian-modernist) concerns with its own sphere of materials, "structural" cinema insisted on the ontological autonomy of film. Hence, films "about" the photo-chemical process and other processes involved in filmmaking, films foregrounding "uniquely and irreducibly" filmic facts like printing and projecting, like the graininess of celluloid, etc.⁷

As influential as it was, this understanding of modernism, derived from painting, was, even in its heyday, one among others – and, when radically applied to cinema by the "structural" filmmakers and by fellow-travelling critics, one whose commitment to an ontology of the medium, grounding an "anti-mimetic" or "anti-representational" stance, could appear to have simply shifted the focus of theorist André Bazin's contrary argument that it was the very ontology of the medium that committed cinema to realism.

Not easily dismissible as a theoretically naïve or retrograde defender of what a Greenbergian would disparagingly call “illusionism” in art (i.e., mimesis), Bazin championed what he took to be cinema’s inescapable realism in the irreproachably modernist terms of the medium’s duty to be faithful to itself. That “unique and irreducible self” was defined, in his view, by the mechanical process (“mechanical” meaning not necessarily influenced by human subjectivity, needing very little human intervention) by which light bounces off an object of this world and leaves an imprint of that object on the film strip. Fidelity to its unique self made painting give up representation of the world in order to concentrate on its own materials – the canvas, paint itself –, but Bazin argued that, where cinema was concerned, the same modernist imperative of fidelity to its proper self should bind the medium more tightly to its realistic calling. In answer to this, a “structural” filmmaker may very well keep the definition of the medium’s true self in terms of light, while denying that reproduction of the natural world is the aim of the photographic process. As Wollen explains it,

light is no longer seen as the means by which the pro-filmic event is registered on film, but as the pro-filmic event itself, and at the same time part of the material process of the film itself, and transmitted through the lens and indeed the strip of celluloid in the projector – so that the strip can be seen as the medium for the transmission (and absorption) of light, the basic raw material.

The result is an anti-illusionist, anti-realist film that, ironically, “ended up sharing many preoccupations in common with its worst enemies”, doubling Bazin’s ontology of film – an ontology which, “seeking the soul of cinema in the nature of the pro-filmic event” (the event taking place in front of the camera), could be called “extroverted” – with a second, “introverted” ontology, seeking the soul of cinema “in the nature of the cinematic process, the cone of light or the grain of silver”. So, film which is radically “about” film, not only attempting to rid itself of what film semiologist Christian Metz called “the non-cinematic codes⁸ with which all representational films have to work (codes existing outside the cinema – often preceding it – and “inscribed into the discourse of film by the process of photographic reproduction”⁹), but reducing “these codes themselves to their material – optical, photo-chemical – substrate”, to “objecthood” and “exclusive self-referentiality” (“the exclusion of any semantic dimension other than reference-back to the material of the signifier itself”, “the

suppression of any signified except a tautological signified"); film as an "investigation and demonstration of its own properties", of "its own processes and structures" – "an epistemological and didactic enterprise".¹⁰ This is filmic "modernism" – if "modernism" is to be rigorously practiced and understood in the Greenbergian manner.

Of course, this was always just one way of understanding it – even if Wollen proposes that Greenberg's field of expertise, painting, "played the leading role in the development of modernism in the other arts", the discoveries of Cubism decisively affecting Gertrude Stein and Ezra Pound, for example, and later William Carlos Williams, Apollinaire, Marinetti, Mayakovsky, Klebikov, and thus playing a pre-eminent role in "the shift of terrain that marked the substitution of one paradigm or problematic for another, the beginning of modernism, the work of the historic avant-garde". Wollen argues that the innovations of Picasso and Braque were seen, or intuitively felt, from very early on, "as having an implication beyond the history of painting itself", as representing "a critical semiotic shift, a changed concept and practice of sign and signification". As explained by Wollen in semiological terms, the change consisted in the opening-up of a space, a disjunction between signifier and signified and a change of emphasis from the problem of signified and reference, the classic problem of realism, to that of signifier and signified within the sign itself. In painting, this started a trend towards "the suppression of the signified altogether, an art of pure signifiers detached from meaning as much as from reference" – a trend whose leading explainer and cheerleader was to be Greenberg. But an early, crucial work like the *Demoiselles d'Avignon* in no way dissolves the signified; it just dislocates it from the signifier, "asserting – as such a dislocation must – the [signifier's] primacy": "[i]t is not a portrait group or a study of nudes in the representational tradition", but neither can it be adequately described, à la Greenberg, as a pure "investigation of painterly or formal problems or possibilities". The signified "clearly remained dominant" in literature, where modernism "could be interpreted in terms of the expansion of subject-matter, new narrative techniques (stream of consciousness) or play on the paradoxes of meaning and reference (Pirandellism)". It is significant – adds Wollen – that the more radical literary experiments, "such as attempts at sound poetry, were the work of artists or writers working closely with painters" (Arp, Schwitters, Van Doesburg), just as in theatre "the most radical developments were invariably associated with changes in set design and costume" (Meyerhold's Constructivist theatre, Schlemmer's Bauhaus

theatre, Artaud). But, of course, neither Ernst Bloch and Bertolt Brecht (both of them in the 1930s), nor Theodor Adorno (in the 1950s), all of them writing to defend literary “modernism” (including drama)¹¹ against Georg Lukács’s condemnation of it (of Kafka and Expressionism, of Brecht and Musil, of Joyce and Beckett) as “decadent”, as a disastrous straying from the great model of the 19th-century realist novel – none of them even dreamed of asking for a literature which would “abandon the whole realm of reference outside [the novel or] the play [itself]”, which would suppress “any signified except a tautological signified”, like Greenbergian-modernist painting. (A note in passing: the aesthetically conservative stance taken by Lukács against literary Expressionism, in the name of the 19th-century model of realist novel, is in no way similar to André Bazin’s rejection of the German Expressionist school of filmmaking, in the name of the cinematic medium’s essential realism. As already noted, Bazin argues from a purist conception of cinema’s specificity as a medium – its “unique and irreducible self”. Although he champions realism, his medium-essentialism or purism brings him closer to Greenberg than to Lukács: in his view, realism is cinema’s vocation, its specificity residing in the fact that, before being an art, it is a medium for imprinting beings and things with the help of the light bouncing off them and without much need for human intervention – which makes its reproduction of the world potentially objective. On the other hand, movie Expressionism, as demonstrated by the German filmmakers, being dependent on theatrical tools – constructed sets, artificial lighting –, sins against the medium’s congenital realism.)

It is this “modernist” novel or drama, still dominated by the signifier, still committed to representationalism and meaning, that exerts the major influence on the “art film” which emerges as a “mode of film practice” (David Bordwell’s phrase) soon after World War II, with Italian Neorealism, and then with Italian directors like Fellini and Antonioni developing away from Neorealism, with the French “Nouvelle Vague” and the subsequent “new waves” appearing in various national cinemas throughout the 1960s. “Modernist” music (the art that served as a starting point for Adorno’s definition of “modernism”, just as painting was the starting point for Greenberg) may have exerted some influence on the cinematic “mode of narration” that David Bordwell calls “parametric”. While Greenbergian “art gallery modernism”, as already discussed, found its delayed filmic manifestation in the American and British “structural film” movements of the late 1960s and early 1970s.

In his 1975 essay "The Two Avant-Gardes", Peter Wollen doesn't identify any aesthetic phenomenon fitting the description of Bordwell's "parametric cinema", and he gives short shrift to the Fellini-Antonioni-Truffaut mode of "art film". For Wollen, writing in 1975, the two directions counting as avant-gardes are, on the one hand, the Greenbergian "modernism" of "structural" film, and, on the other hand, a direction exemplified by filmmakers such as the post-1968 Jean-Luc Godard, the French husband-and-wife team of Jean-Marie Straub and Danièle Huillet (working mostly in Germany and Italy), and the Hungarian Miklós Jancsó – exponents of what other critics and historians (like Jancsó's compatriot, András Bálint Kovács¹²), have called "political modernism".

As Wollen notes, the two "camps" tended to deny each other the status of avant-garde. For supporters of the Godard-Straub-Jancsó avant-garde, "modernism" à la Greenberg could look – as Wollen puts it – "hopelessly involved with the established bourgeois art world and its values": this art which proclaimed its own autonomy, which concerned itself exclusively with its means and medium, didn't threaten to put itself at the service of any social-political revolution; as Greenberg had written (and this was the pre-Cold War, not yet "depoliticized", still Trotskyist Greenberg of "Towards a Newer Laocoon",¹³ championing abstraction and self-reflexivity in terms that still kept a politically militant ring, as an antidote to both Western-bourgeois and Stalinist kitsch), his modernism was not "an about-face towards a new society, but an emigration to a Bohemia which was to be art's sanctuary from capitalism" – in other words, not a danger to the existing social order. András Bálint Kovács remarks that Greenberg "does not have a notion of the avant-garde distinct from modernism"¹⁴ – he uses the two terms interchangeably –, although another film theorist, Gilberto Perez, notes that in earlier essays, Greenberg would more often use the term "avant-garde" (most famously in his 1939 "Avant-Garde and Kitsch"), while later, writing in a different context, "one of Cold War anti-Communism", he would more often use the word "modernism": a shift in vocabulary reflecting the later Greenberg's downplaying of the politically subversive connotations (as Perez reminds us, "*avant-garde* was originally a political term") that the earlier Greenberg used to find in the type of art that he was championing (the art he favored remained of the same type, of course).¹⁵ As Kovács also notes, Greenberg "sees modernism as part of an organic development of the history of art, as something that fits in smoothly with earlier artistic traditions", and he downplays the efforts of some of the avant-gardes to break with the past

radically: “[M]ovements conventionally considered avant-garde, like Soviet futurism and constructivism, Italian futurism, parts of German expressionism, and French surrealism, don’t easily fit within Greenberg’s notion of modernism.”¹⁶ That’s why a more recently influential theorist like Peter Bürger¹⁷ sees fit to draw a clear line between a “modernism” understood in Greenberg’s terms (art-for-art’s-sake aestheticism, media-specific formalism) and a “historical avant-garde” seen, in Gilberto Perez’s phrase, as a “short-lived fusillade”, an attack, from movements like dada and surrealism, on “the bourgeois institution of art and especially [on] its culmination in the heightened autonomy of modern art.”¹⁸ As summarized by Kovács, where modernism “institutionalizes art qua art”, the avant-garde “attacks artistic institutions on the premise that institutionalization confines art to its pure aesthetic dimension and isolates it from its social functions”; the avant-garde claims art’s “reintegration into everyday life”, but an everyday life which it wishes to change – “art should be another intellectual practice promoting social revolution”.¹⁹

It is true that Bürger’s opposition between “the bourgeois aestheticism” of modernism and the revolutionary aspirations of the avant-garde can be made to look less severe and clear-cut than he makes it. For example, Gilberto Perez reminds us that José Ortega y Gasset, writing at the very time of Bürger’s historical avant-garde, praised it for being the very opposite of what Bürger and others would later see in it: “a reaction not against an art that was too detached from life but against an art that was too involved with it”,²⁰ against what Ortega y Gasset caricatures as the self-importance of much 19th-century art, insistently asking “to be placed in connection with dramatic social and political movements, or else with profound philosophical and religious currents”. Against this, Ortega y Gasset pitted his favorable impression that, “for the young generation, art is a thing of no consequence”.²¹ Further challenging Bürger’s opposition between “modernism” and “avant-garde”, Perez also quotes Renato Poggioli’s *Theory of the Avant-Garde* (1962), which sees the “avant-garde” as spanning a century or more (“beginning in the aftermath of romanticism”, “continuing into the present and the foreseeable future”²²) and including both what Greenberg called “modernism” and the “historical avant-garde” that Bürger and others see as breaking with complacently bourgeois modernism. Poggioli sees no complacency – for him, “as the genuine art of a bourgeois society”, modernism can only be antibourgeois²³ –, just as he sees no break – as Perez puts it, “modernism was always breaking

with itself, in revolt against established convention, including its own, what Harold Rosenberg called ‘the tradition of the new’.²⁴

Still, in the very politicized atmosphere of the late 1960s and early 1970s, the accusation that “structural film”, being Greenbergian-modernist – i.e., formalist, apolitical –, is not a “true” avant-garde, was not without a scorching effect.²⁵ That was the climate in which, as film theorist Noël Carroll points out, the exponents of the British variant of “structural” film, called by them “structural/materialist” film, tried to distance themselves from their American colleagues by claiming that their commitment to revealing the “materiality” of film was politically emancipatory – it made them “materialists” in the Marxist sense. But, as noticed at the time by Wollen, such slippage between the two words was inviting confusion: the “structural” filmmakers’ concern with foregrounding the “materiality” of film may have had a certain political significance (“the necessary interest of the artisan or craftsman in his materials and tools, asserted as an end in itself in the face of competition from large-scale capitalist industry, [from] the Ford model, dedicated to the mass production for profit of illusionist [realist, representational] cinema”), but this wasn’t the same as attempting to construct, with a minimum of rigor, a “Marxist-materialist” cinema. The latter effort was, in fact, characteristic of Wollen’s “other” avant-garde – the avant-garde of Godard, Straub and Huillet, or Jancsó –, which both Wollen and David Bordwell see as reviving and carrying on the Soviet-initiated 1920s tradition of what Bordwell called “historical-materialist narration”. (At the acme of his politically militant phase – the years 1968-72, when he teamed with Jean-Pierre Gorin in an attempt to construct what Wollen called “a new form of revolutionary discourse in the cinema”²⁶ –, Godard acknowledged the filiation by signing the films he made with Gorin as “The Dziga Vertov Group”, Vertov having made, in 1929, one of the most important works of the Soviet avant-garde, *Man with a Movie Camera*.)

The key link between Wollen’s “other” avant-garde and its Soviet forerunners (or between Bordwell’s two ages of “historical-materialist cinema”) is Bertolt Brecht. As pointed out by Bordwell²⁷ and others, Brecht’s theatrical practice and theory had been partly inspired by the Soviet cinema of the 1920s – a montage-based cinema whose brightest star, director Sergei Eisenstein, experimented more and more ambitiously, throughout the decade, with inserting images which clearly didn’t belong to the diegesis (i. e., the story-world): from the images of an ox being slaughtered, which he juxtaposed, in the 1925 *Strike*, with diegetic images of workers being

massacred, to images of pagan deities, which he juxtaposed, in the 1928 *October*, with a character's appeal to the Russian God. As he wrote in his journal, Brecht, too, was interested in a form of "montage" which would break the unity, the coherence asked by Aristotelian aesthetics of the world represented onstage, opposing an autonomy of the parts to the "indivisible whole" prescribed by Aristotle.²⁸ Brecht's art is anti-illusionist – it opposes the type of "realist" theatre or film that aims to give its viewer the illusion of being a witness to real-life events. But even if it entails a concern with showing the signs or the mechanisms of production, which the dominant theatre or cinema tries to efface or hide, Brechtian anti-illusionism – a defining feature of Peter Wollen's "other" cinematic avant-garde, also known as "political modernism", or, to Bordwell, as the second age of "historical-materialist" narrative cinema – is very different from the anti-illusionism of Wollen's "first" avant-garde, preoccupied "with self-definition, the irreducibility of the material support of a work, reflexive art-making". The difference is that Brechtian anti-illusionism is not anti-representational. Writing in 1938 to defend his (and other artists') avant-garde practice against Georg Lukács's accusation that it represented a straying away from realism (Lukács's models of literary realism being 19th-century models), Brecht identified himself as no less of a realist than Lukács was, adding that he understood realism as

discovering the causal complexes of society / unmasking the prevailing view of things as the view of those who are in power / writing from the standpoint of the class which offers the broadest solutions for the pressing difficulties in which human society is caught up / emphasizing the element of development / making possible the concrete, and making possible abstraction from it.²⁹

As Wollen summarizes it:

For Brecht, of course, the point of the *Verfremdung*-effect [alienation effect, distanciation effect] was not simply to break the spectator's involvement and empathy in order to draw attention to the artifice of art, an art-centred model, but in order to demonstrate the workings of society, a reality obscured by habitual norms of perception, by habitual modes of identification with 'human problems'. [...] There was no question then for Brecht of abandoning the whole realm of reference outside the play [...]. He did not equate anti-illusionism with suppression of any signified except a tautological signified. [...] Brecht's objection to the traditional

bourgeois theatre was that it provided a substitute for life – a simulated experience, in the realm of the imaginary, of the life of another person, or other people. In its stead, he actually wanted a representation – a picture, a diagram, a demonstration: he uses all these words – to which the spectator remained external and through which he/she acquired knowledge about (not gained experience of) the society in which he/she, himself/herself lived (not the life of another/others). [...] A representation (...) was not simply a likeness or resemblance to the appearance of its object/referent; on the contrary, it represented its essence, precisely what did not appear at first sight. Thus a gap of space had to be opened up within the realm of perception – a gap whose significance Brecht attempted to pinpoint with his concept of ‘distanciation’. [...] Brecht wanted to find a concept of ‘representation’ that would account for a passage from perception/recognition to knowledge/understanding, from the imaginary to the symbolic: a theater of representation, mimesis even, but also a theater of ideas. Moreover, one of the lessons to be learned from this didactic theater, this theater of ideas, arguments, judgements, was precisely that ideas cannot be divorced from their material substrate, that they have material determinations, that ‘social being determines thought’ as the classic formula (deriving from Marx’s *Preface to a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*) puts it. Brecht, of course, was a militant materialist, in the political (Leninist) sense.³⁰

No matter how diverse were the ways in which the lessons of Brecht were assimilated – and these lessons could certainly lead filmmakers in very dissimilar stylistic directions³¹ –, the second of Wollen’s “two avant-gardes” consisted of filmmakers contributing, one way or another, to what American critic Annette Michelson recognized in 1974 as the “post-Brechtian aesthetic of European [cinema]”.³² What Wollen called the very “core” of the “political modernist” position – namely the idea that politics in art concerned the signifier as much as the signified – was indebted to Brecht.³³ It clearly separated “political modernism” from other specimens of militant leftist cinema being abundantly produced in the late 1960s and early 1970s – the thrillers of Gillo Pontecorvo and Costa-Gavras, or the Italian westerns exhorting Mexican (“Third World”) revolution in terms loosely indebted to Frantz Fanon –, films that tried to be (or at least pretended to try to be) politically useful to the radical left, while operating strictly within the genres and formulas of dominant cinema. At the time, such movies were vehemently denounced by avant-garde filmmakers like the immediately post-’68 Godard or by theorists like those writing for the French cinephile journal *Cahiers du Cinéma*, also

turned by the events of May '68 into promoters of "political modernism" and nothing else. As Godard said in a 1970 interview, "it is necessary to stop making movies on politics, to stop making political movies, and to begin making political movies *politically* [his italics]".³⁴ What he meant was – in the words of Wollen – "that being 'political' is not in itself enough, that there must be a break with bourgeois norms of diegesis, subversion and deconstruction of codes".³⁵ Writing in *Cahiers* about a Costa-Gavras film, Jean-Louis Comolli chastised the director and his collaborators for failing "to do the preliminary work *politically* [his italics] necessary to all political discourse: a questioning of its [said discourse's] conditions of existence and of its means"; instead, the filmmakers chose the "simple acceptance of the conditions and means already there, in place (...), the *reproduction* [his italics] of the means, techniques and forms of dominant production in cinema".³⁶ At best, as Godard himself acknowledged, such means, techniques and forms – the storytelling always focused on individuals, always reliant on identification mechanisms, always aiming for big emotional impact – could be of some limited use to the revolutionary cause, by stirring emotional sympathy, outrage etc.; but, as Godard added³⁷, such stirred feelings remained of very limited use (not to mention the fact that they could be just as easily stirred, by the same means, on behalf of the most unjust causes) without a correct (Marxist) analysis of the situation ("discovering the causal complexes of society", as Brecht had put it, beyond the level of identification with "human problems"), an analysis which this type of filmmaking was ill-suited to guide. At worst, as Jean-Louis Baudry wrote in connection to the "politicized" Italian (or "spaghetti") westerns set in Mexico and calling for revolution in the "Third World", the appearance of a "revolutionary discourse" within such genre (or formula) cinema simply meant that "bourgeois discourse", no longer able to ignore or refute an oppositional discourse growing stronger and stronger, defuses it by "producing a double, a *faux-semblant* which, by 'miming' it, destroys it. The process can be described as the appropriation by one ideology of the *terms* [his italics] of a contradictory ideology".³⁸

The "political modernist" avant-garde not only refused fraternization with filmmakers whose political orientation appeared to be correct, but whose aesthetic forms remained conservative; a 1970 *Cahiers du Cinéma* debate on Miklós Jancsó's 1969 film *The Confrontation / Fényes szelek*, with Jean-Pierre Oudart and Jean Narboni making two different cases for the "prosecution", while Comolli mounts a defense of the film, shows an amount of ambivalence and outright suspicion towards a filmmaker

who, at a first glance, seemed to evince the requisite combination of political commitment and formal radicalism. When Oudart writes about the “freshness” and “beauty” of the film, and about the aesthetic pleasure it gives, he is not actually complimenting the Hungarian director: that aesthetic pleasure is actually suspect – even worse than that, because it dissolves all possible meaning of the political analysis that the viewer is given the illusion of participating in.³⁹ Oudart’s critique belongs to the same climate as feminist critic’s Laura Mulvey’s call for “the destruction of pleasure [as] a radical weapon”⁴⁰ – a climate characterized, in the words of the theorist Robert Stam, by “a puritanical attitude toward filmic pleasure”.⁴¹ Writes Oudart:

The problem would thus be to know whether all non-discursive *écriture* does not tend above all else to give us aesthetic pleasure (precisely at the moment when we begin to question its principles), and whether all the ‘readings’ we give it do not have the sole aim of multiplying this pleasure, at the same time as allowing us a knowledge of the object, a knowledge almost always limited to an assent to the object’s aesthetic, in other words to the ideology (to whose production or reproduction we critics contribute) which makes that object acceptable as an aesthetic object (to certain social groups to which we belong).

Meanwhile, looked at from the other “camp” (the one occupied by the first of Wollen’s “two avant-gardes” – the predominantly formalist, apolitical one), not only Jancsó’s films, but also those of other “political modernists”, could appear as much too rooted in the commercial system (narrative fiction shot most of the time on 35 mm film, sometimes using film stars, produced and distributed through “aboveground” channels and networks) in order to qualify as “avant-garde”. As Kovács explains it, in the cinema, the term “avant-garde” has come to be used more or less synonymously or interchangeably with the terms “experimental” and “underground”, although each of the three terms “reveals a different aspect of the same practice”, non-narrative fictional practice in the cinema being “most often structurally determined (thus experimental)”, just as it is often “based on alternative production and distribution networks (thus underground)” and it is “sometimes political (thus avant-garde in the traditional sense)”. In other words, in the cinema, the label “avant-garde” has only *sometimes* been attached to movements which had a political component. If Peter Bürger sees the avant-garde as necessarily political,

opposing an apolitical, „purely” aesthetic modernism, in cinema the term has become inextricably associated with a non-narrative, non-commercial practice, which may or may not include a political component, but which, in any case, opposes both the Hollywood-type film and the European art-film industry for depending on narrative fiction, movie stars, aboveground funding and distribution networks etc. – an opposition which „only seldom translates into political terms”.⁴² So even if a Godard, at the apogee of his period as a maker of politically radical „counter-cinema”, would sometimes dispense completely with narrative, 35 mm and exposure on the film-festival circuit, to the other “camp” he would still appear fundamentally different – the difference, in Wollen’s words, being ultimately one of „the film-makers’ frame of reference, the places from which they come and the culture to which they relate”.⁴³ As for Miklós Jancsó, all through his decade (1969-1979) as a maker of “political modernist” or (Bordwell’s preferred term) “historical-materialist” cinema, he would remain an “art film” director in terms of his institutional backing and of his working with narrative, while his mixture of radical leftist politics and radical aesthetic form would qualify his work as “avant-garde”.

Born in 1921 (to a Romanian mother and a Hungarian father), Jancsó only started to come into his own as a film artist when he was past 40. He first studied folklore and law (in Cluj). He was a Soviet prisoner of war for a few months in 1945 and he joined the Hungarian Communist Party in 1946. Jancsó owed the decision of studying filmmaking to pioneer film theorist Béla Balázs, freshly returned, at the end of WWII, from a 25-year exile precipitated by his having worked, in 1919, for the short-lived Communist government of Béla Kun (in whose Commissariat of Public Education he had been colleagues with Lukács). The future director served as an assistant to Balázs, at the National Film Archive which had just been founded at the latter’s initiative, till Balázs’s death in 1948.

Jancsó spent the next ten years making a lot of newreels and documentary shorts – all of which he would later dismiss as lies.⁴⁴ 1949-53 was the period in which Soviet control over all aspects of Hungarian life was at its most stifling; in the arts, this meant adoption of the dictates of Stalinist “Socialist Realism”, under the supervision of Soviet “advisors” (the Soviet “advisor” to local filmmakers was Vsevolod Pudovkin – an ex-colleague of Sergei Eisenstein’s and Alexander Dovzhenko’s in the Soviet cinematic avant-garde of the 1920s, now reduced to conformity). There were signs of regeneration between 1954 and 1956 – the year of a great,

brutally crushed anti-Soviet insurrection –, but what followed was another period of repression, in which, as film historian John Cunningham has put it, “whatever talent, old or new, was around (...), it could not have flourished”. Cunningham gives the example of Jancsó himself, whose first feature film, *The Bells Have Gone to Rome / A harangok Rómába mentek* (also his fiction debut), “sunk without a trace” after its 1958 premiere.⁴⁵

However, conditions would soon start relaxing under the post-1956 János Kádár regime, until they would become less repressive (for artists, among other categories of population) than anywhere else in the Soviet bloc.⁴⁶ For filmmakers this meant the possibility of emancipation from all vestiges of Stalinist aesthetics, and exposure to the innovations then mainly radiating from two European sources: Italian neorealist and post-neorealist cinema, and the cinema of the French New Wave. Other Eastern bloc film cultures also opened themselves to these influences, leading to a flowering of local “new waves” – consecrated in the film festivals of the West – or to what Kovács calls the birth of “modernist art cinema” in each of these cultures. Kovács adds that, of course, it was not just a matter of copying Western models:

Modernism’s power lay in its capability to ‘infiltrate’ various national traditions [cinematic, literary] and provide a common language with which to communicate with other cultures. It was the common experience of changing modernity that made the common language possible. Nevertheless, each country, each region formulated its own version of this experience, and this is what gave diversity to the modernist movement. This is why almost all of these films became international successes and were acknowledged as widening the modernist movement. But most important, they turned out to be representing just the preparation for the emergence of real original achievements in Eastern European modernism.⁴⁷

Thus, as acknowledged by Jancsó in conversation with Kovács, and as remarked upon by many critics, including Guido Aristarco⁴⁸, the Hungarian director’s crucial debt was to Italian director Michelangelo Antonioni, whom Kovács counts among the four creators (the others being Robert Bresson, Alain Resnais and Godard), of the fundamental “modernist” aesthetic forms within “art cinema”⁴⁹. Jancsó would begin by following rather closely the Antonioni model of *La notte* (1961) in his own second feature, *Cantata / Oldás és kötés* (1962) – the film with which, according to Kovács, Hungarian “modernist art cinema” is born. But,

working from that model, Jancsó would go on to create, in his fourth film, the 1966 *The Round-Up / Szegénylegények*, his very own modernist form.

For a while (in the 1960s) the most emblematic “modernist” working in the narrative “art cinema” (as opposed to the non-narrative experimental cinema), Antonioni had emerged from the margins of the neorealist movement. Modernism in the arts has often been opposed to realism – by theorists otherwise as incompatible as Georg Lukács (upholder of the brand of realist novel perfected in the 19th century, against “decadent” developments beginning with Naturalism, continuing with Expressionism and culminating in Joycean modernism) and Clement Greenberg (champion of modernism in painting). Actually, there are plenty of grounds to see modernism as growing smoothly from a realist impulse, rather than from an impulse to break with realism. In the history of painting, the Impressionists were “both optical realists and champions of pure patches of paint”⁵⁰:

[t]hey endeavored to paint actual appearances as they had never been painted, to render on canvas the way things really look to the eye that perceives them; and at the same time, as part of the same impulse, they made palpable to the viewer the means of their rendering, the paint they applied on canvas and their way of applying it.⁵¹

As for the 19th-century realist novel, it may sometimes be also called “the classic-realist novel”, but its break with classicism is actually much more serious than Naturalism’s supposed (by Lukács) break with realism:

Naturalism only intensified what [literary historian] Ian Watt has called the ‘formal realism’ of the novel, its ‘circumstantial view of life’, its attention to particulars and mistrust of generalities, its insistence on getting down to specifics rather than relying on the idealizations, the universals of classicism. [...] And the modernist novel did not turn its back on naturalism or give up the search after truth [but tried to deepen and refine it, bringing forward its own forms in the process].⁵²

Thus, in Italian cinema, the “neorealism” which flourishes in the aftermath of WWII leads smoothly enough into the post-1960 modernism of Antonioni, Fellini etc., after breaking with a narrative-movie “classicism” epitomized by the Hollywood cinema (which by that time had already been adopted as a stylistic model by most national film industries in the

world). So neorealism may be considered – in the words of Bordwell – “a transitional phenomenon”.⁵³ As Kovács puts it, one its “main contributions to modernism was its suppression of the hierarchy between the narrative background and the narrative foreground, which thereby loosened up the narrative structure”.⁵⁴ Kovács is talking about the accommodation, in the films’ plots, of episodes or incidents which, judged by the principles of “classical” or “Hollywood-style” narration – principles including economy and tight cause-and-effect logic –, would have appeared as disposable (because not strictly demanded by what happens before them and not necessarily leading to what comes next), time-wasting, drama-dissipating, narrative-slowness. It was André Bazin, an advocate of realism in the cinema (and, incidentally, a co-founder of *Cahiers du Cinéma*, future bastion of end-of-the-sixties political modernism), who celebrated these moments for the way they freed cinematic time from the straitjacket of tight cause-and-effect plotting (every action leading to the next, no loose ends, every information handed to the viewer, every highlighted detail, serving either to advance the story or to build up the drama), for the way they made time stick out as a solid substance – the very stuff a film is constructed of – rather than disappear from the spectator’s awareness. Bazin was saluting the new ways of understanding films – film as object sculpted in time, filmmaking as the construction of space in time, emancipated from the narrative and dramatic necessities of classical plotting (what Gilles Deleuze would later see as cinema’s transition from “the movement-image” to “the time-image”) – that Italian neorealism was just hinting at, leaving modernism to explore them⁵⁵. Another tendency that Bazin detected and saluted in certain neorealist films (most signally in Roberto Rossellini’s 1948 *Germany, Year Zero / Germania, anno zero*) was towards character behavior that was increasingly opaque, psychologically unfathomable.⁵⁶ (As Roland Barthes would comment for *Cahiers du Cinéma* in 1963, “the most important criterion of an art work’s modernity is that it is not ‘psychological’ in the traditional sense.”⁵⁷) This tendency will also be developed by Antonioni, and then by Miklós Jancsó.

Antonioni’s first films were documentary shorts and, as a director of feature-length fiction, he started out in 1950, when the first neorealist wave had already broken and the concept of “neorealism” was starting to broaden, no longer presupposing, on the part of the artists, an exclusive concern with the lives of the poor, but reaching to encompass other social milieus. Aesthetically, he didn’t do anything revolutionary until the early 1960s “informal trilogy” of *L’avventura* (1960), *La notte* (1961) and

L'eclisse (1962), although his preferred technique of shooting in long takes, moving his actors and his camera in a complex ballet ("the characters execute a leisurely ballet of foreground and background movement, as if the director has slowed down the choreography of [Jean] Renoir's *La Règle du jeu*"⁵⁸), anticipates Jancsó's own tendency "to follow one character for a while [with his camera] before picking up another just as the figure crosses our path",⁵⁹ and so on, in ever lengthier and more richly balletic takes.

Ironically, Antonioni's own takes became shorter in the aesthetically groundbreaking films of the early 60s (including *La notte*, a model for Jancsó's *Cantata*). What was revolutionary in those films was the carrying to a new level of the neorealist tendency towards abolishing the hierarchy between narrative foreground and narrative background, between what's of big narrative significance or dramatic import and what's just "marginal" or "minor". In Antonioni's own words, what he did was eliminate "the problem with the bicycle".⁶⁰ The film he is alluding to is Vittorio De Sica's neorealist classic *Bicycle Thieves* (1948), where it is the protagonist's clearly formulated goal – retrieving his stolen bicycle, a tool he needs in order to go on earning his living – that justifies the filmmakers' descriptions of Rome; but Antonioni is referring metaphorically to all the neorealist films whose storylines – exactly like those characteristic of "classical" or "Hollywood-type cinema" – are tight cause-and-effect chains of events delineating the protagonists' pursuits of consistent and immediately understandable goals. What happens in Antonioni's epochal *L'avventura* is that, although such a goal emerges quite clearly – it's a detective-story type of goal, finding a missing person –, it gets mislaid in the subsequent course of events: the search for the missing girl becomes, for the amateur investigators, an occasion for romance and sightseeing. Bringing to full fruition a tendency inaugurated by the neorealist films, the distinction between what pertains to a "main" storyline and what amounts to digression disappears completely here, as the purposeful movement of characters in classical-type or Hollywood-type movies (a movement which remains purposeful, goal-driven, in the neorealist films) turns into aimless wandering and passive witnessing. In a development of another tendency that Bazin had detected as early as 1948 in the neorealism of Rossellini, the characters' lack of clear and consistently maintained goals makes them less knowable – characterizable less in terms of a solid "core" than in terms of often capricious, unobviously motivated behavior. Another crucial twist is that, while neorealist heroes fit into their physical environments (which they may experience as harsh to the

point of having become unlivable, but not as fundamentally unfamiliar), the contact between characters and physical environment has become broken in Antonioni – the characters' wandering is actually a search for this lost contact⁶¹, which can be thought of as their abstract version of the neorealist bicycle. The stylistic consequence of this thematic focus on the rupture between character and physical environment is that description of the environment becomes more independent of those imperatives of classical narration – advancing the story and characterizing its protagonists: the environment here is neither backdrop for some character's trajectory towards his or her goal, nor externalization of the character's state of mind. This means that, as characters wander in search of that lost contact with the environment, the filmmaker can conduct a parallel investigation, alternatively documentary and pictorial, anthropocentric and abstract, sticking close to the characters or reducing them to dots in the landscape.

In *Cantata*, this modernist form developed in the West by Antonioni is used by a socialist filmmaker in an early, compromised attempt at a reckoning with what it had recently become possible to acknowledge as the excesses and the errors of Mátyás Rákosi-era Stalinism and post-insurrection repression. (Aristarco has quoted Jancsó's own description of the film as "an exam of conscience for my generation of intellectuals".⁶²) In the film, a successful big-city doctor in his mid-thirties has a crisis whose exact nature remains unspecified for a long stretch, and whose basic manifestation is antonionesque wandering – a lot of restless drifting through an all-night party, among sophisticated, artistic, Westernized friends, followed by an escape to the countryside (more exactly, to the barren Hungarian prairie – the *puszta* – which was to become the setting of most of Jancsó's pre-1980 films), in search of his roots, as it very gradually turns out. It also turns out that he had been a fanatic in the 1950s – undisturbed at the time by his girlfriend's being kicked out of medical school for being the daughter of wealthy peasants. A fanatic for the cause or just fanatically selfish (eager to get rid of a girlfriend whose "unhealthy" social origin could have hindered his professional advancement)? A man of certainty at the time, the doctor confesses not knowing anything anymore.

The borrowed antonionesque form belongs with the modernisms that leading socialist aesthetician Georg Lukács had spent a lifetime denouncing as "decadent", granting them the limited, mostly symptomatic value of being negative responses to the negative reality of Western capitalism, but, beyond that, finding them unhelpful even as Western art, let alone as possible models for socialist artists. Broadly, the modernism

condemned by Lukács – Kafka, Joyce, Musil, Beckett, a modernism to which Antonioni is certainly affiliated – was the history of the development of techniques for depicting alienation from capitalist society. But since these artists, in Lukács's view, lacked a clear grasp of capitalist society as a "totality" to which all individual phenomena were subordinated, their depictions of alienation were stuck at a subjective, myopic level. The history of (principally) the novel in Western capitalist cultures, from the great 19th-century "critical realists" (like Balzac or Tolstoy) to the modernists writing in Lukács's own time, was the story of how artists had gradually given up relating individual alienation to a correctly diagnosed "totality"; instead, they had complacently exacerbated and enthroned this myopic subjectivity, whose most pernicious effect was that it tended to "ontologize" loneliness – to proclaim it an eternal, immutable feature of a universal human condition, rather than the product of a historically determined socio-economic configuration.⁶³ And, if such aesthetic forms were so inadequate even in representing alienation in capitalist society, of what use could they be to Socialist artists trying to represent the contradictions of socialist development?

Still, by 1960 it had started to be admissible in post-Stalinist cultures (Lukács himself admits it in *The Meaning of Contemporary Realism*) that "socialist realism" (which in the lukácsian scheme of things should have proved itself the most evolved artistic form – superior not only to "decadent" modernism, but, just as naturally, to 19th-century "critical realism", because socialist writers were automatically the beneficiaries of the correct philosophical instruments for grasping "totality") had not been completely successful, either, in depicting the contradictions of socialist development; these had often been buried under a combination of mere "naturalism" (often identified by Lukács with a fetishism of appearances, of the external details of reality) with a compensatory "romantic" optimism, aggravated by what could now be acknowledged as political errors.⁶⁴ In these circumstances, borrowed Western-modernist forms could be accepted as fit to represent socialist reality, if selected and handled with care. Jancsó's transplantation of *antoniennui* (as critics were to begin calling the Italian director's specific mood) in a Hungarian socialist context – once an energetic participant in the construction of socialism, the doctor stops feeling at home in this new world, be it city or countryside – is handled so that alienation emerges neither as a product of this specific type of society, nor as an incurably universal human condition. It's something that can only pass, just a breakdown due to exhaustion. The 1950s are

acknowledged as having been a rough patch, but incontestable gains are shown to have been made – the country is shown as definitely being on the right track. “He who is not against us is with us”, Party leader János Kádár declared at the time when Jancsó was making *Cantata* (what Kádár was actually doing in that declaration was turning on its head a slogan of the dreaded Rákosi era),⁶⁵ and, by the end, *Cantata* is in tune with this official discourse of reconciliation.

In a celebrated interview granted in May 1968 to Yvette Bíró (then recent founder and editor-in-chief of the influential journal *Filmkultúra*, subsequently a consultant to Jancsó on the films he made between 1969 and 1972, and still later, in 1977, the author of a French-language monograph of the Hungarian director), life-long anti-modernist Lukács admiringly remarked that “[i]n Hungary, or at least in Hungarian culture, film nowadays plays the role of the avant-garde”, mentioning Jancsó’s fourth feature, *The Round-Up*, as particularly praise-worthy⁶⁶. Confronted with this declaration, other critics have been quick to remark that a film like *The Round-Up* could be said to synthesize a lot of the “decadent modernism” that Lukács had repressed – not only Antonioni, but also Kafka, Beckett and Ionesco.⁶⁷ For it is the film in which, by introducing “the Kafkaesque experience of Central European historical existence” into “the radicalized form of Antonioni-style modernism”, Jancsó created his own modernist form, “starting a long and lasting series of all kinds of political and historical parables” in the Hungarian cinema, and, most importantly, creating “the most general and comprehensive visual and narrative model of the Kafkaesque atmosphere of Central European history”.⁶⁸ Then again, by the 1960s, Lukács is said to have discovered that “Kafka was a realist after all” – this after being arrested for his participation in the 1956 insurrection (as a minister in Imre Nagy’s revolutionary government), after being “taken to Romania, and shut up in a castle where he and his fellow-prisoners were treated sometimes like felons and sometimes like guests of honour”.⁶⁹

Like nearly all the films made by Jancsó between the mid-1960s and the mid-1980s (with the one exception of the 1970 Italian production *La pacifista*, featuring Antonioni muse Monica Vitti), *The Round-Up* is set in the past – in this case, in the late 1860s (at the time of the formation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire), when survivors of the 1848 anti-Habsburg revolution are still being hunted down. Again, like in nearly all the films made by Jancsó between the mid-1960s and the mid-1980s, the action takes place in the *puszta* – in and around a fort where the

military authorities conduct an investigation among arrested peasants and bandits –, with the result that the historical setting is abstracted to a larger or smaller degree.

A crucial move of Jancsó's (and of his life-long partner in the writing of his films' screenplays – novelist Gyula Hernádi) was to have broken here with dramaturgical models (even "de-dramatized" like Antonioni's) centered on psychologically defined individuals, reestablishing contact instead with the Soviet avant-garde films of the 1920s, by reinventing their "collective protagonists". The notion of the "collective protagonist" had originally been developed in opposition to the perceived incapacity of Western-capitalist fiction and drama to imagine conflict except in terms of individual character (good, bad, flawed character), attributing to individual initiative an exaggerated role in changing history and occluding the real (at least according to Marxist-Leninist doctrine), impersonal forces and laws at work in society. The 1920s aim of filmmakers like Eisenstein or Dovzhenko – coming up with a representation of the proletariat (or the peasantry) itself as a historical force, without allowing that representation to be hijacked by individual heroics – was changed by decree, in the 1930s, into the "middle road" of Socialist Realism: a demand for heroes who would still epitomize their class, yet also be relatively individuated. By following a character only for a while, then dropping him – usually by killing him – and following another, then dropping/killing him too, and so on, and by not allowing these characters to express much beyond fear, calculation, survival instinct, Jancsó is truly reinventing the counter-dramaturgy of the collective protagonist. The big difference is that in *The Round-Up* – unlike in Dovzhenko's 1930 *Earth*, say, or in Eisenstein's 1929 *Old and New* – the peasant class is definitely not depicted as a necessarily positive force. The country people who have been rounded up in the fortress – some of them former freedom fighters, others just bandits – are made to inform on each other and kill each other. At the behest of the military, they interchangeably play the roles of victimizer and victim. And what do the authorities gain by manipulating them in this manner? How do these games advance the investigation which supposedly demanded this mass arrest? As pointed out by Kovács, recapitulation of the procedural steps undertaken by the military shows that they don't add up as investigative police work: it's not just that the viewers of the film, like the suspects rounded up in the fortress, are being kept in the dark about what exactly is being investigated; it's also that nothing is actually being investigated – the authorities just pretend wanting to find some people

and clarify some facts (objectives which seem to change constantly, as do the officers supervising the meeting of those objectives), when in reality it constantly turns out that they knew in advance who or what. As Kovács concludes, what's being practiced here is not any investigative police work; what's being practiced here is the ritual of power, "the main goal of which is the survival of the hierarchic power system itself".⁷⁰ (Western critics would be quick to link this vision with the young Jancsó's formative experience of Stalinism, whose destructive methods – the anathemas, the purges – he perceived at the time, like other disconcerted young communists, as completely mysterious, later coming to suspect that there was no deeper logic behind the mystery, no deeper purpose on the part of the power system, than its self-preservation and self-perpetuation.⁷¹)

As explained by Kovács, at the level of Jancsó's principles of *mise-en-scène* or staging, it is the paradigm of this ritual of power – of manipulation understood "essentially as a character's physical impact on another character's motion" – that starts to structure all character movement. At this level, too, Jancsó breaks free of the Antonioni model, in which "spaces vary from film to film, and as [the Italian director] progressed in his career, physical emptiness in a literal sense characterized them only to a limited degree", his films after *L'avventura* and before *Zabriskie Point* (1970) being set in urban environments, where character movement is structured, to some extent, by "the labyrinth of the big city". In the Jancsian *puszta* of *The Round-Up* – where "[t]here are no streets, no roads to lead the characters' movements, and there are only a few randomly dispersed built objects or trees to provide some sense of orientation in this endless and homogenous space" –, the space is "given structure almost exclusively by the movements of the camera and the characters", and the characters' movements are most often structured by orders coming from other characters. As Kovács writes, there is "very little autonomy in the characters' movements", everything they do being "visibly or invisibly enforced and manipulated by other characters' movements, whose manipulation is usually disclosed subsequently". The basic elements of the ritual of manipulation, repeated again and again, are "to set something in motion, to immobilize, to change sides and force others to change sides, to change and to force others to change clothing, to kill (...), to change and to force others to change direction or speed of motion."⁷² Reviewers of Antonioni's films had joked about how the Italian director was turning "the talkies" into "the walkies".⁷³ With Jancsó, the walkies turn into cine-choreography, or cinematic "choreo-caligraphy"⁷⁴, or "camera ballet"

(although this last term had first been used in relation to Antonioni⁷⁵). Neither passively recording the spectacle, nor personified as an “invisible observer” who tries to keep up with a rapidly changing situation that he/she cannot predict, the camera participates in the construction of cinematic space for effects of surprise and suspense. What lies off-screen or beyond the frame – and either invades the frame suddenly, or is disclosed to us by the camera moving without any cuts, extending homogenous space – is unpredictable. As Kovács explains, the surprises originating in off-screen space (made possible not only by the framing, but also by the discreetly “unrealistic” suppression of noises which might have alerted us) train the viewer in a tense awareness that, at any moment, the arbitrariness of the camera movement and the camera angle might conspire to hide important information from his or her eyes.

Jancsó's next film, the international arthouse hit *The Red and the White / Csillagosok, katonák* (1967), becomes even bolder in its choreographic conception, both ritual-like and geometric, asserting with even more clarity a measure of equivalence between power and oppression, a measure of interchangeability between victimizers and victims. Another historical picture (set in 1919), reconstructing events (the heroic participation of Hungarian volunteers in the Russian Civil War, fighting on the Bolshevik or “Red” side against the Tsarist faithful, also known as the “Whites”, during the short period when Hungary itself, led by Béla Kun, was a Communist republic) whose specificity was again abstracted by the barren-plain setting, *The Red and the White* staged armed conflict as an absurdist series of reversals – two groups forever taking each other prisoner and submitting each other to similar rituals (undressing being one of them).

At this stage in his development, Jancsó was not yet a “political modernist” or, in Bordwell's terminology, a maker of “historical-materialist” cinema: he was operating in modes – the kafkaesque-absurdist in *The Round-Up*, the geometrical-absurdist in *The Red and the White* – that still kept him “close to the fashionable heart of international modernism” (as American critic J. Hoberman would later phrase it⁷⁶). Yes, he presented himself as a post-Stalinist left-wing filmmaker (no longer a member of the Communist Party, which he had left after 1956⁷⁷) working in an officially socialist country; his films presented themselves as mechanisms or (in the words of Jancsó and co-writer Gyula Hernádi⁷⁸) “models” of the mechanisms of power and repression, built with the aim of investigating the rule or the law governing such mechanisms. But, as Jean Narboni accused them in the course of his 1970 debate with his

Cahiers colleagues, they weren't true investigations; Jancsó knew the answers in advance – what he represented choreographically in *The Round-Up* and especially in *The Red and the White* was what he imagined that rule or that law to be, what he had decided in advance the rule was. It was this *a priori* understanding of what power is, and how it turns to repression, that provided the main principles of Jancsian choreography, where the exercise of power always consists in dictating the movements of other human bodies, and the oppressed either turn to oppressing others when they get the chance (as in *The Round-Up*), or they simply change places with their oppressors (as happens in *The Red and the White*). As Narboni wrote, there were reasons to doubt that this understanding was in accordance with historical materialism. It was rather that, in films like *The Round-Up* and especially *The Red and the White*, the power-repression equivalence emerged as “an abstract, transcendental, universal Law, always and everywhere valid”. In Lukácsian terms, Jancsó was guilty of “ontologizing” the repressive character of power: it became a fatality, explainable either as a metaphysical evil or an unocorrectable flaw in an immutable human nature. The films easily lent themselves to conservative readings, as they risked, in Narboni's words, “reinforcing scepticism and eliminatory disillusionment” on the left.

It was Jancsó's 1969 film *The Confrontation* that first went beyond choreographically implying a simple equivalence between power and repression. Jancsó's first film in color, it was also his first dealing directly with the Stalinist era – it was set in the late 40s – and the first in which, besides his by now patented choreographic representation of power as repression, he also came up with a positive choreographic representation of revolutionary energy and high collectivist spirits (nudity here – unlike in *The Round-Up* or *The Red and the White* – is no longer associated with vulnerability and powerlessness, with unwanted submission to another's will; here it is featured with its full end-of-the-sixties meaning – freedom, emancipation). With its young, beautiful communists forever breaking into spontaneous, yet as if telepathically synchronized group singing (their repertoire a mixture of revolutionary and traditional folk songs, both Hungarian and international), *The Confrontation* is a quasi-musical. (Until then, the John Ford western had been Jancsó's – acknowledged – Hollywood reference:⁷⁹ the prairie, the isolated fort, the horses, the military uniforms.) It is Jancsó's definitive departure from “realism” – not only the group singing-chanting-dancing adds to the stylization, but also the fact that the events of the late 1940s are reenacted by people wearing clothes and hairstyles obviously belonging to

the late 1960s. Jancsó's previous reenactments of historical events had also been powerfully stylized, but with *The Confrontation* – in which fashions are deliberately anachronistic and movement is pushed further in the direction of dance – he embraces a Brechtian alternative to the aesthetic "illusionism" that simulates you-are-there immersion in history. A reenactment which foregrounds its ritual component at the expense of the dramatic simulation of past events; a reenactment which doesn't aim for immediacy, but, on the contrary, works to maintain spectators at a critical distance; a reenactment not so much dramatic as "epic" – in the sense in which Brecht called his theatre an "epic" theatre – not dramatizing past events as much as *telling* the audience about them, the actors keeping the enacted situations at arm's length instead of simulating as convincingly as possible that they are living through them.

His previous films, with their absurdist-repetitive rituals of always abusive power, conducted on the stage of Beckett-like emptiness provided by the *puszta*, had been vulnerable to charges of ahistoricity, of advancing the politically defeatist notion that the exercise of power was inherently repressive. *The Confrontation*, with its double historical referent – the late 40s and the late 1960s –, helped make his project more apparent, made it easier to see that what he had been trying to do was read the past with the questions of the post-Stalinist present – the questions that the left owed itself after the Stalinist experience, its regeneration depending upon its confronting them. Dealing with Stalinism directly, *The Confrontation* also represented power – in this case, a power that announced itself as liberating, as emancipatory – turning repressive, but it was more complex and ambiguous than the preceding films. It didn't consist only in choreography – some of its characters ordering its other characters to do this or do that, the oppressors changing sides with the oppressed; it also consisted in debate, in the verbal delineation of various positions, ramifying from a common allegiance to Communism – the hardline position, the humanistic-moderate position, the bureaucratic perspective of the Party, the man-of-action perspective of the police. What's more, because of the double time-setting of the film – its cca. '48 which looks like cca. '68 –, the (female) character who, immediately after WWII, stands for revolutionary ruthlessness, even terror, doubles as a New Left student radical of 1968, perhaps a Maoist (like those agitating at the time in capitalist France as well as in officially socialist Hungary – where they protested against Kádár's depoliticized, consumerist brand of socialism). But, even if looked at solely in its late 40s context, this character carries

different associations: she represents an enthusiastic, independent-minded Communist youth, whose autonomy, by the end of the film, is sharply curtailed by the Stalinist officials; but she's herself associated with Stalinist rhetoric – with the Rákosi-era slogan (later reversed by Kádár) “he who is not with us is against us” – and the terror she unleashes when elected leader of her group can be seen as Stalinism in miniature. In the same way, the higher-ups who finally demote her are connoted as Stalinist-era Party functionaries, but also as Kádárist officials – pragmatic above anything else, possibly depoliticized, primarily interested in keeping power. And, while taking away the power of the young hardliner, they also predict that she still has a political future – in other words, in time she'll discipline and bureaucratize herself, and become like them.

Aside from the Communists, in whose ranks all these tendencies are present, the film features another group – the priests and students of a Catholic seminary which the Communists initially invade for the sake of a debate. All these groups confront and circle each other; there are mergings and regroupings. The result is an original contribution to the unconcerted international effort – reuniting filmmakers from France (Godard) to Brazil (Glauber Rocha), with Jancsó and the Yugoslav Dušan Makavejev as the only contributors from the socialist bloc – to redefine for the 1960s the left-wing cinematic avant-garde that had been originally defined by the Soviet filmmakers of the 1920s. Like some of the major Soviet films from that era, Jancsó's films feature “collective protagonists”; and if Soviet films identified themselves to their audiences (through disjunctive editing, characters addressing the camera, intertitles addressing the characters, and other devices) as straightforwardly rhetorical artefacts (with the filmmakers talking *over* their characters, unlike the makers of Hollywood or Western-style dramatic narratives, who tend to talk *through* their characters), Jancsó's films also “bare the device” or “show their own wheels turning” – through those characters who, forever telling other characters how to move, are, to all intents and purposes, endowed by Jancsó with surrogate directorial powers. On the other hand, of course, Jancsó's films are not rhetorical. In Eisenstein, the direct address to the viewer, the self-identification of the film as a rhetorical machine, are not devices of emotional distantiation. Distantiation is not an effect pursued by those films – on the contrary, when Eisenstein is cross-cutting between those slaughtered workers and that slaughtered ox, he is both foregrounding the film's constructedness (before that scene, the ox has not been presented as being part of the story-world – that ox is a rhetorician's ploy, produced out of nowhere for the

sake of effect) and aiming at maximum emotional impact. If, in Eisenstein, the spectacle of violent death is consistently heightened (through choice of camera angle, editing etc.), in the films of Antonioni-disciple Jancsó it is systematically “de-dramatized” (through distant views or, as is the case with some of the executions in *The Red and the White*, a camera which barely bothers to glance in the direction of the killing).

Of course, the most conspicuous difference between the 1920s Soviet model of political cinema and its late-sixties Jancsian avatar has to do with the role of the editing, which in the latter case becomes minimized to the point of insignificance (there are only 31 shots in the 82-minutes long *The Confrontation*, and over the next five years, coinciding with the peak of his “political modernist” phase, Jancsó would experiment with reducing cutting to the necessary minimum of one cut every 11 or 12 minutes – the projection duration of a 300-meter or standard-length reel of celluloid film: if the 1972 *Red Psalm/ Még kér a nép*, with its less than 30 shots adding up to 87 minutes of screen time, is still far from this ideal, the 1969 *Winter Wind / Sirokkó*, lasting 80 minutes and consisting in only 12 shots, gets much closer, as does the 1974 *Electra, My Love / Szerelmem, Elektra*, also known in the English-speaking world as *For Electra*, with 10 shots and a running time of 70 minutes). The 1920s Eisenstein believed that, by making shots “collide”, he could train the viewer to think “dialectically”⁸⁰ or analytically.⁸¹ His most ambitious experiment with “intellectual montage” is a sequence in *October*, where a reactionary character’s pious invocation of the Christian Orthodox God is answered by a montage juxtaposing images of Christian statues and churches with images of deities from many other cultures. As explained by theorist Noël Carroll, the sequence “aims to engage and direct the cognitive processes of the audience in such a way that the audience will perform a logical analysis of the concept of God”. Of course, adds Carroll, as directed by Eisenstein, the viewer’s reasoning process can only result in “the recognition that God does not exist”; this is the one “correct” conclusion. Working in a mood of exultant certainty, when the triumph of the Bolshevik Revolution was still fresh, the Eisenstein of the 1920s aimed to educate “the masses” in an analytic form of reasoning, but that didn’t include finding value in doubt, in being of two minds:⁸² there was no value in such things, Marxism-Leninism had all the answers. Whereas no fixed doctrine could serve any longer as a point of departure for the “political modernists” of the late 1960s, for whom the Soviet Communist Party’s 1956 denunciation of Stalin and the Soviet army’s suppression of the 1956

Hungarian rebellion had been formative experiences.⁸³ Their stance was more interrogative; it combined affirmation of fundamental aims (like the need for revolution in the West or – coming from Jancsó, almost alone in his capacity as a major “historical-materialist” filmmaker actually living in a socialist country – the need for the regeneration of actually existing socialism) with interrogation of means (including cinematic ones – the utility of cinema as a revolutionary weapon or tool etc.). Their didacticism was something more complex than the Eisensteinian guiding of the viewer’s reasoning towards a conclusion known in advance by the filmmaker as the correct one; now, following Brecht, it was more a matter of providing “structured possibilities for reflection on the nature of capitalist (and socialist) relations and the place of the spectator within them”.⁸⁴ Other filmmakers, like the Yugoslav Makavejev (the other major “political modernist”, except Jancsó, living in a socialist country), carried on the 1920s Soviet tradition of “montage cinema” (in a manner that in Makavejev’s case was particularly irreverent and questioning). Jancsó argued⁸⁵ instead that it was the long take, not the “collision” between shots, that better reproduced both the movement of thought and the complexity of a world that is not only full of conflict and contradiction, but also fluid, ceaselessly transforming.

Over the next few years after *The Confrontation*, Jancsó would add to his obsessive, Stalinism-inspired, series of “rituals of power” (still depicted as sinister, corrupting, repressive), with films like *The Technique and the Rite / La tecnica e il rito* (1972) and *Rome Wants Another Caesar / Roma rinvuole Cesare* (1974), both of them historical pictures financed by Italian television, the first a portrait of Attila the Hun, the second set in Roman antiquity. But he would also develop, in films like *Red Psalm* and *For Electra*, the “rituals of liberation” that he had first staged in parts of *the Confrontation*. In both series of films, the ritual-like aspects would hypertrophy into pageantry, in marked contrast with the austerity of *The Round-Up* or the hard-edged geometry of *The Red and the White*. So, from one strain of modernism – preoccupied with reduction, with abstraction, with diagram-like essentialization, with works of art that are like machines or, in Jancsó’s own term, like miniature “models” –, he gravitated towards another strain: what Kovács called “modernism’s fundamental project of reaching back to the most basic and original elements of artistic expression”,⁸⁶ through (often half-invented or half-reinvented) religious rituals, national folklores and classical mythologies. Thus, ostensibly depicting a late-19th-century peasant uprising, but

full of miraculous occurrences and riddle-like symbolism, as well as by-now incessant collective singing, chanting and dancing, *Red Psalm* conjures – in the words of critic Raymond Durnat – an imaginary “sunlit, open-air [pagan] religion”, a “peasant sacredness” as well as an ancient, deep-rooted “village communitarism”, “propitious to socialism, though pre-dating it”.⁸⁷ The rituals enacted in the film were devised by former student of folklore Miklós Jancsó in collaboration with his future monographer Yvette Bíró, who would later explain that this folklore had to be a half-invented one, nationalist-sentimental folklorism, traditional religion and bourgeois ethnographic science having been put too often in the service of mystification;⁸⁸ what Jancsó and Bíró were doing was fighting such mystifications (“myths” in Roland Barthes’s negative sense of fictions passing themselves as self-evident common-sensical or natural truths, as “just the way things are”) with revolutionary counter-myths, or what Barthes (whom Bíró quotes) called “experimental myths” and myths of “second degree”, ostentatiously artificial⁸⁹. The same with *For Electra*, described by critic Tony Rayns as “a radical re-reading of the Electra myth, in which everything individual (from revenge to incest) is systematically translated into social and ideological terms”.⁹⁰

Inspired not only by national folklore or classical mythology, the film ballets made by Jancsó in this period experimentally integrate various strands of then contemporary New Left thinking (the cult of industrially and technologically underdeveloped societies, millenarist and apocalyptic aspects), as well as elements of late-1960s youth culture (the revolution as festival, the revolution as orgy). Alert to any infusions that may regenerate the revolutionary imaginary, the filmmaker is attempting to forge a universal language of liberation.

What presents itself, at the beginning of the 1970s, as a dynamic revolutionary syncretism, aware of tradition as well as alive to the emancipatory potential of diverse contemporary international phenomena, appears less dynamic in the two features made by Jancsó in 1979, after an uncustomarily long three-year pause: *Hungarian Rhapsody / Magyar rapszódia* and *Allegro barbaro*. As the prospects for world revolution and for the regeneration of socialism are dimming to the point of becoming negligible, Jancsó’s choreography of liberation comes under the threat of staleness, of the merely decorative. At the same time, the fact that, unusually for Jancsó, the narratives of these two films are focused on an individual protagonist (the same in both films), is a harbinger of a new era, after “political modernism” has come to an end. Later, writing about Greek

“political modernist” Theo Angelopoulos (who emerged in the 1970s and was possibly influenced by Jancsó), Fredric Jameson would praise, in his early films, the attempt to foreground “that unrepresentable thing, the collective”, disqualifying by the same token “categories of reception that have been formed in an overestimation of the individual, or individualism”; turning to Angelopoulos’s later films, Jameson would lament the “regression [...] to an older framework of the individual subjectivity, the individual experience, the leading protagonist”, substituting “an old-fashioned individual pathos and a familiar existential disillusionment” – in other words, back to Antonioni – “for the indeterminable vibrancy of the earlier collective representation”.⁹¹ As, in the words of historian of ideas Leszek Kołakowski, human subjectivity is vindicated against “historical laws”⁹², what happens in the works of a former “political modernist” such as Angelopoulos is that, in the words of Jameson, “older formal and essentially bourgeois categories of individualistic narrative return to frame, and thus to displace and denature the attempt to retain an historical focus and commitment”. Angelopoulos adapts his stylistic system and thus becomes more successful on the “art film” market than he had been in the 70s. Jancsó doesn’t adapt. In the words of critic Gábor Gelencsér, “Jancsó does not change systems but demolishes them”.⁹³

Jancsó’s break with “political modernism” takes place, very neatly, as the 1970s give way to the 1980s, and it is very noticeably a break, even a breakdown – his 1979 pictures had been announced as the first two in an epic, summarizing trilogy, whose last part he never completed for reasons including his own fatigue.⁹⁴ The film he made instead, *The Tyrant’s Heart / A zsarnok szíve, avagy Boccaccio Magyarországon* (1981), isn’t lacking in intricately choreographed Jancsian long takes – though staged in enclosed spaces instead of Jancsó’s habitual open air; what has truly changed is that, whereas Jancsian choreography used to mean either “liberation” or “oppression”, here it’s explicitly, even brazenly presented as meaningless. In this exemplarily postmodern historical picture, history is masquerade and there’s nothing under the masks – it’s not just that truth is unknowable (such a proposition would stay within the bounds of modernism, it would not yet be postmodern), but that there may not be any truth, only theatrical and storytelling games. The old communist universalism of the oppression-liberation dynamic that the Jancsó of the 1960s and 1970s used to stage again and again, with many variations, has clearly become unsustainable for the Jancsó of the 80s. Films like the 1987 *A Season of Monsters / Szörniek évadjá* and the 1989 *Jesus Christ’s Horoscope / Jézus*

Krisztus horoszkópja – not historical pictures like the ones Jancsó used to make, but films set in the contemporary world – dramatize this feeling of impotence, the emptying out of the old symbols, the splintering of The One Just Belief, of the old confidence in collective meaning and purpose, into many shards of competing, mutually relativizing beliefs. If in the uncompleted late-1970s trilogy, Jancsó's use of familiar props like horses, uniforms, candles, naked bodies (predominantly, but not exclusively female) and revolutionary songs was in danger of congealing into mere decoration, such decorativism is embraced in the 1984 rock documentary *Omega, Omega, Omega*, though this film still resembles his old ones in that it celebrates youth and freedom (even if it does so in depoliticized terms), while other Jancsó films from this era veer very close to nihilism.

As his interviews attest, Jancsó himself never lost his leftist sensibility – as early as 1984, he confessed himself dismayed that

certain levels of society are now beginning [again] to accept as legitimate the idea that they should be (...) superior to other levels of society, that they should be moderately or even very well off, and other people should be poor or deprived.⁹⁵

What he never found was a new cinematic form (he had already invented one in the 1960s), for a new cinema of resistance, suited to these new times. What these 1980s and 1990s films ultimately enact is the disintegration of the old Jancsian form, once it has ceased to be supported by belief in the possibility of a regenerated socialism sweeping the world in a revolution.

Beginning in 1999 and ending with the filmmaker's death in 2014, the last act in Jancsó's journey consisted in a series of comedies (featuring the same couple of popular comedians) that were really strings of loosely connected sketches, grungy, foul-mouthed and full of non sequiturs, showcasing new forms of youth culture (from heavy metal protest songs to nationalistic hip hop), strategically pactizing with the formats of commercial television (the comedy sketch, the music video, the quiz show, the talent show) as the reigning medium of post-communist entertainment, and generally testifying to the octogenarian filmmaker's impudence and openness to the more liberating aspects of youth culture. But it failed to solve the problem of whether there can be life after the "political modernism" of the late 1960s – in other words, how to construct a new, truly "oppositional" cinema of wide relevance.

NOTES

- 1 David Bordwell, *Narration in the Fiction Film* (London and New York: Routledge, 1985), 310.
- 2 David Bordwell, "The Art Cinema as a Mode of Film Practice", in *Poetics of Cinema* (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), 151.
- 3 András Bálint Kovács *Screening Modernism: European Art Cinema, 1950-1980* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2007).
- 4 Peter Wollen, *Semiotic Counter-Strategies: Readings and Writings* (Verso, 1982), 212.
- 5 Clement Greenberg, "Modernist Painting", in *Collected Essays and Criticism*, ed. John O'Brian, vol. 4, *Modernism with a Vengeance, 1957-1969* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 86.
- 6 András Bálint Kovács *Screening Modernism*, 12.
- 7 Peter Wollen, "The Two Avant-Gardes" and "'Ontology' and 'Materialism' in Film", in *Semiotic Counter-Strategies*, 92-104, 189-207.
- 8 Christian Metz, *Langage et cinéma* (Paris: Larousse, 1971).
- 9 Wollen, "'Ontology' and 'Materialism'", 196-197.
- 10 *Ibid.*, 193-201.
- 11 Theodor Adorno, Walter Benjamin, Ernst Bloch, Bertolt Brecht, Georg Lukács, Fredric Jameson (afterword), *Aesthetics and Politics* (London, New York: Verso, 2007).
- 12 András Bálint Kovács, *Screening Modernism*, 349-382.
- 13 *Partisan Review* 7 (July-August 1940), 296-310.
- 14 András Bálint Kovács, *Screening Modernism*, 12-13.
- 15 Gilberto Perez, *The Material Ghost: Films and Their Medium* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 271-273.
- 16 András Bálint Kovács, *Screening Modernism*, 12.
- 17 Peter Bürger, *Theory of the Avant-Garde*, translated from German by Michael Shaw (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984; the original German version was published in 1974).
- 18 Gilberto Perez, *The Material Ghost*, 260-275.
- 19 András Bálint Kovács, *Screening Modernism*, 14-15.
- 20 Gilberto Perez, *The Material Ghost*, 275-76.
- 21 José Ortega y Gasset, *The Dehumanization of Art* (1925), quoted by Perez in *The Material Ghost*, 275.
- 22 Gilberto Perez, *The Material Ghost*, 272.
- 23 Renato Poggioli, *Theory of the Avant-Garde*, quoted by Perez in *The Material Ghost*, 272.
- 24 Gilberto Perez, *The Material Ghost*, 276.
- 25 Noël Carroll, *Interpreting the Moving Image* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 310.
- 26 Peter Wollen, *Semiotic Counter-Strategies*, 210.

- 27 David Bordwell, *Narration in the Fiction Film* (London and New York: Routledge, 1985), 268-270.
- 28 Bertolt Brecht, *Journals, 1934-1955*, translated from German by Hugh Rorrison, edited by John Willett (New York: Routledge, 1993), 83.
- 29 Theodor Adorno, Walter Benjamin, Ernst Bloch, Bertolt Brecht, Georg Lukács, Fredric Jameson (afterword), *Aesthetics and Politics*, 82.
- 30 Peter Wollen, "'Ontology' and 'Materialism' in Film", in *Semiotic Counter-Strategies*, 201-202.
- 31 Robert Stam, "The Presence of Brecht", in *Film Theory: An Introduction* (Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, 2000), 145-150.
- 32 Annette Michelson, "Paul Sharits and the Critique of Illusionism: An Introduction", in *Projected Images* (Minneapolis: Walker Art Center, 1974), 22-25.
- 33 Peter Wollen, *Semiotic Counter-Strategies*, 212.
- 34 Quoted by Christopher Frayling in *Spaghetti Westerns: Cowboys and Europeans from Karl May to Sergio Leone* (London-New York: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 1998), 230.
- 35 Peter Wollen, *Semiotic Counter-Strategies*, 101.
- 36 Jean-Louis Comolli, "Film/Politics (2): L'Aveu: 15 Propositions", translated from French by Nancy Kline Piore, in *Cahiers du Cinéma Volume 3 1969-1972 – The Politics of Representation* (ed. Nick Browne, London: Routledge, 1990), 165.
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Eigene Beiträge und Übersetzungen im Bereich der Bibel- und Liturgiewissenschaft

DIE PAULINISCHE ISRAELOGIE UND IHRE LITURGISCHE REZEPTION IN DER OSTKIRCHE*

Abstract

Die vorliegende Studie untersucht die byzantinische Hymnographie der orthodoxen Liturgie mit dem Zweck, besonders die liturgische Redeweise mit Bezug auf Israel zu besprechen. In einem ersten Teil wird die paulinische Israeologie kurz dargestellt, und dann macht sich der Autor im zweiten Teil dieses Beitrages auf die Suche nach der Rezeption und Auslegung dieser paulinischen Theologie in den Texten der Ostkirche mit byzantinischem Ritus. Besondere Aufmerksamkeit wird dem älteren und für das Thema relevantesten Teil des orthodoxen Kirchenjahres geschenkt, d. h. dass vor allem die Zeitspanne des Triodions in Frage kommt. Die Absicht dieses Beitrags besteht darin, die Diskussion über Anti-Judaismus in der orthodoxen Liturgie und das Verhältnis zwischen Kirche und Judentum aus der Perspektive der orthodoxen Theologie zu thematisieren.

Keywords: Israeologie, Substitutionstheorie, Römerbrief, Paulinische Theologie, Triodion, byzantinische Hymnographie, orthodoxe Liturgie

1. Einführung

Allein wenn man den Namen „Israel“ zur Sprache bringt, sorgt man in der heutigen europäischen Gesellschaft schnell für Meinungsverschiedenheiten. Zu solchen Diskussionen gehören Termini wie „Jude“ und „Anti-Judaismus“, die oft zu einem schnell eskalierenden Konflikt führen. Das Thema Kirche im Spannungsfeld der Politik und der Weltreligionen spielt hier ohnehin eine gewichtige Rolle, die kaum zu

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übersehen ist. Literatur und allgemeine Informationen über das Judentum und die politische Situation Israels im Mittleren Osten stehen heute ständig allen zur Verfügung. Jedoch neigen sowohl die Medien als auch die Teilnehmer an populären Diskussionsrunden leicht dazu, eher die gegenwärtige kriegerische Situation zu schildern und weniger über die Ursachen dieser Konflikte zu debattieren. In unserem Falle von „Kirche und Judentum“ steht außer Frage, dass die ganze Geschichte zwischen Kirche und Synagoge, oder zwischen Christen und Juden, eine traurige, ja sogar grausame Geschichte war, deren Höhe- aber auch Wendepunkt im 2. Weltkrieg zu finden ist.

Die Zusammenarbeit zwischen Kirche und Staat in der Nazi-Zeit löste in fast allen Ländern Europas in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts unglaublich viele Fragen bezüglich der Ekklesiologie und des Verhältnisses zum Judentum aus. Sogar eine neue biblische Hermeneutik wurde später verlangt¹, und die Kirchen haben in Westeuropa öffentlich ihre Schuld eingestanden und ihre Einstellung gegenüber Israel und Judentum radikal verändert. Hier muss man wenigstens kurz die Verlautbarungen einiger evangelischer Landeskirchen aus Deutschland², die gemeinsame Erklärung reformatorischer Kirchen in der Reihe der Leuenberger Texte³, und das 2. Vatikanische Konzil (1965) als Auslöser unzähliger Studien katholischerseits⁴ erwähnen.

1.1. Forschungsstand, Ziele und Grenzen der vorliegenden Studie

Zur paulinischen Israelologie ist inzwischen sehr viel geschrieben worden⁵. Der mittelalterliche anti-jüdische und gesetzesfeindliche Paulus wird meistens nach der historischen Wende von 1945 als Jude und Pharisäer wiederentdeckt, wobei hier mit der sog. „neuen Perspektive“⁶ und den daraus resultierenden Anschauungen die Diskussion oft in die entgegengesetzten Extreme umschlägt⁷. Die Diskussionen nach dem Jahre 2000 bringen vorwiegend die positiven Äußerungen von Römer 9-11 zum Ausdruck, aber auch andere Bibelstellen werden gründlich und neu untersucht. All diese Diskussionen wurden wohl auf verschiedenen Ebenen im Westen rezipiert, während sie im Osten immer noch so gut wie unbekannt sind. Obwohl die Rezeption der Bibel in der Patristik in den letzten Jahren auch in protestantischen Kreisen behandelt wird⁸, erwähnen die neuen Enzyklopädien über die Orthodoxe Kirche kaum etwas über Israelologie oder Judentum⁹.

Orthodoxe Autoren äußern sich zu diesem Thema sehr selten und die Ausnahmen¹⁰ befinden sich oft außerhalb des östlichen Raumes¹¹. Es ist nicht bedeutungslos, dass in einem orthodoxen Land (wie z. B. Rumänien) erste Studien über Juden in der Ostliturgie nicht von orthodoxen, sondern von evangelischen und katholischen Theologen veröffentlicht wurden¹². Der Autor, der sich am meisten mit diesem Thema in der orthodoxen Liturgie beschäftigt hat, ist Prof. Basilius Groen aus Graz. Er hat vor kurzem Aufsätze über Antijudaismus im orthodoxen Gottesdienst verfasst, aber eine gründliche Untersuchung dieses Themas steht noch aus¹³.

2. Paulinische Israelogie und byzantinische Hymnographie. Terminologie und Grundwissen im Hinblick auf eine Analyse der liturgischen Rezeption

Der Leser dieses Beitrags würde vielleicht zuerst die Frage stellen, woher der Terminus Israelogie stammt und was man darunter versteht. Anders als bei anderen Fachtermini, die in der Theologie eine lange Geschichte aufweisen, geht es hier um einen noch nicht etablierten Terminus der christlichen Theologie. Natürlich ist es kein Rätsel, denn das Wort Israel wird von allen verstanden und das Suffix –logie ist üblich. Die ersten, die meines Wissens das Wort „Israelogie“ benutzt haben, sind die Gründer des neuen Instituts für Israelogie¹⁴, wo eine Buchreihe mit dem selben Namen editiert wird. Die Herausgeber definieren die Israelogie als einen erneuten Beitrag zur Diskussion über Israel¹⁵, und man kann von einem schnellen Überblick auf die Publikationsliste leicht den Eindruck gewinnen, dass der Apostel Paulus und seine Israellehre einen wichtigen Platz einnehmen¹⁶.

Die paulinische Israelogie wird heute meist wegen der umstrittenen Rolle des Apostels Paulus zu diesem Thema diskutiert. Einerseits bildet sein *Corpus Paulinum* einen großen Teil des Neuen Testaments, womit ihm eine bedeutende Rolle unter den neutestamentlichen Schriftstellern zukommt. Andererseits übt er in seinen Schriften eine schroffe Kritik an Israel (z. B. *1 Thessalonicher* 2,16), zeigt jedoch auch die optimistischen Seiten im Hinblick auf seine endgültige Rettung an (*Römerbrief* 9-11). Hier wollen und können wir keine ausführliche Darstellung der Israellehre bei Paulus bieten, aber wir können die wichtigsten Bibelstellen bezüglich Israel ansprechen, um dadurch für unsere Studie relevante paulinische Termini und Ausdrücke hinsichtlich der Lektüre der liturgischen Texte vorzumerken.

2.1. Von „allen Menschen Feind“ zu „Israel Gottes“

Trotz dessen ersten Platzes im paulinischen Corpus fangen wir nicht mit dem Römerbrief an, weil dieser lange Brief eher die spätere Erfahrung und Einstellung des Apostels gegenüber Israel widerspiegelt. Seinen Platz in der Reihe der heutigen paulinischen Briefliteratur verdankt er sich gemäß dem patristischen Denken seinem reichen theologischen Inhalt, aber diese Einschätzung hat sich erst im Laufe der Zeit durchgesetzt. Wir entscheiden uns hier für eine chronologische Herangehensweise, weshalb wir als erstes den ersten Thessalonikerbrief zu Rate ziehen, der auch der erste Brief von Paulus überhaupt ist. Wie schon kurz angedeutet, finden wir in diesem Brief eine harte Kritik an Israel:

Die haben den Herrn Jesus getötet und die Propheten (τὸν κύριον ἀποκτεινάντων Ἰησοῦν καὶ τοὺς προφήτας) und haben uns verfolgt und gefallen Gott nicht (θεῷ μὴ ἀρεσκόντων) und sind allen Menschen feind (πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ἐναντίων), indem sie, um das Maß ihrer Sünden allewege vollzumachen, uns wehren, den Heiden zu predigen zu ihrem Heil. Aber der Zorn Gottes ist schon in vollem Maß über sie gekommen (ἐπ' αὐτοὺς ἡ ὀργὴ εἰς τέλος). (1Thess 2:15-16¹⁷)

Wir entdecken hier die Sprache eines Apostaten vom Judentum bzw. eines Konvertiten zum Glauben an Christus, der in einer Notsituation seine Wut gegen die ungläubigen Juden von Thessaloniki zum Ausdruck bringt. Sie zeichnen sich nicht nur durch den Unglauben gegenüber dem Evangelium aus, sondern sie verfolgen zudem diejenigen, die seine Predigt angenommen haben (Vers 14). Der ganze Brief antwortet auf keinen Fall auf diese Situation und kann nicht als eine ausführliche Erklärung des Paulus über das Verhältnis zu den ungläubigen Juden betrachtet werden. Nur diese zwei Verse sind unser Zeuge der damaligen Situation von Thessaloniki, und sie enthalten Topoi antiker Judenfeindschaft¹⁸, darum haben viele Kommentare im 20. Jhd dafür plädiert, dass diese Verse eine spätere Interpolation im ursprünglichen paulinischen Brief sind¹⁹. Andere sprechen doch von einer ursprünglich paulinischen Äußerung, denn hier übe Paulus eine prophetische Kritik gegenüber seinem eigenen Volk aus, was realistischer scheint, denn der Vorwurf des Prophetenmordes und die Mahnung mit Gotteszorn sind klassische Elemente der prophetischen Rede²⁰.

In seinem Kommentar zum Thessalonikerbrief bietet T. Holtz einen Exkurs an, in dem er einen Vergleich dieser zwei Verse mit der paulinischen

Perspektive gegenüber Israel aus Römer 9-11 versucht. Seine ersten diesbezüglichen Worte lauten: „ganz anders steht die Situation in Römer 9-11...“²¹ und will uns davon überzeugen, Paulus hätte im Römerbrief eine ganz andere Meinung über Israel als in seiner früheren Phase der Mission zu den (Juden und) Heiden. In wie fern das stimmt, werden wir später sehen, wenn wir den Text von Röm 9-11 in die Diskussion einbringen.

Viel mehr als der Römerbrief wurde in den ersten Jahrhunderten die Korrespondenz mit den Korinthern benutzt, weil diese Briefe – wahrscheinlich mehr als zwei – auf konkrete Situationen eingehen und weniger systematisch sind als der programmatische Brief zu den Römern. Auch hier gibt es keine paulinische Erörterung der Frage nach dem Schicksal der ungläubigen Juden. In 1 Kor 10 finden wir einen Bezug auf die Geschichte Israels in der Wüste, die als paränetisches Beispiel für die an Jesus Christus gläubige Gemeinde fungieren soll. Nur den Ausdruck „Israel nach dem Fleisch“ (Ἰσραὴλ κατὰ σάρκα) wollen wir dabei hervorheben, denn in der Patristik und in der liturgischen Rezeption wird diese Formel eine breite Anerkennung finden, wenn die christlichen Autoren den Kontrast mit „Israel nach dem Geiste“ (darunter wurde die Kirche verstanden) betonen wollten.

Andere einflussreiche Ausdrücke sind im 2 Korintherbrief zu finden. Hier im 3. Kapitel gibt es wichtige paulinische Äußerungen gegenüber der jüdischen Schrift und dem Gesetz, die für uns sehr relevant sein können. In Vers 14 sagt der Apostel: „ihre Sinne wurden verstockt (ἐπωρώθη τὰ νοήματα αὐτῶν). Denn bis auf den heutigen Tag bleibt diese Decke (κάλυμμα) unaufgedeckt über dem Alten Testament (παλαιᾶς διαθήκης), wenn sie es lesen, weil sie nur in Christus abgetan wird.“ Das ist eine zentrale Aussage des Neuen Testaments, die maßgeblich zur Entstehung einer christlichen Hermeneutik im Gegensatz zur jüdischen Auslegung der Schrift beigetragen hat²². Das Schlüsselement ist hier die Decke, oder besser gesagt, der Schleier, der zwischen dem Leser und dem Schrifttext steht, wenn man nicht an Christus glaubt. Dank seinem Glauben an Jesus als Messias versteht sich der Apostel hier wieder als Prophet, denn die Propheten hatten diesen unvermittelten Zugang zu Gott, während das einfache Volk oft zu einer Unfähigkeit der Wahrnehmung göttlicher Botschaft tendiert²³. Was diesen letzten Punkt bezüglich Ungläubige betrifft, sollte man hier betonen, dass Paulus über die Verstockung der Sinne bzw. ihrer Gedanken redet (ἐπωρώθη τὰ νοήματα), und für uns bleibt bemerkenswert, dass diese Verstockungsterminologie und -problematik später in seinem Römerbrief weiter entwickelt wird (Röm 11,11 et passim).

Diese Fähigkeit zur Wahrnehmung wird durch den Geist gewirkt (πνεῦμα, v. 3,6,8,17,18) und steht bei Paulus im Kontrast mit den „steinernen Tafeln“ (v. 3 und 7), mit dem Buchstaben der Schrift (v. 6) und mit dem „Vergangenen“ (v. 11). Darüber hinaus trug natürlich die Bezeichnung der jüdischen Schrift mit den Worten „Altes Testament“ in der christlichen Auslegungsgeschichte dazu bei, dass der Kontrast zum Neuen Testament wieder und wieder der ideologischen Spaltung zwischen Judentum und Christentum diene.

All das würde den heutigen Leser zur Schlussfolgerung bringen, Paulus wolle hier eine scharfe Trennung der Christen von den ungläubigen Juden begründen, aber die nächsten Zeilen sagen Folgendes: „Wenn Israel aber sich bekehrt zu dem Herrn, so wird die Decke abgetan (ἐὰν ἐπιστρέψῃ πρὸς κύριον).“ (2 Kor 3,16). Damit lässt der Apostel die reale Aussageabsicht erkennen, er warte noch auf die Bekehrung seiner jüdischen Brüder, eine Idee, die in Römer 9-11 wiederum ihre ausführlichere Behandlung finden wird²⁴.

Genauso wie im letzten Zitat von 2 Kor 3,16 gilt überall, dass Paulus da, wo er den Namen Israel benutzt, immer das israelitische Volk und nicht die Kirche oder die Judenchristen meint. Das ist allerdings eine Meinung, die nicht von allen Exegeten einstimmig vertreten wird, denn es gibt eine Stelle im Galater 6,16, die uns Schwierigkeiten bereitet. Hier redet Paulus über das „Israel Gottes“ (Ἰσραὴλ τοῦ θεοῦ), einen Ausdruck, der nur hier im ganzen Neuen Testament vorkommt, während er in der rabbinischen Literatur nie auftaucht²⁵, was seine Auslegung erschwert. Es handelt sich dabei zudem um einen sehr rein überlieferten Bibeltext, denn sowohl die kritische Ausgabe des Neuen Testaments (Nestle Aland²⁸), als auch die Version, die in der Orthodoxen Kirche durch die byzantinische Vermittlung rezipiert wurde, bezeugen denselben Wortlaut²⁶. Fast alle patristischen Kommentare verstehen den Text hier so, dass der Apostel mit Israel Gottes die Kirche bezeichnet. Eine wörtliche Übersetzung würde so aussehen:

καὶ ὅσοι τῷ κανόνι τούτῳ στοιχῆσουσιν, εἰρήνη ἐπ' αὐτοῦς καὶ ἔλεος καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν Ἰσραὴλ τοῦ θεοῦ	Und alle, die sich nach diesem Maßstab richten Friede über sie und Barmherzigkeit und über das Israel Gottes!
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Man kann nicht vermeiden, dass das Wörtchen „und“ (καὶ) so oft vorkommt. Es trennt wichtige Informationen in diesem Abschnitt, und

man kann merken, wie verschiedene offizielle deutsche Übersetzungen Schwierigkeiten mit diesem καὶ und mit dem Verständnis der Formel „Israel Gottes“ haben. Anders als im Original übersetzen die unten stehenden drei Varianten unseren Text mit „Friede und Barmherzigkeit“ und neigen dazu, aus diesen zwei Vokabeln eine Art Grußformel oder liturgisches Verabschiedungswort zu machen, obwohl im Griechischen zwischen Frieden und Barmherzigkeit nicht nur ein καὶ, sondern auch ἐπ' αὐτοὺς steht:

1985 LUTHER: Und alle, die sich nach diesem Maßstab richten – Friede und Barmherzigkeit über sie und über das Israel Gottes!

2010 NT ELBERFELDER: Und so viele dieser Richtschnur folgen werden – Friede und Barmherzigkeit über sie und über das Israel Gottes!

2010 NT BASISBIBEL: Allen, die sich nach diesem Maßstab richten, schenke Gott Frieden und Barmherzigkeit – ihnen und allen, die zu Gottes Volk Israel gehören.

Darüber hinaus übermitteln diese Übersetzungen mehr oder weniger den Eindruck, dass das letzte καὶ explikativ zu verstehen ist: Der Friede und die Barmherzigkeit Gottes seien gerufen auf eine und dieselbe Gemeinde, d. h. die Gemeinde, die aus denen besteht, die sich nach diesem Maßstab richten, die vom Apostel hier zum ersten Mal als „Israel Gottes“ bezeichnet wird. Die folgenden Übersetzungen bieten jedoch eine andere Perspektive, indem sie der ursprünglichen Topik näher stehen:

2007 NT ZÜRICH: Allen, die sich nach diesem Maßstab richten werden: Frieden über sie und Barmherzigkeit, auch über das Israel Gottes!

2010 NT MÜNCHEN: Und so viele dieser Richtschnur folgen werden, Friede über sie und Erbarmen, und über das Israel Gottes.

2005 NT BERGER/NORD: Und wer sich an diesem Maßstab hält, dem darf ich Gottes Frieden und Erbarmen wünschen. Das gilt auch für das von Gott erwählte Volk, Israel.

1980 NT EINHEIT: Friede und Erbarmen komme über alle, die sich von diesem Grundsatz leiten lassen, und über das Israel Gottes.

Diese Übersetzungen und neue wissenschaftliche Studien stellen die lange Auslegungsgeschichte, die unter Israel Gottes die Kirche versteht, in Frage. Natürlich können wir hier nicht die ganze Argumentation anbieten, aber interessanterweise steht diese neuere Interpretation im engen Zusammenhang mit Römer 9-11²⁷, weswegen wir hier diesen Meinungen Platz einräumen müssen.

S. G. Eastman und R. Peterson sind davon überzeugt, dass die Kombination von Frieden und Barmherzigkeit keine typische Segensformel des frühen Judentums oder der hellenistischen Ausdrucksweise ist²⁸; zumindest handelt es sich um eine unlogische Ordnung²⁹. In Röm 9-11 haben wir neun Erwähnungen des Namens Israel, wobei immer auf das erwählte Volk der (ungläubigen) Juden Bezug genommen wird und wo das Konzept der Barmherzigkeit (ἔλεος) eine bedeutende Rolle spielt (z. B. Röm 11,31). Peterson sagt dazu:

When he reads it again and adds his own conclusion he clarifies his statements about the problem of circumcision and asserts the centrality of Christ's cross for all believers, but to prevent the Galatians from moving from this position to a new Christian exclusiveness and sectarianism, he adds his prayer for mercy on God's faithful people³⁰.

Aus dieser Perspektive ergibt sich, dass in Gal 6,16 je ein Segenswunsch für die (jüdisch-) christliche Gemeinde (εἰρήνη ἐπ' αὐτοῦς) und für sein Volk (ἔλεος) ausgedrückt wird. Trotz des polemischen Tons des Briefes gegen judaisierende Christen will der Apostel seine Schüler unterrichten, sie sollen auf keinen Fall in die selbe Sünde der Exklusivität fallen, wie die judaisierenden Extremisten von Galata. In diesem Sinne scheint die Schlussfolgerung von Mussner wohl richtig, denn „so deutet der Apostel in Gal 6,16 schon an, was er dann in Röm 9-11 explizieren wird. Paulus hat sein Volk nie vergessen“³¹. Ähnlicherweise argumentiert D. Lührmann in seinem Kommentar, wenn er sagt, wir hätten hier die Keime einer im Römerbrief entwickelten Meinung des Apostels³².

Aus all dem Gesagten ziehen wir den Schluss, dass Paulus in Gal 6,16 in seinem Segenswunsch über Israel Gottes nichts anderes als Barmherzigkeit für sein eigenes ungläubiges Volk Israel von Gott erbittet. Nicht lange danach wird der Apostel seinen Brief an die Römer schreiben, wo er seine Gedanken über Israel gründlicher erläutern wird.³³

2.2. Zugunsten der Heiden, aber nicht ohne endgültige Rettung Israels

Einige Einsichten zum Text von Römer 9-11 haben wir schon durch das oben Gesagte gewonnen, aber wir wollen vor der Behandlung dieser Kapitel noch andere für die paulinische Israelologie relevante Texte kurz in Betracht ziehen. Als erstes nehmen wir nun den Epheserbrief, der trotz

der gegenwärtigen Zweifel hinsichtlich seiner paulinischen Autorschaft in der Tradition der Alten Kirche und der Orthodoxie immer als paulinisch betrachtet wurde. Hier wollen wir auf dieses Problem nicht weiter eingehen, aber die Tatsache, dass die Kirche diesen Brief als echten paulinischen Brief betrachtet, spricht dafür, dass die Theologie des Briefes dem paulinischen Denken sehr nahe steht.

Im zweiten Kapitel lesen wir:

Darum denkt daran, dass ihr, die ihr von Geburt einst Heiden wart und Unbeschnittene genannt wurdet von denen, die äußerlich beschnitten sind, dass ihr zu jener Zeit ohne Christus wart, ausgeschlossen vom Bürgerrecht Israels und Fremde außerhalb des Bundes der Verheißung; daher hattet ihr keine Hoffnung und wart ohne Gott in der Welt. (Eph 2,11-12)

Diesmal redet der Autor nicht über Israel an sich, sondern er wendet sich an (Heiden-) Christen und schildert ihnen die Gaben des Eintritts in der Bürgerschaft Israels (πολιτείας τοῦ Ἰσραὴλ). Es wird nichts über die ungläubigen Juden gesagt, für uns ist allerdings wichtig, dass die Privilegien Israels nicht als vergangenes Gut beschrieben werden³⁴. Die Heiden, die zum Glauben an Christus kommen, kommen in die Gemeinschaft Israels und bilden zusammen mit den gläubigen Juden einen einzigen Leib (ἐν σῶμα, 2:16). Es steht somit außer Frage, dass die Ekklesiologie des Briefes eine inklusive mit Bezug auf die Heiden ist, ohne eine Enterbung Israels. F. Mussner charakterisiert den Autor des Briefes mit einem „instinktiven Wissen, dass die Kirche ohne ihre „Wurzel“ Israel ein geschichtsloses „Abstractum wäre“. Und weiter ebenda, „es gibt keine Ekklesiologie ohne Blick auf Israel“³⁵. Das würde dazu führen, diese Epistel als theologisches Vermächtnis von Paulus anzusehen, und sie würde nichts anderes als eine komprimierte Schilderung der paulinischen Theologie enthalten³⁶.

Im Unterschied zum Epheserbrief bietet Lukas am Ende seines Doppelwerks eine leicht andere paulinische Einstellung gegenüber Israel. In *Apostelgeschichte* 28 finden wir die Erzählung über den neulich in Rom angekommenen Paulus. Der Apostel ruft „die Angesehensten der Juden“ (28,17) zu sich und fängt an, ihnen zu predigen, mit der Überzeugung, er sei „um der Hoffnung Israels willen“ inhaftiert worden (v. 20). Einige Juden stimmten ihm zu, andere jedoch nicht und es kam bald zu heftigen Meinungsverschiedenheiten (v. 24). In diesem Moment begründet der Autor die Unfähigkeit der Juden zu glauben, indem er dem Apostel den Text von Jesaia 6,9-10 (Apg 28,26-7) in den Mund legt. Dann, so berichtet

Lukas, wendet sich Paulus ganz der Mission unter den Heiden zu, denen er zwei Jahre lang „ungehindert“ predigen konnte (v. 31).

Das lukanische Doppelwerk erwähnt immer wieder, dass einige Juden doch geglaubt haben, was einzelne Exegeten dazu ermutigt hat, diese neutestamentlichen Schriften nicht als Ausdruck der Substitutionstheorie zu betrachten.³⁷ Aber die Wirkungsgeschichte dieser Stelle hat bestimmt dazu beigetragen, dass sich eher die Meinung etabliert hat, es stehe mit der Mehrzahl der Juden hoffnungslos.³⁸ Hier sollten wir unterstreichen, dass wir es in Röm 11 genau mit diesem Thema der Verstockung Israels zu tun haben, wobei Paulus dort eine andere Meinung als hier in der Apostelgeschichte vertritt.

Endlich kommen wir nun zum Römerbrief. Paulus schreibt nun einer Gemeinde, die nicht von ihm selbst gegründet wurde, die schon zur Zeit der Abfassung (57 n. Chr.) mehrheitlich aus Heidenchristen bestand, aber gleichzeitig einen einflussreichen judenchristlichen Anteil hatte. Ungläubige, oder besser gesagt, nicht christusgläubige Juden gab es in Rom wohl ziemlich viele, aber der Apostel schreibt nicht ihnen, sondern thematisiert hier vielmehr zum ersten mal das Verhältnis der Christen zu den „verstockten“ Juden in den Kapiteln von 9 bis 11. Studien über diese Kapitel gibt es in den letzten Jahren so viele, dass man nur schwer eine komplette Übersicht gewinnen kann.

Das wichtigste besteht darin, dass Paulus hier das Thema Unglaube Israels gründlich behandelt. Es gibt im Neuen Testament kein anderes Thema, dem drei Kapitel gewidmet werden³⁹. Fast alles, was die oben erwähnten Texte bezüglich Israel sagen, ist in Röm 9-11 enthalten, und das gilt besonders für die kritische Perspektive gegenüber Israel. Paulus benutzt sogar die Verstockungstradition im 11. Kapitel, und andere sehr scharfe Worte sind auch im 10. und im 9. Kapitel zu finden. Anders als frühere Einsichten von Paulus, die gelegentlich geäußert wurden (z. B. 1 Thes 2,16), bemüht sich der Apostel im Römerbrief um die Antwort auf die Frage nach dem Schicksal der ungläubigen Juden. Laut Röm 11 ist die Verstockung (πώρωσις) nur teilweise widerfahren, damit die Heiden zum Heil kommen können (11,25). Der Fehlschritt Israels bedeutet auf keinen Fall, dass sie aus Gottes Plan herausfallen. Sie sind zu seiner Zeit ungläubig geworden, damit die Heiden zum Glauben kommen (11,11 und 25), aber dann müssen die Heiden ihren Glauben so stark beweisen, dass die Juden wieder zum Glauben kommen (11,15) und sogar „ganz Israel“ gerettet werden wird (11,26). Denn Gott hat die Berufung dieses

Volkes und die ihm anvertrauten Gaben nie zurückgenommen (vv. 28-9) und will nicht, dass jemand auf Kosten eines anderen gerettet wird.

Die patristische Tradition hat wegen dem historischen Kontext der Polemik mit den Juden ziemlich große Schwierigkeiten mit diesen Kapiteln, und sie hat die paulinische These von Röm 11,26 so interpretiert, dass man unter „ganz Israel“ (πᾶς Ἰσραὴλ) entweder die Kirche oder höchstens die Judenchristen verstand⁴⁰. Es gibt heute mehrere Theorien⁴¹ bezüglich das Verständnis dieser hoffnungsvollen paulinischen Formel, aber an dieser Stelle soll es genügen, die Meinung zu vertreten, Paulus benutze hier und sonst im Römerbrief den Namen Israel für sein Volk und nicht für die Kirche⁴²; eine solche Übertragung des Namens ist erst später in der Geschichte der christlichen Theologie zu beobachten. Eigentlich macht die These über die Rettung Israels in Vers 26 gar nicht die ganze Botschaft des Apostels über Israel aus. Vielmehr muss man den gesamten Aussageduktus beachten, und während Röm 11,26 eher eine auf die Zukunft ausgerichtete paulinische Hoffnung ist, bleibt seine klare Mahnung an die Christen, die originell im Ölbaumgleichnis geliefert wird: „so rühme dich nicht gegenüber den Zweigen. Rühmst du dich aber, so sollst du wissen, dass nicht du die Wurzel trägst, sondern die Wurzel trägt dich.“ (11,18). Die Juden bzw. die natürlichen Zweige sind wegen Unglaube aus dem guten Ölbaum ausgebrochen worden, aber die Christen, die aus dem wilden im guten Ölbaum eingepfropft wurden, stehen da durch den Glauben und verlieren ihren Status, sobald sie sich rühmen.

Diese Botschaft des Apostels bezüglich Israel hat im 20. Jhd besonders nach dem Holocaust eine Menge Literatur hervorgebracht. Zum ersten Mal in der Geschichte wurde 2011 von jüdischen Gelehrten eine Edition des Neuen Testaments⁴³ herausgegeben und kommentiert, die mit dem Zitat von Röm 11,26 als Motto des Vorwortes anfängt, und generell könnte man sagen, dass durch die Wiederentdeckung dieser Kapitel eine neue wichtige Basis für den Dialog zwischen Kirche und Israel geschaffen wurde. Diese Kapitel aus dem *Römerbrief*, die bei den früheren Kommentatoren den Titel „Judenfrage“ trugen, wurden in den letzten Jahren prioritär für die paulinische, aber auch insgesamt für die neutestamentliche Israelologie betrachtet. Ihre Auslegungsgeschichte zeigt, dass die Kirchenväter diese Kapitel eher vermieden haben, während sie andere Stellen von Paulus, wie z. B. *1 Tess.*, oder den *Galaterbrief*, ihres Potenzials an Kritik gegenüber Israel wegen bevorzugten⁴⁴.

Deswegen kann allgemein die ganze Patristik und die ganze Reihe der Römerbriefkommentare, sowohl im Westen als auch im Osten, mit

einigen wenigen Ausnahmen⁴⁵, als antijudaistisch bezeichnet werden. Die patristischen Kommentare haben großenteils die liturgischen Hymnen der alten Kirche beeinflusst, sodass die ganze Liturgie unvermeidlich antijudaistische Äußerungen enthält.

2.3. Die byzantinische Hymnographie der Orthodoxen Kirche

Damit man die liturgischen Texte der Orthodoxen Kirche verstehen kann, braucht man heute eine gute Einführung in die Geschichte und Entstehung dieser Texte, deswegen widmen wir die nächsten Seiten diesem Anliegen. Denn im Vergleich zur Katholischen Kirche, die in der letzten Zeit einige Änderungen in der Liturgie bezüglich der Juden vorgenommen hat, und zur Evangelischen Kirche, die auf die alten Hymnen der einen Kirche seit langem verzichtet hatte, benutzt die Orthodoxe Kirche bis heute die Hymnographie der Alten Kirche und des byzantinischen Reiches. Die liturgischen Texte der Ostkirche wurden zwischen dem 5. und dem 15. Jahrhundert verfasst, und in dieser langen Zeitspanne (vor der Reformation, vor der Erfindung des Buchdrucks, vor der Aufklärung), gab es nur die Liturgie als Medium für die Vermittlung der Bibel und der christlichen Lehre allgemein⁴⁶.

Eine kritische Ausgabe dieser liturgischen Texte scheint noch nicht vorzuliegen⁴⁷, was besondere Schwierigkeiten hinsichtlich der Interpretation dieser Texte heute mit sich bringt. Kenner des byzantinischen Ritus warnen allerdings davor, dass eine wissenschaftliche Analyse dieser poetischen Texte mit großer Umsicht durchgeführt werden soll. Die Hymnen dienen uns tatsächlich als Zeugnisse für die exegetische, dogmatische und spirituelle Theologie einer bestimmten Periode der Kirche⁴⁸; sie können „die Bekenntnisformeln der Kirche übernehmen und sie in die Herzen der Menschen hineinsingen“⁴⁹, aber wenn man ihren rhetorischen Charakter nicht berücksichtigt, kann man zu Einsichten gelangen, die dem Spezifikum dieser Literatur ganz fremd sind. Vor allem im Bezug auf die Juden, sollte man Einiges über die Situation der Juden im Byzantium⁵⁰ kennen, damit man sich überhaupt äußern kann.

Patrick Andrist hat die byzantinischen Handschriften *contra Iudaeos* lange untersucht⁵¹ und kam zur folgenden Schlussfolgerung:

...in Byzantine liturgy there are times during the year when material *contra Iudaeos* was traditionally used in churches more often than during the rest of the year. For example, at the beginning of the year, one finds such

material both in the *Vita Basilii* (Jan. 1) and in the *Vita Silverstri* (Jan. 2). As well, on the Sunday of Orthodoxy, one traditionally finds stories of images working miracles on Jews; and of course, around Easter many sermons make the Jews responsible for the death of Jesus. However, even though there is often some kind of “concentration” around this themes in liturgical manuscripts (menaea, homeliars, etc.) at those times of the year, these series are highly traditional and generally do not take up a substantial part of a production unit. Thus it does not make them *contra Iudaeos* books.⁵²

In diesem Zitat, das die Ergebnisse einer sorgfältigen Studie vieler Manuskripte ausdrückt, ist besonders die Tatsache bemerkenswert, dass anti-jüdische Äußerungen auf keinen Fall eine konstante Begleitung liturgischer Dichtung ist, sondern eher um Ostern und sonst sporadisch aus Anlass von für das Verhältnis mit den Juden relevanten Festtagen vorkommen. Darüber hinaus sind diese Äußerungen nicht so zahlreich, dass man die jeweiligen Texte unter Bücher *contra Iudaeos* katalogisieren könnte.

Zu diesen wichtigen Informationen sollte man auch die Schlussfolgerungen einer Spezialistin im Bereich der patristischen Homiletik hinzufügen⁵³. Es interessieren uns besonders die s. g. „dramatic homilies“, wie diejenigen von Amphilochios von Ikonium (4. Jhd) und Severian von Gabala (5. Jhd), derer Untersuchung zeigen kann, dass die Autoren das Judenbild eher für katechetische und dogmatische Zwecke benutzen:

The Jews play a major role in many dramatic homilies, always symbolizing the portion of humanity which rejected Christ as the Messiah. As Kecskeméti points out, denial of Christ in byzantine homilies is almost always equated with Judaism. Thus, even in homilies directed against various Christian heresies, the Jews are frequently accused of lying behind or instigating these wrong beliefs.⁵⁴

Geht es um konkrete Konflikte der Christen mit den Juden, oder redet man eher über ein Judenbild? Das ist eine wichtige Frage, die anhand einiger historischen Informationen über die Juden im Byzantium klären lässt.

2.4. Juden im Byzantium

Zur Zeit der Abfassung liturgischer poetischer Literatur im Byzantium gab es im christlichen Imperium eine tiefe soziale und politische Veränderung: die Araber erobern einen erheblichen Teil des großen Reichs, und drei antike Metropolen und Patriarchate (Jerusalem, Antiochien und Alexandrien) bleiben außerhalb der christlichen Grenzen. In dieser politischen Situation werden Juden von Kaiser Heraklius zwangsweise getauft⁵⁵, und einige Jahrzehnte danach haben wir das Zeugnis des Konzils von 692 (Trullanum), das eine Segregation des jüdischen und christlichen alltäglichen Lebens in der Öffentlichkeit forderte⁵⁶. Andere Taufkampagnen wurden von Kaiser Leo III und Basil I durchgeführt, aber diese waren in der byzantinischen Zeit eigentlich selten, wie Vera von Falkenstein sagt⁵⁷. Diese Autorin hat eine Untersuchung der byzantinischen Literatur mit Blick auf das Vorkommen der Termini Ἰουδαῖοι und Ἑβραῖοι vorgelegt. Gemäß dieser Studie kommen diese Namen sehr oft vor, und bestimmte Adjektive wie „unfromm“ (ἄνομος) oder „gesetzlos“ (παράνομος) waren in der byzantinischen Gesellschaft sehr populär und wurden automatisch mit den Juden assoziiert⁵⁸. Das Judenbild war durchwegs von ihrem Unglauben an Christus geprägt, und der Kontrast zwischen dem alten und dem neuen Gesetz spielte eine entscheidende Rolle.

Wie die Byzantiner die gegenwärtigen Juden betrachteten, könnte man aus dem s. g. *Suidae Lexikon* erfahren (10. Jhd). Unter dem Lemma Ἰουδαῖος findet man folgende Informationen: die Juden beten einen goldenen Eselskopf an, und alle drei Jahre töten sie einen Fremden, indem sie sein Fleisch in kleine Teilen zerschneiden⁵⁹. Ein solches Lexikon war im Mittelalter sehr bekannt, und daraus kann man schließen, dass die damals lebenden Juden sehr wenig bekannt waren, weil solche Ideen schon in der Antike unter den heidnischen Vorwürfen gegen die Juden zu finden sind⁶⁰.

Die Christen des byzantinischen Reiches waren sehr beschäftigt mit der Frage, ob die Juden gerettet werden oder nicht. Das kann man z. B. aus der Vita des Hl. Basilius des Jüngeren (10. Jhd) entnehmen: Gregor, ein Anhänger des Hl. Basilius, fragt seinen Meister, warum der Glaube der Juden schlecht und „unser“ Glaube gut sei. Im Unterschied zum o. g. Lexikon weiß er Bescheid, dass die Juden keinen Götzendienst haben, dass sie an Gott, den Schöpfer der Welt glauben, und dass ihre Vorväter Christus nicht getötet haben; darum kann man nicht allen den Vorwurf des Gottesmordes (θεοκτονία) machen⁶¹. Der Hl. Basilius wartet nicht auf

die ganze Schilderung der Gedanken seines Jüngers. Er kennt sie schon alle, und als der Jünger das Thema eröffnet, fängt der Heilige eine lange Rede gegen die Juden an. Allein diese Gedanken von Gregor sind laut Hl. Basilius teuflisch⁶² und der junge Mann muss seine Perspektive korrigieren, denn die Synagoge ist für immer vom Angesicht Gottes verworfen⁶³:

The Jews, the so-called assemblage of Israel, I give witness concerning them that these are no longer an assemblage of Israel, they are no longer a royal priesthood or holy nation of people of God (λαὸς θεοῦ), but they are accursed, destroyed, and cast away, and it is the assemblage of Satan (συναγωγή τοῦ Σατανᾶ). For whenever they gather together on the Sabbath in their synagogues and examine the Law, the Lord is not then in their midst; rather Satan is in their midst⁶⁴...

Wer diese Meinung nicht teilt, gehört schon der „Generation der Otter“ (γεννήματα ἐχιδνῶν)⁶⁵ an, so meint der Autor dieser Vita. Solche Ausdrücke sind in der polemischen Literatur gegen Juden üblich, die vor allem in den Dialogen erhalten sind. Andreas Külzer sammelte 37 solche Dialoge, die aus der Zeitspanne vom 2. bis zum 15. Jhd stammen⁶⁶. Die häufigsten Themen dieser Gattung sind: die Heilige Dreiheit, die Anerkennung Jesu Christi als Messias, die Jungfrau Maria, und beginnend mit dem 7. Jhd die Ikonenverehrung⁶⁷.

Hier sollte man mit Prof. Suttner erwähnen, dass die orthodoxe Kirche auch „eine Initiation durch Bilder, die der Initiation durch die Hymnen nahe verwandt ist“⁶⁸, kennt. Es ist nicht zufällig, dass die Hymnographie der byzantinischen Kirche besonders nach dem Sieg der Ikonenverehrung (8. und 9. Jhd) geschrieben wurde, und die Verwandtschaft zwischen Hymnographie und Ikonographie besteht nicht nur in chronologischen Details. Es ist nämlich wohl bekannt, dass die Angriffe des Ikonoklasmus seine Wurzeln in den judaisierenden Sekten von Anatolien und im syrischen Raum hat⁶⁹, woher Theologen oder wandernde Mönche zur Hauptstadt kamen, um gegen die Ikonenverehrung zu reden. Der ikonoklastische Kaiser Michael II (820-829) ist einer der berühmtesten Fälle. Er gehörte einer solchen Sekte (Athinganoi) an, und als Kaiser hat er die Juden von der Steuer befreit, was in der Gesellschaft breite Diskussionen auslöste, sodass er in der Chronik von Zonaras (12. Jhd) als „den Juden gehörend“ bezeichnet wird⁷⁰.

Juden, Ikonenverehrung und Hymnographie gehören in dieser Weise zusammen, weil der Ikonensieg als ein Sieg gegen allen Häresien betrachtet

(Konzil von 843) und „der Jude“ gleichzeitig als Verkörperung aller gegnerischen Meinungen angesehen wurde⁷¹. Da die Mönche die größten Verfechter der Ikonen waren und in diesem Streit siegten, waren sie von da an in der Hauptstadt und im ganzen Imperiums für die Richtlinien der christlichen Spiritualität tonangebend. Dieselben hochgebildeten Mönche waren oft Autoren der Hymnographie (z. B. Johannes Damaskenos, Theodoros Studites) und man kann so verstehen, wie anti-jüdische Elemente aus dem Kontext der Ikonendebatte in die liturgischen Texte eingegangen sind. Mit dem 9. Jhd gewinnt die Hymnographie in diesem vom Mönchen geprägten Kontext die Oberhand⁷².

3. Die Rezeption der paulinischen Israelogie in der Hymnographie

Man konnte schon aus dem bisherigen Gesagten ersehen, dass die meisten für uns relevanten Stellen sich in den liturgischen Texten des Triodions finden, d. h. in der vorösterlichen Zeit. Überraschenderweise bildet nicht unbedingt die Karwoche, sondern die daran vorangehende Palmwoche einen Höhepunkt der anti-jüdischen Ausführungen der Hymnographie. Im Folgenden werden wir diese Steigerung zum polemischen Sprachgebrauch des Hymnographen sowohl in der Palm- als auch in der Karwoche verfolgen können.

3.1. Lazarus und „die Juden“ in der Palmwoche

Nach dem oben Gesagten wenden wir uns nun den liturgischen Texten zu, wobei schnell klar wird, dass die ganze Palmwoche von dem Motiv der Auferweckung des Lazarus dominiert wird. Die reiche homiletische Tradition dieses frühen Festes ist Zeuge für ein großes Interesse von Seiten hochrangiger Theologen des Byzantiums, was für unsere Fragestellung nicht bedeutungslos bleiben soll, zumal hier z.B. Andreas von Kreta als eine der Hauptstimmen als Homiletiker und Hymnograph fungiert⁷³. Was die Autoren der besprochenen Hymnen betrifft, ist zu beachten, dass es sich nicht um einfache Mönche der ägyptischen oder palästinischen Wüste handelt, deren Zurückhaltung hinsichtlich der Hymnographie bekannt ist⁷⁴, sondern um hoch gebildete Menschen, u.a. Bischöfe von Konstantinopel oder sogar Kaiser, die diese Art der poetischen Theologie bevorzugten.

Die Bezeichnung der Auferweckung des Lazarus als Wunder findet sich in der Hymnographie der Palmwoche häufig, sodass man hier wenigstens ein paar Beispiele anführen darf: „großes und unbegreifliches Wunder...“⁷⁵ oder „unaussprechliches und unbegreifliches Wunder...“⁷⁶ Abgesehen von der Häufigkeit dieses Terminus in der Hymnographie ist auch der Grund, den Nikephoros C. Xanthopoulos in seinem Synaxarion vom Lazarus-Samstag für die Zelebration des Festes nennt, erwähnenswert. Er sagt, die heiligen Väter hätten dieses übernatürliche Wunder zu diesem Zeitpunkt feiern lassen, weil im besonderen dieses Wunder zum Anlass und Anfang der Wahnvorstellung (μάνια) „der Juden“ gegenüber Jesu wurde⁷⁷. Aus demselben Synaxarion erfahren wir, dass Lazarus „Hebräer, von der häretischen Gruppe der Pharisäer“ war, der Sohn eines Simons, mit dem sich Jesus öfters über die Auferstehung der Toten unterhielt. Seine Auferweckung hat, laut Synaxarion, nicht nur den Hass „der Juden“ gegen Jesus, sondern auch gegen Lazarus hervorgerufen, sodass Lazarus auf die Insel Zypern fliehen musste, wo er später zum Bischof der Stadt Chition (heute Larnaka⁷⁸) gewählt wurde.

Es ist bemerkenswert, wie genau die Hymnographen auf den in den biblischen Texten beschriebenen chronologischen Ablauf der Ereignisse achten und diesen sehr präzise in den Hymnen widerspiegeln. Dementsprechend finden wir schon am Montag der Palmwoche die Ankündigung, dass Christus nach Bethanien kommt, um ein „großes Wunder“ (θαυμάσιον μέγα)⁷⁹ zu zeigen und hier „den Tod mit dem Leben umzustürzen“⁸⁰. „Die Juden“ sind hier noch nicht präsent, aber Theodoros Studites erklärt seinen Lesern, dass mit diesem großen Ereignis auch die Unvernunft der Völker (ἀλόγιστον τῶν ἐθνῶν), d.h. eigentlich der Heiden, dem himmlischen Vater unterstellt ist⁸¹.

Schon am Dienstag in der Palmwoche ermutigt derselbe Autor Lazarus auf rhetorische Weise, sich auf „morgen“ bzw. auf seinen eigenen Tod vorzubereiten, und sagt ihm zugleich die gute Nachricht der Auferweckung „am vierten Tage“ voraus⁸². Auf die bevorstehende Großtat (μεγαλεῖον)⁸³ Jesu werden die Zuhörer der Hymnographie auch durch die Erwähnung des kleinen Details über die Verspätung Jesu (Joh 11,6) vorbereitet: „...du bist ein wenig verspätet, damit das Wunder heraufgebracht wird...“⁸⁴.

Am Donnerstag finden wir fast nichts über das Verhältnis Jesu zu „den Juden“ oder über Wunder. Theodoros Studites erinnert uns lediglich daran, dass nun Lazarus schon seit zwei Tagen tot ist, der Schöpfer (Κτίστης) aber kommen wird, damit er den Tod ablöst und das Leben schenkt (τὸν θάνατον σκυλεῦσαι, δωροῦμενος τὴν ζωὴν)⁸⁵. Trotz einer aufmerksamen

Beachtung der Chronologie vorösterlicher Ereignisse zeigen diese Worte, wie präsent die nachösterliche Perspektive ist. Denn der Satz über die Zerstörung des Todes und das Geschenk des neuen Lebens ist zentraler Inhalt des Tagestroparions der Auferstehung Jesu, das liturgisch eine Woche später gefeiert wird.

Am Freitag findet sich jedoch eine extrem scharfe Kritik an „Israel“, wobei das Stilmittel der Ironie und die Form der Hetzrede besonders einflussreich verwendet werden. „Heute“ – sagt derselbe Theodoros – „versammelten sich viele Juden aus Jerusalem in Bethanien und trauerten zusammen mit den Schwestern des Lazarus; aber morgen, weil sie gesehen haben, wie dieser vom Grabe herauskam, haben sie sich zur Tötung Christi mobilisiert (κινεῖται πρὸς φόνον Χριστοῦ)“⁸⁶.

Aber der ganze Umfang des anti-jüdischen Potenzials wird erst am Lazarus-Samstag und am Palmsonntag offensichtlich. Dabei muss sich der Leser zunächst bewusst machen, dass mit dem Lazarus-Samstag die Fastenzeit eigentlich zu Ende ist. Die vierzig Tage der Vorbereitung sind jetzt vergangen, und die Auferweckung des Lazarus und der Einzug in Jerusalem sind ein Vorgeschmack auf die große Feier der Auferstehung Jesu⁸⁷. Es ist nachvollziehbar, dass der Hymnograph unterstreicht, dass Jesus seine Jünger mit der Auferweckung des Lazarus von seiner eigenen Auferstehung überzeugen möchte⁸⁸. Doch wir wollen unsere Aufmerksamkeit hier speziell auf die Wunder und die Beschreibung „Israels“ lenken. Andreas von Kreta spielt in dieser Hinsicht mit seinen Troparien eine große Rolle:

Es wunderten sich, o Herr, die hebräischen Menschenmengen, wenn sie gesehen haben, wie du den Toten Lazarus mit deinem Wort aus dem Grabe auferweckt hast, aber sie sind deinen Wundern gegenüber ungläubig geblieben (καὶ ἔμειναν ἀπειθεῖς τῶν θαυμασίων σου)⁸⁹.

In diesem Hymnus kann man beobachten, wie derselbe Autor innerhalb desselben Kanons auf der einen Seite beteuert, dass „die Juden“ von den Wundern Jesu nicht überzeugt wurden, während er auf der anderen Seite ausführt, dass niemand den göttlichen Zeichen (νεύματι) widerstehen konnte. Man kann hier aus den Texten keine endgültige Schlussfolgerung im Hinblick auf sein Judenbild ziehen. Die Erwartung eines von Johannes herkommenden Lesers wäre es, hier die Verstockungsaussage vorzufinden (Joh 12,37-43), aber der Text des Andreas von Kreta bietet eher schroffe Kritik: „Oh, Verrücktheit der Juden! Oh, feindliche Hartherzigkeit! Wer

hat einen Toten gesehen, als er aus dem Grabe herauskommt? Elias hat damals [einen Toten] herausgeholt, aber nicht aus dem Grabe und nicht nach vier Tagen.“⁹⁰

Mit diesen Ausführungen erreicht die anti-jüdische Kritik ihren Höhepunkt, wobei die Christen hier zum ersten Mal in dieser Steigerung des liturgischen Dramas zur Passionszeit ausdrücklich als das „neue Israel“ gekennzeichnet werden:

Kommt, lasst uns heute, das ganze neue Israel, nämlich die Kirche aus den Heiden (πᾶς ὁ νέος Ἰσραήλ, ἡ ἐξ ἐθνῶν Ἐκκλησία), mit Zacharias, dem Propheten, rufen... Hosanna!...⁹¹

Hier kann man nicht außer Acht lassen, dass sich diese Sicht gravierend von der neutestamentlichen und besonders von der paulinischen Perspektive unterscheidet, weil im Neuen Testament die Kirche nie als Israel bezeichnet wird. Problematisch ist dies auch, weil für die Hymnographie das „geliebte Israel“ (ὁ ἡγαπημένος Ἰσραήλ) ausschließlich die Heidenchristen sind, sodass die Substitutionstheorie⁹² hier in einer zugespitzten Weise deutlich zum Ausdruck kommt. Darüber hinaus muss man erwähnen, dass der Hymnograph den festen Glauben der (Heiden-) Christen dem Unglauben und der Undankbarkeit „der Juden“ gegenüberstellt: „die Juden“ haben Christus gekreuzigt, aber „wir preisen ihn immer mit unverändertem Glauben (πίστει ἀμεταθέτῃ)“⁹³.

3.2. Das Judenbild der Karwoche

Die Karwoche ist bekannt für ihren anti-jüdischen Anteil von Hymnen, aber der aufmerksame Leser dieser Hymnen wird allerdings in den ersten drei Tagen kaum eine derartige Äußerung finden. Das Thema dieser Tage ist eher die Wachsamkeit als Vorbereitung der Seele für die Begegnung mit Christus, dem Bräutigam⁹⁴. Die nächsten Tage, die im liturgischen Bereich *Triduum Pasquale* genant werden (Donnerstag, Freitag und Samstag), fangen am Donnerstag mit der für einen modernen Leser sehr häufigen Erwähnung des Judas an. Damit nähert sich die liturgische Zelebration den historischen Ereignissen an, die in den Evangelien berichtet werden, während Judas nun das ganze Volk der ungläubigen Juden verkörpert. Das im Byzantium übliche Adjektiv für das Volk der Juden wird nun vom Apostel Judas getragen; er alleine ist nun „der gesetzlose“ (παράνομος)⁹⁵ und wird sogar „Sohn der Ottern“ (γέννημα ἐχιδῶν)⁹⁶ und „Teufel“⁹⁷

genannt. Diese Bezeichnungen erinnern uns eher an die Vita Basilii aus dem 10. Jhd als an die paulinischen Texte, geschweige denn an die Kapitel von Römer 9-11.

Immer wieder fangen die Hymnen mit diesem Namen an, damit der Leser, oder besser gesagt, die Zuhörer, das Bild von Judas ständig vor Augen haben. Dadurch wird verständlich, dass die Autoren keine Beschuldigung von Judas an sich für wichtig halten, sondern ihrem christlichen Publikum vielmehr ein Gegenbeispiel vor Augen stellen, damit die Christen durch die Sünden oder andere Fehler nicht dieselben Taten wie Judas begehen. Das wird in einem Hymnus klar, wo nach der Blamage des ehemaligen Apostels der Hymnograph stellvertretend für die christliche Zuhörerschaft ein Gebet an Gott richtet, in dem er folgendes verlangt: „Behüte Herr unsere Seelen vor einer solchen Unmenschlichkeit...“⁹⁸.

Andere Hymnen von Donnerstag beenden ihre Troparien mit dem Satz: „aber der gesetzlose Judas wollte nicht verstehen“⁹⁹. Die Unfähigkeit der Juden zu verstehen, dass Jesus Messias ist, wird der Bereitschaft der Kinder beim Einzug in Jerusalem gegenüber gestellt, denn die Kinder konnten Hosanna rufen, während die Juden das nicht verstehen wollten. Interessanterweise nimmt der Hymnograph auch in diesen liturgischen Tagen immer wieder Bezug auf die Ereignisse mit Lazarus und dem Einzug in Jerusalem. In der Komplet dieses liturgischen Tages enthält das Triodion einen Kanon von Andreas von Kreta, der in seiner 9. Ode dieselben Epitheten wie *παράνομος* dem ganzen jüdischen Volk zuschreibt und sie rhetorisch fragt: „O, gesetzlose Juden! O, unverständiges Volk! Erinnerst ihr euch nicht der Wunder Christi und der Fülle der Heilungen?...“¹⁰⁰

In den alten Antiphonen dieses Tages, deren Autoren uns unbekannt bleiben, werden die anti-jüdischen Äußerungen immer häufiger, und ein besonderer Hymnus übersteigt sogar noch die übliche Terminologie. Hier kommen auch die Heiden zu Sprache:

Dies spricht der Herr zu den Juden: Mein Volk, was habe ich dir getan? Oder wodurch habe ich dich gekränkt? Deine Blinden habe ich erleuchtet, deine Aussätzigen gereinigt, den Mann auf dem Bette aufgerichtet! Mein Volk, was habe ich dir getan? Und was hast du mir dafür wiedergegeben? Für das Manna – Galle; für das Wasser – Essig; anstatt mich zu lieben, habt ihr mich an das Kreuz geheftet! Länger ertrage ich es nicht mehr: Rufen will ich meine Völker, und jene werden mich verherrlichen mit dem Vater und dem Geiste, und ich werde ihnen schenken das ewige Leben!¹⁰¹

Dieser Text ist sehr hart gegen die Juden, aber das wichtigste besteht darin, dass der größte Teil aus einer prophetischen Quelle in Micha 6:3-4 stammt. Das Ende dieses Hymnus bringt jedoch eine der Heiligen Schrift fremde Idee: die Völker werden gerufen und loben den Herrn gemäß christlicher Trinitätslehre, bekommen dafür auch das ewige Leben, während den Juden ein verschlossener Horizont zu bleiben scheint¹⁰².

Dieselbe Situation wird am Karfreitag in einem bekannten Hymnus beschrieben:

Zweifach Böses hat getan mein erstgeborener Sohn Israel; mich hat er verlassen, die Quelle des Wassers des Lebens, und grub sich einen erschöpften Brunnen; mich kreuzigte er am Holze, den Barabas aber erbat er und machte ihn los. Der Himmel geriet in Entsetzen hierüber, und die Sonne verbarg ihre Strahlen; du aber Israel, bekehrtest dich nicht, sondern übergabest mich dem Tode. Vergib ihnen, heiliger Vater; denn sie wissen nicht, was sie getan haben¹⁰³.

Diesmal fungiert der Text von Jeremia 2,13 als Inspiration, und wir finden am Ende des Hymnus im Sinne des Propheten (Jer 11,18; 12,5,9-11; 14-15) auch die entsprechenden Trostworte. Aber nicht lange danach vergisst der Hymnograph das prophetische Muster und sagt: „denn da du heute erhöht wurdest (am Kreuz), ging das Geschlecht der Hebräer zu Grunde...(γένος Ἑβραίων ἀπώλετο)“¹⁰⁴. Im nächsten Hymnus ist dieselbe Idee zu finden, aber diesmal erinnert uns der liturgische Text interessanterweise an Röm 9,21-23 bzw. an Ps 2:9, wo es um den Töpfer und die Zerstörung der Tongefäße geht¹⁰⁵.

E. Theokritoff bemühte sich in ihrem Beitrag bezüglich Juden in der Karwoche des byzantinischen Ritus, möglichst viele Anspielungen der Hymnographie an Römer 9-11 zu entdecken¹⁰⁶. Man kann natürlich die ganze scharfe Kritik an den Juden mit den prophetischen Zitaten aus der Verstockungstradition, die Paulus im 9. im 10. und besonders im 11. Kapitel des Römerbriefes benutzt, vergleichen. Die Fülle der anti-jüdischen Worte könnte man im Zusammenhang mit Römer 11,11 lesen, wo der Apostel Paulus über den Fehlschritt Israels redet, der den Heiden Zugang zum Heil ermöglichte. Aber diese Bezüge sind m. E. nicht so überzeugend. Theokritoff selbst gibt später zu:

Current liturgical usage does not point so clearly to the 'mystery' described in Romans as the context for reproaches of the Jews; but it should be noted that the penultimate prophecy at the Easter vigil, the important 'new covenant' reading, is precisely the passage Paul takes as testimony that "all Israel will be saved" ("this will be my covenant with them, when I take away their sins", Rom 11:26,27 cf. Jer 31 [LXX 38]:33-4). The Holy Friday emphasis on Israel's falling away is not meant to be seen as the end of the story¹⁰⁷.

In diesem Zitat als auch in ihrem ganzen Beitrag bemerkt man eine gewisse Ambivalenz: die Autorin kann einerseits wegen der übertriebenen Polemik gegen die Juden über den „düsteren Aspekt“¹⁰⁸ dieser liturgischen Tage reden und sogar sagen, dass

der Karfreitag einige Phrasen enthält, die bloß als unnötige Schimpftiraden gegen das jüdische Volk beschrieben werden können. Diese nehmen normalerweise die Form einiger beschimpfender Epitheten an, und sie können nichts anderes als die Atmosphäre der Zelebration zu beeinträchtigen; darüber hinaus sagen sie uns nichts von theologischem Wert. [...] Sie sind eine rhetorische Dekoration von einem sehr emotiven Charakter¹⁰⁹.

Andererseits will die Autorin immer wieder neue Anspielungen an den Römerbrief entdecken und als Schlussfolgerung kann sie vorschlagen, dass eine eventuelle Revision dieser Texte anhand einer sorgfältigen und betenden Herangehensweise durchgeführt werden sollte.¹¹⁰ Sie nennt sogar zehn Strophen aus dem langen Enkomion vom Karfreitag, die besonders übertrieben und für die gesamte Zelebration unpassend sind.

3.3. Eine Reform liturgischer Texte der Karwoche?

Ziemlich wenige Menschen wissen, dass diese zehn Strophen des Enkomions vor einigen Jahren aus dem rumänischen Triodion verschwunden sind. Es gab gar keine offizielle Entscheidung, aber während des Kommunismus ist eine neue Edition des Triodions ohne diese übertriebenen Strophen erschienen. Im Unterschied zur griechischen oder russischen Orthodoxie werden die rumänischen liturgischen Texte in der Volkssprache vorgetragen, und die Übersetzung einiger wie die oben erwähnten Texte hat bestimmt viele Rumänen des 20. Jhd gestört. Es gibt sonst ganz wenige Stimmen aus den orthodoxen Kirchen, die eine Revision

dieser Texte verlangen. Man kann hier z. B. den bekannten Vater Andrew Louth¹¹¹ oder die mutigen Worte von Vater Sergii Hackel erwähnen:

An Orthodox Good Friday service has only the authority, which has been attached to it through centuries of use. It required no major council of the Church to bring it into being, and it requires no major council to edit or replace it once and for all. Such reforms have sometimes been proposed, not least by the Greek theologian Hamilcar Alivizatos (1960)¹¹². But the service is with us to this day¹¹³.

Beide Stimmen kommen aus Ländern, die keine alte Sprache im Gottesdienst mehr benutzen. Erst im 20. Jhd wurden viele liturgische Texte in moderne Sprachen übertragen, und überall empfindet man diese Texte ganz anders als beim Zelebrieren im byzantinischen Griechisch. Mit Recht betonen Theokritoff und E. Suttner¹¹⁴, dass die Revision der liturgischen Texte anders als die Revision eines diskursiven Textes geschehen soll. Aber gleichzeitig gibt es m. E. viel zu wenig Interesse für eine historische Betrachtung unserer Liturgie. Wissenschaftler im Bereich der Liturgik sind der Meinung, die orthodoxe Liturgie sei „ständigen Veränderungen unterworfen. Auch heute verändert sie sich noch; sie ist nicht statisch, sondern dynamisch“¹¹⁵. Robert Taft, einer der größten Spezialisten des byzantinischen Ritus sagt in ähnlicher Weise, die Geschichte dieses Ritus sei eine Geschichte der Wandlung, und man könne z. B. beweisen, dass die Texte des Enkomions als späteste (15.-16. Jhd) in die Karfreitagsliturgie eingefügt worden waren¹¹⁶. Zumal diese Texte keinen festen Platz infolge einer kirchlichen Entscheidung haben, sollte uns – so R. Taft – die historische Betrachtung der Liturgie die Freiheit¹¹⁷ gewähren, eine Revision der Texte durchführen zu können.

4. Schlußfolgerungen und Perspektive

Es gibt grob gesagt zwei große Tendenzen bezüglich Juden in der orthodoxen Liturgie: auf der einen Seite findet man Stimmen aus einem nicht-orthodoxen Umfeld, die die orthodoxe Liturgie nicht kennen oder zelebrieren, aber ihre starken anti-jüdischen Aspekte vehement unterstreichen; auf der anderen Seite gibt es Meinungen orthodoxer Theologen, die sich nicht gerne auf eine Diskussion über die Reform der Liturgie einlassen wollen. Beide Gruppen haben ihre Gründe, aber das

Thema bleibt im Raume stehen und wird noch viel Arbeit mit sich bringen, damit man die beste Entscheidung treffen kann. Mary Cunningham hat Recht, wenn sie die Quelle der liturgischen polemischen Rede gegen die Juden im Alten und Neuen Testament selbst, vor allem in der paulinischen Literatur und bei den Kirchenvätern verortet¹¹⁸. Aber genau hier stellt sich die Frage, welchen Paulus zieht man zu Rate? Natürlich war die byzantinische Kirche ihrem patristischen Erbe treu, und diese patristische Auslegung der paulinischen Literatur hat von Paulus besonders das polemische Potential weiterentwickelt, das im Galaterbrief oder Thessalonicherbrief zu finden ist, während seine Ausführungen vom Römer 9-11 allzu lange Zeit in Vergessenheit geraten sind.

Eine aufmerksame Lektüre der orthodoxen Hymnographie stellt also fest, dass man über eine Rezeption der paulinischen Israelogie im Sinne des Mittelalters, oder gemäß einer patristischen Interpretation, die in der byzantinischen Epoche üblich war, hinausgehen. Natürlich sollten wir den hochgebildeten und vor allem symbolischen Sprachgebrauch der Hymnographen in Betracht ziehen¹¹⁹. Sie wollten höchstwahrscheinlich kein grausames Judenbild aufstellen, sondern eher anhand solcher harter Kritik am negativen Beispiel die christliche Zuhörerschaft dazu ermuntern, ein besseres und frommes Leben zu führen. Das war der Eindruck bei der Lektüre der liturgischen Texte vom Donnerstag in der Karwoche, wenn Judas allein die Epitheten des ganzen Volkes übernimmt, während die Christen gewarnt werden, dass sie keine ähnlichen Taten oder Gedanken zulassen. Im theologischen Denken der byzantinischen Autoren ist der Jude ein Inbegriff aller möglichen Häresien, und das wird in der Hymnographie instrumentalisiert, damit die Christen den anderen Weg einschlagen.

Die Mehrheit der orthodoxen Hymnographie – auch am Karfreitag – besteht auf keinen Fall aus anti-jüdischen Ausdrücken. Der Anteil dieser Elemente ist eher klein im Vergleich zur Zahl der gesamten Hymnen, und viele von diesen scharfen Hymnen haben nichts anderes als eine biblische und oft prophetische Basis. Das einzige und entscheidende Problem besteht allerdings darin, dass wir heute in einem anderen Kontext leben und vor allem, dass sich die Sensibilität der Christen gegenüber den Juden gründlich geändert hat. Wenn die byzantinische Einstellung gegenüber dem Judentum durch historische Informationen erklärbar wird, heißt es nicht unbedingt, dass wir dieselben Hymnen heute immer noch vorsingen sollten. Der erste Teil dieses Beitrages hat hoffentlich zeigen können, dass Paulus selbst sich bemüht hatte, seine gelegentlichen harten Äußerungen

über Israel in den älteren Briefen später in seinem Römerbrief in ein neues Licht zu rücken.

Die prophetische Kritik darf auf keinen Fall aus der Liturgie ausgeschieden werden. Paulus selbst übernimmt sie in seinem Ringen von Röm 11, aber das wichtigste gemäß der Schrift, der Paulus treu bleiben möchte, bleibt die Tatsache, dass Juden und Christen in einem Mysterium verbunden bleiben. Laut Paulus darf die Verstocktheit der ungläubigen Juden auf keinen Fall Grund für den Stolz der Christen werden, und umgekehrt sollten die Christen ein frommes Leben führen, sodass vielleicht Juden zum Glauben an Christus kommen.

Die Wiederentdeckung dieser positiven Perspektive über Israel bei Paulus ist in der Geschichte der christlichen Theologie ziemlich neu, und die wissenschaftliche Betrachtung der liturgischen byzantinischen Texte steht ebenso am Anfang. Bevor wir kritische Ausgaben der liturgischen Texte haben, sollten weitere Studien die Israelologie der orthodoxen Hymnographie genauer untersuchen, denn Paulus ist nur eine Quelle der Autoren, während die Evangelien und die Propheten viel mehr Platz einnehmen. Die Ermunterung von R. Taft zur Freiheit hinsichtlich einer Revision soll also mit aller Dringlichkeit, aber auch mit Umsicht aufgegriffen werden.

NOTES

- ¹ THEISSEN, G., *Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft vor und nach 1945* (Schriften der Philosophisch-Historischen Klasse der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften 47), Winter, Heidelberg, 2009; FIEDLER, P., *Studien zu einer neutestamentlichen Hermeneutik nach Auschwitz*, Verl. Kath. Bibelwerk, Stuttgart, 1999.
- ² Siehe die Akten der EKD-Synode in Berlin-Weißensee (1950) und die neue Studie dazu: Vogel, C., „Die letzte Chance“. Heinrich Vogels Beitrag zur Entstehung des „Wortes zur Judenfrage“ der EKD-Synode in Berlin-Weißensee 1950,“ *Evangelische Theologie* 73 (2013), 189-206. Was die aktuelle Situation z. B. in der Evangelischen Landeskirche von Bayern betrifft, siehe die Diskussionen in der Landessynode: UTZSCHNEIDER, H., „Die Evangelisch-Lutherische Kirche in Bayern und ihr Verhältnis zum Judentum. Zwischenbilanz einer Debatte und ein neuer Vorschlag zur Ergänzung der Kirchenverfassung“, in: *Nachrichten der Evangelisch-Lutherischen Kirche in Bayern* 12 (2011), 76-80; GREIVE, W. *Jüdisch-lutherische Beziehungen im Wandel? Ein lutherischer Beitrag zum christlich-jüdischen Dialog unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Antisemitismus und Antijudaismus* (Dokumentation / Lutherischer Weltbund 48; Genf: Lutherischer Weltbund, 2003). Die Literatur auf der evangelischen Seite im allgemeinen ist zur Zeit unüberschaubar. Zwei Titel seien hier wegen ihrer breiten Rezeption erwähnt: SPECTOR, S., *Evangelicals and Israel*, Oxford University Press US, 2009; DIPROSE, R.E., *Israel and the Church: The Origins and Effects of Replacement Theology*, Authentic Lifestyle, 2004.
- ³ SCHWIER, H., *Kirche und Israel. Ein Beitrag der reformatorischen Kirchen Europas zum Verhältnis von Christen und Juden* (Leuenberger Texte Heft 6; Frankfurt am Main: Otto Lembeck, 2001).
- ⁴ GROPE, E. T., „Revisiting Vatican II's Theology of the People of God After Forty-Five Years of Catholic-Jewish Dialogue“, *Theological Studies* 72 (2011), S. 586-619; MUSSNER, F., *Traktat über die Juden*, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, 2009; BREGER, M., *The Vatican-Israel Accords: Political, Legal, and Theological Contexts*, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Ind., 2004.
- ⁵ Hier erwähne ich nur die Veröffentlichungen eines Symposiums: WILK, F. (Hrsg.), *Between Gospel and Election: Explorations in the Interpretation of Romans 9-11* (Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament 257), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 2010.
- ⁶ DUNN, J., *The New Perspective on Paul*, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2007.
- ⁷ BENDIK, I., *Paulus in neuer Sicht? eine kritische Einführung in die „New perspective on Paul“*, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, 2010.
- ⁸ LIEB, M. & E. MASON, J. ROBERTS (Hrsg.), *The Oxford Handbook of the Reception History of the Bible*, Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford [u.a.], 2011; KLAUCK, H. J. (Hg.), *Encyclopedia of the Bible and its Reception*, De Gruyter, 1. Band, Berlin 2009.

- 9 MCGUCKIN, J. A., *The Encyclopedia of Eastern Orthodox Christianity*, 2 Bände, Wiley-Blackwell, Malden, MA [u.a.], 2011; Idem, *The Orthodox Church: An Introduction to its History, Doctrine, and Spiritual Culture*, Wiley-Blackwell, Malden, MA [u.a.], 2011.
- 10 MIHOC, V., „Saint Paul and the Jews According to Saint John Chrysostom’s Commentary on Romans 9–11”, *Sacra Scripta* 2 (2008), S. 123-138; auch in PATTE D. & Vasile MIHOC (Hrsg.), *Greek Patristic and Eastern Orthodox Interpretations of Romans* (Romans Through History And Culture Series 9), Bloomsbury T&T Clark, London-New York, 2013, S. 63-82; siehe auch RUBIN, D., *Holy Russia, Sacred Israel; Jewish-Christian Encounters in Russian Religious Thought*, Academic Studies Press, Brighton, Mass., 2010.
- 11 KRATZERT, Th., „Wir sind wie die Juden”; *der griechisch-orthodoxe Beitrag zu einem ökumenischen jüdisch-christlichen Dialog*, Institut Kirche und Judentum, Berlin, 1994.
- 12 POIROT, É., „Permanența legământului și textele liturgice Bizantine [Die Bleibende Erwählung und die liturgische byzantinische Texte]”, rum. Übersetzung von Cornel Dîrle in: *Studia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai Theologia Graeco-Catholica Varadiensis* 2 (2010), S. 63-72; TERINTE, C., „Raportul dintre Israel și Biserică în calitate de popor al lui Dumnezeu în Romani 9-11”, *Plērōma* 1 (2009), S. 83-108.
- 13 GROEN, B., „Antijudaismus in der heutigen byzantinischen Liturgie”, in: Albert Gerhards & Hans Hermann Henrix (Hrsg.), *Dialog oder Monolog? Zur liturgischen Beziehung zwischen Judentum und Christentum*, Quaestiones Disputatae 208, Freiburg i.B., Herder 2004, S. 210-222; idem, „Old Testament Saints and Anti-Judaism in the Current Byzantine Liturgy”, in: Marcel Barnard, Paul Post & Els Rose (Hrsg.), *A Cloud of Witnesses: The Cult of Saints in Past and Present*, Liturgia Condenda 18, Leuven: Peeters, 2005, S. 145-159.
- 14 Siehe die Webseite und die Aktivität des Instituts unter www.israelogie.de.
- 15 Berthold Schwarz & Helge Stadelmann im Vorwort zum VANLANINGHAM, M. G., *Christ, the Savior of Israel. An evaluation of the dual covenant and Sonderweg interpretations of Paul’s letters* (Edition Israelogie (EDIS) Bd. 5; Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2012), S. iii.
- 16 Siehe den letzten Band der genannten Reihe: Thiessen, J., *Gottes Gerechtigkeit und Evangelium im Römerbrief. Die Rechtfertigungslehre des Paulus im Vergleich zu antiken jüdischen Auffassungen und zur Neuen Paulusperspektive* (Edition Israelogie Band 8), 2014; und M. G. Vanlaningham (wie Anm. 16). Der erste Band heißt SCHWARZ, B. & Helge Stadelmann, *Christen, Juden und die Zukunft Israels. Beiträge zur Israellehre aus Geschichte und Theologie* (Edition Israelogie (EDIS) Bd. 1; Frankfurt am Main, New York: Peter Lang, 2009).
- 17 In diesem Aufsatz wird immer die deutsche *Luther Revidierte Bibel 1984* benutzt.
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- hatten.“ HAUFE, G., *Der erste Brief des Paulus an die Thesalonicher*, ThHNT 12/I, Evang. Verl. Anst., Leipzig, 1999, p. 43. Über den heidnischen Antijudaismus vor dem Christentum siehe SCHÄFER, P., *Judeophobia: Attitudes Toward the Jews in the Ancient World*, Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, Mass. [u.a.], 1998, 197ff.
- 19 ECKART, K., ‘Der zweite echte Brief des Apostels Paulus an die Thesalonicher’, *ZTK* 56 (1961), 294–315; B. A. Pearson, ‘1 Thessalonians 2.13–16: A Deutero-Pauline Interpolation’, *HTR* 64 (1971), 79–94; SCHMIDT, D. ‘1 Thess. 2.13–16: Linguistic Evidence for an Interpolation’, *JBL* 102 (1983), 269–79; RICHARD, E. J. *First and Second Thessalonians* (SP 11; Collegeville, MN: Liturgical, 1995) 123–7; WALKER, W. O. Jr., *Interpolations in the Pauline Letters* (JSNTSup 213; London: Sheffield Academic, 2001), 210–20.
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- Ausführungen von MUSSNER, F., *Der Galaterbrief*, HThKNT IX, Herder, Freiburg-Basel-Wien, 1988; LÜHRMANN, D., *Der Brief an die Galater*, ZBK 7, Theol. Verlag, Zürich, 1978; RICHARDSON, P., *Galatians 6:16*, in *Israel in the Apostolic Church*, 74-84 und DAVIES, W. D., *Paul and the People of Israel*, NTS 24: 1977/1978, 10. Alle hatten schon eine Inspirationsquelle in E. de W. BURTON, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians*, ICC II/10, T & T Clark, Edinburgh, 1920.
- 28 EASTMAN, S. G., *Israel and the Mercy of God...*, 373.
- 29 RICHARDSON, P., *Israel in the Apostolic Church...*, 76.
- 30 *Ibidem*, 84.
- 31 MUSSNER, F., *Traktat über die Juden* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2009), 417.
- 32 LÜHRMANN, D., *Der Brief an die Galater...*, 102.
- 33 In diesem Sinne spricht auch EASTMAN, S. G. *Israel and the Mercy of God...*, 368: „in both letters Israel refers neither to Jewish Christians nor to the church as a whole, but rather to the Jewish people, whom Paul calls ‘my people’ (ἐν τῷ γένει μου) in Gal 1:14, and ‘my kinsfolk according to flesh’ (συγγενῶν μου κατὰ σάρκα) in Rom 9:3.”
- 34 MUSSNER, F., *Die heilsgeschichtlichen Vorzüge Israels nach Röm 9,4f. und Eph 2,12*, idem, *Traktat über die Juden*, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, 2009, 48.
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- 42 SANDERS, E. P., *Paul, the Law, and the Jewish People*, Philadelphia, Fortress, 1983, 175-6; DUNN, J., *Romans*, WBC 38b, 2 volume, Waco: World, 1988,

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- 44 ROBERT, M.H., *Israël dans la mission chrétienne...*, 2010.
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- 55 DÉROCHE, V., „Forms and Functions of Anti-Jewish Polemics. Polimorphy, Polisémy.“ in *Jews in Byzantium. Dialectics of Minority and Majority Cultures...*, 546.
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- 57 VON FALKENHAUSEN, V., „In Search of the Jews in Byzantine Literature“, in *Jews in Byzantium. Dialectics of Minority and Majority Cultures...*, 871-91; Siehe für die Kapagne von Leo III, eine der wichtigsten in diesem Sinne: STARR, J., *The Jews in the Byzantine empire, 641 - 1204* (Texte und Forschungen zur byzantinisch-neugriechischen Philologie 30; Athen: Verl. der „Byzantin.-Neugriech. Jahrbücher“, 1939), 91ff.
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- 60 VON FALKENHAUSEN, V., „In Search of the Jews in Byzantine Literature“, in *Jews in Byzantium...*, 875. Und ähnlich dazu CONGOURDEAU, M. H., „Cultural Exchanges between Jews and Christians in the Paleologan Period.“ in *Jews in Byzantium. Dialectics of Minority and Majority Cultures...*, 720: „By reading the Byzantine and Romaniote sources, we have sometimes the impression of two worlds which ignore each other: the concrete Jews (not the imaginary Jews) are by and large absent from Byzantine sources whereas the concrete Christians (not the imaginary goyim) are no less absent from the Romaniote sources. Nevertheless, some fields suggest contact: this is the case with the secular sciences, especially astronomy, owing to its implications for the Christian liturgical calendar.“
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- 69 GARDETTE, Ph., „The Judaizing Christians of Byzantium. An Objectionable Form of Spirituality“, in *Jews in Byzantium. Dialectics of Minority and Majority Cultures...*, 587-611.
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- 72 TAFT, R. S.J., „Holy Week in the Byzantine Tradition.“ in *Hebdomadae sanctae celebratio. Conspectus historicus comparativus*. The Celebration of the Holy Week in Ancient Jerusalem and its Development in the Rites of East and West (hg. von A. G. Kollamparampil und Habtemichael, Kidane et al; Roma: C.L.V. - Ed. Liturg), 1997, 80.
- 73 Vgl. CUNNINGHAM M. B. & Pauline ALLEN (Hgg.), *Preacher and His Audience, Studies in Early Christian and Byzantine Homiletics*, Brill, 1998.
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- 75 „Μέγακαίπαράδοξονθαῦμα, τετέλεσταισήμερον!...“ Doxastikon der Laudes, Orthros vom Lazarus Samstag.
- 76 „Θαῦμα, ξένον καὶ παράδοξον! πῶς ὁ Κτίστης πάντων...“ ANDREAS von Kreta, 2. Troparion der 3. Ode, im Kanon der Komplet, Lazarus Samstag.
- 77 „...τοῦτο τὸ Θαῦμα ἀρχὴν καὶ αἰτίαν μάλιστα εὗρον τῆς κατὰ τοῦ Χριστοῦ μανίας τῶν Ἰουδαίων.“ Vgl. NIKEPHOROS Callistos Xanthopoulos, *Synaxarion*, Lazarus Samstag.
- 78 Siehe das *SYNAXARION of the Lenten Triodion and Pentecostarion*, edited by Fr. David Kidd and Mother Gabriella Ursache, HDM Press, Rivers Junction, Michigan, 1999, 109.
- 79 Theodoros Studites, 5. Troparion der 1. Ode (2. Teil), Orthros vom Montag, Palmwoche.
- 80 Theodoros Studites, 1. Troparion der 8. Ode (2. Teil), Orthros vom Montag, Palmwoche.
- 81 Theodoros Studites, 2. Troparion der 1. Ode (2. Teil), Orthros vom Montag, Palmwoche.
- 82 Theodoros Studites, 1. Troparion der 9. Ode (2. Teil), Orthros vom Dienstag, Palmwoche.
- 83 Theodoros Studites, 1. Troparion der 8. Ode (2. Teil), Orthros vom Dienstag, Palmwoche.

- 84 Theodoros Studites, 2. Troparion der 2. Ode (2. Teil), Orthros vom Dienstag, Palmwoche.
- 85 Theodoros Studites, 3. Kathismata, Orthros vom Donnerstag, Palmwoche.
- 86 Theodoros Studites, 2. Troparion der 5. Ode (2. Teil), Orthros vom Freitag, Palmwoche.
- 87 „Τὴν ψυχωφελή, πληρώσαντες Τεσσαρακοστήν, καὶ τὴν ἁγίαν Ἑβδομάδα τοῦ Πάθους σου, αἰτοῦμεν κατιδεῖν Φιλάνθρωπε, τοῦ δοῦναι ἐν αὐτῇ τὰ μεγαλεῖά σου, καὶ τὴν ἄφατον δι' ἡμᾶς οἰκονομίαν σου, ὁμοφρόνως μελωδοῦντες, Κύριε δόξα σοι.“ Doxastikon der Aposticha, Orthros von Freitag, Palmwoche.
- 88 Kaiser LEON der Weise, 6. Stichiron vom Vesper, Lazarus Samstag, Palmwoche.
- 89 ANDREAS von Kreta, 10. Troparion der 4. Ode, im Kanon der Komplet, Lazarus Samstag.
- 90 ANDREAS von Kreta, 6. Troparion der 5. Ode, im Kanon der Komplet, Lazarus Samstag. Ähnliche Texte: „Ποῦ ἢ τῶν Ἑβραίων ἄνοια; ποῦ ἢ ἀπιστία; ἕως πότε πλάνοι; ἕως πότε νόθοι; ὁρᾶτε τὸν θανέντα, φωνὴ ἐξαλλόμενον, καὶ ἀπιστεῖτε τῷ Χριστῷ; ὄντως υἱοὶ τοῦ σκότους πάντες ὑμεῖς!“ ANDREAS von Kreta, 7. Troparion der 3. Ode, im Kanon der Komplet, Lazarus Samstag. „Οἱ σκοτεινοὶ περὶ τὸ φῶς, Ἰουδαῖοι, τί ἀπιστεῖτε, τῇ τοῦ Λαζάρου ἐγέρσει; Χριστοῦ τὸ ἐγγχείρημα.“ ANDREAS von Kreta, 5. Troparion der 8. Ode, im Kanon der Komplet, Lazarus Samstag.
- 91 Es geht um den 3. Stichiron, Vesper vom Palmsonntag.
- 92 Vgl. dazu VLACH, M., *The Church as a Replacement of Israel...*, 2009.
- 93 Hypakoe nach der 3. Ode, Orthros vom Palmsonntag. Was am Palmsonntag und in der ganzen Karwoche vorkommt, zeigt schon die Wende oder das Resultat eines rhetorisch gewonnenen Konflikts aus der nachösterlichen Perspektive. Vgl. CERNOKRAK, N., „Les offices byzantins de la passion, interprètes de la polémique du Christ avec les juifs dans l'Évangile de saint Jean“, in: C. Braga & A. Pistoia (eds.), *La Liturgie, interprète de l'écriture. II: Dans les compositions liturgiques, prières et chants*, Bibliotheca Ephemerides Liturgicae Subsidia 126, Editioni Liturgicae, Roma, 2003, 175: „La scène de l'entrée triomphale à Jérusalem est devenue pour l'hymnographie le prélude authentique de la polémique sur la Passion dans la perspective de la glorification pascale.“
- 94 THEOKRITOFF, E., „The Orthodox services of Holy Week. The Jews and the New Sion“, *Sobornost* 25 (2003), 30f.
- 95 1. Troparion der Laudes, Donnerstag in der Karwoche.
- 96 Doxastikon vom Vesper, am Donnerstag in der Karwoche.
- 97 3. Troparion der Laudes, Donnerstag in der Karwoche.
- 98 Doxastikon vom Vesper, am Donnerstag in der Karwoche.
- 99 3. Atiphon, Donnerstag Abend: „ὁ δὲ παράνομος Ἰούδας, οὐκ ἠβουλήθη συνέναι“.
- 100 Dieser Kanon gibt es in der griechischen Version des Triodions heute nicht mehr. Ich habe aus der rumänischen Version übersetzt, die wahrscheinlich

- eine slavische bzw. eine ältere griechische Variante als Quelle hat. Siehe dazu die deutsche Übersetzung von Malzev im *Fasten- und Blumentriodion*, Aschaffenburg, 2009, 449.
- 101 Siehe den 12. Antiphon von Donnerstag, im *Fasten- und Blumentriodion...*, 468f.
- 102 THEOKRITOFF, E., „The Orthodox services of Holy Week...“, 36-37.
- 103 1. Idiomelon von Laudes, Karfreitag, laut *Fasten- und Blumentriodion...*, 490f.
- 104 2. Idiomelon von Laudes, Karfreitag, laut *Fasten- und Blumentriodion...*, 491.
- 105 Doxastikon der Laudes, Karfreitag: „ἵνα συντρίψω αὐτοὺς, ὥς σκεύη κεραμέως.“
- 106 THEOKRITOFF, E., „The Orthodox services of Holy Week...“, 40-5.
- 107 *Ibidem*, 41.
- 108 *Ibidem*, 42.
- 109 *Ibidem*, 25.
- 110 *Ibidem*, 50.
- 111 LOUTH, A., „Patristic Scholarship and Ecumenism“, in: Cristian BADILITA (ed.), *Patristique et Œcuménisme. Thèmes, contextes, personnages*, Beauchesne - Galaxia Gutenberg, 2010, 7: “We need to recover the deep affinity that exists between Christianity and Judaism, and perhaps also have courage to revise some of our texts that are blatantly supersessionist and anti-Judaic, especially during Great and Holy Week.”
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- 113 HACKEL, S., „The Relevance of Western Post-Holocaust Theology to the Thought and Practice of the Russian Orthodox Church,“. Online: <http://www.jcrelations.net/The+Relevance+of+Western+Post-Holocaust+Theology+to+the+Thought+and+Practice+of+the+Russian+Orthodox+Church.2332.0.html?L=3>. (20.03.2014)
- 114 SUTTNER, E. C., „Glaubensverkündigung durch Lobpreis...“, 83.
- 115 GROEN, B., „Liturgie und Spiritualität in den orthodoxen Kirchen.“ in *Die orthodoxen Kirchen der byzantinischen Tradition* (hg. von T. Bremer und H. R. Gazer; Darmstadt: Wiss. Buchges), 2013, 122.
- 116 TAFT, R. S.J., „Holy Week in the Byzantine Tradition...“, 74-5.
- 117 „That truism, that the history of freedom, a freedom that has been experienced in recent liturgical reforms in the West, but a freedom needed also, I think, in the Churches which have inherited the byzantine-hagiopolite uses of Holy Week.“ *Ibidem*, 90.
- 118 CUNNINGHAM, M. B., „Polemic and exegesis...“, 59.
- 119 *Ibidem*, 63.



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LE DISCOURS SUR L'ECONOMIE POLITIQUE DE JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU OU POURQUOI TOUTE ECONOMIE EST UNE ECONOMIE POLITIQUE

« L'argent est la véritable semence de l'argent, et le premier écu est infiniment plus difficile à gagner que le second million. »

Lorsque l'économie daigne s'esquisser une généalogie, elle tend souvent à se projeter rétrospectivement comme une discipline qui lutte pour atteindre son autonomie naturelle. Imitant l'ancienne manière de l'histoire des sciences – qui se représente en accumulation de savoirs et dévoilement progressif de la vérité – et loin de se percevoir comme le résultat d'un processus constitutif ouvert et contingent, elle ne reconnaît parmi ses ancêtres légitimes que les théories qui ont fini par s'imposer ou celles qui s'apparentent aux notions libérales : ainsi peut-elle les traiter en « précurseurs ». Pour cette histoire dominante de l'économie, téléologique et continuitiste, qui identifie le « vrai » et le « faux » dans des doctrines méritant d'être enregistrées ou au contraire oubliées dans un récit du progrès de l'esprit humain, la pensée économique de Jean-Jacques Rousseau peut apparaître comme une branche morte, une excentricité démentie par les développements ultérieurs de la science économique moderne.

Pourtant le *Discours sur l'économie politique*, le seul grand écrit rousseauiste qui traite explicitement de questions qu'on qualifie aujourd'hui d'économiques, a été conçu à une époque où les réflexions sur le commerce, les impôts, la production et la circulation des richesses, correspondaient assez peu à l'image qu'en projette rétroactivement l'histoire des doctrines économiques. Au milieu du XVIII^e siècle, la pensée dite économique ne semble pas encore se diriger vers une spécialisation disciplinaire ou une autonomisation du champ épistémique censée refléter une sphère économique réglée par des principes indépendants de la

société, la politique, l'histoire. Bien au contraire, même pour les théories les plus avancées – particulièrement celles des physiocrates, qui réclament leur savoir des sciences de la nature –, parler d'économie est une manière de traiter la politique, et les plus importants débats économiques forment le terrain qui voit naître des idées nouvelles sur la société, la gouvernance, la législation¹.

Les écrits de Rousseau partagent ces représentations pré-libérales de l'existence d'un lien interne et d'une interdépendance entre le politique et l'économique, termes renvoyant eux-mêmes à une séparation beaucoup plus tardive. Le temps n'est pas encore venu de raccorder, dans la théorie libérale, la proclamation de leur séparation et l'expérience historique concrète de la dynamique capitaliste – ce que Karl Polanyi a nommé le *désencastrement*. La France du milieu du XVIII^e siècle mène des guerres coloniales, déploie des stratégies commerciales intérieures et extérieures sophistiquées ; ses disputes politiques suscitent des théories sur la nature de la monnaie, de la richesse, sur le rôle et les effets du luxe et de la mobilité sociale suscitée par l'argent, sur les réglementations ou la liberté des échanges ; elle est le théâtre de débats enflammés sur la signification et légitimité des impôts. Pourtant, elle n'est pas encore – et à l'époque rien de prouve qu'elle le deviendra nécessairement – une société de marché, donc une économie capitaliste à proprement parler : la production agricole ou artisanale ne se fait pas strictement en vue de l'échange marchand, la force de travail n'est que très modestement commodifiée², l'allocation des ressources et des bénéfices monétaires ne dépend qu'en partie du marché - et un marché national unifié n'existe point encore ; quant à la contrainte de travailler et de produire qui pèse sur les laboureurs, elle n'est pas prioritairement une contrainte de nature économique, mais la conséquence d'une obligation politique, juridique ou coutumière de livrer un surproduit, obligation provenant des rapports politiques établis dans la société d'états³. Le terme même de « commerce », qui désigne alors les pratiques économiques, suggère de par ses utilisations multiples la connexion intime entre la logique des échanges économiques et le vocabulaire désignant les relations sociales et mondaines.

La pensée économique rousseauiste a donc de bonnes raisons historiques de ne pas traiter le capitalisme comme tel, c'est-à-dire comme un système totalisant caractérisé par un régime d'accumulation spécifique et fondé sur la contrainte économique. Et pourtant elle reprend la question du lien entre le politique et l'économique d'une manière réfléchie, qui curieusement révélera son intérêt et sa portée plus tard, avec l'éclosion

du capitalisme et l'émergence des catégories de la pensée libérale axées sur la séparation. Paru en 1755 dans le V^{ème} volume de l'*Encyclopédie* sous le titre « ECONOMIE (*Morale et Politique*) », et réédité séparément trois ans plus tard comme *Discours sur l'économie politique*⁴, le seul texte que Rousseau consacre explicitement aux questions économiques est particulièrement révélateur de ce rapport entre le politique et l'économique, qui plus qu'une complémentarité est vu chez lui comme un conditionnement mutuel.

Le *DEP*⁵ et le *Manuscrit de Genève* – la première version du *Contrat social* – ont été semble-t-il⁶ rédigés durant la même période, et ils partagent des passages entiers car ils appartiennent tous deux au chantier préparatoire du grand projet d'écriture, jamais achevé, censées devenir les *Institutions politiques*. Et si le *DEP* est contemporain de la formation des idées politiques du *Contrat*, il contient aussi en germe la future théorie de la volonté générale. Dans les deux textes – le *DEP* et le *Manuscrit de Genève* – on retrouve la même problématique de l'unité du corps politique, ce lien qui permet ensuite de distinguer entre le souverain et le gouvernement ; les deux textes engagent une critique similaire de l'article « Droit naturel » que Diderot avait rédigé pour l'*Encyclopédie*, ainsi qu'une déconstruction similaire de la notion de « genre humain » par laquelle Diderot naturalisait la sociabilité humaine et l'instinct social⁷. Tous deux laissent deviner une position politique qui, loin de se montrer hostile aux enjeux du droit naturel, est une critique interne de celui-ci, visant les incohérences et les constructions fictionnelles qui le détournent de ses buts politiques ultimes dont Rousseau est solidaire⁸.

La lecture du *DEP* que je propose dans ce texte donnera quelques aperçus sur sa position centrale, voire sa fonction de synthèse dans l'œuvre politique de Rousseau, et cela nonobstant un penchant persistant chez certains commentateurs⁹ à le dissocier de ses autres écrits politiques – en général pour souligner son étrangeté par rapport aux thèmes habituelles de Rousseau, ou encore pour désolidariser son approche de la propriété, supposée plus lockéenne et donc plus raisonnable, d'une approche comme celle du *DOI*, tenue pour immature car radicale et utopique dans ses vues sur le commencement et les effets dommageables de l'appropriation privée¹⁰. À l'encontre de ces thèses, je suggérerai en premier lieu que si le *DEP* semble se distinguer des autres formulations rousseauistes sur la propriété, il en exprime en réalité l'unité interne – les autres textes n'étant que des réfractions, des reprises complémentaires¹¹ – et que ces différences sont essentiellement dues au décalage assumé entre les différents plans

épistémiques des œuvres (surtout entre l'histoire conjecturale de la dénaturation de l'homme du *DOI* et le projet politique compensateur et correcteur lancé dans le *Contrat* et dans le *DEP*). En second lieu, mon texte examinera la façon dont le *DEP* prolonge une démarche de dénaturalisation des catégories sociales et politiques des philosophes, et montrera ainsi à quel point il est crucial pour comprendre l'originalité du grand projet épistémologico-politique rousseauiste. Il s'agira enfin de le déchiffrer comme l'exercice d'une pensée anti-analytique, s'opposant donc à toute forme d'abstraction dans chacun des examens consacrés à la monnaie, aux impôts, à l'égalité, à la théorie de la société.

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Loin d'être un thème marginal dans l'œuvre de Rousseau, la propriété est centrale tant pour la reconstruction généalogique de la socialisation de l'homme et de l'institution des inégalités, que pour l'examen du système de conservation et de reproduction des formes sociales inégalitaires déjà organisées. L'apparition de la propriété foncière privée et l'effet de détournement qu'elle a eu sur l'évolution politique de l'homme, reconstruits de façon rétrospective, ou encore sa capacité accidentelle à générer le mal dans les sociétés et de vicier les mœurs, autrement dit la fonction à la fois fondatrice et explicative de la propriété, sont parmi les thèses les plus hardies du *DOI*. De même, la recherche d'une méthode pour brider ses effets pernicieux est un enjeu crucial du *Contrat social* et du *DEP* : la découverte et l'institution de la propriété étant irréversibles, toute organisation raisonnable d'une société politique devrait selon Rousseau chercher à contrôler son expansion.

Pourtant, entre ces textes la différence de contenu est patente, et, de ce fait, expliquer cette apparente divergence a longtemps constitué une des plus grandes difficultés tant pour la reconstitution de la genèse des écrits de Rousseau, que pour la question provocatrice de l'unité de sa pensée ou encore la restitution de ce que serait la véritable doctrine rousseauiste de la propriété.

Le *DOI*, publié en 1755, esquisse une généalogie conjecturale de l'apparition de la propriété, employant ce procédé qui consiste à reconstituer certains faits qui ont dû inéluctablement avoir eu lieu (bien que leur position chronologique précise reste à jamais indéterminable) car il n'y a qu'eux qui puissent expliquer la configuration anthropologique, politique et sociale du monde moderne, autrement dit comment et pourquoi ses institutions, mœurs, et formes de socialité sont telles qu'elles sont.

Outre ses conséquences funestes, dont l'humanité aurait pu être épargnée dans le cadre d'une histoire alternative qui aurait ignoré cette exclusivité individualisante de la possession, la propriété privée de la terre rompt d'une manière fortuite avec la pratique coutumière du commun, en s'éloignant ainsi plus encore – et cette fois-ci irréversiblement – de l'état de nature :

Le premier qui, ayant enclos un terrain, s'avisa de dire : Ceci est à moi, et trouva des gens assez simples pour le croire, fut le vrai fondateur de la société civile. Que de crimes, de guerres, de meurtres, que de misères et d'horreurs n'eût point épargnés au genre humain celui qui, arrachant les pieux ou comblant le fossé, eût crié à ses semblables : Gardez-vous d'écouter cet imposteur ; vous êtes perdus, si vous oubliez que les fruits sont à tous, et que la terre n'est à personne. Mais il y a grande apparence, qu'alors les choses en étaient déjà venues au point de ne pouvoir plus durer comme elles étaient ; car cette idée de propriété, dépendant de beaucoup d'idées antérieures qui n'ont pu naître que successivement, ne se forma pas tout d'un coup dans l'esprit humain. Il fallut faire bien des progrès, acquérir bien de l'industrie et des lumières, les transmettre et les augmenter d'âge en âge, avant que d'arriver à ce dernier terme de l'état de nature. Reprenons donc les choses de plus haut et tâchons de rassembler sous un seul point de vue cette lente succession d'événements et de connaissances, dans leur ordre le plus naturel¹².

Par la suite, raconte le *DOI*, une fois la socialisation-dénaturation déclenchée, une fois les sociétés politiques installées dans leurs conflits des classes issus de cette nouvelle pratique de l'appropriation et de la montée consécutive des inégalités politiques entre les citoyens, la propriété devient un droit protégé par l'État, parce que, sous une certaine forme, elle se transforme en une condition de stabilité de ces sociétés inégalitaires et conflictuelles. Ainsi la propriété devient un droit – un constat de fait dans le *DOI*, qui ne cesse de déplorer sa découverte, mais n'en reconnaît pas moins la nécessité de la conserver comme institution sociale.

Le *DEP* semble quant à lui ne plus s'intéresser à cette origine contingente, infortunée et surtout usurpatrice de la propriété, et il l'assimile tout simplement à un droit fondamental. Ce qui lui donne, aux yeux de nombreux exégètes, une apparence lockéenne qui semble orienter la théorie rousseauiste dans son ensemble vers une vision libérale préoccupée du fondement de la société politique et des mécanismes du droit capables de limiter l'autorité d'un prince. L'auteur du *Discours sur*

l'origine des inégalités et celui qui écrit ces lignes seraient-ils la même personne:

Il est certain que le droit de propriété est le plus sacré de tous les droits des citoyens, et plus important à certains égards que la liberté même ; soit parce qu'il tient de plus près à la conservation de la vie ; soit parce que les biens étant plus faciles à usurper et plus pénibles à défendre que la personne, on doit plus respecter ce qui peut se ravir plus aisément ; soit enfin parce que la propriété est le vrai fondement de la société civile, et le vrai garant des engagements des citoyens : car si les biens ne répondaient pas des personnes, rien ne serait si facile que d'éluder ses devoirs et de se moquer des lois¹³.

Si l'on ajoute à cela les fragments de *l'Émile* qui traitent de la propriété et du lien social qu'est la monnaie d'une manière apparemment accommodante et non contestataire, une confusion totale risque de s'installer. Et comme pour confirmer la conviction de ceux qui veulent démontrer que l'œuvre de Rousseau est particulièrement scindée et dépourvue d'unité interne, l'incohérence est d'autant plus troublante que ces textes sont tous rédigés à la même époque, dans les années 1754-1760. Or, s'il m'est impossible d'éclairer ici tous les rapports mutuels entre ces textes, ou encore d'émettre un verdict définitif sur ce que serait la cohérence ou au contraire l'éclatement des théories rousseauistes de la propriété, je vais suggérer que cette ambiguïté peut être déchiffrée par une lecture du *DEP*.

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Le plan du texte est assez clair : après un préambule qui distingue soigneusement, à l'encontre de toute réminiscence aristotélicienne, entre l'économie domestique et l'économie publique, qui correspondent chacune à des réalités entre lesquelles il n'y ni homologie ni homogénéité – la famille et l'État –, le *DEP* expose, en chacune de ses trois parties, les trois fonctions de l'économie publique.

L'analogie aristotélicienne résiduelle constituait traditionnellement une prémisses des théories du pouvoir absolutiste, fussent-elles françaises ou anglaises, mais aussi le cadre où se développerait un des sous-thèmes des théories absolutistes, l'économie politique. Ce nouveau savoir prendrait timidement contour avec Bodin et Montchrétien, et s'épanouirait pleinement dans la deuxième moitié du siècle. Et, s'il est vrai que les déjà modernes Bodin et Montchrétien s'éloignent tous les deux du schéma

aristotélicien – le premier en réunissant l'économie et la « police » dans la sphère de la gestion de l'État, le second suivant Bodin et sa définition de l'objectif de l'État qui est le bien-être des sujets –, chez tous deux, pourtant, les termes « économie » et « politiques » subissent plutôt une permutation, un changement de lieu et d'application, et non une vraie transformation qualitative. De sorte que l'État devient dans leurs textes un grand et puissant *oikos*, et que le savoir-faire administratif du royaume reste toujours semblable au savoir-faire du ménage domestique, tandis que le politique est dépouillé de sa spécificité si fondamentale dans la pensée d'Aristote¹⁴.

Contre cette analogie se tourne donc Rousseau, non sans partager une grande sympathie pour anti-absolutisme des autres philosophes tels Locke, Sidney, Diderot ; pourtant, sa façon de faire dans le *Contrat social* ou le *DEP* est censée contourner les conséquences conciliantes ou tout simplement irréalisables, utopiques de leurs critiques anti-absolutistes. Car, explique le *DEP*, si l'économie de l'*oikos* se caractérise par une convergence naturelle d'intérêts entre un chef provisoire (le père) et ses « sujets » (ses enfants mineurs) et par le désir de conserver et d'augmenter le patrimoine commun dans cette structure de domination naturelle, l'économie publique est, elle, le système censé mettre en œuvre – c'est-à-dire rendre possible, dévoiler et exécuter – des préceptes issus artificiellement de la volonté générale législatrice ; celle-ci est la véritable instance souveraine synthétisant une pluralité d'intérêts divergents des citoyens toujours égaux entre eux. Avec ses trois tâches – administrer les lois ; assurer, par l'éducation des citoyens et la limitation des inégalités des fortunes, la présence des deux éléments interdépendants que sont la vertu et la liberté ; et créer les conditions de la satisfaction des besoins matériels de l'État et des citoyens – elle se confond donc avec l'ensemble de ce que Rousseau appelle le gouvernement.

Laissant de côté la sphère de l'économie domestique qui ne présente pas un intérêt immédiat pour la politique, il peut sembler à première vue que le terme *économie* désigne à la fois le système général de l'exécutif (qui correspond au gouvernement et comprend l'administration des personnes et celle des biens) et une de ses espèces, concernée par les besoins matériels, les impôts, le commerce, les finances, la propriété, les dépenses militaires (un sens restreint, donc, le rapport avec les biens)¹⁵. Toutefois, ce n'est pas une confusion taxonomique dont il s'agit, mais d'un éclaircissement et d'un conditionnement mutuel du genre et de l'espèce : car l'économie au sens restreint acquiert sa spécificité et son juste

fonctionnement dans la mesure où elle s'insère dans l'État, et peut ainsi se distinguer des pratiques de la reproduction de la vie et du patrimoine propres aux communautés familiales. De l'autre côté, il n'y a qu'en s'assurant les conditions matérielles de sa propre application, c'est-à-dire en s'appuyant sur l'économie au sens restreint, que l'économie publique, dans son acception générale de gouvernement, acquiert un sens et une efficacité ; et ces conditions matérielles, qui exigent de geler l'expansion des inégalités (pécuniaires et politiques) entre les citoyens et de bloquer l'action ravageuse de l'argent, lui assurent les ressources financières nécessaires à la reproduction, mais aussi ce qui pourrait être vu comme un système immunitaire. Or, ce système immunitaire ne préserve pas pour toujours la communauté civile de la destruction, mais il empêche son grippage immédiat et, conjointement, ralentit considérablement une corruption politique très probable à terme, car les communautés politiques ne connaissent pas de stases.

C'est pour éclairer ce rapport de conditionnement entre un régime politique juste et fonctionnel et l'économie comprise dans ce sens spécifique qu'il est crucial de distinguer, pour Rousseau comme pour les philosophes contractualistes et surtout Locke, l'organisation familiale de celle de l'État.

Locke avait déjà bâti sa théorie politique sur cette différenciation de façon à ruiner l'absolutisme professé par les apologistes de la monarchie absolue de droit divin, tel Robert Filmer¹⁶. Filmer expliquait, dans son traité appelé *Patriarcha or the natural power of Kings*, que l'autorité royale dériverait directement de l'autorité paternelle, et toutes les deux du droit qu'Adam seul aurait reçu sur ses enfants et sur la terre entière de la main de Dieu. Pour Filmer, Adam, un personnage historique clé, aurait été donc une espèce de seigneur féodal dont le *dominium* comprenait à la fois les terres et les membres de sa famille comme sujets ; les rois modernes, en tant qu'héritiers directs d'Adam, auraient conséquemment des droits sur leurs semblables et en conserveraient l'autorité originelle absolue. Dans ce schéma de *patriarchalisme politique*¹⁷, la souveraineté exercée sur les hommes et le droit de propriété sur les terres se superposent parfaitement et se transmettent par hérédité. C'est à Locke qu'il revient d'avoir brisé cette unité, cette coïncidence de l'autorité et de la possession légitimes, mais aussi d'avoir contesté leur origine prétendument commune. Ainsi, dans le premier *Traité du gouvernement civil*, il balaye la représentation de la monarchie que Filmer partage avec toute une tradition augustinienne, où l'anthropologie du péché – la tendance des hommes à la subversion

et l'anarchie – réclame une domination politique corrective absolutiste, ne serait-ce que pour sauver l'homme de lui-même. Au-delà d'une vision anthropologique plus optimiste, plus égalitaire et émancipée du spectre du péché originel – puisque pour Locke les hommes sont tous de naissance libres et égaux –, le rapport politique regagne dans ses écrits une spécificité irréductible : la souveraineté ne peut dériver que d'un consensus ; ainsi, rapport consenti entre les hommes, elle ne saurait être le pendant d'un droit sur la terre. Les arguments que formule Locke dans la première partie de son *Traité* se dressent contre la continuité historique qui enracinait, chez *Sir Robert*, la souveraineté des rois dans celle d'Adam ; ils rétablissent qu'à l'origine du monde la terre appartenaient sans discrimination à tous les hommes ; et ils mettent en lumière que même cette forme d'autorité qui semble la plus proche de l'état de nature, le pouvoir paternel, est non-arbitraire, conditionnée et non-transmissible¹⁸. Pour séparer les deux formes d'autorité, *le DEP* de Rousseau déploie surtout une ossature de distinctions analytiques et fonctionnelles. Le pouvoir politique et le pouvoir paternel se distinguent par l'origine (ici au sens logique plutôt que historique), par la dimension (dont on verra plus loin qu'elle n'est jamais qu'une simple détermination numérique, mais l'embryon d'un type spécifique de gouvernance), par le régime de la propriété (son objectif et les conditions qui lui assurent l'institution et la préservation), et enfin par le principe qui devrait guider le chef dans chacune de ces sociétés : si le père se laisse conduire par la voix de la nature, le magistrat devrait au contraire lui résister et suivre la raison publique, pour ne pas permettre à ce penchant naturel si proche de l'intérêt privé de le corrompre et de compromettre l'intégrité et la loyauté qu'il doit à l'intérêt public¹⁹.

Ceci signifie que la différence entre famille et communauté civile est incomplète sans une distinction entre le patrimoine familial et la propriété en tant que droit institué par un État, voire qu'elle ne peut même pas être comprise si on ignore ce qui est au cœur même de la souveraineté, la propriété.

Bien entendu, les philosophes du droit naturel moderne n'ignoraient pas son importance pour la constitution des communautés politiques. Locke l'avait fait figurer parmi les droits naturels élémentaires ; sa critique de Filmer s'appuyait sur une désagrégation de l'unité originaire du *dominium*, divisée entre un rapport privé avec la terre que légitime son origine dans le travail personnel, et l'autorité publique obtenue par le consensus d'une majorité. Les théories de Grotius, Pufendorf, Barbeyrac – que Rousseau connaît, dont il s'inspire et qu'il critique à plusieurs

reprises²⁰ – comme d’ailleurs toute théorie provenant d’une manière ou autre du droit romain, reposent fondamentalement sur une compréhension du rapport entre l’appropriation, la conservation de soi, la conservation de ses biens et les institutions politiques.

En quoi consiste alors l’originalité de la théorie de la propriété de Rousseau ? Les théories contractualistes – et Locke, bien évidemment – n’avaient pas attendu Rousseau pour distinguer entre le régime d’autorité familiale et le régime d’autorité politique ; bien plus, quand la propriété n’était pas absolument réductible à son institution positive, comme par exemple chez Hobbes, elle était au moins en partie redevable à une convention civile, comme chez Pufendorf qui, sans être lui non plus très original, soulignait le rôle central des lois civiles pour trouver les règles d’une appropriation qui soit légitime et sans danger pour l’ordre politique.

C’est dans le rapport complexe qui lient, d’une manière peu explicite et sur plusieurs plans, les notions apparemment divergentes de la propriété dans plusieurs de ses écrits – notamment le *DOI*, le *DEP*, le *Contrat social* dans ses deux versions, mais aussi certains passages de l’*Émile* – que peuvent être perçues l’originalité et la cohérence de fond de la conception rousseauiste de la propriété. Surtout, une unité interne lie le *DEP* aux explications généalogiques fournies par le *DOI*, avec son histoire naturelle des sociétés qui doit son cours et ses tournures à un enchaînement de hasards. Cette recherche conjecturale dénaturalisante ne se contente pas de constater qu’une convention ou une imposition juridique est indispensable pour qu’une possession soit légitime, mais elle proclame hautement que la propriété individuelle et exclusive – qu’elle soit instituée ou spontanée, supposée naturelle par les théories modernes du droit naturel et reconnue comme droit fondamental par le *DEP* – aurait pu rester inconnue à jamais du genre humain. *C’est l’incorporation des résultats de ce procédé généalogique de dénaturalisation, d’un radicalisme sans précédent, qui permet au DEP de s’éloigner du droit naturel et qui constitue la première grande originalité de cette théorie.*

Car la nature, cet absolu originaire, n’existe pas et n’a peut-être jamais existé. Tout ce qui est propre à l’homme, toutes les institutions, les dispositions, les valeurs politiques et morales, la religion, ou encore le soi, le langage, la raison et la structure cognitive, sont toutes des cristallisations d’une dénaturation lente, progressive, adaptative²¹. Chacun de ces éléments a été dénaturé dans un sens particulier, encadrée dans un contexte déjà saturé qui lui a donné une certaine direction, et jamais dans un vide historique. La corruption des hommes, qui accompagne

leur lent devenir social et politique, se greffe sur des formes sociales et politiques déterminées et à leur tour contingentes.²² Il n'y a pas de nature, parce que toute chose qui existe est déjà insérée dans certains modes d'organisation sociale qui la précèdent.

C'est donc l'histoire, et non la « nature » ou l'« origine », qui explique comment et pourquoi les hommes et les sociétés où ils vivent sont tels qu'ils sont. Rousseau repousse la logique qui est au cœur des théories du droit naturel, à savoir la prétendue reconstitution d'un état naturel originel qui ne serait qu'une image travestie du présent. Cette fiction qui consiste à conférer à la nature humaine des caractères qui en réalité n'appartiennent qu'aux conditions sociales et historiques spécifiquement modernes – et souvent très corrompues – obstrue et détourne la critique politique efficace.

La propriété n'est qu'une des institutions et habitudes qui paraissent naturelles parce qu'elles sont omniprésentes. Cependant, elle n'est pas une forme sociale parmi d'autres, mais un agent qui déclenche et oriente la formation des sociétés politiques modernes et leur dépravation, telles que les dépeignent le *DSA* et le *DOI*. *C'est cette origine radicalement accidentelle de la propriété individuelle qui, jointe à sa capacité de produire des effets historiques et des structures sociales objectives de longue durée, constitue le deuxième élément d'originalité de la théorie de Rousseau.* Se contenter de constater les conséquences déplorables de la dissémination de la propriété n'aurait pas été une contribution très inédite à une littérature moralisante depuis longtemps répandue. Celle-ci se montrait déjà très critique à l'égard de la société assujettie au commerce et au luxe, mais sa perspective était assez conservatrice car hostile à la mobilité sociale facilitée par le commerce – même lorsqu'elle se drapait du langage et des valeurs du républicanisme politique. Chez Rousseau, l'hostilité républicaine au luxe et à l'enrichissement, la réclamation d'un contrôle étatique de l'économie, ne sont ni une simple posture moralisatrice ni l'expression d'une position de classe déguisée, mais le corollaire de l'explication historique et matérialiste qui distingue sa critique d'un tableau de mœurs statique et d'une littérature de *caractères*.

Dans quel sens peut-on parler d'une explication matérialiste de la socialisation-viciation des hommes ? Il ne s'agit évidemment pas d'un économisme suivant de près le déploiement des formes de production. Surtout, les écrits de Rousseau (en particulier le *DOI*) ne prétendent pas que l'*économie* façonne toujours les sociétés humaines, ou qu'il serait par essence le principal déterminant, le premier moteur des changements historiques. Il s'agit néanmoins d'une vision selon laquelle certains

éléments qu'on qualifierait d'*économiques*, appartenant à la sphère des moyens de productions telles que la découverte de l'agriculture et de la métallurgie, ont influencé les « révolutions » de l'histoire puis engendré et modelé les habitus socio-politiques. Si cette vision peut être qualifiée d'économisme, alors c'est un économisme contingent, spécifique à un certain laps de temps, celui où la propriété instituée donne consistance et poids aux conflits sociaux ; elle produit alors des moyens d'asservissements qui forgent des hiérarchies sociales plus solides que les frictions évanescences qui sont l'œuvre du simple l'amour propre.

L'alliance de l'agriculture et de la métallurgie semble constituer, dans le *DOI*, le ressort de l'histoire et du « développement »²³ ; ensemble, elles apportent des nouveautés décisives et irréversibles, comme la division du travail devenue nécessaire, la socialisation et collectivisation de la production (donc l'interdépendance), le travail obligatoire, la contrainte d'amasser des biens puis de se distinguer des autres, l'inégalité qui s'impose à tous, et avec elles tous les affects, les désirs, les passions nocives et les formes de représentations qui accompagnent une société de la distinction²⁴. En bref, découvertes par hasard, l'agriculture et la métallurgie finissent par créer un système dynamique de contraintes et d'obligations.

Cependant, si la division du travail dénote d'abord un simple partage de tâches dans une corvée collective, suivi très rapidement d'une augmentation de la productivité qui se révélera vitale pour la transformation du train de vie de la communauté, elle renvoie aussi chez Rousseau à une néfaste répartition entre deux catégories de participants, qui se solidifient en deux classes : une scission d'abord économique entre maîtres et serviteurs – ceux qui possèdent des terres et ceux qui n'en possèdent pas, ceux qui travaillent et ceux qui s'approprient le travail des autres – qui se transforme, plus tard, en une scission politique entre gouvernants et gouvernés. C'est alors au récit sur le *contrat des dupes* du *DOI* de montrer comment les rapports de force politiques dérivent de ces inégalités économiques initiales, qu'elles consolident et légitiment à leur tour en créant une circularité et un renforcement réciproque, qui les rend de plus en plus difficile de distinguer l'une de l'autre.

Le *contrat des dupes* a été initié par les riches dans leur intérêt, puisque ce sont eux qui ont le plus à perdre dans une société violente et sans contrôle. Loin d'être une simple étape dans la constitution juridique de la communauté civile, et même s'il peut être partiellement corrigé en évoluant vers un arrangement politique plus juste, le *contrat des dupes* reste pour

toujours une origine structurante, qui dévoile une configuration de force et, surtout, la réalité ultime de toute société politique qui est le conflit de classe. D'une part, il montre que la communauté civile a été constituée en vue de la protection des biens, sans quoi « les hommes eussent pu se passer de législation, car il n'y avait pas initialement d'inégalité entre eux. Par conséquent, la liberté ne fut pas le droit fondateur »²⁵. En conséquence, le rapport entre le droit usurpé et le droit reconnu comme légitime – même celui des sociétés plus justes, comme celle que Rousseau veut constituer par les principes qu'il expose dans ses *DEP* et *Contrat social* – gardera un noyau d'ambiguïté²⁶. D'autre part, le *contrat des dupes* inocule l'idée que cette ambiguïté, cette origine usurpatrice du droit légitime, restera incorporée moins comme une narration mythologique quelconque sur l'*origine* que comme une structure intrinsèquement conflictuelle et qui se conserve tel un ADN politique. Ou plutôt, si la supercherie²⁷ originaire qui mène au contrat a quelque chance de se convertir progressivement en un droit stable et légitime d'un point de vue juridique formel, elle restera encadré comme une usurpation sociale et économique qui n'a de chance d'être limitée et domptée que dans un État justement constitué.

C'est une thèse que le *DEP* reprend sous une forme semblant souder la catastrophe originaire, qui dans le *DOI* fondait l'histoire des inégalités, avec la vie quotidienne normale d'un État moderne :

Résumons en quatre mots le pacte social des deux états. *Vous avez besoin de moi, car je suis riche et vous êtes pauvre ; faisons donc un accord entre nous : je permettrai que vous ayez l'honneur de me servir, à condition que vous me donniez le peu qui vous reste pour la peine que Je prendrai de vous commander*²⁸.

Placer le conflit de classe au cœur de toute société politique est le *troisième et le plus important trait qui fait l'originalité* de la théorie economico-politique de Rousseau.

Pourtant, si au commencement l'organisation politique est mise en place pour conserver un état de fait au fond injuste et pour empêcher tout éclatement révolutionnaire, si donc la signification de l'ordre politique est en dernière instance conservatrice, et si elle est stimulée par les changements survenus dans la sphère de la propriété et de la production des richesses, c'est ensuite le politique qui prend le devant, devenant ce qui est déterminant dans l'aménagement et le façonnage de l'état de fait. C'est en ce sens que Rousseau peut résumer, dans le IX^e livre de ses

Confessions, le programme qui le guidera dans tous ses écrits politiques (et finalement dans ses œuvres philosophiques) sans pour autant renoncer à son « économisme » originel :

J'avais vu que tout tenait radicalement à la politique, et que, de quelque façon qu'on s'y prît, aucun peuple ne serait jamais que ce que la nature de son gouvernement le ferait être ; ainsi cette grande question du meilleur gouvernement possible me paraissait se réduire à celle-ci : Quelle est la nature du gouvernement propre à former un peuple le plus vertueux, le plus éclairé, le plus sage, le meilleur enfin, à prendre ce mot dans son plus grand sens²⁹ ?

Ayant une double dette envers l'histoire et l'économie, l'organisation politique est, dans sa variété, ce qui est décisif pour le destin d'un peuple. Voilà pourquoi, après avoir constaté la profondeur et l'irréversibilité des conséquences de la découverte de la propriété, loin d'être un fataliste politique et donc un conservateur, Rousseau est préoccupé au-delà de tout par l'élaboration d'une forme politique idéale. Mais cette construction politique normative, qu'elle soit la théorie du *Contrat social* ou les préceptes pour un bon gouvernement du *DEP*, ne tombera pas dans un utopisme abstrait tant qu'elle tiendra compte des particularités réelles que la propriété et le développement ont enraciné dans les structures sociales et dans les subjectivités politiques. Au contraire, sa tâche principale étant de prendre en charge et d'administrer un ensemble de rapports déjà corrompus, cette nouvelle forme politique ne saurait être soupçonnée d'évasionisme contraire au réalisme politique sain. Sans être révolutionnaire³⁰, Rousseau n'est pas un conservateur ; mais son objectif est de contourner simultanément le fatalisme implicite des théories de ses amis *philosophes* anti-absolutistes, qui naturalisent ce qui dans la société moderne n'est qu'une dénaturation et viciation, et leur utopisme provenant d'une vision abstraite de ce qu'est et pourrait être l'individu.

Reste que le monde moderne, tel qu'il se présente comme phénomène social aux yeux d'un observateur critique et tel qu'il résulte d'explications généalogiques est profondément divisé et conflictuel. La convergence automatique des intérêts individuels, qu'elle soit envisagée comme unité politique du corps de la nation, fabriquée par une convention (ainsi dans les théories contractualiste), ou encore médiée par un mécanisme indirect, trans-personnel, et qui agirait *malgré* les volontés des individus (ainsi dans les nouvelles théories économique du *doux commerce* ou de

la *main invisible*), ne peut être qu'une fiction produite par une théorie qui escamote l'antagonisme profond.

La convergence entre les intérêts privés et le bien public étant impossible dans une société corrompue, où la concurrence généralisée devient un *habitus* (une disposition cultivée) et l'enrichissement personnel une obligation, il n'y a pas de vraie raison – à commencer par le profit qu'ils pourraient en tirer – pour que les particuliers se soumettent aux lois. Le raisonneur violent qui semblait horrifier Diderot parce qu'il refusait d'accepter l'harmonie préétablie de son intérêt et de l'intérêt d'autrui, et qui dès lors menaçait d'agir en faisant violence à ses semblables³¹, n'a effectivement pas tout à fait tort, prétend Rousseau. La société présente n'est pas constituée de manière à correspondre à nos besoins, mais à accentuer toujours le décalage entre ces besoins et la réalité et ainsi à aiguïser les conflits³². Dès lors, ces lois ne peuvent se fonder que sur la violence, la tromperie et la représentation déséquilibrée et injuste des intérêts des uns au détriment de ceux des autres. Il n'y que dans un État qui peut exprimer et administrer la vraie volonté générale³³ que la liberté est possible sans provoquer la guerre hobbesienne généralisée, et que l'ordre social peut s'installer sans coercition³⁴.

À l'inverse, dans un État absolutise comme la monarchie française, aucune des conditions pour la formation d'un intérêt public n'est remplie. Ni la condition politique, soit le lien effectif d'un corps politique qui ne se réduise pas à une somme d'individus (dont les plus puissants s'appropriant le pouvoir de l'État pour leur propre bénéfice), ni la condition économique, soit l'absence de contradictions de classe qui pourraient éclater en révoltes ou dormir sous la violence de la loi créée pour le service des riches et des puissants. La « volonté générale », un concept dont l'apparition est stimulée par les difficultés soulevées pendant la rédaction du *DEP* et surtout par la lecture de l'article de Diderot, est censée être un moyen d'engendrer un État vraiment *public*³⁵.

La déconstruction de l'analogie entre administration domestique et administration politique – cette doctrine qui permet de traiter l'État comme un domaine privé – a donc besoin, pour éviter d'être confisquée à un autre niveau par une doctrine hostile à la souveraineté populaire, de distinguer entre le souverain, c'est-à-dire la volonté générale du peuple pris en son unité, et le gouvernement, qui est simplement le corps magistériel entièrement soumis à la volonté générale et délégué par elle pour mettre en œuvre ses décisions. En absence de cette subordination de l'exécutif au pouvoir législatif populaire, la distinction entre un souverain indivisible

et le gouvernement ne servira qu'au renforcement de la monarchie. – Une telle déconstruction implique aussi d'abandonner l'illusion que le roi ou les magistrats incarnent l'universel, où l'intérêt public, et de comprendre qu'ils sont des individus qui agissent dans un système politique qui, fondé sur la vénalité, l'achat des offices et des privilèges, stimule l'utilisation personnelle des ressources économiques et politiques de l'État.

L'objectif ne sera donc pas, pour Rousseau, la limitation du pouvoir royal, mais la transformation radicale de la structure du pouvoir³⁶ : non pas rendre le pouvoir royal conforme à une loi fondamentale pour limiter son arbitraire (comme chez les ennemis de la monarchie qui dans la dispute dite *constitutionnaliste* avaient développé des arguments d'une force contestataire sans précédent) mais changer radicalement le sujet de la souveraineté, en le transférant de la particularité du monarque – ou même d'un conseil, d'un parlement ou encore des corps intermédiaires – à l'universalité du peuple législateur.

*

Cette première condition politique de la mise en place d'un État à la fois juste et stable nécessite à son tour l'appui des certaines conditions économiques. *L'objet de l'économie politique, redéfinie comme ensemble des activités du gouvernement, sera d'administrer les personnes et les choses d'une part en satisfaisant les besoins publiques et en conservant la nature publique de l'État, mais sans attenter d'autre part à la propriété privée, ce droit individuel sur lequel se fonde le corps politique.* Comme sa tâche est la création des conditions d'un intérêt commun constitutif, elle devra limiter les différences entre les fortunes et les divisions de classe et confectionner une subjectivité politique adéquate aux citoyens d'une république populaire.

Mais ici la question de la propriété ressort à nouveau, car comment accorder, dans une constitution juste, le droit de chacun à ses biens – motivation même³⁷ de l'entrée dans un contrat politique – et la double nécessité politique de limiter l'accumulation des inégalités des fortunes pour couper l'instabilité à la racine, et de trouver des ressources pour pourvoir aux besoins de l'État ? La question traditionnelle de la *limitation* se trouve quelque peu déplacée de son contexte habituel, celui du consensus, et du moins est-elle rendue plus complexe. Car les règles d'une appropriation juste se déclinent sur un double plan, et celle à laquelle l'État est autorisé – la fiscalité – dépend directement de l'élément qui sanctionne la propriété privée, qui rend le citoyen sujet de son droit et maître de son bien. Or, si Rousseau ne peut pas déterminer ce qui pourrait

rendre une appropriation individuelle absolument légitime, puisque la propriété privée est déjà par son origine une soustraction du commun, et ses conséquences un risque, il peut au moins indiquer les critères d'une légitimité relative.

Pour ce faire, tant dans le *DOI* que dans le *DEP* et l'*Émile*, il emprunte de Locke la théorie de l'enracinement de la propriété dans le travail individuel, et avec elle les limites implicites d'une possession individuelle. Un *fondement* qui, comme le démontre Blaise Bachofen, permet précisément de rebâtir les conditions de possibilité de la vie sociale et du fonctionnement des institutions, malgré son *origine* reconnue comme onéreuse³⁸.

Avec sa théorie qui renvoie la valeur, puis le droit sur un bien, au travail humain – théorie qui a justement inspiré les travaux de Ricardo ou de Marx –, Locke cherche une origine de la propriété à la fois plus proche de la nature et plus individualisante. Le chapitre qu'il lui dédie dans le *Traité sur le gouvernement civil* commence d'emblée par questionner – une question qui ressort d'ailleurs dans toutes les disputes politiques capitales de l'époque, liées à la guerre civile anglaise – les conditions d'existence de la propriété individuelle, vu que selon la raison et la révélation tous les hommes ont le même droit sur la terre³⁹. En expliquant ce transfert de la possession commune à la possession individuelle exclusive, ce chapitre, ainsi que le rémarque Macpherson, « affranchit le droit naturel de propriété individuelle des "limites du droit naturel" »⁴⁰.

C'est la consommation qui fait la médiation entre la totalité du commun et l'individuel, et la consommation suppose déjà un travail, qu'il soit complexe ou plus simple, comme le geste de cueillir un fruit. Cette triade généalogique « travail-consommation-appropriation » permet aussi à Locke d'effacer pour un moment la distinction – si longtemps reconnue par le droit et pratiquée dans le fait – entre propriété et usufruit, de dériver la loi positive qui institue la propriété de cette pratique naturelle qu'est l'appropriation privée, de prétendre que chacun doit tout à son travail et rien à la société⁴¹ et, bien plus, de soustraire tout ce qui concerne la propriété et la reproduction de la vie de la sphère politique dirigée par le consentement.

Bien entendu, l'appropriation-consommation suppose une limitation intrinsèque imposée par la loi naturelle – chez Locke, une triple limitation qui défend de gaspiller en prenant pour soi ce qui, ne pouvant pas être consommé, risque de s'altérer et se perdre ; de préjudicier la satisfaction des besoins des autres ; d'accaparer ce qui n'est pas le résultat de son

propre travail. C'est également à Locke qu'il revient d'avoir trouvé le moyen d'expliquer et de justifier la façon dont ces limitations ont été contournées dans l'état civil, sans pourtant violer la loi naturelle qui les impose⁴². L'argent est cette découverte opportune, qui d'une part rend possible la suspension des deux premières restrictions puisqu'il incarne la valeur des biens sans leur altérabilité et autorise par cela même l'accumulation illimitée devenue légitime, et qui, d'autre part, satisfait la troisième restriction – le droit de subsistance – en rendant possible le travail salarié. Puisque les hommes ont accepté (de fait) l'existence de la monnaie, poursuit Locke, il en résulte également qu'ils ne doivent pas s'opposer à ses conséquences, ni à l'inégalité des fortunes comme phénomène omniprésent. De plus, la possibilité de ce rapport salarial qui dérive de l'accumulation d'argent neutralise la troisième restriction et offre un titre légitime au travail d'un autre. D'ailleurs, Locke a une notion très particulière de ce que signifie le travail de quelqu'un, comme le prouve le célèbre passage qui assimile l'activité du serviteur à un prolongement laborieux du corps de son maître⁴³...

Et encore tous les travaux n'ont-ils pas une valeur égale, car Locke introduit un critère supplémentaire pour établir une hiérarchie entre le travail que caractérise une productivité croissante, capable d'apporter un profit, et le travail simple – c'est-à-dire entre une forme de possession plus légitime car capable d'*améliorer* de la terre et une autre qui ne l'améliore point. Cet argument aboutit à une justification des enclosures et des expropriations, car il implique que même les terres déjà occupées ou labourées, si elles ne sont pas améliorées – ainsi celles utilisés en commun par coutume dans les communautés rurales d'Angleterre ou les terres des Indiens aux Amériques – deviennent intrinsèquement des *gaspillages*. Ainsi, en se faisant maître d'un terroir, celui qui améliore sa terre et lui augmente la valeur par une croissance de la productivité du travail ne soustrait pas quelque chose à l'humanité, mais au contraire lui en fait don.

Du droit de jouir des fruits de son travail, Locke passe ainsi au droit d'occuper une terre déjà labourée en excluant ses premiers occupants. Par ailleurs, ce qui était unité originelle entre le travail et la propriété finit par se scinder, tout comme l'humanité d'abord homogène et unitaire se scinde désormais en deux classes : les industriels-propriétaires et les oisifs sans propriété.

Or, si Rousseau ne saurait désigner par le terme « capitaliste » ce nouveau type de productivité, dont le but n'est pas la satisfaction des

besoins ou la consommation ostentatoire mais le profit⁴⁴, il ne manque pas de remarquer cette fracture qui finit par séparer, chez Locke, le travail et la propriété. La méthode qui consiste à se servir d'idées radicales et d'éléments du droit naturel pour combattre l'absolutisme, mais en neutralisant ensuite leurs conséquences radicalement égalitaires, ne lui échappe non plus⁴⁵. Il comprend tout autant que l'invocation formelle de l'égalité naturelle universelle peut cohabiter avec (ou servir de cache-sexe à) l'inégalité substantielle et à la justification par le droit des faits qui composent l'injuste tableau social de l'Angleterre lockienne. D'où cette contradiction fondamentale : que le travail soit la source première de l'abondance, de la prospérité et de la propriété, et que pourtant le travail et la propriété reviennent à des catégories sociales différentes. Pire, que ces catégories ne soient pas deux classes complémentaires, mais deux classes qui, tant qu'elles sont ainsi divisées, restent essentiellement en conflit, et que tant que ce conflit structure la société, leurs intérêts ne puissent être en harmonie ni entre eux, ni avec ceux de la nation, leur opposition empêchant l'existence même d'une unité du peuple et d'un intérêt général. Cette prétendue unité, là où la réalité ne montre que violence et déséquilibre, est ainsi une fable (d'ailleurs entretenue par de nombreuses autres théories anti-absolutistes) très utiles aux dominants, un prolongement de l'idéologie du *contrat des dupes* et l'indice que le *contrat des dupes* est encore en place⁴⁶.

Il ne reste alors pour Rousseau qu'à réintroduire les questions économiques dans la logique de la politique, précisément en vue de dénoncer l'illusion entretenue par les théories qui prêchent leur indépendance. Si Locke avait démontré qu'on peut partir de l'égalité naturelle pour justifier l'inégalité sociale, Rousseau montre qu'il faut partir du rapport naturel que le travail institue avec la possession pour éclairer l'écart de fait entre ce fondement naturel et les rapports sociaux qui le contredisent si visiblement. Pour reprendre un exemple dont se sert Blaise Bachofen⁴⁷, un passage de l'*Émile* raconte la double initiation de l'enfant à la théorie et à la pratique du droit de propriété⁴⁸. Aidé par le jardinier Robert, son complice, le gouverneur incite son élève à cultiver des fèves dans un petit jardin ; une fois que la récolte ait suscité chez l'enfant l'émoi et le sentiment d'être le possesseur de ce qui est né de son travail, le jardinier entre en scène pour détruire la récolte : c'est à lui qu'appartient la terre où Émile a semé ses fèves, par conséquent Robert a tous les droits sur elles.

Pire, lorsque Émile se demande ce qu'il peut faire pour avoir accès lui aussi à un coin de jardin comme Robert, la réponse montre encore une fois combien l'hypothèse de l'égalité des participants au jeu économique n'est qu'une fable : « il n'y a plus guère de terre en friche. Moi, je travaille celle que mon père a bonifiée ; chacun en fait autant de son côté, et toutes les terres que vous voyez sont occupées depuis longtemps »⁴⁹. La propriété se tourne alors contre le travail⁵⁰, tandis que la soi-disant division du travail se convertit et se cristallise en deux classes, les propriétaires de terres et ceux auxquels ne reste que la capacité de travailler.

L'exemple tiré de l'*Émile* montre ensuite que le travail présent est toujours précédé par une occupation effective des terres. Ce décalage perpétuel entre l'effort d'aujourd'hui et l'accumulation d'hier rappelle que, quoique la source matérielle ultime de toute propriété soit un travail, la source juridique en est toujours différente et que le droit s'enracine dans le fait historique de la force et de l'appropriation primitive usurpatrice, par conséquent non consensuelle⁵¹. Il ne s'agit donc nullement d'un écho du droit naturel, mais d'un écart qui ne peut être comblé à moins de reproporionner le droit de propriété à son seul fondement naturel possible, le travail.

Toutefois, il ne faut pas voir dans cette critique interne du droit naturel un moralisme, ou encore une simple confrontation des théories avec leurs conséquences pratiques, ces dernières ouvrant la voie à la légitimation de l'inégalité. Tant le *DOI* que le *DEP* saisit la différence économique entre les classes dans sa conflictualité, laquelle menace en permanence de devenir explosive et de provoquer une guerre généralisée. C'est une telle dynamique qui pousse à l'apparition des États et des systèmes consensuels de contrôle et de contraintes, qui engendre le *contrat des dupes* et qui motive tout projet politique. Avec la propriété et l'occupation de la terre, avec les classes, l'abus se trouve déjà encasté dans la société politique, et la propriété devient le droit politique par excellence car il n'y a que la garantie de la propriété par le droit positif qui puisse assurer tout à la fois la sécurité des citoyens et la stabilité de l'État.

L'inverse est alors également valable. Si la garantie de la propriété privée est le fondement de l'État, il ne s'agit pas, comme chez Locke, de la propriété comme fin en soi mais comme condition de stabilité et de sécurité. Ce qui signifie que, dans un système constitutionnel accompli, le fait que les citoyens (tous les citoyens) possèdent leurs terroirs présente l'avantage de les rendre convenablement dépendants de l'État et participants à l'intérêt commun, tout en assurant la subsistance

et la reproduction autonome de chacun – ceci en évitant la mauvaise dépendance qu’est celle du commerce⁵².

Si un citoyen ne doit dépendre que de l’État, l’autonomie serait tout autant préférable pour une économie nationale – tant parce que le commerce international, avec sa tendance à stimuler le développement inégal des fortunes, met en danger la vertu citoyenne, que parce qu’en dépit des théories mercantilistes le bonheur d’une nation⁵³ ne dépend pas, selon Rousseau, de la quantité de monnaie qu’il possède. Économiquement parlant, le marché ne dévoile pas les valeurs des biens mais les manipule et les altère, pour cette raison que le marché, national ou international, repose en dernière instance sur un rapport de force entre les participants, lequel finit par se traduire en un déséquilibre économique qui à son tour assure avantages politiques et bénéfices économiques aux plus puissants. Le pur échange d’équivalents est une fable et – assurerait sans doute Rousseau s’il n’écrivait si longtemps avant le libéralisme – le marché comme miroir des valeurs et comme mécanisme de distribution adapté à la jouissance générale est un mensonge. Le déséquilibre entre les agents de l’échange est inscrit au cœur de la transaction, car il émane de la substance même de l’échange, l’argent⁵⁴.

Plus une économie est monétarisée, plus l’argent stimule et alimente la production et l’échange et plus il devient une forme de contrainte rendant dépendants tous ceux qui y sont impliqués. Généralisé, le marché est une coercition plus qu’une opportunité. Pire, s’il n’est que partiellement généralisé (comme en France à l’époque de Rousseau), cette monétarisation partielle donne naissance à des inégalités supplémentaires entre les participants au jeu : bien que les paysans aient en général accès à leurs moyens de production sans dépendre de l’argent liquide, ils sont ainsi forcés de vendre leurs marchandises hâtivement pour obtenir l’argent nécessaire aux paiements des impôts et des rentes foncières. Et plus ils sont pauvres et faibles, c’est-à-dire proches de la subsistance, moins ils peuvent se permettre d’attendre pour convertir leurs produits périssables en argent⁵⁵ ; leur force dans la négociation est donc inférieure à celle de ceux qui capitalisent en argent, et ils restent exposés et vulnérables dans leur commerce avec les villes qui, sans produire autre chose que du luxe inutile, attirent la richesse comme un aimant.

Le résultat est que, loin d’assurer un ajustement mutuellement bénéfique de l’offre et de la demande, ce flux unidirectionnel affaiblit gravement l’agriculture, secteur essentiel d’une économie nationale et le seul qui crée les vraies richesses (et qui d’ailleurs fortifie la vertu citoyenne).

L'augmentation de la quantité d'argent rend les denrées agricoles toujours moins chères. De plus cette coexistence du marché des biens utiles et des produits de luxe dévalorise les premiers, qui sont les plus demandés : c'est parce qu'elles sont nécessaires, voire indispensables, que les vivres obtiennent des prix plus bas que les objets destinés à la distinction sociale. C'est à Marx qu'il reviendra, un siècle plus tard, de développer en système cette opposition entre la valeur et le prix.

Contre ceux qui prétendent que la manufacture de luxe est bénéficié indirectement à tous, Rousseau dénonce la racine de ce système qui crée des pauvres en même temps que le besoin de les nourrir et de leur trouver un travail. La pauvreté n'est nullement naturelle, elle est le résultat d'un arrangement social⁵⁶. Tout comme il n'y a pas d'unité sociale dans un État corrompu, l'unité du marché n'existe pas et l'enrichissement des uns provoque l'appauvrissement des autres.

Reste que, si une législation juste dénaturerait les individus, un bon système constitutionnel serait capable de défaire la mauvaise dépendance qui assujettit une partie des citoyens aux forces économiques et politiques des autres, et, en échange, de les rendre dépendants et solidaires de l'intérêt public exclusivement. Aux moyens politiques – la volonté générale et la suppression des sociétés semi-privées et des corps intermédiaires – devraient donc s'ajouter les moyens économiques – la propriété privée limitée aux surfaces restreintes qui permettent la subsistance autonome des foyers. Dans ces conditions, pour pourvoir aux besoins des citoyens sans aucune aide matérielle de la part de l'État, il suffit alors de « maintenir l'abondance tellement à leur portée, que pour l'acquérir le travail soit toujours nécessaire et ne soit jamais inutile »⁵⁷.

Pour que l'unité politique soit possible, l'art de la législation doit recréer une homogénéité sociale relative – plus qu'une égalité politique formelle ; limiter l'emploi de l'argent et empêcher qu'il ne devienne un moyen d'accumulation et d'asservissement direct ou encore une ressource de distinction symbolique ; ramener la valeur des marchandises à leur utilité et supprimer leur dimension représentationnelle ; redéfinir en conséquence ce qui est socialement nécessaire, et dissoudre cette constitution de la pauvreté comme rapport social dérivé d'une comparaison, d'une distinction, d'une privation de consommation ostentatoire, mais aussi cette pauvreté réelle qui dérive d'un désavantage structurel dans la participation au marché et a pour résultat l'absence du minimum utile pour vivre. Toutes ces mesures concrètes doivent s'organiser dans un système d'économie politique ou de gouvernement.

Vu que la propriété est politiquement constituée comme droit, l'État – c'est-à-dire le peuple souverain⁵⁸ – a aussi la légitimité de recourir aux biens des citoyens pour pourvoir à ses propres besoins. Pourtant, un domaine public foncier serait la forme optimale pour limiter d'une part la fiscalité qui écrase le peuple (donc limiter l'atteinte au droit individuel), et d'autre part la monétarisation supplémentaire de l'économie nationale. Prévenir les besoins par une sage administration des fonds publics serait alors toujours préférable à l'augmentation des revenus. C'est le seul moyen pour ralentir la tendance irrépessible des « systèmes de finances modernes »⁵⁹ à corrompre l'économie et les mœurs, en augmentant les besoins fictifs, en alimentant les systèmes de commerce et les guerres de conquête – qui consolident le pouvoir des chefs au détriment du peuple – et en appauvrissant les campagnes. Car plus une économie est monétarisée, plus s'installe une distance entre les riches et les pauvres, et une rupture entre les gouvernants et les gouvernés. L'argent, s'il devient la substance et la motivation de la production, est le ferment qui dissout le lien social et la forme politique de la souveraineté populaire. L'argent incarne et engendre le conflit entre ceux qui accumulent et ceux qui travaillent, entre les chefs et les sujets, entre l'intérêt privé et l'intérêt public, et l'abondance monétaire ne se traduit pas en prospérité pour les habitants.

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Pourtant la fiscalité se révèle parfois nécessaire, car la monétarisation n'est pas complètement réversible et les corvées citoyennes ne suffisent pas à alimenter les revenus publics. Mais même ce compromis peut être organisé de manière à neutraliser en partie l'effet de hiérarchisation sociale produit par la monétarisation.

Premièrement, pour ce faire, l'impôt devrait être universel - et ceci à une époque où la généralisation de la fiscalité est toujours perçue par les groupes privilégiés comme le plus scandaleux des affronts politiques, puisque les nobles, la plupart des villes, l'Eglise, divers détenteurs de charges et d'offices en sont exempts: dans l'Ancien Régime, l'essence du privilège est en effet le dégrèvement fiscal, et les taxes pèsent donc surtout sur les paysans. Cependant, dans une société hiérarchique, la simple universalité uniforme de la taxation (autrement dit, l'égalité formelle des contributions) ne ferait que renforcer et reproduire l'inégalité effective entre les citoyens, la différence entre le riche et le pauvre n'étant pas une simple différence quantitative, arithmétique, mais un composé dynamique d'inégalités de puissance. Les différents types d'inégalités – entre les

qualités naturelles des individus, les moyens politiques disponibles ou encore les disproportions économiques – se cimentent ensemble et donnent, tel un composé chimique, une réalité nouvelle, une forme inédite de pouvoir. Ce pouvoir, en s'élevant au beau milieu de la société, menacerait alors de modifier la substance des lois, de les rendre formelles et vides – les lois justes ne faisant pas exception⁶⁰.

L'argent est la seule matière qui s'autoreproduit et qui, dynamique par essence, modifie les propriétés des rapports sociaux. L'argent est une chose abstraite, une façon de mesurer les quantités qui produit des qualités et des réalités positives nouvelles, des hiérarchies, des représentations, des habitudes, des besoins.

Ce qui signifie aussi, concrètement, que le riche et le pauvre n'ont pas autant à perdre des convulsions sociales, et que le besoin que le premier a de l'État est plus grand que le besoin qu'en a le pauvre.

La conséquence en est que, deuxièmement, l'impôt aussi devrait être progressif. Et ce type de proportionnalité est encore une nouveauté à l'époque, mais une nouveauté qui bouleverse même les représentations établies du *devoir envers l'État*. Pour reprendre les mots de Céline Spector,

les avantages de la société vont tous, à titre gratuit, aux puissants et aux riches; (...). Il est donc juste que le riche rémunère sa protection à l'État qui le protège mieux que le pauvre. Or une telle idée de l'impôt est profondément réformatrice, et témoigne d'une conception novatrice de la justice distributive : non pas donner à chacun ce qui lui revient (les avantages sociaux conformément aux services rendus), mais prendre à chacun selon ce qui lui revient (la ponction fiscale s'accordant aux services reçus)⁶¹.

Si les inégalités se composent pour donner une réalité nouvelle, le calcul des impôts doit aussi se fonder sur l'analyse des différences qualitatives du pouvoir, des différents types de besoins, de la productivité ou de l'improductivité des contributeurs. Le taux d'imposition pour les riches sera donc bien supérieur au taux appliqué aux revenus modestes.

Et s'il doit s'agir d'une taxation monétaire, alors l'impôt sur le revenu – la taxation des richesses abstraites – est préférable à l'imposition des terres, qui sont la base des vraies richesses. Ce troisième principe de la fiscalité est dicté par le même critère de la déflation des valeurs et des besoins économiques fictifs provenant des représentations sociales corrompues. Il

signale que la proportionnalité devrait être renvoyée à l'utilité et comprise d'une manière non arithmétique :

Premièrement on doit considérer le rapport des quantités, selon lequel, toutes choses égales, celui qui a dix fois plus de bien qu'un autre doit payer dix fois plus que lui. Secondement, le rapport des usages, c'est-à-dire la distinction du nécessaire et du superflu. Celui qui n'a que le simple nécessaire, ne doit rien payer du tout; la taxe de celui qui a du superflu, peut aller au besoin jusqu'à la concurrence de tout ce qui excède son nécessaire⁶².

Et Rousseau de conclure « qu'il n'y aurait rien de plus mal proportionné qu'une taxe proportionnelle au bien même en la supposant fidèlement répartie »⁶³. Encore une fois, la simple légalité et l'égalité formelle ne feraient qu'accentuer gravement une injustice provenant de l'usurpation initiale, vidant donc la loi de son contenu substantiel, de sa signification ou de son applicabilité. Ainsi le nécessaire ne sera pas imposable, tandis que le luxe sera sévèrement taxé⁶⁴, comme pour sanctionner par une amende un type de consommation qui se rapproche d'un délit citoyen.

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Indirectement connectée à l'histoire naturelle de l'espèce, l'économie politique est la clé de voûte de la pensée politique de Rousseau comme de sa critique interne des Lumières. Le *Discours sur l'économie politique* assume que les effets de l'apparition de la propriété privée, de la division du travail, des hiérarchies politiques, du désir de distinction, de la richesse et de son corollaire obligatoire qu'est la pauvreté – tous décrits dans le *DOI* – sont déjà métabolisées dans la constitution de l'homme *civilisé*. Pourtant, il assume leur contingence historique radicale et leur objectivité politique relative et flexible. « Si les formes sauvages et barbares de la vie sociale ont constitué, selon Rousseau, l'époque la plus heureuse et la plus durable de l'histoire de l'humanité », comme l'écrit Blaise Bachofen, « la raison en est seulement que les modalités d'existence socio-économique des sociétés sauvages limitaient objectivement la capacité de leur membres à se nuire et à s'asservir mutuellement »⁶⁵. Contre les représentations anthropologiques courantes, les écrits de Rousseau prétendent que la vie humaine serait envisageable – et combien plus heureuse – sans l'économie de la production, de l'accumulation et des désirs infinis ; ils prétendent également que les nations sauvages, qui ne les ont pas connus, ont pu s'épargner la contraignante soumission à un État sans pour autant que

cette existence pré-politique les empêche de cultiver les facultés morales et intellectuelles, et sans expérimenter tous les rapports de servitude qu'enfante la propriété⁶⁶.

Au vu de cet anti-essentialisme, un projet politique radicalement correctif n'est donc pas pour Rousseau une utopie. Utopique serait une théorie qui ferait fi de ce qui est vraiment social – c'est à dire acquis – chez l'homme, une théorie qui naturaliserait les mœurs et le système de droit positif et qui prétendrait pourtant, sans aucune chance de réussite, changer la société et éradiquer le despotisme. Cet utopisme s'assortit bien avec un fatalisme conservateur, car la racine des deux est une image abstraite, des-historicisée de l'individu, et une illusion provenant de la cécité envers les fractures profondes qui font obstacle à la vraie harmonie sociale et à l'existence d'un intérêt commun. L'inégalité dénoncée par Rousseau ne sera donc pas tant celle déjà incriminée par les *philosophes* comme abusive et arbitraire, l'inégalité des *conditions*, mais une inégalité sociale ayant ses racines dans les rapports de propriété et pouvant cohabiter avec une (encore hypothétique) égalité juridique formelle. Autrement dit, l'objet de son enquête sera moins le phénomène de l'inégalité que le mécanisme de la production systématique de l'inégalité. Le projet du contrat social s'impose alors pour rendre possible cet intérêt commun, sans méconnaître les difficultés issues de la socialisation de l'homme moderne.

D'où les antinomies de la propriété que le *DEP* tente de résoudre. Car si la propriété est un acquis culturel, elle n'en demeure pas moins, dans les sociétés qui l'ont découverte, un fondement de l'organisation politique. Pourtant, tout un art est nécessaire pour qu'elle ne soit pas un principe de division mais un principe de stabilité et de cohésion civile – un art qui joigne la bonne constitution d'une souveraineté populaire et son complément pratique, l'économie politique, laquelle rend possible la généralisation des intérêts naturellement divergents des citoyens, en assurant à la fois les conditions de la production, de l'expression, de l'interprétation et de l'application de la volonté générale, convertissant ainsi ce qui est formel dans les lois en un contenu substantiel concret. Assurer que chacun puisse vivre de son bien et éviter l'asymétrie économique radicale – la domination et les conflits qui les accompagnent – a donc une raison essentiellement politique, tout comme il y a une raison publique à ce que la propriété privée reste un droit fondamental.

L'économisme de Rousseau, sa conviction que des facteurs qu'on pourrait qualifier d'économiques ont été les agents historiques décisifs de la socialisation politique moderne, est donc contingent dans une certaine

mesure, tant il est vrai qu'il est dû au hasard et qu'il peut et doit être dompté par la politique. C'est surtout parce qu'elle est déterminante que l'économie ne devrait pas être poussée à l'extérieur de la politique. Dès lors, pour redéfinir le rapport réciproque du politique et de l'économie, la pensée devrait suivre un double mouvement : distinguer d'abord entre le souverain universel (la volonté générale) et le gouvernement particulier, c'est-à-dire entre le politique comme fondement et l'économie comme application ; et redéfinir ensuite l'économie comme étant intimement politique, en ce sens que c'est la politique qui détermine son contenu, mais aussi pour cette raison que les effets de l'économie structurent toujours la vie de la société et qu'ils constituent, en cela, une condition d'existence de la politique.

Si l'objet de la critique de Rousseau n'est pas une société déjà dominée par une économie à proprement parler capitaliste, si son siècle ne saurait encore porter le nom de « bourgeois »⁶⁷, sa pensée n'en est pas moins une déconstruction philosophique des catégories politiques qui s'avéreront fondamentales pour la pensée libérale. Non pas une critique du capitalisme, donc, mais une boîte à outils élémentaire pour toute critique du capitalisme – et notamment une révocation de la pensée abstraite, analytique et anhistorique de ses contemporains philosophes, du matérialisme transféré illicitement de la nature à la société, et par conséquent incapable d'appréhender la spécificité de l'homme, de la société (incapacité à comprendre *combien* l'homme civilisé est social) et même des catégories économiques.

Contre toute arithmétique politique et sociale, ce philosophe qui a si profondément influencé la pensée sociologique met en forme un principe de déconstruction de la proportionnalité abstraite : qu'il s'agisse du rapport entre pauvreté et richesse, entre famille et État, entre individu et société, la différence d'échelle est déjà une nouveauté qualitative. Au croisement d'une pensée de l'histoire – guidée par le principe de la productivité du temps historique, comme suite de transformations dans le monde humain qui échappent à la nécessité et la téléologie – et une pensée de l'économie – centrée sur la nature également dynamique et fertile de l'argent et des rapports modernes de propriété –, le résultat en est un nouveau matérialisme social. Et, si ce nouveau matérialisme est à ce point moderne et intempestif qu'il faudra des décennies aux sciences humaines pour le reprendre et le comprendre, c'est parce qu'il échappe au matérialisme physicaliste des *philosophes* et place le centre de gravité du monde humain en dehors de la nature.

NOTES

- ¹ LARRÈRE, C., *L'invention de l'économie au XVIII^e siècle : du droit naturel à la physiocratie*, PUF, Paris, 1992 pp. 6-8, explique que si les physiocrates se sont proclamés effectivement les fondateurs d'une nouvelle science, ils ne l'ont pas moins placée sous le patronage des paradigmes dominantes, la nécessité physique et l'évidence mathématique, et surtout l'ont érigée en contenu privilégié de la politique de l'État monarchique. « Ils ont certainement voulu changer la modalité de la politique, en la faisant relever de la science, et non de la décision, en passant de l'autorité des hommes à la nécessité des choses, mais ils ne n'ont pas modifié la délimitation, Ils se situent toujours dans la globalité sociale, ils ont toujours affaire au corps politique. » (p. 7) L'incontournable livre de Larrère s'attache même à montrer que la pensée économique moderne et la notion de *société* ont une racine commune, voire qu'elles partagent en partie leur objet. – Contre les narrations qui reconstituent l'histoire de la pensée économique comme une libération progressive des entraves politique et de la subordination à l'État, il serait donc utile de se rappeler que les théories des physiocrates, considérées comme des formes radicales d'autonomisation du champ par des historiens tels J.-C. Perrot ou J.-Y. Grenier, sont plutôt une manière de penser concurremment le politique et l'économique tout en dépassant la durable tradition aristotélicienne du partage entre l'espace domestique de l'*oïkos* et l'espace public de la politique ; la pensée de Rousseau, comme on le verra dans ces pages, en est une autre.
- ² En outre, une grande partie du futur prolétariat ne jouit pas encore de la liberté juridique de choisir un métier, et de nombreux types de dépendances, comme le servage ou les tenures, lient les paysans de leur occupation agricole. De plus, en France, ils sont encore très souvent de petits propriétaires fonciers, donc moins contraints de migrer vers les villes que les paysans anglais.
- ³ MEIKSINS WOOD, E., « The Separation of the Economical and the Political in Capitalism », in *New Left Review*, no. 127, 1981. Meiksins Wood s'appuie sur la distinction que fait Perry Anderson (dans ses *Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism* et *Lineages of the Absolutist State*) entre, en gros, l'appropriation du surplus produit par le travail – ou plus-value – par des moyens intrinsèquement économiques, selon Anderson propres aux capitalistes, et, respectivement, l'appropriation extra-économique du surproduit qui assure aux seigneurs féodaux l'accès aux bénéfices sans qu'ils soient aucunement impliqués dans la production.
- ⁴ Il semble que Diderot n'avait pas été assez content de ce texte, qu'il trouvait trop spéculatif et centré sur des questions accessoires ; ainsi, dix ans plus tard, dans le tome X de l'*Encyclopédie*, il publiera un article posthume de Boulanger, sous le titre d' *Oeconomie politique*, où celui-ci intègre

- des recherches tirées de son ouvrage sur le *Despotisme oriental* traitant des différents types de gouvernement et des lois constitutives des sociétés politiques. Plus généralement, pour les emplois du mot « économie » et ses dérivés dans l'*Encyclopédie*, on consultera avec profit l'article de PIGUET, M.-F., « Économie/Économie (politique) dans le texte informatisé de l'*Encyclopédie* », in *Recherches sur Diderot et sur l'Encyclopédie*, no. 31-32, 2002, pp. 123-137, et celui de SALVAT, C., « Les articles "C\Économie" et leurs désignants », in *Recherches sur Diderot et sur l'Encyclopédie*, no. 40-41, 2006, 107-126.
- ⁵ On désignera, dans ce texte, le *Discours sur l'économie politique* par « DEP », le *Discours sur l'origine des inégalités* par « DOI » et le *Discours sur les sciences et les arts* par « DSA ».
- ⁶ BERNARDI, B., « Introduction », in ROUSSEAU, J.-J., *Discours sur l'économie politique*, Paris, Vrin, 2002. L'édition coordonnée par Bernardi, avec les textes d'accompagnement consacrés à des analyses thématiques de ce texte rousseauiste, est peut-être la première entreprise éditoriale qui restitue la place centrale de cet écrit dans l'ensemble de l'œuvre de Rousseau et son importance pour la cohérence politique de ses écrits.
- ⁷ Ces fragments disparaîtront le *Contrat social*.
- ⁸ La thèse très vraisemblable d'une philosophie rousseauiste qui serait une autocritique des Lumières ou des théories du droit naturel s'est imposée récemment du fait des travaux de B. Bernardi, M. Hulliung ou B. Bachofen.
- ⁹ Par exemple, la présentation que fait Vaughn dans son édition d'*Oeuvres politiques* de 1915, signalée par Bernardi. – Toutefois, cet écrit rousseauiste demeure ignoré et marginalisé dans un grand nombre d'études consacrées à la pensée sociale et politique de Rousseau.
- ¹⁰ BERNARDI, B., « Introduction », *op. cit.*
- ¹¹ Cette axiome de l'unité « dialectique » de la pensée économique de Rousseau est celle qui conduit Bertil Fridén à analyser conjointement, en dehors des grands écrits politiques, des passages de l'*Émile* publié en 1762 – qui selon Fridén peindraient la société du point de vue de l'individu et de ses options personnelles –, des *Considérations sur le gouvernement de Pologne* de 1768 – qui représenterait les intérêts conjoncturelles d'une aristocratie nationale tentant de conserver la patrie et le patriotisme –, de la *Nouvelle Héloïse* – où on trouverait formulées les différences de perception, d'information et de jugement entre le philosophe et l'homme du monde sur les questions politiques. Voir FRIDÉN, B., *Rousseau's economic philosophy: beyond the market of innocents*, Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998.
- ¹² DOI, in ROUSSEAU, J.-J., *Œuvres complètes III*, Paris, Gallimard (Bibliothèque de la Pléiade), 1964, p. 164.
- ¹³ DEP, p. 65.

- 14 On consultera avec profit MEIKSINS WOOD, E., *Liberty & Property: A Social History of Western Political Thought from Renaissance to Enlightenment*, Londres, Verso, 2012.
- 15 Voir aussi, au sujet de cette ambivalence, BERNARDI, B., « Introduction », *op. cit.*, pp. 35-36.
- 16 Bien entendu, Filmer n'est pas le seul à soutenir ce genre de thèse, mais Locke le préfère pour sa notoriété et pour la clarté, l'exemplarité et le radicalisme de ses thèses – et surtout pour la réactualisation de ses positions par les partisans de la monarchie dans le nouveau conflit qui oppose ceux-ci aux partisans du parlement. Plus tard, le chevalier Ramsay ou l'évêque Bossuet écriront des œuvres qui reprendront le genre d'arguments détractés par Locke.
- 17 J'emprunte l'expression à GUÉNARD, F., « L'Etat et la famille », in ROUSSEAU, J.-J., *Discours sur l'économie politique*, *op. cit.*
- 18 *Idem*, pp. 227-244.
- 19 D'ailleurs, aucune des deux voix n'est naturelle à proprement parler, puisque si on suit le *DOI*, il n'y a ni sociabilité naturelle ni rapport naturel d'autorité. Mais la famille en est plus proche parce qu'entre le père et ses fils l'inégalité est naturelle, tandis que pour avoir une signification politique l'inégalité n'est jamais (seulement) naturelle, mais appartient à des rapports sociaux qui la produisent et la reproduisent, lui donnent une force et une représentation. Ce qui signifie que si la famille n'est pas une forme absolument naturelle d'organisation permanente, parce qu'elle est (ainsi que l'établit le *DOI*) postérieure à l'état de nature, elle n'est pas non plus une institution politique. (Ou, selon le *Contrat social*, le lien familial est naturel autant que dure la dépendance des enfants envers leurs parents, et perdure ensuite grâce à une convention dont le but est en principe la conservation et la transmission du patrimoine – transmission qui elle-même est garantie par l'Etat. D'ailleurs, dans le *DOI*, le lien vraiment naturel lie l'enfant plutôt à sa mère, tandis que dans la famille-institution, celle dont parlent le *Contrat social* et le *DOI*, la mère perd son ascendant.) Le politique éloigne de la nature, c'est un fait historique ; pourtant, une fois que le genre humain socialisé se trouve corrompu, rongé par des conflits, c'est aux institutions politiques et aux lois justes que revient la tâche de « dénaturer » l'homme et de le refaçonner pour le rendre apte à vivre en société.
- 20 Dans plusieurs articles politiques qu'il avait rédigés pour l'*Encyclopédie*, Diderot s'était inspiré de Pufendorf et de son traducteur et diffuseur, Barbeyrac. Sur les lectures jussuaturalistes de Rousseau, voir le grand classique de DERATHÉ, R., *Jean-Jacques Rousseau et la science politique de son temps*, PUF, Paris, 1950.
- 21 Le *DOI* raconte que la constitution de l'homme originel – une fiction méthodologique assumée – ne comprenait aucun attribut naturel dans un sens essentiel et définitif. Tous ses caractères étaient circonstanciels et

adaptatifs, à l'exception de l'amour de soi et de la pitié provoquée par la souffrance des autres êtres vivants. Mais même ces deux traits minimaux ont été transformés et corrompus chez l'homme social.

22 Cette préexistence épargne d'ailleurs au *DSA* une interprétation habituelle, à la fois totalement idéaliste et totalement anti-intellectualiste, qui prétend que dans ce premier *Discours* Rousseau attribue les transformations historiques des sociétés et la corruption des mœurs à la culture, aux arts, aux formes épistémiques liées à la pensée abstraite et spéculative. En fait, la causation n'est jamais unidirectionnelle, ni nécessaire et téléologique, mais contingente, parce que circonstancielle.

23 « Tant que les hommes se contentèrent de leurs cabanes rustiques, tant qu'ils se bornèrent à coudre leurs habits de peaux avec des épingles ou des arêtes, à se parer de plumes et de coquillages, à se peindre le corps de diverses couleurs, à perfectionner ou à embellir leurs arcs et leurs flèches, à tailler avec des pierres tranchantes quelques canots de pêcheurs ou quelques grossiers instruments de musique, en un mot tant qu'ils ne s'appliquèrent qu'à des ouvrages qu'un seul pouvait faire, et qu'à des arts qui n'avaient pas besoin du concours de plusieurs mains, ils vécurent libres, sains, bons et heureux autant qu'ils pouvaient l'être par leur nature, et continuèrent à jouir entre eux des douceurs d'un commerce indépendant : mais dès l'instant qu'un homme eut besoin du secours d'un autre ; dès qu'on s'aperçut qu'il était utile à un seul d'avoir des provisions pour deux, l'égalité disparut, la propriété s'introduisit, le travail devint nécessaire et les vastes forêts se changèrent en des campagnes riantes qu'il fallut arroser de la sueur des hommes, et dans lesquelles on vit bientôt l'esclavage et la misère germer et croître avec les moissons.

La métallurgie et l'agriculture furent les deux arts dont l'invention produisit cette grande révolution. Pour le poète, c'est l'or et l'argent, mais pour le philosophe ce sont le fer et le blé qui ont civilisé les hommes et perdu le genre humain ; aussi l'un et l'autre étaient-ils inconnus aux sauvages de l'Amérique qui pour cela sont toujours demeurés tels ; les autres peuples semblent même être restés barbares tant qu'ils ont pratiqué l'un de ces arts sans l'autre ; et l'une des meilleures raisons peut-être pourquoi l'Europe a été, sinon plus tôt, du moins plus constamment et mieux policée que les autres parties du monde, c'est qu'elle est à la fois la plus abondante en fer et la plus fertile en blé. » (*DOI*, OC III pp 171-2)

24 MEIKSINS WOOD, E., *Liberty & Property*, op. cit., p. 204: « This also produces the transformation of *amour de soi* into *amour propre*, the conversion of an instinct for self-preservation into active egotism and the antagonisms of self-interest, which other philosophers have mistaken for the natural condition of humanity: "in a word, competition and rivalry on one hand, opposition of interest on the other; and always the hidden desire to

- profit at the expense of others. All these evils are the first effect of property and the inseparable consequence of nascent inequality". »
- 25 BOUVIEGNIES, I., « Droit de la propriété et domaine public », in J.-J. Rousseau, *DEP*, op. cit., p. 179.
- 26 D'où les diverses solutions possibles, toutes partiales et imparfaites, entre lesquelles Rousseau semblera osciller : « He would in his later work go on to oscillate between the stance of *Émile* (1762), which purports to portray the education of an isolated individual, divorced from a world in which civil society can never be anything but an instrument of the rich against the poor, and, in the same year, the apparently contrary impulse of the Social Contract, in which the civic bond is powerful and just. But – and here we should take seriously Rousseau's own contention that all these major works formed a unity – both these classics start from the same premise: that there can be no freedom in society as it now exists grounded as it is in the inequalities of property and power. » (MEIKSINS WOOD, E., *Liberty & Property*, op. cit., p. 204)
- 27 Le contrat des dupes reste une tromperie bien que, formellement, le *riche* ait obtenu le consentement des *pauvres* : selon les principes de Rousseau, pour qu'un pacte soit valable et légitime, il doit suivre de façon plausible l'intérêt de chacun des contractants ; autrement, l'esclavage pourrait être justifié aussi comme consentement implicite, ou encore l'assujettissement politique aux autorités absolues, etc. Dans ces cas le *consentement* devient une simple escroquerie philosophique en mesure de justifier, comme chez Grotius, les formes les plus barbares d'oppression par le plus progressiste des langages.
- 28 *DEP*, p. 76.
- 29 *Confessions*, in ROUSSEAU, J.-J., *Œuvres complètes I*, Paris, Gallimard (Bibliothèque de la Pléiade), 1959, pp. 404-405.
- 30 Blaise Bachofen fournit une excellente explication de l'hostilité que Rousseau manifeste vis-à-vis des renversements politiques soudains. Si Rousseau n'aime pas les changements révolutionnaires, c'est en premier lieu parce qu'il prend très au sérieux la stabilité et la profondeur des effets que l'histoire – de longue ou de courte durée – a produit sur les institutions, les passions, les disponibilités des hommes. Voir BACHOFEN, B., « Why Rousseau Mistrusts Revolutions. Rousseau's paradoxical Conservatism », in LAURITSEN, H. R. et THORUP, M. (dir.), *Rousseau and Revolution*, Londres, Continuum, 2011.
- 31 Dans son article « Droit naturel », Diderot réfute Hobbes, sous la figure du « raisonneur violent », qui refuse de se soumettre aux décisions collectives parce que son intérêt y serait contraire.
- 32 Voir HULLIUNG, M., *The Autocritique of the Enlightenment. Rousseau and the philosophes*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1994. Hulliung, très attentif à la sensibilité phénoménologique que Rousseau

partage avec les philosophes conservateurs, observe que pour Rousseau il n'y a qu'un seul moment – et encore très hypothétique – où les besoins et la réalité se trouvent en équilibre : à l'état de nature – ce qui explique l'immobilité anhistorique de celle-ci. Dans ce cas, Pascal a certes raison d'observer que l'homme est insatiable, mais il ne s'agit pas de l'homme social : en effet, si les besoins sont illimités dans la société, ceux de la nature ne le sont pas.

33 « Vraie » car elle appartient à un peuple concret, susceptible d'avoir un intérêt commun, et non pas à une humanité abstraite et générique.

34 DEP, p. 125. Ajoutons que Rousseau souligne à plusieurs reprises que l'individu ne doit pas être sacrifié au bien général, mais que ce bien doit se fonder sur l'accord et l'accomplissement des intérêts individuels (voir notamment *Le contrat social*, in ROUSSEAU, J.-J., *Œuvres complètes III*, op. cit., p. 373).

35 C'est une observation que fait Meiksins Wood dans son *Liberty & Property* : tout comme la théorie de l'absolutisme français développée dans ses autres écrits (notamment le très significatif *Les origines du capitalisme* où Meiksins Wood porte un dialogue polémique avec Perry Anderson) distingue entre la structure politique et sociale de l'Etat monarchie absolutiste française et celle de l'Etat Anglais ; Rousseau, qui pourtant n'avait été contaminé ni par l'obsession anglomane, ni par la fascination pour le régime « des libertés anglaises », n'était guère intéressé par l'Angleterre, qu'il regardait comme un régime politiquement assez similaire à la France – ressemblance à laquelle s'ajoutait un réprovable esprit commercial.

36 Comme le formule Meiksins Wood, « Rousseau's concern is not merely to "bridle" the absolutist monarchy but to overturn it, not simply to guide sovereign power but to transfer it ». (MEIKSINS WOOD, E., *Liberty & Property*, op. cit., p. 200)

37 Dans une formulation lockienne, avec celle d'assurer sa vie et sa liberté ; voir DEP p. 49.

38 BACHOFEN, B., *La condition de la liberté : Rousseau, critique des raisons politiques*, Paris, Payot & Rivages, 2002.

39 Voir le chapitre. V., §25, et MACPHERSON, C. B., *La Théorie politique de l'individualisme possessif : De Hobbes à Locke*, Paris, Gallimard, 2004.

40 *Idem*, p. 330.

41 *Idem*.

42 Voir l'analyse que fait Macpherson de l'abolition paradoxale de la loi naturelle.

43 « Ainsi, l'herbe que mon cheval mange, les mottes de terre que mon valet a arrachées, et les creux que j'ai faits dans des lieux auxquels j'ai un droit commun avec d'autres, deviennent mon bien et mon héritage propre, sans le consentement de qui que ce soit. Le travail, qui est mien, mettant ces choses hors de l'état commun où elles étaient, les a fixées et me les a

appropriées. » *idem*. Selon les travaux de Meiksins Wood et son époux, Neal Wood, Locke ne serait pas un philosophe de la bourgeoisie capitaliste naissante, mais un théoricien du capitalisme agraire.

44 Dans ses écrits économiques, Locke se montre également critique envers les marchands, qui ne sont qu'une médiation entre les marchés et envers les aristocrates qui refusent d'améliorer leurs terres. Son idéal est, comme le montrent les époux Wood, l'aristocrate foncier qui pratique une agriculture nouvelle de type capitaliste, et il a donc toutes les raisons de combattre un absolutisme monarchique qui ne soit pas contrôlé par un parlement puissant et par une classe riche de gens « industriels ».

45 MEIKSINS WOOD, E., *Liberty & Property*, *op. cit.*, p. 259.

46 Et aussi une anticipation de ce penchant du libéralisme qui ne niera certes pas l'existence des classes dans la société devenue bourgeoise, mais, une fois l'égalité formelle instituée, niera le conflit des classes.

47 BACHOFEN, B., « Le sens du travail dans les théories pédagogiques de Locke et de Rousseau », *Annales Jean-Jacques Rousseau*, no. 5, 2012. Bachofen explique que, comme le travail pour gagner sa vie n'est qu'une obligation tardive (l'activité de cueillir des fruits pour se nourrir ne pouvant pas être nommée à proprement parler « travail ») et le résultat d'un rapport des forces et d'un développement historique regrettable, l'idéal de Rousseau n'est non plus l'homme industriel, comme chez Locke. Si les oisifs ne sont pas utiles à L'État, la condition idéale pour l'individu est celui où il peut jouir de ce qu'il a, en restant utilement occupé s'il le faut (c'est pourquoi Émile sera artisan), mais en évitant de stimuler la dynamique croissante des besoins ou des désirs, ainsi que l'augmentation de la productivité du travail.

48 *Émile*, I. II, OC IV, pp. 331-2.

49 *Idem*.

50 Voir BACHOFEN, B., « Le sens du travail dans les théories pédagogiques de Locke et de Rousseau », *op. cit.*, mais aussi *La condition de la liberté*.

51 *Idem*, pp. 130-139; MEIKSINS WOOD, E., *Liberty & Property*, *op. cit.*

52 Bien que dans un État démocratique on puisse décider de l'utilisation en commun des terres, soutient Rousseau dans le *Contrat social* (voir ROUSSEAU, J.-J., *Œuvres complètes III*, *op. cit.*, p. 367), la petite propriété est préférable car elle lie les citoyens à la patrie (voir *Constitution pour la Corse*, in *Idem*, p. 919). Mais ce qui importe surtout c'est d'éviter « l'inégalité de combinaison » et la dépendance réciproque des citoyens.

53 Rousseau est persuadé que le mercantilisme sert les intérêts de quelques groupes restreints. Voir *Fragments politiques*, VI. 8, in *Idem*, p. 512, où il énonce la différence entre une nation *heureuse* (indépendante) et une nation *florissante* (dont les autres dépendent).

54 C'est l'argument principal du livre de Bertil Fridén, qui développe une excellente analyse de la différence de pouvoir de négociation entre les participants au marché.

- 55 Voir Fridén et Meiksins Wood. – La structure du système politique et économique français fait que ceux qui vendent les céréales sont les producteurs directs, les petits fermiers, et non comme en Angleterre les grands propriétaires fonciers déjà capitalistes.
- 56 Dernière réponse sur le *DSA*, in ROUSSEAU, J.-J., *Œuvres complètes III, op. cit.*, p. 79: « Le luxe peut être nécessaire pour donner du pain au pauvres, mais s'il n'y avait pas de luxe, il n'y aurait point de pauvres. » Et aussi dans le *DEP*: « plus la ville est riche, plus le pays est misérable ». , p. 77)
- 57 *DEP*, p. 65.
- 58 La question du consentement à l'impôt, classique dans les écrits théoriques et surtout dans les pratiques politiques françaises depuis le Moyen Âge, provient des conflits entre la monarchie et les villes, les Parlements et les États soumis à la fiscalité. Mais si Rousseau s'inspire de ce registre de contestations et de limitations traditionnelles du pouvoir monarchiques, comme le font d'ailleurs la plupart des philosophes du droit naturel, il comprend que la configuration sociale dont elles étaient issues ne ressemblaient point à une démocratie populaire telle que celle du *Contrat social*, et donc que le consentement à l'impôt ne s'y référerait pas au peuple dans son ensemble.
- 59 BOUVIEGNIES, I., « Droit de la propriété et domaine public », *op. cit.*
- 60 *DEP*, p. 59 : « Le plus grand mal est déjà fait, quand on a des pauvres à défendre et des riches à contenir. C'est sur la médiocrité seule que s'exerce toute la force des lois ; elles sont également impuissantes contre les trésors du riche et contre la misère du pauvre ; le premier les élude, le second leur échappe ; l'un brise la toile, et l'autre passe au travers. »
- 61 SPECTOR, C., *Théorie de l'impôt*, en *DEP*, pp. 207-208.
- 62 *DEP*, p. 74. Voir aussi ce fragment supprimé de l'édition publiée : « Quand aux impositions sur les denrées et les marchandises il est difficile qu'elles fassent une répartition proportionnelle dans les diverses conditions parce qu'il y a des denrées dont les pauvres font proportionnellement une consommation plus considérable et que c'est presque toujours sur celles-là par préférence qu'on établit les impôts. » (*Idem*, p. 74, n. 154)
- 63 *Idem*, p. 76.
- 64 SPECTOR, *idem*, p. 207.
- 65 *La condition de la liberté*, p. 147.
- 66 *Idem.*, p. 155.
- 67 Parce qu'une classe « bourgeoise » n'existe pas encore : en effet, avant 1789, aucune position objective ou conscience subjective n'unifie encore dans une classe commune les représentants d'un Tiers État si variée qu'en font partie les marchands, les financiers, les détenteurs d'offices, les administrateurs de l'État, les gens de lettre, etc.



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Bourse de la Ville de Paris : *Roland Barthes et la Roumanie dans les années 1940* : chercheur invité par le laboratoire CRAL – EHESS (2011)

Résidence à l'Institut culturel roumain de Paris pour la rédaction du livre *Le Tombeau du communisme roumain. Le « romantisme révolutionnaire » avant et après 1989*, Bucarest, éditions IBU Publishing, 2011 (2010)

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« Dialectica frontierei » (« La Dialectique de la frontière »), in Romanița Constantinescu (coord.), *Identitate de frontieră în Europa lărgită. Perspective comparate* (*Identité de frontière dans l'Europe élargie. Perspectives comparées*), Bucarest, Polirom, 2008, p. 275-291, Grant CNCIS A 1622 (2007-2008)

Articles Antimoderne, Habitus, Hypermodernité dans la *Baza teoretica de date pentru studiul interdisciplinar al fenomenelor culturale contemporane, tendinte actuale in stiintele socio-umane si in creatia literar artistica, teme si concepte postmoderne*, grant CNCIS, cod A 918, <http://www.unitbv.ro/postmodernism/autori.html> (2007-2008)

« Devenirea in poveste a teoriei literare », (« Le Devenir narratif de la théorie littéraire »), in « Piața ideilor teoretice despre literatură în Europa contemporană. Situația teoriei literare românești », Grant « Idei », Université de Bucarest, JUNIORI Nr.20 (2007-2008)

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Livres :

O tribună captivantă. Televiziune, ideologie societate în România socialistă 1965-1983 (*A captivating tribune. Television, ideology, society in Socialist Romania, 1965-1983*), Prefață prof. dr. Adrian Cioroianu, București, Curtea Veche, 2013

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Mormantul comunismului romanesc (*Le Tombeau du communisme roumain / Romanian Communism's Grave*), essai d'histoire et d'idéologie, Bucarest, éditions IBU Publishing, 2011

Ultimele zile din viața Literaturii (*Les derniers jours de la vie de la Littérature / Last Days of the Life of Literature* Bucarest, éditions Cartea Romaneasca, 2008.

Prix de l'Association de Littérature Générale et Comparée de Roumanie, 2009 et Prix de la revue Paradigma, 2009

CONVERGENCES CULTURELLES ET POLITIQUES DE LA TÉLÉVISION PUBLIQUE EN FRANCE ET EN ROUMANIE À L'ÉPOQUE DU « DÉGEL »

« Tout le monde a eu envie de s'exprimer, de prendre
les affaires en main. C'est ça, le socialisme. »

Jacques Sauvageot, dans Philippe Labro, *Ce n'est qu'un
début*, 1968, cité dans Michel de Certeau, *La Prise de
parole et autres écrits politiques*, Seuil, 1994, p.37

Le texte qui suit tente de rendre compte d'un moment dans l'histoire, très court par rapport au temps de l'histoire humaine, de la télévision européenne : les années 1960. Nous allons faire l'économie d'une immense bibliographie au sujet des années 1960, en histoire¹ mais aussi en philosophie², pour aller directement vers le domaine de la « socialist television »³ ou bien, plus récemment, de la télévision dans « l'Europe autoritaire »⁴. Que la télévision roumaine des années 1960 en fasse partie, c'est évident : la Roumanie est une république populaire depuis décembre 1947 et socialiste depuis mars 1965. Mais est-il possible d'y intégrer la télévision française, média audiovisuel occidental, simplement parce que *l'Organisation Internationale de Radiodiffusion et de Télévision* (OIRT) qui rassemblait les radios et les télévisions des pays socialistes (européens et d'ailleurs) s'écrivait en français, et que ses deux premiers co-directeurs étaient un Français et un Soviétique (bien que plus tard, la France rejoignait l'EBU, l'organisation des médias audiovisuels occidentaux) ? Ou bien ce rapprochement est-il possible parce qu'une nouvelle alliance éphémère entre la France et l'URSS, s'efforce à contrecarrer l'offensive allemande dans le combat technique pour les systèmes des transmissions en couleurs⁵ ? Enfin, peut-on parler à ce propos du rapprochement de la France des pays de l'Est comme d'une sorte de contrepoint à l'acculturation subie par l'Europe de la part des États-Unis⁶ ? Certes, ce sont là des faits, mais ils ne démontrent pas que la RTF et puis l'ORTF ait été un média

« socialiste ». Mais il y a, dans ces premiers choix, une certaine réserve envers la scission politique de l'Europe et surtout envers les deux empires ennemis qui visent à *totaliser* le monde. La télévision française évolue dans un pays démocratique pour autant que celui-ci accepte les règles générales de jeu imposées par les États-Unis. Mais l'arrivée au pouvoir du général Charles de Gaulle, en 1959, met la France sur la voie d'une politique de souveraineté culturelle, militaire et économique qui en fait une exception parmi les pays de l'ouest européen. La télévision en sera un enjeu d'une très grande importance.

Le chef de l'État avait donc une conception absolutiste et quasi personnelle du monopole. C'est après son départ que les deux chaînes de télévision furent mises en concurrence, que fut supprimée la direction unique de la télévision, qu'on discuta des composantes du monopole et de la « décentralisation ». Même après mai 1968, « il n'en démordit pas. C'est ainsi. La télévision est sa télévision⁷.

Ce qui pourrait sembler d'abord étrange ne l'est pas si on s'y attarde davantage : le régime autoritaire de Charles de Gaulle, dans le contexte d'un régime politique constitutivement démocratique, se rapproche, par son centralisme, par son idéologie nationaliste et par le rôle que joue l'État dans tous les domaines, notamment la culture et l'économie, du régime socialiste roumain de la fin du régime Dej et des premières années du régime Ceausescu. Mais de Gaulle, d'un côté, Dej et Ceausescu de l'autre, sont tous placés dans une époque à part, du point de vue culturel et politique avant tout. Le premier point de convergence entre la TVR et la RTF est à trouver précisément à cette époque : les années 1960, dont l'histoire relève de l'intensification des liens transnationaux dans le contexte du relâchement inauguré à Moscou par Nikita Khrouchtchev, mais aussi dans le contexte de la globalisation médiatique⁸ qui, depuis, avance à pas rapides. D'autres rapprochements surgissent, que nous aurons à charge d'analyser : l'« exceptionnalisme » français⁹ par rapport à l'OTAN répond à l'exceptionnalisme roumain au sein du camp socialiste, avec pour leaders Charles de Gaulle et Nicolae Ceausescu, deux leaders nationalistes à penchants absolutistes qui expriment des points de vue similaires lors de la visite que le président français rend à son homologue roumain en mai 1968. Comme le confirme François Fejto : « [d]e nombreux observateurs avaient en effet cru déceler dans la 'dissidence roumaine' un écho balkanique de la décision de la France gaulliste de

quitter les structures militaires intégrées de l'OTAN. »¹⁰ C'est alors que commence la montée internationale du dirigeant roumain, avant que le général français ne fasse ses adieux à une époque dont les illusions progressistes ne cesseront de se déchirer.

Nous allons considérer la télévision roumaine et la télévision française selon l'articulation de trois liens : celui qui les met en rapport au pouvoir politique d'État (et à son incarnation), celui qui en fait la réalisation d'une idéologie culturelle du « service public » et dont les lignes de force avaient été tracées pendant l'entre-deux-guerres par les dirigeants de la radio BBC (qui n'est pas spécifiquement française ou roumaine, mais qui prend appui dans l'idéologie nationaliste) et celui qui va de ces deux pôles, politique et idéologique, en passant certes par une multitude de nœuds que nous allons traiter ponctuellement, aux programmes d'information (magazines de reportages et débats pour l'essentiel, à l'exclusion de toute « fiction »). Nous allons essayer de replacer tout ce schéma à l'intérieur des « années 1960 » de l'histoire de la télévision européenne et de la culture de masse européenne, de part et d'autre du rideau de fer. Des reproches pourront fuser à l'encontre de notre approche, que nous nous efforçons de pallier. Il est vrai que, dans le contexte de la télévision européenne de monopole ou du type service public, la télévision française présente des similitudes évidentes avec d'autres télévisions nationales, la télévision roumaine y comprise. A titre de vitrine nationale, la télévision française des années 1960 met en avant un discours culturel qui souligne l'excellence et l'unicité du « français », tout comme le faisaient les Soviétiques à Moscou ou les Roumains à Bucarest à l'égard du « communisme russe » et du « socialisme roumain », à ces différences près que Paris ne comptait pas imposer une suprématie par la force et faisait recours aux objets symboliques (culturels) susceptibles d'être fétichisés à l'extérieur, et que le nationalisme roumain n'était pas la conséquence d'une histoire impérialiste, mais d'un complexe d'infériorité avant tout ethnique et puis politique et militaire par rapport aux grands conquérants – les Turcs et les Russes en particulier – qui se traduit par une des attitudes défensives. Ce qui justifie un rapprochement des liens particuliers entre la RTF et la TVR réside dans le croisement entre une conception artistique de la télévision et le prestige du modèle culturel français. Ecaterina Oproiu, la journaliste et l'intellectuelle la plus en vue qui ait suivi et encouragé le développement de la télévision en Roumanie, envoyée spéciale agréée par les officiels au festival de Cannes et rédactrice en chef de la revue *Cinéma*, écrit déjà en 1963 :

la télévision est un art de l'authenticité ». Le journal s'écrit à la troisième personne. Entre moi, celui qui l'écrit, et vous, le lecteur, il y a des dizaines, des centaines de kilomètres. Mais à la télévision, « nous » sommes face à face et il n'y a qu'une vitre qui nous sépare. Ici, il n'y a plus de « lui » et d'« elle », il y a « moi » et « vous ». Personne n'a encore écrit un « art poétique » de la télévision¹¹.

Or, si la télévision en tant qu'instrument pourvoyeur d'authenticité fait déjà événement en Union Soviétique au début des années 1960¹², où elle a pu faire reconnaître son propre discours, la télévision, en Roumanie, au sein d'une société à prédominance rurale et peu cosmopolite, n'a pas, à la même époque, le prestige qui lui permît d'imposer un discours propre. Le vocabulaire littéraire des articles d'E. Oproiu – preuve de son effort d'anoblir le discours télévisuel lui-même – est emprunté à un autre discours et à la langue qu'elle parlait et dans laquelle elle lisait : le français. C'est dans la mesure où on conçoit la télévision en tant que média culturel émancipateur, urbain et en tant que diffuseur de la grande culture « universelle » que les faiseurs de programmes de télévision en Roumanie regardent du côté de l'Hexagone. Cela ne veut pas dire, en revanche, que les grands genres télévisuels n'emprunteront davantage à la télévision soviétique, notamment en termes de types de programmes – les émissions de propagande et les programmes destinés aux enfants. Toutefois, là encore, la télévision française sera, on le verra bien, une source d'inspiration pour la télévision roumaine pour ce qui est du format des magazines d'information et de la mise en scène des spectacles de variétés.

Convergences Est-Ouest : L'expression de l'opinion publique

L'un des objectifs de cet article est celui de démontrer le rôle crucial que la télévision a joué dans les années du « dégel » en Europe de l'Est et plus particulièrement en Roumanie, années où l'on assiste à un essor singulier d'une urbanisation superficielle et des technologies dans la vie quotidienne des gens, dans un premier moment de « convergence culturelle » entre l'Ouest et l'Est. Il y a plusieurs acceptions de ce syntagme, qu'Henri Jenkins s'emploie à définir dans un livre qui fait date¹³. L'une de ses définitions prend appui dans les usages dont on sait, au moins depuis Michel de Certeau, combien ils peuvent détourner la

conception qui préside à la construction et à l'échange réglé d'un certain objet. A une époque où l'Occident et le bloc communiste lénifient les antagonismes qui les avaient opposés, où le travail de reconstruction sociale et de progrès économique sont menés de part et d'autre du rideau de fer en dépit de conflits armés ponctuels inextinguibles, l'absence d'un « ennemi » extérieur imminent chasse la vigilance militaire et redore l'avenir : l'ère de la « communication de masse » peut s'accélérer. Dans les années 1960, au lieu de contribuer à l'uniformisation sociale de par l'imposition d'un imaginaire fabriqué dans les laboratoires du *star system* américain, la « convergence culturelle » que la télévision, avec d'autres médias de diffusion sonore comme les magnétophones, la radio (privée ou non) rendent possible, contribue à saper le soubassement théorique et économique des régimes socialistes jusqu'à leur échec définitif. L'idée qui fonde notre approche appartient à Marshall McLuhan, mais la citation qui suit a été trouvée, et est donc reprise, en français, à un ouvrage paru en roumain en 1972, portant le titre *Le Socialisme et la culture de masse* et ayant pour auteur un sociologue d'obédience marxisante et l'un des fidèles du régime de Nicolae Ceausescu :

Dans le domaine des arts, c'est la combinaison sensorielle particulière au médium employé qui compte par-dessus tout. Le contenu programmé apparent n'est qu'un leurre endormant nécessaire pour que la forme structurale passe les barrières de l'attention consciente¹⁴

Certes, l'auteur roumain cite McLuhan pour contredire ses remarques irrévérencieuses envers la validité du conflit idéologique sur lequel repose la justification historique de la « société socialiste », mais il parvient, ce faisant, à faire circuler en Roumanie ces mêmes idées qu'il combat. Voici, déjà, un argument de la convergence culturelle qui s'entame à l'époque.

Dans son livre sur la convergence culturelle, Henry Jenkins écrit :

Je vais contredire l'idée que la convergence devrait être entendue avant tout comme un processus technologique qui met ensemble différentes fonctions médiatiques dans le cadre de dispositifs communs. En revanche, la convergence représente un tournant culturel au fur et à mesure que les consommateurs sont encouragés à trouver de nouvelles informations et à faire de nouvelles connexions à travers des contenus médiatiques dispersés. (...) La convergence arrive dans l'esprit de consommateurs individuels et au travers de leurs interactions sociales avec les autres¹⁵.

La télévision, plus que les livres, sera, en dépit du rôle idéologique que les partis communistes lui assignent, un agent de la convergence culturelle au sens assigné par Jenkins.

Pour que mon opinion soit publique, il me faut un espace public où parler, qui recueille et diffuse mon opinion. Il est vrai que, pendant des siècles, l'espace ecclésial, en tant que lieu de sociabilité et de politique, moins que *chora* de la sacralité, fut un espace public. Les parlements locaux étaient d'autres espaces publics, mais leur fonction était précise, parce que les intérêts qui y amenaient les gens étaient aussi précis. La grève, de même (celle devant l'Hôtel de Ville de Paris en témoigne). Néanmoins, il faut attendre le XVII^e siècle pour voir émerger des espaces publics – la place, la rue, puis le boulevard, puis le café, et le XVIII^e pour que les espaces publics se consacrent en tant que tels dans et devant l'histoire. Les Révolutions modernes sont également des drames, voire des tragédies, jouées aussi sur la scène de la rue – et il ne faut remonter qu'une vingtaine d'années en arrière pour se souvenir de la foule bucarestoise acclamant dans la rue le départ de l'hélicoptère où les Ceausescu ont cru pénétrer pour échapper au lynchage, alors qu'ils ne faisaient qu'entrer dans une prison d'où ils n'allaient pas sortir vivants.

C'est toujours au XVIII^e siècle que la presse apparaît : un monstre qui mélange le privé et le public, et que la radio et un peu plus tard la télévision relaient. Il y a une différence essentielle entre la rue, la place – et la presse, puis les médias audiovisuels: les médias transmettent l'événement, à travers un réseau mis en place, vers des terminaux placés chez soi. Le lieu public n'est plus figé : est public tout lieu depuis lequel on peut diffuser et *qui* peut être diffusé. Le lieu public est en fait le lieu pris en charge par la technologie de diffusion : un endroit de fiction (et non plus un endroit de réalité). Le studio de télévision remplace la Cour, en ce qu'il est la dimension visible du Pouvoir. C'est en cela que le discours des médias d'État est, évidemment, le discours du Pouvoir. Au moment où la télévision roumaine se construit en tant que service public, au début des années 1960, elle ne cesse pas moins de faire entendre une voix dominante. Mais, à cette époque, comme le remarque Roland Barthes dans un texte de 1973, « La Division des langages »,

la médiation entre le pouvoir et le langage n'est pas d'ordre politique, mais d'ordre culturel : reprenant une vieille notion aristotélicienne, celle de *doxa* (d'opinion courante, générale, « probable », mais non « vraie »),

« scientifique »), on dira que c'est la *doxa* qui est la médiation culturelle (ou discursive) à travers laquelle le pouvoir (ou le non-pouvoir) parle¹⁶.

Or, de ce point de vue, quoique diffuser l'opinion publique risque de mettre le discours officiel, celui du parti, devant un soupçon d'inauthenticité, cette même opinion publique ne fait qu'exprimer la *doxa* d'une société en termes larges, culturels. La propagande commence à faire pression sur la télévision, à partir du début des années 1970, pour justement éduquer et transformer les messages portés par la voix de l'opinion publique. *L'expression de l'opinion publique* devient désormais l'objet d'un *travail de programmation discursive et institutionnelle*, que la télévision avait du mal à « renaturaliser », à faire passer pour naturel. C'est pour cela que la télévision roumaine, pendant la courte époque d'exercice selon les commandements de l'idéal du service public, se fait la vitrine non pas d'une volonté de puissance, mais du *discours culturel au pouvoir*. Ce discours est – les apparatchiks auront raison sur ce point – celui du petit-bourgeois. Il est donc normal qu'une volonté de changement se manifeste chez un pouvoir politique qui voulait systématiser la nature – de la géographie et de la conscience également.

Soumise à un rythme et à des étapes de développement similaires – pour le dire en un mot : croissance –, remplissant de plus en plus de rôles différents pour les institutions qui la dirigent et, respectivement, pour le public qui en consomme l'offre, la télévision, des deux côtés du rideau de fer, manipule et est manipulée. Dans ces années 1960, alors que le public est en train de s'y habituer et qu'elle se manifeste en tant que moyen de solidarisation nationale, de légitimation du pouvoir politique et de résistance envers l'acculturation de l'extérieur (tenant également d'une croyance commune en la « valeur » de certains produits et habitudes culturels en opposition à d'autres), les télévisions française et roumaine partagent bien des points communs. Afin de comprendre pourquoi cette convergence ne devait pas durer, nous allons revenir plus en détail à l'époque connue en tant que celle du « dégel », à l'Est.

D'une télévision à l'autre : technique, programmation et culture télévisuelle française à la télévision roumaine

Du point de vue des relations institutionnelles entre la RTF et la Radio(télévision) roumaine, après 1948, les données dont on dispose ne

sont pas spectaculaires, quoiqu'elles annoncent déjà la lente progression vers l'Ouest de la culture roumaine après le retrait des troupes soviétiques. Le PDG de la RTF arrive officiellement à Bucarest en 1956, pour entamer des pourparlers en vue d'un accord qui sera signé en 1961 et qui ouvre la voie à une collaboration soutenue entre les deux institutions, surtout entre les deux radios nationales. Au cours des années 1961-1962, seulement deux films ont été envoyés en France et un film français reçu en Roumanie dans les échanges entre les deux institutions : deux reportages sportifs et un reportage de la Foire de Dijon respectivement.¹⁴ audio-diffusions roumaines sont en préparation pour la radio française (Paris-Inter, programmes II, III et HF IV) pour 1962, mais rien n'est mentionné en ce qui concerne la télévision¹⁷. Il faudra attendre encore quelques années pour que la télévision roumaine arrive à un niveau technique qui lui permette une intensification des échanges internationaux.

1. Technique

Quoique du point de vue technique, la télévision française n'ait pas été prise pour modèle par les techniciens roumains qui appréciaient davantage soit l'industrie ouest-allemande (le système en couleurs PAL et le tube cinémascope réalisé à Bucarest sur modèles allemand et américain) soit la tradition britannique¹⁸, ce fut la « techno-politique »¹⁹ qui eut un mot important à dire dans les choix matériels de la télévision roumaine. Un accord avec CSF-Thomson prévoit l'achat de licences techniques de la part de la Radiotélévision roumaine, dont celle de l'appareil Clarville²⁰. Des techniciens roumains sont formés en France et ils importent le savoir-faire français en la matière au début des années 1960, jusqu'à ce que, sur les instances du secrétaire général du parti ouvrier, Gheorghiu-Dej, une autre licence, japonaise, vienne remplacer la licence française. En ce qui concerne le choix du système SECAM, ce n'est pas par fidélité envers l'URSS que ce système était préféré par le pouvoir politique, mais suite aux pourparlers menés pendant les années 1970 entre Ceausescu et le président français Giscard d'Estaing²¹. Ces accords, qui portaient sur l'importation des techniques de télévision en couleurs de France en Roumanie rendent compte, d'une part, du prestige déclinant de la France d'un point de vue économique auprès de ses alliés traditionnels, mais aussi du fait que la France était, pour la Roumanie, du moins dans tout ce qui concerne la culture, un modèle incontestable. En effet, d'une part, le SECAM est refusé en faveur du PAL, au moment où

l'enjeu d'un choix ou de l'autre était sensiblement inférieur – au début des années 1980 – à ce qu'il avait été dix ans auparavant : et, d'autre part, la francophonie roumaine était suffisamment forte pour que la télévision française devienne un repère, en terme de programmation, de technique de presse et d'esthétique cinématographique, pour la télévision et pour le public roumains.

2. Programmes

Le premier magazine de reportage de la télévision roumaine est *Saptamina* (*La Semaine*, 1963, une heure hebdomadaire), relayée par *Transfocator*, auquel s'ajoute *Reflector*, en 1967 et *Ancheta TV*, les deux dernières émissions ayant un profil à part, car plus courtes et ciblant un seul sujet (ou, pour *Reflector* au début, ayant plusieurs petits sujets) ; une émission du type *Conférence de presse*, où un cadre politique répond aux questions posées par le public reprend semble-t-il un modèle américain dont la RTF s'était inspirée à son tour. En 1962, la parolière Sasa Georgescu, fait une référence explicite à *Cinq colonnes à la une* dans l'un des premiers articles en roumain sur les magazines télévisés d'information :

notre studio a réalisé des débats et c'est un genre d'émission de télévision très apprécié par le public, ce qui n'est certes pas une surprise vu que l'une des émissions préférées de la télévision française, *Cinq colonnes à la une*, a souvent recours à la même formule²².

Hormis ces émissions, certains magazines dont les problèmes abordés relèvent expressément du secteur économique : le surenchérissement de la dimension « économique » de la société représente la première preuve d'immixtion du politique dans le métier de journaliste, mais il s'agit d'une imposition rhétorique que les réalisateurs savent d'abord dompter, de sorte que souvent les émissions « économiques » sont toujours des émissions « sociales ». *Telecronica economica* ou bien *Panoramic economic* en sont les deux titres les plus importants.

Côté français, le nombre de ces magazines est plus important : *Faire face*, dont nous avons suivi l'édition du 29 septembre 1961 (Etienne Lalou), confronte le spectateur au problème des logements et réalise un entretien avec le ministre responsable, Pierre Sudreau. Pendant quelques mois, la télévision roumaine a elle aussi programmé l'émission *Fata in fata* (*Face à face*), sur le même modèle d'une rencontre entre des citoyens et des cadres

supérieurs, se donnant pour mission de soulever, mais aussi de contribuer à la résolution des problèmes ciblés. Il faut dire, par ailleurs, que la crise du logement se trouve au centre des préoccupations des deux télévisions. Alors qu'en France la critique des insuffisances des constructions de logements se déploie librement, en Roumanie la critique vise plutôt les malfaçons dans les nouveaux appartements²³. L'habitude de confronter les cadres supérieurs du parti et de l'État au public ne disparaît qu'avec la montée en puissance de la figure de Ceausescu, qui grandit et obscurcit peu à peu toute autre figure politique. L'un des meilleurs magazines d'information de l'« âge d'or » de la télévision française est, dès 1957, *A la découverte des Français*, émission-reportage et émission-débat, ayant pour invité permanent, lors des premières éditions, le sociologue Paul-Henry Chambart de Lauwe et pour réalisateurs Jaques Krier et Jacques Lalou. Cette émission fait partie de ce que David Buxton, sur les pas de Hervé Brusini et Francis James, appelle le « journalisme d'investigation », auquel s'oppose le « journalisme d'examen » ou « de synthèse » qui, lui, ferait la belle part au commentaire de synthèse du journaliste et au débat dans le studio. Faute de personnel et de machines, faute de temps aussi, il n'est pas question pour la télévision roumaine de réaliser des émissions d'une heure, voire de 90 minutes, ce qui nuit à la profondeur de l'investigation. Mais *Clubul tineretii* (*Club de la jeunesse*) est, toujours vers le milieu des années 1960, un magazine de reportages destiné à la vie quotidienne des jeunes, sans parti-pris mobilisateurs ou moralisateurs, qui laisse parler les images et où les présentateurs, tel le très jeune comédien et chanteur Florian Pittis, assistent à une histoire que narre la caméra mobile, ponctuée d'interviews dans la rue qui rassemblent de petites foules autour de la présence inouïe qu'est alors la télévision. *Transfocator* relève de la même poétique du journalisme direct et distant, où les images ne représentent pas le prétexte d'un débat, mais suscitent le « plaisir scopique »²⁴. Au début d'un *Transfocator* de 1969, la réalisatrice Carmen Dumitrescu lance le thème de l'opposition entre la vie en plein air et la vie urbaine : « On est passé dans la rue, on a vu une femme qui époussetait ses tapis par-delà la balustrade de son balcon, au-dessus des têtes des passants, on en a été frappés et on s'y est arrêtés. »²⁵. Immédiateté, spontanéité, contact direct avec la rue, voici des traits d'une esthétique (néo-)réaliste des reportages de télévision en Roumanie qui, à l'instar des magazines télévisés français, prennent pour prétexte les problèmes de l'urbanisation et de l'industrialisation d'une société traditionnelle, les conditions de vie des gens « de peu », en évitant en général les questions politiques délicates.

Le modèle de *Cinq colonnes à la une* se retrouve avant tout dans *Transfocator*, dont les génériques se ressemblent : il s'agit dans les deux cas de la présentation, dans des décors différents d'une part et d'autre, des réalisateurs des séquences (pour *Cinq colonnes* : les trois Pierres, Desgraupes, Dumayet, Lazareff, et Igor Barrère ; pour *Transfocator*, Carmen Dumitrescu, Alexandru Stark sont les deux principaux réalisateurs, auxquels s'ajoutent dans une reprise de l'émission, au début des années 1980, sous le titre *Fotogramme din realitate*, Anca Fusariu et Tudor Vornicu). La durée est encore une fois différente : *Transfocator* dure moins que *Cinq colonnes* et sa couverture est plutôt nationale. Pour cause : les prétentions souverainistes de la Roumanie dans le bloc des pays de l'Est et par rapport à l'URSS ne lui permettent pas de trop passer au crible de l'actualité tous les lieux de conflits du globe : les magazines d'informations roumains se gardent de prendre des attitudes trop nettes envers les conflits internationaux, par peur de rendre encore plus délicat son statut déjà incommode à l'intérieur du bloc de l'Est. La condamnation de l'invasion soviétique en Tchécoslovaquie n'a d'ailleurs pas été suivie par des reportages sur la situation réelle de la société tchécoslovaque en train d'être « normalisée », puisque l'information, en Roumanie et à l'Est, ne pouvait pas circuler avec la liberté – toujours relative, mais à un degré différent – qu'elle avait à l'Ouest.

La tendance nationaliste des médias roumains et français se manifeste à travers un autre genre d'émissions, ce qu'on appelle en vocabulaire spécifique, en Roumanie, « émissions économiques ». Pendant quelques années, une émission de reportages de la RTF a porté un titre qui ne peut que rappeler la propagande nationaliste du régime socialiste roumain : *Les Grandes réalisations françaises* est inaugurée en 1960 par une émission qui retrace l'histoire de l'autoroute du Sud, dans le contexte d'un éloge de la densité du système routier français qui rend saillante « l'importance de la civilisation française » et la volonté de travailler pour l'épanouissement « de la nation »²⁶. Le commentaire ne fait aucune allusion au régime de Gaulle à qui revient le mérite de ces réalisations – ni d'ailleurs à la guerre froide en cours, pour montrer l'excellence d'un régime politique par rapport à un autre: il s'agit plutôt de rendre les Français fiers de leur pays – subrepticement, certes, des ses représentants politiques – et de redorer la vitrine nationale dans une compétition implicite non pas avec l'URSS, mais avec les pays développés et surtout avec les États-Unis. *Les Grandes réalisations françaises* a de nombreux équivalents à la télévision roumaine, mais il est vrai que les émissions qui présentent « de grandes

réalisations » roumaines sont peu nombreuses dans les années 1960, ne serait-ce que parce que le plus gros de la « construction socialiste » est à venir, mais aussi parce que, à la différence de la plupart de ses consœurs est-européennes, la Roumanie de Ceausescu fera un tabou de l'époque 1945-1965 (assimilée au stalinisme). Quoi qu'il en soit, le processus de modernisation nationale se trouve au centre de cette émission et, certes, de plusieurs séries d'émissions – « économiques » - diffusées par la télévision roumaine jusqu'à la fin de son âge socialiste.

Sans aller jusqu'aux louanges que la télévision roumaine chantait à Ceausescu, la figure de Charles de Gaulle à la télévision française est celle d'un dirigeant inconditionnel, populaire et populiste. Dans l'émission *Panorama* du 25 juin 1965, la foule qui l'accueille en campagne électorale « est nombreuse et enthousiaste ». L'image du leader est toujours placée dans un contexte altier, digne, au-delà du discours critique : cette aura apparente Charles de Gaulle aux dirigeants des partis communistes, et surtout à ceux d'entre eux qui pouvaient prétendre à une centralité aussi (voire plus) nationale que politique.

Un autre type d'émission qu'on retrouve des deux côtés fait connaître auprès du public les grandes personnalités culturelles, scientifiques ou politiques du pays. Le rôle de ces entretiens publics est à évaluer toujours en fonction de la politique culturelle et sociale nationale dont la télévision est chargée : solidarisation autour des figures exemplaires de la nation, manifestation de l'essence nationale à travers ces figures représentatives etc. En outre, l'émission renchérit sur la valeur romantique du créateur par rapport à l'homme « médiocre » : prééminence du créateur par rapport à « l'exécutant », richesse intérieure du travailleur de l'esprit etc. *En direct avec...*, réalisée par Igor Barrère dans les mêmes années 1960, se décline en Roumanie sous le titre de *Prim plan* et a pour invités des personnalités culturelles ou du monde des sciences, jusqu'au début des années 1970, où les protagonistes sont de plus en plus souvent des ouvriers ou des techniciens récompensés par l'État avec différentes médailles et prix qui les consacrent en un autre genre d'exemples à suivre : c'est le moment où l'émission commence son déclin et où son côté spécifique commence à fondre, car on n'y voit plus qu'une version de plus des « émissions économiques » qu'on assène à un public las.

Au fur et à mesure que l'on approche des années 1970, des différences de plus en plus importantes accentuent l'écart entre le magazine d'information français et celui de la télévision roumaine. Dans l'émission *Les Dossiers de l'écran*, dont le modèle est résolument le journalisme

de synthèse, l'opinion prend de l'ampleur au détriment du reportage « objectif » et entre l'événement-présence et la longue durée-problème, c'est le second qui l'emporte²⁷. Une édition houleuse des *Dossiers de l'écran* est celle diffusée le 29 mai 1973 sur le phénomène hippie (réalisée par Alain Jérôme et Armand Jammot), et illustrée, comme d'habitude, par un film. Il s'agit, en l'occurrence, d'un documentaire d'André Cayatte, *Les Chemins de Katmandu*. Les invités, nombreux – car l'émission avait une durée de 60-90 minutes – représentent toutes les « parties » qui pouvaient avoir une voix au chapitre sur ce sujet : la Belge Brigitte Axel, auteure d'un livre sur le phénomène ; son mari, un Canadien à la recherche d'un emploi ; une psychologue qui ne décline pas son identité (elle se fait appeler Groseille) et qui, dans une effusion de langage de rue et pour faire preuve d'authenticité, s'exclame à un moment donné : « on est à la télé, moi je m'en fous de la télé – enfin vous pouvez regarder quelqu'un qui s'exprime naturellement, merde ; on est à la télé française, on peut dire 'merde', 'putain', on peut montrer le cul à la télé » ; un membre de secte la « Communauté de Dieu », cheveux longs et guitare à la main ; un journaliste, Michel Lancelot ; le scénariste du film *Les Chemins de Katmandu*, René Barjavel ; un académicien (Thierry Maulnier) ; un psychiatre ; et un membre d'une organisation civile – on dirait de nos jours une ONG – Alain de Montebello, chef des « Frères des hommes ». Or, une telle émission ne pouvait plus être réalisée à la télévision roumaine de la même manière. L'exemple des *Dossiers de l'écran* consacrés au phénomène hippie est d'autant plus intéressant pour notre analyse des programmes d'informations à la RTF et à la TVR durant l'âge de la télévision du service public qu'il peut être mis en parallèle avec l'émission *Transfocator* de 1968 traitant du même sujet²⁸, mais en prenant mille précautions pour ne pas mettre à l'écran le « hippie » lui-même, figure par ailleurs prétendument absente de la société roumaine qui n'en connaît que des versions soft (des jeunes qui se rencontrent pour jouer de la guitare, écrire de la poésie, qui aiment se donner une apparence moins soignée et qui se revendiquent en partie du phénomène dont on prétend faire l'analyse).

La télévision française et la télévision roumaine des années 1960 devant les enjeux de la culture de masse

Il est évident que, avant d'être soumise au contrôle total de la politique d'État (et du parti communiste), la télévision roumaine ait connu une évolution comparable à l'évolution d'autres télévisions nationales européennes²⁹, en tant que moyens techniques, politique et poétique des programmes, voire en tant que modèle institutionnel. Il est tout aussi évident qu'il eût été improbable que la situation fût radicalement différente dans le cas particulier de la télévision roumaine, puisque la télévision est un média et une institution occidentale, et que la Roumanie ne pouvait que reprendre à son compte ce qui s'était déjà fait en la matière. Qui plus est, vu les débuts de la politique internationale roumaine de souveraineté et d'autonomisation à l'égard de l'URSS, l'évolution de la télévision roumaine ne peut pas être considérée en l'absence de son rapport avec les télévisions des pays dont la culture avait traditionnellement marqué la culture et la société roumaine. La télévision française a été ainsi le premier modèle conséquent de la télévision roumaine, quoique ce rapport ne doive pas perdre de vue un circuit plus général des concepts d'émissions (que la télévision française à son tour emprunte à la BBC ou à la télévision américaine), le circuit des conceptions institutionnelles (là où la radio-télévision soviétique impose au début les siennes) et un circuit d'outillages, domaine où, il est vrai, ce n'est pas l'industrie électronique française qui était le partenaire de la télévision roumaine. Cette parenté entre la télévision roumaine et les télévisions européennes de type service public – et surtout avec la télévision française sous de Gaulle – ne signifie pas, loin de là, que la télévision et l'État roumains aient suivi des chemins divergents. Un livre récent de Kristin Roth-Ey qui porte sur le film et la télévision soviétiques montre et explique le paradoxe, manifeste dans tous les pays socialistes, d'un système média qui, en dépit d'un succès patent, essuie à terme un échec cuisant dans la compétition avec les médias occidentaux qui, eux, s'étaient entre temps convertis à l'américaine³⁰. Le contexte idéologique et politique de la télévision soviétique – sauf la décentralisation de celle-ci dans les années 1970 – ont été ceux de la télévision roumaine : Comité d'État pour la Radio et la Télévision, appellation des « producteurs » et « éditeurs » par le nom de « rédacteur », investissement massif dans l'infrastructure, diffusion de la grande culture dans un projet de « culture de masse » qui visait l'éducation, l'émancipation et la mobilisation des masses et qui

s'opposait à la culture populaire de souche américaine. La télévision est devenue, en Roumanie aussi, ce média dont la mission essentielle était de diffuser une culture authentiquement et traditionnellement roumaine, intégrée toutefois au trésor culturel occidental. « La culture – l'éducation, l'inspiration, la mobilisation – était la voie royale vers un avenir radieux non seulement pour les Soviétiques, mais pour tout le monde. »³¹ Roth-Ey a raison d'associer cette mission avec celle que se donne la France dans l'après-guerre pour faire rayonner sa propre culture en tant que noyau et acmé de la culture européenne³², et l'histoire culturelle et politique du régime de de Gaulle confirme cette volonté de la France de s'octroyer un statut d'exceptionnalité dans le monde binaire qui s'installe de manière globale après 1945³³. Quoique mineur par rapport au nationalisme culturel de l'URSS et de la France (les États-Unis exceptés, car ils étaient déjà l'ennemi qu'il fallait combattre), le cas de la politique culturelle d'État de la Roumanie des années 1960 (voire de 1970 et de 1980) est une version de l'exceptionnalisme qui se manifestait, dans des conditions plus favorables, en France et surtout en URSS. La télévision roumaine se développe dans la proximité imposée et donnée par la télévision soviétique et des concepts culturels qu'elle porte. Ses efforts pour s'en détacher l'amènent au début, à une sorte de réaction (typique pour une culture en mal de modèle et d'autorité) similaire à celle de la France, pays dont on avait depuis longtemps, au nord du Danube, embrassé la culture et la civilisation. En outre, à la différence de l'URSS et des États-Unis, la France ne pouvait pas être soupçonnée d'attitude impérialiste.

Hormis la technique, la programmation et le contexte culturel et politique du fonctionnement des télévisions française et roumaine – dont on peut rapprocher la télévision soviétique, surtout pour ce qui est de la conception de la culture de masse que la télévision est appelée à produire –, la réception de la télévision mérite également au moins quelques mentions.

Alors que chez les Soviétiques, les téléspectateurs les plus assidus dans les années 1960-1970, étaient les hommes sans éducation³⁴, les études de l'audimat en Roumanie montrent le désintérêt relatif des agriculteurs (la pauvreté de l'infrastructure y aidant) pour rapport à des programmes appréciés surtout des cadres moyens, hommes ou femmes³⁵. Le divertissement de télévision est, à l'époque, de plus en plus élitair – surtout après l'inauguration des nouveaux studios, plus larges, mieux dotés – et s'adresse (les enquêtes sociologiques le démontrent) aux femmes. Il convient de remarquer la dimension féminine de la télévision

roumaine, tant du point des réalisatrices qui s'imposent vite (soit dans les programmes culturels soit, et c'est d'autant plus important, dans les magazines de reportages), que de celui du genre de presse que l'apparition de la télévision fait fleurir pour un temps, la chronique de télévision. Le promoteur le plus en vue, par son talent et par son ouverture d'esprit de la télévision roumaine est une femme, Ecaterina Oproiu, qui s'illustre aussi par le commentaire cinématographique, par des biographies *people* et même par des pièces de théâtre ; elle est, comme la plupart des intellectuels de nouvelle génération – dans les années 1960 –, francophone.

Une partie importante des programmes de la télévision roumaine, dans ses premières années, étaient destinée, sans aucune arrière-pensée par ailleurs, aux femmes et à leur univers : les programmes pour enfants étaient souvent commentés et loués par E. Oproiu³⁶, le divertissement consistait de variétés de type français (cirque, danse, chanson), sans oublier les émissions culturelles (surtout le théâtre). Certes, une complexification des programmes est évidente, du côté de l'information surtout, il y a aussi des transmissions sportives et puis des séries britanniques et américaines – bref, le public masculin est ciblé à son tour, mais dans une moindre mesure. Dès le milieu des années 1960, les jeunes seront de plus en plus ciblés, à mesure que la télévision est transformée – en théorie – en outil de mobilisation. Mais la « culture française » – ses mythes culturels les plus répandus, la littérature, le loisir, le romantisme sentimental, Paris – est encore une culture qui impressionne avant tout les femmes³⁷. Au moment des grands investissements, lors des premières années du régime Ceausescu, ces programmes empruntent à l'étranger toujours en fonction des affinités des réalisateurs. Tudor Vornicu, le réalisateur de magazines de reportages et de divertissement le plus connu, dont le nom est porté aujourd'hui par un studio de la TVR, avait passé six ans à Paris, 1960-1965, en tant que correspondant à l'agence roumaine *Agerpress*, pour devenir directeur des programmes à la télévision roumaine par la suite. Alexandru Bocanet, le metteur en scène de variétés le plus apprécié après le départ en Espagne de Valeriu Lazarov, était toujours francophone : ils seront les principaux artisans des spectacles de variétés qui s'imposent, dès le début, en tant que programme le plus souvent commenté par les chroniques de télévision ou bien dans les courriers des spectateurs.

Soumise à la critique « de goût » qui accepte de prendre pour objet, à côté de la littérature, du film et du théâtre, les programmes de télévision, les formes culturelles « de masse » sont évaluées selon leur « valeur » : degré de convertibilité en spiritualité, en discours émancipateur, bref, en culture

« haut de gamme ». Là encore, la convergence entre culture de masse « européenne » (versus « américaine ») et « soviétique » post-stalinienne doit être de nouveau soulignée. Voici le passage d'un livre français publié en 1972 : « La culture populaire est l'effort investi dans tous pour que tous ceux qui ne font pas partie des deux millions d'individus privilégiés puissent en effet jouir de leur droit à la culture. »³⁸ La comparaison avec cet extrait d'un traité de sociologie contemporaine publié en Roumanie à la fin des années 1960 est intéressant :

La culture de masse, pour autant que l'on s'en tienne à cette expression rendue tautologique, devient de plus en plus tout simplement culture, socialement généralisée, et ce, tant en largeur – comme territoire – qu'en profondeur – comme force spirituelle d'enrichissement, de transformation et de mobilisation des consciences³⁹.

Ce qui fait ici la différence entre la « culture populaire » à la française par rapport à la « culture de masse » à la roumaine c'est, évidemment, l'accent mis, du côté roumain, sur le lien culture-morale-politique. Pour s'éloigner du modèle soviétique, les théoriciens roumains des années 1960 devaient chercher une forme et un contenu ailleurs. Cela ne pouvait se faire que de deux manières : soit en bricolant parmi les modèles culturels du marché disponible en Roumanie pour arriver à une forme plus ou moins propre, soit en inventant de toutes pièces un contenu « roumain », projet manifestement impossible. Le premier choix était le plus réaliste et la culture de masse roumaine s'est régénérée dans les années 1960, puisant chez les Français, chez les Italiens, chez les Américains (dans ce cas-là, tout en faisant profil bas), chez les Soviétiques et, en fin de compte, dans le folklore roumain qui, couplé au jazz et au rock, incarnait le mariage parfait : tradition et modernité sous le chapeau de la « roumanité ». A force de croire dans une roumanité qui, de fait, n'avait jamais existé en tant qu'« origine », les dirigeants de la politique culturelle de la Roumanie socialiste – bientôt réduits à deux personnes – sont arrivés à engendrer d'une part un refus du « roumain » et le déplacement vers « l'américain », très net dans les années 1980, et d'autre part à gonfler une eschatologie de la roumanité mortifiée que les années 1990 verront à son acmé et qui marquera d'un sceau indélébile les pratiques réflexives et culturelles des années post-socialistes.

NOTES

- ¹ Anne E. Gorsuch and Diane P. Koenker, *The Socialist Sixties. Crossing Borders in the Soviet World*, Indiana University Press, 2013 dispose d'une bibliographie très riche sur les histoires des années 1960 au sein du bloc socialiste, en URSS, Tchécoslovaquie et Bulgarie notamment.
- ² Patrice Maniglier (dir.), *Le Moment philosophique des années 1960 en France*, Paris, PUF, 2011.
- ³ Sabina Mihelj, « Understanding Socialist Television. Concepts, objects, methods », in *Journal of European Television History and Culture*, Vol. 2, 5, 2014.
- ⁴ Peter Goddard (ed.), *Popular Television in Authoritarian Europe*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2013.
- ⁵ Andreas Fickers, « Cold War Techno-Diplomacy. Selling French Colour Television to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe », in Alexander Badenoch, Andreas Fickers, Christian Henrich-Franke (ed.), *Airy Curtains in the European Ether. Broadcasting and the Cold War*, p. 77-100, Siegen, Nomos, 2013.
- ⁶ Charles de Gaulle arrive en gloire à Bucarest en mai 1968, alors que le secrétaire général du parti communiste bulgare, Todor Jivkov, choisit Paris pour y effectuer sa première visite officielle en Occident après la tombée du Rideau de Fer, en 1966. (Voir Paulu Burton, *Radio and Television Broadcasting in Eastern Europe*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1974, p. 435.)
- ⁷ Jérôme Bourdon, *Haute fidélité. Pouvoir et télévision, 1935-1994*, Paris, Seuil, 1994, p. 61. La citation est d'Yves Guéna.
- ⁸ Anne E. Gorsuch and Diane P. Koenker, *op. cit.*, « Introduction », p. 10.
- ⁹ Sujet à débat depuis 1989, voir surtout Claude Imbert, « La fin de l'exception française ? », *Revue des deux mondes*, no 50, avril 1989, en ligne sur <http://www.revuedesdeuxmondes.fr/archive/article.php?code=18540>, en traduction anglaise, dans *Foreign Affairs*, fall 1989, à <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/44892/claude-imbert/the-end-of-french-exceptionalism>. On s'y réfère aussi dans Jonathan Bignell, Andreas Fickers (éditeurs), *A European Television History*, Wiley-Blackwell, 2008, p. 166.
- ¹⁰ François Fejto, *La Fin des démocraties populaires. Les chemins du post-communisme*, Paris, Seuil, 1997, p. 93.
- ¹¹ Ileana Costin (pseudo de Ecaterina Oproiu), citations reprises à deux chroniques de télévision, rubrique « Micul Ecran », no 32 et 39, août et septembre 1963, *Contemporanul*.
- ¹² Le concept de « lichnost » en Union Soviétique en tant qu'effet esthétique de la télévision, est mis en saillie par Kristin Roth-Ey dans David Crowley, Susan Reid, *Pleasures in Socialism. Leisure and Luxury in the Eastern Block*, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, Illinois, 2010, p.148.

- 13 Henry Jenkins, *Convergence Culture: Where Old and New Media Collide*, New York, New York University Press, 2006.
- 14 Marshall McLuhan, *Pour comprendre les médias*, Paris, Mame, 1968, cité dans Constantin Pottinga, *Socialismul si cultura de masa*, Iasi, 1972, p. 240.
- 15 Henry Jenkins, *op. cit.*, p.3.
- 16 Roland Barthes, *Œuvres complètes IV*, Bucarest, Seuil, 2002, p. 356.
- 17 Document secret adressé à Paul Niculescu Mizil (secrétaire chargé de la propagande auprès du Comité Central du PCR à l'époque) le 27 mars 1962. Ces données figurent dans les Archives de la Société Roumaine de Radiodiffusion, séparée de la Télévision en 1994. (ci-devant Archives SRR). Les dossiers des années 1960 sont classés par an, il n'y a pas d'opus.
- 18 Petre Varlaam, « Adevarata introducere a televiziunii in culori in tara noastra » et Andrei Ciontu, Mihai Gheorghe, « 50 de ani de la fabricarea primului televizor in Romania », in *Noema*, publication du Comité Roumain de l'Histoire et de la Philosophie de la Science et de la Technique, Bucarest, vol. XI, 2012, en ligne à www.crist.ro/noema/nr.11.php
- 19 Allusion à l'article d'Andreas Fickers « The Techno-politics of Colour: Britain and the European Struggle for a Colour Television Standard », *Journal of British Cinema and Television*, April 2010, p. 95-114.
- 20 Andrei Ciontu, Mihai Gheorghe, *art. cit.* Les auteurs se trompent toutefois de données, puisque la CSF, Compagnie Générale de Télégraphe Sans Fil, s'allie à Thomson en 1968.
- 21 Petre Varlaam, *op. cit.* Voir aussi des reportages de JT consacrés à la visite que Giscard d'Estaing fait à Bucarest le 10 mars 1979, Archives INA, BNF.
- 22 Sasa Georgescu, « Publicistica de televiziune », in *Presa noastra* no 2-3, 1962.
- 23 Alexandru Matei, *O tribuna captivanta*, *op. cit.*, p.61.
- 24 David Buxton, *op. cit.*, p. 45.
- 25 *Transfocator* du 17 juillet 1969, Filmoteca TVR.
- 26 Archives INA, BNF Paris.
- 27 Pour une histoire et une analyse du passage d'un type de journalisme à l'autre, le livre de David Buxton est incontournable, surtout le premier chapitre, « Forme et idéologie ».
- 28 *Transfocator* du 7 août 1968, réalisateur George Pietraru, avec la participation de l'écrivain Mircea Stoian. Voir Alexandru Matei, *op. cit.*, p. 72-74.
- 29 Voir la ligne générale des articles sur la télévision roumaine – dans sa dimension transnationale et dissidente – publiés par Dana Mustata. Sur ce point, Dana Mustata, « Television in the Age of (Post)Communism », in *Journal of Popular Film and Television*, Vol 40, Issue 3, Fall 2012, p. 132.
- 30 Kristin Roth-Ey, *Moscow Prime Time: How the Soviet Union built a Media Empire that Lost the Cultural World War*, Cornell University Press, 2011.
- 31 *Ibidem*, p. 5.

- ³² *Ibidem*, p. 21.
- ³³ Richard Kuisel, *Seducing the French. The Dilemma of Americanization*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1993, p. 134.
- ³⁴ Roth-Ey, *op. cit.*, p. 202.
- ³⁵ Matei, *op. cit.*, p. 179.
- ³⁶ Dans ses chroniques de télévision publiées dès juillet 1963, sous pseudonyme, dans la revue culturelle du parti communiste – et la meilleure à l'époque par la qualité et la diversité des textes publiés – *Contemporanul*.
- ³⁷ Un témoignage en ce sens : en 1947, Roland Barthes, qui organisait des auditions symphoniques à l'Institut français de Bucarest où il était attaché culturel, jette l'opprobre sur « la population clitoridienne » qui venait se régaler de ses paroles et de la musique qui les suivaient. Voir *Fonds Barthes*, « Correspondance avec Robert David », BNF.
- ³⁸ Brian Rigby, *Popular Culture in Modern France*, London & New York, Routledge, 1991.
- ³⁹ Traian Herseni, *Psihosociologia culturii de masa*, Bucarest, Editura Stiintifica, 1968, p. 25.

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QUESTIONS OF AUTHORSHIP AND AUTHORITY IN SOME EARLY MODERN ANATOMICAL IMAGES, THE *TABULAE ANATOMICAЕ* OF PIETRO DA CORTONA*

Abstract

The study is centered around a series of anatomical engravings made in the first half of the seventeenth century in Rome after anatomical drawings by the famous painter Pietro da Cortona, but first published over a century later. This case study allows, through the analysis of its intricate history, the inquiry into numerous issues fundamental for the understanding of the scientific image in the early modern era: issues related to technique (drawing, engraving), the role of reproduction in the history of science, problems of authorship and investment of the image with authority, as well as the destination and audience of the books containing these images.

Keywords: anatomical illustrations, artistic conventions in scientific representations, Pietro da Cortona, authorship, authority of the image.

Questions of the legitimacy of images and the possibility to derive knowledge from them constitute the subject of numerous debates in the scientific world of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. As a result,

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early modern natural historians who use images in their publications are extremely cautious when claiming the role of images as instruments of knowledge: they argue for images devoid of the marks of authorship, and thus able to embody a higher degree of objectivity. Consequently, the history of the scientific illustration is seen as the constitution of a *decorum* of objectivity in the search for the essences in nature,¹ parting with the conventions of high art and developing un-naturalistic conventions of its own (depictions of parts of the plants separately and in different scale, letters relating elements of the picture to text, see-through views, etc.).

Nevertheless, looking at sixteenth and seventeenth century scientific images (whether we choose Vesalius' anatomies, or the plants illustrated by the *Accademia dei Lincei*) we have the clear impression that high art conventions are not completely eliminated; on the contrary, they are deliberately employed in the construction of what has been called "the authority of the image". One such example is the *ad vivum* quality of the image based on elements and strategies meant to affirm and increase the credibility and authority of the image: what Martin Kemp calls the "rhetoric of the real".² Another interesting case is the use of Baroque scenographic strategies in the *mise-en-scène* of illustrated scientific experiments.

Not only might one wonder why such elements aren't disposed of by scientists, but the complex cohabitation between them and the conventions pertaining to the scientific usage of the image needs a closer investigation.

In looking at the construction of the rhetoric of scientific illustrations the question of agency arises: what are the relative roles of the author of the scientific text, the draftsmen, engravers and typographer. How do issues of authorship – a debated notion in the early modern era, both in the artistic and the scientific milieu³ – arbitrate in this context? Such questions are often very hard to answer, as are questions pertaining to the intended audience of these books, but one must nevertheless have them present when trying to explain the visualization techniques in use in early modern science.

My focus in this article is a chapter of the history of anatomical illustration in the early modern period. By focusing on a specific case study I hope I will be able to throw light on the mechanism through which the legitimacy of the scientific image is constructed in the early modern period through interlocking references of authority and authorship.

In the focal point of the argument lies a series of engravings from a book published in 1741 in Rome by the surgeon and anatomist Gaetano Petrioli:

Tabulae anatomicae a celeberrimo pictore Petro Berrettino Cortonensi Delineatae, & egregiae aeri incisae nunc primum prodeunt... As the title makes clear, the engravings are based on drawings made by Pietro da Cortona (1596-1669),⁴ a famous seventeenth-century painter, so famous that he is worth being mentioned in the title of the publication, whereas many anatomical treatises from the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries don't mention either the artist responsible for the drawings nor the engraver in charge of their transfer into print.

Pietro da Cortona's drawings (Fig. 1), which have miraculously survived,⁵ are thought to have been made by the artist at a young age, around 1618,⁶ during his apprenticeship years, most probably after dissections. A handwritten note which in the eighteenth century accompanied the drawings stated that they had been made in the Santo Spirito hospital in Rome, with the help of a surgeon, Nicolo Lache.⁷

The provenance of the drawings is fairly well documented; they have been left to the Glasgow University Library by Dr. William Hunter, interestingly, the first doctor to have been appointed to teach anatomy at the Royal Academy of Art in London and someone with strong interests in the history of anatomical illustration. Hunter, who in a letter from 1773 agrees with the traditional attribution of the drawings, discusses them in connection to the plates in the 1741 printed edition.⁸ He notices that the prints contain additional anatomical figures in respect to the drawings, which he deems to be "so injudiciously put in and [...] such mean compilations that they could not have been directed by the Author (Lache) of the original work". The "supplemental figures", as he calls them, "must have [therefore] been the absurdity of some person into whose hands the Drawings had fallen".⁹

Despite the claim that the 1741 edition is based on Pietro da Cortona's drawings, only twenty out of the twenty-seven plates (Pl. 1-19 and 27; Fig. 2) have corresponding drawings in Glasgow. Moreover, the style of Pl. 20-26 is different and they don't correspond in subject matter to the rest of the plates, sustaining the hypothesis that they have been made later than the original project. Due to this fact, I shall not take them into consideration.

A second edition of the plates is published in 1788 by Francesco Petraglia, who accompanies the images with a new text. More importantly, the plates (Fig. 3) – expurgated of all the flaws (*omni labe expurgatas*) – no longer exhibit the "supplemental figures" which have been erased, with the declared intention of restoring them to their original perfection

(*pro dignitate sua*) and the risk of leaving somewhat bewildering bare spaces (such as in Pl. 6 or Pl. 8). The new title, *Tabulae anatomicae ex archetypis egregii pictoris Petri Berrettini Cortonensis expressae et in aes incisae...* mentions the cleansing operation – *nothas iconas expunxit* (the bastard images were struck out/erased) –, underlining at the same time the conformity to the original, *archetypis*. Although Petraglia affirms he is very displeased with the stylistic incoherence (*discrepantia [...] a Berrettini stylo*) introduced by the additional figures, he maintains the additional plates (Pl. 20-26) considering they are all consistent (*consentaneas*) in style and design (*stylum, rationemque*).¹⁰

The copperplates themselves have not survived, but Petraglia suggests in his introduction that Petrioli had used plates engraved in the seventeenth century; the engraver has been identified as Luca Ciamberlano (an Umbrian active in Rome between 1599 and 1641), whose monogram LC appears on the first and fourth plates in both editions.¹¹ Alongside it, in Pl. 4, in some rare states of the 1741 edition, appears the year 1620, the probable date of production of the engravings.¹² The 1788 images are undoubtedly produced from the same original plates, “burnished and then re-engraved to effect repairs, in some cases clumsily”.¹³

The rather small bibliography on the subject has perpetuated the idea of the composite nature of the 1741 plates: Martin Kemp, for example, considers that Hunter is “surely correct in his judgement [about] the additional illustrations”¹⁴ and the classical work on the history of anatomical illustration by Roberts and Tomlinson, *The Fabric of the Body* of 1992, states that the figures in question were “engraved in an incongruous manner wherever there was sufficient space on the plate”, with the result of “detract[ing] and irritat[ing] the viewer”.¹⁵ Details such as the lack of shading over Fig. IV in Pl. 3 (Fig. 2) confirm that they have not been engraved at the same time as the main figures.

Although I agree with the conclusion that the supplemental figures are additions to the original design, maybe made by a different hand – a somewhat less subtle engraver, as the close examination of the engravings let me to believe –, I consider that the nature of these figures deserves more attention and will prove insightful for the understanding of the status of anatomical illustration in the early modern period, at the intersection of the artistic practice and the scientific endeavor. I shall try to give a short outline of the early seventeenth-century Roman artistic and scientific circumstances relevant for this encounter.

By the early seventeenth century the involvement of artists in dissections and illustrations of medical treatises was by no means a novelty. In the artistic milieu, knowledge of anatomy was considered a precondition for the correct representation of the human body. The figure of Michelangelo, the perfection of whose bodies was regarded to be the outcome of his anatomical studies, lent authority to the practice of dissection by artists. Around 1600 however, the tight connection between artists and anatomists seems to have loosened and artists turned to treatises of anatomy for their knowledge of the human body rather than direct involvement with the interiority of cadavers. This happened in the context of the institutionalization of anatomical teaching in art academies (and, paradoxically, of the generalization of dissections intended for artists).¹⁶

Furthermore, this framework explains the diffusion of a new genre, the treatise of anatomy for artists. Some of these were produced by artists involved with scientific anatomical publications: Odoardo Fialetti, the draftsman who had produced the images for the anatomical treatises of Giulio Cesare Casserio, published *Il vero modo et ordine per disegnar tutte le parti et membra del corpo humano* in 1608, and Luca Ciamberlano, the engraver of Pietro da Cortona's plates, will go on to engrave, in 1626, *Scuola perfetta per imparare a disegnare tutto il corpo Humano, cavata dallo studio e disegni de Caracci*. Although very different in form and intent (as will be discussed later), these publications suggest the many levels of intersection between the artists' and the anatomists' interests in anatomical images as a crucial site for the production and transmission of knowledge about the human body.

Pietro da Cortona's drawings originate in the midst of this anatomical culture where artists and anatomists still are indispensable to each other. He was the pupil of Andrea Comodi and Baccio Ciarpi, and through them he met Lodovico Cigoli and Domenico Passignano, all of whom belonged to a generation of artists educated at the *Accademia del Disegno* in Florence and for whom the study of anatomy was crucial; Cigoli studied anatomy intensely and produced, in collaboration with a physician and after dissections, a wax *écorché* (later cast in bronze). The young Pietro da Cortona must have also followed dissections offered to artists in the *Accademia di San Luca* in Rome.

The first question that might arise is what was the aim of Pietro da Cortona's 1618 drawings. They were undoubtedly made in view of engravings, but nothing is known either of the type of publication intended (loose sheets or anatomical treatise; the latter is more probable due to the

numbering of the plates¹⁷), the intended public of it (artists, anatomists, or a more general audience), or the reasons for not having been published in the seventeenth century (many planned illustrated books have never been completed due to financial shortcomings, and such is believed to have been the case here).

The drawings were most certainly done with the aid of an anatomist, apparently in the Ospedale di Santo Spirito in Sassia, the main site of anatomical dissection, teaching and research in early modern Rome.¹⁸ Their medical specificity connects them closely to this scientific context of production. They focus, as pointed out for the first time by Hunter,¹⁹ on muscles, veins and nerves, especially the latter, while ignoring other anatomical aspects, such as the abdominal cavity, the details of which are largely approximated. Although anatomically incorrect in various respects,²⁰ the kind of attention given to nerves, and in particular to the relationship between movement and brain,²¹ leads to the conclusion that they were meant to illustrate an anatomical treatise on nerves,²² and thus intended for medical practitioners, rather than for the use of artists, for whom the relevant parts of anatomy are the muscles and the skeleton, useful for representing bodies in motion.

Nevertheless, Petraglia insists in his 1788 Introduction that his publication is useful for students of anatomy, and especially for painters,²³ suggesting that this might be a path worth investigating.²⁴ Furthermore, their “artistry”, often remarked by commentators, invites us to read them and the final appearance of the engravings also in the light of art-historical methods and concerns, a perspective, we would argue, more appropriate for the milieu in which they came into being. Nancy G. Siraisi and Silvia De Renzi have stressed the artistic and antiquarian expertise that, understood as a mark of local identity, single out the Roman medical practitioners.²⁵

The case of Cassiano dal Pozzo is extremely illustrative for the meeting of artistic and scientific concerns in early seventeenth-century Rome: not a physician himself, but an antiquarian with natural history interests, Cassiano is the continuator of the natural history project of the *Accademia dei Lincei*, commissioning drawings of flora and fauna and supporting natural history publications. Better known for being the most important Italian patron of Poussin, he was also the creator of a visual encyclopaedia of the antique world, the *Museo Cartaceo* (which he never managed to finish and bring to print), employing young artists such as Poussin, François Duquesnoy, Pietro Testa and Pietro da Cortona.²⁶ Although the latter’s contacts with Cassiano date from the early 1620’s and thus

postdate his anatomical illustrations, they throw light upon the fact that artists, antiquarians and natural inquirers shared common skills and visual habits of inquiry, and conceive the image in pretty much the same way as a visual argument rather than an illustration to a text, allowing us to examine these fields in close connection.

The first issue worth looking into is that of the authorship of the plates. Both eighteenth-century editions claim very loudly in their titles that the *Tabulae anatomicae* are drawn (*delineate*) or portrayed (*expressae*) by the famous painter Pietro Berrettini. Despite this, and although their publication in the eighteenth century is very probably due to the fame of the painter, the authorial claims and debates surrounding them are not that simple.²⁷ And I am not referring to the attribution of the original drawings to Pietro da Cortona, since the issue did not come up in the eighteenth century.

Instead, in the publisher's foreword of the 1741 edition we read "the name of the author who composed these *Tabulae* [is] unknown";²⁸ he cannot be thinking of the text, since the text accompanying the plates was lost (or never existed) and Petrioli had to write one. Moreover Pietro Berrettini is not mentioned here. The Introduction written by Petraglia in 1788 engages in a true quest for the author.²⁹ He is more explicit: he is looking for the "anatomic author of the tables", since "for sure he cannot be the one who formulated them by pen or chisel".³⁰ Thus, the bulk of Petraglia's text deals with establishing who the anatomist behind the tables could have been, proving that some names invoked by writers before him could not have been involved and proposing his own candidate for the role of *the Author*. Nevertheless, on occasions he uses the same term when referring to Pietro da Cortona (*Auctoris stylum*), when he is distinguishing between his involvement and that of the "strange hand" responsible for the additions.³¹

We are faced with a regime of authorial identity and intellectual property very foreign to the modern sensibility. Looking into the specificity of the cultural and social framework of early modern book production will help us to better understand the factors influencing the fortune of these engravings.

The insistence with which the name of the artist is expressed on the frontispiece of both books is the outcome of a long process of radical reconceptualization of the artistic creative process during the Renaissance, which led to a conception of art as a process based on inspiration, rather than imitation, and of the artist as individual genius rather than artisan.

Although this was the general background for the development of “high art”, the status of scientific illustrations and their makers was different. The authorial identity of the latter was questioned on two levels.

Firstly, because their activity was subject to the dynamics of book production and thus hinged on the role distribution in the manufacturing process: various craftsmen were usually involved in the production of a printed image, a draftsman, an engraver, and sometimes another artisan in charge of transferring the image onto the wooden block or copperplate. Among them – somewhat contradicting the modern notion of creation as the origin of the work of art – the better paid, and consequently the more appreciated was the engraver, not the artist who created the design.³² Leonhart Fuchs, the author of one of the most celebrated sixteenth-century herbals, included the portraits of the three craftsmen who produced his illustrations in his *De historia stirpium* (though not in such a prominent place as his own portrait, which appears immediately after the frontispiece of the book). His attitude towards the image producers was revealed when the illustrations from his book were pirated and used in a book printed by another publisher. Fuchs’ defence stressed that the one injured is Specklin, the engraver, attesting that he conceived Specklin to be the creator of the images, not the draftsmen who made the original drawings. Christian Egenolff, his plagiarizer, argued on his behalf that not all of Fuchs’ images appear in his book, and that others have been added. The logic of the conception of the book in its entirety seems to prevail over the notion of artistic copyright of the images in his line of reasoning.³³ This attitude is in tune with the logic of the book market and book publishers, for whom the main investment is the woodblock or plate – a “regime [that] accorded printers, and, more importantly, booksellers, substantial power over the making and maintenance of [authorial] identities in print”.³⁴

The process was, nevertheless, beyond their control. Monetary interests led to scientific images often being copied and reused in other books, despite privileges granting intellectual property rights upon text and images to authors and publishers (never artists).³⁵ The illustrations of Andreas Vesalius’ *De humani corporis fabrica* – which is the source for many additional figures in the 1741 edition of Pietro da Cortona’s *Tabulae anatomicae* – became undoubtedly the most copied images in the sixteenth century; in some cases the whole book was unlawfully reissued, in other cases some of the images were used to illustrate other anatomical treatises and sometimes other illustrations were commissioned to complete the ones taken from Vesalius. Most authors or publishers practicing this

didn't even address the issue, but Juan Valverde, who transposed many of Vesalius' images from woodcuts to engravings, explained in a letter that he had done so with the purpose of pointing out the differences between his anatomical content and that of Vesalius.³⁶ Felix Platter, another anatomist who acknowledged his use of the Vesalian imagery, made explicit that he considered them a kind of canon of correctness and clarity.³⁷ These examples show that often images were thought to embody the authority of the author of the book.

This leads us to the second peril hovering over the concerns of artistic authorship: the hierarchy between artisans and scientists. Although the early modern period was a time of profound rethinking of the role of experience and artisanal involvement in the process of acquiring knowledge from nature,³⁸ the labor of the illustrator was perceived almost as an extension of the undertaking of the naturalist: he was credited with guiding the eye and hand of the draftsman and controlling the resulting images. Although Fuchs took pride in the fact that he had worked with the best available artists, he nevertheless felt obliged to ensure his readers that he had "not allowed the craftsmen so to indulge their whims as to cause the drawing not to correspond accurately to the truth".³⁹ Like Fuchs, many more early modern naturalists and anatomists – Vesalius above all – went to great efforts to ensure the quality and correctness of the illustrations in their books, suggesting that they perceived themselves as partaking to the authorial *persona* of the images. The inclusion of the portraits of the three craftsmen in Fuchs' herbal functioned more towards constructing "the rhetoric of the real,"⁴⁰ by showing direct acquiring of knowledge from nature, and thus as a strategy of lending authority to the images, rather than as an act of imparting authorship identity upon them (functioning thus very much like the inclusion of an image with the instruments for dissection in Vesalius' *Fabrica*).

Other cases confirm the view that artists were not generally thought to be the originators of scientific images. The publication of Charles Estienne's 1545 anatomical treatise was the subject of a lawsuit regarding whether the draftsman, a surgeon, should receive authorial credits and which ended in Estienne being granted full authorship. The case is even more bewildering since many of the illustrations were based on previous erotic mythological engravings,⁴¹ and upon close inspection they appear to be composite in nature: the anatomical details of most of the plates have been inserted in the general design, showing that the anatomical image was separately conceived and then introduced into the woodblock,

suggesting maybe multiple authors.⁴² Another astonishing case in this respect is Vesalius, who, although he speaks at length in his introduction about the illustrations, never names the artist who produced the most celebrated and influential anatomical images of the sixteenth century (he was identified as Jan Stephan van Calcar on the basis of other documents). Paradoxically, the engraver Nicolas Beatrizet who copied the images for Valverde signs his plates prominently.

There was more variety, though, in the views about the role of artists in scientific endeavors: one of Egenolff's arguments is that the credit for the images lies with the artists, not Fuchs.⁴³ This allegation, rather rare in the sixteenth century, saw a spike in the eighteenth-century editions of Pietro da Cortona's anatomical plates, but, even then, such a conception was not prevalent and one might wonder, had the publishers known the anatomist involved, would the titles had figured his name instead of that of the artist?

Another editorial project by Gaetano Petrioli gives us a hint: in 1740 he gives to print another set of old engraved plates, produced in the sixteenth century for (and probably after drawings by) Bartolomeo Eustachi, and published for the first time in 1714. Petrioli's edition includes eight more plates in respect to the 1714 edition, commissioned by him and intended to stand for eight lost plates of the original set.⁴⁴ Although one of the plates bears the names of the draftsman and engraver, he nevertheless describes them as *Tavole anatomiche di Gaetano Petrioli* and signs all of them *Orig. di Gaet. Petrioli Romano*. This leads us to believe that he conceived himself to be the originator of the plates, just like Eustachi had been for the rest, eluding the fact that Eustachi had probably drawn his own anatomical images.

But even leaving aside the customary draftsman / engraver respective roles and the artist – anatomist tension, we are faced with the puzzling situation of the mixed nature of the 1741 plates. The “supplemental figures” inserted into Pietro da Cortona's drawings prove to be the place of the intersection of artistic and scientific strategies of bestowing authority upon the image. It is not known who added these figures; Martin Kemp incriminates Petrioli, but it is worth noticing that neither Hunter⁴⁵ nor Petraglia, who erased them, identify Petrioli to be responsible for the insertion and he himself does not mention anything in his 1741 edition. I have been able to trace the source of almost all of the additional figures in the plates derived from designs by Pietro da Cortona (the sources being,

in the order of importance, Valverde, Vesalius, Casserio and probably Eustachi), and they all predate the original design, so I am tempted to consider them early additions to the plates. Many of them are, indeed, graphically inferior to the rest of the engraved design. Interestingly enough, they are indebted, in the manner of the engraved line, to the source: thus I was able to conclude that in many cases Valverde rather than Vesalius was the source of an image present in both treatises and the crudest ones derive from the less sophisticated illustrations of Bartolomeo Eustachi.

Nevertheless, there are reasons to believe that a composite design was envisaged in the original planning of the plates. Firstly, the main feature of the very drawings by Pietro da Cortona is the fact that in exactly half of them the main figure exhibits a framed image containing another anatomical feature. These have been kept in most of the engravings in both editions. Secondly, in some cases some of the additional images seem to have been planned: the drawing for Pl. 7 (Fig. 4), for example, shows signs of *pentimenti* in the area of the right arm of the figure, including the thought of the ribbon, and apparently the position of the figure was intended in view of the whole device. Fig. II – the bust suspended from the ribbon, which is taken from Valverde – is stylistically uneven with the main figure, leaving us unclarified as to the reason (Fig. 5). In the drawing for Pl. 3, the frame on the right side of the image leaves enough space to maybe add another figure, and in the corresponding engraving Fig. II – the hand detail – although part of Pietro da Cortona's drawing, has been moved, suggesting that the initial engraver sought space for more figures (Fig. 1 and 2). In Pl. 4 instead of a figure detailing the anatomy of the neck, planned by the draughtsman, we find another anatomical bust derived from Vesalius (Fig. 6 and 7);⁴⁶ we tend to believe that this was included in the original plate made by Luca Ciamberlano, since it is very unlikely that a later engraver would have made the change of the already engraved detail, and, most importantly, the monogram of the engraver lies upon this very element.

Could we read this as an assertion of authorship regarding the insertions? We could, had the stylistic differences not point us in the opposite direction. Other examples, nevertheless, attest to the early modern usage of this particular modality of author-function: Robert Felfe, for example, has discussed the collages of Johann Jacob Scheuchzer, a doctor and collector, which included images from different sources, such as a frontispiece by Holbein the Younger, but bore the signature of Scheuchzer.⁴⁷ An argument might be found, still, in another work by

Luca Ciamberlano, the anatomical treatise for artists already mentioned, containing engravings after images probably used in the Carracci workshop for teaching. In one of the plates, the rendition of a marble bust is much closer to the manner in which the bust in Pl. 4 is executed. It shows, in any case, that the engraver is very versatile in his manner of reproducing in print different kinds of designs, deliberately adapting his duct to the model. This impression of alertness to issues of authorship and style on the part of Ciamberlano is further enhanced by another plate, which he signs in a very visible place and in a way (Fig. 8) – representing the gesture of signing itself, a visual pun on the act of engraving maybe – that transforms the image into a discourse on representation and self-presentation.

This brings us to the question of the reason of the inclusion, and afterwards exclusion of the additional figures. Although traditionally discussed as *absurd* (Hunter), and not directly related to the main subjects of the prints (neurology and myology), they do follow in some sense the logic of the general design of the planned treatise. The order of the plates, it has been observed, follows the progressive flaying of the figure, showing successive layers of the dissection, and thus largely corresponds to Vesalius' plan: the figure is shown frontally in the first 14 plates, firstly standing, then progressively sitting or kneeling, and from the back in the plates 15-19.⁴⁸ The additional figures also follow the Vesalian order (followed by almost all the imitators and followers of Vesalius, Valverde first among them). So the question is whether the inclusions were intended to transform the anatomical treatise into a more general one (as suggested first by Hunter), making it maybe a more profitable investment, or whether the reasons for the inclusion might be found in the aesthetic of scientific illustrations, deeply rooted in a "highly reflexive image practice".⁴⁹

The exclusion, on the other hand, is equally puzzling: was it made because of scientific reasons, to "expurgate the plates from every error" or because of the awkwardness of the distribution and discrepancy between some of the figures and the main figure (see, for example, Pl. 7 – Fig. 5 –, where the kidneys are interposed without any effort to suggest a spatial relationship to the rest of the composition). Both reasons are invoked in Petraglia's 1788 Introduction,⁵⁰ suggesting that the Neo-Classical criterion of "purity" governs both scientific and artistic practices (paradoxically, however, Pietro da Cortona was to be identified soon by Neo-Classical theorists with the supreme lack of taste represented by the Baroque⁵¹).

Rather than accepting Petraglia's judgement, I would like to look more closely at the strategy that first led to amalgamating various elements on the plates. Artistically incongruent, the general aspect of the plates actually follows "un-naturalistic" conventions of scientific images developed in the sixteenth century: both in plant and anatomy illustrations crucial parts of the main figure are illustrated separately, in bigger detail – proposing a visual equivalent to the action of medical dismemberment through dissection, and, slightly later, of anatomical preparations –, a development which Brian Ogilvie has called the "scientific" or "analytic realism".⁵² The artist Pietro da Cortona is reacting to the un-naturalistic character of these conventions, by introducing the "frame-devices", but the person responsible for the additions is more reliant on the analytic aesthetics, which legitimizes the body part *per se*. This follows developments in late sixteenth-century anatomy, which mark a movement away from general anatomy and towards the anatomy of particular parts (organs, apparatus),⁵³ establishing "a new aesthetic of the part, [...] an aesthetic that did not demand or relied upon the reintegration of the part into a predetermined whole".⁵⁴ Other types of anatomical images, or better called devices, embody – if I may be allowed a wordplay – this logic: anatomical flap-images, which have detachable body parts in order to show successive layers. Vesalius in fact intended some of his plates to be cut out and reassembled to be used as a kind of anatomic mannequin (and he even provided instructions for the reader). The book itself, *Epitome*, was conceived to be read either from the skeleton, with which it began, towards the full nudes in the middle of the book, or the other way around,⁵⁵ encouraging thus an interactive approach on the part of the readers towards both text and images.

Alternatively we can look for the pictorial logic of the anatomical supplements. There is, from this point of view, an ontological difference between the framed details, which respect the artistic logic, and the floating organs or body parts. Some of the supplemental figures follow though the logic of the former, suggesting that they are reliefs or are in some kind of relation to the main figure and subject to the perspectival laws governing the image as a whole.

Pietro da Cortona's framed images are often discussed as mirrors.⁵⁶ Though this possibility would not really undermine my argument, since mirroring is itself thought of as a model for representation in early modern art theory, I think that it's worth acknowledging that they are meant to be read as artificial representations: in Pl. 16 (Fig. 9) a shadow

is cast over the device, in a way impossible for a mirror; in Pl. 12 (Fig. 10) the framed representation overflows its frame, in a way that recalls equivalent illusionistic tricks employed in seventeenth-century painting as commentaries on the limits between fiction and real, on the nature of representation itself. Lastly, some of these devices, such as those in Pl. 3 (Fig. 1-3), are extremely large, which was very rare for mirrors in early seventeenth-century Italy.

Framed images, or *quadri riportati*, were a common device in late Mannerist and Classicist painting in Rome. To give only an example, probably the most important one for Pietro da Cortona, who like most of his peers studied this masterwork intensely: Galleria Farnese painted by Annibale Carracci in the last decade of the sixteenth century thematised illusion through a dense network of references to different levels of reality and different grades of presence and illusion (fictive framed canvases, painted sculpture, fictive bronze medallions) and through a critical approach to artistic tradition. In the large decorative projects painted later in his career, Pietro da Cortona engaged with this strategy of articulation of the surface of the vault through *mise en abyme* devices, making frequent use of enframed images; a drawing in the British Museum (which is generally considered to be a study for the vault of the salon in the Barberini Palace, though on iconographic grounds I find it closer to the later Palazzo Pamphili decorations) shows a nude male holding a medallion in a similar way to the anatomical nudes of his early career (Fig. 11).

But frame-devices have in the seventeenth century a more complex role than simply organizing a large pictorial space. Louis Marin, arguably the most important thinker on painting as a semiotic system, discussed the physical frame, which isolates the image, and concentrates our visual rays upon it, as an operator which introduces the effect of theoretical (attentive, contemplative, that is) gaze. The perception of the frame, or the introduction into the area of the representation of this material condition of the representation, disrupts the transitive reading of the image, putting forward the reflexive dimension of the representation.⁵⁷ Also, Victor Ieronim Stoichiță has examined in his book, *The Self-aware Image*, the role played by mechanisms of framing, mirroring, assemblage, etc. in the meditation on the nature of representation and the affirmation of the autonomy of the artwork in the early modern period.⁵⁸

Pietro da Cortona's framed images embody this meta-artistic concern for the presentation of the representation which represents, as Louis Marin would put it.⁵⁹ On the one hand the drawings are made in view of

engraving, which itself is a technique of replication, creating a double, or to be more precise, many more instantiations of the original image. The technique itself defines the resulting image as a reflexive discourse. But in the same time, the construction of the image as an intertextual play serves the anatomical gaze. The frames serve to present to the viewer for inspection enlarged details. The operation of framing is a rhetorical one – just like the gestures of self-presentation of the main figures – and guides the eye towards the correct reading.

Both artistic and medical practices were, in the early modern era, going through a process of institutionalization, trying to “legitimate their new-found status [and] intellectual frameworks”, in the words of Ludmilla Jordanova.⁶⁰ Self-awareness was central to this discourse, and the *instauration du tableau*⁶¹ is the effect of it on the art scene. Many anatomical illustrations of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries exhibit this programmatic character as well: the process of repeating images from previous books is firstly determined by commercial interests, but it also introduces, through the imagistic material, the historical dimension. The compositional logic of the 1741 plates is thus not that of “addition”, but of visually rooting the process of knowledge acquisition in this authorial reservoir of historical images, since anatomical images, as brilliantly shown in Sachiko Kusakawa’s recent book, don’t just illustrate the text, but they adjudicate authority, they are employed to convince the reader of a particular interpretation and so on.

The only evidence of the usage of the *Tabulae anatomicae* that I could find attests to this dynamics: Plate 26 of the 1741 copy of the book found in the Wellcome Library in London (shelfmark F.109) bears letters added in pencil next to some of the ones printed on the plates to identify the bones. I believe they must correspond to the description of the skeletal system in a different anatomical text and that they thus prove images to be at the core of an inter-textual cross-referencing process through which knowledge is produced.

But images often display a kind of metarepresentational network, as well. An anonymous flap image produced in late sixteenth century, a male nude, is bearing the portrait of Vesalius himself, which functions “as a guarantee [...] of the correctness of the anatomy”.⁶² The inclusion of scientific instruments⁶³ (such as in Vesalius), or the many details in later images which suggest the method of anatomical study by displaying anatomical preparations (such as in the images made by Gérard de Lairese

for Govert Bidloo's *Anatomia humani corporis* of 1690, Fig. 12), refer to the process of production of knowledge itself.

The most widespread mark of self-reflexion in anatomical images are the dramatic gestures of exposure, cadavers showing (off) their interior or body parts, a performative mode to which Pietro da Cortona's drawings explicitly take part. But maybe the most surprising of them all is Valverde's dissected man who dissects another body (Fig. 13), actually an assemblage (another meta-artistic and meta-scientific figure) of two figures previously published in Vesalius (Fig. 14 and 15). The imagistic motif is so powerful that it is reduplicated in Pl. 10 of the 1741 *Tabulae anatomicae* (Fig. 16). There was not enough space for the display of the whole exhibit, so only the standing figure is kept, but the reflexive reference to the act of dissection is maintained, as the figure is fitted with dissecting instruments.

On a second level, there is an intimate connection between the reflexivity embedded in the structure of the image and anatomical content. As Susan Dackerman recently wrote, "artists as well as their scientific colleagues assumed each other's authority as a means of deploying their own expertise".⁶⁴

The framing operation – *opération de cadrage*, as Louis Marin would call it – exposes the visual mechanism behind the production of the image, as theorized in the fifteenth century by Alberti: the image is a selection, a cut-out (*découpage*) from reality, an intersection through the visual pyramid which connects the eye of the painter to the visible world, an operation which closely mirrors that of the anatomist's act of dissecting.

Anatomical procedures are being engaged and interrogated through the medium itself. Flap images, it has been argued, influenced the way medical practitioners conceived their interaction with the human body, particularly hands-on examination.⁶⁵ The act of incision is common to both medical dissection and engraving, and even the specific instruments look alike (as one can see in Diderot and D'Alambert's *Recueil de planches, sur les sciences, les arts libéraux, et les arts mécaniques...*), introducing an explicit competition between representation and medium. The anatomists from the sixteenth century were very alert to the possibilities of the graphic medium: Vesalius writes to his publisher in order to ensure that he will pay extreme care to the rendering of the lines ("the thickness of the lines in certain parts, which is the most artful feature of these illustrations and thoroughly delightful for me to view, will appear along with the elegant darkening of the shadows"⁶⁶); Valverde is even more aware of the double

function of hatching lines – conventions to render the volume and representations of the fibers of the muscles (“in this shading I demonstrate the course of the fibers of the flesh, according to their particular orientations in each muscle”⁶⁷). Stylistic language becomes crucial to the content. In some late seventeenth-century books, the anatomical preparation is rendered in such a way that it looks like a demonstration of engraving technique (Fig. 17 and 18), making visible the tension between the double function of the graphic conventions envisaged over a century earlier by Valverde, a commentary on the opacity of the medium. And this is not just a visual pun, for the engraver the two could not be distinct, consisting of the same operation, as the transitive and reflexive dimension of the image can never be separated.⁶⁸

For the viewer though, the opacity of the medium brings about the awareness of the delicate issue of visibility in representation. Louis Marin, speaking of an etching none the less, calls this phenomena “eruption of the invisible into the realm of the visible”.⁶⁹ In the case of an anatomical image this brings about a supplementary level of self-reflexivity, since the anatomical gaze itself implies making the invisible visible. A powerful illustration of this fact is present in the last plate (Fig. 19), the only one dedicated to the female body, where the mystery of procreation is revealed.

Lastly, I would like to point to the influence of contemporary conventions of displaying works of art. It has been suggested that the associative structure of many anatomical images is dependent on the eclectic practices of collecting of the early modern Wunderkammern, or cabinets of curiosities.⁷⁰ Other collecting and display settings might prove even more relevant for this discussion, particularly the display of antiquities.

The 1741 plates present many anatomical preparations in the form of fragments of antique marble statues, taken from either Vesalius or Valverde. For Vesalius, their function is to suggest he is presenting the anatomy of the “canonical” body to the reader, one of his quotes being the celebrated Torso Belvedere, an antique fragment considered *absolutissimum* by none other than Michelangelo.⁷¹ Treatises of anatomy for artists, such as Luca Ciamberlano’s one mentioned earlier, often present antique sculpture as a means to teach anatomy.

Antique sculpture was perceived as the embodiment of the perfection that cannot be identified in a single natural specimen. Its fragmentary state is no impediment to the discernment of the perfection of the whole, or to the understanding of the relationship of the part to the whole body. The

“aesthetic of the fragment” governing the perception of antique sculpture informed, I reckon, the representation of the anatomical “aesthetic of the part”. Antiquarian practices of display (Fig. 20) produced a discourse governed by intertextual mechanisms of montage meant to give visual form, through successive *mises en abymes*, to their historical discipline.

The case of Pietro da Cortona’s drawings and the engravings made after them has shown that attention given to the usage of artistic conventions, techniques and medium in scientific images, understood as part of a larger artistic scene rather than an isolated phenomena dependent only on scientific developments, makes possible a better understanding of the complex interaction between artists and scientists in early modern Rome, by highlighting the processes of appropriation and transformation of artistic resources and strategies by the scientific world.




Fig. 1: Pietro da Cortona, drawing for Pl. 3 of *Tabulae anatomicae...*, brown ink and black chalk, blue, sepia and grey washes, white highlights, c. 1618, by permission of University of Glasgow Library, Special Collections




Fig. 2: Luca Ciamberlano (and possibly another engraver), after Pietro da Cortona (and with further additions), Pl. 3 of Gaetano Petrioli, *Tabulae anatomicae...*, Rome, 1741, copperplate engraving, BIU Santé, Paris




Fig. 3: Luca Ciamberlano, after Pietro da Cortona, Pl. 3 of Francesco Petraglia, *Tabulae anatomicae...*, Rome, 1788, copperplate engraving, BIU Santé, Paris



Fig. 4: Pietro da Cortona, drawing for Pl. 7 of *Tabulae anatomicae...*, brown ink and black chalk, blue, sepia and grey washes, white highlights, c. 1618, by permission of University of Glasgow Library, Special Collections




Fig. 5: Luca Ciamberlano (and possibly another engraver), after Pietro da Cortona (and with further additions), Pl. 7 of Gaetano Petrioli, *Tabulae anatomicae...*, Rome, 1741, copperplate engraving, BIU Santé, Paris



Fig. 6: Pietro da Cortona, drawing for Pl. 4 of *Tabulae anatomicae...*, brown ink and black chalk, blue, sepia and grey washes, white highlights, c. 1618, by permission of University of Glasgow Library, Special Collections




Fig. 7: Luca Ciamberlano (and possibly another engraver), after Pietro da Cortona (and with further additions), Pl. 4 of Gaetano Petrioli, *Tabulae anatomicae...*, Rome, 1741, copperplate engraving, BIU Santé, Paris



Fig. 8: Luca Ciamberlano (after Agostino Carracci?), detail of an unpaginated plate from *Scuola perfetta per imparare a disegnare tutto il corpo humano*, Rome, 1626, Getty Research Institute, available through <http://archive.org>




Fig. 9: Luca Ciamberlano (and possibly another engraver), after Pietro da Cortona (and with further additions), detail of Pl. 16 of Gaetano Petrioli, *Tabulae anatomicae...*, Rome, 1741, copperplate engraving, BIU Santé, Paris



Fig. 10: Luca Ciamberlano (and possibly another engraver), after Pietro da Cortona (and with further additions), detail of Pl. 12 of Gaetano Petrioli, *Tabulae anatomicae...*, Rome, 1741, copperplate engraving, BIU Santé, Paris



Fig. 11: Pietro da Cortona, Study after the nude, red chalk,
© Trustees of the British Museum




Fig. 13: Illustration from Juan Valverde de Hamusco, *Historia de la composicion del cuerpo humano*, Rome, 1556, Book IV, page 108, detail, copperplate engraving, Wellcome Library, London




Fig. 14: Illustration from Andreas Vesalius, *De humani corporis fabrica...*, Basel, 1543, Book VI, page 560, woodcut, Wellcome Library, London




Fig. 15: Illustration from Andreas Vesalius, *De humani corporis fabrica...*, Basel, 1543, Book VI, page 559, woodcut, Wellcome Library, London



Fig. 16: Luca Ciamberlano (and possibly another engraver), after Pietro da Cortona (and with further additions), Pl. 10 of Gaetano Petrioli, *Tabulae anatomicae...*, Rome, 1741, copperplate engraving, BIU Santé, Paris




Fig. 17: Gérard de Lairese, Anatomical plate detailing the fibres of the muscles, from Govard Bidloo, *Anatomia humani corporis...*, Amsterdam, 1685, copperplate engraving, detail, Wellcome Library, London




Fig. 18: Plate showing copper engraving technique, from Denis Diderot, Jean Le Rond d'Alambert, Pierre Mouchon, *Recueil de planches, sur les sciences, les arts libéraux, et les arts mécaniques...*, 4ème livraison, Paris, 1767, detail, Bibliothèque Nationale de France.



Fig. 19: Luca Ciamberlano (and possibly another engraver), after Pietro da Cortona (and with further additions), Pl. 27 of Gaetano Petrioli, *Tabulae anatomicae...*, Rome, 1741, copperplate engraving, BIU Santé, Paris



Fig. 20: Jan Goeree, Drawing with Roman monumets and artefacts for *Novus Thesaurus Antiquitatum Romanorum*, Amsterdam, 1704, pen and black ink, brush and brown wash, over traces of red and black chalk, Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York; www.metmuseum.org.

NOTES

- ¹ Daston, L., Galison, P., *Objectivity*, Zone Books, New York, 2007.
- ² Kemp, M., "Temples of the Body and Temples of the Cosmos: Vision and Visualization in the Vesalian and Copernican Revolutions", in Baigrie, B. S. (ed.), *Picturing Knowledge. Historical and Philosophical Problems Concerning the Use of Art in Science*, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, Buffalo, London, 1996. Parshall, P., "Imago Contrafacta: Images and Facts in the Northern Renaissance", in *Art History*, 16, 4, 1993.
- ³ Biagioli, M., Galison, P. (eds.), *Scientific Authorship. Credit and Intellectual Property in Science*, Routledge, New York, London, 2003.
- ⁴ An attribution with which current historiography concurs (except for the drawing related to Pl. 11, of a different style and lower quality and which seems a copy of the latter). Jörg Martin Merz, the authority on Pietro da Cortona, sustains it on stylistic grounds in *Pietro da Cortona und sein Kreis. Die Zeichnungen in Düsseldorf*, Deutscher Kunstverlag, München, Berlin, 2005, p. 42. The drawings have *pentimenti* and bear traces of their transfer for engraving, so they are considered to precede the plates. See Kemp, M., "Dr William Hunter on the Windsor Leonardos and His Volume of Drawings Attributed to Pietro da Cortona", *The Burlington Magazine*, Vol. 118, No. 876, 1976, p. 147.
- ⁵ Except for the drawing corresponding to Pl. 11, see the previous note.
- ⁶ The date is inscribed on some states of the first table of the 1741 edition (*Petr^{us} Berret.^s Corton.^s delin. 1618*), and also mentioned in the Introduction of the 1788 second edition (*Petrus enim Berrettini has eadem tabulas elaborare coepit anno 1618, ut ex prima tabula patet.*). For the dating, see Norman, J. M., "Introduction", in *The Anatomical Plates of Pietro da Cortona. 27 Baroque Masterpieces*, Dover Publications, New York, 1986.
- ⁷ Identified with Nicolas Larchée, the dissections of which were, according to Bellori, followed by Nicolas Poussin after his arrival in Rome in 1624. Choulant, L., *History and Bibliography of Anatomic Illustration...* [1852], trans. and ed. by M. Frank [...], University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1920, p. 235 and Kemp, 1976, p. 148 and n. 15. The handwritten note is mentioned by Dr. William Hunter in a letter transcribed in Kemp, 1976, p. 148.
- ⁸ For the letter and the history of the provenance of the drawings see Kemp, 1976, pp. 144-8.
- ⁹ Hunter, in Kemp, 1976, p. 148.
- ¹⁰ Petraglia, F., "Lectoribus humanissimis...", in the 1788 edition, pp. xii-xv.
- ¹¹ Identified by Choulant, p. 235.
- ¹² For the dating of the plates see Dühme, L., *Die Tabulae anatomicae des Pietro Berrettini da Cortona*, Institut für Geschichte der Medizin, Köln, 1980, pp. 7-8. I do not agree though with the author's reading of two graphic signs

- on the bottom left of Pl. 20 as the number 22, standing for 1622, especially since that is one of the plates added later.
- 13 Roberts K. B. & Tomlinson, J. D. W., *The Fabric of the Body. European Traditions of Anatomical Illustration*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992, p. 276.
- 14 Kemp, 1976, p. 147.
- 15 Roberts & Tomlinson, pp. 274, 278.
- 16 Laurenza, D., *Art and Anatomy in Renaissance Italy. Images from a Scientific Revolution*, The Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York, 2012, pp. 29-33.
- 17 I have traced in the Istituto Nazionale per la Grafica in Rome a set of the plates which, unlike all the copies of the 1741 edition that I have seen, bears, on each of the 26 plates (Pl. 27 is missing), the inscription "LIBER II" (or LIB II). They come from the Biblioteca Corsiniana and are on deposit, since 1895, from the Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei. They all contain the "supplemental figures". In this state of the research I am inclined to interpret them as a first proof made after the plates, but I cannot say when they were done. The inscription "LIBER II" suggests that at some point the plates were intended to illustrate one book of a larger medical publication. I would like to thank Dott.ssa Francesca Orobi from the Istituto Nazionale per la Grafica in Rome and Dott.ssa Ebe Antetomaso from the Biblioteca dell'Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei e Corsiniana for their kind assistance in the research of this set of plates.
- 18 For medical practice in seventeenth-century Rome, see De Renzi, S., "Medical competence, anatomy and the polity in seventeenth-century Rome", in Cavallo, S., Gentilcore, D. (eds.), *Spaces, Objects and Identities in Early Modern Italian Medicine*, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 2008, p. 91.
- 19 "The work was intended evidently for the Nerves only." Hunter, in Kemp, 1976, p. 148.
- 20 Roberts & Tomlinson, pp. 276-8.
- 21 Dühme, p. 48.
- 22 The additional plates (Pl. 20-26) treat other topics – the brain, the eye, the ear, the vascular system, etc. –, another features concurring with the general agreement that they are later afterthoughts not intended in the original project.
- 23 Petraglia, pp. x, xv.
- 24 One way of figuring out the real audience of the book, if not the intended audience, is checking if different copies of the book have marginal notes (by medical practitioners, for example) on them. I have inspected six copies of the 1741 edition and six copies of the 1788 edition in different libraries in Rome, London and Berlin, but none had any adnotations on them. Only the 1741 copy of the book in the Wellcome Library in London had notes on one plate indicating, as I shall further discuss, medical use.

- 25 De Renzi, pp. 79-95; Siraisi, N. G., "Rome: Medicine, Histories, Antiquities, and Public Health", in *History, Medicine, and the Traditions of Renaissance Learning*, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 2007, pp. 168-193.
- 26 For Cassiano dal Pozzo's *Paper Museum*, see Cropper, E., Dempsey, Ch., Nicolas Poussin. *Friendship and the Love of Painting*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1996, esp. pp. 110-11; on his activity as a natural historian, Haskell, F. et. al., *Il Museo Cartaceo di Cassiano dal Pozzo. Cassiano naturalista, Quaderni Puteani* 1, Olivetti [f.l.], 1989.
- 27 History of science has put forward in the last decades a new vision about scientific images, expanding the notion of authorship to include artists, instrument makers, etc., and thus completely changing the traditional way of describing the process of construction of knowledge. My emphasis in what follows is somewhat different, trying to elucidate the *early modern discourse* about scientific/artistic authorship.
- 28 *Auctoris qui has Tabulas confinxit (nomen ignoratur)*... Fausto Amidei, "Studiose lector", in the 1741 edition (n.p.).
- 29 Other eighteenth-century authors before and after Petraglia tried to solve the enigma. See Albert von Haller, *Bibliotheca Anatomica: qua scripta ad anatomen et physiologiam facientia a rerum initiis recensentur. Tomus I*. TIGURI, apud Orell, Gessner, Fuessli, et Soc., 1774, pp. 340, 579; and the exchange of letters published in *Antologia romana*: "Lettera del Sig. Dott. Antonio Marinucci, medico primario sopra-numero del Venerabile Arcispedale della Santissima Consolazione al Sig. Dottor Pietro Orlandi sopra alcune notizie riguardanti il già celebre anatomico, e chirurgo Gio. Guglielmo Riva" (Vol. XV, Num. IV, 1788, Luglio, pp. 28-9) and "Lettera del Sig. Dott. Pietro Orlandi al chiarissimo Sig. Cavaliere Abate Girolamo Tiraboschi consigliere di S.A.S. il Sig. Duca di Modena, presidente della ducal biblioteca, e galleria delle medaglie, e professore onorario nell'università della stessa città, sopra alcune memorie appartenenti alla vita del celebre medico, ed anatomico Romano Monsignor Gio. Maria Castellani archiatro della san. mem. di Gregorio XV" (Vol. XV, Num. XXVI, 1788, Dicembre, pp. 204-5).
- 30 Petraglia, p. x.
- 31 Petraglia, pp. xii and xiv.
- 32 Kusakawa, S., *Picturing the Book of Nature. Image, Text, and Argument in Sixteenth-Century Human Anatomy and Medical Botany*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 2012, p. 45.
- 33 Kusakawa, 2012, pp. 47, 87.
- 34 Johns, A., "The Ambivalence of Authorship in Early Modern Natural Philosophy", in Biagioli & Galison, p. 70.
- 35 Kusakawa, 2012, pp. 64-9, 80-97.
- 36 Laurenza, p. 27.
- 37 Kusakawa, 2012, pp. 241-2.

- 38 Smith, P. H., *The Body of the Artisan. Art and Experience in the Scientific Revolution*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, London, 2004.
- 39 Fuchs, L., *De Historia Stirpium* [1542], trans. in Ogilvie, B. W., *The Science of Describing. Natural History in Renaissance Europe*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, London, 2006, p. 196.
- 40 Martin Kemp (1996, p. 42) coined this expression which he used to describe the series of elements and strategies meant to claim and increase the credibility and authority of the image.
- 41 Nutton, V., "Representation and Memory in Renaissance Anatomical Illustration", in Meroi, F., Pagliano, C. (eds.), *Immagini per conoscere. Dal Rinascimento alla Rivoluzione scientifica*, Leo S. Olschki Editore, Florence, 2001, pp. 73-4. Talvacchia, B., "Mythology, Sexuality, and Science in Charles Estienne's Manual of Anatomy", in *Taking Positions. On the Erotic in Renaissance Culture*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1999, pp. 161-88.
- 42 Petherbridge, D., "Art and Anatomy: The Meeting of Text and Image", in Petherbridge, D., Jordanova, L., *The Quick and the Dead. Artists and Anatomy*, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1997, p. 54.
- 43 Kusukawa, 2012, p. 89.
- 44 Choulant, pp. 203-4. The images are drawn by Giovanni Pesci and engraved by Bald. Gabbuggiani, as appears on every single plate. They appear in *Corso anatomico o sia universal comento nelle tavole del celebre Bartolomeo Eustachio...* of 1740.
- 45 He just says "the absurdity of *some person* into whose hands the Drawings had fallen" (my emphasis). Hunter in Kemp, 1976, p. 148.
- 46 Petraglia (pp. xii-xiii) does not change this features according to Pietro da Cortona's drawings which he obviously did not see himself. He had knowledge of them through Albrecht von Haller's *Bibliotheca anatomica* of 1774, but believed them not to be related to the plates or possibly not even made by Pietro da Cortona.
- 47 Felfe, R., "Collections and the Surface of the Image: Pictorial Strategies in the Early-Modern Wunderkammern", in Schramm, H., Schwarte, L., Lazardzig, J. (eds.), *Collection, Laboratory, Theater: Scenes of Knowledge in the 17th Century*, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, New York, 2005, pp. 249-50.
- 48 Dühme, p. 37 and Roberts & Tomlinson, p. 275.
- 49 Felfe, p. 263.
- 50 *Insuper nunnularum Iconum inconcinna prorsus, atque inordinata in ipsarum potissimum areis describendis distributio, et a principe Figura insignis discrepantia*. Petraglia, pp. xiii-xiv.
- 51 Francesco Milizia, writing in 1797 in his *Dizionario di belle arti*: "Borromini in architecture, Bernini in sculpture, Pietro da Cortona in painting [...] represent a diseased taste – one that has infected a great number of artists."

- 52 Ogilvie, pp. 201-2.
- 53 Carlino, A., "Frammento, artificio e ricomposizione: l'anatomia del particolare e la medicina dell'età barocca", in Carlino, A., Ciardi, R. P., Luppi, A., Petrioli-Tofani, A., *Visioni anatomiche. Le forme del corpo negli anni del Barocco*, Silvana Editoriale, Milano, 2011, pp. 13-21.
- 54 Hillman, D., Mazzio, C., "Individual Parts", in Hillman, D. & Mazzio, C. (eds.), *The Body in Parts. Fantasies of Corporeality in Early Modern Europe*, Routledge, New York, London, 1997, p. xiv.
- 55 Kusakawa, 2012, pp. 210-11.
- 56 The only one who tries to give a sense to this understanding of the framed images is David Packwood in a conference paper from 2010 at the University of Durham, "Specular Visuality and Artistic Self-Reflexivity in Pietro da Cortona's Drawings of the Tabulae Anatomicae of 1619" [sic!], published on the author's account page on Academia.edu. He understands self-reflexivity in a different sense than I do, and our arguments do not overlap.
- 57 Marin, L., "Du cadre au décor ou la question de l'ornement dans la peinture", *Hors cadre*, 2, 1984, pp. 180-2.
- 58 Stoichiță, V. I., *The Self-aware Image. An Insight into Early Modern Meta-Painting*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, New York, 1997.
- 59 ... *l'espace de présentation où le tableau se présente représentant*. Marin, 1984, p. 185.
- 60 Jordanova, L., "Happy Marriages and Dangerous Liaisons: Artists and Anatomy", in Petherbridge & Jordanova, p. 101.
- 61 *L'instauration du tableau...* is the original title of Stoichiță's book, first published in French in 1996.
- 62 Dr. Harvey Cushing, *apud* Spielmann, M. H., *The Iconography of Andreas Vesalius, Anatomist and Physician (1514-1564)*, John Bale, Sons & Danielsson, London, 1925, p. 152. The image is available at <http://catalogue.wellcomelibrary.org/record=b1657611> (last accessed June 3rd, 2014).
- 63 Dackerman, S., "Prints as Instruments", in Dackerman, S. (ed.), *Prints and the Pursuit of Knowledge in Early Modern Europe*, Yale University Press, New Haven, London, 2011, p. 24.
- 64 Dackermann, p. 24.
- 65 Dackermann, pp. 30-2.
- 66 From Vesalius' letter to Johannes Oporinus, the printer, published at the beginning of the *Fabrica*. Translation from <http://vesalius.northwestern.edu/>, Printer's note to the reader (last accessed June 1st, 2014).
- 67 Juan Valverde, *apud* Kemp, M., "The mark of truth: looking and learning in some anatomical illustrations from the Renaissance and eighteenth century", in Bynum, W. F., Porter, R. (eds.), *Medicine and the five senses*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993, p. 101.

- ⁶⁸ For the theoretisation of the transitive / reflexive dimension of the image, see Marin, L., *On representation*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2001, pp. 352 ff.
- ⁶⁹ ... *ouverture de l'invisible dans le visible même*. Marin, L., "L'opaque", in *L'Art, effacement et surgissement des figures: hommage à Marc Le Bot*, Publications de la Sorbonne, Paris, 1991, p. 29.
- ⁷⁰ Felfe.
- ⁷¹ Kusakawa, S., "The Uses of Pictures in the Formation of Learned Knowledge: The Cases of Leonhard Fuchs and Andreas Vesalius", in Kusakawa, S., Maclean, I. (eds.), *Transmitting Knowledge. Words, Images, and Instruments in Early Modern Europe*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006, p. 86. Harcourt, G., "Andreas Vesalius and the Anatomy of Antique Sculpture", *Representations*, No. 17, Winter 1987, pp. 28-61.