Cosmopolitanism and Philosophy in a Cosmopolitan Sense

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COSMOPOLITANISM AND
“MULTICULTURALISM FROM BELOW”
IN CONTEMPORARY BRITAIN
NEW LABOUR, THE MACPHERSON
REPORT AND MULTICULTURALISM

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As is well known, the New Labour party that emerged triumphant in the British general election of 1997 was a re-invented, post-socialist Third Way party, its adoption of neoliberal economic principles fused with a preoccupation with social inclusion.¹ The promotion of “diversity”, a key plank in its early programs, can be seen in this context as a replacement for the traditional politics of class,² based as that had been on the redistributionist political economy that had characterized the party for almost a hundred years. This new government for a new Britain promised and carried out, most notably in its first two terms, an extensive program of modernization premised on

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“cosmopolitan” stances towards the economy, transnational political and legal institutions and military intervention.

It is the argument of this paper, however, that the New Labor government’s inability or unwillingness to think carefully through the distinction between cosmopolitan universalism on the one hand, and the vigorous promotion of ethno-cultural diversity as an automatic good on the other, led to an incoherent and overly ideological social policy of multiculturalism. The widespread “collapse” of faith in this project (and, to a significant extent, in cosmopolitanism as an ideal itself) in the latter part of the 2000s was thus, perhaps, to be expected.

But if what might be termed the “diversity-by-edict” model of multiculturalism has had the effect of turning many British subjects away from its central aims, it should also be stressed that the people of this relatively open society have been able, as we will see, to produce concrete, at least one actually existing multiculture which owe little to the official pieties – and bears little resemblance to the utopian fantasies of the diversity advocates.

Fundamental arguments critical of New Labor multiculturalism might be grouped into two streams; that it was based on mistaken, unrealistic premises, and that its actual functioning was and is inimical to the formation of a culturally syncretic public sphere in which people from a variety of ethno-cultural backgrounds might genuinely open themselves to one another. To take the first: the experience of many Labor activists and politicians in the municipal anti-racist movement of the 1970s and 1980s meant that multiculturalism emerged as a primarily moral project centered on the unrealistic “desire to do away with racism” – an impulse that was to come to full, disastrous fruition with the adoption of the Orwellian findings of the Macpherson Report in 1999 (see below). Secondly, New Labor’s anti-assimilationist thinking about multiculturalism, as a patchwork of equally valued cultural
formations, was based on a spurious and simplistic ideology of culturalism that amounted to a form of cultural absolutism.\textsuperscript{8} In this perspective “cultures” and communities become closed, reified \textit{things} and not processes.\textsuperscript{9} It is this reductive essentialism that produced what became, in some parts of the country, an official system of “plural monoculturalism”,\textsuperscript{10} in which spatially proximate but tectonically aligned communities arrange themselves into essentialised, decidedly non-cosmopolitan formations.\textsuperscript{11}

Perhaps the clearest exemplification of New Labor’s intellectual shortcomings and inability to deal honestly with the cultural politics of race and ethnicity came with its promotion and full blooded acceptance of the Macpherson Report,\textsuperscript{12} one of the most significant, though illogical and dishonest, documents of the post war period and a major driver of the shutting down of rational public discussion of race and racism and, by extension, diversity and multiculturalism. The Macpherson Inquiry, which gave rise to the report, was launched in 1997 in response to unease surrounding what was clearly a botched police investigation into the murder of a Stephen Lawrence, young black man, in south London in 1993.\textsuperscript{13}

Enthusiastically welcomed upon its publication in 1999 by the government and left-liberal intelligentsia, it promised a new dawn in British race relations – or at least was heralded as such. It is difficult however, from a rational perspective, to see why this should have been, given its manifest illogicalities, tautologies and gross simplifications. Two things are most significant among its approach and findings: \textbf{1)} that the police were “institutionally racist”,\textsuperscript{14} as indeed were the other British institutions such as the Judicial System, Civil Service, National Health Service and local government, and \textbf{2)} the inferred thoughts and motivations of actors became, in an unprecedented turn in the British context, a basis for judgments about culpability for alleged crimes:
The definition of racism...is that it is anything perceived to be racist. The perpetrators of racist activity may not know they are racist at all. All they have to do to be so called is to treat people in a way which is interpreted as racist. Racism is, in short, insensitivity to the feelings of members of ethnic minorities... The notion that the perception of a fact makes it a fact is a legal and philosophical monstrosity. If it is proposed, as indeed the Report does, to make unwitting racism legal offence, the only evidence relevant to a judgment about whether an admitted or act constituted an offence would be the assertion by the plaintiff that an offence had been committed.  

The hook around which this Orwellian, or perhaps McCarthyian intrusion into the minds of actors was organized was “unwittingness”:

It (the Report) switched attention...away from observable conduct, words or gestures towards the police officer’s “unwitting” thoughts and conduct. But how could the Macpherson inquiry know what was in an officer’s unconscious mind – except through the failure of the police to be effective in the investigation of a racist crime? This definition puts charges of racism outside the boundaries of proof or rebuttal.  

So preoccupied was the report with eradicating “unwitting racism” that it was “willing to contemplate the imposition of a police state to achieve its aims. For this alone one should condemn the mentality that produced it. It is deeply illiberal in spirit”. Despite its illiberalism, and its “intellectual confusion and moral cowardice” the report, as noted, passed quickly into orthodoxy and injected into civil society the notion that all whites are racist whether they know it or not, and that it is immoral – indeed in some cases criminal, to offend the sensibilities of ethnic minorities. The acceptance of both these notions proved
to be, in official and institutional circles, inimical to honest and open debate about Britain’s experiment in multiculturalism. A perfect storm of events and processes had formed to produce a lastingly important shift in policy and thinking, as “the fateful meeting of the stricken Lawrences, an unworldly High Court judge, a feckless social-affairs intelligentsia, and what is currently fashionable in political militancy”\(^\text{20}\) combined to finally move robust discussions of race and multiculturalism beyond the pale. Later in the decade, the true extent of the fecklessness of Britain’s governing political elite became apparent. Andrew Neather, a former New Labor advisor, caused something of a political storm in 2009 when he suggested that, in the early 2000s, New Labor had loosened immigration controls, implicitly and at least in part, in order to further diversify Britain as an attack on “the right” in particular and conservative notions of British national identity and opposition to multiculturalism.\(^\text{21}\)

This implicit ideological commitment to diversity as an inherent social good should be placed in context as one of perhaps three key dynamics in a process that underpinned Britain’s second, and unforeseen, phase of post-war mass immigration from the mid 1990s on. The first of these was the liberalization of arrangements for incoming workers at the behest of business interests, in the context of New Labor’s conversion to neo-liberal principles, a booming economy, and the expansion of the European Union;\(^\text{22}\) the second was an explosion of organized people smuggling and a consequent upsurge in successful applications for asylum -an aspect of developments in the global economy of organized crime as well as migration;\(^\text{23}\) and the third was, indeed, a deeply held belief among many of those on the progressive left - many of whom, as noted, had cut their political teeth in the anti-racism movement of the 1970s and 1980s – that the extension of diversity in Britain was a desirable goal \textit{per se} and offered,
since Labor had by now drastically severed most of its roots to the white working class that spawned it, an arena in which to continue to apply its rhetoric of “progress”, social justice and equality, and - of course - to claim moral superiority over the Conservatives. A key aspect of New Labor’s bequest to Britain then has been a startlingly high level of migration “churn”, even for a society at the leading edge of globalization, accompanied by the saturation of Britain’s institutions and media with the rhetoric of desirable diversity and the cementing of Macpherson’s “institutional racism” as an unarguable truth. Because of this the social and psychological effects of rapid and profound demographic and cultural change are only now emerging as a subject for civilized debate; it is, in fact, no longer possible to ignore them. In 2010, according to the widely respected British Social Attitudes Report, a majority of the population in Britain believed that multiculturalism has been a failure, with 52% considering the country to be deeply divided along religious lines; a further 45% say that religious diversity has had a negative impact on the country. Similar research by YouGov in 2010 found that 58% of respondents linked Islam with extremism and 69% believed it encouraged the repression of women. These fears about the effects of the establishment of Muslim communities should be understood in two closely connected ways: first, as an aspect of broader concerns about social and cultural cohesion, with Muslims being not only widely seen as the most “other” of Britain’s diverse communities but also the most challenging to older British norms, whether these be social, cultural, religious or legal; these concerns must be set in the context of the profound demographic change Britain saw throughout the 2000s.

In fact, this deep public anxiety about the Britain’s new phase of “super-diversity” should come as no surprise to anybody familiar with Robert Putnam’s research for “E Pluribus
Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-First Century”

which found, disturbingly, a clear correlation (in the United States) between increasing levels of diversity and, among other things, declining levels of trust, individual happiness and assessments of quality of life, and confidence in local governance. The research model used by Putnam has since been replicated in the Netherlands, with similar results and the same overall conclusion. Though both studies assert that the decline in trust is not a permanent phenomenon but rather a characteristic of societies in transition, the debate over Putnam’s decision to delay publication of his findings in full until he had formulated recommendations for positively handling increasing diversity through social policy led some to conclude that the latter represent a form of wishful thinking not strongly supported by his initial research.

Whether temporary or otherwise, levels of trust appear to be extremely low in Britain, according to recent research. For example, the BBC reported in January 2009 that people under 50 years of age in Britain appear to experience the lowest levels of trust and belonging in Europe, based on research conducted by New Economics Foundation (on the basis of data taken from the 2006-07 Europe Social Survey). Reports of research of this kind now feature regularly in the British media, and play their role in late modernity’s ‘feedback loop’ of reflexivity, as individuals absorb and process findings about their society and its characteristics, in many cases perhaps heightening the sense that something is deeply wrong. Such low levels of trust – in others, and in the public sphere – are of course inimical to the flourishing of the cosmopolitan imagination. But at a more practical level, that of everyday interaction, of conviviality and conflict in real communities, forms of ambiguously cosmopolitan “multiculturalism from below” are emerging – and emerging strongly.
Multicultural London English and an actually existing multiculture

It may have seemed strange to some, in the aftermath of the English riots of August of 2011, to see the mainstream media poring over the language used by many of the rioters. What was being said on various social media sites by participants, as the riots raged, came in for particular attention. There are, in fact, precedents for this preoccupation with forms of speech as social markers, since British society has long been acutely class and accent conscious. But on this occasion there may have been something more troubling going on than the usual fun and games with language and social stereotypes; a sense that a “socially excluded” underclass has become worryingly entrenched, and that the language spoken by many of the young rioters, drawn from London’s increasingly marginalized social housing estates (projects), was somehow implicated in this. The emergence of this dialect, which is called Multicultural London English (MLE) by sociolinguists, and “Jafaican” by the popular media, is of the utmost significance to any attempt to understand what an actually existing multiculture looks like, shorn of diversity ideology and wishful thinking.

As far back as 2001, research by educationalists found that well over 300 languages and dialects were being spoken by children and teenagers in London’s schools. It is this exceptionally diverse linguistic environment that has formed the “feature pool” from which MLE has emerged. More recent research being conducted into the phenomenon, led by Paul Kerswill at Lancaster University and Jenny Cheshire at Queen Mary, University of London, finds that the new speech form is unique insofar as it is being spoken in more or less the same way by young people of all ethnic backgrounds; this is not a mere slang, but a dialect (or “multiethnolect”) that emerges out of a sphere of multiculture – of everyday, shared, lived experience.
and negotiation. MLE derives, it is suggested, from four main sources: Caribbean Creoles, most notably Jamaican – a cornerstone of London street speech for decades and the reason why many non-speakers of MLE “hear” it as “black”; former colonial Englishes (e.g. those of South Asia and West Africa); Cockney, the now fading dialect of the old London working class; and “learner varieties” – unguided second language acquisition through friendship groups. The research further confirms a convergence on MLE across Inner London, with the dialect being spoken within the same parameters by all ethno-cultural groups in the relevant areas, though, more specifically, the primary innovators are male non-Anglo teenagers and Anglo teenagers with non-Anglo networks. Indeed, this increasing convergence in London may be part of a far wider phenomenon, with examples of the use of MLE (or a closely related regional equivalent) evident farther afield, in Birmingham, Bristol and Manchester. All of this, unsurprisingly, has reignited a debate the British love to have about the “dumbing down” of the English Language; but this time round, in the aftermath of the riots and their frighteningly nihilistic assault on norms of public behavior, the stakes are higher than usual. Arguments about the coarsening of language, and the imprisoning effects of restrictive language codes, are emerging from some unlikely places. For example Lindsay Johns, a self-defined “hip hop intellectual”, argues that the young people he mentors in south London are becoming trapped – linguistically, educationally, socially – by “ghetto grammar” and cannot “code switch” their way out. This is a key issue from a linguistic point of view, as it pertains to the question of whether or not young people are able to move between different languages, dialects or registers of speech. Lindsay’s fear is that young people who do not – who cannot – do this may be psychologically trapped in highly restrictive lifeworlds. This, after all, is a language much
more of performance than reflection. This sense of restriction is important more generally; the parts of London from which MLE emerged appear, over the last decade or so, to be contracting too, as neighborhood affiliations intensify in an increasingly dog-eat-dog atmosphere; the emergence of “postcode gangs” represents a new kind of hyper-territorialism at the heart of one of the world’s great global cities. John Pitts’ work on “reluctant gangsters” argues that it is becoming increasingly difficult for young people to opt out of these street level affiliations. Some good news here might be that these tiny neighborhood identifications are now primary for many people – which is to say that they may be post-racial; it is the “end” you come from that matters, by and large, in the capital’s patchwork culture of violent territorialism, not your ethnicity.

But the bad news is arguably worse than the good news is good; this convergence on MLE among young Londoners seems to represent a kind of double-restriction: of urban space and of the mind. And these restrictions are taking place against a backdrop of acute crisis for disadvantaged young people: at present Britain is looking at over 20% unemployment among its young, functional illiteracy among teens is at 17%, and the country has one of the lowest social mobility rates in Europe, according to a 2010 study by the OECD.

Many of the accounts of this crisis, however, have not encompassed all its (decidedly un-cosmopolitan) dimensions, constrained as they have been by PC and the liberal orthodoxies around race and racism. But Professor Gus John, the Guyanan born writer and activist who has been working in Afro-Caribbean community empowerment and education in Britain for decades, has recently said what white, liberally minded sociolinguists will not: that much of the violent dysfunction and pain experienced by Britain’s multi-ethnic underclass is, to a significant extent, generated from within its own patterns of culture.
Cosmopolitanism and Philosophy in a Cosmopolitan Sense

John’s voice, coming as it does from “within”, amounts to a cry of despair that demands recognition of the true scale of the problem. It does not sit especially well with the conventional wisdom now routinely employed by the state, that minorities are the passive victims of institutional racism and externally imposed, top-down social injustices. Earlier in 2011, before the riots occurred, Professor John called for a “peoples’ inquiry” into “Gun and Knife-enabled Murders in the African Community”. Again, the question of language and its brutalization was at the centre of things:

No “black talk”, street language or slang should contain nonchalant sayings like “he was duppied”, meaning that he was shot or stabbed to death; or he “got a wig”, meaning that he was shot in the head. All of that represents a measure of brutality and barbarism that dehumanizes not just the perpetrators but the entire community and society.

Regardless of the fact that public faith in state multiculturalism is much weakened, the British have a major challenge to deal with: to try and “mainstream” a globalized, multi-ethnic underclass, coherent enough to produce a genuine multiculture but largely immobilized in increasingly territorial and socially dysfunctional neighborhoods. Solving the problem of an entrenched and nihilistic youth culture, in particular, is not going to be easy. It will be more difficult still if those responsible for tackling the problem cannot move beyond the dominant political and academic narrative - in which what is not said is usually at least as important as what is - that has it that the sufferings and social pathologies experienced by the underclass are entirely somebody else’s doing. And this would entail, among other things, an end to the condescending pretence that MLE is anything more than a rudimentary and limiting form of street
speech that can do nothing but perpetuate the entrapment of its speakers in their increasingly primitive “endz”.

Conclusion

Though it does not much resemble the imaginings of New Labor’s diversity ideologues, Britain has produced at least one genuine, and largely post-racial, youth multiculture. But how “cosmopolitan” is the milieu from which MLE emerges? Do the violence, nihilism and cultural poverty of this world mean that it can ever be regarded as cosmopolitan in anything other than a minimal sense – if that? Does the deracination of street life in “socially excluded” neighborhoods form the foundation for something more positive and genuinely cosmopolitan further down the line? None of these questions is easy to answer at this time. But one thing is clear – that essentialist, top-down diversity policies cause as much resentment as they remove and have therefore become part of the problem they were designed to solve. The closing down of honest public debate on the cultural politics of race and ethnicity, and the turning of a blind eye to the gradual development of a dysfunctional and frequently murderous youth multiculture – because young people from minority backgrounds have made the running in it – are of a piece. Both have undermined the efforts of mature people of goodwill from all backgrounds to give Britain, little by little, and day by day, a more genuinely open, cosmopolitan character.
NOTES

3 Hall, S. “New Labour has Picked Up Where Thatcherism Left Off”, The Guardian, 06/03/03
8 Gilroy argued in 1990 (ibid, p.250) that the “commonsense ideology of antiracism has also drifted towards a belief in the absolute nature of ethnic categories and a strong sense of the insurmountable cultural and experiential divisions which, it is argued, are a feature of racial difference.”
9 See Gilroy, P. After Empire: Multiculture or Postcolonial Melancholia, Routledge: London and New York, 2004. Gilroy’s account of the “conviviality” that allows people to rub along in their daily interactions is rooted in an understanding of the pragmatic, inter-subjective nature of the social worlds - warts and all - in which many live but that tend to elude the ideologues of diversity. For the fullest account of the inter-subjective social experience see Taylor, C., Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity, Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA, 1992
The “Cantle Report” into the inter-communal disturbances in Oldham in 2001 demonstrated this clearly. It is interesting to note that this important inquiry into what was very serious social disorder has had much less exposure in the public domain than the Macpherson Report, or its forerunner, The Scarman Report. Is this because its findings did not fit comfortably into the simplified schema of wicked institutions and oppressed minorities set out by Macpherson? That is to say that the inquiry found communities ‘leading parallel lives delineated by high levels of segregation in housing and schools, reinforced by differences in language, culture and religion’ (p.4). Institute of Community Cohesion, Challenging Communities to Change Oldham, Coventry University, 2006 http://www.oldham.gov.uk/cantle-review-final-report.pdf


There is not the space here for account of the innumerable logical flaws in and political usages of this concept, which is now a fixed and unarguable orthodoxy in official thinking and language. For a systematic dismantling of its intellectual bases, including its origins in the campaigning rhetoric of the anti-semitic and sometime Marxist revolutionary Stokely Carmichael, see chapter six in Dennis, N., Erdos, G. and Ai-Shahi, A., Racist Murder and Pressure Group Politics, Institute for the Study of Civil Society, London, 2000; for its insertion of paranoia and mistrust into everyday experience see Waterfeld, B., Imposing parallel lives: how the concept of “institutional racism” leads to estrangement, division and confusion’, spikedonline, 22/01/2003; and for its obsolescence in the analysis of the educational under-achievement of black boys see Sewell, T., Generating Genius: Black Boys in Love, Ritual and Schooling, Trentham: London, 2009.


Skidelsky, op. cit., p.6.
Cosmopolitanism and Philosophy in a Cosmopolitan Sense


20 Dennis et al., op. cit., p.148.

21 For contrasting views of this see Marin, M. ‘Labour’s secret scheme to build up multicultural Britain’, The Times, 01/111/09, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/columnists/minette_marrin/article6898174.ece and Travis, A., ‘Former Labour advisor denies immigration plot to undermine right, The Guardian, 26/10/2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/oct/26/labour-immigration-plot-andrew-neather. Even the latter, however, concedes that Neather ‘admitted he had a sense from several discussions at the time that there was a subsidiary purpose to boosting diversity and undermining the right’s opposition to multiculturalism, but (Neather) insisted it was not the main point at issue’.


24 The nature of New Labour’s self-serving engagement with the politics of faith and faith communities, rather than class, is well brought out in Berger et al.’s skepticism about ‘...the wisdom of both elites and their policies regarding what has become known as multi-culturalism. The notion, for example, that specifically Christian festivals offend minorities is widespread – but it is rarely the view of the minorities themselves, who (equally rarely) are asked for their opinion...secular elites make use of faith communities in order to further their own – frequently secular – points of view’. Berger, P., Davie, G. and Fokas, E., Religious America, Secular Europe? A Theme and Variations, Ashgate: Farnham, 2008, p. 65.

25 The first New Labour government drew heavily on the theology of institutional racism in its attempt to discredit the Tories once and for all in this sphere: ‘For New Labour, race represents an opportunity to claim a moral advantage over its opponents. Look at the way Labour
politicians continually accuse their Tory opponents of playing the race card. This accusation might have had some substance in the past, but today the Tories appear too defensive to play any card at all... Rather, today it is the race relations lobby and particularly New Labour that finds it difficult to avoid the temptation of playing the race card. By treating routine conflict as racially motivated, they are racialising everyday life.' Furedi, F., ‘Institutional racism: a new original sin’, *Spiked Online*, 01/05/2001

27 ‘YouGov – public becoming more hostile towards Islam’, ukpollingreport.co.uk/blog/archives/302, 2010
Cosmopolitanism and Philosophy in a Cosmopolitan Sense

37 Roger Hewitt and Les Back each produced invaluable earlier studies, conducted in south London, which attest to the gradual development of what was to become MLE (and the multiculture in which it is embedded):


40 The most widely circulated and controversial of these came from historian Richard Starkey in a televised debate (*Newsnight*, BBC2, 12/08/2011). His account centered on an account of a white underclass that has ‘become black’ in the context of a “violent, destructive and nihilistic gangster culture.” This “blackening” of white youth is most visible, he argued, through the extensive use of a Jamaican patois “intruded” into Britain. These comments drew a firestorm of criticism from liberal commentators and politicians - the leader of the New Labour opposition party, Ed Miliband, asserted that it was “absolutely outrageous” that someone should be making such comments in the 21st century (this statement itself exemplifying, perhaps, the Macpherson Report’s baleful impact what may and may not be said in contemporary Britain). There were numerous calls for Starkey’s head, or at least for sanctions that would affect his prospects of further employment in the media. But while it is undeniable that Starkey was wide of the mark in some respects, and clearly had a very weak grasp the “Jamaican” “patois” he was trying to describe, of he was articulating the concerns of many and was right to draw attention to the dialect being spoken by so many on the street in London – because it matters.
46 John, G., Gun and Knife Enabled Murders in the African Community: The Case for a People’s Inquiry, gusjohn.co.uk, 2011, p.16.
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