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IRINA GENOVA
AZRA HROMADŽIĆ
CHRISTINA JORDANOVA
ALP YÜCEL KAYA
NADEJDA MILADINOVA
ELENA OTEANU
VASSILIS PETSINIS
BLAŽ ŠEME
AGLIKA STEFANOVA

Editor: Irina Vainovski-Mihai

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New Europe College

Str. Plantelor 21

023971 Bucharest

Romania

www.nec.ro; e-mail: nec@nec.ro

tel. (+40-21) 327.00.35; fax (+40-21) 327.07.74



AZRA HROMADŽIĆ

Born in 1976, in Bosnia-Herzegovina

Ph.D. Candidate in Cultural Anthropology, University of Pennsylvania,
Philadelphia, U.S.A.

*Dissertation Emerging Citizens: Youth, Education, and Reconciliation
in Post-conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina*

Dissertation Fellowship for Research Related to Education,
Spencer Foundation (2006-2008)

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Dissertation Writing Fellowship, University of Pennsylvania (2006-2007)

International Dissertation Field Research Fellowship,
Social Science Research Council (2005-2006)

International Fellowship, American Association of the University Women
(2005-2006)

Penfield Scholarship in Diplomacy, International Affairs, and Belles Lettres,
University of Pennsylvania (2005-2006)

Research Fellowship for the Study of the ex-Yugoslav Refugees in New York
City, Center for the Advanced Studies of Sofia (2004-2005)

William Penn Fellowship of Support to Outstanding Incoming Graduate Students, University of Pennsylvania (2002-2005)

Summer Field Research Fellowship for the Study of Women's Identity in Relation to Rape and Ethnic Conflict in Bosnia, Anthropology Department, University of Pennsylvania (2002)

Research Fellowship for the Study of Women's Identity in Relation to Rape and Ethnic Conflict, Solomon Asch Center for Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict, University of Pennsylvania (2001-2002)

Participation in international conferences in Austria, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Check Republic, France, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, USA

Publications in women studies and Balkan studies, participation in projects on education, diaspora, and youth

DISCOURSES OF INTEGRATION AND POLITICS OF REUNIFICATION IN POST-CONFLICT BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: CASE STUDY OF THE GYMNASIUM MOSTAR¹

Introduction

This ethnographic and anthropological study of youth and education in post-conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina (B&H) sets out to explore the following tension: the internationally administrated reconciliation and democratization programs intend to build a reconciled nation and democratic state in B&H, yet they foster the production of ethnically divided and “denationalized” citizens that obstruct the creation of a viable state. In order to get at the lived complexities of this tension, I ask how young people, as designated agents of change in the reconciliation and democratization of B&H, experience the process of state-making in everyday life. An in-depth ethnography utilizing three main anthropological methods (multi-sited participant observation, interviews, and content analysis) in the Gymnasium Mostar will explore this tension and provide detailed knowledge of the special role of education and youth in the everyday processes of reconciliation and democratization in a society disintegrated by violent ethnic conflict.

This study is divided into two main parts. The first part provides a general background including a short historical overview, a brief summary of education in B&H, and a description of the ethnographic settings. In the second part, I use the case of the reunified school to study the insertion of the international discourses of reconciliation, and especially integration, into the post-conflict context of B&H.

PART I: RESEARCH BACKGROUND

I.1. Historical Background

After more than three years of bloody conflict, 200,000 deaths, and the displacing of 1.5 million people as refugees, on December 14 1995 the Dayton Peace Agreement brought an end to the Bosnian war. While claiming to have as its objective reconciliation, democracy, power-sharing, and ethnic pluralism, in the eyes of its critics the Agreement inscribed in law the ethnic partitioning of Bosnian Serbs, Croats, and Muslims (Campbell 1999, Chandler 2000). It divided B&H into two entities: the Federation of B&H, with a 51% share of the territory and inhabited by mostly Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) and Bosnian Croats, and Republic Srpska (RS), with 49% of the territory and populated almost exclusively by Bosnian Serbs. Further, the agreement separated the Federation of B&H (FB&H) into ten ethnically distinct cantons, with little intermixing between the two ethnic groups.

The global politics of reconciliation and democratization provide a blueprint for post-conflict reconstruction projects the world over, including in South Africa, Rwanda, and B&H. Of these, the B&H case is of particular interest due to the extensive involvement of some of the world's most powerful states (USA, Britain, France, Germany, and Russia) and leading international institutions (the International Monetary Fund (IMF), United Nations (UN), Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and NATO) in governing of the country. Accordingly, the "International Community" (IC) in B&H is best described as a "loose coalition of international governmental institutions, national governments and non-governmental organizations that has bound itself to Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Dayton Accords and the period of reconstruction" (World Bank, 1999:2).²

In addition to the post-conflict reconstruction, B&H also faces the multiple challenges of post-socialist transformation. The exit from socialism and "transition" to democracy has been managed differently by each of the former socialist countries in Eastern Europe. In the case of B&H, the "transition" has been transnational because of the central role of the IC in governing the country (Coles 2002, Verdery 1998:293, Paley 2002:13). The ultimate power of government is concentrated in international bodies, such as the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and the NATO-led military Implementation Force (IFOR), which was later renamed the Stabilization Force (SFOR) and finally replaced with

European Union Force in B&H (EUFOR).³ The overall goal of the IC in B&H is to “touch and change the political, social, and economic life of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state and Bosnians as people in such a way that the country and its citizens become modern, democratic, and capitalist with regard for human rights and the rule of law” (Coles 2002:2).

I consider reconciliation and democratization as a set of discourses and policies circulating globally through the aforementioned governing organizations that aim to build a democratic, multiethnic, and modern state in B&H. These discourses and policies of social reconstruction are wrapped in the rhetoric of development, modernization, democratization, equality, and their bourgeois forms of civic sociality. When placed into the B&H context, these universal notions of civic nationalism collide with ethnic political society and its multiple pursuits of security and welfare.⁴ In this study, I will focus on one segment of this collision: the integration of the B&H schools. Reconciliation and democratization programs are shaped by modern policies of international governmentality, in which the integration of schools and youth are among the main tools used in assisting B&H citizens to stitch back together the torn social fabric of their country.

In this study I look at the reunified school and its relationship to the struggle between the civic/integrationist governmentality and ethnic/segregation nationalisms in B&H and the modern world. I argue that the Gymnasium Mostar is an excellent entry point from which to understand the workings of the contested political, cultural, and social efforts involved in the processes of nation building. Besides being a field where the two socialites collide, the reunified school is also a showcase for *transformations*, *borrowings* and *reversals* between the two forms of socialite. For example, in part II, I describe in detail how the minority political community reframed and reversed the rhetoric of civic nationalism and its model of power sharing into the ethnicism and domination of one group (Bosniaks) in order to achieve its goals of political autonomy in its quest for self-preservation.

1.2. Education in B&H Before, During, and After the War

1.2.1. Education and Socialism

The education system in B&H reflects the dreadful consequences of the destruction of the war, the paradoxes of the Dayton Peace Agreement,

and the weaknesses of the B&H Constitution(s). Before the war, education in the former Yugoslavia was inspired by Josip Broz Tito's ideological regime. This education regime was similar to other socialist education regimes that served to promote socialist values and communist ideologies. Tito's government was also unique, however, particularly in terms of its "self-management concept".⁵ This system had many disadvantages and only a few advantages. For example, extreme decentralization slowed down the process of decision-making on educational issues in such a way that decisions could no longer be made efficiently. In addition, the system "recognized competing interests and desires" but also "dissolved them in consultation and collective responsibility" (World Bank, 1999:6). The strengths of the system were also numerous, including participation and knowledge dissemination (World Bank, 1999:7), as well as the elaborate system of adult education that focused on educating the working class. As a result of these efforts, the illiteracy rate decreased progressively, from 44.6 % in 1931 to 24.9 % in 1953 (Zarkovic 1954:511), continuing to fall until Tito's death in 1980.

Overall, education was one of Yugoslavia's most remarkable achievements. Through curricular and extracurricular instruction and rituals it engineered a socialist youth with a degree of a shared Yugoslav identity and emphasized the pride in the country's ability to incorporate diverse linguistic and cultural groups into a multicolored and vibrant Yugoslav nation.

1.2.2. Education and War

During the war, as the country was being torn apart through violence, the educational system became fragmented along ethno-national lines. Almost immediately, education was turned into a tool for the political control and advancement of nationalist ideologies. In a change from the single pre-war system, children and youth began to be educated according to the "tripartite pattern", which was based on the area in which people lived and the ethnicity to which they belonged (Conventions on the Right of the Child, B&H, article 28/247). Soon after the breakout of the conflict, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats adopted their corresponding curricula and textbooks from their neighbors – Serbia and Croatia, respectively, while the Bosniaks continued to use the old Republic of B&H curricula, albeit attempting to introduce the most necessary changes and modifications.

In many parts of the country, attending school during the war was a dangerous activity, since schools in B&H lacked adequate bomb shelters. As a result, schooling was sporadic, *ad hoc*, and frequently took place in the basements of better-protected houses. In some towns teachers would visit different neighborhoods on different nights, giving modified classes. Studying at home was also challenge since basic materials were scarce and there was a lack of basic infrastructure – electricity, water, heating etc.


I was a second-year high-school student (equivalent to 10th grade in the US) in Bihać when the war started. Before the war my classmates had been of all ethnic backgrounds (Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks), all of whom coexisted peacefully in my town and my classroom. One day, in April 1992, I came to school to find many desks empty – all the Serb children had left our town, including my best friend Nataša. Many of my classmates and teachers had moved to the surrounding hills, and literally overnight they became the “enemies” who bombed our hometown for the next three and a half years.

I finished the last two years of my high school education under siege, with the other Bosniak, Croat, and a few Serb children who remained in the town. It was not rare for me to leave the classroom in the middle of a lesson to run home to take shelter, since the building did not offer any protection. With these irregular school conditions, obtaining good grades was not an easy matter. I remember how our teachers encouraged us to continue studying, saying that we could not stop learning “just because of the war.” Some even said they expected us to read and learn harder still, at a time when “the enemy” was trying hard to destroy our schooling and our future. “Your knowledge is the only possession you can take with you if you have to become a refugee,” one of my teachers once told us between the sounds of bombs exploding nearby.

1.2.3. Education and Post-Conflict Social Reconstruction

The Dayton Peace Agreement brought an end to the shelling of school buildings, but it also reinforced the fragmentation and decentralization in education created during the war. This fragmentation was a result of the dominant international approach to post-conflict social reconstruction in which “the need to address inequalities between members of different communities often leads government policy-makers to adopt an education

system that is premised upon segregation” (NICIE 2006:1). In other words, it is widely accepted that the transition from violence to peace depends, at least in part, on guaranteeing communities’ control over their own internal affairs (Hadden and Craig 2000:23). B&H was designed on the basis of these models of segmental autonomy and power-sharing (Lijphart 1977; 1985; 1990; Horowitz 1985, 1990, 1991; Palmer 2005) and emerged from the Dayton Peace Accords as a weak and clumsy state containing three or four tiers of government, “13 parliaments, 13 executive branches, and about 180 ministries and ministers” (Bebler 2006:1). In other words, the state itself had almost no governing powers. The majority of its governing power, including in the matters of education, resided at the level of the two entities. Under the Dayton Accords, education in the FB&H was further delegated to the level of the ten cantons. This fragmentation in education is shown in the following diagram:



Structure of the Education System in B&H. Adopted from the OSCE PowerPoint presentation, *Education Reform in B&H: The Education Reform Process and OSCE’s Co-ordinating Role*, 2005.

The ten cantons in FB&H fall into three groups: the five in which the Bosniaks form the majority population and where the so-called “Federal curriculum” is used, the three Croatian-majority cantons where the “Croat curriculum” is used, and the two “mixed” cantons which are divided between the two curricula (World Bank 1999).

Under the Dayton Peace Agreement, however, education policy-making in RS remained at the level of a single entity. The system of education here is thus highly centralized, with the “Serb curricula” being employed in all schools. This difference between a decentralized educational structure on the Federation side, and the exceedingly centralized structure in RS led to the creation of a complex, bureaucratically expensive, irrational, parallel, astigmatic, and asymmetrical structure (Pasalic-Kreso 2004) and discrimination in education, especially in the “mixed” cantons (World Bank 1999). In addition, the thirteen B&H constitutions barely mention how the thirteen Ministries of Education should effectively design, implement and coordinate educational policies. The result, with the exception of the constitution of RS, is the proliferation of *ad hoc* procedures motivated by political interest (see Pasalic-Kreso 2004).

The IC realized that the political authorities’ opposition to common regulations combined with a lack of basic legal conditions “hampered the development of educational policies in accordance with European standards”⁶ (Schmidtpott and Hermann 2001:107). In order to confront this problem, many international and local experts attempted to draw up bills that would provide new directions for primary and secondary education in B&H. As a result of these initiatives, a sufficient legal framework was established and multiple agreements and laws have been developed (Schmidtpott and Hermann 2001:107). The implementation of these bills and agreements, however, has been slow and beset by obstacles.

During the war, 70 % of all school buildings in B&H were damaged, destroyed, or requisitioned for military use (World Bank 2004). After the war ended, the IC contributed significantly to the reconstruction of B&H schools: in the two short years between 1996 and 1998, various international donors provided \$172 million for the rehabilitation of education in B&H (World Bank 1999:20). In 2000 in the FB&H alone, 239 primary school buildings were constructed or rehabilitated (UNESCO EFA 2000). Donor commitment to the rehabilitation of education in B&H has steadily declined, however: “total commitments for education were

\$110 million in 1995/96, \$49 million in 1997, and \$13 million in 1998” (ibid) and donations have been decreasing ever since.⁷ While the IC has provided much support for the reconstruction of schools since 1995, the reform of education was not high on the list of the IC’s priorities. The main IC political actors involved in education – OHR, OSCE, UNESCO, UNCHR, the Council of Europe, the European Commission, the World Bank, and the USA Embassy/Civitas – only identified reform in education as important where it was instrumental in meeting their other goals – mainly the return of refugees and displaced persons to their original homes (Palmer 2005:60).

While there were no significant efforts by the IC to promote educational reform in B&H in the first years after the war, this changed significantly after 2002 when the OSCE took the lead and linked reform of education to EU accession (Palmer 2005). On the basis of the July 4 2002 mandate from the OSCE permanent Council in Vienna, the OSCE resumed responsibility for the coordination and realization of the IC’s work in the field of education with the overarching goal of making B&H education more inclusive and closer to European standards. Consequently, the IC made the re-integration of ethnically segregated schools and reconciliation among ethnically divided young people the main goals of successful nation building in B&H. Under the plan 54 ethnically divided schools in Bosnia were to be reunified. To date, however, only in Vareš, Žepče, and Mostar (the Gymnasium Mostar) have the two schools merged officially to become one legal body with two components; in all the other cases the two schools have retained their separate legal identities (OSCE 2005:1). However, even the four “integrated” schools maintained separate ethnic curricula for the students of the three majority ethnic groups, thus preserving ethnic segregation. What this means in practice is that ethnically divided youth share the same schools but follow different curricula.

1.3. Ethnographic Setting: Mostar and the Gymnasium

1.3.1. City of Mostar

In July 2005 I set out to begin 16 months of multi-sited ethnographic research (Marcus 1998) in Mostar. I chose Mostar because it is often described as a microcosm of the Bosnian state. With over 100,000 inhabitants, it is the largest city in Herzegovina. During the Tito period,

Mostar, the city famous for its bridge, was a symbol of ethnic integration and coexistence in Yugoslavia. However, its history of mutual respect, heterogeneity, and intermarriage ended in 1992, when Mostar became the scene of one of the bloodiest conflicts of the Bosnian war. The Serb population is now almost completely gone, and Mostar is left with only its Muslim and Croat sides.

In January 2004, Lord Ashdown, the internationally appointed High Representative for B&H, reacted against the slow reunification of Mostar and combined Mostar's six municipalities into a single assembly. Regardless of the city's official reunification, Mostar is still a noticeably divided city. As the most popular B&H tourist destination, Mostar is very appealing when visited for a few days. Everyday life, however, is full of hardships. The tension and the difference between the two sides of the city are still very visible and they create an atmosphere of anxiety and insecurity. The East side, populated almost exclusively by Bosniaks, is poorer, dirtier, and noisier than its western counterpart. Several of my Croat informants as well as some Bosniak informants mentioned that the Bosniak side was filthy and neglected. Some of my Croat informants called it *ciganska strana* ("the Gypsy side") because of the high number of Gypsies that roam its streets. The Croat side, the West side, appears richer and more polished, with its wide and clean streets, and two well-stocked shopping malls. The two sides seem like two different cities, especially given their different urban geographies and economic asymmetries.

1.3.2. Gymnasium Mostar /Old Gymnasium

Of the nine secondary schools in Mostar before the war, all but two schools were located on the present-day Croat side of the city (OSCE 2005). Faced with the new and unexpected homelessness, Bosniak students and teachers established seven temporary secondary schools using the primary schools on the East side of town. This lack of space introduced some logistical problems: the number of school shifts was increased from two to three in most of the schools. For years the IC has tried to convince the Bosniaks in Mostar that they will be able their return to the original buildings, but the return never took place, and more than 2,400 high-school students have been studying in overcrowded and poorly equipped temporary schools for the past 15 years. Croat students,

on the other hand, enjoy the use of all but two high schools in the city (OSCE 2005:3).

Among the first schools to be integrated in Bosnia-Herzegovina was the Gymnasium Mostar, or *Stara Gimnazija* (The Old Gymnasium) as people in Mostar refer to the school. The symbolic importance of this step is immense and it is constantly being discussed in public. In the words of the professor of philosophy at the Gymnasium Mostar and leader of the union of Croat secondary school teachers:

In the year 2000 I got hold of the International Crisis Group report that said "the key to the B&H state's survival is Mostar, and the key to the survival of Mostar is the Gymnasium Mostar". This means that everything revolves around us, the country's future depends on our success... in other words, we are the center of the world.

Although this comment was intended as irony, it still encapsulates the frenzy shaping the discourses surrounding the integration of the school. The school has a very special place in B&H, past and present. The Old Gymnasium is a historical institution and national monument. It was built in 1898 in the Austro-Hungarian orientalist style. The school was one of the most famous and academically prestigious educational institutions in the former Yugoslavia, and possibly the best in B&H. Many famous and primarily male youth revolutionaries, freedom fighters, world-famous artists, academics, and scientists attended this school. Given its illustrious history – and the fact that someone from almost every family in Mostar attended this school – a lot of emotion surfaces in conversations about the school and its future.

The school's importance and symbolism is enhanced by its location in the very center of Mostar, on the West/Croat side of the main boulevard, the one-time front line. In pre-war Mostar, the boulevard was the center of economic, social, and cultural life:

You could not walk for two meters without meeting someone you knew... The whole world was there" (teacher's comment). This image of the boulevard lives on only in the memories of the city's older generation. Today, it is a ghostly strip of land, "a twilight border zone of hostile and uneasy separation between the two halves of the divided city (Wimman 2004:3).

In 1999, when the city was still divided into Croat and Bosniak municipalities, the Croat dominated city council transferred authority over the school to the Croat controlled Cantonal Ministry, which in turn transferred authority to the Croat Municipality South West (OSCE 2005:4). The Croats in Mostar almost immediately set about some small-scale repair work on five different classrooms, renamed the building “Fra Dominik Mandić”, and began teaching 257 students using the Croat curricula and Croat language (OSCE 2005:4). The school became a Croat school:

This school is located in Croat territory. In this area, the war started because nobody knew what belonged to whom. I want this to be a representative Croat school that will train and produce Croat intellectuals. (Josipi Milić, quoted in Wimmen 2004:8).

Meanwhile, the Bosniaks established a temporary high school, the “First Gymnasium”, in the 7th Primary School in an old neighborhood on the East side known as *Mahala* (OSCE 2005:4).

The process of nationalization of the Gymnasium Mostar by the local Croat community should be understood in the context of the Croat imagined community (Anderson 1983), which was shaped by the triad of relations between the emerging B&H state, the Croat national minority, and its external homeland, Croatia.⁸ For the Croats in Mostar, the Croat national community stretched between the Croatian border with Slovenia to the west and the boulevard in Mostar to the east, thus unifying the Croatian homeland with its national minority in B&H. Placed within this political field, the Old Gymnasium is seen as displaced from the center of the formerly united city to the frontline of national space at its southeastern frontier. This renders the school both marginal, in terms of its physical location, and central, in terms of its role in marking and preserving the political/national/ethnic boundaries of belonging. For Croats, the school is one of the “building-blocks, and possibly a linchpin, of a bulwark designed to seal off ‘nationalized territory’” (Wimmen 2004:5).

Some Croat youth described the school as located in the marginal, shady, and dangerous part of the town. This feeling was reinforced by several violent attacks at the school that took place prior to the school's

reunification. These acts included throwing stones at the building, robbery, and one especially violent act by a group of young Bosniaks. After hearing that one of their Bosniak friends had been attacked by a group of Croats in Kantarevac – a sports complex behind the school on the Croat side of the boulevard – these young men quickly formed a group and set off for the school with two pit bulls. After breaking into the school, they entered one classroom where class was in progress and began beating up a number of Croat students and their teacher (author’s interview with one of the attackers). The teachers and students at the school still often recall this event:

A few years ago we had police come in and separate the students. Each side blames the other for the events. I do not know who started it, but from the boulevard there came stones and rocks flying...I do not know if it came from *Mahala*, I don’t know where they came from. For that whole year the police guarded the school, from a car, like a police patrol (teacher’s comment).

For many Croats the incident reinforced the perception of the school as located in the dangerous borderland between the Croat community and the rest of the world. For example, Dinko told me that several of his Croat friends refused to go to a nearby Pizzeria on the East side during the school breaks. However, it is the only such place where they can get a decent snack during the short break. Instead they sometimes pay other Croat students – those who do cross to the other side – to buy them a slice of pizza or a sandwich. These practices of (non)crossing create a unique logic of movement within and around the school best illustrated by the practice of “splitting” at the end of the school day. One day, at around 13:30 in early September 2005, I was waiting at the square in front of the school to observe what happened when the students finished their school day and left the building. Shortly after I heard the school bell announcing the end of the final period, a “mixed” student body, composed of some 300 young people, stormed out of the door. A few meters after leaving by the same door, this intermingled mass of youth started to split into two symmetrical, ethnically separate, snake-like shapes – one marching East, the other going West.

For the IC and a number of citizens of Mostar who refer to themselves as *pravi Mostarci* (“true” Mostar people) and who do not have *podjelu u*

glavi (division in their heads/minds), the Old Gymnasium continues to rank among the most important symbols of pre-war coexistence and post-war social reconstruction in B&H. The difference between *pravi Mostarci* – whose roots lie in the city, and who claim cosmopolitanism as their main character trait – and *dočljaci/dočlje/ovi sto su došli sa strane* – those who moved to the city from the surrounding villages and mountains during and after the war – was mentioned frequently by many of my informants, especially those who claimed to be in favor of integration and coexistence. While talking to these people about the recent bloodshed in Mostar, I noticed how each had a Croat/Bosniak who helped them during the war, often saving their lives or the lives of their family members. In other words, “it was those who came from elsewhere who committed the crimes; ‘true’ Mostar people could never commit such atrocities”. This difference, tension, and even straightforward antagonism between urban/modern/cosmopolitan and rural/backward/nationalist are common throughout B&H. The civic identity favored by the majority of the “true” inhabitants of the cities in B&H “simultaneously reflects nostalgia for the old life and a rejection of the boxes in which people find themselves” (Čorkalo et al. 2005:147).

The emphasis on the school’s role in the process of social reconstruction and reconciliation held a central position in IC rhetoric, as shown in the OSCE 2005 report: “The importance of Gymnasium Mostar as a flagship for multi-ethnic education in B&H cannot be underestimated. The OSCE and the IC must continue to support and nurture this process” (OSCE 2005:6). In the Gymnasium Mostar, the IC saw an opportunity to reintegrate the school and “undo the Croat strategy of separation, to engineer the reunification of the city, and to establish a showcase example of the benefits of cross-communal coexistence and cooperation” (Wimmen 2004:5). However, by framing their project in the language of integration and pluralism, the IC “stumbled into a minefield of Croat national passions” (Wimmen 2004:5). Contested by an unforeseen level of resistance from the Croat political community, the IC had to adjust their visions and language of integration in order to continue to negotiate social reconstruction with the local communities and their diverging agendas.

PART II: DISCOURSES OF INTEGRATION AND SEGREGATION

II.1. Discourses of Integration

II.1.1. The IC's Demands for Integration and the Croat Responses

The first concrete stimulus for the integration of the Gymnasium Mostar came from the USA government, when it offered \$1 million in assistance to the school under the condition that 392 students in the temporary Bosniak Gymnasium be reintegrated (OSCE 2005:3). The Bosniaks accepted this proposal immediately, since they wanted to return to the school and end their forced exile in the primary school in *Mahala*.⁹ The Bosnian Croats, however, initially refused the offer. Eventually, under pressure from the IC, the Croat political representatives started to negotiate different types of integration. The reactions of the local Croat political community bordered on the "hysterical" in claiming that "cultural genocide had been carried out against the Croat people", calling the Croat representatives who agreed to integration "traitors of the nation, if they support the project" and "evoking images of 'new janissaries' being created from Croatian youth" (Wimmen 2004:7). Wimmen (2004) explains this reaction in terms of the behavior of a "trapped minority", a phrase first suggested by the Israeli anthropologist Dan Rabinowitz (1999).¹⁰ Seen through the lens of the trapped minority,¹¹ integration unleashed an unnatural and dangerous fragmentation of the Croat nation (Wimmen 2004:7). Politically speaking, integration was understood as a forced incorporation and assimilation of the Croat population into a seemingly equal power-sharing pluralist B&H state, which, for most Croats, is experienced as one of Bosniak hegemony.

The stance articulated by the Croat "trapped minority" arose within the dynamic field of various intersecting and often conflicting positions. On the one side was the IC, with a clear mandate, agreed in Dayton, to challenge the ethnic segregation and segmental autonomy itself given to the ethnic political communities by Dayton. On the other side were the discourses infiltrating from neighboring Croatia and Serbia that challenged the IC's approaches.

The overarching position of the Croat national minority, which emerged as a reaction to the aforementioned political stance of the IC, stressed that B&H and FB&H were political arenas for the ethnic dominance of the Bosniaks. This ethnocracy had been hidden, they claimed, behind

the language of the liberal politics of power-sharing and coexistence. This apparently democratic process of integration was threatening the segmental autonomy of the Croats in B&H:

As Robert Hayden (199, 79) rightly observes, “the rhetoric of democracy that adorns the state defined by constitutional nationalism can be used to deligitimize minority protests to the majority community. If all are putatively equal, even if actually unequal, resistance to institutionalized inequality can be represented as hostility to the dominant (ethnic) nation and not to the constitutional nationalist state”. But as the example of Mostar serves to show, this observation can also be turned around: imputed inequalities can be used to delegitimize a democratic state as governed by an ethnic group through a system of constitutional nationalism, to represent the workings of its institution as hostile by the dominant (ethnic) nation, and to justify minority resistance in the language of human rights...(Wimmen 2004:5)

What Wimmen’s discussion reveals is the process by which the self-perceived political minority encumbered with ethnonationalist sentiments of a “trapped minority” turns civic society and democratic postulates “inside-out” so that they appear as ethnic, primordial, and ascribed nationalisms (i.e. the domination of the Bosniaks). At the same time, the national minority appropriates and revives the language of democracy and minority rights in order to resist integration into a state based on the principles of power-sharing and ethnic pluralism which they do not trust. It is important to stress that the politics of the Croat ethnic community, and for that matter also other popular ethnic politics in B&H, was a politics of modern nationalism, and not of a primordial nature. Many great thinkers in the past have addressed the tensions between “new states and old societies” (Geertz 1963), which emphasize the modern-day conflict between the universal ideas of civic nationalism on the one hand, and the popular ethnic politics on the other (Anderson 1998, Urban 2002). What is missing in existing analyses, however, are illustrations of transformations, reversals, and borrowings within and between the two forms of nationalism. What the example of the Croat resistance to integration into a pluralistic democratic society shows is how popular ethnic politics can take the form of *modern* and *contingent* nationalism (Brubaker 1996), something not properly understood within the old frameworks of pre-modern communities, primordial belonging, and tribal politics.

The example I use in this paper shows how the Croat ethnic minority became suspicious of liberal forms of integration and citizenship, which they saw as “ideological masks for substantively nationalizing and ethnocratic forms of rule, as assuring the cultural predominance and political autonomy of the dominant nation” (Brubaker 1996:50) – in this case the Bosniaks. In the politics of mistrust, liberalism and ethnic pluralism become facades for ethnocracy, in other words for a Bosnification or even Turkification of the state. There are many cases that illustrate the workings and consequences of this reversal. For instance, the fact that less than 40% of Croats in Mostar have visited the Old Bridge since its reconstruction in 2004 is the cause of much confusion among much of the IC, which sees the Old Bridge as a symbol *par excellence* of post-conflict reconciliation. However, this makes perfect sense if one accepts that, in the eyes of the Croat political community, this “symbol of reconciliation and integration” is construed as a “Turkish bridge”, signifying the dominance of the past Ottoman and the present-day Bosniak social and political formations:

I: Have you seen the new Old Bridge?

Mia (Croat university student): All this discussion about the bridge! It is ridiculous how much money *they* spent on it, the money that went into nothing, at times when people need jobs. To me, it was a day like any other – only the police presence and the fireworks showed that something was happening. I have no feelings for the bridge because I was nine when the war started and I do not remember the bridge from before. And I really do not like how they had a Turkish band marching all over the city.

As Croat fury about the integration of the school continued to grow, it became obvious that the IC had not fully realized the importance of the Gymnasium Mostar for the Croat community. The messages sent by the IC – such as “integration does not mean assimilation”¹² – did not convince the Croat population. In addition, the IC’s vague definition for the integration of schools enabled manipulation of the term and its meanings.

II.1.2. The “Integrated School” Concept

“An integrated school” is an educational concept with a long history in conflict-ridden societies; it is most frequently associated with Northern Ireland, and more recently Israel.¹³ It is one of a whole range of attempts

made to bridge the divides between Protestant and Catholic children in Northern Ireland, and Palestinian and Israeli children in Israel. Although Northern Ireland has been nurturing 58 integrated schools since 1981, the meaning of integration has remained ambiguous for a long time (see Dunn 1989) and still means different things in different schools (Gallagher, personal communication).

The IC in B&H considered integrated education as a norm that would bring about political and educational improvement, something that is clear from the IC's numerous declarations – e.g. “without integration you will never become part of Europe” (Keiffer quoted in Farrell 2001:17). In addition, discourses of integration produced by the IC in Mostar were initially unclear. The OSCE education officer in charge of integration explains:

We had an idea – we wanted Bosniaks back in schools, and we wanted to see them [Croat and Bosniak students] in the same classes. Initially, the OSCE was pushing for integration. And frankly, there is absolutely no reason why they should not be together. [However,] We did not succeed in fully integrating the Gymnasium Mostar. Despite our constant repetitions to the locals that it is much more complicated and expensive to work separately and stay segregated, it did not work... We made a mistake because at the beginning of our “campaign” for the integration of the Gymnasium Mostar, we talked so much about the “common curricula” for non-national subjects. That integration was understood as a conflict of Croat national interests.

The quotation above shows how the discourse of integration produced by the OSCE had two main components: the return of Bosniaks to the building and the integration of classrooms and curricula. It is the latter that spread panic among the Croat community. Understood from the standpoint of the Croat political community, the “integrated classroom” agenda contained many dangers for the Croat people, such as blurring the boundaries of the Croat imagined community or, worse still, assimilation into the “Bosniak state”. This political agenda of boundary-maintenance and self-preservation through segregation, however, was framed in the public sphere in terms of the fear of obliteration of the Croat language, the essence of Croat peoplehood.

The integration of classes, as envisioned by the OSCE, meant that students of both ethnic groups would together attend “shared subjects”

deemed less controversial. These included psychology, philosophy, sociology, biology, chemistry, mathematics, physics, art, and sports education. The instruction of “national group” subjects, including language, geography, literature, musical education, and history, however, were to remain separate. While this idea seemed to accord with the existing education bills that promoted inclusive, democratic, non-discriminatory education that was open to all, the OSCE leadership initially failed to understand what integrated classes meant for the Croat community. While the Croat national minority accepted that Bosniak students would most probably return to the school, the boundary between *Us* and *Them* in the school had to be maintained in order to protect political boundaries and the essence of the Croat nation. In order to justify its position, the Croat leadership used the language of the Dayton accords, which guaranteed the control of ethnic groups over their internal affairs, including education. In addition, the Croat principal of the school used the example of other European countries which lack complete integration:

The OSCE and I understand each other well. Eventually, they understood why we need two curricula, for two constituent peoples. It took them some time, but they get it now. The International Community constantly complains that “they [the students] are not together.” Well, other Europeans are not [together] either! Look at Switzerland, what about them...is that not a problem?The IC wants to impose their ideologies on us but they do not understand the situation on the ground, among the people.

The Croats in Mostar also stressed the parts of the B&H constitution that legitimize the ideas of political belonging based on ethnic membership. The constitution grants rights to the constitutional peoples to protect their community’s rights, including the education of Croat youth using Croat curricula, in Croat classrooms, and especially in the Croat language. It is the language of instruction that became the battleground between the sociopolitical forces of integration and the practices of segregation.

II.1.3. Discourses of Croat Language, Integration, and Segregation

In education and in current linguistic practice there are three official languages in use in B&H: Croat, Serb, and Bosnian. The standard language in B&H during the pre-war period was Serbo-Croatian, or Croato-Serbian.

This language in its practice, grammar, and orthography respected two language variants: the eastern and the western (Conventions on the Right of the Child, B&H, article 28/252). Since the start of the war, political leaders and many lay people on all three sides insisted they speak three different languages, a claim constitutionally acknowledged in Dayton (Farrell 2001:5).

Regardless of the political motivations behind the resistance to integration, it was the Croat language that emerged as the key marker of Croat identity and the social glue that held together all Croats in the region. Seen from these two perspectives, survival of the language meant the Croat's survival as a people. Furthermore, education became an especially sensitive issue for the Croats – it is the main vessel for transmitting the Croat language and culture to the new generation. Having students of the two ethnic groups in the same classroom, taught by both Bosniak and Croat teachers, in the Bosnian and Croatian languages, was therefore unacceptable to the Croats (Farrell 2001:8).

This integrationist model could lead to a “mixing” of languages, which is seen as a dangerous first step on the road to national destruction. Mixing of languages is especially forbidden in the context of ethnic segregation, protectionism, and national purity. For most Croats, the “mixed” Serbo-Croat language symbolizes the legacy of the Serb hegemony in the former Yugoslavia.¹⁴ Croat language policy since 1991 thus attempted to keep the language “pure”, cleansed of Orientalisms, Serbisms, and other linguistic impurities.¹⁵ The Croat language, in this framework, was elevated to the throne of Croat peoplehood and its very existence as *narod* (a people). The former principal of the Gymnasium Mostar explains:

The IC forced, I don't want to say violently, but still pushed for full integration...and the local political parties that were in power – they also pushed for this, because of their own interests. But the IC did not understand the complexity of the situation for the Croats. The problem [of integration] becomes most obvious when we talk about language. Our local languages are similar in some ways, but they are mostly different. And *narod* without language is not *narod* at all. Which language would students listen to at school? Parents fear that the Croat language will be destroyed... this is bigger than politics; it's about society and about culture.

In February 2006, I met the head of the Croat Institute of Education (*Zavod za Čkolstvo*), the agency in charge of developing curricula,

creating standards, and evaluating the quality of education in five Cantons with a significant Croat population in B&H. Before we began the interview, he asked me not to record or take notes of his answers. The reason for this became clear when we started talking about language as a barrier in the development of the “common curricula” and integrated classrooms. After leaving his office, I quickly made notes of the interview, a paraphrased version of which appears below:

M: You see... I don't want you to record or write down what I say because, in that case... I would have to cleanse my speech... because if you cite me later, it has to be clean... You and I are now talking *mješanac* (mixed language) so that we can understand each other. We have to recognize the fact that both of us were educated under the old system, in the old language, Serbo-Croatian, or Croato-Serbian. That is how we learned. But that was an artificial language, neither Serb nor Croat. If one were to write an essay in that language today, it would be illiterate...you know, language is a very intimate thing...We are speaking *mješanac* now, but the children today, they'd have problems, they wouldn't understand each other. Go to Split [harbor in Croatia] today and you will not understand much. It's a different syntax they use! And if you teach these kids a little bit in this language, a little bit in that language.... A little bit this way, little bit that way... use some of these words, and then some of the others... these kids would be illiterate, because they wouldn't speak any language, but a mixture of languages... and that is not OK because that means illiteracy.

I: But... speaking this *mješanac*, as you call it, twenty years ago, was a pre-requisite for literacy!

M: That's true, but that artificial country and its artificial language collapsed, violently. That means it was no good. Maybe in the future we will look for new versions, with new types of integration, but for the time being, whoever speaks *mješanac* is illiterate.

I: But language...

M (red in the face, voice rising): Please, do not speak about language any more... language is sacred... it's intimate. Let's not take it so easily.

I have provided this lengthy transcription of the interview I conducted with one of the most powerful people in education in the Croat community in order to demonstrate what is at stake. For the Croat community, integrated classrooms meant the exposure of Croat students to the Bosnian language, which, to many, is very similar to the Serbo-Croat language of the past – where the language of the past was one of Serb hegemony, today's is of Bosniak hegemony. The purity of the Croat language was to

be protected from “mixing” by any means, since it is at the border between the Croat, Serb, and Bosnian languages that the political, social, cultural, and economic boundaries between *US* and *Them* are disputed, designed, sealed, and guarded.

The Croatian leadership used the community/minority rights discourse to claim their right to preserve Croatian language instruction in schools. This automatically led to protectionism and the politics of segregation for the Croat language/people from Bosnian language speakers, even though the two languages are mutually understandable. The president of the School Board of Gymnasium Mostar captured this linguistic tension well when he said:

Language is a medium of communication, not of isolation. We all have a right to speak our own language – that is only democratic. But if I have a right to use my language, does it mean that only Bosnian words can enter my ear? That is what the other side is asking for.... If the other side uses democratic rhetoric to ask to hear only the Croat language, then I lose my democratic right to speak my language, you see? So you cannot ask that.... that only one language can enter your students’ ears because other languages will contaminate your language – you have to be more inclusive... because in that case M. [OSCE], when he comes to visit the school, would have to speak in the Croatian language... see what I mean... you see, one of our most famous authors said that we, the people in B&H are unique in Europe because by being born in this country we have passive knowledge of three languages – which one I speak is my choice.

The political stance that framed exposure to local languages other than Croatian as a threat to national identity became embedded in many Croat youths’ vision of school and life. The following two examples show different aspects in which this ideology of ethnicity through language policy operates among youth. The first example comes from part of an interview I conducted with a young male Croat student called Ivan at the Gymnasium Mostar. He constantly expressed his Croat nationalism but at the same time had quite a few Bosniak friends at the school. He established some of these friendships during a joint trip to the USA.¹⁶

You know what, to me... this is not segregation... like “you will never accept each other if you do not sit classes together”. Absolutely not! I have mine, and Lejla [friend and Bosniak student next door] has her classes, and we can go for coffee afterwards. And we can be in the Student Council

together, and during the break. But simply, I mean.... I'm very happy that I'm a Croat, and that I study the Croat language, and that I study history from the Croat point of view... and I love some words like *toèno* ("exactly" in Croatian) and I do not know, I am so happy about it.

This student's comments encapsulate the multiple attitudes I heard among Croat teachers and students. He stressed his right, his wish, and his need to have his classroom instruction only in the Croat language. That is why the proposal to have joint classes, in which the teachers would be obliged to use Croat and Bosnian variants, was not acceptable to them. This right – the right to hold classes exclusively in the Croat language – created multiple boundaries between Ivan and the others who did not "speak" his language, including his friends Lejla, Alma, and Aida.¹⁷ Consequently, this right defined new, post-conflict parameters of social distance which were necessary for the purity of language and political society to survive. This new form of social distance is clearly reflected in the new geography of the reunited school as well. Interestingly, informal activities, such as smoking in the toilets during breaks between classes or after school, seemed to pose less of a threat to this particular Croat student. This is because these activities are all informal, and the slang used by youth is separate from the official register used in classrooms, at conferences, or in professional environments. Similarly, in their study of social reconstruction in Vukovar, Prijedor and Mostar, Ćorkalo *et al.* (2005:152) conclude:

Social reconstruction is not a linear process. While being significantly improved in some aspect of the social world, in others the "social tissue" or social network can be remarkably weaker or even non-existent. For example, an improvement in business or work relations between members of different ethnic groups may not necessarily be present in private, social encounters.

The next example demonstrates the shrinking space for "bilingual" interaction caused by the fear of language contamination than can lead to personal failure. In this short excerpt from my field notes of September 10 2005 I illustrate the narrowing of the shared social space. During that weekend, I spent many hours documenting the interaction between student council representatives from the largely segregated small town of Vitez in central Bosnia. These students were attending a workshop at the

Gymnasium Mostar. In their own school building in Vitez there were two schools that shared the same building but nothing else. By bringing Vitez students together at the Gymnasium Mostar, the OSCE was hoping to achieve two goals. The first goal was to introduce students to each other so that they could recognize how much they have in common. The second goal was to expose the students to the unusually prosperous (thanks to IC donations) and newly renovated, well furnished, well-equipped, reunited Gymnasium Mostar, which achieved this prosperity upon its reunification.

I walk into the student lounge. It is quiet, colorful, spacious, and nicely lit. The OSCE employee in charge of the workshop is not there yet. While we wait for him to come back from lunch, the students lean back in their chairs, arranged in a semi-circle, and start talking:

X (Bosniak): You see how they [Gymnasium Mostar] can cooperate and have one roof, one school. Look at this fancy student lounge they got!

A (Bosniak): That is what I have been saying all this time, we need one joint Student

Council, not two... we need to unite.

Y (Croat): That will never happen with us.

X: Yes it will, why not?

A (quietly): Not if it continues like this.

Z (Croat): How would we do it, with two different languages?

D (Bosniak, raising his voice): Is it really important which language it will be? I speak now and you understand me, we all understand each other! That is all that matters.

M (Croat): Well it is important to me. I do understand you and it is OK for this kind of thing, ... but if I spend time with you and I hear your words, and if I use those words in my exam at the University of Zagreb, I will fail!

Silence.

In this case, the idea of integration is interpreted as a road to personal failure in the demonstration of "Croatness" in the capital of the imagined national community, Zagreb. Because the majority of young Croats from B&H tend to study in Croatia, they feel pressure to prove they are "true" Croats, and one way to do so is by speaking perfect Croatian. This is accentuated by the fact that the "true" Croats in Croatia tend to dislike the Croats from Herzegovina due to their supposedly backward ways and their wealth (Wimman 2003, Loverenović 2002). In order to be a perfect Croat, one has to keep one's language free from other local language variations. This can only be ensured if the teachers speak Croatian and if all books are in Croatian. On several occasions I witnessed students

correcting their teachers mercilessly where “Bosnian/Serb” words slipped into their speech. The following Bosniak teacher, who teaches the Croat curriculum, was a frequent target of such corrections:

A student came up to my desk and said, “Why did you underline this word professor?” pointing to a part of the homework I had just returned to him. I said, “because it is not *tačno* [Bosnian version of ‘correct’], son”. Then I heard someone in the last row say *točno* [Croat version]. And I said, “You know what, if you write this *tačno*, it will be *točno*!

...Another time, I think it was '93, I was in class and I said *sedmica* [Bosnian for “week”] and someone immediately shouted *tjedan* [Croat version]. I got up and wrote on the blackboard: *tjedan=sedmica=nedjelja*[Serb version]=*hefta* [Bosnian, colloquial]. As I wrote *hefta*, they cried, “Oooooo!” I said, “Yes, yes, *hefta* means seven in Greek. The more languages we know, the more we are worth, right? They responded, “Right.”

She looks at me, sighs, and says: “You have to make it funny, so that you don’t get overwhelmed with sadness and start crying right there, among them.” This Bosniak teacher, in order to avoid humiliation at the hands of the students or punishment by the Croat educational authorities, had to “sit down and learn those 20 main Croat words, such as *tisuća, kolodvor, tjedan*, etc.” (Author interview with the teacher).

Teachers of the Croat language were also under considerable pressure. A Croat teacher described the challenges she faced when teaching the Croat language in an ethnically segregated society:

I had to study it [Croatian] myself, even though I knew the two variants of the language from before, there were always alternatives offered to us at the University of Sarajevo. We studied both Serbo-Croatian, and Croato-Serbian. Maybe I used more Serb variants in the past, but luckily, after the changes, I was able to learn all the new vocabulary quickly, maybe because I have a talent for language. But I have to prepare more now, and I have to learn as I go. Now, I always double-check everything to make sure I know all the new grammatical terms. I spend more time on language now, and less on literature. In the past I did much more literature... Once I was in a very uncomfortable situation: I had just begun teaching Croatian Language at the Gymnasium Mostar, and we were reading Meša Selimović [a world-famous Bosniak author] and one student walked out of class and said he didn’t want to read this author. I felt terrible. I didn’t know how to

react. I stayed calm, and after the class I went to the staff room and told my colleagues what had happened. They didn't react at all.

These examples demonstrate how language emerged as a tool of political and social boundary-making between the two communities, and how teachers had to develop unique ways to cope with the situation in shifting classroom environments. In short, education was critical to the perpetuation of the Croat language and Croat culture, and the integration of the school threatened this process. Consequently, a reunified school became a salient political issue and a contested space of multiple opposing stances.

II.1.4. From Integration to Reunification

The IC approached the Gymnasium Mostar as a showcase for post-conflict reconciliation that favored integration as a form of social reconstruction. This approach stressed the need not only to protect communities in order to manage conflict, but also to reconcile them in order to ensure that conflict does not recur. This kind of policy favors the adoption of an education system that promotes integration (NICIE 2006). The OSCE, however, initially misunderstood the depth of the integration issue for the Bosnian Croats: the IC's first approach to the problem of the resistance of the Croats was to see it as a political issue that could be resolved by pressuring the nationalist parties in power, especially the Croat Democratic Community (HDZ). However, when challenged by the "hysterical" reaction of the Croat political community, the OSCE and the IC in general understood that the issue was much deeper; in other words, they understood that "it was a social issue" (Author interview with the Education Officer, OSCE). This new understanding facilitated a shift in the integrationist discourse of the IC. The IC employees working in and around the Gymnasium Mostar learned not to use the term "integration" when dealing with local subjects. An international volunteer from the United World College working at the Gymnasium Mostar explains:

I would like to be involved in helping to create joint extracurricular activities at the school, because this is our [United World Colleges] mission as well—integration! It is integration that we want... we always talk amongst ourselves about integrated students and integrated classes at the

Gymnasium. But integration is a rude word out here. When we talk about our project and mission with the local students and teachers, we explain it without using that word because we feel the people won't react well to it. We avoid the word 'integration', as if it were some terrible disease.

Similarly, the OSCE education field office shifted its focus from integration to other concepts, such as reunification and the return of Bosniaks. I asked the OSCE Education Officer in Mostar about the shift in the discourse of integration:

I: When do you use word 'integration' in your work?

M.: We tend not to use 'integration'... not any more... actually we use it when we present the project to the IC, to the donor community, but in the local context and when talking to local officials we use 'unification' of the two schools. We just avoid the term 'integration' – it has too much baggage. And as soon as you mention the word... I mean, it could be the integration of the curriculum, or the integration of classrooms, I mean ... it's too much, it's too open ended. We say 'unification'. I would even say that we usually say 'administrative unification'. I think it's much more specific and doesn't allow for manipulation and misunderstanding of the term.

When faced with the response of the national minority, which used the politics of minority rights to support its quest for segmental autonomy and self-preservation, the liberal discourse of integration was transformed into the policy of "administrative unification." Administrative unification discourse retained the "return of Bosniaks" component of the formal integrationist discourse but dropped the "common curriculum" and "integrated classroom" ambitions. The IC had learned that it had to listen far more attentively to the local political communities:

What we have learned is that this is a social problem... it is like the Gymnasium Mostar, you cannot be so out of step with the people's attitudes... you have to stay in step with the attitudes of the people. You can be slightly, maybe one step ahead, but you cannot be two steps ahead. And that is what we tried to do. It is a broader social issue with the Croats feeling so insecure regarding their status in B&H... Maybe, if there is a constitutional reform that would get them more representation at the state level, and if there are structures that would make them feel more secure about their place in B&H, maybe then, only then can we make further progress (OSCE Education Officer).

This quotation hints at the limits of education in resolving the wider social problems while at the same time showing the close link between education and its socio-cultural, political, and economic contexts. It also accords with the results of the research into integrated education in Northern Ireland, which shows that:

In the absence of inter-communal trust or of movement forward from sectarian politics, the majority parents opt for single-identity schooling for their children. To prescribe integrated education in such a situation, besides overriding a right of parents which is recognized in international law, risks being counterproductive. The promotion of integrated education, as an option, can contribute to social cohesion but cannot, whether through being mandated or as an option, compensate for lack of progress towards political structures which accommodate diversity (Farrell 2001:17).

After several years of heated negotiations, shifts of discourses, demonstrations, petitions, and the investment of large sums of money in reconstruction, the school was finally reunited on an administrative level in February of 2004. In September of the same year, and for the first time since 1991, Bosniak and Croat students began attending the same school (OSCE 2005:5). The two schools became one administratively unified school but with separate instruction in national subjects (Wimmen 2003:3). In practice this means that reunification has maintained separate national curricula for the students of the two ethnic groups, thus preserving ethnic segregation through unification.¹⁸

Conclusion

In this paper I have argued that the “failure” of the IC to fully integrate the Gymnasium Mostar has to be understood in terms of the contested space of the IC’s quest for integration and the national minority’s search for segmental but legitimate autonomy. The Croat political community, through segregation, used education to achieve protection for its community, language, and culture. The IC, when challenged by the rage and resistance of the local ethnic community in claiming its right to segmental autonomy, was forced to modify its rhetoric of integration by shifting to a rhetoric of “reunification” of the school. This collision, reversal, and transformation led to the development of a new educational

phenomenon in B&H: an administratively unified school with two separate curricula. The school now has unified management, while preserving ethnic segregation and the ethos of segmental autonomy. This materialization of a new type of school and youth that is concurrently “shared” and “separated” created a new type of school geography in B&H, one based on the ideology of ethnic symmetry (Bekerman 2002) and ethnic polarization with limited “mixing” among the youth of different ethnic backgrounds.

NOTES

- 1 I gratefully acknowledge the help of Helen Cunningham with regards to various parts and versions of this paper.
- 2 There is another sense in which the phrase "International Community" functions in B&H, however. "International Community" exists also as a metaphor that indexes a powerful, imagined, desired, fantastic, and ambiguous force that can be captured by the term "empire". The feeling of being at the mercy of the empire creates a sense among the local population that the "International Community" is there primarily to serve its own interests, even when attempting to help the local population. In other words, Bosnians see this as a new form of a colonial relationship, suitable for the Global Age.
- 3 The position of the High Representative was created under the General Framework Agreement for Peace in B&H, and the mission of the High Representative, who is also European Union's Special representative, is to "work with the people of B&H and the IC to ensure that Bosnia and Herzegovina is a peaceful, viable state on course to European Integration" (<http://www.ohr.int>). It is important that in addition to the coordination and monitoring, the High Representative "is the final authority in the political theatre of B&H, while it has no authority over the military operations in the country which are under the control of multinational military Implementation Force" (see Article X, Dayton Peace Agreement).
- 4 For an explanation of "civic" vs. "political" forms of sociality see Chattarjee 2004:37. For an ethnographic study of these processes, see Lukose 2005a:508.
- 5 Since the early 1950s implementation of this concept attempted to avoid Stalinist bureaucratization of power, retain communist hegemony, and empower the workers (World Bank, 1999:5). This concept of government was also applied to education, beginning in 1951 (*ibid.*). This resulted in a complex education scheme, which was based on decentralization, but, paradoxically, in practice often returned to centralization.
- 6 For a good discussion on the ambiguous nature of the phrase "European standards" and the discrepancy between international policy and practice in B&H regarding inter-ethnic education, see Farrell 2001:11-14.
- 7 In March of 2006 I contacted the OSCE offices in Mostar and Sarajevo to find out the total amount of the financial contribution that was directed to the rehabilitation of B&H education since the end of the war. Both offices reassured me that no one could give me the exact numbers.
- 8 For an inspiring analysis of the workings of the triadic relationship between 'nationalizing states', 'national minorities', and their 'external national homelands', see Brubaker 1996.

- ⁹ Generally speaking, Bosniaks almost always agreed on the IC's pro-integrationist policies in FB&H where they represent a clear majority (roughly 70 %), but their politics shifted in situations when their numeric dominance was questioned by integration (see Wimmen 2003:5-6).
- ¹⁰ For an extensive discussion of the "trapped minorities" phenomenon, see Rabinowitz 1999. For a discussion of the Croat minority in B&H see Lovrenovic 2002, and for an analysis of the Croat community in Mostar see Wimmen 2004.
- ¹¹ In the FB&H, the Croats politically speaking are not a minority because they are one of the two constituent peoples. Numerically, however, they represent roughly 30% of the total population, and comprise about 15% of the total population of the country.
- ¹² Dr. Falk Pingel, Head of OSCE Department of Education.
- ¹³ For integrated schools in N. Ireland see Moody and Becket 1959; DENI 1988; Murray 1985; Dunn 1989; Gallagher, Smith, and Montgomery 2003; Smith, 2001, 2003; Montgomery *et al.*, 2003, McGlynn 2003, Gallagher 2002, 2003. For studies that focus on bilingual education in Israel see Bekerman 2002, 2005b and Feuerverger 2001.
- ¹⁴ I was often told by Croat education leaders, including the head of the Croat Institute of Education, that the Bosnian language is in face only the old Serbo-Croat language with a few extra Turkish words added to its vocabulary.
- ¹⁵ For the importance of language in the case of Mostar, see Wimmen (2004).
- ¹⁶ One of his Bosniak friends told me how she liked him, but his need to stress everything Croatian annoyed her: "I do not understand him. When we went on the school trip to the USA together, one day our hosts took all the Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs to a cave... There is a part of the cave where you are allowed to write on the walls. We all wanted to leave, but Ivan would not leave until he wrote his comment on the cave walls. When he turned back, we saw he had written CROATIA in capital letters. Come on! We were all there together because we were from B&H, we came to the USA to meet and learn about each other, and now on the walls in the USA he writes Croatia. I just don't get it!"
- ¹⁷ This excludes those who are not Croatian but who want to be educated in the Croatian language. There were four non-Croat students in "my" Croatian class who fit this category.
- ¹⁸ This type of school is not unique to B&H. Similar schools exist in Scotland where they are known as "shared schools" (Tony Gallagher, personal communication). In addition, a new direction in education policies in Northern Ireland argues in favor of seeing education as a continuum from segregation to integration, with several possibilities in between, including shared schools and the federation principle school (David Russell, personal communication).

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