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RIGHT-WING IDEOLOGY AND THE INTELLECTUALS IN ROMANIA DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR

The association of Romanian intellectuals with the ideology of the extreme right has been a subject of ongoing debate in historiography. Authors from different academic fields have tried to analyze the reasons for the “strange” engagement of some of the most prominent representatives of the brilliant Romanian “new generation” of the 1930s with the Romanian authentic fascist movement, the Iron Guard. Additional acuteness is brought to the debate by the fact that some of the “Guardist” intellectuals, such as Mircea Eliade and Emil Cioran, later received worldwide popularity. But scholarly interest is somehow restricted to the interwar period only and almost no attention is paid to this relationship in the immediate period that followed. In a comparatively recent overview of Romanian historiography on the Second World War, the American historian Kurt Treptow emphasizes that

while some issues such as the Holocaust, the Antonescu regime and the post-1944 communist takeover had become the focal points of increasing interest and debate, others among which internal social, cultural, or economic development have barely been pursued.¹

This article is an attempt to examine the legacy of the interwar pro-German sympathies and extreme right association of Romanian intellectuals in the wartime years when the country was an ally and satellite of Nazi Germany. It will focus on the impact of the ideas behind Hitler’s National Socialism on Romanian society and, in particular, on its intellectuals, with the aim of analyzing the extent of their receptiveness towards and motives for support of the Nazi ideology. Thus, in a way, I will be tracing the development of a process, though, at the same time, it will be in a completely new situation, as the war itself changed the whole perspective. It naturally linked the analysis of the

right-wing ideological orientation of Romanian intellectuals to a more general reflection on the human condition and the state of culture in a time of war. Therefore, the investigation of the issue can only proceed after examining the specific historical context of time and while paying attention to the condition of the intellectual within the constraints imposed by the extreme situation.

In the aftermath of the First World War, Romania joined the “anti-revisionist” camp, and in the interwar period, it strictly followed a policy of preserving the status quo. This meant alliance with the countries supporting it, in particular, France and Britain. Starting with the latter half of the 1930s, Romania increasingly found itself within Germany’s economic and political orbit. Although Romanian politicians at the beginning of the war opted for a policy of neutrality, by the summer of 1940 an alliance with Germany had become inevitable. However, it was the Soviet ultimatum of 26 June 1940, demanding that Romania cede Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina, which actually brought Romanian neutrality to an end. In this grave situation, in which Romania could no longer rely on its traditional allies, alliance with Germany seemed the only alternative. The monarch of Romania, King Carol II, made desperate last-ditch efforts to adapt to the situation and win German support. They all proved futile, however, and the Soviet ultimatum marked what was just the beginning of probably the most humiliating period in Romanian history, when, in the course of two months, it surrendered one third of its territory and population without firing a single shot.²

The great territorial losses of the summer of 1940 had a grave impact on Romanian society as a whole and resulted in the widespread feeling of humiliation, despair and desire to take revenge. Return of the lost provinces became Romania’s primary national aim and the main preoccupation of society. Small wonder, that the government decision to join the military campaign against the Soviet Union the following summer received the enthusiastic support of the majority of the population. The signing of the Vienna Diktat had also direct consequences for internal political life. It put an end to King Carol’s rule, who abdicated in favor of his 19-year-old son Michael, and led to the accession of General Antonescu as the only alternative, “the strong man who could save the country”.³

Solidarity with Germany was now considered to be the key in solving the Romanian national question. To this end, the new government formed by Antonescu in September 1940 took immediate steps to drive Romania closer to Germany. In October 1940, the first German troops arrived in

Bucharest In November 1940, Romania signed up to adherence to the Tripartite pact. This was followed one month later by an economic treaty, which geared the Romanian economy to the German war effort. More far-reaching anti-Semitic measures were put into practice, with the amount of anti-Semitic legislation and propaganda increasing steadily in the following years.⁴ On 22 June 1941, just a few hours after Germany had begun its invasion of the Soviet Union, General Antonescu proclaimed that Romania, side by side with Germany, was starting “a holy war” against Bolshevism in order to regain Bessarabia and Bucovina.⁵ Although within a month from the beginning of hostilities, the primary Romanian military objectives in the East – the liberation of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina – had been achieved, Romanian troops pressed on, crossing the river Dniester, and soon established a new province (Transnistria) with the city of Odessa as its center. At the same time, General Antonescu (who became “Marshal” from August 1941 onwards) had never given up on the idea of regaining Transylvania and remained convinced that the bigger the Romanian military effort and the closer the cooperation with Germany, the more likely it was that it would indeed be regained. For a long time Romania was considered a close partner of Germany and Antonescu one of the leaders most trusted by Hitler.⁶

By its formal adherence to the Tripartite pact, Romania became a part of Hitler’s grandiose project to build a “new order” in Europe.⁷ I shall try to focus below on how this “new order” was implemented in Romania and to examine Germany’s real “presence” in satellite Romania, in particular with regard to the scope of Nazi propaganda and the influence of the ideology of National Socialism on Romanian society as this will afford us an idea of the wartime ideological climate in Romania.

After the arrival of the first German troops in Romania in October 1940, whose official task was the training of the Romanian army, German military presence grew continuously in the following months. There was also a significant German economic presence, particularly following the signing of the economic treaty of December 1940, which brought hundreds of German “experts” into Romanian businesses. Of special interest for the purpose of this study, however, is Germany’s cultural presence in wartime Romania. One diplomat working at the German Embassy in Bucharest at the beginning of the war mentions in his memoirs that he was impressed by the “mass influx” of German culture in Romania in the period 1939-1940.⁸ This cultural “invasion” was quite normal given that it happened at a time of extensive Romanian appropriation to Germany.

What made it striking, however, was the fact that it was in sharp contrast to the traditionally dominating cultural model in Romania. With the eve of modernity, it was French cultural influence that prevailed in the country. Although this situation started to change in the second half of the 19th century, when Germany gradually began to acquire a high status among the Romanian elite, as a result of the unfortunate experience of the First World War, German influence faded gradually.⁹ In interwar Romania, with exception of the sympathizers and adepts among the people who has been educated in Germany, German cultural influence in the society as a whole was not very significant. In the wake of closer Romanian-German political relations at the beginning of the war, one of the most outspoken German sympathizers and Minister of propaganda at that time, Nichifor Crainic, repeatedly pointed out the "sad reality" that, "due to the policy of previous Romanian governments, Germany was almost totally unknown to the Romanian people", and he insisted that this situation had to be changed as soon as possible.¹⁰

As Romania drew closer and closer to Germany, the propaganda machine made great efforts to make Germany, its history and its culture, better known to the Romanian population at large. Books on German history were translated, numerous articles on German politics, culture and philosophy started to appear in the daily Romanian press, abstracts from the German press were regularly published in the leading Romanian journals and it was mostly German and Italian films and plays that could be seen by the Romanian public.

How did Romanian society react to this change and how successful was the pro-German cultural propaganda spread by the Romanian state? At the beginning of the war it was believed that Romania would manage to stay out of the conflict, or that the Allies would quickly take hold of the situation that prevailed among the population at large. For a long time after the beginning of hostilities, the war seemed to be somehow "far away" to the majority of Romanians. On 2 September 1939, Mihail Sebastian notes in his diary his great astonishment at the unawareness, the calmness with which the Romanian people perceived the war, as if it were something that had nothing to do with them:

Everything is confused, unclear, undecided. But what seems to me most unbelievable is this illuminated Bucharest, lively, full of people, with animated streets, a Bucharest that is very curious about what is going on,

but still not in panic and not conscious of the presence of the tragedy that has just started.¹¹

The American journalist Countess Waldeck was a witness to what happened in Romania in the first two years of the war and made the observation that for the majority of Romanians, the really big change in terms of realizing of the gravity of the situation and Germany's new role in Europe came only after the fall of Paris on 14 July 1940:

With the fall of France, the Germans became the whole show in Romania. Everybody agreed that now in Romania everything relied on Hitler.¹²

The political orientation towards Germany did not lead immediately to widespread pro-German sympathies among the Romanian population. The Romanians maintained a reserved attitude and mixed feelings towards the Germans. There was a combination of different reasons for this. The great territorial losses that Romania had suffered in the summer of 1940 happened not without the consent and the decisive role of Germany. Although blame for the national tragedy was entirely attributed to Carol II, and not to Germany, this fact did not pass unnoticed. At the same time, it was becoming obvious that the only possibility Romania had of regaining what it had lost lay with Germany. Anti-Bolshevism was also a factor that provoked pro-German sympathies. However, the attitude was still quite measured. The Romanians fought "side by side with the Germans" in the war with the Soviet Union, but they did so with great enthusiasm only because they were fighting for their own national ideals, and when the attack continued beyond the river Prut they were no longer so willing to fight.¹³ Despite the official daily propaganda, it was very difficult to convince the population that the interests of Germany coincided fully with those of Romania. The repeated promises of the Romanian leader Marshal Ion Antonescu of the possible return of Transylvania as a reward for the great Romanian military efforts was not enough to bolster the fighting spirit of the Romanians as their military losses increased and, in particular, when set against the perspective of a German defeat.

As for the scope of the German cultural influence in wartime Romania, the fact that up to that time Germany had seemed so "distant" to the Romanians played a role and swift change could not be expected overnight. The already mentioned pragmatic Romanian attitude towards reality was also expressed in a certain way with respect to cultural matters.

In 1943, Nichifor Crainic, at that time a director of Romanian cinematography, pointed out that it was mostly German and Italian films that could be seen in Romania, but that the Romanians clearly preferred the Italian films. His explanation was that the Italian films were simply of better quality and thus better received by the Romanian public.¹⁴

The condition of the intellectuals in wartime Romania was inseparably linked to the political and ideological situation in the country and the possibilities it gave to a free expression of ideas. In this respect, it is interesting to see whether the cultural propaganda spread by the Romanian state was paralleled by a conscious effort by Germany to spread the indoctrinating ideology of National Socialism, and also what constraints the internal political situation in Romania put on the activity of intellectuals.

In the scholarly literature concerning the history of the Second World War, there is general agreement that Hitler did not give much importance to the ideological coherence of the satellite states.¹⁵ He was far more concerned with maintaining military and economic security. The aforementioned memoirs of Countess Waldeck on the situation in wartime Romania support this more general view. Countess Waldeck recalls a meeting she had in 1940 with the plenipotentiary German minister for economic matters in Romania, Hermann Neubacher. The conversation concerned the new economic order being established by Germany across Europe and, at certain moment, Waldeck asked if the Germans intended to make Romania a protectorate or a fascist state in order to implement their economic plans. Neubacher's response was quite unambiguous:

No. We haven't got any political interest in Romania. We have only one aim – to maintain calm in the economic sphere. We don't want to Germanize Romania or to make it fascist. Any strong government, which has the authority to maintain calm in the raw material sphere, will do.¹⁶

From this conversation, it can be concluded that Germany had adopted a quite pragmatic attitude in relation to satellite Romania. As far as Germany was concerned, any strong government that worked would be preferable to a fascist setup that didn't. To this Waldeck adds her own impression that Germans were "resentful towards people who tried to go fascist overnight". Clear evidence that Neubacher really was expressing official German policy is given by the position of Hitler during the acute crisis of January 1941 in relations between Antonescu and the Iron Guard.¹⁷

In terms of the nature of the internal political regime in wartime Romania, there were three distinct regimes in Romania between 1 September 1939 and 23 August 1944: royal dictatorship, National Legionary State, and military dictatorship. The drift towards authoritarianism in Romanian political life was already discernable in the second half of the 1930s. The new constitution of February 1938 marked the beginning of the period of royal dictatorship. It increased Royal prerogatives dramatically and afforded the king a dominant role in politics and government: all political parties were abolished and replaced by a single political organization constituted under the auspices of the king, civil rights and freedoms were limited, anti-Semitic legislation was passed, and censorship of the press was introduced. The period of royal dictatorship lasted until September 1940, when Romania was proclaimed a "National Legionary State" with Antonescu as its indisputable leader (*Conducătorul*). The Iron Guard was recognized as the only legal political organization in the country and became a dominant political force. In power for the first time in their political history, the Legionaries directed their efforts towards building a strong totalitarian state and devoted much energy to the manifestation of legionary spirit.¹⁸ Intolerance, xenophobia, and anti-Semitism developed quickly. Legionary rule soon became synonymous with a reign of terror, anarchy, and fear. The crushing of the legionary rebellion on 27 January 1941 marked the beginning of military dictatorship in Romania, which saw the government made up exclusively of military men. This lasted until the Soviet takeover on 23 August 1944. Although the power had been concentrated in the hands of Marshal Antonescu and a strong personality cult around him had been established, his regime was authoritarian, and not fascist, because, unlike Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy, it lacked ideology and was not supported by a mass political party.¹⁹

A general characterization of the wartime internal political regime in Romania is well expressed by the opinion of the Romanian historian Dinu Giurescu in that, apart from the short interlude of the Legionary experiment (September 1940 – January 1941), the regime in Romania was authoritarian, it maintained its traditional features, all, of course, in conditions of war.²⁰ As for the role played by the ideology of National Socialism, given what was said above, it can be concluded that, although propaganda for the Nazi regime existed, there was no determined effort from Germany to implement the ideology of National Socialism in satellite Romania. We must also take into account the fact that, despite the German

military presence, Romania was not occupied; it was, in fact, an ally of the Reich. For Romania, it was the national question and not ideological reasons that determined the alliance with Germany; and Germany's policy towards satellite Romania was dictated by its economic and strategic needs. By the participation of Romanian troops in the war with the USSR, Romania managed to ensure itself a special status in its relations with Germany and enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy in its internal affairs during wartime.²¹

As a natural result of the wartime situation and Romania's alliance with Germany, the Romanian press was, as a rule, of pro-German orientation. Coverage of the war, the internal situation in Germany and the ideas of the "new order" Hitler was building across Europe filled the title pages of major Romanian newspapers. Cultural magazines continued to exist, but this was only possible as long as they towed the line of the official cultural propaganda. There was room for publishing on pure literary and cultural matters, but sufficient attention had to be paid to the dominant ideology and the conditions imposed by the war.²²

Although the system was not totalitarian and Germany did not concentrate on instilling its indoctrinating ideology in the society, the ideological climate in Romania in this period had nonetheless changed completely. Though Nazi ideology was not forcefully imposed on Romanian society, the wartime alliance made it unavoidable. War itself imposes a certain totalitarianism of thought. The national interest is brought to the fore as opposed to the selfish private interest of the individual. Everything is politicized, propaganda is of primary importance, censorship is normally introduced, and the free expression of ideas is limited or even non-existent. The activity of the individual takes place within the constraints of the extreme situation. In such circumstances, the position of intellectuals is particularly difficult, as liberty is, by definition, their primary domain.²³

The above-mentioned factors make a judgment on the real ideological convictions of the intellectuals in wartime Romania a difficult proposition. In trying to explain his own position during the Second World War period, the philosopher Constantin Rădulescu-Motru emphasizes the "tight situation" (*situație-limită*) of the period and points to the fact that what was written in this period was often motivated by the context in which it appeared.²⁴ Additional difficulty results from the fact that, in the given situation, Romanian authors were not very prolific, some of them did not write at all. Thus, this investigation must be brought within the limits of

what is discernable. While fully aware of the dangers of not being able to grasp the whole picture, I have decided to focus on several important intellectual figures of the time and, from this basis, tried to arrive at more general conclusions. More precisely, my intention is to draw conclusions on whether extreme pre-war right-wing allegiances and pro-German sympathies among intellectuals developed, given the new circumstances, into support for Hitler's National Socialism.

What was the nature of the ideological development and activity of the much-debated "Guardist" intellectuals of the 1930s in wartime? In fact, for a number of reasons, it turns out to be very difficult to understand the legacy of the interwar extreme right association of Romanian intellectuals in this period. We must keep in mind that, by the time war started, some of them were already dead or imprisoned as a result of the persecutions in the late 1930s. The undisputed mentor of the "new generation", the maestro Nae Ionescu, himself died on 15 March 1940.²⁵ For a short time in 1940, the Iron Guard was legalized and even became a dominant political force in the country, but after the crushing of the January 1941 rebellion, it was again disgraced and disappeared forever from the Romanian political scene.²⁶ It is only in this brief period of Legionary rule in Romania that the activity of the pro-Legionary intellectuals is somewhat more visible. A deep silence covers the lives of those who were still alive after 1941.²⁷ I will briefly try to present what I could discern about the wartime activity and ideological development of three of the most famous "pro-Legionary" Romanian intellectuals – Mircea Eliade, Emil Cioran and Constantin Noica.

During wartime, Mircea Eliade was involved in diplomacy and spent almost the whole period of the war outside Romania. Eliade started his diplomatic career in April 1940, when he was sent as a cultural attaché to London. In February 1941, he was assigned the position of cultural secretary at the Romanian Embassy in Lisbon, where he stayed until the end of the war.²⁸ It was as early as the second half of the 1930s that Eliade expressed his pro-Legionary sympathies and the opinion that he was clearly becoming "a man of the right", as Mihail Sebastian characterized him.²⁹ In the period at the beginning of the war in which Eliade was still in Bucharest, Sebastian noted in his diary that, by the time the war had started, Eliade's sympathies to the ideology of the extreme right were stronger than ever, in terms of the war, his attitude was clearly pro-German and most of all anti-Bolshevik.³⁰ Diplomatic appointment came just at the right moment for Eliade and was, in a way,

a consolation for the death of his beloved teacher, Nae Ionescu. Later, Eliade wrote in his memoirs that he had wished to leave Romania for a long time (he wanted to leave for an academic career in the United States) but after the death of Nae Ionescu he also felt he didn't have anything to do in Romania anymore and it was "due to Nae's death" that he was sent to London.³¹

What were the activity and the ideological convictions of Mircea Eliade for the rest of the wartime period after he left Romania? He wrote in his memoirs that, as a diplomat, he was engaged in cultural propaganda, but the war itself changed his proper duties. After Eliade went into diplomacy, he stopped writing for Romanian periodicals and this makes it difficult to learn about his ideological beliefs. In his "Autobiography", Eliade for the first time spoke about the most unclear period of his life (1938-1945), but the fact that it was written long after the events of that period, when Eliade was still trying to break with his past, make his memoirs an unreliable source with regard to his own convictions as we can not fully trust his sincerity.³²

However, judging from what he wrote in this period, it is possible to agree with Laignel-Lavastine that, in the wartime period, Eliade retained his pre-war sympathies for the ideology of the extreme right. His first play, *Ifigenia*, was full of pro-Legionary overtones despite the fact that it was staged at the National Theatre in Bucharest on 12 February 1941, that is, after the Legionaries were no longer in power. In 1942, Eliade published the book *Salazar and the Revolution in Portugal*, in which he spoke with admiration and respect of the Portuguese dictator and the political order he had established. Eliade even met Salazar in person just before his first visit to Romania in July 1942.³³

The beginning of the war reached Cioran in Paris, where he had left for in 1937 with a grant from the French Institute, Bucharest. In the autumn of 1940, Cioran went back to Romania and stayed in Bucharest until February 1941. The reasons for his return to his home country are not quite clear. However, given the timing of the visit, which took place shortly after the Legionaries had come to power, we can assume he had been very much excited to see the accomplishment of his "dreamed of, transfigured Romania".³⁴ During his stay in Bucharest, Cioran passionately expressed his pro-Legionary sympathies. At the end of November, just a few days before the reburial of the legendary Legionary leader Corneliu Codreanu, Cioran gave a lecture on Bucharest radio, in which he spoke in high praise of the "inner profile of the Captain".³⁵

It would have been interesting to know whether Cioran would have decided to remain in Romania had the Legionary experiment proved successful. However, it is clear that after the events of January 1941 he was more than ever eager to leave. On 2 January 1941, Mihail Sebastian took notes in his *Journal* of an accidental meeting with Cioran. Cioran had expressed his happiness at being nominated cultural attaché in France “for the chance it gave him to escape mobilization”. Sebastian defines his behavior as an “astonishing mixture of cynicism and cowardice”.³⁶ In February, Cioran left Romania to settle down indefinitely in France and, with the exception of his short-lived “diplomatic experience” at Vichy, his activity, as well as his ideological inclinations during the rest of the war lie in obscurity.³⁷

While in general both Mircea Eliade and Emil Cioran spent the war years outside Romania, each of them returning to his home country only once before leaving indefinitely, the philosopher Constantin Noica remained in Romania for most of the wartime period. Noica’s open support of the Legionary movement came quite late, in 1938, after the death of Codreanu and it was as a sign of protest, although his right-wing orientation had been from as early as 1933-34.³⁸ During Legionary rule in Romania, Noica was one of the most ardent supporters and propagators of Legionary ideology. Even before the Legionaries came to power, Noica had already made clear his pro-Legionary stance. On 8 August 1940, the journal *Ad sum (I am present)* appeared as a single publication written and edited entirely by Noica. It included four articles in which he gave clear expression to his pro-Legionary convictions. Noica became the first editor-in-chief of the official newspaper of the Iron Guard *Buna Vestire* when it reappeared on 8 September 1940. In this period he published many “Legionary” articles in which he spoke with great enthusiasm of the mission of the Legionary movement, the establishment of the “new spirituality”, the creation of the “new man”, the essence of the Legionary sacrifice, etc.³⁹ He remained true to his ideological convictions even after the events of January 1941, when the Legionaries were expelled from government and the Legionary movement was banned.⁴⁰

At the beginning of 1941, Noica was appointed referee on questions of philosophy in the Romanian Institute in Berlin. He stayed in Germany until June 1941 and then returned to Bucharest and concentrated mainly on literary and philosophical work.⁴¹ Noica returned to Germany in June 1943, this time to attend a conference in Berlin where he presented the lecture entitled *The Inner Tension of Romanian Culture*, a subject

Sebastian would find quite grotesque at that given time.⁴² If Noica's pro-German sympathies had dated from the period before the war, they were being clearly expressed now. In the period 1942-1944, Noica published a series of articles on German philosophy under the general title "The Political Philosophy of Contemporary Germany" in the Romanian journal *Revista Fundațiilor Regale*. In these articles, he touched upon German history and German contemporary political regime and ideology.⁴³

On the question as to what extent association with the ideology of the Legionary movement turned into support for Nazi ideology, it is my opinion that no such direct "transformation" existed. For Mircea Eliade, although his ideological orientation in this period was clearly right-wing and he expressed pro-German sympathies, there is no evidence regarding his attitude towards the ideology of National Socialism. The same is true of Emil Cioran. Even though Cioran had been expressing his clear sympathies towards the German model and even Hitler himself from as early as the early 1930s, there is no indication that his pro-Legionary sympathies were paralleled by any fascination for the ideology of National Socialism in the wartime years. Apart from the few articles he wrote during his stay in Bucharest, there is no written record of his ideological orientation after he left Romania. In several interviews, mainly during the 1990s, Cioran spoke with regret about his Romanian past, but made virtually no mention of his life during the war. Despite the fact that Noica paid a great deal of attention to Germany and even referred to National Socialism as the "ideology of the future", this did not take the form of propagation of explicit pro-Nazi ideology. The emphasis in his writings of this period was always more on philosophy, than ideology.

Another prominent intellectual figure in Romanian society of that time, who, though not associated with the Iron Guard, was still explicitly orientated towards the extreme right, was Nichifor Crainic.⁴⁴ As early as the 1930s, Crainic became an advocate of a pro-German orientation for Romania and an admirer of the ideology of Hitler's National Socialism. At the beginning of the war, Crainic was one of the most ardent supporters of close political alliance with Germany and, during the war years, worked actively for an even closer relationship with Germany, most particularly in the sphere of cultural relations, remaining one of the most outspoken supporters of German order and ideology. In this period, Crainic was also directly involved in Romanian politics and, due to his political obligations, was, in fact, very active in the area of propaganda.⁴⁵

In 1940, Crainic repeatedly emphasized the need for closer Romanian-German cultural cooperation, something he considered of primary importance to the Romanian national cause. Later, he wrote in his memoirs that he had paid great attention to the “outside propaganda”, aimed at making Romania’s cause known abroad by putting the emphasis on culture. He was convinced it was serving the national cause and considered it particularly important with regard to Transylvania, which, as he noted, “preoccupied his mind day and night”. He also mentions in his memoirs that he made a lot of efforts in this direction and that, in fact, this “outside propaganda” became one of the major areas of his activity while he was a minister of propaganda.⁴⁶

At the same time, equally important for the spreading of Romanian history and culture abroad, most particularly in Germany, Crainic considered making German culture popular to the Romanian public. He emphasized the importance of culture in shaping the national spirit. In a 1943 article, he wrote:

It is my belief that ethnicization in the cultural domain is more important than in the political or economic sphere because the spirit of a nation is modeled by the culture by which it is nurtured.⁴⁷

Crainic highly praised “the German spirit” which he characterized as “the most open and well-disposed in the whole of Europe towards other peoples and races” and was convinced that German influence was of vital importance for the development of Romanian culture, particularly in opposition to the French cultural model. As he pointed out in another article:

As sterile the French influence is, as fertile is the German influence ... French culture enslaves, German culture liberates. French culture annihilates personality; German culture reveals the real deep essence of the individual.⁴⁸

In many of his articles from the wartime years, Crainic repeatedly showed his admiration of the German political order, the National Socialist revolution, the “new spirit”, and Hitler himself.⁴⁹ Crainic’s pro-German sympathies were paralleled by his strong anti-Bolshevism. As a part of the official propaganda, Crainic enthusiastically supported Romania’s “holy” war against the Soviet Union, on which, he believed, depended

not only the destiny of “our brothers” beyond the Dniester, but the destiny of the Romanian national state, the salvation from Bolshevism, as well as the inclusion of Romania in the New Europe – that of the “conqueror of the continent Adolf Hitler”.⁵⁰

As Crainic himself pointed in his memoirs, his pro-German attitude was directly linked to his “outrage” with democracy. On several occasions, he clearly distinguished himself from the democratic regime, which he considered disastrous for Romania. For instance, in an article written exactly after the signing of the Vienna Diktat, Crainic put the whole blame for the “tragedy of Romania” on Romanian democracy, as for him it was a logical consequence of its “unfortunate short-sighted Anglo-Francophile policy”.⁵¹

As an opposite of this “democracy”, Crainic coined a new word – “demophily” (*demofilia*). This concept of “demophily” was developed in detail in a separate article published in January 1941, in which he addressed his students by presenting “demophily” as the essence of the attitude of the new (Christian) nationalism towards the people. Crainic stated:

This new nationalism is not identical with “national pride”, i.e., oriented towards the idealization of the past only, but to love the people as it is in the present with its good and bad sides, or even more – it means “compassion” for the people.

He also emphasized that exactly this Christian specificity – “the love of one’s people with compassion based on the model of Christ” made this nationalism different from all the other European nationalisms.⁵²

An interesting change appeared in this period in Crainic’s famous *gândirist* doctrine. As in the previous period, Orthodoxy continued to lie at its core, but now an attempt was made to somehow “situate” it within the limits of the ideology of National Socialism. This made his doctrine sound quite artificial and confused at some points. For instance, in line with the general preoccupation with race, Crainic spoke of “the boundary of the blood as a law of nature and life, which nobody can destroy in an artificial way”, connecting it with Orthodoxy:

As a Christian people, which has never oppressed another people with tyranny, we see the only possibility for a harmony between the peoples

that states are based on the principle of political and blood boundaries are identical.⁵³

In the new situation of war, Crainic became even more nationalistic than before. He became an advocate of integral nationalism, insisting that "Romanization of the cities was a vital problem for the Romanian people" and that "the ancestral land was an exclusive property of the Romanians".⁵⁴ Crainic's anti-Semitism also increased in the wartime years and he already started to talk about the Jews in racial terms only. In general, during this period, Crainic spoke increasingly of "our race", not of a nation or people.

One of his first actions as a minister of propaganda was to advocate throwing out the Jews from the Romanian press. On 10 July 1940 at a meeting with the editors in chief of the newspapers in the capital, Crainic stated that

Romanian newspapers cannot be conducted by Jews, and in the newspapers conducted by Romanians, Jews cannot collaborate.

His motivation came from the fact that he considered himself a part of a "nationalist" government and pointed out that he had learned from his own experience that

what was written by Jews has never supported of the ideas of Romanianism, but rather an expression of the interests of their own race, which unfortunately are contradictory to that of ours.

He considered the fact that "the whole press was dominated by Jews" as a failure of the previous democratic regime and emphasized the need for a "national press", which should be given the status of "an active collaborator with the regime".⁵⁵

In Crainic's case, right-wing orientation and pro-German sympathies clearly turned into a pro-Nazi support in this period. Which factors contributed to this orientation? To a certain extent, his political engagement implied the expression of such support, as the propaganda of the internal regime was closely intermingled with that of Nazi ideology. Most likely political opportunism also played its part. That Crainic was a political opportunist is evident from the fact that, although he hadn't been a supporter of or even a sympathizer with the Iron Guard

during the 1930s, by the time the Legionaries came to power, he was already one of their most passionate admirers, speaking apologetically about the courage and sacrifice of the Legionaries and praising the young generation to which the nationalist spirit belonged and which was destined to change Romania profoundly.⁵⁶ However, most importantly, Crainic was a convinced admirer of German political model and for him, the support for the ideology of National Socialism came naturally as an evolution of his own ideological development and pro-German sympathies.

Pro-German sympathies and foreign policy orientation were also typical for the philosopher Constantin Rădulescu-Motru. Like Crainic, Motru was also a traditionalist in the sense of the definition of "Romanianism", but unlike Crainic, up to that period, he had never openly expressed ideological support for the extreme right.

In 1941-42, this pro-German orientation, at least at the level of propaganda, turned into support for Nazi ideology, and this is evident from his writings at the time. Some of the articles Motru published in the Romanian daily press (mainly in *Timpul*) contained explicit ideological overtones. Motru was convinced the future lay with German order and that Romania should have sufficient wisdom to realize this. For instance, he repeatedly emphasized the necessity of "the study of the race", to which not enough attention is paid in Romania:

The young Romanian nation which puts so much hope in its future and which has so many intellectual resources, cannot leave its racial origins and its ethnic consciousness neglected.

He gave the examples of Italy and Germany and insisted on the urgent need for the development of ethnical and racial studies, which he considered a criterion for making a distinction between the countries with "real culture" and those without real culture, as, in his view, culture meant the "the ability to foresee".⁵⁷

In another article of around the same time, Motru highly praised the "German idea":

The realization of the German idea has given to the German state a model army, a healthy population in body and soul, a political and moral order that cannot be seen anywhere else. All of these are sufficient prerequisites for its durability.⁵⁸

Throughout the article, he used many quotations from Hitler's *Mein Kampf* and repeatedly expressed his firm belief that the German model was "the future for a new Europe". At a time when great attention was being paid to the education of the youth in the national spirit, Motru stressed the need for an ideal and again showed his own admiration of Hitler's Germany for its ability to make "the best selection of people", which, in his view, was the reason for its success.⁵⁹

In 1942, Radulescu-Motru published the book *Etnicul Românesc. Comunitate de origine, limbă și destin (The Romanian Nation: Community of Origin, Language and Destiny)* in which most of the ideas mentioned above are developed in a more systematic way. Motru's pro-Hitler stance had again been clearly demonstrated. For example, he advocated the application of the integral concept of the individual (inseparable body and soul) as in the Italian and German model where "it had formed the basis of state policy" and stressed the importance of knowledge of "the characteristics of the different racial types of which the Romanian nation consists"; and praised highly the German order (especially discipline and selection) and Hitler himself.⁶⁰

In its preface (dated 22 March 1942), Motru stated that the book was addressed first and foremost to the young generation, as

it was called to gather the fruits of victory for when the community of destiny of the Romanian nation was accomplished, or to pay with bitter sacrifice if this were not achieved.⁶¹

Etnicul Românesc was Motru's last extensive work. However, it was written on the request of the Ministry of Propaganda and, for this reason, was full of ideological implications.⁶² He later wrote that when preparing his contribution to the *Anthology of Romanian Philosophers*, he didn't excluded parts of this book from his selection because he considered it as "having the occasional character of a time of war".⁶³

The study of the "ethnic" was not a new topic in the works of Motru. However, on this occasion, he was trying to find an explanation of the term that would serve his contemporary politics. I shall briefly present the major points in the development of his concept in order to illustrate how vague were the premises on which it was based.

Motru starts his argument by stating that community consciousness was of primary importance when explaining the term "ethnic" and

continued by tracing three successive stages in its evolution: the consciousness of the community of origin, the consciousness of the community of language and the consciousness of the community of destiny. First came the consciousness of the community of origin. It was based on blood and tradition and referred to the most primitive forms of social organization. In time, this was gradually transformed into the consciousness of community of language because, as he argued, "by means of language the community was able to arrive at consciousness of its cultural unity".⁶⁴

At this point, Motru's argumentation is clear. It is smooth and logical. Suddenly, however, on arrival at the third type of community consciousness, there is an abrupt breakdown in his logic. It is exactly this third type of community consciousness – the consciousness of the community of destiny – that Motru invents in order to be able to build up his new theory of the "ethnic" in the changed situation. The consciousness of the community of destiny appears not as result of social evolution, but as a sudden break up in the course of events. It is presented as a direct product of an extreme situation,

springing from the great historical decisions through which a nation goes in the course of its historical life. Wars, revolutions, wartime alliances, betrayals, that is to say, facts which decide its destiny.⁶⁵

The community of language, argues Motru, was in fact the basis for the idea of national sovereignty of European peoples and, "had it not been for the peril of the war, this stage of community consciousness would probably be dominant in contemporary Europe". "However", and here he reaches the fundamental point of his concept, "the war has brought the need to think about the future, that is, the essential need of a new community consciousness – the consciousness of destiny." "The war", the argument continues, "leads to new relations between nations, new alliances are made between different peoples according to their closeness in destiny".⁶⁶

While the first two types of community consciousness evolved in the history of the society, the consciousness of the community of destiny is directly linked to the future, or, to quote Motru:

Consciousness of the community of origin is the form of the "ethnic" of the villages today; that of language came as a result of the adaptation to the

spiritual needs of the time; the third form is very recent; this is the “national essence” of the future Europe – “the conscious solidarization of the members of a nation in their will to preserve and protect their national unity”.⁶⁷

Motru used his concept to make some explicit ideological references. For instance, Motru states that unlike the first two types of community consciousness, which were a product of human evolution, that of destiny was not essentially based on objective reasons, but depended exclusively on the human will and was most subject to outside influences. He uses this argument to emphasize the decisive importance of a capable leader, gifted with the ability to foresee the future in such a critical time, and this turns into an apology of general Antonescu.⁶⁸ In ascertaining the existence of such communities of destiny in his contemporary world, Motru also points to the examples of “National Socialist Germany, Fascist Italy and the Japanese Empire”, which Romania had to follow because transformation to the “community of destiny” was “the calling of the day” and because the big question facing Romanians at that time was whether they were able to attain this consciousness of destiny, which was “a key to their survival”.⁶⁹

As can be seen, there are many instances of direct propaganda throughout the book, but knowing the motives behind the writing of this book, we cannot use it to judge the real ideological beliefs of the author. When preparing his contribution for the *Anthology of Romanian Philosophers*, Motru did not include elements of *Etnicul Românesc*, as he considered this work as “having the occasional character of a time of war”.⁷⁰

A much more reliable source for Motru’s real ideas and thoughts is the last book he wrote in this period, his *Revisions and Additions*. On 15 February 1943 on his 75th birthday, Motru started writing a diary with the intention of making an account of his life up to that moment and he called it *Revisions and Additions*.⁷¹ This time Motru could allow himself to be more sincere as was not following official orders. This is why I find this book of particular importance for the understanding of his ideological convictions during the war years.

Motru remained strongly pro-German, although by the time he started his diary, Germany was already on the losing side. A convinced anti-Bolshevik, Motru was greatly disillusioned by the prospect of a German defeat and the possible advent of the Soviets. In his view, the bitter

perspective towards the end of the war was that: "if Germany falls, European culture would be replaced by Americanism or Bolshevism".⁷² The fear of what would happen after the war preoccupied his mind, most particularly in 1944, when a German defeat was becoming more and more obvious, however he was convinced that "whatever the fate of Romania would be, it was closely connected to that of Germany".⁷³

Reflecting on the effects such an outcome might have on Romania, Motru could not hide his bewilderment at what he considered a "curious state of the spirit" of the Romanian population at large: living unaware of the course of the war and not realizing the consequences it might have for their own lives. Motru writes:

In the newspapers that write in a bombastic way about the events of the war, the rest of the world leads a life as usual (*ca de obicei*), as if we were not in the most terrible war.

And he adds:

Of course, people speak of the war, but as a "subject" in cafes, not as something tragic.⁷⁴

He was also very much impressed by the fact that the pragmatic attitude of the Romanians remained unaffected by the sweeping course of events "while the people in the upper levels of society speak of the probability of victory for the Allies, those in the lower levels live in apathy", guided by the common wisdom: "What has been, has been. What will be, we are going to see".⁷⁵

In terms of ideological orientation, his diary illustrates that, until the very end of the war, Motru firmly remained "on the German side", however, there is no longer any notion whatsoever of continuing support for Nazi ideology. It is my belief that the support Motru expressed for the ideology of National Socialism during wartime was driven more by pragmatism and opportunism, than by any deep ideological convictions.

Being pro-German did not necessarily imply the embracing, even if only in a superficial way, of the ideology of National Socialism. A typical example of this can be seen in the case of the historian Gheorghe Brătianu who was one of the most manifest sympathizers with Germany in the interwar period. From the second half of the 1930s onwards, Brătianu established himself as one of the most ardent supporters of a pro-German

foreign policy orientation for Romania and he even played an active role in this. In the wartime period, Brătianu remained clearly pro-German but, unlike Motru, he remained unaffected by the influence of the ideology of Hitler's National Socialism and refrained from involving himself with its propaganda.

Instead, Brătianu became one of the most active proponents of the Romanian national cause. In particular, after the "tragic Romanian summer" of 1940, all his academic and public activity was subjected to the ideal of Romanian reintegration. He published numerous articles, both in foreign languages and in daily Romanian press, and gave many public speeches and lectures in which he firmly defended the justness of the Romanian national cause. In this moment of extreme national importance, Brătianu addressed his compatriots in his highly patriotic *Words to the Romanians*, a sequence of ten lectures in which he gave particular emphasis to the idea of Romanian national unity and the need to keep the national spirit alive.⁷⁶ The Romanian national idea and the origins and the formation of Romanian national unity continued to be the main areas of interest in his academic life. However, in this period, as a university professor at the Bucharest University, Brătianu, convinced it was his duty to prepare young Romanians for the great national tasks that lay ahead of them, devoted much of his attention to "academic propaganda".⁷⁷

In all the cases shown above, pro-German attitudes in the wartime period were motivated either by traditional pro-German sympathies (most often as a result of education in Germany) or by an already existent association with the ideology of the extreme right. Strong anti-Bolshevism was also a factor that inspired pro-German feelings and support, but there were also many intellectuals who had never expressed pro-German attitudes at the time the war started, but who suddenly became explicitly pro-German, driven by the comfort of conformism. Mihail Sebastian notes in his *Journal* the deliberate expression of pro-German sympathies among a growing number of his friends and he gives particular mention to the literary critic Camil Petrescu who is described as the typical opportunist. From their viewpoint, in the changed situation after the war started, when German power seemed paramount, becoming pro-German was a way to adapt to the new reality, an attempt at being "objective". Although Sebastian realized conformism was unavoidable in such a situation, he could not accept this "objectivity" which prevented them from reasoning,

from realizing all the consequences of the situation. On 31 Mai 1940, he wrote in his diary:

I could not be objective. The so-called "objectivity" which I observe in many people (Camil as well) seems to me a way of accepting things, of adapting to them. Not only does he not feel frightened by the Germans, but he shows respect, even liking for them.... The world is startled, when it should feel frightened....⁷⁸

The issue of "conformism" brings us into the realm of the more general question regarding the role and responsibility of the intellectuals of the society. This usually leads to passing moral judgment. Inclination to do just this is particularly strong when it comes to the issue that is the subject of this article. It is my opinion that this should be done very carefully and that any such attempt should necessarily start by looking at the choices available by taking into account such questions as: can we accuse someone of not having been sufficiently active and finding the means to adapt? Can we blame those who attempted escape? Of those who were silent, why were they silent? Did this silence mean compliance or agreement, or was it, as a reaction to the lack of choices available, an expression of protest? Finally, is it legitimate to ask this "moral question" in such an extreme situation? As well as the more general question, as to whether the historian has the right to pass moral judgment at all?

This essay was not intended as an assessment of the behavior of the Romanian intellectuals in the wartime years, but only to present their reaction to the paramount ideology of the time. The rest is left for the reader.

NOTES

- 1 TREPTOW, Kurt, ed., *Romania and World War II*, Centrul de Studii Românești: Fundația Culturală Româna, Iași, 1996, pp. 297-317.
- 2 The Soviet ultimatum was followed shortly by the territorial claims from Hungary and Bulgaria. Germany supported the claims of Romania's adversaries. Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina were annexed by the Soviet Union; with the Second Vienna Award of 30 August 1940 a huge part of Transylvania was assigned to Hungary and under the Craiova treaty of 7 September 1940 Southern Dobrogea went back to Bulgaria. On Romanian-German relations in 1940 see, HAYNES, Rebecca, *Romanian Policy Towards Germany, 1936-1940*, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2000, pp. 119-166.
- 3 ALEXANDRESCU, Sorin, *Paradoxul Român*, Univers, București, 1998, p. 133.
- 4 A detailed account of anti-Semitism in Romania in the WWII years, particularly during the Antonescu regime can be found in the recent book by Radu Ioanid *Evreii sub regimul Antonescu*, Ed. Hasefer, București, 1997.
- 5 On 22 June 1941, general Antonescu proclaimed Romania to be starting a "holy war" to regain Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina and put an end to Bolshevism. See, GIURESCU, Dinu, *România în al doilea război mondial (1939 - 1945)*, ALL, București, 1999, p. 94. By the end of the year, the country was fully engaged in the world conflict – on 7 December 1941, Great Britain declared war on Romania; obliged by her commitments to the Tripartite pact five days later (12 December) Romania declared war on the United States.
- 6 Strains in relations between the two countries started to appear from the end of 1942 onwards and became most noticeable after the battle of Stalingrad when it became clear that Germany was losing the war. See, HITCHINS, Keith, *Rumania, 1866-1947*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994, pp. 488-499. In a recent interview, the last king of Romania, Mihai I, also gains the enthusiastic support of the population. In his view, the war became unpopular only shortly before the battle of Stalingrad. See CIOBANU, Mircea, *Mihai I al României*, Humanitas, București, 1997, pp. 146-147.
- 7 Mark Mazower speaks of "Hitler's lost opportunity" given the fact that, disappointed by the reality they lived in, many Europeans by the end of the 1930s were ready to leave behind the liberal, democratic order created after the end of WWI for a more authoritarian future. Thus, opinion in Europe at that time was in fact not opposed to the idea of an authoritarian reconstruction of the continent under German leadership. At the beginning, Hitler even raised hopes, but soon disappointment came. Doubts over possible boundary shifts and annexations across Europe also undermined faith in Hitler's New Order. But his major mistake lied in the essential feature of the New Order – it was not European, but German order, and so far as there was a Nazi vision for Europe, it belonged to the sphere of economics not politics – "a regional

- economy with Germany at its heart". MAZOWER, Mark, *Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century*, Penguin, London, 1998, ("Hitler's New Order, 1938-1945", pp. 141-184).
- 8 PUSCH, R. and G. STELZER, *Diplomați Germani în București, 1937-1944*, ALL, București, 2001, p. 42.
- 9 See BOIA, Lucian, *History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness*, CEU Press, Budapest, 2001, pp. 162-165.
- 10 See, for example "Înfrățirea culturală romano-germana", in: *Universul*, nr. 226, 18 August 1940.
- 11 SEBASTIAN, Mihail, *Jurnal, 1935 – 1944*, Humanitas, București, 1996, p. 227.
- 12 Countess Waldeck arrived in Bucharest on 14 June 1940 and left Romania in January 1941 after the crushing of the legionary rebellion. During her stay in Romania she lived in Hotel Athene and closely followed the course of events. Later she published the book *Athene Palace*, where she described the situation in Romania as seen through her own eyes. See, WALDECK, R.G. *Athene Palace*, Center for Romanian Studies, Iași, Oxford, Portland, 1998, p. 43.
- 13 PROST, Henry, *Destin de la Roumanie (1918-1954)*, Editions Berger-Levrault, Paris, 1954, p. 162.
- 14 „Filmul Românesc”, in *Gândirea*, nr. 5, 1943, p. 274. The article basically dealt with the new tendencies in German historiography in view of the ideas of National Socialism.
- 15 Rab Bennett, for example, in his study of WWII collaborationism makes the observation that in order to avoid unnecessarily antagonizing the indigenous population, the Germans preferred to work with the cooperation of prominent local politicians and administrators, rather than with the “active minority of vociferous but unpopular fascist collaborators who might plunge their country into civil war and chaos”. Ideological identification was less useful to the Nazis’ scheme of economic exploitation than creating a semblance of normality that obscured the extent of their control. See, BENNETT, Rab, *Under the Shadow of the Swastika: The Moral Dilemmas of Resistance and Collaboration in Hitler's Europe*, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1999, p. 43.
- 16 WALDECK, R.G. *Athene Palace*, pp. 55-56, 85.
- 17 In Antonescu’s first government there was a “duality of power” between the General and the Iron Guard. For a time, there was a certain degree of consent but signs of disagreement were shortly to appear and they turned into an escalating conflict which reached its peak by January 1941. Supported by Germany, Antonescu took a firm stand against them and, after crushing the so-called Legionary rebellion (21-23 January 1941), became the sole master of Romania. Overlooking the ideological proximity of the Legionaries, Hitler took the side of the General, thus opting for order against chaos and uncertainty. See, GIURESCU, Dinu, *România în al doilea război mondial*, pp. 54-55.

- 18 In the period 1938-40, the movement was very badly hit due to its conflict with the King who considered it a major adversary to his own power. With their advent to power the Legionaries felt the time for revenge had come and initiated a form of collective psychosis in memory of the Legionary victims of the former regime, which soon turned into "settling private bills" with political adversaries. An excellent and detailed analysis of the history of the Iron Guard can be found in: HEINEN, Armin, *Die Legion "Erzengel Michael" in Rumänien. Soziale Bewegung und Politische Organisation*, Oldenbourg, München, 1986.
- 19 HITCHINS, K., *Rumania, 1866-1947*, p. 469.
- 20 GIURESCU, D., *România în al doilea război mondial*, p. 79.
- 21 GIURESCU, D., *România în al doilea război mondial*, pp. 89-90.
- 22 A good example for this is one of the best cultural magazines in that period, *Revista Fundațiilor Regale*. As in the previous period, after the war years, it continued to publish poetry, novels, articles on history, literature, philosophy, literary criticism, books review and reviews of other magazines. In the new circumstances imposed by the war, several changes became noticeable in the magazine. From 1940, many abstracts from the German press related to Romania were included in the annex and after 1941 "Actualities from the frontline" started to appear as a separate section. Apart from the purely literary and cultural topics, articles were also published with a clear pro-German ideological orientation. See, for instance, the article of D. Gherasim "Spațiul European", where he advocates the "inescapability" of Hitler's "new order" and the proper place Romania deserves within it after its adherence to the Tripartite pact – *Revista Fundațiilor Regale*, nr. 5, 1941, pp. 427-445.
- 23 On the role and position of the intellectuals in society, see the excellent book of Bernard-Henri Lévy, *Éloge des intellectuels*, Bernard Grasset, Paris, 1987.
- 24 RĂDULESCU-MOTRU, C., *Scieri politice*, Nemira, București, 1998, p. 13.
- 25 Nae Ionescu was a professor of logic and metaphysics at the University of Bucharest. He was extremely popular among his students and it is believed that he influenced to a great extent the "Guardist conversion" of some young intellectuals after he became a member of the Legionary movement in 1934. His influence was decisive particularly in the case of Mircea Eliade.
- 26 The events of January 1941 were crucial to the future political destiny of the Legionaries. The Iron Guard was banned, a great number of active Legionaries were arrested, some of them (including Horia Sima) took refuge in Germany, where they lived in concentration camps. At a certain point Sima made an attempt to escape to Italy but was brought back. Although for a time there were rumors that the Legionaries were planing a return to power, they didn't actually have a real opportunity to exert influence on events in Romania and Antonescu kept firm control over the situation. See, BUZATU, Gh., C. CIUCANU, C. SANDACHE, *Radiografia dreptei românești (1927 - 1941)*, Editura FF Press, București, 1996, pp. 319-332.

- 27 It is only in her recent book that Alexandra Laignel-Lavastine sheds more light on the wartime activity of two of the most famous pro-Legionary intellectuals, Mircea Eliade and Emil Cioran. See LAIGNEL-LAVASTINE, Alexandra, *Cioran, Eliade, Ionesco : L'oubli du fascisme*, PUF, Paris, 2002, pp. 275-382. The book immediately provoked acute debate among the Romanian public. Although some of her statements are too extreme and rely very much on presuppositions, the information she gives, in particular with regard to the wartime activity of Mircea Eliade, is of particular interest as she uses his important Portuguese diary, which was unknown to the public at large as it was only published in Spanish, in 1941.
- 28 Eliade arrived in Lisbon on 10 February 1941, the day of the break-up of the British-Romanian diplomatic relations and was to stay in Portugal until September 1945, when he left for Paris.
- 29 Mihail Sebastian was one of the best Jewish writers in Romania at that time. He was a disciple of Nae Ionescu and many of the representatives of the "young generation" who in the late 1930s became sympathizers or adherents to the Iron Guard. In his diary, Sebastian wrote with sorrow about Mircea Eliade's "Guardist conversion", whom he considered one of his closest friends, and the change in their relationship. See, SEBASTIAN, Mihail, *Jurnal*, p. 41, 45, 85-6, 96, 120, 148, 157.
- 30 See, SEBASTIAN, Mihail, *Jurnal*, pp. 231-32.
- 31 See, ELIADE, Mircea, *Autobiography, vol.II : 1937 – 1960. Exile's Odyssey*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1988, p. 4.
- 32 The same view is also expressed by Laignel-Lavastine in her recent book (already mentioned) on Cioran, Eliade and Ionesco.
- 33 This was actually Eliade's last visit to his motherland. The reasons for this "coming back" exactly at that time are quite unclear. Eliade mentions in his memoirs that this visit was connected with information he had received from one of his friends in Bucharest that he was listed among the candidates for the chair of Philosophy of Culture, recently created at the University. See, ELIADE, M. *Autobiography, vol.II : 1937 – 1960*, p. 98. It is more believable, however, that it was more in connection with Eliade's recent visit to the Portuguese dictator Salazar and the message he had to deliver to general Antonescu, *ibid.*, pp. 99-100.
- 34 ORNEA, Zigu, *Anii treizeci. Extrema dreaptă românească*, Editura Fundației Culturale Române, București, 1996, p. 197.
- 35 The text of this speech was later published in the Transylvanian newspaper, *Glasul strămoșesc* (Sibiu), nr. 10, 25 decembrie 1940. LAIGNEL-LAVASTINE, A. *Cioran, Eliade, Ionesco*, p. 132.
- 36 SEBASTIAN, M., *Jurnal*, 286.
- 37 In her last book Alexandra Laignel-Lavastine confirms the disputed fact that for a short time Cioran really occupied the position of cultural advisor at the Romanian Embassy in Vichy. See, LAIGNEL-LAVASTINE, A. *Cioran, Eliade, Ionesco*, p. 530.

- 38 Unlike both Eliade and Cioran, Noica did not try to break with his past – he never publicly dissociated himself from his adherence to the Iron Guard and until the end of his life kept silent on this issue.
- 39 See, LAIGNEL-LAVASTINE, Alexandra, *Filozofie și naționalism. Paradoxul Noica*, Humanitas, București, 1998, p. 59.
- 40 In his book on Romanian right-wing movements in the 1930s, Zigu Ornea mentions that there were rumors in 1943 that upon learning of Antonescu's decision to release the Guardists from prison and send them to forward positions on the Eastern front, Noica, in an expression of solidarity with his comrades, volunteered to go to the front as well. He was only unable to do so, however, due to prohibition by the medical commission. See, ORNEA, Z. *Anii treizeci*, p. 215, 219.
- 41 Upon his arrival in Bucharest with Constantin Floru and Mircea Vulcanescu, Noica published four university courses of professor Nae Ionescu and the annual *Sources of Philosophy* (1942-43). In 1944, Noica published his book *Pagini despre sufletul românesc*; during this period, he also continued to publish philosophical articles in the major Romanian philosophical and literary journals.
- 42 SEBASTIAN, M. *Jurnal*, p. 516.
- 43 These articles were later published in DIACONU, Marin, ed., *Constantin Noica. Echilibrul spiritual. Studii și eseuri*, Humanitas, București, 1998, pp. 277 – 338.
- 44 Nichifor Crainic (1889-1972) was a very controversial personality – he was a poet, essayist, professor of theology. In the interwar period, Crainic was an editor of the literary magazine “*Gândirea*” and the author of one of the leading traditionalist trends in defining “Romanianism”, which regarded Orthodoxy as the core of “Romanian national essence”. In the 1930s, Crainic's ideas became increasingly nationalistic, anti-Semitic and exclusivist. Crainic developed his own version of corporatism, the so-called “ethnocracy” and in 1936 he published the program of the “Ethnocratic State” in which he advocated an “organic, spiritual, ethnic community with Orthodoxy playing a leading role”. See HITCHINS, Keith, “*Gândirea*: Nationalism in a Spiritual Guise”, in: JOWITT, Kenneth, ed., *Social Change in Romania, 1860 - 1940: A Debate on Development in a European Nation*, Institute of International Studies, Berkley, 1978, pp. 148-156.
- 45 Crainic was a minister of propaganda in the government of Ion Gigurtu (5 July 1940), and then again in the second cabinet of Ion Antonescu. Meanwhile, he was working in the same domain as a director of the Romanian Radio Broadcasting Station, and later of the Romanian Film Association.
- 46 CRAINIC, Nichifor, *Zile albe, zile negre. Memorii*, *Gândirea*, București, 1991, p. 337, 339.
- 47 “Filmul German”, in *Gândirea*, nr. 5, 1943, p. 270.

- 48 See, "Viața spirituală în România de azi", in *Gândirea*, nr. 10, 1940, pp. 633-641. This was originally a lecture Crainic gave on the occasion of becoming doctor honoris causa of the University of Vienna in November 1940. He also repeated it in Breslau and Berlin. In his memoirs Crainic mentions proudly that this speech was very well received and presented extensively in the German press, CRAINIC, N., *Zile albe, zile negre*, p. 308. Similar thoughts were expressed by the writer Liviu Rebreanu in an interview given in the Romanian press on the eve of 1942 after his return from a trip to Italy and Germany. He started with the sad observation that Romanian culture was completely unknown to the public in those two countries, mainly because "for the last 100 years it was turned into a French cultural colony". For this reason he opposed the "unproductive" French influence and advocated Romania's orientation towards the German and Italian cultural models, that "to the contrary, were giving it freedom", see *Vremea*, Crăciun, 1942.
- 49 "Spiritul German contemporan", in *Gândirea*, nr. 2, 1943, pp. 57 – 65.
- 50 "Aliații lui Hitler", in *Gândirea*, nr. 7, 1941, pp. 337-340.
- 51 "Scurtă recăpitolare", in *Gândirea*, nr. 7, 1940, pp. 465-470.
- 52 "Despre demofilie", in *Gândirea*, nr. 1, 1941, pp. 1-10.
- 53 See, "Avram Iancu", in *Gândirea*, nr. 3, 1943, pp. 113 – 120.
- 54 See, *Curentul*, nr. 4717, 2 aprilie 1941.
- 55 *Universul*, nr.187, 10 ianuarie 1940.
- 56 "Viața spirituală în România de azi", p. 635. See also, "Revoluția legionară" – in *Gândirea*, nr. 8, 1940, pp. 521-528. By the beginning of March 1941 Crainic was already praising general Antonescu as "the savior of the country!" – see "Generalul", in *Timpul*, nr. 1370, 12 martie 1941.
- 57 "Rasa Românilor", in *Timpul*, 6 ianuarie 1941.
- 58 "Ideea Germană", in *Timpul*, nr. 1330, 20 ianuarie 1941.
- 59 "De la ideal la conjurație", in *Timpul*, nr. 1371, 13 martie 1941.
- 60 RĂDULESCU-MOTRU, C., *Scieri politice*, pp. 572-73.
- 61 *Ibid.*, p. 571.
- 62 *Ibid.*, p. 13.
- 63 RĂDULESCU-MOTRU, C., *Revizuire și adăugirii.1943*, București, 1944, p. 170.
- 64 RĂDULESCU-MOTRU, C., *Scieri politice*, p. 578.
- 65 *Ibid.*, p. 600, 645.
- 66 The concept of "destiny" was already the subject matter of an earlier book the author published in 1940, in which he made the distinction between the chronological time measured by the clock, and the "time that we live" (*timpul trăit*), for which he used the term "destiny". See, RĂDULESCU-MOTRU, C., *Timp și destin*, București, 1940.
- 67 RĂDULESCU-MOTRU, C., *Scieri politice*, pp. 643-44.
- 68 *Ibid.*, p. 600, 629, 652.

- ⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 654.
- ⁷⁰ RĂDULESCU-MOTRU, C., *Revizuire și adăugirii*. 1943, p.170.
- ⁷¹ Motru's *Revizuire și adăugirii* appeared in a total of 6 volumes, covering the period 1943-1948. The first two volumes relating to the period 1943-44 were of particular interest for the purposes of this study.
- ⁷² RĂDULESCU-MOTRU, C., *Revizuire și adăugirii*, p.151.
- ⁷³ *Ibid.*, p.13.
- ⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 151.
- ⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 254.
- ⁷⁶ See TODERAȘCU, Ion, ed., *G. Brătianu. Cuvinte către români. Zece conferințe și prelegeri*, ed. Univ. "Al.I.Cuza", Iași, 1996. Before being published for the first time in 1942, the lectures were presented to the students at the University of Bucharest, on radio and at the Free University. Brătianu was convinced that what Romanians needed most at that moment was not to loose courage and he consequently put a lot of effort into raising the national spirit. See, for instance, "Destinul în viața poparelor", in *Curentul*, nr. 4718, 8 aprilie 1941.
- ⁷⁷ See, "... Un istoric printre politicieni", in *Dosarele istoriei*, nr.1 (53), 2001, p. 27.
- ⁷⁸ SEBASTIAN, Mihail, *Jurnal*, p. 280.