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BEHIND ESTATE: COSSACK PARTICULARISM AND INADEQUACIES OF THE NATIONAL PARADIGM

Abstract
The nineteenth century has long been considered as the age of nationalism during which different societies across Europe and beyond gave up their regional and social class identities in favor of the national ones or adjusted the former to the latter. However, increasingly more historians call this view into question, drawing attention to individual and collective historical actors who did not think of themselves in ethnic or national terms. This article builds upon the recent scholarship on national indifference in search for a new approach to studying the collective identifications of people, whose sense of belonging has always been a subject of discussions—the Cossacks.

Keywords: Cossacks, Russian Empire, Ukraine, Kuban, North Caucasus, nationalism, national indifference.

Introduction
Sometime in the first half of the 1840s, during his trip across the Caucasus, the German traveler and naturalist Moritz Wagner found himself involved in an unusual conversation in the town of Ekaterinodar, the capital of the Black Sea Cossacks. A borderland military outpost rather than a center of urban life, Ekaterinodar was anything but a place to enjoy sophisticated discussions with representatives of the learned society, and Wagner was spending his time with some Cossack officers whose trust he won while drinking glasses of vodka to their health. One day, their talk turned to the question of the Cossacks’ origin. Wagner had already had some insight into this matter and was willing to share knowledge with his companions. This knowledge, however, nearly led to a conflict. The traveler naively assured the officers that, according to the renowned philologist Julius Klaproth, the term “Cossack” was a loanword from the Tatar language, where it meant nothing more than a
robber. Such an unpleasant etymological note provoked anger on the part of the Cossacks, and Wagner hastened to defuse the situation by saying that another great scholar, the Russian historian Karamzin, debunked this offensive hypothesis and defended their honorable name. Karamzin proved, as Wagner told them, that “Cossack” meant a volunteer, partisan, daredevil, and that “it was only applied to bold soldiers who bled and died for freedom, country, and faith.” The Cossacks were pleased and went on drinking vodka, resenting Klaproth, and giving Karamzin hearty cheers.¹

Wagner believed that even the Cossack officer stratum had quite a vague understanding of where their name came from and what it meant, but they were fully confident that it signified something valiant, honest, and brave. The word “Cossack,” which comes in English from Ukrainian kozak and has a slightly different Russian equivalent kazak, was indeed a loanword from the Turkic languages, where, as it has been well established, it signified “a free, independent person, an adventurer, a vagabond.”² The first Cossack communities, which appeared in the sixteenth century along such rivers as the Dnieper, Don, Terek, and Yaik, fully complied with these meanings. They were bands of freebooters, formed from social groups as diverse as runaway serfs and adventurous nobles, whose way of life consisted of forays into either neighboring or more distant territories, be it Muscovy, the Ottoman Empire, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, or the communities of the North Caucasus people. The Cossack communities were independent, horizontally organized, and open to all newcomers regardless of their origin. These communities elected their elders through the assemblies and managed their own affairs at the assemblies as well. Gradually, with the expansion of Muscovy, they were absorbed into the tsars’ domains. In the eighteenth century, the Cossack hosts ended up as military communities in the service of the empire, dependent on the will of the tsars.

At the time of the collapse of the tsarist regime, eleven Cossack hosts populated the imperial fringes from the Black Sea steppes to the Pacific coast. These late imperial Cossack communities shared little similarity with the original freebooters of the early modern era and constituted large social organizations of irregular troops employed by the authorities for military purposes and, later, used to suppress demonstrations and popular unrest. Moreover, not all of these hosts existed before the nineteenth century. What place, then, was secured for the Cossacks within the imperial social order? How did the former freebooters manage to survive until the very end of the modernizing empire? The irony was that the existence of the
Cossacks in the late imperial time could hardly be named as a survival. Rather, it was, to a considerable extent, a surprisingly modern phenomenon that owed much to imperial social creativity. In this sense, the Cossack estate had a remarkably close parallel with another example of imperial social engineering—the system of Indian castes, which, as Nicholas Dirks showed, was not “an unchanged survival of ancient India,” but a largely modern innovation, introduced by the colonial British authorities in order to categorize and manage the unfamiliar social reality.3

To a certain degree, the Russian Empire followed a similar pattern. It invented the category of soslovie (estate) as a way of organizing the diversity of its population into an easily manageable system. The groups that eluded clear-cut social definition were subsumed under the estate system. The authorities appropriated pre-existing traditions and recast them in a new manner, endowing them with particular rights and responsibilities.4 Thus, diverse and heterogeneous social groups became legal categories, among which were the Cossacks and plenty of the so-called inorodtsy (literally, “of alien origin”), i.e. colonized imperial people, lumped together into legally defined groups and provided with artificial traditions. In the words of Vladimir Bobrovnikov that echo those of Dirks, they were “constructed in the course of the colonial conquest.”5

Cossack hosts, with their various collective experiences, conditions of life, and personal backgrounds, were first ascribed to the soslovie category in Mikhail Speranskii’s Code of Laws in 1832, but their status was elaborated in detail some years later. At first, it was done so for the Don Cossacks in 1835, and for the rest of the hosts—in the subsequent decade. In its homogenizing endeavor, the state institutionally determined the Cossacks’ way of life from above, cementing their fluid relationships into the static and thereby relatively easily governable construct. The Cossacks were not governed by common imperial law, but were subjected to the regulations of military code, developed by central authorities. Henceforth, Cossacks turned into a privileged part of the population of the Russian Empire, a specific military caste that possessed peculiar rights and obliged to execute specific military duties.6

While the relationship between the Cossacks and the state were determined through the concept of estate, it allowed authorities to avoid officially the intricate problem of determining the social nature of the Cossacks in terms of nationality (narodnost’), which gained currency in the 1830s. However, the question of whether there was something besides the estate principle, and, if so, what it was, preoccupied the minds of
many. Some went as far as to regard the Cossacks as a separate ethnic category within the greater Russian nation. For example, in his work *The Geography of the Russian Empire*, the educator Ivan Pavlovskii listed the Cossacks as one of the most important nations (*narody*) of Russia, along with the Great Russians, Little Russians, and Belarusians. For him, their peculiarity was apparent, but it could not be easily catalogued. As he explained in his survey, “the Cossacks share with the Russians only two common features: faith and language; in all other respects of their folk way of life they differ drastically from the latter, such as by physiognomy, mores, clothes, housings etc.”

Other scholars, agreeing with this classification, attached greater importance to such a taxonomy in political terms. The ethnographer Sergei Maksimov contrasted the Belarusians who, as he claimed, were averse to the idea of their separateness and national exclusivity, with the Little Russians, the Cossacks, and the Siberians, who he believed were prone to separatism.

The idea of the Cossacks as a full-fledged and separate member of the all-Russian family could indeed be a banner for some politically engaged Cossack circles, such as a small but conspicuous group of the “Cossack nationalists” (if anything, such was their self-designation), which were active on the Don in the early 1910s.

Views of this kind did not belong to the mainstream. Much of the Russian intelligentsia increasingly viewed the Cossacks as an epitome of all the things Russian. This remarkable, mostly of literary origin, myth had a long-lasting career. It was powerful enough to be able to affect imperial policy towards the Cossacks in the reigns of Alexander III and Nicholas II or, notably, led many anti-Bolshevik officers during the Civil War to believe that Cossack lands were destined to play the major role in crushing the Bolsheviks. However, the late imperial fascination with the Cossacks reveals more about the intelligentsia’s beliefs rather than something about the Cossacks themselves.

**Ethnicity, Nation, or Neither?**

In the last decades, a number of scholars attempted to explain the peculiar nature of the Cossacks in terms familiar to social sciences, taking the largest Cossack community, the Don Cossack host, as a model. Since the 1980s, when it became possible to discuss openly Cossack-related themes, Russian historiography has adopted the term *subetnos* (sub-ethnic group) that came into the academic fashion largely due to the influence of
the leading Soviet anthropologist Yulian Bromlei. Despite, or, more likely, thanks to its vagueness, this concept has come into general use among post-Soviet researchers. It contained the notion of ethnicity as a reference point, having the “less than ethnicity” connotation.  

Some scholars attempted to explain the question with the help of analytical categories developed within the Western theories of nations and nationalism. Peter Holquist argued that it was only in the course of the Civil War that the Don Cossacks came to understand themselves as a sort of separate ethnic group, detached from the Russian one, albeit associated with it. The reason for this transformation was the collapse of the social system of the Russian Empire, due to which the very estate categorization died out. It shattered the foundations of the Cossacks existence as an estate, since the Russian imperial order was “the one universally recognized structure that gave form to Cossack identity.” Some attempts to formulate the idea of Cossack separateness as either ethnic or national group were undertaken in earlier decades as well, but they were scant. Even during the Civil War, as Holquist stressed, being Cossack meant to participate in the Cossack political allegiance rather than to be of Cossack descent.  

If Holquist used the term *ethnos* with regard to the final stage of the collective existence of the Don Cossacks, another historian of the Don Cossack host, Shane O’Rourke, opted for classifying them as a *nation*. While agreeing that the collapse of the empire indeed was the turning point in the Don Cossacks’ understanding of themselves, which forced them to resort to the idea of nationhood, he nevertheless contends that long before these events threw the Cossacks into the arms of the nation, they had already constituted a tightly knit community with the firmly secured boundaries. According to him, by 1917 the Don Cossacks had already existed as a distinct group for centuries, while the post-1917 dramatic developments became for the Cossacks the period of transition “from a separate but subordinate community to a nation.” Yet the nature of this separateness is unclear. O’Rourke generally avoids using clear-cut definitions but tends to present the Cossacks as an “ethnic group,” capable of being compared with the Finns or the Latvians. Their distinctiveness was built on a historical memory about their former statehood, their rootedness in the Don lands, their local institutions and traditions of self-administration, and a powerful sense of cohesiveness, based on some specific kinds of Cossack social relations. All that, in his opinion, “gave them an existence in their own right.” However, he applied the term “nation” to the pre-1917 Don Cossack community as well, noting that
the absence of nationally minded intellectuals was an important feature
that distinguished the Don Cossacks from other European nations in the
making. “Ironically, the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have been full
of intelligentsias looking for a nation,” while “the Cossacks were unusual
in being a nation in search of an intelligentsia.”

Brian Boeck, the author of a comprehensive and sophisticated study of
the Don Cossacks in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, advocates
for the use of the term *ethnos* for the Don host of the eighteenth century
as well. In the late seventeenth century, as he established, the Don
Cossack community ceased to accept newcomers to its structure, closing
the boundaries of the Cossack corporative body. Eventually this led to
the emergence of the self-contained community, closed in on itself. In
another article, dedicated to the Kuban Cossacks, the second largest host in
the Russian Empire, Boeck is less specific about the limits of the Cossacks’
particularism. Stating that “prior to the revolution the Cossacks had clear
conceptions of group identity (drawing important distinctions between
themselves and their Russian, Ukrainian, and Caucasian neighbors) and
zealously guarded the boundaries of their communities against non-
Cossacks,” he does not specify how far this identity extended. It remains
unclear, for instance, whether it embraced exclusively members of the
Kuban Cossack community, or it also included the neighboring Don and
Terek Cossacks. Without further specifications, one can go as far as to
conclude that the rest of the Cossack hosts, separated by thousands of
kilometers, shared a more or less common sense of identity regardless
of distance, the absence of horizontal communication, and the striking
differences in administrative, social, military, economical, and cultural
organization of their life.

Thomas Barrett’s book about the Terek Cossacks seems to be the only
study that shows the irrelevance of the concepts of *nation* and *ethnos*
with regard to the Cossack communities. Barrett points out that the Terek
Cossacks’ identifications were “locally grounded” and were shaped by a
very limited set of social interactions, in which they were involved. The
Cossacks rarely participated in war campaigns *en masse* and “looked more
to their regiments—or their villages, or their part of their villages, even—for
a sense of identity.” They had some sense of belonging to the empire’s
Cossackdom, but did not think much about what this belonging actually
meant. Barrett cites the words by a contemporary observer that, just like
Moritz Wagner’s companions, “in most cases they call themselves simply
‘Cossacks’ not understanding the significance of the word.” For Barrett,
generalizing conclusions about the Terek Cossacks’ identities would be futile, since “the frontier identities of the Terek Cossacks were as diverse as the people themselves and many, no doubt, combined identities.”

Such inconsistencies in using definitions may be explained by the difficulties confronting the language of social sciences with its fixation on the national or ethnic identities, but they also raise further important questions. There is an evident over-representation of the Don Cossacks in the studies dealing with the history of the Cossacks in the Russian Empire. Studying this particular Cossack community, historians tend, albeit implicitly, to extrapolate their conclusions to other Cossack hosts. It results in an unwitting essentialization and homogenization of the Cossacks estate, for which reason it is not always clear how broadly the Cossack distinctiveness should be interpreted. If, according to the suggested models, the Cossacks came to see themselves as either an ethnos or nation, it is often far from clear, which Cossack hosts “matured” to such degree. Apparently, minor Cossack hosts created by the authorities in the nineteenth century almost from scratch, as was the case of the Ussuri, Amur, or Semirech’e Cossack hosts, could not claim any sort of ethnicity or nationhood for themselves. Yet, even such large hosts that boasted their ancient historical roots as the Kuban or Terek Cossack hosts were in fact aggregations of people of various origin and background, who spoke different languages and were brought together at different times by the state interest. This makes them unlikely candidates for “ethnic” or “national” communities.

The case of the Kuban Cossacks, as the Black Sea Cossacks came to be called after 1860, is particularly illustrative. Nearly half of them spoke in a dialect of Ukrainian, while another half spoke a vernacular form of Russian, and this cultural rupture was an undercurrent of many local developments. The Kuban Cossacks clearly shared a sense of belonging to a Kuban Cossack military organization and differentiated themselves from both Ukrainian- and Russian-speaking non-Cossack settlers that came to live on their land in large numbers. But the processes of self-identification also worked the other way around. With the rise of ethnography as a scientific discipline that relied on language as a criterion for categorizing human diversity, local elites and intellectuals acknowledged the Cossacks’ cultural affinities with the Little Russians and Great Russians and somehow asserted their belonging partially to the Little Russian people, and partially—to the Great Russian. Yet these “ethnic” loyalties, which rank-and-file Cossacks were not necessarily aware of, were of
secondary importance in comparison to the loyalty to the host. Given these circumstances, can we postulate the awkward social model, according to which two different Cossack “(sub-)ethnic” groups existed within a larger Kuban Cossack “ethnos,” which in turn was subordinate to the larger Ukrainian and Russian ethnic communities at once? Or, if the concept of *ethnos*, let alone *nation*, just did not work, should we nevertheless insist on employing it to better understand this complex social phenomenon?

**National Indifference in East-Central Europe**

In a number of his works, Rogers Brubaker famously warned against conflating the category of practice, be it either “ethnicity” or “nation”, with the category of analysis. The way of thinking about “ethnic groups and nations as real entities, as communities, as substantial, enduring, internally homogenous and externally bounded collectivities,” so conventional to the social sciences, he argued, led to a major misconception in scholarship, which he referred to as the social ontology of “groupism.”\(^{17}\) By this, he did not intend to imply that these terms should be discarded from the conceptual apparatus of humanities. Rather, Brubaker called for ultimate caution in their use:

Ethnicity, race, and nation should be conceptualized not as substances or things or entities or organisms or collective individuals—as the imagery of discrete, concrete, tangible, bounded, and enduring “groups” encourages us to do—but rather in relational, processual, dynamic, eventful, and disaggregated terms. This means thinking of ethnicity, race, and nation not in terms of substantial groups or entities but in terms of practical categories, situated actions, cultural idioms, cognitive schemas, discursive frames, organizational routines, institutional forms, political projects, and contingent events. It means thinking of ethnicization, racialization, and nationalization as political, social, cultural, and psychological processes. And it means taking as a basic analytical category not the “group” as an entity but groupness as a contextually fluctuating conceptual variable.\(^{18}\)

Indeed, the conceptual apparatus of the social sciences is rooted in the political experience of twentieth-century Europe, which ostensibly ended up as a commonwealth of nation states. It implies that the unavoidable and progressive mass nationalization underlies modern societies and, simultaneously, is the reason for them being modern. According to this
nationalism-cum-modernization template, the advent of nationalism was inevitable as far as societies succeeded in their development. Thus, different societies were advancing, at varying speeds and with varying success, toward the national state of mind. This narrative conflates the arrival point, i.e. national state, with the point of departure that already contains the preassigned vector of movement towards the nation. Such a vantage point on the history of Europe leaves little room for those who might not have been involved in the orbit of nationhood. The omission of people with no precise national belonging or with many non-national ones, thus, is not an oversight of the contemporary scholarship. It stems from the presumption inherent in the social sciences as such. As James Bjork put it,

The virtual absence of such [nationally indifferent] groups in European historiography is not just a “gap,” an unfortunate lacuna in historians’ research agendas. It reflects, rather, a fundamental difficulty in imagining individuals and groups who operate outside of a definite national context, actors whose nationality might provide a useful external perspective for exploring not only the internal engines of nationalization but also the limits of such processes. Part of the challenge of exploring the phenomenon of national indifference, of course, is envisioning whether and where the residents of modern societies could plausibly escape the omnipresence of the nation.¹⁹

The underlying premise of this article proceeds from the assumption that neither nation nor ethnos should be the measures with which every society should be approached, especially when societies stubbornly resisted being analyzed, described, or explained with the help of these criteria. In other words, one should not keep looking for the “nation” or “ethnos” if one experiences insurmountable difficulties in finding them. As I argue, the Cossacks were but one case of that social reality, where these concepts barely worked.

In her programmatic article “Imagined Noncommunities: National Indifference as a Category of Analysis,” Tara Zahra invited historians to reevaluate critically the power of nationalism in both nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Instead of seeing Europe as an arena of nations in the making and communities being imagined, she suggested taking the category of “national indifference” as an analytical tool for studying personal and collective identifications.²⁰ According to her, ambiguous
loyalties were a norm rather than an exception in the pre-1914 era, but even after 1918 exclusive national identities did not gain that much ground as it is universally believed. Outlining the new perspective for historical research, Zahra took stock of the work already done by a collective of scholars to which she herself belongs.

This collective of historians who specialize on the Habsburg monarchy and, more particularly, Bohemia, addressed the issue of non-national allegiances on different levels—from representatives of educated elites, engaged in politics and culture, to “ordinary” people. The pioneering book by Jeremy King, focused on local politics in the Bohemian town of Budweis/Budejovice, provided an in-depth analysis of the city, much of the population of which did not fall exclusively into the categories of either “the Czechs” or “the Germans.” Instead, they constituted a society that comfortably existed somewhere in-between, being overwhelmingly bilingual and choosing one nationally-framed side or another depending on circumstances and transient preferences.21

The path-breaking book by Peter Judson has demonstrated the failure of the efforts of national activists in the Habsburg monarchy to win the sympathies of the local population for the national cause. Judson’s book, which concentrates on such regions as South Bohemia, South Styria, and South Tyrol, focuses on a wide range of topics, all of which testify to the unwillingness of the local people to participate in nationalist undertakings. Judson puts into question the very concepts of frontier or border as ideological tools employed by national activists “as part of a larger strategy to normalize national identities and to eradicate both bilingualism and the alternative loyalties that it represented.” Contrary to the nationalists’ claims, the inhabitants of such areas rarely viewed the territories they lived in as borderlands that separated nations and “did not automatically translate division in language use into divisions of self-identification or even of loyalty.” Developing his argument, Judson suggests that the notion of language frontier, too, should be treated with care since the majority of people who were supposedly divided by language, were in fact bilinguals and easily switched languages depending on situation and their own interests. Remarkably, it was newcomers to these regions, nationally-minded intellectuals, who saw themselves as spokespersons of “real” local interests, “authentic rural insiders with a natural right to set the local agenda.”22

Tara Zahra, a former Judson’s student, applied his approach to another subject. Her book, devoted to the nationalist struggle in Bohemia to take
control of children’s education by establishing schools, orphanages, and organizing the welfare system, also revealed the striking reluctance of largely bilingual commoners to enroll themselves in the exclusive, monolingual national communities.\textsuperscript{23}

The criticisms against the borderland paradigm are true for not just “weak,” unmarked borders, but for “strong” borders as well. Even the ostensibly firm, stable and long-existing “natural” state borders like that between Saxony and Bohemia, which had existed since mid-fifteenth century, as it appears on closer examination, were no less permeable than the shifting language frontiers described by Judson. This is evident from Caitlin Murdock’s study of the German and Czech nationalists’ struggle with the national ambiguity of the local population on both sides of the Saxon-Bohemian border.\textsuperscript{24}

While these works deal with the Habsburg monarchy, the classic model of supranational empire and, thus, the most likely place to find non-nationals, other important studies demonstrate that national unawareness was not unique to the Habsburg Empire. By the example of Upper Silesia, James E. Bjork demonstrated that in the German Empire there were large numbers of people who continued to think in non-national categories well into the twentieth century. Besides, his work has made it evident that national indifference was characteristic for Central European highly industrialized and modernized regions as well. Proceeding from his analysis of the local electoral politics, census data, and the results of the plebiscite of 1921, he has shown that due to the influence of the Catholic elites, which partially resulted in and partially was reinforced by the nationalists parties’ lack of success in rallying people around national cause, a large part of the population of Upper Silesia were ambivalent about their national status.\textsuperscript{25}

Historians of the Ottoman Empire and its successor states have also contributed to the scholarship that breaks with the national and ethnic-centered analytical framework. Nicholas Doumanis proposed to get rid of the national paradigm’s “retrospectively ascribed distortions and anachronisms” and to look at the social composition of the late Ottoman Empire as a kaleidoscopic diversity of social solidarities that were not aligned according to the language or religious criteria, but were based upon the notion of locality, where the people jointly lived. Analyzing the testimonies of Greek Orthodox Christians who left Turkey in the course of the “great unmixing of peoples” of 1912-1924, he shows that the violence that occurred in these years was not caused by inter-ethnic tensions. On
the contrary, the violence created the very situation when individuals were forced to choose the side. Moreover, the choice was already made for them by those who spoke on behalf of their assumed national communities.  

In her research of the population exchange and mass migrations between Greece and Bulgaria in the first half of the twentieth century, Theodora Dragostinova has examined the fates of people who were involved in these processes. She has shown that those, whom the governments of both countries counted as Bulgarian Greeks and Greek Bulgarians, i.e. the national minorities that by historical chance found themselves living in a wrong homeland, sought ways to stay in their actual homelands. These people resisted the national ascription from the part of the nationalizing states, even if they adopted the “national language” imposed by the authorities to negotiate more tolerable conditions for themselves. 

The Russian Empire, Ukraine, and National Uncertainty

All these works show that people in East-Central Europe did not necessarily framed the experience of their collective existence in national or ethnic terms. Moreover, they demonstrate that nationalization of the masses met with serious difficulties even in the regions with well-developed nationalist movements, which possessed the means and, as in the case of the Habsburg monarchy, relative freedom of action to propagate their ideal of nation. To what extent are their conclusions applicable to the Russian Empire or the states that emerged across the post-imperial space? 

So far, no studies have examined the issue of national uncertainty there in a way comparable to the works described above. Even those works that came close to this problem failed to address it explicitly, which testifies to the resistance of scholarly language to the challenges of this kind. In one of a few monographs written in the genre of local history and dedicated to the borderland area between Ukraine and Russia, Donbass, its author, Hiroaki Kuromiya, admitted that he had begun to explore the history of this region relying on the theory of nations and nationalism suggested by Ernest Gellner, but instead found there “nonnations” and “nonnationalism.” However, he did not make these categories instrumental for his research and proceeded to use more convenient and well-developed framework of references based on national terminology with its clear and non-problematic usage of the designations the “Ukrainians” and the “Russians.”
Moreover, he openly juxtaposed them as adverse communities who lived separately in cities and villages and expressed their mutual hostility by means of physical violence.\textsuperscript{28}

An important exception is Kate Brown’s book dedicated to the Soviet ethnic constructivism in the region of Volhynia during the interwar period. Brown has put into the focus of her research the policy toward nationally indifferent Ukrainian and Polish speakers, who were unsure about their ethnic belonging. She points out that the lack of understanding of how to categorize these communities along the ethnic lines caused many difficulties for the Soviet authorities.\textsuperscript{29}

Unlike the early Soviet period, when the authorities required people to be national and used expert knowledge to determine it from above, the Russian Empire did not envision the imperial edifice as a structure divided into national compartments and, just as it was elsewhere, room for non-national allegiances was much broader.\textsuperscript{30} Some of the historians of the Romanov Empire have long come to realize the need of studying non-nationals. As early as 1985, Alfred Rieber called on historians to hear “the voices of inarticulate,” those who associated not with the nation, but primarily with soslovie or certain regions.\textsuperscript{31} Andreas Kappeler also came close to putting the feasibility of the nation-related conceptual apparatus into question. He wondered: “Are elites and commoners, townspeople and peasants members of the same nation? Or do they have any national consciousness at all?”\textsuperscript{32}

These questions have not become a subject of special studies, yet fruitful discussions about ambivalent, multi-dimensional and non-national identifications of imperial subjects did take place. In 2005, in the journal \textit{Ab Imperio}, Mikhail Dolbilov and Darius Staliunas urged for caution in using the concept of “nation” and nationally-loaded terminology with respect to the imperial era because it leads to the imposition of modern-day analytical techniques on the logic of historical actors. Historians, they wrote, must not “lose sight of the differences between today’s categories of research and the language of self-description of actors of nation-building (or the language used, for example, by the imperial authorities to describe their activities).”\textsuperscript{33} Further elaborating their point in another essay, they argued that the late imperial understanding of the “great Russian nation” (which, apart from Great Russians, included, Little Russians and Belorussians) was rather a “not so consolidated set of ideas and feelings that were compatible with other, non-ethnic definitions of Russianness,” in which “the ethnocentric narrative did not play the crucial part.”\textsuperscript{34}
The fact that the discussion about non-national allegiances in the Russian Empire was raised around the question of cultural and political loyalties of the population of Ukraine is particularly illustrative, given all the complexities associated with the problem of the identifications of Ukrainian speakers in the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Romanov monarchy. While the exclusive Ukrainian identity was shared by a relative minority of national activists, much of rural population and a significant part of educated elites were rather unsure about the boundaries of the community they belonged to. In the same work quoted above, Andreas Kapeller stressed that those individuals with Little Russian allegiances, whom the Ukrainian national activists treated with disdain, retained a powerful sense of local patriotism and devotedness to local traditions, combining it with the loyalty to the emperor and the commitment to Russian culture. Kappeler argued that although with the rise of nationalism people’s identifications with the Russian or Ukrainian nations came into conflict, various degrees of mixed identities continued to exist in the minds of many.35

In another study, which continued the discussion in Ab Imperio and was focused on imperial identifications of Ukrainian speakers, Ernest Gyidel stressed that even representatives of educated elites always had more than two options as to how to think of themselves. While there were those who considered themselves conscious Ukrainians and those who called themselves members of the Russian nation, space in-between was filled with people that oscillated and combined overlapping allegiances, adhering to several identifications at once.36 A more recent ambitious attempt to approach the issue of Little Russian identifications was undertaken by Faith Hillis in her book on what she called “the Little Russian idea,” by which she implied the use of the local patriotism to political ends. Her study sheds light on that part of Ukrainian/Little Russian society that took pride in local cultural and historical peculiarities and tried to adjust these sympathies to the imperial ideology. Hillis invokes the literature on national indifference, specifically the works by Judson and Zahra. However, contrary to the declared intention, she makes far-reaching conclusions about the adherence of Little Russian intellectuals to the modern Russian nationalism, in this way portraying them as ardent Russian nationalists, albeit with local specificity.37

Another approach, proposed recently by Alexei Miller, also draws from the scholarship on national indifference, but, unlike Hillis, it gives nationally indifferent Ukrainian speakers much more agency. Miller
applies the concept of national indifference to Little Russian elites, who opposed being enrolled into either Ukrainian or Russian nation and comfortably felt within non-national imperial environment and military service. In doing so, he suggests seeing Little Russians in line with other examples of nationally indifferent elites of the Russian Empire who put local loyalties above national ones. Such were the Baltic Germans, the gentry of Bessarabia, and the intellectual and political movement of krajowcy, who combined Polish, Lithuanian and Belarusian identifications at once (studied in a similar vein by Karsten Brüggemann, Andrei Cușco, and Darius Staliunas).38

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The irrelevance of the analytical language that frames both the Cossacks and Ukrainian speakers in exclusively ethnic or national terms and represents them as more or less coherent groups that had a common ethnocultural “identity” becomes particularly conspicuous when it comes to Ukrainian-speaking Kuban Cossacks. In this case, two difficult research problems overlap, only adding to the complexity of each.

On the level of commoners, who remained aloof from intellectual processes related to contemplation of the Kuban Cossacks’ history, distinctiveness, and their place within the imperial structure, the level of engagement in nation building was negligible. In Kuban, where the Ukrainian national movement was incomparably weaker than in the provinces on the territory of today’s Ukraine, mobilization into the Ukrainian nation had much less chance to gain a stronghold. Just as it was elsewhere, Ukrainian nationalists lamented the lack of national awareness, and it was all the more obvious given that their activities took place clandestinely, in drastically different conditions. On the other hand, we may conclude that the problems that Ukrainian activists faced were not peculiar for the Ukrainian national movement only and that, contrary to the claims of contemporary Kuban researchers of this issue, its weakness was not determined by some unnatural character of Ukrainian nationhood in Kuban and the Kuban Cossacks’ “voluntary convergence with the Russian people.”39

It goes without saying that the persecution of the Ukrainian nationalist activities as well as the ban of the public use of the Ukrainian language in 1863 and then in 1876 by the imperial authorities decisively contributed
to the weakness of the Ukrainian national movement. However, attributing all responsibility for this on the state policies would be erroneous. In the Habsburg Empire, where no such harsh persecutions existed, we can observe similar processes. A recent study by Andriy Zayarnyuk, devoted to Ukrainian speaking peasants of Austrian Galicia, sheds light on national indifference in the region of the Habsburg monarchy where the Ukrainian national movement had much more power in comparison with the Romanov Empire. Zayarnyuk argues that even “by the end of the nineteenth century, the national activists did not succeed in imposing the Ukrainian identity among the masses of villagers.” Educated elites, in their turn, often had multiple loyalties and did not see themselves as belonging to an exclusive national community. According to him, it was only in interwar Poland that “the possibility of avoiding the tenets of the national projects came to a close.”

The weakness of the Ukrainian national movement in Kuban does not mean, by extension, that the state-led, Russifying nationalization took the upper hand. In Kuban, as in the Little Russian gubernias, the state did not possess enough resources to instill into villagers’ consciousness a sense of being Russian nationals. Neither did it elaborate a clear strategy of how to implement it. A number of historians stress that the paucity of state functionaries made the empire an unlikely candidate to enact an effective policy of nationhood. Its weakness determined its eventual failure to, as Stephen Velychenko puts it, “nationalize the Russians, and to russify the non-Russians.” According to Alfred Rieber, peasants’ encounters with the state representatives were so rare that there were minimal possibilities to intervene into their everyday life. “The state fixed the amount of taxes and the number of recruits that the peasants apportioned and gathered for it. It punished disobedience and rebellion. Beyond that the state had little to do with the peasants in ordinary times; it was a kind of absentee government.” Moreover, the bureaucracy did not carry out any definite, efficient, and assertive policies when it came to nationality issues. Alexei Miller stresses that imperial policy toward the Little Russians did not contain an affirmative agenda and rested instead on restrictive measures. In other words, tsarist bureaucracy knew what to forbid, but had very weak ideas about what to allow, support, and promote. The state did not develop a consistent policy with regard to the Little Russians until the collapse of the empire in 1917. This does not allow us to regard the imperial apparatus as an effective actor in the nationalization of the masses. This is particularly true in the case of Kuban, where the state
was utterly underrepresented and the Cossack administration itself ran much of the affairs normally carried out by the state.

While rank-and-file Kuban Cossacks did not belong to any nation or ethnos *sensu stricto*, neither did the Cossack educated elites. They were preoccupied with retaining their privileges and referred to the early modern origins of their community not due to national considerations, but because they strove to secure the status of the host. Here, too, we can make some cautious comparisons with other social groups that existed within the state order that did not demand them to be national. An interesting parallel can be traced with Bohemian nobles, who opposed Habsburg centralism and referred to the ancient historic rights of the Bohemian crown not out of concern for the national self-determination of the Czech people, but rather seeking “to increase their power by strengthening the institutions, local and provincial, in which they retained the most influence.” As officers who owed everything to their service of the empire, the Cossack elites somewhat resembled Habsburg militaries who defined themselves through their military service, being resistant to the advances of nationalism and having no nationality.

The Cossack elites had parallel attachments to the empire, to Cossackdom, to their region and their host, to their Little Russian or Great Russian distinctiveness, but none of these loyalties was national. It was an intricate mixture of identifications, aptly characterized by Alon Rachamimov as a situation when “a myriad of collective identifications might be simultaneously attractive to an individual, while not presupposing that these were fundamentally different from—or conflictual with—one another.” With all their inconsistencies, as Rachamimov holds, these identifications did not necessarily belong to different categories or possess different strengths, and an individual did not need to be worried that different notions of collectivity would impinge upon one another.

The conclusions, made by historians with respect to other multi-cultural and borderland societies in other parts of the world can prove surprisingly useful for a better and more nuanced understanding of the phenomenon of the late imperial Cossacks and for the acceptance of the complexity of their allegiances, which cannot be easily disentangled with the help of modern-day analytical tools. Instead of pondering how the concepts of *ethnos* or *nation* can help to elucidate the Cossacks’ sense of collectivity, we can ask how the Cossacks can question and challenge these very concepts. In this sense, they can significantly broaden our knowledge about the foundations and limitations of collective coexistence.
NOTES


14 Brian J. Boeck, *Imperial Boundaries: Cossack Communities and Empire-Building in the Age of Peter the Great* (Leiden: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 208–21.


25 Bjork, *Neither German nor Pole*.


Alexei Miller, The Ukrainian Question: The Russian Empire and Nationalism in the Nineteenth Century (Budapest, New York: Central European University Press, 2003), 242, 256.


István Deák, Beyond Nationalism: A Social and Political History of the Habsburg Officer Corps, 1848–1918 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 184. Deák was not the first scholar who drew attention to the non-national character of Habsburg militaries. As early as 1929, Oszkár Jászi stated that Habsburg army’s officers “constituted something like an anational caste.” See Oszkár Jászi, The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), 144. However, Deák does not presume that such a posture stemmed from officer’s non-national background. On the contrary, it was cultivated from above, while ordinary soldiers brought their national consciousness with them while entering into the ranks of the imperial army and did not get out of it during the period of their service since they had “too little time to shed an ethnic identity for a supranational one.” See Deák, Beyond Nationalism, 4. What is more, he insists on the uniqueness of the case of the Habsburg monarchy’s officer corps and contrasts it to the Russian imperial army, which, although multiethnic, was “dominated by the Russian nationality and Eastern Orthodoxy” (ibid., 5).

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