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Romanian-Greek relations during the interwar decades. Political and economic dimensions, Omonia Publishing House, Bucharest, 2011
POPULATION MOVEMENTS, DISPLACEMENT AND REFUGE DURING WORLD WAR I IN ROMANIA (1916-1918)

Abstract
This study examines the background, causes and consequences of population movements, the significance and implications of displacement and refuge during World War I in Romania, as well as the socio-demographic factors related to the above-mentioned evolutions. The article investigates the dimension of individual and collective trauma associated with the experience of refuge, the connection between violence and aggression, on one hand, and displacement and refuge (associated with pauperization) on the other hand. The paper also undertakes the way Romanian authorities have dealt with the prolonged issue of refugees, mainly the social and humanitarian dimensions of it.

Keywords: World War I, Romania, Population Movements, Refuge, Displacement, Casualties

During the last decade, scientific interest dedicated to First World War remained constant, both within Europe and overseas. Historians and other researchers of the worldwide scientific community have agreed that First World War unleashed a paroxysm of violence, aggression and trauma, obviously marking a major radicalisation of warfare. Consequently, major topics of the Great War have been already tackled (to various degrees), focusing mainly on the extent of violence during military confrontations, as well as on the various effects on societies during the war itself, but also during the postwar decades. A huge number of studies, books and articles published during the 20th century (as well as during the first decade of the 21st century), have almost exhausted the topic, at least in Western historiography.

When it comes to Romanian historiography dedicated to First World War, it is worth mentioning that it was dominated, throughout the last decades and particularly during the Communist regime, by research
themes and scientific topics related to the political dispute surrounding Romania’s participation into the War, or simply focused on the military confrontations per se. Despite such a rather linear trend, after 1990 new research themes and fresh perspectives have been assumed by historians and other specialists, such as those exploring everyday life during wartime, the interaction between war, territory and memory, the social and cultural implications of the war and so on.

However, apart from a few tangential contributions, Romanian historiography comprises no scientific works dedicated to population movements and displacement during First World War, conducted in a multidisciplinary manner, given the historical, demographic, social and cultural implications. It seems astonishing that after more than a century after the outbreak of World War I, no academic article or study has yet been accomplished with regard to the experiences of (Romanian) population movements or individual and collective experiences of displacement and refuge. More recently, that is, during the last years, there has been a new wave of historical analysis (assumed within Romanian historiography) exploring the cultural context of wartime violence, not only on the battlefields, but also in relation to the civilian population obviously affected by the war operations. However, in terms of existing approaches, there is no other paper dealing with the issue of population movements, not even for an extended period of time (for instance, the only book, by Dumitru Şandru, is only covering World War II and the first postwar years. In other words, in Romanian historiography there is no scientific equivalent of the Western volume edited by Sandra Barkhof and Angela K. Smith, dedicated to war and displacement occurring in the 20th century, which is a living expression of Western interest for this topic, even though is referring not only to World War I, but also to World War II, in terms of population movements generated by war.

As for Romanian historiography, although there is no work dedicated to the above mentioned topic, we should mention a few significant scientific contributions referring tangentially to the theme. An important one is the work by Grigore Antipa (elaborated in French), which provides significant information and data on the debut of the population movements given the advance of the German forces, as well as specific data on the demographic evolutions triggered by the German occupation. It cannot be omitted, also, the book by Anibal Stoenescu (former Chief of Police in Bucharest, during wartime occupation of the Romanian capital), which offers significant demographic data, obtained mainly due to his position, during
the occupation. Other contributions belong to Constantin Bacalbașă and Virgiliu Drăghiceanu, whose contribution was, in real terms, a sort of diary, kept by the author during German occupation. Various other pieces of information on the displacement and population movements triggered by the war were included in the work of E.C. Decusără, as well as in the work of Alexandru I. Socec. Of course, other useful source of information is represented by memoirs and various press collections.

The present research sets out to assess the background, causes and consequences of population movements, the social and demographic factors, the dimension of individual and collective trauma associated with the experience of refuge, the studying of the connection between displacement and refuge, on one hand, and violence, associated with fear and pauperization, on the other hand. Given their role during the process, this analysis also implies the studying of the way Romanian authorities have dealt with the serious and prolonged issue of the refugees, mainly the humanitarian dimension of the issue. It is worth mentioning that the present study will focus mostly on civilian displacement, and only tangentially on the military displacement.

Any analysis regarding population movements and displacement during World War I in Romania obviously needs to start by investigating the context that generated such processes, starting from Romania’s intervention into World War I and continuing with the specific evolutions leading to the several stages of population movements and refuge.

Romania entered the First World War in August 1916, after two years of hesitations and sinuous negotiations with the Entente, being convinced that siding with the Entente against Central Powers would best serve its national interest, despite the personal inclinations and beliefs expressed by the old King Carol I (at the beginning of the War) and despite the non-interventionist or pro-German approach - a significant one, backed by the majority leading members of the Conservative Party. Before the intervention itself, Romanian society was more and more dominated by the interventionist current, which flowed across party lines and political figures, growing in intensity particularly in universities and intellectual circles across the country.

During the years before Romania’s entry into the War, a plethora of street demonstrations, gatherings and various meetings, held particularly in Bucharest (but not only) have displayed a pro-Entente approach; all of these demonstrations supported Romania’s intervention into the war, and blamed the Government for postponing the final decision to enter the
In the end, after negotiating a treaty of alliance with the Entente powers, Romania decided to enter the War, relying on the recognition from the part of the Entente powers (as stipulated by the treaty of August 17, 1916) of the legitimate right of Romania over the province of Transylvania, and over Romanian inhabited territories within the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Despite initial successes, soon Romania had to face a series of military defeats, eventually leading to the loss of the capital itself. Thus, by December 1916, after a disastrous military campaign of less than four months, Romania had surrendered approximately two thirds of the national territory to the Central Powers, while its Army shrunk to less than 100 000 troops, out of more than 450 000 soldiers. Consequently, after December 1916, Romania comprised an area of less than 40 000 km² (the region of Moldavia), considerably reduced when compared to its previous 138 000 km², and thus overpopulated territory.

When assessing the origins of displacement and refuge, one should take into account three main (and interlinked) dimensions; first of all, the displacement was obviously triggered by the defeat of the Romanian Army and the loss of territory to enemy forces (the Central Powers’ advance was quite impressive); the second and equally important factor consisted in the already existing fears in Romanian society, concerning the (expected) behavior of the enemy troops; the third, and probably the key-factor, was the Romanian authorities’ decision to move the Administration and remaining Army units from Bucharest and surrounding areas to Iași, in Moldova, in order to continue the fight (and resistance) against enemy invasion. Apart from the military defeat itself, which represented a serious blow for the entire nation, nothing seemed to frighten Romanian society more than the ongoing advancement of the Bulgarian forces on Romanian territory, during the fall of 1916 (the image of the dramatic defeat in the battle of Turtucaia - August 24/September 6, was still fresh in Romanian society) particularly after the crossing of the Danube by the joint German-Bulgarian forces. While Germans were rather perceived in Romanian society as being a civilized, well-educated and rigorous people, Bulgarians were seen as a backward and un-educated people, willing to take revenge over Romanians after their defeat by the Romanian forces during the Second Balkan War, when the Romanian Army crossed the Danube, advancing on Bulgarian territory. The Bulgarian resentment over Romania (before and during the First World War) originated from a sense of frustration that profoundly affected Bulgarian society, especially after the territorial losses resulted from the Bucharest Peace Treaty of August 1913,
which was perceived as real national trauma in Bulgaria. The outcome of the Balkan Wars, as well as the Bucharest Peace Treaty of 1913, marked the failure of the Bulgarian national aspirations regarding a Greater Bulgaria (Велика България), which animated the Bulgarian political and intellectual circles, since the signing of the San Stefano Treaty of March 1878. That could explain, to a great extent, the plethora of Bulgarian abuses, as well as the numerous cases of mistreatment (targeting Romanian civilian population and prisoners of war, as well) during the advancement of Bulgarian forces on Romanian territory, since the late summer and early fall of 1916 campaign. In fact, most of the Romanian refugees had no doubts that not only the Bulgarians, but the Germans and Austrians as well, angered by what they perceived as Romania’s treachery, when Romanian Government joined the Entente, would exact revenge.¹⁷

The many cases of abuses and mistreatment by the Bulgarian forces¹⁸ on Romanian ground, as well as Bulgarian mistreatment of Romanian prisoners of war¹⁹ were reflected in several Romanian contemporary testimonies, some of them published immediately after the war, during the interwar decades. For instance, a Romanian contemporary politician and journalist, Constantin Bacalbașa, underlines the fact that Bulgarian soldiers attacked Romania and its civilian population with a sort of deadly hatred, but he is also wondering whether the Bulgarian people was really that wild.²⁰ Probably the most severe description of the Bulgarian behavior on Romanian territory, (and, to some extent, a proof of the fact that Romanian fears regarding a potential Bulgarian vengeance were justified) is the work of G. Rădulescu (written under the pseudonym of Archibald) which is depicting a rather terrifying image of the Bulgarians, by referring to a vast number of murders and rapes committed by the Bulgarian soldiers on Romanian territory (particularly in villages, but not only) that shocked the Romanian civilian population and Romanian society.²¹ The atrocious image of the Bulgarians in Romanian society is somehow confirmed by other contemporary witnesses such as Vasile Th. Cancicov, a former member of the Romanian Parliament, who is referring to the consequences of the potential advancement of Bulgarian soldiers on Romanian territory and the occupation of Bucharest:

[...] the invasion will come. I am terrified about the consequences of such an invasion. Can anyone stay sane, when thinking about the prospect of their arrival (Bulgarians-n.n.)? What should we do? What should I do? Should I simply take my wife and child and run away, as many others? And where to go? In Moldova [...].²²
Another Romanian author, Virgiliu Drăghiceanu, is also referring to the barbarious behavior of the Bulgarian troops in various villages nearby Bucharest (for instance, in the village of Pârlita).  

Going back to the displacement and refuge itself, it should be underlined that there were several stages and waves, as well as various size and evolution, strictly connected to the outcome of military operations. First of all, there was a narrow group of some of the Romanian political and economic elite, which decided to flee, heading towards external destinations, most of them shortly after the Romania’s entry into the War; however, the extent of the phenomenon is quasiunknown, being impossible to document. As the tragedy of the situation was growing, some of the personalities of that time, such as Constantin Gane, have blamed those who abandoned their country, finding refuge for them and for their families far away, in „Norwegian fjords or on the banks of Seine“. It was, without any doubt, the starting point of a moral debate on the guilt of those who stayed in the occupied territory, in sharp contrast with those who decided to flee.

Another wave of refugees was the one that followed the retreating Romanian Army units from the Transylvanian battlefields, after the initial and quite promising Romanian successes over the Austro-Hungarian troops. With the advancement of Central Powers’ forces, a number of refugees, members of the local civilian population, decided to join the Romanian Army in retreat, fearing Austro-Hungarian retaliation.

According to some sources, while the local Hungarians and the Transylvanian Saxons have gathered to welcome the Central Powers’ forces, the Romanians, and particularly the local priests, teachers and heads of local communities that previously backed Romanian authorities, felt suddenly insecure about their life and future, being afraid of a potential vengeance coming from the Austro-Hungarian forces. Thus, due to panic, many of them, around a few thousands (for instance, there were at least 100 priests, together with their families), decided to follow the retreating Romanian Army.

The total number of Romanian individuals that decided to leave and follow the retreating Romanian Army was quite significant, being evaluated to at least 80 000, out of which around 2000 were reserve officers. The following months, some of the Romanians who decided to stay in Transylvania did face various punishment decisions; some have been arrested, while others have been deported, convicted or even sentenced to death. For instance, according to some data, after the retreat of the
Romanian Army, 293 Romanian individuals from Sibiu county have been arrested, while other 205 (from Făgăraș county), 198 (from Brașov county), 146 (Alba county), 134 (Trei Scaune County), 111 (Tîrnava Mare County) and others, totalling 1734 Romanians, have faced the same punitive actions from Hungarian authorities. As for those Romanian individuals who managed to retreat into Romanian controlled territory, most of them took refuge in various big cities, such the capital city of Bucharest, or the Danubian ports of Brăila and Galați.

In the meantime, another wave of Romanian refugees was triggered by the disastrous outcome of the fights in Dobroudja, where Romanian Army units were dramatically defeated during the battle for Turtucaia; the dramatic loss of Turtucaia (August 24-September 6, 1916) and the advance of Bulgarian forces from the South have jeopardized the outcome of the battles in Dobroudja. The fear within Romanian society concerning the evolutions on the battlefields was augmented by the circumstances of the Turtucaia defeat, leading to a serious shock, due to the fact that it emerged somehow unexpectedly for the Romanian collective mind (still relaying on the memory of the easy success achieved by the Army during the Second Balkan War). Moreover, given the Romanian decision to evacuate several towns, such as Constanța (8/21 October 1916), because of the advancement of Bulgarian forces, the already existing panic grew in intensity, increasing the number of refugees among Romanian civilians. According to some researchers, Romanian population in Dobroudja dropped from 147 042 individuals before the confrontations, to around 87990 individuals, which means a decrease of almost 60 000 individuals (for accuracy, 59052). Later on, with the crossing of the Danube by the German, Bulgarian and Ottoman troops (10/23 November 1916), the rapid advancement of Central Powers’s troops on Romanian territory triggered another wave of refugees from Oltenia and Muntenia (Valachia), especially in the countryside, where entire rural communities abandoned their homes heading North, to Bucharest or directly to Moldavia.

Finally, the last and most important wave of Romanian refugees was triggered by the decision (assumed on November 11/24) taken by Romanian authorities to move the Government, the Parliament, foreign diplomatic missions, as well as to withdraw all state institutions to Moldavia, because of the outcome of the military campaign of 1916. The moving of central authorities to Iasi, seemed the best solution for continuing the fight and the resistance, given the situation, especially after the loss of the last battle for Bucharest (the Arges-Neajlov defeat of November 29-December 3,
1916). After the massive refuge of the Romanian administration, the Army was followed by an important contingent of civilians, all of them heading towards Moldavia.

When assessing the refuge itself, one should also consider the categories of refugees as well as the ways of refuge. For instance, the members of Parliament and other Romanian politicians have left Bucharest on special trains, starting with November 13/26, 1916. When the prospect of enemy advancement to Bucharest seemed very plausible, authorities also initiated the moving of Central Administration, Archives and Treasure of the National Bank to Moldavia. The members of the Royal House of Romania also left for Iaşi, Moldavia, on November 13/26, only 3 days before Bucharest was occupied by the enemy forces of the Central Powers. A few days later, November 17/30, even the Romanian Army Headquarter had to be evacuated, heading from Periş (the outskirts of Bucharest) towards Moldavia, in order to coordinate the military operations from a safe place. Other leading members of Romanian political and economic elite traveled by their own cars or by gig (light and fast two wheeled carriage, pulled by one horse), although they had to face the difficulties of the jammed and overcrowded roads, as well as the heavy autumn rains.

In contrast, the refuge of the ordinary people occurred in dramatic and even tragic conditions, due to panic and especially because there was no evacuation plan for the civilian population. It should be mentioned that such a strange approach by the Romanian authorities was not at all singular among the belligerents of the Great War; for instance, similar lack of reactions and/or contradictory orders were given by the French authorities, at the beginning of the German invasion. In many resembling situations, French local civilian population, as well as local authorities, have been deprived of appropriate governmental information, instructions and measures and that led to a certain feeling of abandonment.

As for Romania, in fact, for quite a long time, the authorities have strived to limit the scale of a potential civilian refuge, probably fearing that a massive number of refugees would have impeded the army’s movement, while their massive presence in Moldavia would have generated famine and a growing risk of epidemics, due to overcrowding. However, despite the above-mentioned reluctance, there were some weak and inconsistent attempts, by the Romanian authorities, to organize the evacuation of civilians; thus, in order to organize the evacuation, Romanian authorities have prepared four centers in Bucharest, where permits were issued for those wishing to leave the city by train. Those interested had to go to a
particular center (assigned according to home address) and buy a train ticket, in order to get on board the next day. Very soon, Gara de Nord in Bucharest, the main train station, became extremely overcrowded, making an already chaotic situation even worse, as there were tens of thousands of people willing to leave the city and not enough trains. According to an eye-witness, Elena Th. Emandi, many people, especially children, died aboard wagons due to overcrowding and lack of air, and the other passengers had to throw their bodies off the windows during the travel by train to Moldavia.41

On the other hand, the individuals willing to leave the capital city of Bucharest placed an unbearable burden on the already overstretched Romanian railway network, as significant troops and military equipment were being evacuated or moved to Moldavia. Vasile Bianu, doctor and former Senator of Romania, has described the ordeal of those inhabitants of Bucharest (and other refugees) trying to leave the city by train, during the last days before the arrival of the Central Powers’ forces:

[...] the trains were overcrowded, there were people of all ages sitting even on the roof of the wagons, while others were hanging on the stairs of the wagons or even on the locomotive....a lot of terrible things happened due to overcrowding, some of the passengers have died instantly while others have suffered leg and arm fractures, being crippled for the rest of their lives[...].42

The dramatic situation and widespread panic of the civilian population were aggravated by the fact that, due to war related priorities, the trains carrying civilians had to wait, sometimes for several days, for the passing of the trains transporting troops to the frontline or back, on their retreat.43

When referring to the refugees, it should be mentioned that they were individuals of all ages, origin and background, all of them being driven by panic and despair. Some families travelled together, while others preferred to only send their children (particularly the daughters) and their loved ones as far away as possible, fearing the enemy forces and/or occupation.44 As expected, there were major contrasts and discrepancies regarding the refuge itself. For instance, among the first who left the southern cities and particularly the capital city of Bucharest were the politicians and members of the Romanian Parliament, of various political parties; during the refuge to Moldavia, most of them used their personal influence in order to gain several benefits and advantages. In this respect, the most known case was
the one of Alexandru Constantinescu (also known as Porcu), minister of Agriculture, who used a 17-wagon train for the transportation of all of his personal belongings and valuables, from empty barrels, chairs and tables to firewood and even pickles.\textsuperscript{45}

Obviously, there was a strong connection between the rush and chaos associated with the preparations for departure of the Romanian politicians and authorities, on one hand, and the rising agitation and fear among the urban and rural (Bucharest and the suburbs were already shelter for tens of thousands of refugees) civilian population, on the other hand.

Defeat on the frontline did not spare the civilians, who had to decide whether to remain under enemy occupation or to flee eastward, towards Moldavia, together with the remaining Romanian Army and Administration. Being overwhelmed by the fear of being terrorized by enemy troops, many of them have quickly decided to leave; their displacement was basically triggered by the potential punitive behavior of the enemy troops. Consequently, the retreat of Romanian Administration and Army was soon followed by the retreat of a consistant part of civilian population, in an unorganized, even chaotic movement,\textsuperscript{46} evoked by various contemporary witnesses. Thus, the civilian population, consisting mostly in the so-called \textit{ordinary people} that decided to leave, have used horses-drawn carts and ox-drawn carriages, for their refuge to Moldavia, while many others – in fact, thousands and thousands of them, had to walk the entire distance of a few hundred kilometers to Iaşi.

The refugees that travelled in horse-driven carriages were able to save some of their assets, especially food reserves and smaller items, such as work tools, utensils and clothing, but the heaviest assets had to be left behind. Even so, they were among the fortunate ones, when compared to other refugees, that had no other choice but to travel on foot. The refugees who traveled on foot or by ox-driven carriages also had to face harsher difficulties; such a long journey was definitely an ordeal, due to extreme weather conditions, corroborated with the precarious state of the roads, already overcrowded. The way in which Alexandru I.V. Socec is referring to the ordeal of civilian refuge to Moldavia is more than suggestive:

\textit{[...]}...Until they reached Chitila, they have walked cheerfully, making jokes, laughing...at Ploieşti, after a 60 km walk under the freezing rain, the fatigue has overcome them ...throughout the devastated villages of Moldavia they couldn’t find food, nor shelters...after Focşani, there were already hundreds of dead bodies...later on, at Huşi only arrived 47 children, out of a convoy of 2000 \textit{[...]}.\textsuperscript{47}
When it comes to civilian refuge, a particular case is the one of the boyscouts of Romania (although a youth organisation, boyscouts were initiated in a sort of pre-military training, so to some extent, they were more than just ordinary civilians). After Romania’s entry into the World War I, Romanian boyscouts were involved in various activities, from assisting the Romanian medical staff in hospitals, to offering support in various institutions, such as police and post offices and not only. However, probably the most important activity assigned to Romania’s scouts was the one related to the large number of enemy air raids that the capital city of Bucharest had to face, particularly during the first weeks after Romania’s entry into the war. Thus, due to the increasing number of German air raids over Bucharest, the boy scouts - especially the students, were assigned (during night watches) various observation posts within the capital city of Romania, and they were supposed to alert the authorities and civilian population about the imminence of an enemy air threat (plane and Zeppelin air raids). Queen Marie of Romania herself, mentioned that the boyscouts were using the same signals as the Romanian police officers, in order to alarm the civilian population to find an appropriate shelter, as soon as possible. But after the disastrous Romanian military campaign of 1916, the Association of Romania’s Scouts decided (November 1916) to ask its members to seek refuge into Moldavia. The main reason for such a hasty decision had to do with the bravery the boyscouts have shown during the battle for Targu Jiu; various rumours made the Romanian authorities believe that enemy would take revenge, consequently, Romanian General Staff ordered young men aged 15-19 to follow the rest of Romanian army in exile, for avoiding retaliation and the Association of Romania’s Scouts had to comply. As a consequence, some of the teenagers managed to get on trains, but most of them had to walk all the way (or at least a part of it) to Moldavia. Among the written accounts of the episode, we should mention the one delivered by Sabina Cantacuzino: “[…] Scouts aged from 12 to 17 were sent on their way on foot due to fear of German concentration camps even though they were still in tender childhood; many of them died on the way because of the effort, or influenza, or fatigue […]”. The most detailed written account of the Romanian Scout’s refuge to Moldavia is the one offered by Alexandru Daia, a boy-scout himself, one of the refugees. In his main work, Daia described the hasty retreat of the boyscouts, that started on November 13, as well as the challenging (and healthy endeavour) experience of travelling the 56 kilometers distance from Bucharest to Ploiești, on foot,
in more than two days, under heavy autumn rain.\textsuperscript{54} In Moldavia, the boy-scouts, numbering around 4000 members, were located in several colonies, such as Soleşti (Vaslui), or Sculeni (Iaşi), or Bâlca (Bacău), which also served as schools.\textsuperscript{55}

When assessing the scale of refuge, it should be mentioned that all existing data seem contradictory in terms of number and structure of displaced population. In the particular case of those who left Bucharest, according to some authors,\textsuperscript{56} around 22\% of the capital’s population took refuge to Moldavia, out of almost 396 000 - a considerable number, but still much less than other evaluations, such as the one made by the US diplomat Charles J. Vopicka, the only remaining foreign diplomat in Bucharest, during the WWI occupation, who argued that only 150 000 individuals remained in Bucharest, after December 1916, as many of the inhabitants left the city due to widespread panic.\textsuperscript{57}

Other foreign sources refer to slightly higher figures; thus, a German census, conducted during the occupation, on January 6\textsuperscript{th}, 1917, reported 308 987 inhabitants\textsuperscript{58} in Bucharest, although the document should probably not be regarded as being accurate, given the conditions in which the census took place. According to the same document, Romanian population across the occupied territory numbered 3 438 000 inhabitants (meaning that around 800 000 individuals were among the refugees or enlisted soldiers. Similar information was offered by Virgiliu N. Drăghiceanu, Secretary of the Romanian National Commission for the Historical Monuments and corresponding member of the Romanian Academy,\textsuperscript{59} while Constantin Kiriţescu, whose work dedicated to Romania’s participation in the First World War, is probably the most accurate, mentioned that not more than 10\% of the entire population (excepting the military) of Bucharest left for Moldavia.\textsuperscript{60}

Moreover, when it comes to population data referring to Moldavia and/or Iaşi, there were even more discrepancies. The new (and provisional) capital city of Romania- Iaşi, attracted many ordinary refugees, particularly because it was considered as being much safer than other regions of Moldavia, since the all Romanian authorities (Government, Parliament, Army, Administration) also took refuge in Iaşi. The evaluations vary between 300 000 refugees (as suggested by Charles J. Vopicka\textsuperscript{61}) to 510 000 individuals (580 000, when including the previous 70 000 inhabitants of Iaşi), as mentioned by Vasile Bianu,\textsuperscript{62} while according to other evaluations, the city of Iaşi sheltered, at the beginning of 1917, some 400 000 to 450 000 individuals, without considering the existing
Romanian troops and the other Entente forces located in the area. The highest number of refugees (living in Iasi) is mentioned by Ethel Greening Pantazzi, the Canadian wife of Vasile Pantazzi (captain of Galatzi port) in her work entitled *Roumania in Light & Shadow* (1909-1919), first published in 1921. The above-mentioned author is mentioning the existence of more than a million inhabitants of Iasi, in December 1916, out of which only around 70,000 individuals were previous inhabitants of the city, although most likely these numbers are exaggerated, if not completely inaccurate.

Other foreign accounts (such as the one prepared in 1920 by the *Geographical Section of the Naval Intelligence Division of Great Britain*), which also include the remaining Romanian army and Russian units and extend the evaluation to the entire region of Moldavia, refer to the existence of much more than a million refugees at the end of 1916. Despite the contradictory data, there was an obvious increase in terms of population (it probably more than tripled) if we consider the fact that, before the war, Iasi only had between 65,000 to 75,000 inhabitants. For instance, according to some data, more than 45,000 refugees, originating from Dobroudja alone (most of them still horrified by the brutality of Bulgarian soldiers), were heading to various regions of Moldavia, including Iaşi. Other cities from Moldavia doubled their population, during the years of Romanian refuge. For instance, the population of Galaţi had almost doubled at the end of 1916, reaching 130,000 inhabitants, while a small town such as Vaslui, numbering only around 10,000 individuals during peace time, was also significantly overcrowded. Due to the rather contradictory various data, it is difficult to assess the total size of the Romanian displacement, but most likely, by corroborating existing information, there were between 500,000 (at least) to 800,000 refugees in Moldavia, at the end of 1916, meaning that almost ¼ of the entire population of Romania took refuge in Moldavia and other foreign destinations, during the First World War. When comparing to the refuge and displacement that occurred in other countries and regions of the First World War Europe, we should mention, for instance, the first War refugees, meaning the one million Belgian refugees who fled from Antwerp and other Belgian cities to Holland (while other 200,000 Belgian refugees fled to France). On the other hand, by mid July, 1915, the total number of internally displaced French refugees stood at 735,000 individuals, while in the case of Serbia, more than half a million civilians fled during the retreat of the remnants of Serbian forces, fearing the anticipated consequences of Bulgarian and Austro-Hungarian occupation, so that the scale of Serbian displacement affected one-third
of Serbia’s population.\textsuperscript{71} In the Russian Empire, the scale of civilian displacement reached three million in 1915 and climbed to approximately seven million, by 1917.\textsuperscript{72}

The trauma represented by the forced abandonment of Bucharest, the occupation of the capital and the advance of German forces towards Siret, which made a invasion of Moldavia plausible, led to even more concern. For the small group of rich refugees, Moldavia and Iasi were only a temporary place to stay, as many of them were already considering a new refuge to the south of Russia, to the Black Sea port of Odessa or even to Paris.\textsuperscript{73} In fact, according to an archival document, issued by the Minister of Interior, Romanian authorities were seriously taking into account the bleak hypothesis of another refuge, in Russia. The above -mentioned document, entitled Certificate (Certificat), a bilingual (Romanian-Russian) unfilled printed page, certified the identity and nationality of its holder, offering unrestricted passage into Russia, due to „military reasons, according to the agreement with the Russian Government”.\textsuperscript{74} In fact, the potential evacuation of the Romanian Administration and army into Russia was a Russian initiative, being considered by the Russian Army Headquarter in order to provide a sort of unimpeded freedom of action for the Russian troops in Moldavia. General Henri Berthelot, Head of the French Military Mission in Romania, had opposed the Russian proposal, considering such an approach (especially the part regarding the evacuation on Romanian Army) as a sort of abandonment of Moldavia to Russian influence and control.\textsuperscript{75} However, a Romanian official delegation that travelled to Petrograd in January 1917, led by Ion I.C. Brâtianu, did engage into discussions with members of the Russian Imperial House (including with Tsar Nicholas II) and other officials (such as general Mihail Beliaev, Head of the Russian Military Mission in Romania), debating, among other things, the issue of a potential evacuation and refuge into Russia.\textsuperscript{76} Later on, due to rather dramatic existing circumstances, some members of Romanian political elite have decided to seek exile into Russia, and an article published in Kishinev, on January 2/15, 1917, was mentioning the passage through the Razdelnaia railway station of a first special train (coming from Romania), transporting some of the Romanian politicians and their families.\textsuperscript{77} In fact, other sources have confirmed that since the end of December 1916, Romanian authorities were seriously taking into consideration a potential evacuation into Russia and another consistent proof backing that theory is the fact that immediately after the New Year’s Eve (1916-1917), a special commission was created by the Romanian
authorities, with the primary task of searching and evaluating the best potential destinations of refuge in the South of Russia (for the Royal House of Romania, members of the Government and other Romanian authorities). Comandor Vasile Pantazzi was among the members of the above-mentioned commission, an entity created in great haste mainly because things were going "so bad on the frontline". According to the existing accounts, the commission had spent almost an entire month on Russian soil, and returned in Moldavia after being convinced that the best solution (meaning potential refuge destinations) would have been Kherson and Odessa, due to their convenient proximity to Moldavia. Moreover, the same testimony is mentioning the fact that in March 1917, Odessa was already sheltering a significant Romanian community of refugees, as well as the entire Romanian Commercial Navy, including the Royal Yacht Ştefan cel Mare. Even more interesting seem to be the fact that, by the summer of 1917, an appropriate house in Odessa had been reserved for the entire Romanian Royal family, while by August 1917, many influential Romanian politicians, deputies and senators such as Take Ionescu and Constantin I. Angelescu (former Minister of Public Works in the previous Romanian government and future Romanian diplomatic representative in the USA) were also seen in Odessa.

There are several other eye-witness accounts on the re-start of the evacuation procedures, regarding Romanian state institutions, senators and deputies, hospitals and banks, which were sent to Russia, in order to be salvaged and protected, during the spring and summer of 1917. According to various accounts, in Russia, both Odessa and Kherson have become the new shelter for thousands of Romanian refugees, from ordinary civilians to politicians, officers and soldiers, members of various supply services or medical staff. Many wounded soldiers and other sick refugees, evacuated from Romania, have been treated in Romanian hospitals temporarily located in Odessa, since the summer of 1917, until they were healed and returned to Moldavia, when the situation in Moldavia stabilized. However, even the news of the Romanian victory over the German troops at Marăşeşti (July 24/August, 6 - August 21/September, 3, 1917) reached the Romanian community of refugees existing in Odessa with considerable delay, on the arrival of several trains transporting Romanian wounded soldiers.

Previously, Romanian authorities have also considered an evacuation of the boy scouts, from Moldavia to Russia; significant preparations have been made in this respect. Thus, according to a letter by Gheorghe
Munteanu Murgoci, one of the leaders of the Great Legion of Romanian Scouts (after Crown Prince Carol joined the General Quarter of the Army, at the beginning of the 1916 military campaign), addressed to C.I. Istrati, on April 2, 1917, it seems that the Romanian Government was seriously relying on Russian authorities for a potential evacuation of the Romanian boyscouts into Russia. As mentioned in the document, during the early Spring of 1917, Russian authorities were already fully prepared for receiving and sheltering around 4000 Romanian boyscouts, in various locations, such as: 250 boyscouts in Ekaterinoslav; 600 in Hortița; 200 in Mirovaia; 750 in Samoilovka; 100 in Novomoskovsk; 100 in Rozovica; 500 in Simferopol; 500 in Bakhchisaray, Crimea; and other 1000 to Rostov, Don). The Romanian boyscouts were supposed to arrive to the above-mentioned destinations by train (around 1000 boyscouts per train), and the costs of the entire operation (transportation and sheltering on Russian territory) were covered, through donations, by various Russian entities, such as the Union of Russian Cities (4200 roubles for the journey between Sculeni and Bălți; 4000 roubles for food (warm food), while the Tsar Nicholas II also donated 20000 roubles. It should be mentioned that the exact number of the Romanian boyscouts that were sent to Russia is unknown, as there is no available official data referring to such a presence. However, despite the lack of official data regarding the per se evacuation of Romanian boyscouts in Russia, according to some accounts, 12500 Romanian scouts, together with their leaders, have crossed the Russian frontiers during the first weeks of January 1917, on their way to various destinations on Russian territory.

Regardless of the extent of the boyscouts refuge into Russia, it should be mentioned that after the First World War, the boy scouts refuge was often used by various authors and Romanian political circles in order to underline the rather erroneous approach of the wartime Romanian authorities, concerning the evacuation or relocation of the Romanian boyscouts, from Bucharest (and the rest of the occupied territory) to Moldavia and not only. Thus, one of the harshest critics of such an approach belongs to Alexandru Socec, who referred to the 500 (Romanian) young men, sent to Russia by Romanian authorities, to return only as 500 death certificates.

Probably one of the least known issues regarding a future evacuation (and another type of refuge) from the overcrowded region of Moldavia was the one occurring in April 1918. We refer to an initiative by Take Ionescu, a leading Romanian pro-Entente politician, who addressed the Romanian
Government and requested a special train for travelling abroad (to Paris), in order to initiate various lobby actions for Romania, in France. Everything happened during a complex and complicated regional context, after the signing of the Armistice with the Central Powers (Focsani, December 1917) and the signing of the preliminary Peace Treaty of Buftea (February 20/March 5, 1918). Although the above-mentioned train, which could be referred to as an easy way out, was meant for Take Ionescu and for a small group of diplomats, many other persons (particularly politicians and members of the economic elite) suddenly became interested. There were several versions of the passenger list and all the versions were influenced by various official letters sent by different high-ranking officials and influential individuals, all of them requesting approval for certain names. For instance, in a letter addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, C.C. Arion, on April 14, 1918, Ion Mitilineu requested approval that Colonel Radu Rosetti be included on the passenger list. Even more interesting seem to be another letter addressed, on April 27th, 1918, to Prime Minister Marghiloman, concerning a former member of the Ion I.C. Brătianu Government, and future outstanding Romanian diplomat, Nicolae Titulescu, who also required to be included (with his wife, as well) on the passenger list of the Take Ionescu train. It is worth mentioning that one of the last version of the list of passengers included 119 individuals, such as Take Ionescu, Ion Cantacuzino, Prince Şerban Cantacuzino, Nicolae Titulescu, Petre Coandă, Constantin Capşa, Lascăr L. Catargi, Marius Nasta, Frederic Nanu, Alexandru Duiliu Zamfirescu, Radu R. Rosetti, and many others (among the 119 names, there were also various foreign diplomatic representatives, such as Fasciotti –Italy, Strihou-Belgium, Marincovici-Serbia). Apart from the details of the wartime
life in the new capital of Romania, as witnessed by C. Argetoianu, much more important is the (harsh) observation made by the author, according to which the refugees were considered by the local population of Iaşi as a sort of calamity, most likely because their arrival in Moldavia (and in Iaşi) took the form of an invasion and was perceived as such by the local inhabitants of Iaşi. When assessing the situation of other First World War refugees, it becomes obvious that such a perception of the local population was not at all singular or surprising. For instance, many official authorities and local population in Russian cities and villages have expressed serious misgivings about the burden they were expected to shoulder (referring to Russian refugees).

Due to overpopulation, especially during the first weeks of the refuge, most of the ordinary people were wandering and living on the streets of the main cities of Moldavia, particularly in Iasi, where hundreds of refugees were visiting the police stations and city offices, in order to ask for a shelter. The first solutions to tackle the issue of overpopulation, as envisaged by the already overwhelmed Romanian authorities, seemed to be the improvised shelters of the Red Cross, the using of Army tents, the sheltering in disused train wagons, as well as the refugee shelters hosted by several institutions, such as the Anatomy Institute in Iaşi, high-schools, concert halls and other available spaces; among the most unfortunate individuals, there were the peasants and particularly the workers from various factories (of Bucharest, Ploieşti and Craiova).

The acute housing shortage affected even the members of the Romanian economic and political elite, as many of the residential buildings of Iasi were needed for the Romanian Administration, Army and other institutions that also took refuge in Moldavia. As a consequence, the rent had gone too high even for refugees with financial means, while the prices for those willing to buy appropriate proprieties in Iaşi were making the few available houses and villas almost unaffordable. For instance, one of richest family in Romania, Bragadiru, was able to buy a property in Iasi, for the huge and impressing price of 125 000 lei-gold. Not surprisingly, even the Queen Marie of Romania herself had to spend almost two weeks in a train, close to Iasi, waiting for appropriate accommodation.

For the refugees, the lack of food and financial resources was another severe problem, as a significant part of them fled their homes and most of their belongings were lost, because they couldn’t carry them when they left. The lack of resources was aggravated by the central and local authorities, which were obviously overwhelmed by the scale of the refuge,
as well as by the difficult issues regarding the War confrontations that needed to be solved first. To make things even worse, the extreme weather conditions, during the bitter cold winter of 1916-1917, with temperatures dropping to -25 or even -30 degrees C,\textsuperscript{106} have exacerbated the negative effects of war, overpopulation and famine. The extent of famine across Moldavia, particularly at the end of 1916 and beginning of 1917, was also mentioned in a French document, a letter by General Henri Berthelot, Head of the French Military Mission in Romania, addressed to St-Aulaire, a French diplomatic representative in Romania. In the above-mentioned document, Berthelot underlined the fact that Romania was very close to face extinction due to famine, in case the promised minimum 35 Russian (train) wagons of supplies (which were supposed to be delivered daily), would not have been delivered.\textsuperscript{107} The situation was aggravated by the fact that a significant part of Romanian supplies, in fact, 43479 wagons of 10 tons each, have been (previously) \textit{temporarily borowed} or sold to Russian Government.\textsuperscript{108}

Another severe burden was the typhus epidemic, which began to spread in December 1916 and continued to spread, reaching its climax during the spring of 1917. Typhus was almost extinguished during the summer of 1917, after causing almost half a million deaths,\textsuperscript{109} although, according to other sources, there have been around 300 000 deaths during the winter 1916-1917, meaning 400-500 deaths daily.\textsuperscript{110} Widespread typhus was, in fact, another consequence of overcrowding, which was also reflected in hospitals across Iaşi, as there were at least 11 000 wounded individuals, while the total capacity of all the hospitals in the new (wartime) capital of Romania consisted in only 5000 beds.\textsuperscript{111} All the above-mentioned disastrous circumstances were influencing the chances of survival among the refugees (and not only), as the terrible shortage of food, wood and other main supplies could not be solved, or (at least) diminished by the Government, until de late summer-early autumn of 1917.

Due to dramatic situation across Moldavia, especially during the first months of the refugeedom, urgent relief and support actions were needed; thus, various relief actions were initiated by the Romanian Government, as well as by Romanian Red Cross, the foreign diplomatic missions in Romania and last, but not least, by voluntary organisations, from Romania and from abroad. The main entity, established in January 1917 and located in Iasi, on Gheorghe Asachi Street (with several branches in other Romanian cities, across Moldavia), was the Special Committee for the Refugees. Although the \textit{Special Committee for the Refugees} benefited
from Government financial backing, it also relied on various donations from the Romanian Red Cross and other internal and external entities, local population and so on.

Apart from the governmental financial support, equally important proved to be the various fund-raising campaigns, initiated and conducted both in Romania (Moldavia) and abroad (particularly in France). Public fund-raising campaigns were mostly initiated by the Romanian Red Cross Society and by Royal House of Romania, which also offered direct financial aid and various donations to the refugees. For instance, in December (1916) alone, the Royal House of Romania donated to the Municipality of Iasi the sum of 120000 lei to be distributed to refugees, on the occasion of Christmas. In fact, during the two years of refuge in Moldavia, the Royal House of Romania donated to the refugees, orphans and wounded soldiers more than 3 000 000 lei. Queen Marie herself had long been involved in various charity actions, and her visits to hospitals and orphanages in Iasi, during the years of refugeedom have been reflected in various contemporary newspapers and postwar studies and articles, as well as in memoirs.

As mentioned before, fund-raising campaigns were also organized abroad, in various capitals of the allied countries (Entente member states), particularly in France (Paris). For instance, such a fund raising campaign was organized in February-March 1917 by the Romanian Legation in Paris and by a Special Committee of Romanian Red Cross, under the patronage of Queen Marie of Romania, in order to help Romanian refugees and soldiers. At the end of the campaign, the Romanian Legation had offered diplomas and awards to main (foreign) donors and contributors. Similar fund-raising campaigns have been organized in other places, including Bessarabia (Kishinev); for instance, at the end of 1917, Fondul Refugiaților (The Refugee Relief Fund) managed to raise through donations and other local contributions, the significant sum of 760 rubles in only a few days.

In Romania (more exactly in Moldavia, the only territory that remained under Romanian Administration), the main fund-raising campaigns were initiated and conducted by the Romanian Red Cross Society whose significant efforts were limited by the lack of personnel and lack of appropriate financial resources, in order to match the scale of humanitarian needs. According to reliable sources, apart from fund-raising, or as a result of such campaigns, Romanian Red Cross Society was able to distribute to refugees and wounded people in Moldavia, during the war years, through its own canteens, over 10 million meals, meaning that
100,000 refugees and wounded people have received around 100 meals throughout the entire war period, rather a modest number, considering the scale of suffering the wartime years and refuge have brought into the lives of millions of ordinary people. It should be also mentioned that many volunteers have joined the Romanian Red Cross, including underage volunteers (children); in their case, in order to join the Red Cross, they needed parental consent documents (letters). For most of them, the rationale behind joining the Red Cross had to do with patriotism and national ideals, although it is worth mentioning that all the Red Cross volunteers (as well as the entire Red Cross personnel) were receiving free meals and appropriate shelters, as well as medical assistance, if needed. That is probably why many parents have written parental consent letters (for their underage children of 16 to 18 years old, willing to join the Red Cross during the wartime refuge into Moldavia), thus protecting them from being exposed to famine and wartime suffering. Apart from the fundraising campaigns, the Romanian Red Cross Society activated (in terms of treating the sick and injured individuals) both in the occupied territory (26 Red Cross hospitals, totaling 6895 beds) and Moldavia (29 Red Cross hospitals, and many other field hospitals).

Another lesser known dimension of the Moldavian refuge is the one related to the growing number of the War orphans. Initially, the War orphans have been assigned to various locations in Moldavia, under the umbrella of „Regina Maria” Society, backed by the Ministry of Education, but later on, they were sheltered by the Societatea Ortodoxă Națională a Femeilor Române – Romanian Women’s National Orthodox Society („Protection of Orphans” Section), an entity created in 1910. The War Orphans Section of the above mentioned entity was established on May 5th, 1917, being coordinated by Princess Olga M. Sturdza (President). According to an official report, towards the end of 1917 (in autumn), there were 16,152 war orphans sheltered in orphanages and hospitals, across Moldavia (Romanian administration only), a significant number of children that needed care and protection during a dramatic wartime period.

When taking into consideration a comparative approach regarding the way other State authorities have dealt with the issue of the refugees, the casestudy of France is probably the most relevant, due to the scale of population movements and displacement. Such an evaluation underlines the fact that, despite some significant actions, the scale of (Romanian) state involvement in the matter of improving the status of the Romanian refugees
was rather poor, when compared to other Governments involved in the war. The French Government, for instance, had initiated a plethora of actions in order to back the refugees, and one of the most important entities proved to be the Office de Renseignements pour les familles dispersées.\textsuperscript{123}

An explanation for that could be the dramatic situation faced by Romania at that time, after losing two thirds of the national territory to Central Powers (which could have jeopardised its very existence), due to the disastrous campaign of 1916.

A key-factor for the relief actions conducted during the refuge in Moldavia, was related to Foreign Medical Relief Missions, located in Moldavia. The most important one was Berthelot Mission-French Mission (October 1916-February 1918), which apart from its main military purpose, also had a Medical Section. The French Mission comprised 289 officers, 88 doctors and pharmacists, 37 airplane pilots and observers, 1,150 inferior ranks and soldiers.\textsuperscript{124} Among the French doctors and nurses of the French medical section of the Berthelot Mission, Jean Clunet and three other colleagues have paid the ultimate price, while treating the widespread exhanematie typhus, during the wartime refuge in Moldavia.\textsuperscript{125} Romania was also assisted by a British Military Mission, including a medical section, (from 1916-until 1919), under the umbrella of British Red Cross. However, among the most effective foreign medical mission was the one of the Scottish Women’s Hospitals in Romania, medical units consisting of 76 doctors, nurses, pharmacists, chefs and ambulance drivers, co-ordinated by Dr. Elsie Inglis, which activated on Romanian soil between September 1916 and October 1917.\textsuperscript{126}

A US Red Cross Medical Mission also activated in Romania, since 1917, after US entered the War on April 6, 1917. The aim of the US mission, coordinated by colonel Henry Anderson, was to initiate and conduct care and relief actions dedicated to wounded individuals and refugees. The US Red Cross Mission in Romania\textsuperscript{127} coordinated two main hospitals in Moldavia, in Iasi (for civilians) and the second one in Roman (for the military). A second US Red Cross Mission after the war, in 1919,\textsuperscript{128} and backed the relief efforts conducted by the Romania authorities, by providing humanitarian aid.

When it comes to return and resettlement of the former refugees into their initial homes, it is worth mentioning that there were two major waves, which were strictly related to the outcome of the war. Thus, a first wave consisted in various individuals and members of Romanian Administration which returned to the occupied territory, after the signing
of the Buftea Treaty on May 7, 1918 (the preliminary treaty was signed on March 5/18, 1918).

According to numerous archival sources, after the signing of the Buftea Treaty, and particularly since June-July 1918, Romanian authorities located in Moldavia have sent thousands of such individuals back in the occupied territory (with German approval), by using pre-approved list of Romanian citizens (and their permit numbers) that were traveling back (most of them, together with their own families) to various destinations, but particularly to big cities, such as Bucharest.¹²⁹ There were also telegrams referring only to individual cases, all of them being issued by the „Serviciul Evacuărilor Iaşi” (The Evacuation Service-Iasi), and bearing the names of the individuals arriving in the occupied territory, as well as their permit numbers (Ausweis).¹³⁰ Their arrival could be regarded, also, at least to some extent, as a sort of benevolent gesture made by the German Administration, after the signing of the Bucharest Peace treaty (as the Treaty provisions were disastrous for the Romanian side). A second wave, the biggest one, was triggered by the end of War, and occurred particularly after the return of the Romanian Royal family to Bucharest (November 18/December 1, 1918), although most of the (surviving) ordinary refugees have returned to their initial homes during the spring and summer of 1919.

It is worth mentioning that the return of the Romanian refugees amplified the already existing moral debate regarding those who left and those who stayed in the occupied territory, a moral debate that started almost immediately after the refuge to Moldavia. During the years of refuge, Romanian society had to deal with an increasing animosity between those who remained in the occupied territory (accused of being cowards or even collaborators of the Central Powers forces) and those who left, seeking refuge to Moldavia.¹³¹ In fact, for those who remained in the occupied territory, the per se fact that they did not leave during the massive refuge of the Romanian administration and civilians, did not mean they were less patriotic than the others. As a matter of fact, in many cases, they were either too old, too young, or they just could not abandon their houses, a fact which has to do with human nature, to a certain extent. In other cases, the potential refugees could not find the appropriate vehicles and could not just walk the significant distance to Iaşi (several hundred kilometers), or to other destinations in Moldavia, being thus forced to remain in the occupied territory. When comparing the living conditions, both in the occupied territory and in Moldavia, the situation was more or less the same, with every day life being dominated by the strive for survival; however,
those who left had, at least, the advantage of living as free individuals, in various regions of Moldavia, under Romanian administration.

Among the Romanian intellectuals who decided to remain in the occupied territory, there were some individuals who favored the Central Powers approach (meaning an alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary, against Russia) for achieving the national ideals; they were not less patriotic, but, in many cases, they did have a German background, at least in terms of academic education, and were perceiving the Russian Empire as the main menace for Romania. Of course, there were several cases of collaborationism among those who stayed in the occupied territory, but others have been unfairly accused of being collaborators.\textsuperscript{132}

**Conclusions**

Romania had faced, during the First World War, a massive displacement and refugeedom, triggered by the disastrous outcome of the military operations of the 1916 campaign. As the military situation in Romania began to disintegrate in late October - early November 1916, significant groups of Romanian civilians have decided to move to safer areas, in order to protect themselves and their families.

When evaluating the background of the refuge itself, it should be underlined that, apart from the fact that displacement was obviously triggered by the Romanian military defeat and the loss of territory to enemy forces (the Central Powers’ advance was quite impressive), there were also other contributing factors, equally important. We refer to the already existing fears in Romanian society, concerning the (expected) behavior of the enemy troops (Bulgarian and German) towards the civilian population and also to another key-factor, the Romanian authorities’ decision to move the Administration and remaining Army units from Bucharest and surrounding areas to Iaşi, in Moldova, in order to continue the fight (and resistance) against enemy invasion. The military defeat itself (a serious blow for the entire nation), and implicitly the loss of Romanian territory to enemy forces, associated with fear, provided the initial basis for the displacement of civilians.

During the various waves of the refugeedom and particularly during the last one, triggered by the retreating Romanian Administration into Moldavia, the size of civilian displacement and refuge took the Romanian authorities by surprise. While the Administration and Army have been
somehow evacuated to Moldavia, the civilian refuge followed a rather chaotic and unorganized path, due to poor and even reluctant involvement of the Romanian authorities. The refugeedom itself exhibited sharp discrepancies among the refugees, as the politicians, high-ranking officials and influential individuals have evacuated themselves by using special trains and private cars, while the boy scouts, peasants and other ordinary people have travelled on horse-driven carriages or even on foot. Even more difficult proved to be the years of exile in Moldavia, considering the increasing overpopulation (most of the ordinary people were wandering and living on the streets of the main cities of Moldavia), the lack of food and financial resources (refugees fled their homes and most of their belongings were lost), the extreme weather conditions and last, but not least, the widespread typhus (which generated a huge loss of human lives).

The general lack of resources was aggravated by the central and local authorities, which were obviously overwhelmed by the scale of the refuge, as well as by the difficult issues regarding War confrontations that needed to be solved first.

Due to the tremendous size and intensity of the refugeedom, there was a massive impact of the large number of refugees on social and economic life in the host communities, which was perceived by various Romanian and observers. As expected, the large number of refugees significantly affected the demographic structure of the Moldavian cities and village, at least for a few years. Also, in connection to the outcome of the war confrontations, the existing refugees had to face the prospects of a continuous refuge, or even of another refuge (into various other external destinations, particularly in Russia).

Despite the significant efforts made by the bureaucratic administration in Moldavia and particularly in Iasi, the scale of (Romanian) State involvement in the matter of sheltering and supporting the refugees was limited by the financial and logistical constraints faced by Romania at that time, after losing almost two thirds of the national territory to Central Powers. However, consistent support was offered by the Red Cross Society, by private and semi-official organizations and entities, as well as by foreign medical missions activating in Romania, especially in terms of fund-raising and treating or sheltering the refugees.

It should be also mentioned that refugeedom, although a traumatic experience, was at the same time a prolonged opportunity to increase a certain sense of national cohesion and solidarity among the citizens, in front of the continous external danger. Helping and supporting each other
during the wartime years was not only a manifestation of humanitarian sentiments and relief efforts, but also another step taken by various individuals and entities in order to back the war effort and the final victory of the country over the Central Powers forces.

The refugeedom generated also a moral debate regarding those who left and those who stayed in the occupied territory, a debate that started almost immediately after the beginning of the refuge to Moldavia. In fact, even throughout the interwar decades, Romanian society witnessed an increasing animosity and resentment between those who left the occupied territory seeking temporary refuge to Moldavia, as opposed to those who decided to stay in the occupied territory, many of them being openly accused of *collaborationism* (especially those holding various official positions in the occupied territory). Regardless of the various individual and collective wartime experiences, the refugeedom left physical and psychological scars on the entire (surviving) population, on the Romanian society itself.
NOTES


12 For instance, the Romanian Crown Council (Consiliul de Coroană) held in Sinaia, on July 21/August 3, 1914, rejected King Carol’s plea that the alliance with the Central Powers be put into effect. See Ion Mamina, *Consiliul de Coroană*, Editura Enciclopedică, București, 1997, pp. 32-39.

13 On the Romanian pre-war debate, as well on the choosing of the appropriate side for serving the national interest, see also the work by Lucian Boia,

Quite often, these demonstrations and student meetings ended up with violent marches towards the German and Austrian Legations in Bucharest, where windows were broken; in other cases, the demonstrators showed their support for the Entente Powers in front of the French or Russian Legations in Bucharest. See, for instance, the article entitled „Întrunirea Federației Unioniste la Dacia”, unsigned, published in Universul (newspaper), June 21, 1916.

When it comes to Romanian casualties during the campaign of 1916, data tend to vary, depending on the sources. See, for instance, the work by Ion Cupșa, Armata Română în campaniile din anii 1916-1917 (Romanian Army during the 1916-1917 military campaigns), Bucharest, Editura Militară, București, 1967, pp. 179-180.

The prospects were even worse, due to the size of the enemy forces engaged on Romanian territory.


Probably the most relevant are the works by G. Banea, Zile de lazaret. Jurnal de captivitate și spital, București, Fundația pentru literatură și artă Regele Carol II, 1938, pp. 9-11; Constantin Vlădescu, Bulgarii. Memoriile unui ofițer român fost prizonier în Bulgaria, București, Biblioteca ziarului Universul, București, 1926, pp. 26-27; George Topârcianu, Pirin Planina. Episoduri tragice și comice din captivitate, Editura Humanitas, București, 2014, pp. 184-185. Topârcianu is referring to the Bulgarian hate (regarding Romanians) was stirred by the Bulgarian press.

See Constantin Bacalbașa, Capitală sub ocupația dușmanului 1916-1918, Editura Ancora, Brăila, 21, pp. 32-43. C. Bacalbașa is also considering the fact that such an image of the Bulgarian people could have been the result of a sort of „ruthless propaganda”.

Archibald (pseudonym of the Romanian journalist G. Rădulescu), op.cit, pp. 56-62. The data offered by Rădulescu may seem very detailed and accurate, but the information is probably exaggerated.


The data, from Teodor V. Păcățian, *Jertfele românilor din Ardeal, Bănat, Crișana, Sâtmăr și Maramurăș, adeuse în răsboiul mondial din anii 1914-1918*, Sibiu, 1923, pp. 25-26. All of them have been arrested and faced internment in various Hungarian prisons and internment camps, during the War.

According to *Universul* newspaper, at the end of October – early November, 1916, the city of Galați was already sheltering 300 refugees from Transylvania (*Universul*, XXXIV, Nr. 302, Issue of Monday, October 31 /November 13, 1916, p. 4)


Constantin Bacalbașa, *op. cit*, p. 20.

The dramatic moments of the Romanian administration hasty refuge to Moldavia were best described by Grigore Antipa, in his work entitled *L’Occupation ennemie de la Roumanie et ses consequences économiques et sociales*, Les Presses Universitaires de France, Paris & Yale University Press, 1929, pp. 12-13. From his directorial office located at the Bucharest Museum of Natural Sciences, Antipa was able to see the desolate images of the retreating Romanian Army and had the opportunity to talk to one of the Romanian officers, who ended his dialogue with Antipa by saying: „[…] What is happening is indescribable. What you see here - me and my horse, are the only things that remained, out of my entire regiment. My regiment is lost. The entire army is lost! The country is lost!”.


See, for instance Arabella Yarka, *De pe o zi pe alta. Carnet intim 1913-1918*, Editura Compania, București, 2010, pp. 129-130. Arabella Yarka was a member of Bucharest high-life, who married Carol (Cîtta) Davila, nephew of the famous Romanian doctor Carol Davila. Arabella Yarka is also referring to various acquaintances, who were forced to flee and traveled to Moldavia by car.

There were many witnesses of the rather generalized panic, fear and confusion that dominated the capital of Romania, during the last days before


National Archives of France, Fond Félix Trépont (1914-1941), Issue 96 AP/1, Dossier 1 (Début du Journal dactylographié), (1914-1917), August 31, 1914, p. 93. As Préfet du Nord at the outbreak of the Great War, Félix Trépont (1863-1949) firmly backed the defence of Lille during the German invasion of France and Belgium. He opposed and criticised governmental policy according to which the city of Lille was officially declared an open town, that would not be defended. While such a decision was considered by Trépont an abandonment, many other French local notables (including the mayor of Lille, Charles Delesalle, later accused of defeatism and collaborationism, during the German occupation) considered it as the best option for the civilian population, for the city itself. Prefect F. Trépont was soon arrested and deported in 1915, returning to France in 1916.


Ibidem.

See the details in the work by Vasile Bianu, *Însemnări din războiul României Mari, Tomul I, De la mobilizare până la Pacea din București*, Institutul de Arte Gráfice Ardealul, Cluj, 1926, p. 50.

Ibidem, pp. 57-59.

Adrian Vițalaru, *op. cit.*, p. 224.

See Constantin Argetoianu, *Memorii. Pentru cei de maine. Amintiri din vremea celor de ieri*, Ed. Machiavelli, București, 2008, p. 54. Ioan G. Bibicescu, the governor of the National Central Bank of Romania, decided to evacuate to Iași, by train, even his fig trees (ficus), together with the other belongings.

The ordeal of the hasty refuge was also described by Constantin Kirițescu, in his work *Istoria Războiului pentru Întreagirea României, 1916-1919*, Ediția a II-a, Vol. II, Editura Casa Școalelor, Atelierele Cartea Românească, București, 1926, pp. 246-249.
Alexandru I.V. Socec, Zile de restrîşte din anii 1916-1918 şi episodul din bătălia de pe Argeş, Bucureşti, Institutul de Arte Grafice „Tiparniţa”, 1928, p. 68-69. Socec portrayed the ordeal of the refuge to Moldavia by using rather macabre details: [...] the dogs and crows were feeding themselves with the dead bodies of unburied refuged children [...]”.

The boyscouts were also helping with the transportation of the wounded civilians (after the air raids) to various hospitals. See Constantin Th. Sapatino, Trăiri, trăiri...de-a lungul unui veac, Editura Romfel, Bucureşti, 1995, p. 15. The most devastating German air raid on Bucharest was the one initiated on 12/25 September 1916, which caused 485 dead and over 1000 wounded among civilians. See the details in the work by Anibil Stoinescu, op. cit., pp. 47-53.

See Maria, Povestea vieţii mele, III, Editura Eminescu, Bucureşti, 1997, p. 73. For further details regarding the German air raids and their effect on Romanian civilian population, see also Maria Regina României. Jurnal de Război 1916-1917, Editura Humanitas, Bucureşti, 2014, pp. 149-150. For the odyssey of the Romanian boy-scouts during First World War, see also Bogdan Popa, A passage to manhood. The boy-scouts of Romania during the First World War, in Revista Istorică, tom XXVII, 1-2, 2016, pp. 29-48.

For the results of the German Census of January 6, 1917, conducted in Bucharest, have been published in „Bukarester Tagblatt” (which was a newspaper published by the German Administration), Issue of January 11, 1917 (Kriegsausgabe no. 20).
Virgiliu N. Drăghiceanu, *op. cit.*, p. 35. Drăghiceanu’s figures originate from the same German Census of January 1917, although he is mentioning the existence of 312,942 inhabitants of Bucharest, slightly more than the official number forwarded by the German Administration. Drăghiceanu is also mentioning the existence of 25,099 Austro-Germans (out of which 2,700 Germans of the Empire), 5,406 Greek individuals, 1,126 Bulgarians, 1,644 Italians and 2,538 inhabitants of various other nationalities.

Constantin Kirițescu, *op.cit*, p. 316. However, Kirițescu is in fact using the same data as resulted from the German Census of January 1917.


Vasile Bianu, *op. cit.*, p. 71. Bianu underlines that the population of Iași reached nearly twice the level of population of Bucharest. The same Vasile Bianu is mentioning the existence of 600,000 individuals in Iași, at the end of February 1917. See Vasile Bianu, *op. cit.*, p. 90.


According to a *Handbook of Roumania*, prepared by the *Geographical Section of the Naval Intelligence Division*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1920, p. 62.

*Ibidem*, p. 61.


Constantin Gane, *op. cit*, p. 80.

National Archives of Romania (Arhivele Naționale Centrale ale României –ANIC), Ministry of the Interior Fund (Ministerul de Interne), File 471/(1917)-1918, Biroul Permiselor, f. 14 (unfilled, undated and unsigned *Certificate*). See the document – Fig. 1).

According to a written account of the Romanian visit in Russia, which was sent, as a letter, by the Crown Prince Carol of Romania (also a member of the Romanian delegation), to his father, King Ferdinand of Romania, on January 10/23 1917. See the full text of the above mentioned letter in the work by Sorin Cristescu, *Carol al II lea. Scrisori către părinți*, Editura Tritonic, București, 2015, pp. 102-106.

According to „Viata Basarabiei”, Nr. 2, January 2/15, 1917, p. 4. The above mentioned article, studied by Dinu Poştarencu, in his work entitled *Primul Război Mondial- Exodul populaţiei României în Rusia*, published in „Art-emis Review”, January 10, 2012. The newspaper also stated that Romanian politicians have underlined that their arrival was not the beginning of the evacuation of legislative chambers, but a solution to acute overpopulation that affected Iași, the new capital of Romania.

See Ethel Greening Pantazzi, *op. cit*, p. 185.

*Ibidem*, p. 185. Comandor Vasile Pantazzi was the Romanian husband of the author.

*Ibidem*, p. 189.


*Ibidem*, pp. 120-125.

Ethel Greening Pantazi, *op. cit*, pp. 198-199.


*Ibidem*, p. 147. The Union of Russian Cities had also prepared a reserve consisting of 200000 roubles.

See the article by Ph.D. Dinu Poştarencu, entitled *Primul Război Mondial-Exodul populaţiei României în Rusia*, published in „Art-emis Review”, January 10, 2012. Poştarencu is referring to an information published by Viata Basarabiei, Nr. 9, January 11/24, 1917, p. 2. A similar information was published by the „Cuvânt Moldovenesc” (a Romanian language newspaper, published also in Chișinău), Nr. 5 (205), January 15, 1917, p. 4. The latter was mentioning the fact that all the 12 500 Romanian boy scouts have crossed the Russian frontier and walked until they reached the city of Bălți.


93 Ion M. Mitilineu (1868-1946), Romanian lawyer and politician, Minister of Justice during Alexandru Marghiloman Cabinet.

94 See Romanian National Archives, Fund Ministerul de Interne, File nr. 471/1918, Vol. II, The letter addressed on April 14th, 1918, to Constantin C. Arion, Minister of Exterior, by Mitilineu, (requesting approval for colonel Radu Rosetti, so that the above mentioned high-ranking Romanian officer be included on the passenger list of the Take Ionescu Train), p. 115.

95 Nicolae Titulescu (1882-1941) was an outstanding Romanian diplomat, several times Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania. During the interwar decades, he was elected President of the General Assembly of the League of Nations (twice, in 1930 and 1931).

96 See Romanian National Archives, Fund Ministerul de Interne, File nr. 471/1918, Vol. II, The letter addressed to Prime Minister Alexandru Marghiloma, on April 27th, 1918, concerning Nicolae Titulescu’s request to be kept on the passenger list of the Take Ionescu Train, p. 117.


99 Ibidem, p. 81. Argetoianu is explaining such an attitude of the local inhabitants, by saying that their reaction was triggered by the lack of organisation (nothing was prepared in order to accommodate them) regarding the continuous arrival of the refugees.


101 Constantin Kiriţescu, op. cit, p. 368. Kiriţescu is referring to a vast number of refugees (around 300 refugees per day) going to each of the Iasi police stations, in order to ask for a shelter.


103 Very often, the same house or room was allocated to several persons at the same time, thus generating quarrels and conflicts between the new temporary tenants. See Elena Th. Emandi, op. cit, pp. 88-89.
Sabina Cantacuzino, *op. cit*, p. 25. Sabina Cantacuzino is also mentioning that „half of Bucharest high society moved to Iași, such as Catargi family, Florescu, Olanescu, Bragadiru and Capitanovici families.


National Archives of France, Pierrefitte sur Seine, First Word War, Romania, F/23, File 154, (Organisation du ravitaillement), Letter by Henri Berthelot, addressed to St. Aulaire, on April 27/9, 1917. In the original text: „[…] si la Russie ne fournit pas à la Roumanie ce qu’elle demande, c’est la supression pure et simple de ce peuple et de son armée, en tant que facteur de la coalition, par „supression de nourriture”.

Ibidem. According to the document, 5826 train wagons of supplies were *borrowed*, while other 37753 wagons (mainly cereals) have been bought by the Russian Government.


Data published by the „Gazeta Bucureștilor”, Issue nr. 381, January 1918.

Constantin Kirițescu, *op.cit*, p. 373.

See the article entitled „Efectul moral și material al ultimelor donațiuni regale”, signed by a „Cavalry officer from Putna County”, published in „Ilustrațiunea”, Nr. 10, October 1916, pp. 133-134.


See the information on the above mentioned diplomas, in „*L’Illustration*”, Nr. 3863, Issue of March 17, 1917.

See the article entitled „Fondul Refugiaților”, published by „Ardealul” newspaper, An I, Nr. 12, Issue of December 17, 1917, p. 2.


Archive of Romanian Red Cross Society, File 1916 (No opis number). The (holograph) letter of consent written on August 20 (1917?), by Ecaterina Constantinescu, widow, concerning her son’s decision to become a Red Cross volunteer, p. 17. There also many other similar examples.
Although the Red Cross volunteers (particularly the under-aged) were exposed to other types of trauma, associated with the huge number of deaths occurring in various Red Cross hospitals and shelters.


For the history of the above mentioned entity, see the work by Anemari Monica Negru, Din istoria Societății Ortodoxe Naționale Române, Editura Cetatea de Scaun, Târgoviște, 2016. See also significant data concerning the activity of SONR in the book written by Alin Ciupală, Bătălia lor. Femeile din România în Primul Război Mondial, Editura Polirom, Iași, 2017, pp. 159-172.

See Expunere făcută M.S. Reginei asupra activității desfășurată de la 5 maiu și până la 5 octombrie 1917, de către Societatea Ortodoxă Națională a Femeilor Române, Secția Ocrotirea Orfanilor, Tipografia Dacia, Iași, 1917, p. 7.

Ibidem, p. 28. In fact, the real number was probably much higher (at least twice as big, when considering the non-institutionalized War orphans, not to mention the War orphans located across the occupied territory. The main orphanages were „Regina Maria” (Iași), the Piatra Neamț orphanage, the orphanages located near Agapia and Văratec Monasteries, the orphanage located in Solești (near Vaslui ).

Archives Nationales (France), Paris, Pierrefitte-sur-Seine, Première Guerre Mondiale, Fond F/23/2, Section (F/23/2-Dossier 15), The note of October 2, 1915. The above -mentioned French entity initiated various actions in order to identify the location of many of the missing French citizens.

See Generalul Henri Berthelot, op. cit, pp. 137-159.

Constantin Kirițescu, op. cit, pp. 391-392.


For details (photos) regarding US Red Cross Mission in Romania during First World War, National Archives of Romania, Colecția Documente Fotografice, P II 1969/1-10; F II/1970.


Ibidem, pp. 74-81.

For instance, that was the case of the famous Romanian scientist and bacteriologist Victor Babes, who was blamed for his decision to remain in the occupied territory. In fact, as the archival documents show, he was ordered to remain in Bucharest; he did not just decide to stay in the occupied territory. See the Archive of the Romanian Red Cross Society, File 1916, (P 1323), *(Personal medical ce a activat la spitalele Crucii Roșii)*, The Note nr. 4633 of November 16/1916, addressed to the Romanian Red Cross Society by the General Headquarters of the Romanian Army, The Medical Service, p. 13.
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