New Europe College
Ștefan Odobleja Program
Yearbook 2013-2014

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This volume was published within the Human Resources Program – PN II, implemented with the support of the Ministry of National Education - The Executive Agency for Higher Education and Research Funding (MEN – UEFISCDI), project code PN–II– RU–BSO-2013

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ISSN 1584-0298

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THE CASTELLANY ACCOUNTS OF LATE-MEDIEVAL SAVOY:
A SOURCE-ORIENTED APPROACH

This article focuses on a corpus of late-medieval documents, the fiscal accounts (computi) of the castellanies, or territorial-administrative units, of the principality of Savoy. Its aim is to shed new light on the possibilities for interpreting the data of the computi. Because of their wealth of detail about institutional reform and socio-economic trends, the Savoyard castellany accounts represent an extraordinary source for medievalists. And yet, although significant contributions in the last two decades have advanced our understanding of institutional reform and societal change in late-medieval Savoy, the computi must still be ranked among the least explored medieval manuscripts.¹ In part this is due to the sheer volume of the evidence and the history of its archival conservation in the twentieth century. But in my opinion the underlying cause of this neglect has to do with the challenge of devising an interpretive framework that makes the most of the primary data. This involves analyzing the manuscripts’ structure and internal logic in conjunction with the institutional practices based on them, and tracing the effects of the institutional reforms on both the political designs of the House of Savoy and the socio-economic life of local communities. This exploratory essay addresses itself precisely to this task.

The earliest Savoyard computi date from the middle of the thirteenth century.² Institutional reforms under Count Pierre II (1263-1268) resulted in the creation of a system of auditing the written accounts of each castellany. The castellany became the fundamental territorial-administrative unit of the Savoyard state; at its head was the castellan, an official appointed by the count for a period of several years. Before becoming count of Savoy, Pierre had followed his niece Eleanor to England upon her marriage to King Henry III, and served the king for several years in England and southern France; his brother Boniface of Savoy was appointed archbishop of Canterbury. The
contact with the Anglo-Norman pipe rolls (fiscal accounts) and Exchequer audits was probably a major influence on Pierre’s decision to introduce fiscal records in Savoy. Pierre’s more ample reform program also included the codification of legal custom in the Statutes. Pierre’s brother and heir, Philippe I (1268-1285), and then Amadeus V (1285-1323) expanded the network of castellanies throughout the Savoyard territories and put the practice of audited accounts on firm ground.

Notwithstanding their limitations, the level of detail of the Savoyard records makes them stand out from the more ancient Catalan computi and Anglo-Norman pipe rolls. The typical castellany account, up to the final decades of the fourteenth century, was not necessarily drawn for a period of one year (the period could be shorter or longer), but yearly accounts were becoming increasingly common. A fiscal roll consists of several folios or membranes of parchment sewn together. An annual account might run to ten folios or more; multi-annual accounts are even larger. A computus usually covers not only the main town of the castellany but also a couple of other villages. It has several rubrics, grouped under revenues and expenses. The former include dues in produce and cash, property and sale taxes, the income of the lands and productive facilities (such as mills and ovens) farmed out to locals or administered directed by the castellan, and judicial fines. An important rubric concerns the sums raised by selling the produce collected from the populace (the venditiones). The expenses consist of the payments and deliveries made by the castellan for the count’s military and administrative needs throughout the year (the so-called librate), and the costs of running the castellany, including the salaries of the administrators, starting with the castellan. Particularly important are the investments in the local infrastructure, from fortifications to bridges, roads, mills, and market halls. The fiscal accounts were audited by the specialized personnel of the central fiscal administration – the chambre des comptes – often in the presence of the count.

While some of the sections of the castellany accounts record only modest annual variations – generally when the dues could not be paid because of economic hardship – others register significant evolutions and thus afford us the opportunity to reconstruct socio-economic trends. In particular, the tax on property transfers and the annual rates at which enterprising locals were farming the count’s various facilities and sources of revenue, such as lands, mills, baking ovens, or the sale tax collected at markets and fairs, are quite valuable for reconstructing local socio-economic dynamics. The variations in the price of grains sold locally
have been analyzed to reconstruct the broad trends in late-medieval economy. The *librate* are an index of the demands made on the local communities by the House of Savoy, while the revenues re-invested in the maintenance and development of the local infrastructure were a stimulus for the local economy.

My research at New Europe College, of which the present essay gives a general account, is part of a broader project that focuses on several castellanies from the bailiwick of Savoy proper – the heartland of the House of Savoy. After a brief historiographical section, in what follows I offer some examples drawn from the texts of how the *computi* might be read so as to shed new light on late-medieval institutional reform and socio-economic trends.

**Recent research directions**

In this section I focus on a few contributions that stand out from a larger body of scholarship over the last two decades, briefly highlighting their merits and limitations, as a stepping stone towards building an inclusive analytical framework.

While it might seem that the relative historiographical neglect of the *computi* does not extend to their institutional aspects, the first systematic discussion of Pierre II’s institutional reforms came only in 2000, when Guido Castelnuovo and Christian Guilleré published their analysis of the earliest Savoyard *computi*. Their work marks an important stage in understanding the organizing logic of these documents, moving beyond Demotz’s pioneering study of the administrative geography of medieval Savoy. It traces the steps by which the *computi* evolved as administrative documents during a formative stage from the 1260s to the end of the thirteenth century when the castellany system was consolidated and extended. Thus, it draws attention to the transition from an initial territorial principle for organizing the contents of the *computi*, according to which revenues were listed for each town and village of a castellany, to a more graduated structure in which the general revenues of the castellany were grouped by kind (e.g., dues in produce, revenues farmed out, etc.), thereby facilitating the assessment of a castellany’s fiscal worth. Lastly, the article endeavors to gauge the contribution of the early castellanies to the finances of the House of Savoy. But Castelnuovo and Guilleré’s article is more of an overview. The question of the impact of the castellany
system on the Savoyard communities and local elites fell outside the scope of the article. Two major research directions are left unexplored: the comparison between the early computi and their most likely model, the Anglo-Norman pipe rolls, and the analysis of the early computi in relation to the inventories (extente) on which they were based.

Castelnuovo also pioneered the prosopographical study of the Savoyard castellans, with particular emphasis on the fifteenth century. His 1994 monograph gives an overview of the social background and recruitment pattern of the castellans, highlighting the significant proportion of castellans drawn from the ranks of the bourgeoisie – around one third. The limits of this work stem from its problematic approach to the sources. Castelnuovo’s analysis is not grounded in the analysis of the manuscripts, but of the very brief eighteenth-century summaries drawn by the archivists of the House of Savoy, which make no further mention of the documents’ contents beyond the name of the castellan and the dates of his term in office. This makes it very hard to ascertain whether administrative efficiency as reflected by the accounts of revenues and expenditure played a significant part in the count’s assessment of his administrators’ performance. The issue is of interest beyond the confines of Savoyard history, because it relates to a key topic in late-medieval and early-modern studies, the professionalization of the state’s administrators.

Nicolas Carrier’s monograph on the mountainous region of Faucigny in northern Savoy from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century draws on a variety of sources and makes relatively limited use of the computi. The earliest castellany accounts analyzed date from the second half of the fourteenth century, and Carrier largely replaces thorough analysis with data sampling – often analyzing only one account in ten – and does not attempt a prosopographical reconstruction of local communities. Nevertheless, the volume offers a model for analyzing the socio-economic evidence of the castellany accounts. It has some useful discussion of social strategies: for instance, it argues that the contracts establishing bonds of fictive kinship represented an alternative to the payment of heavy succession taxes in the event of one’s death without direct heirs. But Carrier’s interest is in reconstructing broad economic trends, rather than micro-economic strategies and the dynamic of social change at the local level. Future research must complement this focus on demographic and macro-economic trends over the longue durée with an analysis of the differentiated impact of the general economic trends on different communities and social groups. Such an approach – on which more in the
The Savoyard state: professionalization and institutional accountability

The *computi* are a record of the institutional practices of the Savoyard state in the aftermath of the reforms of the 1260s. They are particularly interesting for the study of institutional history because they are part of a broader European context. To begin with, the probable English inspiration for the *computi* brings up the important issue of the transfer and creative adaptation of institutional models. Furthermore, the rise of accountability, a historical development spanning several centuries with important consequences for both institutional consolidation and economic growth, is amply illustrated by the *computi*. The professionalization of the early-modern state has its roots in the transformation of the thirteenth-century land-owning, military aristocracy into a corps in the service of the prince. The Savoyard castellan was seldom appointed for more than a few years (appointments for a year or less were by no means rare), to be subsequently posted at the head of another castellany, sometimes quite some distance away. Furthermore, in order to prevent the castellans from colluding with the local notables they were not normally appointed to castellanies where they had land or family connections. For the bourgeoisie, the possibility of joining the ranks of this emerging corps of professional administrators represented an avenue for upward social mobility.

The challenges of institutional innovation left their trace in the fiscal records. The arduous effort to implement novel record-keeping practices and set an unprecedented standard of accountability entailed a degree of experimentation in the drafting of the *computi*. This is revealed by notes and remarks interspersed throughout the otherwise straightforward bookkeeping. The text of the *computi* is organized as if on three columns: on the left margin general rubrics succinctly enumerating the different types of revenues (e.g., *frumentum* – wheat) and expenses (e.g., *salarium* – the castellan’s compensation), and on the right the numeric figures for each category (e.g., *v setiers* or *xxv livres*). The largest column, in the middle, includes the subtotals for each category, visually set out from the body of text. But it records much more than this. It is here that most of the text is...
found. Aided by the clerks of the *chambre des comptes*, the count took advantage of the auditing of accounts in Chambéry to instruct the castellans about specific aspects of running their appointed castellanies, such as checking information and keeping the records up-to-date. As late as the middle of the fourteenth century, these injunctions were written down in the *computi* (for instance, “iniungitur castellano quod in sequenti computo veniat informatus declarare...” – “the castellan is directed to inform himself so as to state in the subsequent account...”). This practice helped the count’s central administration in their review of castellans’ performance. The frequency of the instructions can be analyzed as an indicator of the inertia which the count and his trained aides had to overcome in order to achieve the success of their project of institutional reform. This brings up the multi-functional role of the castellany accounts. They were an instrument of government not only as part of an auditing mechanism, but also for the more direct purpose of issuing orders.

Similarly, I argue that the ubiquitous presence of the verb *computare* throughout the records might be read as the clerks’ effort to drive home to the castellans – most of whom came from the traditional local aristocracy – the necessity to calculate constantly their revenues and expenses: put plainly, the need to have their income and spending add up. This was a way of inculcating an arithmetical habit of mind through repetition: first of all orally, in the dialogue between the auditors (*auditores computorum*) and the castellans, and then through the written records.

This brings up the essential issue of institutional accountability. The emphasis on rendering an account of one’s actions to one’s social and, increasingly, institutional superior was part of the twelfth-century institutional reconfiguration of medieval polities. *Reddere rationem*, a phrase with Biblical overtones, underlines the moral and social dimension of accountability in the high and late Middle Ages. The received orthodoxy on this topic is that medieval ideas of institutional accountability leaned more heavily towards a patrimonial perspective, in which accounts and audits were relied upon mainly to re-affirm the prince’s rights over lands, revenues, and people. The point was to prevent the erosion of the ruler’s patrimony by corrupt agents or locals determined to assert their customary rights. This scholarly perspective resonates with the idea that medieval rulers were first and foremost interested in the loyalty, rather than the professional competence, of their agents.

But in the Savoyard castellany accounts, as in other European records from the later Middle Ages, one can also detect elements of the more
modern outlook on institutional accountability. This is defined by the use of accounts and audits to increase revenues by improving the collection of dues and taxes and taking some steps towards encouraging trade and raising agricultural outputs. The Savoyard principality made recourse to investments in maintaining and improving the local infrastructure, but mainly relied on a close monitoring of the performance of its agents. This shifts the emphasis towards competence, rather than obeisance and loyalty. While *prima facie* the former, “patrimonial” interpretation seems to carry more weight, the issue can only be decided after a minute examination of the sources.

For instance, the count’s presence at the auditing process is not necessarily a sign of traditionalism – a relic of “charismatic” lordship during a time of bureaucratization and professionalization of the administrative apparatus. Gaining the prince’s favor was not merely a question of loyalty but also of competence. Like the prince’s wrath (*ira regis*),¹⁶ in medieval political culture the prince’s favor could approach the status of an institution, because it was extended or withdrawn not on a whim but as a calculated political move. Consider this example from the 1317-1319 account of Antoine de Barge, castellan of Montmélan and head of the bailiwick of Savoy. Following the condemnation of the notary Jean de Sallanches to a fine of twenty-five *livres* for having forged a notarial document, Antoine was unable to recover more than ten *livres* from the sale of Jean’s goods (specifically a vineyard): “nec adhuc potuit plus recuperare quia plus non inuenit de bonis ipsius magistri Johannis”.¹⁷ The text includes a directive to the castellan to inquire diligently into the matter so that he might seize more of Jean’s goods in payment of the fine, and enter the sum thus recovered in the subsequent *computus*. The entry regarding the failure to collect the entire sum is accompanied by an intriguing marginal note, “Vide”, which sends to a mark on the verso of the last folio of the roll of parchment, where the following terse and powerful notation was recorded: “Vidit dominus et not placet”, “the lord saw this and he does not like it”.

This rare and succinct testimony about the count’s perspective on the administrative matters audited in his presence by the personnel of the *chambre des comptes* might be interpreted as an effort to throw the weight of his authority in support of the work of his central clerks. The count’s point, I suggest, was to make clear to an important castellan that the auditing process was a vital matter and the problems identified by the *auditors computorum* were to be taken seriously. Efficiency, then, not merely loyalty was required for gaining and maintaining the prince’s favor.
Analyzed closely, the *computi* offer some glimpse into the opportunities available to castellans during the auditing process to draw attention to their administrative efficiency. While the terse wording of the accounts poses a challenge for the historian, some examples show that the castellan tried to emphasize those aspects of his management that represented improvements from previous practice. Thus Nicolet François de Chambéry, castellan of Conflans, made it a point at the auditing of his account in 1344 to underscore an increase in revenues during his management, in comparison to the account of a previous castellan. He recorded that a due in oats (*terragium*; modern French: *champart*) yielded almost double the quantity in the ante-penultimate *computus* – a calculated reference to the last annual account of an able administrator, Aymon de La Chambre, who headed the castellany of Conflans for a record nine years (1333-1342).

Terragium -- Receptit eodem anno pro terragio terre domini juxta grangiam domini de Ruppecula ubi mina custoditur, accensatur pro tanto hoc anno [millesimo] ccc xliii° et computat plus de sex quartis quam in tercio computo precedenti -- xiii quartes auene.\(^{18}\)

We have to consider that since Aymon’s time no castellan administered Conflans for more than one year. The count and his aides were quite possibly searching for a competent castellan to serve a term of several years at Conflans. Thus, Nicolet’s point in highlighting his modest achievement was perhaps to indicate that he was quite fit to exercise the office of castellan for another few years (he only got a few more months).

Another illustrative example of how a castellan might try to highlight his achievements in comparison with his predecessors in the office comes from the 1318-1319 account of Raoul d’Herbeys, castellan of Faverges. Under the rubric “denarii census”, a cash due paid by the count’s customary tenants, an additional mention was made, accompanied by the attention-drawing note “Vide” in the left margin, to the effect that the castellan collected an extra 4.5 *solidi* because he discovered that the count was owed more than the sum given in the earlier *computi*. The auditors duly noted this modest increase in revenue, writing that it had not been recorded in the accounts of Raoul’s predecessors in the office – which in all likelihood is just the point that Raoul wanted to underscore.
Denarii census -- Idem reddit computum quod recepit in dictam castellaniam de redditum per annum in predicto festo beati Andree ut in particulis in computo precedenti -- xiii lb. xviii sol. xi den. ob. fortes excucellati.

Vide hic -- Recepit ibidem de redditum per annum eodem termino quos inuenit in dictam castellaniam deberi domino per annum ultra summam predictam et de quibus hactenus non fuit computatum per castellanos predecessores eius -- iii sol. i. ob. fortes escucellati.19

That such efforts by the castellans were recorded in the *computi* confirms that the count and his aides were interested in the smallest sources of revenue. Collected from the Savoyard lands stretching on both sides of the Alps and both banks of Lake Geneva, they would come up to the total needed to fund the ambitious projects of the House of Savoy. This conception of combining small but numerous sources of revenues was quite common in the Middle Ages. But did the gestures through which the castellans aimed to highlight their administrative efficiency have a significant impact on their subsequent promotion? Nicolet François’s example suggests the contrary. Still, even if the increases in revenue reported by the castellans were modest, they might have created an impression of diligence. But it was the successful completion of other administrative, judicial, and military tasks that seems to have carried more weight in the count’s assessment of his castellans’ performance. Furthermore, professional competence had to compete with the traditional ideal of loyalty to one’s lord, and with the pull of family connections.

To tackle these issues I suggest focusing on the *librate* section of the *computi* to ascertain if it represents a reliable index of the castellan’s success on the job. The rationale for this approach is that many of the “deliveries” (*librate*) were made in response to urgent demands by the count, often triggered by the needs of a military expedition. How fully and timely the castellans could acquit themselves of the charge to deliver the much needed moneys, men, and supplies would have been the ultimate test of their effectiveness as administrators. The length of a castellan’s term in office and his subsequent appointment to a more important castellany or, alternatively, to a backwater position can be read as indicators of the count’s satisfaction with his performance. I hope to trace in my future work the careers of several castellans, using a database to correlate their performance as measured by the figures of the fiscal records with their
terms of office and subsequent promotion or relegation. This will help clarify the extent to which professional competence mattered alongside the older virtue of loyalty.

I do not mean to emphasize competence and professionalization unduly, so as to make the Savoyard administrative practices look more modern than they really were. On the contrary, I am interested in capturing the persisting ambiguities between personal responsibility and institutional accountability. To give an illustrative example, in the account of the *subsidia* (direct taxation) levied from the castellany of Conflans in 1333, Aymon de La Chambre listed alongside the money he owed for the tax levy a sum representing his outstanding debt from several years previously when he served as castellan of Entremont. The outstanding sum was to be paid from the taxes now collected from Conflans:

To which it is added the debt carried over from his past account of the castellany of Entremont, [to be paid] from the tax levied by him in the aforesaid castellany [Conflans] -- 59 *sous* and 11 *deniers gros tournois*. [Annex: Pièces justificatives, II]

Clearly, the Savoyard castellan was given considerable autonomy in running local finances. Thus, for his services as tax collector Aymon received a share of the money raised (it was from this share that his outstanding debt would have been paid). But such arrangements were by no means rare in the late Middle Ages. More importantly, castellanies’ finances were seen as to some degree interchangeable. The ideal of the fiscal accountability of the territorial-administrative unit could be substituted in practice by the castellan’s personal responsibility for delivering the sums expected of him. Whether the outstanding debt from Entremont was due to the castellan’s own failures or to economic hardship in the castellany, the debt was paid back by an *individuel* from revenues collected elsewhere. The people of the castellany of Entremont got a break. In an earlier case from Conflans (1305), the castellan’s outstanding debt was paid back after only one year; but it was, in this case as well, a debt carried over from his previous term at the head of a different castellany, Saint-Georges-d’Espérance, in the bailiwick of Viennois.20
The socio-economic life of Savoyard communities

Much of the promise of the *computi* comes from the wealth of detail they offer about socio-economic trends at the local level, in the main town and the villages of each castellany, including data about better-off commoners, notoriously difficult to come by in medieval sources. But the fiscal records do not offer a complete picture of the society, economy, and everyday life of the Western Alps in the later Middle Ages. Not all of Savoy was organized into castellanies. Even within the territory of a castellany, families that did not owe significant dues to the count of Savoy generally escape the purview of the *computi*, surfaced only occasionally in the rubrics concerned with judicial fines because they were subject to the count’s jurisdiction. Consequently, the story that the fiscal records are apt to tell us concerns not the workings of Alpine economy and society as a whole, but the differentiated transformation of local communities under the impact of the expanding institutional arm of the Savoyard principality.

My initial exploration of the sources has highlighted the considerable potential of a dual approach to the socio-economic evidence of the *computi*: database analysis combined with case studies that can verify and flesh out the findings of quantitative research. The database will enable correlations between various socio-economic figures, such as the demands made on the local economy by the count’s military expeditions and the portion of castellany revenues directed towards investment in the local infrastructure. Furthermore, I will test the possible correlation between the annual rates at which locals were leasing the count’s agricultural land, vineyards, or mills and the tax records that reveal property purchases by prospering locals. At the other end of the social spectrum, I will examine the link between the rate of defaults on tax payments and the records of the judicial fines that can be read as an index of social unrest. These are just a few of the possible ways of investigating the *computi*’s socio-economic evidence through a database.

The case-study, prosopographical research of Savoyard communities involves tracing the individuals and families that surface in the *extentes*, the *computi* (particularly under the headings concerned with sales and acquisitions, leases of the count’s lands and revenue sources, and judicial cases), the *subsidia*, and the occasional surviving charters. The benefit of this approach inspired by microhistory is that it sheds light not only on the Savoyard aristocracy but also on the more prosperous commoners who surface in the sources through purchases of land and property taxes.
Obviously, the evidence is particularly rich for the locals who did business with the local administration. The following pages are meant to give a sense, through specific examples from the sources, of the ways in which the analysis of the *comptus* can lead to significant findings about socio-economic developments.

Particularly useful are the first *comptus*, dating from the year when the territory of a local lordship, now acquired by the count from its aristocratic owners, was organized as an administrative unit under a castellan. These *comptus* give a record of the problems pertaining to the collection of revenues during this transitional period and indirectly shed light on how local lords had conducted their business. Thus, they enable us to assess the relative efficiency of the castellany system in comparison with the administration of local lords.

The 1319-1320 *comptus* from Conflans is a case in point. Owing to the circumstances from which it emanates, this document highlights many of the aspects that make the *comptus* invaluable sources for social history, and as such I dwell on it at some length. While this is not the first *comptus* from Conflans, it is the first complete one, listing the entire array of revenues collected. Conflans was organized as a *mistralia* or *métralie* (smaller administrative unit) in the second half of the thirteenth century and run by the lord of Conflans on behalf of the count as part of a power-sharing arrangement that turned the head of the leading aristocratic family into the count’s castellan. Thus, until 1319 the count’s revenues were limited to the proceedings of the administration of justice, the tax on property transactions, and a few other occasional dues. In 1305-1306 the subheadings in the earliest extant *comptus* from the *métralie* of Conflans are limited to *Banna intra uillam*, *Banna extra uillam* (fines for small crimes committed in and outside of the town of Conflans), *Laudes et venditiones* (the tax on land transactions), *Placita* (payable upon the accession of a new count to the Savoyard throne), *Inuenda* (the proceedings of lost and found sales), and *Firma* (the revenue of a tax which in 1305-1306 was farmed out to the castellan himself, as it occasionally happened when no local thought he could meet the price set by the Savoyard administration – here, the round sum of twenty-five *livres* – and still make a profit). In 1319 the count took advantage of the jurisdictional rights over Conflans that he had acquired in the last decades, and passed a sentence against Humbert of Conflans in a local dispute. Humbert realized that some sort of bargain was preferable and agreed to sell to the count most of his lands, rights, and revenues.
Dating from 1319-1320, the first complete *computus* of what was now the castellany of Conflans illustrates perfectly the complex nature of the Savoyard fiscal records. More than a register of local revenues and expenses, it is a tool of government in the sense that it abounds in written instructions to the castellan. The instructions are recorded in the body of the text, with a note, “Vide”, visually set out in the left margin. The note would have come in handy at the next auditing, reminding the central administrators and the count to look not only at the balance of revenues and expenses, but also to verify the way in which the castellan had acquitted himself of the instructions received in writing. A good deal of the instructions commanded the castellan to gather more detailed information about the families and individuals that, according to the sale deed passed between the lord of Conflans and the count, now owed taxes to the latter. Some of the revenues sold to the count seem to have been rather nominal: Humbert of Conflans had neglected to collect them for some time. The point that emerges from reading these instructions is, not surprisingly, that the Savoyard administration was far more interested in the efficient collection of revenues and in monitoring the performance of its agents than a local lord.

The received wisdom has been that the Savoyard castellanies were first and foremost military units centered on the castle. This is not to say that their function was merely defensive, because a castle could serve as a launching pad for raids and expeditions. A corollary view is that the contribution of the typical castellany to the finances of the house of Savoy pales in comparison with the revenues generated by taxing the trans-Alpine trade through tolls in several key places. While this emphasis on the military function probably holds true for border castellanies during times of military conflict, more recently the recognition that a good deal of the lands of Savoy were free of major military conflicts for long periods of times has led to more nuanced perspectives on the multi-functional role of Savoyard castellanies. Nevertheless, a thorough study of the castellan as an administrator of economic resources has yet to be undertaken. In particular, the correlation between the expansion of the network of castellanies and the granting of franchise charters (with market privileges) to towns needs to be examined more closely, because it shows a more subtle way in which the castellany system influenced economic growth, by providing the jurisdictional and administrative framework within which urban life could flourish.
The count was an important landowner in most castellanies, with arable lands, meadows, and vineyards. He held the monopoly of two important productive facilities in the castellany, the mills and the ovens on which the locals depended for processing their wheat, rye, and oats. Another source of revenue were the markets and fairs, on which the count levied a sale tax (leyda). As a rule, the castellan was instructed to farm out these resources to locals in exchange for an annual payment.

Farming out made financial sense particularly for those facilities that generated revenues through a tax on each individual transaction, such as the grinding of wheat at the count’s mill or the baking of flour at the oven, or particularly the sale tax on every transaction that took place at the local market, the butchers’ stalls, and other merchants’ shops. The castellan did not have the men effectively to police this daily business which can easily escape the eyes of the administration. The denizens of the castellany would have relied on local solidarities to conduct as much of their business at the market without paying the tax, or would have put pressure on the millers and bakers to under-report the quantities and thus pay less than what was owed to the castellan. That this must have been so is suggested by anecdotal evidence. The 1319-1320 computus from Conflans records the revenues of the market and the oven both during a short initial period when they were administered directly by the castellan, and during the subsequent interval when they were farmed out. The difference is striking. Administered by the count’s men between 18 August and 16 September 1319, the leyda or market tax yielded four solidi. Subsequently this was farmed out for nine livres and ten solidi to be paid annually in two instalments: this comes down to almost sixteen solidi per month, or four times as much as when the sale tax was collected directly by the castellan. As for the revenue of the ovens, by farming it out the castellan was able to raise it from a monthly average of approximately 7.5 solidi to 13.5 solidi – a more reasonable increase, but still a spectacular one: 80 percent.

These anecdotal data suggest that taxing the daily business of the local markets required local knowledge and connections – which the Savoys, at least during their first year of full control over Conflans, understandably did not possess. Furthermore, a local notable whose knowledge and status enabled him to administer such revenues effectively would have been interested in farming them from the count for a profit.

Here is a similar example from l’Hôpital-sous-Conflans, “villa nova Hospitalis Confleti”, just across the river from Conflans, a town that
had received a franchise charter from the count in 1287 and was first integrated in the Savoyard administrative structure as part of the castellany of Ugine. By 1319, when l’Hôpital-sous-Conflans became part of the newly established castellany of Conflans, the count’s oven was farmed by a local notable, Mermet “de Furno”, in exchange for an annual payment. Mermet came from a clan that appears to have been a power-house in the near-by village of Saint-Sigismond, holding lands for which dues in kind and cash were paid to the count. Jacob de Furno, who may well have been the clan’s leader, is even called “lord” – “dominus” – in the computi, although he, like Mermet, paid the taille to the count. This suggests a family of commoners who over time rose in station. It is tempting to speculate that their name, “de Furno”, indicates a tradition of farming the operation of the town’s oven from the count, but the earlier computi from Ugine are silent on this matter because they generally do not record the name of the revenue farmer. At any rate, it is significant that a member of this prosperous family was interested in the business opportunities opened up by the Savoyard administration.

The evidence points to real negotiation between the state and the local revenue farmers. The administration seems to have stuck to the price, unwilling to farm out sources of revenues at low annual rates and unable to pressure the locals to pay the asking price. The computi record that revenues were exploited directly when no one could be found to lease them; this could happen not only for short intervals as in the examples discussed above, but even for years in a row – for various reasons. For several years after 1319 the castellan could not lease out the mill at Conflans, for all the recent investment in its productive capacity (see below). A brief note in the computus submitted in March 1325 provides a hint in this respect: “non inuenit qui ipsum uellet accensare propter inundationes et diluuium aquarum”, no one could be found to lease it “on account of the inundations and flood of the waters”. The entry goes on to note that in the two years covered in the computus the mill was put out of business for four months. Presumably such an occurrence had been anticipated by the locals – hence their reservations. What is more, the count’s agents were reluctant to adjust down their estimation in December 1320 of the mill’s annual revenue at ten setiers of wheat, even as the revenues collected during the subsequent years of direct operation came up on average only to around four setiers annually, and rose to circa seven setiers annually only in 1323-1325. This shows a certain lack of sensitivity to local micro-economics, but it does make some sense if we
see castellanies’ contribution to Savoyard finances as more than just a modest addition to the income brought in by the trans-Alpine tolls. Put simply, the count could not allow his revenues from the castellanies to drop significantly. Furthermore, the presence of the more entrepreneurial merchants from northern Italy meant there was a chance that, where locals saw only risks in farming certain of the count’s revenues, “the Lombards” might see a way of making a profit – but only by driving a hard bargain.

Here is an illustrative example. According to the Ugine computus for April 1314 - July 1315, at l’Hôpital-sous-Conflans Tomasetto the Lombard farmed the tax known as the métralie, paying four livres for the half-year term ending in September 1314. Subsequently, however, the métralie remained vacant (“uacata”) for four weeks because no one was willing to farm it (“quod non inueniretur qui ipsam recipet, ut dicit”). Presumably Tomasetto wanted a lower rate for the term starting in September 1314 and the Savoyard administration was unwilling to go lower. There is a gap in our records about l’Hôpital-sous-Conflans from 1315 until 1319, and we do not know who took over the collection of the tax after those four weeks of vacancy in the autumn of 1314. Quite likely it was Tomasetto himself, but at a lower rate. In 1319 the computus of the castellany of Conflans mentions him as the revenue farmer for the métralie, at a rate of three livres for a half-year term, i.e., 25 percent less than in 1314 (the reference to a preceding computus submitted by the castellan of Ugine makes clear that Tomasetto also rented the métralie in 1318). The auditores computorum felt compelled to add a justifying note for this low rate in the computus, stating that no one could be found who would bid more. To sum up, it appears that no local was willing to take a gamble and farm at a price that the Italian merchant declined as too high. But it is also clear that the “institutional memory” of the Savoyard state – a function of detailed and well-kept computi – kept alive the idea that this local source of revenue might be leased out for an amount approaching the peak of five years previously.

If for several years no revenue farmer could be found it often fell upon the castellans to farm the revenues at the price expected by the count. No doubt this was a burden on their finances, and the fact that castellans accepted it suggests that their office carried benefits that extended beyond the standard annual salary of twenty-five livres. The count could put pressure on a castellan to farm the mill or market tax that no one else was interested in, because they both knew that the office of castellan had
sufficient perquisites that made it attractive even with such occasional burdens.

The castellan’s role as an administrator of economic resources also involved directing the investments made by the Savoyard state in the maintenance, repair, and expansion of the local infrastructure, from roads and bridges to the mill, oven, market hall and stalls. By shouldering the cost of these investments the Savoyard administration ensured that the various economic facilities continued to generate revenues and locals remained interested in leasing them. At Conflans, the investment in repair and construction in 1319-1320 was considerable, because the erstwhile lord had neglected to look after the local infrastructure. It included the repair of a mill and two baking ovens (in Conflans and l’Hôpital-sous-Conflans) as well as of the market buildings (which housed the butchers’ booths, the salt sellers’ stalls, and other shops),\textsuperscript{36} and the building of a new mill next to the existing one, thus doubling its capacity (as discussed above, this did not work out as expected). Together with some woodwork in one of the towers of the count’s newly acquired residence in Conflans – and bearing in mind that some of the labor was provided for free by a local carpenter – the grand total ran to almost 60 \textit{livres}.\textsuperscript{37} This was about 60 percent of the nearly 100 \textit{livres} of revenue yielded by the castellany in that year. But the investment was badly needed: the entry in the \textit{computus} records that the roofs of the market buildings “were threatened by ruin”. This gives a good illustration of the contrast between the previous lord’s neglect of the local economy and the state’s effort to stimulate local trade and business through investments in infrastructure. While many Savoyard communities faced for the first time a professional fiscal administration, more rigorous and taxing than the earlier attempts of local lords, they also stood to benefit from the count’s general policy of encouraging economic development through investments and the granting of franchise charters to towns.

Further research can evince the socio-economic effects over the medium and long term of locals’ strategic decision to do business with the administration. As suggested by the anecdotal evidence analyzed here, this research direction has considerable potential, because the \textit{computi} are a particularly useful record of information for precisely such individuals and families. While the castellany accounts do not provide a detailed picture of the entire society of the Western Alps, they can afford us a sense of the differentiated impact of the advent of the Savoyard administration on the local communities.
Because of its avowed preference for long-run, structural developments spanning more than two centuries, Nicolas Carrier’s pioneering approach to the *computi* from Faucigny left out some of the more intriguing possibilities for writing local socio-economic history. The approach that I sketch here as a complement to Carrier’s perspective capitalizes on the *computi*’s wealth of information about local socio-economic dynamics. It can help reconstruct not just broad economic trends over the *logue durée* but the social developments that are at the heart of all historical change, such as the affirmation of a class of local entrepreneurs who turned the advent of the reformed state administration into an avenue for socio-economic advancement.

Of particular relevance in this context is the evolution of the local land market. The analysis is made possible by the records of the tax on property transactions, under the “Laudes and uenditiones” rubric of the *computi*. Each entry under this rubric gives the names of the seller and buyer, the price of the sale, and the amount paid in tax (generally, one sixth of the price). Flourishing families typically invested their money in land. For instance, of the four land transaction taxed and recorded in the *computus* submitted by Thomas Evian, castellan of Faverges, for a brief, two-month term (June-August 1318), three refer to acquisitions by the same individual, Pierre “Mercatoris” or Marcheant (see Annex: Pièces justificatives, I). Pierre’s name features under the same rubric of property purchases in the next two *computi* from Faverges, with the acquisition of another land and of a house. In total, between June 1318 and August 1320 Pierre spent almost 20 *livres* buying real estate. He must be ranked among the town’s notables, his surname indicative perhaps of the activity – viz., commerce – from which he and his ancestors had made their money. In many *computi*, the list of property transactions is quite lengthy, testifying to a vibrant land market. This makes it possible to study the dynamic of socio-economic change at the local level, bringing nuance to the analysis of “structural” economic trends over the long run. This micro-historical approach to the socio-economic evidence of the *computi* can benefit from the lessons of decades of research on the economic records of medieval England.

The crucial point is to take into account both demographic factors such as the plagues of 1348 and 1362 and political developments like the creation and expansion of the castellany system. The plague’s socio-economic impact differed according to the social and political structures in place, including the regime of property, institutional development, and social mobility. An analysis sensitive to the socially-differentiated
impact of the defining political and demographic events in the history of late-medieval Savoy can problematize the metanarrative of sharp economic decline and slow re-growth across Western Europe. It can also introduce a sense of human agency into the broad picture, looking at socio-economic strategies at the level of the local community, the family, and the individual. This can help to flesh out what would otherwise be an arid analysis of macro-historical trends. Lastly, it bears repeating that this “prosopographical” approach to local socio-economic trends is well-worth undertaking if only for the simple reason that there is abundant material for it in the sources. This is one of the stories that the sources are particularly apt to tell us.

In the examples discussed above the focus is on how locals made use of the business opportunities offered by the Savoyard state to advance their socio-economic position in the community. But just as well, the economic decline of other individuals and families can be tracked through the computi. The defaults on the payment of fixed dues and taxes – a clear indicator of economic troubles – are relatively common throughout the various subheading of the castellany accounts.

Certainly, the possibilities for correlating the data from the various subsections of the castellany accounts are not limited to the well-off individuals. The computi occasionally record the wages paid to agricultural workers, making it possible to correlate their evolution with that of food prices, and even with the dynamic of land transactions. Specifically, it would be interesting to look at a possible correlation between laborers’ wages and the dynamic of sales of small properties – the kind that modest peasants who relied in part on wages might have tried to purchase during times of higher pay and would have been forced to sell during hard times.
ANNEX: Pièces justificatives

I. ADS, Chambéry, SA 11579
Account of revenues and expenses, castellany of Faverges, 1318

Computus Thome Aquini castellani Fabriciarum a die noua mensis junii anno domini m° ccc° xviii° usque ad diem dominicam, terciam decimam diem mensis augusti anno eodem, uidelicet de nouem septimanis una die, receptus apud Chamberiacum presente domino comite per Johannem dictum Acquibella clericum domini comiti.

De frumento, fabis, auena, turtis, gallinis, feno, palea, nucibus, piper, denarii census non computat quia nichil recept.

Leyda
Idem reddit computum quod recepit ibidem de exitu magne leyde et parue a die uicesima septima die aprilis anno [millesimo] ccc° xviii° usque ad diem dominicam predictam ut in particulis -- lxxi sol. ob. gebennensium.

Item recepit in sexdecim quartis frumenti, quatuor quartis et dimidium salis, septem quartis et dimidium auene, et tribus quartis de heray habetis de exitu dicte leyde per dictum tempus per manum dicti Noriont, sibi pro tanto uenditis quarta frumentum - duobus solidis, quarta salis - quatuor solidis decem denariis, quarta auene - decem denariis, et quarta de heray - uiginti denariis -- lxv sol. iii den. gebennensium.

Item recepit de exitu dicte leyde fromagie in quadraginta nouem paruis fromagiis habetis de exitu dicte leyde per dictum tempus per manum eiusdem Neriondi pro tanto uenditis -- x sol. x den. gebennensium.

Summa -- vii lb. vii sol. i den. ob. gebennensium.

Pedagium
Idem reddit computum quod recepit de exitu pedagii per dictum tempus, uidelicet de trecentum quatuor viginti decem nouem bestiis et dimidium transeuntibus per dictum tempus, et leuantur de quolibet bestia quatuor denarii gebennensium, deductis tribus solidis pro salario collectoris -- vi lb. x sol. ii den. gebennensium.

Summa eadem -- vi lb. x sol. ii den. gebennensium.
Alpagium
Idem reddit computum quod receptit pro alpagio propter quam dominus perceptit in monte de Aroisa ad alltata de Montouz et ... de Giers -- vii den. gebennensium.
Summa eadem -- vii den. gebennensium.

Laudes et uenditiones
Idem reddit computum quod receptit a Petro Mercatoris pro prato empto a Mermeto de Chambillen. precio centum solidorum -- x sol. gebennensium.
Recepit ab eodem pro terra empta a Peroneto Cazati precio duodecim solidorum -- ii sol.
Vide -- Recepit a Peroneto Pauioti et eius uxor pro terra empta a Jaquimeto Comtent precio sex libre, deductis quinque solidis pro precio trium denariorum de redditu et sex denariorum de placito quos ibidem percipiebat dictus Comtent, et de quibus tribus denariiis castellanus post ipsum computare debeat -- xx sol.
Item recepit a Petro Mercatoris pro terra empta a Johanne Mitana precio centum decem solidorum -- xviii sol. iii den.
Summa -- l sol. iii den. gebennensium.

Banna
Idem reddit computum quod receptit ab Hugonerio de Fucimagna quia lapides prohicerat contra quatuor homines -- v sol. gebennensium.
Summa eadem -- v sol. gebennensium.

Vintenum
Idem recepit ab Agnesona uxor Johannis Balli pro uinteno -- vii den. ob. gebennensium.
Item a Jaquerio Quartonis pro eodem -- iii sol.
Item a Johanne Decray -- xvi den.
Summa -- iii sol. xi den. ob. gebennensium.

Escheite
Idem reddit computum quod receptit de bonis Hudriseti Mathrye habitatoris de Sancte Foriuel. usurarii defuncti, et non potuit ultra recuperare quia dimisit castellaniis sed castellanus post ipsum de hiis computare debeat,
in duabus vathis efigatis cum illis qui eas tenebant ad commandam -- xxx sol. gebennensium.
Item receptit de bonis eiusdem in pecuniam, deductis duobus solidis sex denariis pro expensis factis in mittendo quesitum dictas vatias in monte de Arclusa -- v sol. vi den. gebennensium.
Summa -- xxxv sol. vi den. gebennensium.

Iterum i firme
Item reddit computum quod receptit a Michaele de Cleyriaco pro medietate firme mistralie domini de Fabricis acquisiti de nouo a Radulpho de Fabricis finiende in festo beate Katerine anno [millesimo] ccco xviiio et de alia medietate computauit in computo precedenti -- xxx sol. gebennensium.
Summa eadem -- xxx sol. gebennensium.

Summa tocius recepte huius computi inclusiue duobus denariis pro rotalibus predictis -- xx lb. iii sol. x den. gebennensium.

Opera castri
Tecto turris castri domini quem Boreas destruxerat, resitiendo undecies centum triginta duabus scindulis emptis ad idem, octo solidis octo denariis gebennensium, duobus miliaris cum dimidio clauini emptis ad idem, sex solidis octo denariis, una duodena ratiarum ferrearum emptis [...], empta duodecim denariis, inclusis octo solidis nouem denariis stipendiis septem carpentariorum ad idem operancium, capiente quolibet quindecim denarios per diem ut in particulis -- xxv sol. i den. gebennensium.

Expense uinearum
Uinea domini comitis de Fabricis liganda et esbratanda in mense julii anno [millesimo] ccc° xviii°, stipendiis uiginti sex hominum ad idem operandi capiente quolibet septem denarios, et stipendiis trium hominum... dictam uineam, et stipendiis triginta octo hominum dictam uineam rebinantium eadem mense capiente <quolibet septem denarios> -- xxxix sol. xi den.

[fol. 2] Expense pratorum
Item prato de uinea domini et alio prato nouo, secandis, fenandis, et feno in grangia domino reponendo, et continent prata septem falcatas et aliud pratum de Fauergetes unam falcatam, stipendiis octo falcatorum capiente
quolibet quatuordecim denarios, et stipendiis sexdecim fenatorum
capiente quolibet octo denarios, et unius alterius hominis recoparentis
grangiam capiente octo denarios ut in particulis -- xx sol.
Item situ furni deiiificio reparandis ut in particulis -- xiii sol.

Salarium
Libravuit sibi ipso pro salario suo capiente per annum uiginti quinque libras
viennenses cursibilium, et allocatur sibi pro nouem septimanis una die,
de quibus computat -- iii <lb. x sol. vii den. viennenses cursibilium>

Summa expensarum et salarium -- iii lb. xviii sol. v den. gebennensium.
Et -- iii lb. x sol. vii den. viennenses cursibilium.
Debet -- xv lb. v sol. v den. gebennensium.
Debentur -- iii lb. x sol. vii den. viennenses cursibilium.
Quoniam viennenses cursibilium uiginti sex denarii pro duodecim denariis
gebennensium ualent -- xli sol. x den., qui deducuntur de predictis
quindecim libris quinque solidis quinque denariis gebennensium, quas
uide supra.
Restant quas debet finaliter -- xiii lb. iii sol. vii den. gebennensium.

Sciendum quod fenum dictorum trium pratorum depositum est in grangiam
expeditum castellano successore suo, ut dicit; nescit quantitatem quia non
sunt ibi trosse neque thariate, ut dicit.

II. ADS, Chambéry, SA 9004
Account of subsidia (direct taxation), castellany of Conflans, 1333

Computus domini Aymonis de Camera militis castellani Confleti de
subsidiio concesso domino in castellania Confleti per quinque annos
inceptos in festo beati Andrei anno [millesimo] ccc° xxxj°, ut in computo
precedenti, et computat hic pro tercio anno, uidelicit pro termino festi
beati Andrei anno [millesimo] ccc° xxxiiij°, redditus die quinta mensis
aprilis anno [millesimo] ccc° xxxiiiij°. Receptus apud Chamberiacum,
presente domino, per Romanetum de Chamberiacum clericum domini.
Recepta
Idem reddit computum quod recepit pro sexcies viginti et octo focis existentibus in castellania Confleti, quorum septuaginta duo sunt de ulla Confleti, in quibus recuperavit pro quolibet foco adiuuante diuite pauperi octo denarios turonenses grossos. Et pro residuis quinquaginta sex focis existentibus extra ulla Confleti recuperavit pro quolibet foco adiuuante similiter diuite pauperi quatuor denarios turonenses grossos prout et in computo precedenti, deductis duodecim denariis turonenses grossis pro vacacione trium focorum de munero supscripto, uidelicet Aymonis d’Elpisour, Jaquimeti Renil, et Mermeti Ponti de mandamento Confleti, qui hoc anno absque liberis, bonis, et focis relictis obierunt et nichil soluerunt, ut dicit -- lxv sol. viii den. grossos turonenses.
Recepit pro eodem a liberis Humberti de Confleto quondam pro duodecim focis hominum quos habent apud Nonam et Agreignon pro eodem termino -- iiiii sol. grossos turonenses.
Recepit a Petro domino de Feysson pro eodem pro quinque focis hominum quos habet in valle Sancti Ypoliti, tam pro termino predicto quam pro termino festi beati Andrei anno [millesimo] ccc⁰ xxxij⁰, et est sciendum quod castellanus ante ipsum pro focis dictorum duorum nobilium nichil computauit, nec pro focis hominum Johanni domini castri Confleti, quem dictus presens castellanus compellit ad soluendam dictum subsidium in manibus Guillelmi Boni, ut dicit. Et iniungitur quod in sequenti computo veniat informatus declarare si et cui nobiles predicti vel eorum heredes subsidium predictum soluerunt -- iiiii sol. iiiiiii den. grossos turonenses.
Summa recepte -- lxxiii sol. grossos turonenses.

Librata
De quibus idem librauit Guillelmo Boni burgensi Chamberiacum receptori pro domino et qui de ipsis domino computare debebit per litteram dicti Guillelmi de testimonio et recepta datam Chamberiacum die xiiiia mensis januarii anno [millesimo] ccc⁰ xxxiiiio quam reddit -- lxxiii sol. iiiiiii den. grossos turonenses.
Summa librate -- lxxiii sol. iiiiiii den. grossos turonenses.
Et sic debet -- ix sol. viiiii den. grossos turonenses.
Quibus adduntur quos debebat de remanencia sui computi olim castellanie Intermontes de subsidio per ipsum leuato in castellania predicta -- lix sol. xi den. grossos.
Summa additi -- lix sol. xi den. grossos turonenses.
Et sic debet -- lxix sol. vii den. grossos turonenses.
De quibus deducuntur quos librauit Guillelmo Boni de Chamberiacum
recipienti pro domino et de quibus ipse Guillelmus domino computare
debebit, ut per confessionem ipsius Guillelmi presentem in computo de
recepta -- ix sol. viii den. grossos turonenses.
Summa deducti -- ix sol. viii den. grossos turonenses -- et sic lix sol. xi
den. grossos turonenses.
Respondet in computo castellanie -- et sic hic eque.
NOTES

1. This assessment by GUILLERÉ and GAULIN, “Des rouleaux et des homes”, p. 51, still rings true today, two decades after it was made. The recent effort to digitalize the manuscripts of the castellany accounts can provide a new stimulus to research on this topic. Many digitalized computi can be accessed through the website of the Archives départementales de la Savoie, under the heading “Archives en ligne”: http://www.savoie-archives.fr/2643-archives-numerisees.htm


4. BISSON, *Fiscal Accounts of Catalonia*; CASSIDY, “Recorda splendidissima”.

5. The castellan sometimes exercised a pre-emption right when the dues that had been collected in produce were sold locally; CARRIER, “Le rachat des redevances en nature”.


7. CASTELNUOVO and GUILLERÉ, “Les finances et l’administration”.

8. DEMOTZ, *La géographie administrative*, which makes very limited use of the computi.

9. This approach has proven influential. For a recent contribution, see THÉVENAZ MODESTIN, “Une élaboration par étapes”.


11. CHIAUDANO, *Finanza Sabauda*. For a more recent overview, see MOUTHON and CARRIER, ‘Les extentes’.

12. CASTELNUOVO, *Ufficiali e gentiluomini*.


16. See ROSENWEIN (ed.), *Anger’s Past*.

17. Archives départementales de la Savoie (hereafter ADS), Chambéry, SA 9335, fol. 4. I am indebted to Patrick Stoppiglia of the Archives départementales in Chambéry for sharing with me some of his research material on the castellany of Montmélian.

18. ADS, Chambéry, SA 8880, fol. 2.

19. ADS, Chambéry, SA 11579, fol. 2.

20. ADS, Chambéry, SA 8864, fol. 1.


23. ADS, Chambéry, SA 8864, fol. 1. The tax in question is most likely what subsequent accounts record as mistralia, but its nature remains obscure.


See MARIOTTE-LÖBER, *Ville et seigneurie*.

ADS, Chambéry, SA 8867, fol. 4.

MARIOTTE-LÖBER, *Ville et seigneurie*, p. 141.

Furthermore, in 1310 when we have a detailed record the oven was leased to one Jean Chevrot; ADS, Chambéry, SA 12357, fol. 3.

ADS, Chambéry, SA 8869, fol. 1.

“extimatum fuit ualere per annum decem sestarios frumenti”, ADS, Chambéry, SA 8867, fol. 10; SA 8869, fol. 7.

ADS, Chambéry, SA 12357.

ADS, Chambéry, SA 8867, fol. 7.


ADS, Chambéry, SA 8867, fol. 8. Uginet’s transcription in the “pièces justificatives” of his work omits one entry of the list of expenses (concerning the cost of the bread and lunch provided to the workers who transported the wood for the constructions), which I transcribe here: “Pane et prandio date centum et duobus curribus charreantibus fustam necessariam pro predictis operibus de diuersis nemoribus per unam diem, et fuerunt dati baneriis cuiuslibet currus octo denarios fortes escucellati pro pane et prandio -- lxviii solidos fortes escucellati.”

ADS, Chambéry, SA 11579, fol. 1, 3, 9.

See RAZI, “The Toronto school’s reconstitution”.


Lacunae in the manuscripts and illegible words are indicated by suspension points; where it proved possible to reconstruct missing words this is indicated between angle brackets. Three currencies are used in the *computi* transcribed here, following the Carolingian system of money of account in which a *livre* (lb.) was subdivided into 20 *sous* or *solidi* (sol.), each worth 12 *deniers* (den.; a further subdivision was the *obolus*, worth half a *denier*); the currency of the bishop of Geneva (*gebennensium*), of the Dauphin of Viennois (*viennenses cursibilium*), and of the king of France (*turonenses* or *tournois*).
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II. Secondary literature


