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- Eseuri critice* (Critical Essays), Ed. Muzeului Național al Literaturii Române, Bucharest, 2006
- Textul confesiv în literatura română veche* (The Confessive Text in the Medieval Romanian Literature), Artemis, Bucharest, 2006
- Fragmente de noapte* (Slices of Night), Ideea Europeană/ EuroPress Group, Bucharest, 2008
- Secvențe literare contemporane. O panoramă a deceniului 1990-2000* (Contemporary Literary Fragments. A Panorama of the 1990-2000 Decade), Editura Academiei Române, Bucharest, 2009
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ALTERNATIVE CULTURE AND POLITICAL OPPOSITION IN TITOIST AND POST-TITOIST YUGOSLAVIA (1945-1991)

This project proposes in the first place to trace, by a few significant moments, the evolution of alternative culture in former Yugoslavia in the period 1945-1991 and secondly, to outline the correspondences and influences between such evolution of the alternative culture and the recent history of ex-Yugoslavia.

The main focus in my research will be to identify the cultural codes and contexts of the Yugoslav totalitarian regime, in close connection to a phenomenon for which the political regime was not actually ready and for which the Leninist and Stalinist theses did not provide any answers. The situation of Yugoslavia should be so much the more interesting as we think that the Titoist communist regime broke up with Moscow in 1948 and developed a theory and a practice different than the usual ones seen in the East Europe.

The second focus of my research will be to investigate the importance of the alternative culture within the much larger framework of the general culture, and also to fight against the preconception of the existence of two cultures: an "elitist", performance culture for the intellectuals, and a "vulgar", consumer one for the uncultivated masses. Insofar as it generates an original creation, culture is one, and counter-culture, despite that after the collapse of communism ended in entertainment, was by the time I will speak of able to assume, throughout the various critical moments of the political and cultural evolution of ex-Yugoslavia, intellectual and civic missions of great responsibility.

Unlike the research on alternative culture in Western Europe, the status of research in this particular field of Yugoslav culture is not very advanced. We need a theoretical grounding, able to accredit for the presence of the forms and manifestations of alternative culture in a totalitarian regime,

and also a synthesis of the few histories and monographs dedicated to phenomena and personalities of the Yugoslav counter-culture: the *pop art* phenomenon, the last avant-garde movement called *Klokotrizm*, the rock band Bijelo Dugme, the musician Goran Bregović, the film-maker Emir Kusturica or the visual artist Olja Ivanicki.

As for current bibliography, there is even a research – unfortunately biased and far from the academic neutrality required – dedicated to the relation between the music of Riblja Čorba band and the Serbian politics during the 1980s-1990s. I could also find useful remarks in the books and studies of some contemporary Balkans specialists such as Stefano Bianchini (*La Questione Jugoslava*) or Barbara Jelavitch (*History of the Balkans*). Yet, this study attempts to sketch the hallmarks of a new synthesis.

I. Counter-culture, alternative culture. Moving concepts

If we stick with the theory of counter-culture as presented in the classic book of Theodore Roszak, *The Making of a Counter Culture* (1969), the very existence of some phenomena such as *alternative culture*, *counter-culture* or (in the lingo of ultra-conservatory theorists) *infraculture* seems difficult to accept in the context of a totalitarian regime of the Socialist type, as it was the political regime established in 1945 in Yugoslavia and in all the other East European countries.

One explanation would be that the birth of counter-culture, in the classic theory of Theodore Roszak, is closely related, first of all, to a political context of democracy and to the idea of developed capitalist societies, as in the world of the United States of America or in certain countries of Western Europe like France, Germany or Great Britain at the beginning of the decade 1960-1970. The origins of counter-cultures are also accompanied by the manifestation of major political and social crises like the Vietnam War or the Civil Rights Movement. This is the background against which, according to Roszak, “only a strict minority of young and a handful of their adult mentors”¹ can raise their voices, as the only people responsible in the construction of a counter-culture. They perceive themselves by the time as the saving solution to preserve humanism and civilization, threatened by “what anti-utopians like Huxley and Orwell have forecast”.²

The inexistence or the poor development of any of the said elements could raise questions on whether we should speak of counter-culture, or

not. In countries like Spain or Portugal, for instance, although capitalism was sufficiently well-developed, until 1975 and 1974 respectively, right-wing, catholic and conservatory dictatorships existed, which, through the agency of almighty repression mechanisms, prevented the countries from the emergence and development of contesting cultural structures, and most especially from the appearance of a young generation with a political and cultural consciousness that we could call anti-system.

On the other hand, in Latin America there were quite a few democratic regimes, but the poor development of the capitalist social and economic structures did not permit the emergence of a coherent form of counter-culture. Against the background of a volatile *establishment* and given the enhanced permeability of the social strata, Latin America could not develop conflicting cultural structures where a technocratic ossified majority may be challenged and opposed by a humanistic and dynamic minority: at the south of Rio Grande, *right* and *left* are actually notions of quite relativity.

Finally, in countries like Japan or South Korea there existed both democracies and open-market economies, but the cultural Asian-like autarchic systems made that, despite such favorable premises, counter-culture could not be yet developed but only eventually, much later after becoming official in the European cultures (at the beginning of the 1980s), and solely in the form of the industry of entertainment.³ Most particularly, these Asian gerontocratic cultures did not allow the development of a political consciousness to the young Asian generations of the 1960s and 1970s, whose revolutionary potential was unfortunately symbolized only by the hideous Maoist "Cultural Revolution". (Note that a superficial Western reading of the 1960s-1970s apparently identified it as counter-culture, while, as a matter of fact, the only common point it had with counter-culture was the violence showed in the deconstruction of any antagonizing paradigms).

Besides, should we abandon the somehow triumphalist perspective of Theodore Roszak and of other theorists of the counter-culture,⁴ we shall notice that not even in democratic states with highly-developed capitalist systems did counter-culture operate without facing reactions from the *establishment*. Such reactions usually restricted its scope by the use of legal means (and, first of all, by resorting to public policies and budget instruments⁵). Jean-Michel Djian, in an *avant-propos* to the anthology of studies *Vincennes. Une aventure de la pensée critique*, emphasized the

very contradictory element that existed in the French social environment of the 1970s between contestation and the sphere of political power:

La pensée contemporaine visionnaire y trouvait (at Vincennes – my note / R. V.) un territoire de prédilection, et les intellectuels une sorte de havre en ébullition. C'est une authentique société en miniature qui en jaillit, peuplée de milliers de non-bacheliers, de travailleurs, d'étudiants de toutes origines géographiques et sociaux, d'enseignants cooptés. Elle vit de maîtres interdisciplinaires, des assistants émancipés, des gourous pénétrés, des visionnaires improbables dispenser un corpus de connaissance si audacieux qu'il suscita l'effroi: chez les récipiendaires comme dans les hautes sphères du pouvoir terrifié à l'idée que l'on puisse, *in situ*, réinventer le monde. De là est née une culture. De la contestation, de la liberté, de l'innovation, de la transgression, de l'exigence, le tout porté par une certaine idée de la pensée.⁶

Even when it was born within a legitimate structure and had a fundamental academic dimension, as it was the case with the University of Vincennes, counter-culture raised, according to the specialists, numerous concerns and replicas from the power, which was very sensitive to the development of sciences with a critical potentiality such as philosophy, urbanism, social sciences, etc. The destiny of the experimental University of Vincennes tells much in this respect: after a series of scandals produced by the Police, the University was forcibly moved to Saint-Denis,⁷ and the old buildings bearing the visual signs of the critical spirit in action were demolished in 1980, even before the new University site was to be built. Nowadays, Université Paris VIII – Vincennes – Saint-Denis is a large but marginal university, open to students from the Third World, and with an excellent potential of academic research and an elite teaching body, but completely deprived of the potential spirit of social criticism which made it famous about four decades ago.⁸

Let us note, nevertheless, that although it seems that, in order to speak of counter-culture or alternative culture, we should be able first to identify the existence of democracy and capitalism, elements of counter-culture have existed in all the other areas of the world where there was no democracy at all, or which had economies far from the stage of highly-developed capitalism. Early or derived forms of counter-culture appeared even in places where the political power fought a sustained and explicit battle against them. We should reflect upon the case of Brazil, where at the end of the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s – which makes it quite relative

synchronical with the Western cultures – the phenomenon of *Tropicalism* was born, whose concepts were closely related to specific ideas of the *beat* generation. The Tropicalist Revolution was equally a reaction against the Brazilian society and a post-colonial reaction that asked for the abandonment of the Western cultural patterns and the enactment of local ones, fed from the very roots of the pre-colonial indigenous culture. The outstanding members of the Tropicalist Revolution, like Joao Gil or Caetano Veloso, were forced to choose the exile, and their music and texts were banned by the military dictatorship, which still could not prevent Tropicalism from resisting as an *underground* phenomenon, until the return of Brasil to democracy.

The element that makes the existence of certain counter-culture elements possible in hostile social-political environments is the appearance of *minority phenomenon* of the counter-culture. As a minority phenomenon, counter-culture may avoid censorship and even repression more easily, by taking refuge to *underground* or closed-circuit environments. It may even dispense with the official institutions, by operating in private areas difficult to control, however tough the political regimes may be.

One little example that combines all these evasive constituents of counter-culture is Club “A” in Bucharest, which belongs with the “Ion Mincu” Institute of Architecture. Established in 1969, as a closed-circuit institution, accessible only to students that studied Architecture and officially registered as members, the club hosted numerous artistic manifestations opposed to official art, and which had an obvious content of social and political criticism. Such existence was possible thanks to its ambiguous statute: the club existed socially as a public institution, with an officially registered seat, depended administratively on the “Ion Mincu” Institute of Architecture but operated in a private way, due to its closed circuit, accessible only for its members and only once a week for one guest of each member. The private operation of the club kept the censorship (unfortunately, not also the police, or better say the former communist Militia) away from the club. On the other hand, it is not less true that *all* the public manifestations of Club A that were carried out outside the confined space of the institution – and more particularly, the Club A Festivals – were censored.⁹

In order to have an alternative, we definitely need that the mere *idea* of alternative should be accepted at the level of the current political practices. However “liberal” they may be, communist regimes were not famous for accepting alternatives, even the most innocent ones: on the

contrary, their history is a long repertory of repressive actions, starting from the most insignificant deviations from the official line of the political party and which could occasionally affect even the regime officials or the people aligned to the party's ideology. The alternative was not theoretically accepted even within the limits of the official culture. The much-acclaimed "cultural resistance", if not a *post factum* compensatory concept, consisted of a bunch of disparate facts, and not in a coordinated strategy with clear objectives. And most especially, it was not the expression of the consciousness of a young generation, eager to save the humanist values from the pressure of the technocrat society and did not have a global amplitude either: not a single act of creation that we could include in the phenomenon of "cultural resistance" equaled the power that we could actually see in Western acts of counter-culture. The acts of "cultural resistance" were strictly subsumed to the mission of preserving a minimum of normality in a politically subordinated cultural climate.

In practical terms, if we take the case of Romania, we could identify in the communist period not less than four consecutive ideological movements, all of them imposed to the culture and society as the only ways of literary creation: 1) proletcultism (1948-1949), 2) socialist realism (1950 – about 1964), 3) socialist humanism (1968-cca 1971) and 4) protochronism (1977-1989).¹⁰ Three of them even contained in their titles roots or sounds that referred to their communist nature, while the fourth represented the "original" ideological contribution of the Ceausescu regime: a mixture of socialist realism and nationalism, of proletarian sequels of the '50s and cult for our "Thracian" origins, of primitivism and autarchy. There were short periods of ideological confusion between them that were caused by the political evolutions, but not even once did the ideological confusion bring the freedom of creation or expression in the Romanian public space. Censorship was a constant trait of the entire communist period, and its role was not only to *preserve* the ideological purity of the art works, but also to *guide creation* and *rewrite the past*.

In such a cultural and social system that drastically sanctioned any trace of individuality, original expression or manifestation of diversity, counter-culture could not get coagulated into open institutional forms, but functioned solely in private or closed environments (see the aforementioned case of Club A in the Romanian capital city).

This is why, should we limit strictly to the description of counter-culture as performed by Theodore Roszak – the new revised edition of 1995¹¹ did not bring any change of view, but only a few supplements and updates of

the information –, we should be very cautious when we leave the territory of the rich and democratic societies of Western Europe and dare to venture in the world of the communist societies of Eastern Europe.

Let us say that Roszak's theory is already 44 years old: it has been recently subject to direct or indirect criticism right from the viewpoint of its own evolution, which changed 1) how we understand counter-culture today, and 2) how counter-culture should be placed among the cultural practices of humankind ever.

For instance, in a recent book, Steven Jezo-Vannier speaks of counter-culture not as a historical phenomenon, possible to be located in time in a specific age. Counter-culture is, according to the author, an *eon*, namely a permanent reality of cultures, starting from Ancient times through the ages and up to the present:

Contestations, contre-cultures, dissidences, hérésies, désobéissances, insurrections, séditions, pirateries... l'histoire est jalonnée de mouvements d'opposition au système dominant. Avec plus ou moins de radicalité, souvent à contre-courant de leurs contemporains, des individus se sont positionnés en rupture avec le monde, le temps et la société qui les ont vus naître.¹²

Jezo-Vannier obviously puts a stress on the contents of the political and social contestation in counter-culture, also achieving a “release” of the concept from the temporal and ideological frontiers set by Roszak – the 1960s, the *beat* music and the *hippy* movement, the anti-Vietnam contestations and the Civil Rights Movement. This enlargement of perspectives results in a kind of counter-culture “sans rivages” that hallmarks the entire history of humankind and which could be logically opposed by an official culture of repression and conformism, originating also in the Ancient times (let us imagine an episode of that in the accepting act of Socrates of drinking the coniine), and up to our times.

In reality, should we consider a gain the fact that there is a counter-culture/ counter-cultures also outside the frameworks outlined by Theodore Roszak, the risk that Jezo-Vannier's viewpoint exposes us to would be to extend the limits of culture and politics altogether. Not every contestatory practice should belong with culture, just as not all non-conformist acts of culture should have a political content. To say that everything is culture is as risky as it would be to say that everything is politics.

A better conception of a new theory of counter-culture(s) can be found in the volume *Contre-cultures!*, brought out under the coordination of Christophe Bourseiller and Olivier Penot-Lacassagne.¹³ The authors of this collective volume also consider counter-culture a way of living in culture and not a historical phenomenon, and they therefore approach themes like: 1) the avant-garde and counter-culture, 2) the relation between the cultural and political revolution, 3) the counter-culture of the 1980s (*New Wave, Black Generation*), etc. As resulted from the very title of the book, the somehow triumphalistic perspective of Roszak was left behind in favor of a pluralist perspective, which advocates for a world full of counter-cultures and for a contemporary culture actually composed of several counter-cultures.

Should we read in that that we cannot use freely the classic concepts of the theory of Western counterculture when we analyze the ways this has manifested in communist countries? Do we need new, hybrid concepts just like the manifestations of counter-culture, concepts liable to describe phenomena and personalities that combined contestation and a semi-official or even official existence, the free culture with the totalitarian institutions of validation and the democratic thought and action, free of any constraints, with the living within the strict confined frontiers of totalitarian institutions?

More particularly, the recent criticism on Theodore Roszak's theory provides us with a few working instruments that are more appropriate to the cultural context of the Titoist and post-Titoist Yugoslavia.

One accomplishment would be to reveal first of all, as Steven Jezovannier did, the connections between the literary bohemianism and the counter-culture:

La contestation artistique, reprise par les beatniks puis le mouvement hippie, se place dans la filiation d'une longue tradition, sans cesse renouvelée, qui a traversé le Xxe siècle. En gagnant la France, les auteurs américains des *beat* et *lost generation* ont cherché à nouer des liens avec les bohèmes parisiennes des XIXe et Xxe siècles, celles de Montmartre, de Montparnasse et de Saint-Germain. La bohème n'a rien d'un mouvement organisé, théorisé et cloisonné, elle se définit uniquement par l'attitude commune et la mode de vie des artistes parisiens qui la font vivre. Elle se caractérise par la marginalité et l'anticonformisme de ses artisans, qui font le choix d'une esthétique à contre-courant de la mode bourgeoise, et s'opposent à la vague romantique qui séduit l'aristocratie. Familiers des cabarets et des cafés d'artistes des quartiers populaires, ils mènent une vie

communautaire, se retrouvant quotidiennement por partager rires, alcools, drogues et plaisirs charnels. Cette vie d'excès, refusant la dogme du travail, est tempérée par la pauvreté des bohèmes, qui vivent maigrement des fruits de leur art et de quelques boulots sans lendemain.¹⁴

The homologies between the artistic bohemianism and the counter-culture are truly numerous and easily discernible, despite the fact that the first does not have an organized character, while counter-culture is doubled by theories and, in the end, by institutions that get it structured and give it the offensive character toward the technocrat society. But the refusal of conformism, the violent anti-bourgeois aesthetics, the dismissal of the protestant spirit read in the "cult of labor" supported by the capitalism, as well as the community spirit make the artistic bohemianism the place of first choice when we study counter-culture. In Western Europe, the bohemianism of the 1950s was the first cultural space where certain changes of paradigm could be sensed, which announced the future break-ups and were about to make the second half of the past century so renown.

The second valuable idea would be the organic connection that exists between the avant-garde and the counter-culture, an idea proposed in the study "Vol au dessus d'un nid d'ignus: surréalisme et contre-culture" by Jérôme Duwa, a study included in the volume coordinated by Christophe Bourseiller and Olivier Penot-Lacassagne.¹⁵ In the words of the author,

Pour reprendre les distinctions introduites par Alain Touraine dans un article de 1974, le surréalisme n'a pas de rapport avec les *drop-out* Beat dans le style de «refus» de la société; il n'est pas non plus attiré par une recherche mystique à base de philosophie zen fondant de nouvelles communautés; il n'accorde aucun intérêt à la musique pop et très peu au jazz; il est fort éloigné sociologiquement de la réalité de la vie étudiante, qu'elle soit celle des facultés parisiennes ou *a fortiori* des campus américains. En revanche, ce que Touraine nomme «contestation culturelle» et pas seulement «nouvelle culture», «refus», «culture parallèle» ou «rupture culturelle» est un terrain commun entre la tradition surréaliste et les mouvements d'opposition mis en effervescence par la guerre du Vietnam (1959-1975).¹⁶

In other words, the sociological status and the surrealist themes may be very different from those of counter-culture, but the *grammar* of the forms remains the same.

However, an easier attempt to define alternative culture in the communist space will be to define it by what it is *not*, rather than by what it actually is, or by what the Western canons tell us that it should be. There is an infallible symptom provided to us by the very censorship and communist propaganda, and with the help of which we could rapidly identify the creations of counter-culture. This will, in the language of propaganda and official criticism, the accusation of *decadentism*, *moral degradation* or *unhealthy condition*, with respect to the works and/or artists in question.

Totalitarian regimes basically rely on the idea of *salvation*, of *redemption*, applied to nations. In this sense, art works do not divide any longer into *aesthetically valid* and *without value*, respectively, but into *healthy* and *unhealthy* ones, meaning that the healthy ones are obviously those devoted to the regime, while the others will be the independent or antagonizing creations. Whenever we meet this hygiene-sanitary criterion instead of an aesthetic one, we can be sure that the judgment will attack the contestatory work created outside the principles of the official canon. In the period 1948-1960, this accusation usually regarded the political contestation disguised into works of art and generally all the creations that were not based on the dominant ideology. After 1960, the accusation of *moral and/or artistic decadentism* regarded solely the creations of counter-culture, to whom the official propaganda opposed a healthy, namely a controlled "counter-culture" (like in Ceausescu's Romania, with the case of the „Flacăra" Circle).

In the Titoist and post-Titoist Yugoslavia, counter-culture originated and lived from: 1) the older Yugoslav avant-garde that – through artists and writers like Dušan Matić, Oskar Davičo, Moni de Buli, Milan Dedinac – continued to influence the contemporary letters and arts (the most illustrative example will be that of the poet Vasko Popa, the most important modern Serbian poet); 2) from the literary and artistic bohemianism, which was very much evolved, and 3) from a series of phenomena such as *Pop Art*, the rock music and the *hippie* lifestyle, that gradually appeared in the cultural life of Yugoslavia once the communist regime became more liberal and opened itself to Western Europe.

II. A different type of socialism

The Titoist and post-Titoist Yugoslavia fortunately make an exception in the East-European picture of the repression of alternatives.

The Yugoslav socialist regime was not one to admit the right or need to have alternatives, in any field of activity at all. But the specificity of the Yugoslav communism, together with the different geopolitical context in which Josip Broz Tito placed himself after his break-up with the Comintern (1948), made that the existence of one or several alternatives in several fields would be tolerated and even discreetly encouraged. Small and medium private agricultural property, private trade and most especially the full freedom of circulation of the Yugoslav citizens – that is, the famous “red passport” – took to a more varied image of the socialist society of Yugoslavia than in the other states blocked behind the Iron Curtain.

Joint properties in agriculture, to take one example, were subject to a mere experiment in Yugoslavia, unlike in the other communist states, where the land reform and the cooperativization took out the land cultivation from the authority of the legitimate land owners and placed it under the authority of the State. (For, even if theoretically the plots subject to cooperativization remained legally under the peasants’ ownership, their cultivation did not depend on them anymore. Both with the help of the laws – which imposed to the joint owners a lot of obligations and restrictions –, and also through the agency of some abusive bodies, private property upon the land became fictitious.)

Nevertheless, this was not the case with Yugoslavia. Here the Soviet solutions were not applied *ad litteram*, and the best example can be found right in the field of agriculture. At the end of 1948, promptly after the break-up with Moscow, the Yugoslav regime decreed the beginning of cooperativization in agriculture, taking after the Soviet model.¹⁷ Only that the reaction of the peasants – which represented almost 63% of the population –, was very rough, which made that as early as from 1949 the authorities would start to give up on the idea,¹⁸ and in 1953 to even abandon the idea in its entirety and give back the lands to their owners.¹⁹ This is the only case of the type in the entire communist system.

The same difference can be reported also at the level of the industrial policies. The first five-year plan, commenced in 1946, got profiled from the very beginning as a failure, much aggravated by the economic embargo imposed by the Soviet Union upon Yugoslavia at the beginning of 1949.²⁰ Because of this, on the 27th of July 1950, the Yugoslav regime adopted

the economic system of self-management,²¹ which turned the centralized and bureaucratic system of the Soviet type into a decentred one, whereby the decision-making did not lie any more with the minister on top of the respective industrial domain, but with the economic units themselves. Subsequently, the state property resulted after nationalization was turned into a *social property*, within a system where all the employees were co-interested and involved in the decision-making process: in exchange, the state apparatus was to a big extent released from the burden of this economic bureaucracy. In the decade 1950-1960, which was marked by serious economic problems in all the socialist countries, the result of the aforementioned measures took to one of the most rapid rhythms of economic growth of the entire world: 11% in 1953, 14% in 1955, 10% in 1955, 17% in 1956, and in the period 1956-1960, the average increase came to the amazing percent of 45.6%, as compared to 1956.²²

We cannot definitely speak of capitalist economy in Yugoslavia, but of a social economy where the weight of private initiative and of private property was considerably larger than in any other socialist states. At the same time, prosperity was also neatly superior, both for the State (which fulfilled many investments in infrastructure), and for the citizens, as well. This prosperity did not mean an equalitarian leveling ordered by the top management of the Communist Party, but the maintenance and even the formation of distinct social strata where the middle class became the most important class of the society. This middle class – with many bourgeois elements in its constituency –, was an eminent product resulted from this type of socialism, and was to become the element of stability of the Yugoslav regime, and also the target group of the artistic contestation of the 1960s and 1970s (like in democratic regimes).

A special discussion should be borne on the political regime that the Yugoslav communism imposed upon its own citizens, and which deserves a more distinctive approach than the appraisals or undifferentiated criticism, respectively, that were expressed after the disintegration of the federal state. This is because 1) the Yugoslav regime was part of a world system of power, which most often caused in medium and small countries favorable or unfavorable evolutions, and 2) the personality of Josip Broz Tito is still set up in lights and shadows more than in the case of any other communist dictator.

In general terms, one may say that there existed three distinct ages in the Yugoslav domestic policies: 1) 1945-1948, when both the Soviet policies and the post-war policies peculiar to the countries occupied by the

Nazi Germany were applied (see the deportation of the Swabians from the Banat and the repression of the members of pro-Nazi guerrillas in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slovenia and Serbia); 2) 1948-1954, the most radical period, when the open conflict with Stalin allowed Tito to liquidate, through a system that was similar to the Soviet concentration camps (on the Goli Otok island, in the Adriatic Sea), any real or alleged political enemies, and 3) 1954-1991, years of progressive civil liberalization, when Yugoslavia turned into the most liberal communist state of the world. Mention should be made that one of the basic instruments of personal freedom in that world, namely the tourist passport, was established by the Constitution of 1945, and the access of any citizen to such passport was never restricted, not even in the periods of maximum political strain. The right to circulation remained, throughout the entire communist era, at maximum parameters in Yugoslavia, and this unrestricted right produced effects not only upon the domestic regime, but also upon the development of culture and counter-culture themselves.

The only field where the Titoist Yugoslavia chose to align to the policies of the other communist states was *religion*. Religion was both repressed and isolated on a large scale, even on a scale larger than what happened in Romania over the same years. However, Tito's rationale was different than the idea of replacing religion with the Marxist-Leninist "people's opium": the Yugoslav Federation was a multi-religious state, where Christian Orthodoxy, Catholicism, Islamism and Judaism coexisted, not to mention other smaller religious cults. The official atheism was also a way to reduce the "asperities" between the Yugoslav peoples and to maintain political stability, as well.

In conclusion, there was repression in Yugoslavia,²³ but to a more reduced extent as seen in other communist countries and within a shorter period of life (which unfortunately does not change too much the overall picture, for we consider irrelevant whether a political system imprisoned 200.000 persons for political causes, like in Romania, or "only" 32.000, like in Yugoslavia). All types of limitations of political and civil liberties that were criticized in the totalitarian regimes of Eastern Europe existed in former Yugoslavia, too – except for the freedom of circulation that all the population enjoyed –, although these limitations were applied on shorter periods and at different degrees of intensity. However, the regime was perceived both in the inside and from the outside as the most liberal one of all the communist regimes.

III. Internal contradictions and Tito's solution

Another element that differentiates communist Yugoslavia from other countries of the former Soviet bloc is its ethnic diversity, translated in administrative terms into a federal structure.

Both the USSR and Czechoslovakia were federal states. But the federalism of the Soviet Union was only apparent, if we think of the powerful Russian hegemony, visible in the very statute of the Russian language, which was the official language of the entire Union, and last but not least at the level of every individual republic. In Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, we had a sort of "dualism", translated into a partnership between two republics that were closely similar in size and also ethnically and linguistically similar.

In Yugoslavia, this kind of diversity was straightforwardly disconcerting for the Westerners, who were confronted with six republics – Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Slovenia and Montenegro – plus two autonomous provinces (Vojvodina and Kosovo-Metohija, both in Serbia), and all were inhabited by about 26 ethnic groups. Except for Slovenia, all the other 5 republics were actually an ethnic mosaic whose cohesion was ensured by acceptable standards of living and, paradoxically, by Tito's absolute power, who would forbid any kind of nationalist movement with separatist goals.²⁴

One of the causes of the differences between the Yugoslav communists and Moscow, which eventually took to the 1948 break-up from Moscow, was represented by the very particular structure of the Yugoslav federation, which did not permit the application as such of the formulas and solutions imposed by the Soviets to the other communist countries. The reconciliation of the small nations that formed the Yugoslav federation, each with its own traditions and aspirations, and each with its particular expectations from a regime created through a legitimate war of independence from the German occupation (1941-1944), was much more difficult than governing through terror, as Stalin used to do in the USSR. The formal cause of Tito's break-up with Stalin (or better said, of his excommunication by the latter) is known for a fact: the Yugoslav leader refused to take part in the great Balkan federation that Moscow was preparing,²⁵ and that was for obvious reasons. The existence of some differences with Bulgaria in the issue of Macedonia, as well as in the Albanian problem from Kosovo, made Tito very reserved to the question of such political projects, which risked to destabilize Yugoslavia, a state

where the interethnic balance had been seriously jeopardized during the war, and trust was so difficult to be gained back. Tito preferred to look for his own way to build the socialist society and for his “own way to the communism”, which was motivated both by his wish to remain the only master over Yugoslavia’s fate and by the multi-ethnic and multicultural specificity of the country, which imposed to the leader from Belgrade much caution in adopting the Soviet solutions and suggestions.

IV. The roots of the Yugoslav communism

Communism also had in Yugoslavia more powerful origins than in other East European states, some of these roots even preceding the communist movement from USSR.

First of all, it was the *zadruga* concept, which was a form of organizing the community in the villages from the West Balkans, from the Middle Age and up to the dawns of modernity, with the only exception provided by the Slovene villages.

Zadruga was an organization that comprised from a few individuals up to 70-80 people, interrelated through direct kinship or in-law associations (marriage, god-parenting). These people had joint ownership upon the important property – lands, production means, meadows, orchards, lakes, etc. – and private property was reduced only to some personal stock of each individual. Labor was equally divided, but according to everyone’s capabilities: the children were responsible with herding the cattle, the women and the elders dealt with household activities, easy agricultural works were assigned both to adult men and women, while the hard works were only assigned to men. The community was ruled by an old man, called *domaćin*, who had domestic administrative and legal duties, as well as responsibilities in exerting the (Ottoman and Habsburg, respectively) state authority, according to the area. There was also a mistress of the *zadruga* that was called *domaćica*: she had to take care of the children’s and young girls’ education and of the cultivation of folk arts.

Several *zadruga* used to form a village, which at a larger scale would reproduce the same community structure, with joint ownership and exploitation through labor division, but in equal proportions. All the *domaćins* would form a *village council*, which had increased competences in deciding upon the rotations in using the lands, mills, ovens, wells, woods, maintenance of roads. This council was also the community’s

tax collector, which they further delivered to the tax authorities of the village, and they were also granted legal powers and moral censorship.²⁶

Zadruga left deep marks in the collective mentalities of the ex-Yugoslavs and, even if the official propaganda has always denied that, this form of organization also hallmarked the original solutions of the communist regime, such as in the theory of self-management and in the respective administrative practices, which always emphasized the community's roles and the autonomous decision-making.

Beside *zadruga*, which anticipated certain forms of communist social organization, the Yugoslav communism was also rooted in another domestic reality that was both powerful and prestigious.

This is the former Austrian social democracy from Slovenia, Croatia and the Serbian Banat. The Socialist Party of Austria, one of the most powerful parties of the ex-Austro-Hungarian Empire was increasingly heading towards Marxism in the eve of the First World War. Tito himself had begun his political career in this party, first as a trade union activist (1910), and then as a full member. In developed industrial regions like Vojvodina (north of Serbia), Slovenia and Croatia, the ideology of the left had profound roots, and the future Yugoslav Communist Party many times came and took advantage of these pre-existent structures that were trade unionist and party-like, and which were remnants left from the extinct Socialist Party of Austria.

The post-war political polarization in former Yugoslavia therefore occurred on other criteria than in the states of Central and East Europe, and the repression, despite playing its part in the Yugoslav society, was more limited than in the so-called "popular democracies". The reality is that the communist regime was perceived as a legitimate one by a large majority of the population, as well as by the intellectuals, unlike in the other East European countries, where this regime was the unfortunate result of the Soviet occupation and of a distribution of the "spheres of influence" from Yalta.

This legitimacy of the political regime, although it was about to fade away at the end of the federal state, nevertheless it was about to give a particular direction to artistic contestation.

V. An open and varied cultural system

The inevitable cultural diversity of the Yugoslav federation was to be stimulated by the very Titoist communist regime, both as a form of consolidation of his personal power (Tito being a ruler as authoritarian as any other communist leader),²⁷ as well as a way to consolidate the common state of the six republics.

If we pursue the relationship between the federal power and the powers of the each republic, between 1945 and 1974 – the date of the first communist Constitution and, respectively, the year of the last substantial amendment of the same – we can easily notice that the permanent tendency was to *diminish the functions and power of the federal structures*, in parallel with an *increase of the republican and provincial ones*. Practically, apart from the army, the police and external representation, which were all under the power of Tito himself, the other functions of the state (including the monetary issues²⁸) passed, one by one, to the power of the constituent republics.

Most especially, education and culture were domains exclusively under the power of each republic, which – considering the constitutional provisions that were favorable to the minority languages and cultures – could not take but to a *space of cultural diversities* within the Yugoslav space. Unfortunately, as we shall see, the socialist illusion prevented them from doubling this *space of cultural diversities* with a *culture of the diversity itself*: since nobody dared to challenge the communist nature of the state or the unity of the federation, the Communist Party considered that socialism and its myths was sufficient to make the Yugoslavs live together in harmony. The absence of a culture of diversity, tolerance and political compromise was to appear as fatal in 1991, when the collapse of communism and the falling apart of the federal state were accomplished by means of a series of bloody civil wars. Unfortunately, as we shall see, the *critical and contestatory action of counter-culture did not suffice to build a culture of diversity and tolerance*.

The stimulation of cultural diversity and the protection of the specificity of each of the six republics that formed Yugoslavia, despite the merciless political calculations that stood behind it, finally took to the establishment of a Yugoslav cultural system more open and varied than in other socialist states. This opening could not be but favorable to counter-culture, which was thus able to express itself in Yugoslavia with more freedom than in any other socialist state.

Within this system, alternative culture appeared earlier (and in better articulated forms) than in the remaining communist world, and was massively affirmed in the 1960s and 1970s, became dominant in the 1980s and left its imprints upon the political and cultural context of the last decade of the federation.

A favoring element was the heterogeneity of censorship, which was caused by the decentralization and the increased transfer of prerogatives from the centre toward the republics and provinces. This is why censorship in Yugoslavia was an institution that had very different aspects from one republic to another, and from the federal to the republican level. More severe in Belgrade – where the federal structures were located, together with those of the largest republic, Serbia –, censorship was more permissive in other republics, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina or Croatia, a fact that explains the more rapid developments of some counter-culture genres – and the rock music, first of all – at the margins, and not in the centre. However, there were also some contrary situations, especially close to the end of the communist regime: small local tyrants, ruling with their cultural and public order prerogatives, and who, in the name of decentralization, censored some rock shows, which, for instance, in Belgrade had been quite free to perform.²⁹

Within the Yugoslav alternative culture, there were similar genres to those that could be seen in Western Europe, but – given the cultural richness of a multiethnic society as the Yugoslav one – certain original ways also developed, which answered the public's expectations and got adapted to the particular context of the Yugoslav society.

VI. The political constituency of the alternative culture

The political constituency of counter-culture was recognized even by its first theorist, Theodore Roszak, despite the fact that he put an emphasis on the social and cultural dimension of the new structure appeared at the beginning of the 1960s. Late research has insisted, nevertheless, more than ever on the political role of counter-culture and on its commitment(s) to that effect.

For instance, according to Steven Jezo-Vannier, the political constituency, that of *opposition* and *contestation*, is essential in defining counter-culture. It actually links the various historical forms of counter-culture:

La dissidence contre-culturelle est une lame de fond qui traverse les époques. Ses racines sont nombreuses et plongent profondément dans le passé, convergeant chaque fois vers des mouvements plus anciens. Les référents sont plus ou moins directs, mais permettent de dessiner les contours d'une tradition de la dissidence, voire, quelques fois d'une véritable lignée, d'une chaîne continue. Ainsi, on peut observer que la contestation des *sixties* a nourri les élans qui lui ont succédé, des punks au hackers; tout comme elle a elle-même puisé dans ses prédécesseurs: beatniks, situationnistes, surréalistes, bohèmes, s'inspirant même parfois d'expériences tirées d'un passé beaucoup plus lointain.³⁰

However, in a communist regime one must make a difference between *mere contestation* and *counter-cultural contestation*.

And this is why we say that there was an implicitly contestatory side in any valuable work of art that managed to be brought out in a communist regime. Any valuable work is by itself a testimony of the false equalitarian theories, and acts against the moral and intellectual proletarianization that is the ultimate goal of any communist regime. It is not about this type of implicit contestation that we speak here. Counter-cultural contestation always implies *an explicit and public gesture of fighting the officials*, of open confrontation with the various bodies of the propaganda and repression (from mass media to various party organizations).

The political constituency of the Yugoslav alternative culture was from the very beginning visible and assumed by its representatives. As from its early age already, when it had not yet parted with the scholarly culture proper (in the 1950s), alternative culture has been established as a way of contestation of the communist regime, more precisely of the socialist realism as the unique cultural way.

As a matter of fact, socialist realism, as performed in the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Romania and the other socialist states, did not represent the main target of the Yugoslav contestation of the 1950s. And this was because from this viewpoint, as well, the Titoist communism was also different, as it did not introduce the socialist realism as the unique method of creation, as it happened in the remaining communist world.

I have spoken before of the roots of the Yugoslav communism. They made that, in the inter-war period, quite a large number of valuable intellectuals, especially young ones, were to enlarge the lines of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, now still illegal. Tito himself had a close collaborator in the person of the surrealist artist Moša Pijade (1890-1957), who would become in the Second World War the founder of the Tanjug

Press Agency and the informal leader of the propaganda.³¹ Pijade was a cultivated man, even refined, and that is why the application of the party policies in the propagandistic and agitatoric work, especially after the break-up with Moscow, were to move away more and more from the Soviet patterns. Pijade did not encourage purges, interdictions and physical repression against the intellectuals that were not aligned to the Communist Party and neither did he ask for the organization of Party cells within the artistic Unions, which thus remained politically independent throughout their entire life.

Pijade did not agree either with the introduction of the socialist realism in the letters or visual arts. He first encouraged a few dogmatic artists, but when confronted with the opposition of some genuine men of letters— like Vasko Popa, Miodrag Pavlović —, the Party executives did not make any interventions in favor of dogmatism, and the socialist realism eventually disappeared as fast as the cooperativization in agriculture.

However, although the socialist realism did not strike roots in Yugoslavia, the disputes around it at the beginning of the 1950s maintained quite a dogmatic *climate*, aggravated after the unexpected death of Moša Pijade, in 1957. The most prestigious victim of this *dogmatic atmosphere* was Branko Miljković (1934-1961), considered by the critics as one of the most talented young poets affirmed after the Second World War.³²

The personality of Miljković, a spectacular and troubling poet, reunited, in fact, two contestatory sides: that of the inter-war Yugoslav avant-garde and that of the artistic bohemianism from Belgrade.

The first side produced the novelty of his poetic formula, which in all that concerned themes and style was breaking up not only with the Party's poetry (very fashionable by then, just like the regime), but also with an entire lyrical and classic-like tradition of Serbian poetry. Not by a simple coincidence the consecration of Miljković was to be jointly connected with the avant-garde that was still active in Belgrade in the 1950s: although, as a student at the Faculty of Philosophy, he had refused to join the Party, the poet became famous after the publication of a volume of poems in the influential literary magazine *Delo* (in 1955), whose editor-in-chief was the great Serbian surrealist artist Oskar Davičo. Though a communist, Davičo did not feel outraged by the anti-system attitude of Miljković, and saw in him the post-war continuator of the big break-up operated by the poetic avant-garde in the inter-war period. More aged than Miljković, the older "heretic" Davičo was to repeatedly protect his younger and trouble congener.³³

When the young poet was only 19, the Miljkovići moved from Niš to Belgrade, and their son started to attend to the bohemian circles of Belgrade. He was definitely an adorer of Bacchus' liquor and he liked marginal milieus. The traditional pubs of the Yugoslav capital city were an environment where unpoliticised artists, sports people and intellectuals used to meet,³⁴ very close to interlopes and losers, anonymous people and the few opposers of the political regime. The opposition of Branko Miljković to the system was due more to the restrictions imposed to him by the editorial system, which directly hit him as the uncommitted poet and "rebel" that he was, against a Serbian poetic tradition that was very convenient to the regime. After a few conflicts with the public order bodies, the poet got arrested for several times and was even publicly denounced on the cover of *Duga* (1957), in a discreditable photograph, which showed him blind drunk. Later on, Miljković chose this very magazine *Duga* to announce his readers, by means of a letter sent from Zagreb, that he refused the October Prize from Belgrade on 1960: an official prize of big prestige that was meant to celebrate the city's independence achieved in 1944 by Tito's partisans and the Soviet army. The refusal of this prize raised a new wave of hostility towards him from the regime, as it was interpreted as an open gesture of opposition to a political power that still enjoyed an immense, internal and external, popularity.³⁵

The case of I Miljković does not illustrate only the convergence of the avant-garde and bohemianism with the counter-culture, but also the particular way of operation of censorship in Yugoslavia, which was more severe in the capital city and less strict in the constituent republics. In 1960, fed up with the permanent editorial harassment and the continual fights with the activists and the Police from Belgrade, Branko Miljković surprisingly moved to Zagreb, where he got a job in the cultural show broadcast at the local radio channel. At Zagreb, a little bit further from the vigilant eye of his censors and from the radicals of the political regime, the poet knew a short period of relative peace. And then, in the night of the 12th to 13th of February 1961, he was found hanged in a distant park from Zagreb. His death, which was officially qualified as suicide, is still a mystery today.³⁶

Almost concomitantly to the poetic experience of Branko Miljković, another group representative of the early counter-culture manifested their art in the Titoist Yugoslavia: the *Mediala* group.

The members of this group first met in 1953, at an exhibition that was celebrating the art of Le Corbusier and had been organized by two students

at the Faculty of Architecture, Leonid Šejka and Siniša Vukotić. Other two artists came to this exhibition, too: Dado Đurić and Uroš Tošković. The four of them discussed about the works of Le Corbusier, his urban style and the newly formed group further got enlarged step by step, until, in 1957, the first semi-official nucleus of *Mediala* was formed by a group of friends under the name of *Baltazar*. Beside the aforementioned artists, we could also mention Miro Glavurtić, Mišel Kontić, Peđa Ristić, Vukota Vukotić and Olja Ivanjicki as part of this group nucleus. The name *Mediala* was taken in the following year, when the group exposed part of their works (Olja Ivanjicki, Leonid Šejka, Miro Glavurtić and Vladan Radovanović) under the title *Media research*. This was the first multimedia exhibition in Yugoslavia, which reunited paintings, objects, photographs, texts and sounds. The group members published programmatic texts first in the review *Vidici (Horizons)*, and then in their own review entitled *Mediala*, which was brought out starting from 1959.³⁷

Ideologically speaking, during its first years *Mediala* was not a group hostile to the Communist Party. On the contrary, the first programs and debates, which approached the problems of modern urbanism in the wake of the ideas expressed by some left-wing architects like Le Corbusier, Walter Gropius and Oscar Niemeyer, raised the interest of the state rulers, who were interested both to rebuild the country after a tough war and to “upgrade” the patriarchal Yugoslav society. However, with the passing of time, the manifestations of this group grew to conflicts with the officials because of the artistic liberties they increasingly indulged to. *Mediala* gradually abandoned the urban experiments and developed rather a theory of its own on modern art, which totally contradicted the Marxist aesthetics. The very name of the group contains a destructive, disobeying and dissident core: *med* meant *honey*, but *ala* was the scary *dragon*.

Two of the personalities of *Mediala* are particularly important for the theme of this study: Olja Ivanjicki (1931-2009) and Milić od Mačve (1934-2000).

Olja Ivanjicki was probably the first *Pop Art* artist of East Europe, in a period when this art movement was still at its beginnings in the United States. A chance made that the young female artist, a fresh graduate (1957) of the Academy of Fine Arts, could win the first scholarship awarded by the Ford Foundation in the East Europe, so that she went to study art in the United States in 1962. She soon arrived in Los Angeles, the epicenter of *Pop Art* painting of California, in the very years when artists like Edward Kienholz, Wallace Berman, Edward Ruscha or Mel Ramos,

expanding the openings of inter-war avant-gardes, managed to “assimilate advertising, the conventions of commercial art and their own techniques into specific forms.”³⁸ Olja Ivanjicki developed her own style, which mixed up cultural allusions and the flamboyant style from Hollywood, by emphasizing (more than her American art fellows) the sexual element and the challenge of the bourgeois morality. In a Yugoslav communism that was as prude as any other of East Europe, her pan-sexuality, erotism and lack of inhibitions drew the attention of some young rock musicians who shared similar ideas. The pictural style of Olja Ivanjicki decisively influenced the stage style of the Bijelo Dugme band, the most influential rock band in the history of Yugoslavia.

Much more collusive was to be the contact of artist Milić od Mačve with the authorities. If Olja Ivanjicki was only criticized now and then, in marginal propagandistic publications, by dogmatic critics left behind by the art history, on the other hand Milić od Mačve directly experienced censorship. In 1963, when he still signed as Milić Stanković, on the occasion of an exhibition organized at the Museum of Šabac, the authorities mistook letter „ć” of the Serbian Cyrillic alphabet, found in the end of the artist’s surname and name („ћ”), for an allusion to ... the cross. Although a liberal one, the communist regime was atheist. Since the religious orientation of Milić od Mačve’s art was more and more visible – though a mixture of pre-Christian Balkan paganism, Orthodox Christianity and esoteric spiritualism –, the pretext of his allusion to the Christian cross was enough for the exhibition to be closed, and the artist to be criticized in many Party meetings in Šabac, his native region. The artist was saved when he went on a tour in Western Europe (Italy, Switzerland, France), where he scored a considerable success of press, criticism and public, and thus could go back to Belgrade somehow “protected” by this international success. Nevertheless, the attention of the authorities stayed close on him, and the label of “religious artist” continued to make him a suspect in the eyes of the authorities. The edition of 1 September 1965 of the newspaper *Večernje novosti* denounced him for the only reason that Patriarch Gherman of Serbia had bought two works of his new collection:³⁹ that was a clear invitation for the authorities to stay vigilant toward this artist who was liked by the ultimate provider of the “people’s opium”, as the Patriarch was perceived.

The 1960s also brought in the Yugoslav cultural world a phenomenon that was to report a rapid and spectacular development, and then escalate

the world of counter-cultural manifestations, by guiding them to a direction very similar to that of Western counter-culture. This was the **rock music**.

The Yugoslav rock was born in Sarajevo, in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This fact may seem strange to the people who only know the today's Sarajevo, a city to a much extent Islamized due to the ravages caused by the war, and very far away from the cultural brilliance it had during the second Yugoslav age (1945-1991). The actual truth is that, at the end of the 1950s and beginning of the 1960s, without being a cultural capital greater than Belgrade or Zagreb, Sarajevo was still a place where the artists enjoyed much freedom, and censorship was even more relaxed than in the first two cities of the Federation. Besides, Sarajevo, as a result of its tumultuous history, was equally an environment with a pronounced multiethnic and multicultural character, where the Muslim influences (much reduced by the official atheism) were counterbalanced by the Western influences, in the wake of the Austrians and the Germans.

The first rock band officially recognized in former Yugoslavia was founded in 1962 and was named Indexi: it was the same year when the Beatles were founded and one year before the Rolling Stones. Two years later, in 1964 – maybe influenced by the film *The Young Ones*, considered to have influenced even the appearance of some rock bands in Romania –,⁴⁰ a festival unique in the East Europe started in Belgrade: it was entitled *Gitarijada* and was meant to stimulate the bands of “electric guitars” (as they were called by the time), and also to discover and propose the future leaders of this musical genre. Indexi reported a long success, and in 1967, influenced by the Beatles' album *Sgt. Pepper's Lonely Hearts Club Band*, they adopted the psychedelic style in music, clothing and lifestyle, being the first promoters of the use of narcotics as means of releasing the creativity.⁴¹ Indexi actually gave a signal for the alignment of several other bands that were at the beginning of their careers, and the musicians grown in this band – Ranko Rihtman, Kornelije Kovač, Davorin Popović, Ismet Arnautalić, Milić Vukašinić, Kemal Monteno – are now some of the most remarkable voices of the musical stage in the current states of ex-Yugoslavia.

The end of the decade 1960-1970 marked the generalization of a new form of musical expression. Tens of rock bands were born in all the Yugoslav regions, encouraged by the cultural decentralization, the tourism opening of the country and, of course, by the freedom of circulation of the Yugoslav citizens, which allowed them to get informed in due time about everything that was new in the Western culture and to procure the

instruments, equipment and facilities that were missing in other socialist countries.

Nevertheless, the end of the decade did not find Yugoslavia in good peace. On the one hand, the young people's dissatisfaction toward the ossification of the regime grew, and on the other hand, new nationalistic outbursts could be seen in Croatia and Slovenia⁴² – against the background of remarkable attempts of economic and political liberalization.⁴³ Old by now, Tito seemed to face the challenges with much difficulty. But the year 1968 proved that “Stari” (“The Old Man”), as he was called, had enough hat tricks left.

VII. Alternative culture and the Yugoslav cultural canon after 1968

In the history of contemporary civilized world, 1968 is a year of student revolutions that started in Paris and continued in Great Britain, Federal Germany and even in Franco's Spain. The youth got out in the streets on barricades and expressed a left-wing ideology that was most of the time unclear. What is certain, however, is that they asked for profound reforms in education and society. Analyzed today from a conservatory perspective, 1968 was a year of absurdities, for the young contestatory Westerners asked to their rulers to become communists, while preserving all their liberties, which seems simply impossible in theoretic terms. Now we know that the communist regimes are always based on the same poverty that numbs the good senses, initiative and critical spirit, thus reviving the equalitarian tendencies, but also leaving the power to suppress any freedoms.

However, something was true in the anarchic outcome of those Western young people. The Western society truly needed some reforms if it wanted to arise from the “technocratic slumber” and from the convenient belief that it was “the best world possible”. More flexibility, more care to the disadvantaged, a polycentric cultural perspective were undoubtedly necessary in Western Europe.

Unlike in other socialist countries, the young Yugoslavs were in a paradoxical situation. They were living in a totalitarian communist regime, but also in a prosperous society that had produced – as predicted one decade before by the dissident Milovan Djilas⁴⁴ – its own privileged and middle-class. In all the communist countries, the contestation of the

young came from the right wing. In Yugoslavia, this contestation came, just like in the Occident, from the left wing: in July 1968, the students from Belgrade, Zagreb, Ljubljana, Sarajevo and Novi Sad, following the model of their Parisian colleagues, got barricaded in the universities and, through *sit-ins*, *teach-ins*, meetings and *samizdat* publications, protested against the hypocrisy of the regime, against stagnation, corruption, poverty and inefficient educational methods. Glad that, unlike the Westerners, the Yugoslav students did not contest the communist regime *de plano*, Tito personally showed up on TV and, by a strategy typical to the great political actors, took over and appropriated their claims.⁴⁵ He used them only to distract the people's attention from the rebirth of nationalism in Croatia, Slovenia and Kosovo-Metohija, on the one hand, but also to fight his war with the "young wolves", as they called the reformists on top of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia.

As a matter of fact, with the unexpected help of the students' contestations, Tito prepared the land to make his hits in 1971: that is, to end up with the liberals of the Communists' League and liquidate the Croatian nationalism now in full force. However inappropriate this contestation *from the left* of the Yugoslav socialist regime may seem today, it however revealed the weak points and hypocrisy of the communist regime from Belgrade and provoked profound political and constitutional changes. The amendments to the Constitution of R. S. F. Y., produced in 1968 and 1974, consolidated the prerogatives of the constituent republics and weakened the authority of the central government from Belgrade – thus preparing the premises for the future collapse of the communist regime and disintegration of Yugoslavia – and all of these can be said to have been direct consequences of the 1970s contestation.

This was also the time that marked a breaking point in the transformation of the alternative culture – rock music, unconventional theatre, *happenings*, *entertainment*, and avant-garde cultural manifestations such as *Pop Art* or modern art – from a marginal phenomenon to a central one that retained the entire public and undertook the fundamental themes of the social dialogue, in an opposition more and more obvious to the public policies of the current regime. The counter-culture artists – either rock stars like the Bijelo Dugme band, or the artists from *Mediala*, or the young nonconformist writers that made their debut now – all became much respected and influential names of the proper culture.

The best proof of this fact will be the exceptional career of the rock group Bijelo Dugme (meaning The White Button) and of his leader, the famous musician Goran Bregović.

Just like Indexi, Bijelo Dugme was founded in Sarajevo (only in 1974) and was, throughout its entire life, a multiethnic group, with Serbs, Croats, Muslims, Jews etc.⁴⁶ We can trace three periods in the life of this rock band: 1) the period of imitation of the great Western rock bands (1974-1975); 2) the ethno-rock period (1975-1981), and 3) the period of open political commitment (1981-1989).

During the first two years after formation, Bijelo Dugme tried to imitate the sound, appearance and behavior of the great Western rock bands, and the most probable musical pattern used was that of the English band Deep Purple. Sometimes they took over and adapted unconsciously certain hits of these bands, and their outfits and equipment were created to fit those patterns. Bijelo Dugme was the first Yugoslav band that understood the need to go out from singing in clubs and start to give concerts in large open spaces (the concert in Hajdučka česma, in 1977 being a reference point in this respect).

During this first period, the band didn't experience any problems with the censors and was neither restricted in any way in any of its activities. After the constitutional reform of 1974, Yugoslavia had found its stability for the moment, and earned a new tranche of the international funding. The country seemed to regain its exceptional rhythm of economic growth. The Titoist regime was not troubled at all by the huge volume of decibels that Bijelo Dugme, taking after Deep Purple, would throw in the ears of their listeners: it was only some good evidence that the regime was capable to resist well to its ideological enemy behind the Iron Curtain.

The problems and confrontations with the official ideology started to appear after the second album, *Šta bi dao da si na mom mjestu/ What would you give to be in my shoes* (1975), recorded in London. With this album, the band was not satisfied only to follow a Western pattern, but it also looked for a source of inspiration: the rich Yugoslav folklore. The members of the band understood that the Western rock music contained quite a big amount of folklore, either Afro-American (the *blues*) or Anglo-Saxon (the *country*). Therefore, since folklore was a legitimate component of this music, an original music could have been produced if they replaced the elements of the foreign folklore with autochthonous ones. (Such thing had already happened in Romania with the music of Phoenix, who started to do that as early as in 1971, and the results were remarkable.)

With Bijelo Dugme, the ethno-rock synthesis brought a considerable change of terms for the rock music of Yugoslavia. Until then, with all the development reported in the previous decade, the rock music was still an urban business, reserved to the public of high cultural level. But now, ethno-rock was a language accessible to anyone. This fact turned Bijelo Dugme from a very good band into a symbol of the young generation, who now found themselves – regardless of the region, education or ideological sympathies – in the songs of Goran Bregović and of his rock fellows.

This statute also brought the band members under the press spotlights and aroused repeated conflicts with the authorities. The cover of their third album, *Eto! Baš hoću! / Be my guest! I really want it!* (1975), which was a processed image of a debatable *Pop Art* painting of Olja Ivanjicki, was considered sexist, pornographic and provocative. If the alcohol addiction of the vocal Željko Bebek did not actually bother anyone – in a country where the consumption of alcohol was quite high –, the consumption and even (according to some rumors) the traffic of drugs of the drummer Ipe Ivandić called the attention of the Police. The artists' non-conformist outfits were tolerated on the stage but they were more difficult to be exposed in television studios. At the same time, as an "official" band, with hundreds of albums sold every year and frequent appearances on radio and television, Bijelo Dugme, just like many other artists, was supposed to make a contribution to Tito's personality cult: with much ability, Goran Bregović avoided, until the band's break-up, not only to sing a single song of propaganda, but even to utter the simplest sentence that could have been interpreted as in favor of the regime. Eventually, the band raised a big question mark to the official ideologues when they collaborated with the poet Duško Trifunović, a former political prisoner at Goli Otok, whose lyrics for the songs of Bijelo Dugme were many times considered to challenge the regime.

The method by which the officials tried to restrict the Bijelo Dugme phenomenon was very surprising, at least for someone who is not familiar with the world of the communist East. Strictly speaking, they used the so-called *mandatory military service*. Yugoslavia was very reliant on its army, which, after the country's independence from the German occupation, enjoyed very much the respect of the population. Irrespective whether they were students or not, the young had to undergo the military service, which lasted not less than two years. The rules were very strict, there were no favors for anyone and, besides, the army was used also as a means of ethnic homogenization, so that the chances to perform your service close

to one's domicile were actually none. According to the well-documented *Ex-Yu Rock Enciklopedija*,⁴⁷ in the period 1975-1981 the Bijelo Dugme band was literally harassed by its members leaving to the army, a fact that produced an almost uncontrollable fluctuation of performers in the band's composition and a slow-down in the rhythm of their tours and recordings. Every time the enrollment in the military service of a Bijelo Dugme member used to be a result of a particular confrontation with their censors or authorities. And then, two songs of the band put an end to this situation, whose visible aim was actually to destroy the band. In 1980, in the album *Doživjeti stotu* (*Long you may live for one hundred years!*), there was a song entitled *Pesma mom bratu* (*A song for my brother*), which allusively but intelligibly to everyone, approached for the first time the issue of the violence in the Yugoslav army. In 1983, too, disguised in a children's song, *A milicija trenira strogoću/ The Militia makes you "stronger"*, the band ironically accused the brutality of the Militia forces. Only after these proofs that the counter-culture artists can answer back in subtle but influential ways, the officials ceased to harass the band with the military service.

As liberal as they may have been, we cannot say that the Yugoslav officials did not do anything they could against the pressure of counter-culture, especially that this pressure was continually growing and threatened to become the real culture of the young generation. Just like in other countries, they first tried to prevent counter-culture from full affirmation, and then to control it. Since they did not manage to do it – Tito's showing up on TV as a spokesman of the students' claims also had this result: it was a hard blow for the institutional authorities –, then they tried to detour it: to create something that looked like counter-culture but was ideologically favorable to the regime. The Romanian phenomenon of the "Flacăra" Circle was represented in the Titoist Yugoslavia by a few artists, some of them honorable, who interpreted folk-rock songs on propaganda texts. For instance, the Rani Mraz (Early Frost) band, led by Đorđe Balašević, the author, in 1978, of the song *Računajte na nas/ You can rely on us*, was for a few years the official hymn of the communist youth movement, and even the great artist Zdravko Čolić interpreted the song *Druže Tito, mi ti se kunemo!/ Comrade Tito, we swear faith to you!* The paradoxical outcome of these songs is that they were actually very popular and sung by many young people in informal contexts,⁴⁸ which proved that, turned into rock music, even the propaganda paradoxically became an act of counter-culture.

The death of Tito was to be strangely preceded by the launching of the most contestatory band of the post-Titoist decade. In 1979, at Belgrade, in the same *Šumatovac* restaurant where Nichita Stănescu wrote the volume *Belgradul în cinci prieteni* (*The Belgrade of Five Friends*, brought out in 1972, but written one year before), the *Riblja čorba* (*Fish Sour Soup*) band laid its foundations.

VIII. Agony, dogmatism, open political opposition

The death of Josip Broz Tito (in 1980) opened the way to a fundamental relocation of the Yugoslav communist regime, which, on the one hand, reaffirmed a more radical form of Titoism than during the dictator's life (and launched the slogan *Tito after Tito*), and on the other hand questioned a lot of the Yugoslavia's taboos, of which the first was the organization of the federal state.

During these debates – which started calmly and unfortunately ended in the blood bath of the civil war of 1991-1995 –, alternative culture occupied a foreground position.

But the unity of the 1970s, by then nourished from the opposition to the political regime, was now to break up to pieces at the end of the 1980s, when we see, for instance, the Bijelo Dugme rock band and the singer Đorđe Balašević taking explicit pro-Yugoslav positions (against the separatist tendencies of the six republics), the Bosnian singer Dino Merlin taking a spiritual refuge in the Islamic fundamentalism, or the rebellious rockers from Riblja Čorba adopting a bohemian contestation of the regime, which anticipated in a strange way the attitude of the Serbian nationalism of the 1990s.

After a decade of confronting the official authorities, Bijelo Dugme got out from that stronger than ever. The popularity of the group members was equal to that of famous football players, and the transfer of one of their performers – Laza Ristovski – from Smak to Bijelo Dugme was front-page news. But, on the other hand, the band risked to be ruined by scandals, the most serious of them being the accusation of drug traffic. The group drummer Ipe Ivandić was even sentenced to prison for drug consumption (and was about to die in Belgrade of an overdose, in 1996), and the second vocal, Mladen Vojčić-Tifa, was finally forced to stop his music career in this band in 1985, because of his involvement in a drug traffic network from Sarajevo. The Ivandić and Tifa cases, so tragic in fact, showed how

far this idea of the drugs as means of creative liberation had gone: what in the counter-culture of the 1960s used to be a way to part with the artificial barriers of the bourgeois society, now in the post-Titoist Yugoslavia, just like in Western Europe in general, had become a disaster.

Besides, Bijelo Dugme got politically engaged in a way that had no precedents in the Yugoslav rock. Practically, the band sensed ever since the beginning of the decade, the centrifugal tendencies that threatened the federal state and urged by reborn nationalistic movements, and the last four albums of the band are like the gradual steps of an explicitly pro-Yugoslav political program, played with the instruments of the rock music.

The fist of them, *Uspavanka za Radmilu M./ Lullaby for Radmila M.* (1983), the last one having Željko Bebek as vocal, includes a song entitled *Kosovska*, which is interpreted in Albanian together with the Berisha brothers, famous musicians of Kosovo. This was the beginning of a demonstrative plan of ethno-rock synthesis that started from the music of all the important ethnic groups of Yugoslavia. It was obvious that this song stirred the Serbian feelings, and was considered insulting to the suffering Serbs of Kosovo, not to mention a support to the Albanian separatists.

It was definitely not so, which was to be proven by the following album, a nameless one,⁴⁹ but that everyone knew as the album of *Kosovka djevojka/ The Maiden from Kosovo*, after the classic painting of the Serbian artist Uroš Predić, who proposed a romantic interpretation of the myth of the battle from Kosovo Polje (1389). The folk music orchestra of the Skopje television, as well as the renown Serbian and Macedonian interpreters, cooperated in an ethno-rock synthesis that was strongly influenced by the Serbian songs from Kosovo. Furthermore, an ironic interpretation of the state hymn *Hej Sloveni/ Hey you, Slavs* called the people's attention on the rebirth of nationalisms and on the separatist tendencies of the Croats and Slovenes.

The most radical pro-Yugoslav album was *Pljuni i zapjevaj, moja Jugoslavijo* (1986). The cover texts were written both in Latin and Cyrillic alphabet, and the folkloric inspiration came from Serbia, Bosnia and Croatia, while a prophecy line of Branko Miljković, "Ko ne sluša pjesmu slušaće oluju" ("He who's not listening to my song will hear the storm") was warning the people against the dangers of the nationalist discourse in Yugoslavia, which was now also facing an economic crisis. (As an irony of the fate, the operation of the Croatian army that in 1995 was to entirely purge the Serbs from Croatia got to be named *Oluja - The Storm*).

This album brought a big scandal in the nationalist circles of all the Yugoslav republics. During a television show on the Sarajevo Television in February 1987, a rock journalist from Belgrade, Dragan Kremer, ostentatiously tore to pieces the album cover and stirred the biggest media scandal of Yugoslavia until then.⁵⁰

Finally, the last studio album of the band, *Ćiribiribela* (1988), came with a new challenge: the *Đurđevdan* song, in translation *Saint George's Feast*, a very popular folkish song which eventually came to be considered genuine folk. Nevertheless, this was entirely cult, with lyrics written by Đorđe Balašević on the music of Goran Bregović! We should say that this was a most rare performance, to provide for the folklore with cult products, which proves how deeply spiritual counter-culture may be some of the times. However, it was not *Đurđevdan* that was subject to scandal, but a song entitled *Ljepa naša.../ Our beautiful...*, where Bregović simply mixed up the nationalist Croatian hymn *Ljepa naša domovina / How beautiful our country is!* with the nationalist Serbian hymn *Tamo daleko/ Far away, over there!*

And yet, it was not Bijelo Dugme who were to head the bill of contestation over the last decade of ex-Yugoslavia, but the new avant-garde movement entitled *Klokotrizam* and the rock band Riblja Čorba.

The *Klokotrizam* was founded in 1979 around the personalities of the poets Adam Puslojić, Aleksandar Sekulić and Ioan Flora. We cannot assign to it a specific place of birth, for it was from the very beginning meant to be a pan-Yugoslav movement, subsequently joined by creators from Serbia, Croatia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina and even Slovenia. It did not have acknowledged headquarters, a fact that followed the tradition of the avant-garde ever. *Klokotrizam* did not propose to rebuild any connection with the inter-war Yugoslav avant-garde. They were rather a genuine avant-garde, a spiritual and not a bookish one. It is true that they were strongly influenced by Western counter-culture, for its main form of manifestation were the *happenings*. Of the *Klokotrist* artists there were some famous names from the ex-Yugoslav cultures, such as the poets Ivan Rastegorac, Predrag Bogdanović-Ci, Goran Babić, Nikola Šindik, the prose writers Moma Dimić and Ratko Adamović, the sculptor Kolja Milunović, and so on. The *Klokotrist* *happenings*, entitled *situacija*, were assisted even by prestigious writers like Alan Ginsberg or Nichita Stănescu.

But these *situacijas* were not actual *happenings* but only in what concerned their improvisation aspect. They were performed in large public squares, in spaces of symbolic value (like on the place of the

former Nazi camp from Belgrade, on the shores of Sava), in front of an impressive number of viewers. Their improvisations did not regard only the interpretation, but also the creation itself: artists from various genres and arts would spontaneously create a new complex and syncretic artistic object, which was also ephemeral and always had a moral meaning.⁵¹

Klokotrism strangely anticipated, by its *situacjias* on the communication crisis, the rewriting of the collective memory and of the story of degradation of human condition after the tragedy of break-up of Yugoslavia. It was not a coincidence that some of them, like the Croatian poet that Goran Babić, fell victims to the nationalistic fury and had to get exiled from Croatia and live until today in Belgrade.

The rock band Riblja Čorba, founded by the musician and poet Borisav-Bora Đorđević in 1979, became not only the most popular, but also the most “hunted” by the authorities because of the behavior of his members outside the stage, and also because of its challenging texts for the regime. In a paradoxical way, Riblja Čorba also illustrated the collapse of counter-culture, which, pressed by the commercial and financial success, was prepared to become, at the end-’80s, mere entertainment. In a much more liberal Yugoslavia, whose economy underwent a public-private regime, this process was much more rapid and visible than in the other communist countries.

The music of this band is not extremely complicated. As confessed by its leader, it was from the very beginning meant to be a music more accessible than the progressive and intellectual rock of the ’70s.⁵² And yet, under their vulgar-commercial appearance, the texts are full of irony toward the official hypocrisy or, on the contrary, make clear testimonies of the misery and dullness that could be found behind the shining polished front of ex-Yugoslavia. If, musically speaking, Riblja Čorba is one of the first *New Wave* bands of East Europe,⁵³ with its texts we can read pages of postmodernism. On the one hand, this is because the texts avoid the “high” style, big themes and rather focus on trivial, marginal and everyday things, while on the other hand, it was because Bora Đorđević had an enormous propensity for parody and pastiche, which went up to creating cult texts written in a folk manner.

It will be hard to make a top of the scandals raised by this band. Their first albums (*Kost u grlu/ Bone stuck in your throat*, 1979, *Pokvarena*

mašta i prljave strasti/Shattered dreams and dirty passions, 1981, *Mrtva priroda/ Still life*, 1981) are real inventories of the social problems about which the official Yugoslav discourse did not speak a word: the break-up of families, poverty, alcoholism, materialism, indifference, intolerance, de-spiritualization. The music of these years was tough, almost brutal, only in order to highlight the message of protest and to oppose the lyrical, entertaining music created after the officials' heart and tastes.

A wave of protests from the communist organizations of pensioners, partisans and conformist young people could be heard to the song *Na Zapadu ništa novo/ Nothing new in the West*, whose lyrics denounced, point by point, the much larger gap in the everyday's life between the Titoist communist ideals and the realities of the Yugoslav society. Without being properly censored, the band was harassed by the authorities and its leader almost got arrested.⁵⁴ He was even summoned for trial in Montenegro, in a law suit that he won most probably because of his popularity and the authorities' fear for riots if Bora Đorđević had been imprisoned.

In 1987, the song *Član Mafije/ Member of the Mafia* also stirred a storm of protests from several communist local and national organizations. The poet Bora Đorđević, who had refused to become a member of the Party while performing his military service,⁵⁵ simply associates the League of Communists of Yugoslavia with the Mafia. It was only the serious crisis that the federal state was now facing– only four years before its falling apart– that made this serious offence not to be punished much harsher than with the actual verbal sanctions from the newspapers.⁵⁶

IX. Weak points of alternative culture. The absence of the civil society

Any yet, why was not counter-culture capable to prevent the blood bath that marked the end of the communism and of the Yugoslav federal state?

A relative and handy answer would be that counter-culture – and, more precisely, its critical spirit and the cult for individual freedom – marked its own weakness, in the dispute with the reborn nationalisms. It was not actually the communist regime that destroyed the counter-culture (the regime only undermined it at the very most), but the violent assertion of the Balkan nationalisms. Neither the critical spirit, nor the cult for individual freedom was liable to encourage the predilection of counter-culture to

the spirit of partnership. Or, in the absence of such spirit, there is no civil society and, should they not have one, who could take over the burden of so much diversity hidden under the tight uniform of the communist regime?

Even Edvard Kardelj, an official economic ideologist of Tito, had understood in 1977 that the old social communist pattern of equality and pauperism did not correspond any longer to the actual image of the Yugoslav society, which was now facing “a plurality of self-managed interests”, after the economic growth that “provoked radical transformations in the social stratification, through a diversity of professions, productive businesses, and the sector of services.”⁵⁷ Unfortunately, counter-culture only managed to emphasize the cracks appeared in the social body, together with the dysfunctionalities and dangers, and could not provide any solutions to that. Is this, perhaps, because this was not its part to play from the very beginning?

The absence of an organized civil society – destroyed after the removal of the liberals from the top management of the Communists’ League of Serbia in 1971 – aggravated the weakening process and the force of civic persuasion of the alternative culture, and prevented it from exerting the role of mediator in the society, a fact that was about to further escalate violence and intolerance in the future disintegration of ex-Yugoslavia.

NOTES

- ¹ Theodore Roszak – “Preface”, in *The Making of a Counter Culture*, Anchor Books/ Doubleday & Co. Inc, 1969, p. XII.
- ² *Ibidem*, p. XIII.
- ³ Except for some extreme manifestations of the political counter-culture, such as the AUM sectarian group, responsible for many terrorist attacks.
- ⁴ Roszak affirms that “the alienated young people are giving shape to something that looks like the saving vision that our endangered civilization requires” (*Ibidem*, p. 1).
- ⁵ See “Lettre ouverte sur Vincennes”, in *Vincennes. Une aventure de la pensée critique*, sous la direction de Jean-Michel Djian, préface de Pascal Binczak, Président de l’Université Paris 8, Flammarion, Paris, 2009, pp. 153-154.
- ⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 3.
- ⁷ See chapter “Histoire d’un transfert”, in *Vincennes. Une aventure...*, ed. cit., p. 185, as well as the letter addressed by the Rector Pierre Merlin to the Senate members, at p. 186.
- ⁸ See the slogan “From a critic of the University to a critic of the Society”, revealed in the photograph at pp. 22-23 of the anthology *Vincennes. Une aventure de la pensée critique*, ed. cit.
- ⁹ For more information, see Doru Ionescu – *Club A – 42 de ani. Muzica tinereții tale* (Club A – 42 years. The music of your youth), with a foreword by Emil Barbu Popescu, Casa de pariuri literare, Bucharest, 2011.
- ¹⁰ See Răzvan Voncu – “Falsa legitimize. Discursul naționalist în literatura deceniului 1980-1990” (False Legitimation. The Nationalist Discourse in the Literature of the Decade 1980-1990), in *Zece studii literare* (Ten Literary Studies), Editura Academiei Române, Bucharest, 2010, pp. 135-137.
- ¹¹ Theodore Roszak – *The Making of a Counter-Culture: Reflections on the Technocratic Society and Its Youthful Opposition*, California University Press, 1995.
- ¹² Steven Jezo-Vannier – *Contre-culture(s). Des Anonymes à Prométhée*, col. „Attitudes”, Editions Le Mot et le Reste, Paris, 2013, p. 7.
- ¹³ Christophe Bourseiller, Olivier Penot-Lacassagne (sous la direction de) – *Contre-cultures!*, CNRS Editions, Paris, 2013.
- ¹⁴ Steven Jezo-Vannier, *op. cit.*, pp. 130-131.
- ¹⁵ *Contre-cultures!*, ed. cit., pp. 33-46.
- ¹⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 34.
- ¹⁷ Stefano Bianchini – *La questione jugoslava*, Giunti Editore, Firenze, 1999 (quoted after the Romanian edition: Stefano Bianchini – *Problema iugoslavă*, translated by Luminița Cosma, All, Bucharest, 2003, pp. 87-88).
- ¹⁸ *Idem*.
- ¹⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 100.

- 20 Barbara Jelavich – *History of the Balkans*, Cambridge University Press (quoted after the Romanian edition: Barbara Jelavitch – *Istoria Balcanilor. II. Secolul al XX-lea*, translated by Mihai-Eugen Avădanei, Afterword by I. Ciupercă, Institutul European, Iași, 2000, p. 296.
- 21 Stefano Bianchini, *op. cit.*, pp. 98-99.
- 22 *Idem.*
- 23 The Western large syntheses published before 1991, such as the one of Barbara Jelavich, do not even mention it. Other monographs that are more recent, such as Stefano Bianchini's, only mentions it in passing (ed. cit., p. 89), and without specifying the number of victims. The explanation of such omission does not reside in any secrecy that may have wanted to hide the tragedy of the Goli Otok island, but in the favourable image that Tito enjoyed in Western Europe, after the break-up with Moscow (1948) and the liberal measures that followed it;
- 24 On the repression of the "Croatian Spring", see Stefano Bianchini, *op. cit.*, pp. 119-120.
- 25 Barbara Jelavich, *op. cit.*, pp. 293-294.
- 26 Stefano Bianchini, *op. cit.*, p. 12 and 14.
- 27 "The charismatic figure and the enormous political influence exerted by the old marshal made any intervention of the same decisive in any field and at the same time also provided a crucial reference point to anybody." (*Ibidem*, p. 130; my translation / R.V.).
- 28 *Ibidem*, p. 117.
- 29 Bora Đorđević, the leader of Riblja Čorba band, tells such a case in his autobiography. Once, in a music tour, the Riblja Čorba band were asked by the local cultural competent bodies of Sarajevo not to either sing the song *Na zapadu ništa novo* (*Nothing New in the West*), or "skip" the lines that the local authorities considered as an insult to the Yugoslav communism. In the end, under the pressure of the ten thousand spectators in the concert hall, the authorities were pushed to give up. See this episode in Bora Đorđević – *Šta je pesnik hteo de kaže* (*What the Poet Meant*), Novosti, Belgrade, 2011, p. 55.
- 30 Steven Jezo-Vannier, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-15.
- 31 Barbara Jelavich (*op. cit.*, p. 346) erroneously considers him responsible for the legal issues. As a matter of fact, Pijade only dealt with the legal acts of punishment applied to collaborationists and with the indemnification of the people who suffered in the Holocaust occurred in the Yugoslav territories.
- 32 Miloslav Šutić – *An Anthology of Modern Serbian Lyrical Poetry (1920-1995)*, Relations/ Serbian Literary Magazine, Belgrade, 1999, p. XIII.
- 33 Jovan Deretić – *Kratka istorija srpske književnosti*, BIGZ, Belgrade, 1983, p. 268.

- 34 A very plastic description of these pubs, even if from a period subsequent to
the death of Miljković, can be read in the autobiography of Bora Đorđević (*op.*
cit., pp. 38-47), who was also a regular customer of these establishments;
- 35 Jovan Deretić, *op. cit.*, p. 269.
- 36 Z. Radisavljević – “Kako je stradao Branko Miljković”, in *Politika*, 11.II.2011,
p. 17.
- 37 Irina Subotić – *Od Avangarde do Arkadije*, Klio, Beograd, 2000, p. 16.
- 38 Dan Grigorescu – *Pop Art*, Meridiane, Bucharest, 1975, p. 189.
- 39 See the full text of this article in Milić od Mačve – *Slovar o Odšelniku*, vol.
II, Milićevo zdanje na Zvezdari/ Kula na sedam vetrova, Belgrade, 1996,
p. 500.
- 40 Oana Georgescu – *Fugaru prin lumea muzicii* (Fugaru in the World of Music),
Societatea Română de Radiodifuziune (The Romanian Radio Broadcasting
Company), Bucharest, 2004, p. 20.
- 41 Petar Janjatović – *Ex-Yu Rock Enciklopedija*, drugo dopunjeno izdanje,
Čigoja Štampa, Belgrade, 2006, pp. 105-107.
- 42 Stefano Bianchini, *op. cit.*, p. 108.
- 43 *Ibidem*, pp. 110-112.
- 44 See his reference volume: Milovan Djilas – *The New Class: An Analysis of*
the Communist System, Brace Harcourt, New York, 1957.
- 45 Stefano Bianchini, *op. cit.*, pp. 109-110.
- 46 Petar Janjatović, *op. cit.*, p. 31.
- 47 The chapter on Bijelo Dugme can be read at pp. 31-36.
- 48 According to the story of Bora Đorđević, a former member of the Rani Mraz
band, in *op. cit.*, p. 19.
- 49 In the official discography, it is named *Bijelo Dugme*; see Petar Janjatović,
op. cit., p. 36.
- 50 *Ibidem*, p. 34.
- 51 See the monograph of Brana Dimitrijević – *Odgonetka Klokotrizma*, Sinteza,
Kruševac, 1983.
- 52 Bora Đorđević, *op. cit.*, p. 22.
- 53 On *New Wave* as a form of counter-culture, see the study of Christophe
Bourseiller – “La *New Wave*, une «réaction» culturelle?”, in *Contre-cultures!*,
ed. cit., pp. 235-238.
- 54 A presentation of the long story of this song, see in Bora Đorđević, *op. cit.*,
pp. 48-56.
- 55 *Ibidem*, p.127.
- 56 The story of this song can be also found in the author’s autobiography, *op.*
cit., pp. 126-129.
- 57 *Apud* Stefano Bianchini, *op. cit.*, page 134.

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