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NATURALISING EPISTEMIC NORMS THROUGH HUMEAN STANDARDS OF TASTE

Abstract

This paper reflects on the possibility of expanding the normative options available within a naturalized epistemology using strands of thought that emerge in Hume’s account of the role of philosophical relations in causal judgments. Working within the confines of a naturalized action-focused epistemology it will be demonstrated that standards of taste generate evaluative judgments regarding causal inference. Such judgments of taste are characterized as objective to the extent that they are fixed not merely within the individual but also in the community and are subject to evaluation against a steady and general point of view. This process attempts to moves beyond instrumental normativity and bestow these judgments with epistemic justification. In avoiding the positing of irreducibly normative facts and properties it will be demonstrated that we can expand this account to the wider context of epistemic justification within a naturalized epistemology.

Keywords: Naturalism, normativity, Hume, standards of taste, inductive inference.

While the broad outline of Hume’s sceptical argument is well known, Hume is often taken to be an advocate of naturalism in philosophy. Given the prominence of naturalism in our contemporary philosophical landscape, Hume’s naturalism represents more than a historical curiosity. Hume gives the question of “how do we arrive at our beliefs?” a central role in epistemologies ameliorative task of improving our reasoning strategies. Like many contemporary naturalists, he recognizes that this descriptive task is essential to any attempt to proffer prescriptions about belief formation. However, the descriptive approach of naturalist epistemology has led to great concern about the capacity of such approaches to generate epistemic norms. At the heart of the normative problem facing versions
of contemporary naturalized epistemology is the fact that, descriptive material, which provides a reason for why we reason in certain ways, does not provide epistemic justification for such reasoning. Hume’s naturalism must also confront this difficulty in producing epistemic norms given its commitment to a descriptive methodology. This paper seeks to investigate the kind of norms available within a naturalized epistemology using strands of thought that emerge in the sections of Hume’s naturalist account of causal inference. It will be demonstrated that the action focus of Hume’s naturalist epistemology does not limit him to a purely instrumental account of norms. An action-centred epistemology cannot disconnect from the context of engaged social agents hence it facilitates the exploration of alternative sources of justification. Specifically, it will be argued that epistemic standards of taste play a role in the evaluation of our causal judgments as they enable us to weigh up conflicting evidence in order to arrive at a considered judgment.

It is Hume’s desire to improve our reasoning processes and it is in the impulse to make recommendations about how we can improve our reasoning strategies that normative content emerges in Hume. In Section 1 of the paper it will be demonstrated that, in taking a naturalistic turn in response to his skeptical findings regarding causal belief formation, Hume has not only changed the route of epistemological inquiry but he has also changed its destination. There is a shift from justification to action as the focus of epistemological investigation. We are encouraged to move the focus of epistemological inquiry away from addressing the sceptical challenge to human reason by placing human action at the centre of our epistemological concerns. Hume’s action-centred approach puts the focus of epistemological inquiry on developing a theory of reasoning excellence that has an ameliorative aim. This revision of epistemology’s goals necessitates the generation of practical rather than theoretical findings. Given this practical drive we might expect Hume to appeal only to instrumental normativity. Hume does indeed provide clear instrumental reasons for why we should form causal beliefs. However, as will be discussed in Section 2, he is not happy to confine the normative reasons for such beliefs to instrumental normativity. It will be argued that what I have reason to believe does not have to depend on the content of my goals.

Having set out Hume’s ameliorative objective (Section 1) and rejected purely instrumental justification for our causal beliefs (Section 2) in Section 3 we turn to look at an alternative source of evaluation for our causal beliefs. In his 1993 article “Why We Believe in Induction” Bennett W.
Helm argued that the model of evaluation Hume proposed for aesthetic judgments is also deployed in the epistemological context of judgments regarding inductive inferences. On the aesthetic model standards of taste act as reasons that justify our aesthetic judgments. Drawing on Helm’s account strands, in Hume’s writing that point to the role of standards of taste in the evaluation of our causal judgments will be explored and developed. To the extent that these standards cohere in a steady and general point of view they take on normative force. It will be argued that such a model points the way for naturalism to be conducted as a normative enterprise even if it does not satisfy standard conditions of normativity. This process expands the kind of justification available to epistemologists working within a naturalized framework.

Section 1: Ameliorative Epistemology

What clearly emerges in Hume’s account of causal inference is that an explanation of why one in fact makes the inference does not justify it. Nevertheless, it is only once we are able to make such inferences that it makes sense to ask whether they are justified or not. When Hume initially asked how we make inferences from one idea to the other he provides a descriptive explanation of why we in fact do so, but what justification can he provide for such inferences? Notwithstanding the danger of deriving ‘ought’ claims from ‘is’ claims, many naturalists are committed to generating norms from the empirical information they possess. There is little doubt that Hume wished to distinguish between reasonable and irrational beliefs, “weaning our mind from all those prejudices, which we may have imbibed from education or rash opinion” (EHU 112-3; EHU 12.1.4; SBN 150). This process of developing recommendations that move us away from flawed beliefs is a normative task. However, in adopting a descriptive method how can Hume legitimately generate normative recommendations about our causal judgments?

Hume’s sceptical findings famously concluded that our causal inferences are not based on reason. Hence, if our causal judgments are to be epistemically justified the source of this justification cannot be some infallible a priori criterion. These sceptical findings set strict limits on the kind of solution Hume can develop in response to his own sceptical challenge. One of the key shifts necessitated by an acceptance of these sceptical findings is the conviction that any meaningful account of the
justification of causal inference cannot ignore information about how humans actually reason. We can also find this approach advocated among contemporary epistemologists as Brown states, “epistemic norms that are based on a particular account of our cognitive abilities become suspect if that account is rejected, and norms that require us to do what is beyond our capabilities are surely unacceptable” (Brown 1996, 31). Our beliefs are not the epistemic possessions of disembodied spirits but aspects of the activity of essentially embodied creatures. Hume’s naturalism begins from this point highlighting that a full understanding of why we make an inference from cause to effect demands first an understanding of the natural transition that makes such inferences possible. Hence the descriptive method advocated in naturalism is essential if we are to understand the kinds of belief-forming mechanisms that make the generation of causal beliefs possible. It is only once such a descriptive account is in place that reasoning strategies that take account of our cognitive capacities can be provided. While acknowledging a link between the question “how do we arrive at our beliefs?” and “how ought we arrive at our beliefs” Hume is not prepared to eliminate prescriptive directives.

In working through the process of coming to terms with his sceptical findings, Hume comes to a point where addressing the sceptical challenge is no longer regarded as the central task of epistemology. In Hume we find the focus of epistemology being directed away from developing solutions to sceptical problems and towards the development of normative reasoning strategies. A concern with the realities of human action is the primary driver of this move. Hume was very much aware that scepticism is incompatible with how we live and, as such, is an untenable position. A preoccupation with confronting scepticism has generated a distorted picture of man in which his capacity for reason was viewed as the only facet with epistemological relevance. Hume’s sceptical findings demonstrate that reason alone fails to provide us the kind of knowledge necessary for action. What we find in Hume is recognition that the belief forming process cannot be explained through reason alone. Hume acknowledges that “Man is a reasonable being” (EHU 7; EHU 1.6; SBN 8) but he continues to highlight that “Man is a sociable, no less than a reasonable being” (EHU 7; EHU 1.6; SBN 8) and crucially that “Man is also an active being” (EHU 7; EHU 1.6; SBN 8). For Hume, these three facets of man are relevant to the process of belief formation. As Hume points out in the opening of the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, there are two ways to approach the science of human nature:
The one considers man as born for action, and as influenced in his measures by taste and sentiment; .... The other species of philosophers consider man in the light of a reasonable rather than an active being, and endeavor to form his understanding more than cultivate his manners (EHU 5; EHU 1.1-2; SBN 5-6).

Hume ultimately recommends a middle path, one necessitated by Nature. Nature says, you may indulge your passions for science “but let your science be human, and such as may have a direct reference to action and society” (EHU 7; EHU 1.6; SBN 9). Hume’s work seeks to have a direct reference to action and society.

Hume does not seek to deal with the specific claims of the sceptic but accepts them in their most potent and rigorous form. Strawson aptly describes Hume’s response to the sceptical challenge as “a response which does not so much attempt to meet the challenge as to pass it by” (Strawson 1985, 3). In bypassing the sceptical challenge, Hume has set a new goal for the science of man, one that focuses on the outcome rather than the inputs of the belief formation. In attempting to understand the acquisition, growth and changes of belief, epistemologists have tended to focus on the input to and internal interactions of our cognitive states. Hume’s primary concern however, is on the output; his is an action-focused approach. In demonstrating that we are not the slaves of reason, Hume is concerned primarily with action. As he puts it;

The great subverter of Pyrrhonism, or the excessive principles of scepticism, is action, and employment, and the occupations of common life. These principles may flourish and triumph in the schools, where it is, indeed, difficult, if not impossible, to refute them. But as soon as they leave the shade, and by the presence of the real objects which actuate our passions and sentiments, they are put in opposition to the more powerful principles of our nature, they vanish like smoke, and leave the most determined sceptic in the same conditions as other mortals (EHU 112; EHU 12.2.21; SBN 158-159).

Hume deems that our philosophical science should have a direct reference to action and society. Deleuze held that what we find emerging in Hume is a case for insisting that “Philosophy must constitute itself as the theory of what we are doing, not as a theory of what there is” (Deleuze 1991, 133). As a theory of what we are doing, Hume’s science of human nature strives not to defeat scepticism but to provide useful guidance to
reasoners. Far from inviting us to a sceptical attitude toward life in general, Hume tells us that the sceptical attitude is of academic merit only; it has no value for our actual living. Sceptical philosophy Hume maintains, does not “undermine the reasoning of common life, nor carries its doubts so far as to destroy all action as well as speculation” (EHU 36; EHU 5.1.2; SBN 41). Wittgenstein also held that belief could not be radically divorced from praxis. He states that: “Giving grounds, however justifying the evidence, comes to an end; – but the end is not certain propositions’ striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting…” (Wittgenstein 1969, 204).

In placing the focus of his epistemological investigation on action, he anticipates the development of 20th century pragmatism where knowledge is placed in the context of action. C.I. Lewis, for example, reminds us that “knowledge, action, and evaluation are essentially connected. The primary and pervasive significance of knowledge lies in its guidance of action: knowing is for the sake of doing” (Lewis 1946, 3). The guidance of action should form the normative thrust of our epistemology. Kemp Smith (1905, 155‑7) highlights that Hume regards reason and knowledge to be ‘practical’ and concludes that Hume is providing a new naturalistic conception of the function of reason “to afford us guidance in practical life” (Smith 1905a, 155). This is the basis for a genuinely prescriptive epistemological theory.

Hume was primarily interested in why people do what they do, not in why they think what they think. Much of Hume’s sceptical argument highlights that people do what they do, not because they are motivated by rational arguments but rather as the result of natural relations. Like pragmatists who strive to put the practical bearing at the centre of philosophical considerations, Hume’s action focus gives his work an ameliorative drive that is intensified if we accept that knowledge is for action.4 If the action focused approach is to make any headway in its attempt to improve the outcome of our reasoning, it must take into account the actual elements which contribute to the belief forming process. Hume’s sceptical findings have a role to play here, as they expose the untrustworthiness of our cognitive faculties. This Humean insight, Collier claims, should direct us away from comparisons between Hume and advocates of replacement Quinian versions of the contemporary naturalized epistemology project. The heirs to Hume’s project are best located, not in academic philosophy, but in the fields of psychology, anthropology and human ecology. Collier argues instead that comparisons
should be drawn between Hume and cognitive scientists such as Daniel Kahneman and Richard Nisbett. As with Hume’s investigations, the research of these cognitive scientists reveals profound, systematic and fundamental errors in our intuitive judgments. In marking out such researchers as the “genuine descendants of Hume’s approach”, Collier highlights how their findings “provide support for Hume’s contention that a careful examination of our everyday beliefs raise serious concerns about the reliability of our faculties” (Collier 2008, 307). I agree with Collier regarding the comparisons between Hume and the kind of contemporary cognitive scientists who reveal errors in our intuitive judgments is apt in locating the inheritors of Hume’s negative program. However, Collier fails to make similar connections with Hume’s positive program.

It is my contention that Hume also anticipates moves in contemporary cognitive science to provide guidance on the improvement of our reasoning strategies in the light of such tendencies to error. The cognitive scientists of interest here do not detect errors in our intuitive judgments in order to advance sceptical ends, indeed, most explicitly indicate their ameliorative objectives. For example, in Thinking, Fast and Slow, Kahneman (2012) also sets out research findings that demonstrate among other things the effects of cognitive biases on decision making in order to offer practical insights into how we can use different techniques to guard against the mental slips that often lead to inappropriate action. Similarly, behavioural economist such as Dan Ariely (2008), the author of Predictably Irrational, have produced research findings that show that we are not as rational as we think when we make decisions. Again, in this case the goal of the research is not simply to expose errors in our intuitive judgments; the principle goal of such research is to enable us to recognize how we make cognitive mistakes so we can begin to improve. This desire to make prescriptions about how we ought to acquire belief is certainly not forsaken by Hume. Far from dispensing with an ameliorative thrust, the desire to proffer recommendations on belief formation preserves a normative component within his enterprise. The whole force of Hume’s anti-dogmatic approach is to contribute to this wider task of improving our reasoning strategies in order to ensure that we come to reason better.

It is not only in the kind of psychology that exposes the flaws in our reasoning strategies that we find Hume’s legacy but also in the branches of psychology that seek to improve reasoning. Following Bishop and Trout (2005), I will refer to these branches of psychology as ‘Ameliorative Psychology’. Examples include Paul Meehl’s Clinical Versus Statistical
Prediction (1966), which demonstrates that the application of statistical prediction rules (SPRs) make more reliable predictions than human experts in a variety of domains. Other examples include Gerd Gigerenzer’s (1999) work, which demonstrates that people making high-stakes diagnoses can improve their reasoning by reformulating the problems about probabilities as problems about frequencies. These findings provide normative guidance about how we ought to reason about certain kinds of problems; this direct link to action in improving reasoning strategies has been lost in much contemporary epistemological research. I want to go further than Collier and identify Hume not only with the error identification motif but also with the ameliorative drive of those cognitive scientists who are his genuine descendants. Given Hume’s action centred approach, it should come as little surprise that his motivation in exposing the flaws in our reasoning is not to undermine our belief forming process but to advocate for improvements where flaws arise.

As the findings of ameliorative psychology demonstrate, in the practical fields of human activity epistemic norms are rooted in descriptive knowledge about facts. Any meaningful prescriptions must embrace accounts of theory change that are consistent with the way that cognition has been discovered to work. As a result, epistemology’s ameliorative task cannot be done entirely without being informed by cognitive science. Consequently, any search for justification must be primarily concerned with the analysis of cognitive processes of belief formation and not with the logical analysis of relations between propositions. We might expect the prescriptions of such ameliorative findings to appeal only to instrumental justification. But as we will see in the next section Hume is not content to rest his account of the evaluation of inductive inferences purely on instrumental justification.

Section 2: Beyond Instrumental Justification

The use of inductive inference in the sciences has been a great success and yet philosophers have found it extremely difficult to satisfactorily resolve the problem of induction raised by Hume. C.D. Broad famously described induction as “the glory of science and the scandal of philosophy” (Broad 1952, 143). But why have philosophers encountered such difficulties in their attempts to resolve the problem of induction? Wilfrid Sellars (1964) identifies the reason for this difficulty in the fact that
philosophers have attempted to justify induction by theoretical rather than by practical reasoning. O’Shea argues that:

Hume attempted to resolve the traditional philosophical problem (or perhaps more accurately, to set it aside on principled grounds) by transforming the issue from one of theoretical consistency to one of pragmatic coherence (O’Shea 1996, 1).

Given Hume’s action-centred approach, he is firmly committed to the use of practical rather than theoretical reasoning. Audi (2004) characterizes practical reason as above all our capacity for rational action whereas theoretical reason is above all our capacity for knowledge and rational belief. In shifting his focus to action, Hume is primarily concerned with developing a theory of practical reason as this provides the basis of rational action and attempts to explain the relationship between practical and theoretical reason.

In pursuing a philosophical investigation which is to have a direct reference to action and society, Hume’s distinction between the theoretical and the practical certainty of our ideas takes on a pivotal importance. This is evident in Windelband’s analysis of Hume when he states that,

The associations of ideas which lie at the basis of the conceptions of substance and causality are, indeed, attended neither by demonstrative nor by intuitive certainty; instead of this, however, they are accompanied by a conviction, which has its roots in feeling, a natural belief, which unperturbed by any theoretical reflections, asserts itself victoriously in man’s practical procedures, and is completely adequate for attainable ends of life, and for knowledge relating to these (Windelband 1958, 477).

In our lived experience we find that some ideas that cannot secure demonstrative certainty nevertheless possess a practical certainty. Hume’s sceptical findings would seem to indicate that, epistemically speaking, we should have no beliefs, while his naturalism points to the fact that forming beliefs is an inescapable part of human life. However, it is not just unavoidability that Hume emphasizes but also the instrumental normativity attached to these beliefs.

Hume provides clear instrumental reasons why we should form inductive beliefs. He states that if we jettison our customary transition from causes to effects, a foundation of all our thoughts and actions, we would
immediately “perish and go to ruin” (T 148; T 1.4.4.1; SBN 225). In doing so, he has provided a clear end for any chain of means-end reasoning that would seek instrumental normativity for the causal instinct. The ends supplied by the causal instinct provides the first premises for a chain of means-end reasoning. If you want to avoid perishing, and if operating in accordance with the causal instinct ensures that you avoid perishing, then you ought to operate in accordance with it. We can set about justifying induction not by theoretical but rather by practical reasoning. Instrumental approaches to the problem of induction such as Reichenbach’s (1963) bestows our faith in induction with a kind of practical rationality. Given the high cost of a failure to operate in accordance with these natural instincts, it would seem that beliefs they generate possess this kind of practical rationality. Reichenbach’s pragmatic approach to the problem of induction justifies the use of good inductive reasoning because, if that does not work, then nothing will. If no courses of action guarantees success but one holds out the possibility of success, then it is rational to embark on the latter. The natural instincts themselves and many of the content specific beliefs they give rise to are often cited by Hume as having a clear instrumental value. For Hume our natural beliefs are conducive to our survival. As the following examples demonstrate, when defending a belief, or an inference rule, it is never simply naturalness that Hume cites:

The ‘natural’ principles “are the foundation of all our thoughts and actions, so that upon their removal human nature must immediately perish and go to ruin” (T 148; T 1.4.4.1; SBN 225).

The ‘unnatural’ principles “are neither unavoidable to mankind … or so much as useful in the conduct of life (T 148; T 1.4.4.1; SBN 225).

…all Human life must perish, were [the sceptic’s] principles universally and steadily to prevail. All discourse, all action would immediately cease; and men remain in a total lethargy, till the necessities of nature, unsatisfied, put an end to their miserable existence. It is true; so fatal an event is very little to be dreaded. Nature is always too strong for principle (EHU 119; EHU 12.2.23; SBN 160).

…this operation of the mind, by which we infer like effects from like causes, and vice versa, is so essential to the subsistence of all human creatures... (EHU 45; EHU 5.2.22; SBN 55)
Here, again, it is the instrumental value of the natural mechanism which Hume cites by way of a recommendation. Indeed, Audi (2002) suggests that “broadly Humean versions of instrumentalism are among the most plausible contenders to represent instrumentalism as a contemporary naturalistic position in the theory of practical reason” (Audi 2002, 235). Contemporary advocates of naturalized epistemology frequently commit themselves to instrumental teleological theories of epistemic normativity. Truth-conducive norms of reason are valuable and motivating insofar as they promote the ends we have. According to instrumentalists, epistemic norms are binding insofar as conforming to them makes it more likely that we will form beliefs that promote our ends.

But is such instrumental reasoning trivial and inadequate as a normative theory? There is a difference between forming and retaining beliefs for epistemic reasons and forming and retaining beliefs for instrumental or pragmatic reasons. The kind of hypothetical oughts generated in instrumental reasoning take the form: If X wants A, she ought to do B. Hypothetical oughts are concerned with logical advice and do not offer substantive, categorical advice such as: You ought to do X. To give substantive advice, one needs to eliminate the subjectivity of the antecedent in the conditional. One prominent difficulty facing the instrumentalist approach is its inability to evaluate whether or not a goal is worth pursuing. Siegel argues that “instrumental rationality itself depends on a non-instrumental conception of rationality, that is, that instrumental rationality cannot be coherently understood without recourse to a ‘categorical’ conception of rationality which underlies it” (Siegel 1996, 118). Even if normativity can be retained by appealing to instrumental norms contingent upon our aims, the instrumentalist still requires an account of the normative force of those aims. As Hilary Kornblith points out:

We cannot rest content with Quine’s seemingly innocent suggestion that epistemic norms ‘become descriptive when the terminal parameter is expressed’, for we need to know what the source of this terminal parameter is. What, ultimately, is the source of epistemic normativity? (Kornblith 2002, 139)

The pursuit of one’s cognitive goals can provide instrumental rationale for why one acts in one way rather than another. However, despite the fact that one has certain cognitive goals, it seems possible that I could have
reasons to hold beliefs about a given topic even if I have no goal which would be advanced by my believing the relevant truths. For example, having been committed to working on the night of a big match I might record the match and undertake deliberate measures in order to avoid discovering what took place during it. The goal of these measures is to avoid the acquisition of reasons for believing the truth about how the match ends. Thomas Kelly using a similar analogy, to not having seen a movie you are intending to see draws our attention to the fact that:

…if the possibility of acquiring reasons for believing the truth about p is contingent on one’s having some goal which would be better promoted by believing the truth about p, then this project is incoherent: there is no need to deliberately avoid the acquisition of epistemic reasons to believe propositions about subjects with respect to which one has no desire to believe the truth, for one knows a priori that there are no such reasons (Kelly 2003, 628).

If the measures I put in place fail and a particularly irritating friend blurts out the final score I might then acquire epistemic reasons to believe the truth about how the match ends despite my not having the relevant goal. It could not then be the case that nothing is epistemically rational for those who lack the relevant goal. I might have epistemic reasons to believe the truth about how the match ends, despite my not having the relevant goal. As a result, attempts to reduce epistemic rationality to instrumental rationality fall short, because one can have epistemic reasons to believe propositions even in cases in which believing those propositions does not advance any of my goals. For this reason Kelly argues that “it can be epistemically rational to believe propositions even in cases in which it is clear that believing those propositions would not advance any goal which one actually holds” (Kelly 2003, 630). It would seem then that what I have reason to believe does not have to depend on the content of my goals.

The realms of epistemic and pragmatic justification operate in accordance with different requirements. While pragmatic responses may establish that our inductive reasoning and our inductive beliefs have a kind of practical rationality or instrumental justification, it cannot establish grounds in an epistemic sense. Focusing on the instrumental benefits of inductive belief formation establishes that our inductive reasoning and our inductive beliefs have a practical rationality. But the sceptic does not deny this. The point of Hume’s sceptical argument is that our beliefs
are not well grounded in an epistemic sense. As we have seen, Hume attaches strong pragmatic justification to his account of belief formation. But as Meeker points out,

The sceptical interpreter of Hume can agree that we still form beliefs for various reasons but insist that we should abstain from maintaining that one belief (or system of inquiry) is more justified (epistemically speaking) than its competitors (Meeker 1998, 42).

Hume’s difficulty is with epistemic justification, not with instrumental justification.

What kind of normativity can we derive from description? How are we to get from the experimental findings of an investigation into belief generation to normative recommendations? One avenue is to reflect on the reliability of our belief-forming strategies. On such a reading, epistemic norms are to be identified with scientific descriptions of facts about humans’ reliable processes of reasoning. The task of naturalized epistemology is to judge, on the basis of scientific findings, which, among humans’ cognitive capacities, are the most reliable guide for the activities of man. In such a naturalized framework, the meaning of epistemic justification is also altered with the focus now placed on reliability. Epistemic norms are thus regarded as descriptive statements about reliable cognitive processes for achieving knowledge. A reliable process is one which, in the majority of cases, leads to the truth. There is, however, a key difficulty with locating the source of a justified belief in its production by a reliable process. What justification do we have to accept that in the long run poor reasoning tends to lead to worse outcomes than good reasoning? How are we to connect good reasoning (strategies that lead to true beliefs) with good outcomes? Research has demonstrated that in some very significant situations, having false beliefs leads to better individual outcomes than having true beliefs. In the case of research carried out by Shelley Taylor and her colleagues, it was shown that ‘positive illusions’ and ‘unrealistic optimism’ in patients with HIV leads to both better psychological coping and slower progression of the infection (Taylor 1989; Armor and Taylor 2002). In these cases it would appear that good reasoning will be unsuccessful, as those with false beliefs live longer and have a higher quality of life.

As we have seen both Hume and contemporary naturalized epistemologies are in a position to develop strong instrumental norms. When epistemic norms are replaced with instrumental norms, successful
practice comes to be seen as the standard by which norms are sorted and raised or lowered in epistemic status. However, even if we accept that it is sometimes in our interest to have false beliefs, we might interpret such occasions as a refusal to engage in epistemic activity rather than an example of epistemic behaviour. There are times when we choose not to investigate the truth of a proposition without violating any norms of judgment. This may arise, for example, in cases where the propositions would be unacceptably time-consuming or trivial. As we will see, in the Humean account when one chooses to engage in an epistemic activity then one is governed by the applicable epistemic norms. In choosing not to engage in some activity I do not reject the norms that govern that activity.

Hume’s readiness to reject all belief and reasoning stems from an inability to comparatively rank his beliefs according to their probability of being true, thus reflecting a concern with epistemic, not pragmatic, justification. We have seen above Hume provides clear instrumental justification for making inductive inference. The fact that I have the goal of learning a certain truth gives me an instrumental reason to act in a certain way: I engage in the activity of looking for evidence that bears on the goal. The rationality in play here is instrumental rationality in the service of a cognitive goal. However, in addition to regularly attributing instrumental value to the causal inferences generated by natural relations Hume also refers to philosophical relations and the normative underpinnings of evaluative judgments about such inference. One might ask why he does both? One possible explanation of this is the recognition that in order to effectively pursue one’s cognitive goals one needs both epistemic and instrumental elements. Even if the reasons we have to engage in practices of evidence-gathering and experimentation are instrumental reasons, it is clear that once the information has been gathered what it is rational to believe is no longer a matter of instrumental (but rather epistemic) rationality. While instrumental rationality may govern the rationality of my looking for that evidence it cannot also be said to govern how I respond to the evidence. Kelly (2003) gives the example of hearing a strange sound behind me and, seeking to find out the source of this noise, I turn around. My cognitive goal is to find out what has made the noise; given this goal, it is instrumentally rational for me to turn around. Having turned around and discovered a cat in an otherwise empty room, it is now epistemically rational for me to believe that a cat was responsible for the noise.

Given the vast explanatory resources of scientific findings, it is one’s particular cognitive goals and the instrumental reason to engage in certain
mental activities that gives theoretical reasoning its focus. As Harman notes “your desires can rationally affect your theoretical conclusions by affecting what questions you use theoretical reasoning to answer” (Harman 1999, 15). In pointing to both the instrumental rationality and epistemic rationality of causal inference, Hume lays the ground for the recognition that the cognitive goals one possesses makes a difference to the outcome of theoretical reasoning. For Hume, in appropriately responding to the evidence we encounter in attempting to fulfil our cognitive goals, particular standards are appealed to. Once one is engaged in an epistemic activity, one is governed by these standards. Such epistemic norms apply regardless of instrumental considerations. In evaluating our causal judgments Hume appeals to philosophical relations, in the next section we will examine the standards that underpin the operation of these relations. It is within Hume’s examination of the philosophical relations of causal judgment that we find insights on how to move beyond instrumental normativity and bestow these judgments with epistemic justification. Expanding on these strands of thought, it will be argued that, we can begin to see new possibilities for the generation of epistemic normativity within contemporary naturalized epistemology.

Section 3: Standards of Taste

In his descriptive account of how we form causal beliefs Hume points to the unavoidable pull of natural relations. However, in addition to this descriptive account Hume also points to judgments regarding the philosophical relation of causation as involved in determining the normative status of our inductive inferences. The first hint that we might consider reformulating the problem of how to evaluate our epistemic judgments in terms of taste comes when Hume states that: “Tis not solely in poetry and music, we must follow our taste and sentiment, but likewise in philosophy.” (T 72; T 1.3.8.12; SBN 103) Specifically, in relation to the case of inductive inferences, the subject of this paper, Hume states that:

No questions in philosophy are more difficult, than when a number of causes present themselves for the same phaenomenon, to determine which is the principal and predominant. There seldom is any very precise argument to fix our choice, and men must be contented to be guided by a kind of taste or fancy, arising from analogy, and a comparison of similar instances (T 323fn; T 3.2.3.fn; SBN 504).
If we are to use taste as a model for justifying our inductive judgments it will be necessary to take account of two key features of judgments of taste as set out in Hume’s account of aesthetic reasoning. Firstly, judgments of taste are characterized as objective to the extent that they are fixed not merely with in the individual but also in the community. Secondly, judgments of taste are subject to evaluation against what Hume called a steady and general point of view. In his 1993 article “Why We Believe in Induction” Bennett W. Helm investigates why Hume gives two definitions of causation one of causation as a natural relation the other of causation as a philosophical relation. Drawing on Helm’s reading of Hume it will be argued that Hume tries to model the way we justify our inductive inferences on aesthetic reasoning. Helm argues that:

According to Hume, our probable reasoning is a matter of taste, in the sense that which inferences (or which general rules) we are willing to endorse depends on our appreciative sense of how good the inference is (Helm 1993, 130).

It will be demonstrated that for Hume standards of taste enable us to weigh up conflicting evidence in order to arrive at a considered judgment. On this model, standards of taste provide a form of justification appropriate within the constraints of a naturalized epistemic landscape.

Having provided a detailed description of how it is that we make causal judgments, taste is for Hume the mechanism by which we defend why it is we ought to make a given inference. Standards of taste guide us in the evaluation of our judgments by providing us with good reasons for our judgments. In appealing to standards of taste to underpin the philosophical relations that enable us to evaluate our causal judgments it may appear that we have made such claims ‘subjective’ in the sense that their truth depends not only on how things are with the objects they explicitly concern, but on how things are with some subject not explicitly mentioned. However, it is important to bear in mind that for Hume an appeal to taste in making causal inferences, just as in morality and aesthetics, does not carry with it the implication that one person’s taste is as good as another person’s. In both Book 3 of the Treatise and in his essay “Of the Standard of Taste”, Hume makes it clear that there exist standards to which one’s judgments of taste (in morality, aesthetics, or causation) must conform. While Hume recognizes that there exists a “great variety of Taste” (ST 1), he notes that we hold there to be such things as good taste and bad taste. Hume gives
the example of Sancho’s kinsmen who can discriminate one wine from another (ST, 15). In this example the taste of one man can be applauded as ‘good’ and another dismissed as ‘bad’.

We do not accept that all sentiment is right. If judgments of taste were meant to be expressions of someone’s likings or dislikings, this “great variety of taste” would be understandable. But there seems to be evidence that this is not how things are as it clashes with the way we think and talk within these domains. We express our aesthetic judgments in an objective mode of speech. When I say something is likely and you deny this we are genuinely disagreeing with each other, and not making compatible claims about our respective tastes. It would follow then that our judgments of taste are meant to designate some objective matter of fact. Hume argued that it was “natural for us to seek a Standard of Taste; a rule, by which the various sentiments of men may be reconciled; at least, a decision, afforded, confirming one sentiment, and condemning another” (ST 6). There exist, then, standards for deciding whether one person’s taste is better than another’s. Hume observes that:

…whoever would assert an equality of genius and elegance between OGILBY and MILTON, or BUNYAN and ADDISON, would be thought to defend no less an extravagance, than if he had maintained a mole‑hill to be as high as TENERIFE, or a pond as extensive as the ocean (ST 8).

Anyone expressing such views would be dismissed, as Hume states, “no one pays attention to such a taste; and we pronounce without scruple the sentiment of these pretended critics to be absurd or ridiculous” (ST 8). Costello points out that while there is room for disagreement in certain cases, “no one could possibly ‘agree to disagree’ with somebody who took lesser poets over greater, because that would be to ignore accepted standards governing the judgments regarding such authors” (Costelloe 2003, 173).

On this model, aesthetics is an empirical investigation. Such an investigation tries to find out the “certain qualities in objects, which are fitted by nature to produce those particular feelings” (ST 16) of delight inherent to beauty, or of uneasiness attendant to deformity. Such knowledge of the objective basis of aesthetic qualities would, provide the “rules of composition” (ST 9) which an artist has to observe in his creations. Such rules of composition would constitute an objective standard of taste. And aesthetic criticism would become an empirical science, as Hume had
projected it in the introduction to his *Treatise*. Until we have a scientific aesthetics, however, artists must discover the rules of composition “either by genius or by observation” (ST 9). With respect to the standard of taste, we have to rely on the joint judgment of the community of good critics because good critics are the best epistemic instruments we have for aesthetic qualities.

Just as the process of justification worked for poetry we can look to locate standards which guide us in the evaluation of our causal judgments. In identifying objective standards of taste as the root of the philosophical relations that make epistemic judgments possible, Hume has opened up new avenues of exploration for contemporary naturalists, particularly for those who seek to reconcile commitments to both subjectivity and disagreement.\(^5\) Likings and judgments refer to different orders of existence as opinions do not make claims about objective reality, but refer only to the subject who utters them. When it comes to likings there are no criteria in terms of which one might be correct or incorrect. Judgments, by contrast, presuppose general or rational standards, they are open to public evaluation. As Costelloe observes, likings “do not involve the parties in genuine contradiction because no claim to common standards (universality) is being made”. However, in the case of judgments reference is made to common standards in order to produce the general assent. To endorse general rules for evaluating judgments based on standards of taste is not to say that what I think is right will inevitably be right (even just for me). Standards of taste are fixed not merely within the individual but also in the community.\(^6\) The process through which we reach belief cannot be addressed in purely formal and abstract terms, with no reference to concrete contexts. It is not only the biological imperatives of the human species which are vital to an understanding of our belief-forming processes, but also the social nature of that species.

Through standards of taste, the descriptive and explanatory resources of scientific findings (not just psychology, but also a broad range of human sciences that can contribute to our understanding of actual epistemic practices, e.g. biology, cognitive neuroscience, sociology, anthropology, and history) are united with the language of community and individual justification. Both elements are needed for meaningful discourse, as together they create the frame within which we live and act. Capaldi describes humans as “cultural beings whose values are shaped by biology and history and the capacity for sympathetic identification with others” (Capaldi 1992, 132). Human understanding, according to Capaldi, cannot
itself be understood except from the perspective of engaged social agents. If each individual is permitted to fix their beliefs by their own methods, then in the context of social interaction she will find that others have different beliefs and doubt will reoccur. Hume is clear on the point that our opinions of all kinds are strongly affected by society and sympathy. It is virtually impossible for us to support any principle or sentiment against the universal consent of everyone. However, standards of taste are fixed not merely with in the individual but also in the community. The normativity of the standards of taste exist only in a social context; the ‘oughts’ they produce require a community. This Humean emphasis finds resonance with contemporary virtue and social epistemologists for whom intellectual agents and communities are the primary source of epistemic value and the primary focus of epistemic evaluation.

Hume views knowledge as essentially a social phenomenon, and holds that the social nature of our experience fundamentally shapes our beliefs. In discussions of a child’s socially interactive yet pre-semantic situation Casey notes how that context of social interaction is not merely “a starting point to be left behind as the child matures; it is the continuing environment, the ground that keeps our language rooted to reality, however recondite and sophisticated our knowledge may become” (Casey 2006, 327). As we have seen, Hume openly declares that “Man is a sociable no less than a reasonable being” (EHU 7; EHU 1.6; SBN 8). Man is born into a family and social state; indeed, Hume goes as far as to say that “man cannot live without society” (T 259; T.2.3.1.9; SBN 402). This social aspect of our being has a profound effect on belief-formations. If the “mutual dependence of men is so great in all societies that scarce any human action is entirely complete in itself, or is performed without some reference to the actions of others, which are requisite to make it answer fully the intention of the agent” (EHU 68; EHU 8.1.17; SBN 89), then an action-centered epistemology must take proper account of the social nature and context of man. In clearly recognizing the primacy of man’s social nature, Hume is in fact questioning whether the traditional approach of accounting for our understanding as a purely theoretical activity is a coherent one. Stumpf reminds us of Feuerbach’s warning: “Do not wish to be a philosopher in contrast to being a man …. do not think as a thinker …. think as living, real being …. think in existence” (Stumpf 1993, 553).

The kind of epistemic normativity we can derive from standards of taste appear much ‘weaker’ than traditional normativity. They do not present
infallible and unchangeable standards. But all naturalism is required
to do is to satisfy its own standard of reasoned beliefs, and these have
nothing to do with mysterious, infallible, a priori sources. Traditional
epistemology seeks to derive epistemic norms from a priori foundations,
on the assumptions that such norms form the foundation for all our
knowledge. As empirical data are part of that knowledge base, they cannot
give rise to epistemic norms without incurring vicious circularity. Hence
introspection is regarded as an indubitable source of epistemic norms and
the most effective tool for checking if a process of reasoning is reliable.
Most naturalists reject the idea that epistemic norms, justified a priori,
can form necessary and infallible foundations of our knowledge about the
world. Not only do they reject the possibility of objectively verifying such
a priori foundations, they also insist that epistemic norms must be based
on empirical knowledge about human cognitive capacities.

The traditional meaning of ‘epistemic norms’ as infallible assertions
derived from a priori foundations has no place within a naturalist
framework. Naturalists start from a fallibilistic conception of justification
and knowledge, which emerges with the rejection of first philosophy
and the acceptance of a continuity between science and epistemology.
As such, naturalized epistemology forms conditions of justification on
the basis of scientific descriptions of humans’ cognitive processes and
abilities, it is clear that naturalist epistemology starts from very different
philosophical presuppositions to traditional epistemology. As a result,
naturalistic conditions of normativity are different from the traditional
ones. The naturalist no longer operates with the traditional understanding
of terms such as ‘epistemic norm’ and ‘justified belief’. On the naturalist
framework, ‘epistemic norms’ emerge as empirical information about
correct processes of reasoning. We can accept naturalized epistemology
to be normative only according to its own presuppositions. Hume’s
skepticism has made it impossible to locate the source of epistemic
norms by a priori means or in infallible sense data. However, given the
commitments of naturalism there is no onus to satisfy traditional standards.
Given the radically different commitments naturalized epistemology has
from that of traditional epistemology, the framework for justification must
also be radically different.

Most naturalists reject the idea that we can have necessary and infallible
foundations of our knowledge about the world. Likewise Hume’s work also
evolved to a position where certainty was no longer a valid requirement
for justification. Once we dispense with the idea of certainty we are in a
position to recommend or prescribe conditions for making good causal inferences based on the strength of such inferences as determined by a matter of taste. As Helm argues:

just as we cannot and do not expect there to be specifiable sufficient conditions for things in general to be beautiful, we should not expect there to be specifiable sufficient conditions for something to be a good causal inference. The lack of such conditions does not prevent our being able to provide reasons for our aesthetic judgements, to criticize the judgements of others, or to resolve conflicting judgements so as to arrive at a consensus concerning the aesthetic value of a given work of art; likewise, the appeal to taste and the lack of specifiable sufficient conditions for good causal inferences need not prevent the kind of discussion and criticism essential to doing science (Helm 1993, 131–2).

By addressing the difficulty of how it is we are to evaluate our judgments in terms of taste, Hume has located a non a priori standard on which to endorse judgments. In searching for a justification for our causal reasoning, Hume demonstrates that we have no reason to believe that the future will be like the past. Without such reasons there is no empirical evidence that can be sufficient for justifying our causal reasoning. But having set up a naturalized framework, it is no longer an imperative to set out the sufficient conditions for making good causal inferences. Hume states that “to judge an object properly, that object must be surveyed in a certain point of view” (ST 21). What we must do if we are to arrive at a considered judgment is balance conflicting evidence in such a way that it can survive the test and scrutiny of time. Hume argues that, “the best way of ascertaining the relevant criteria for evaluating a particular case is to appeal to those models and principles, which have been established by the uniform consent of nations and ages” (ST 17). As a result, the key feature of a considered judgments for Hume is that such a judgment is ‘steady’ or ‘constant’. For Hume: “the utmost constancy is requir’d to make us persevere in our enquiry, and the utmost sagacity to choose the right way among so many that present themselves” (T 117-8; T.1.3.15.11; SBN 175).

If we are to arrive at considered judgments then this kind of examination is critical. The key question to be asked on this Humean approach is whether: “looking back at the evidence again in light of one’s experience with similar cases since, one would arrive at the same judgments for the same reason” (Helm 1993, 134). We can only make sense of a standard
of taste in light of such “steady and general points of view” (T 171-2; T 3.3.1.15; SBN 581-582). As Hume puts it in the Treatise, we must regulate our judgments in light of principles that “stand the test of the most critical examination” (T 177; T 1.4.7.14; SBN 272) and so “bear the examination of the latest posterity” (T 177; T 1.4.7.14; SBN 273). These standards provide the tools for critical reflection;” Hume’s is a naturalist account that could survive our reflective scrutiny and fits with our capacity for autonomous evaluation and action.

If we are to arrive at a more stable judgments of things, Hume argues that we must “fix on some steady and general points of view; and always, in our thoughts, place ourselves in them, whatever may be our present situation” (T 372; T 3.3.1.15; SBN 582). Laird (1931) argues that beliefs for Hume are those ideas that fit into a stable system. In this way, Hume encourages us to see the wider normative task of epistemology, in a naturalized framework, as one that draws on the findings of all our resources to assess judgments within the relevant circumstances. There are many factors that can be taken into consideration and these factors will vary from case to case.

Flanagan describes the normative component of naturalized epistemology as involving “the gathering together of norms of inference, belief, and knowing that lead to success in ordinary reasoning and in science” (Flanagan 2006, 439). This gathering together is essential so that in each case we can come to identify what is relevant for evaluating our judgments. Unlike the hypothetical oughts generated in instrumental reasoning, the generality and steadiness of taste allows us to construct a coherent all-things-considered ‘ought’. As we have seen, from the perspective of natural relations, there can be no reason for a causal relation beyond a descriptive account of belief formation and such a reason is not a justification. When we search for justificatory reasons for our causal inferences we must turn to philosophical relations. From this perspective, we are presented with what Hume describes as an enlarged view that encompasses “several instances” of the relation. (T 115; T 1.3.14.31; SBN 170) We may recall that Wilfrid Sellars famously stated that “The aim of philosophy, abstractly formulated, is to understand how things in the broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest possible sense of the term” (Sellars 1976, 369). Similarly, for Hume, it is only by taking such a steady and general enlarged point of view that justificatory reasons can be given for inferences. It is, as Helm points out, “only because our judgments of taste are considered judgments, judgments that have
withstood reflection in light of such a steady and general point of view, that they will be reasonably certain and backed up by good reasons.” (Helm 1993, 135) There is, of course, no implication that such reasons provide certainty but such certainty is not a requirement of judgments in a naturalized framework.

Conclusion

As we have seen, Hume is keen to provide a holistic picture of man, characterizing man not just as a reasonable being, but also as an active being and a sociable being. Essentially, Hume is to be interpreted as a common sense philosopher and is in no way anxious to destroy faith in human knowledge. In foregoing the search for ultimate explanations, in the rationalist sense, Hume is content to found epistemology on what happens in human life and on how we as human beings function in the world. A priori epistemic norms have no place within a naturalized framework, but the project of improving our reasoning strategies remains the naturalist’s normative task. In making the connection between knowledge and action, Hume has moved the focus of epistemological enquiry from a focus on inputs to a focus on outputs, thus indicating the possibility of combining descriptive and prescriptive aspects of the epistemological task. A descriptive epistemology is not reduced to appeals to instrumental justification. For Hume, in both epistemology and aesthetics, standards of taste enable us to weigh up conflicting evidence in order to arrive at a considered judgment. Such judgment must withstand the test and scrutiny of time if we are to have confidence in them. Hume does not simply reject inductive inference because he demonstrates that it cannot be modelled on deduction. Instead Hume indicates an alternative account of the kind of justification we can expect for our causal inferences. In pointing to standards of taste as a potential source of reasons for evaluative claims, Hume provides a path to naturalizing normative judgments. Epistemic standards of taste can then account for features of normative discourse such as its objective purport, its apparent universality and its non-arbitrariness, while avoiding positing the existence of irreducibly normative facts and properties.
NOTES

1 As with contemporary naturalism there is no single unitary account of what Humean naturalism entails. Norman Kemp Smith’s seminal work on Hume led the way on naturalist interpretations and there now exists a wide array of competing naturalist readings of Hume, see for example Garrett (1997), Loeb (2002), Pears (1990), Stroud (1977), P.F. Strawson (1985).

2 There is no attempt here to develop a unified and holistic interpretation of Hume’s philosophy but rather the goal is to extract specific Humean insights that provide instructive guidance on approaching the place of epistemic normativity in a naturalized context.

3 Abbreviations used for Works by David Hume

T A Treatise of Human Nature

EHU An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

ST Of the Standards of Taste

4 Contemporary thinkers such as Korsgaard (1997), Velleman (2000), and Rosati (2003) have attempted to ground normativity in what is constitutive of action.

5 Such difficulties in accounting for the possibility of disagreement in subjective discourse are reflected in the criticism contemporary relativists level against contextualism.

6 Lynn Hankinson Nelson has argued that it is “communities that construct and acquire knowledge” (1993:124). Kusch (2002) has argued that socially isolated individuals are unable to generate normative phenomena while the individual remains the type of entity that conforms or fails to conform to epistemic norms.

7 Korsgaard (1996) emphasizes the unavoidability (for us) of deliberation or reflection.
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