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MIHAIL EVANS
SAYGUN GOKARIKSEL
MARIA (CIOATĂ) HARALAMBAKIS
WOJCIECH KOZŁOWSKI
DANIEL KUCHLER
DÓRA MÉRAI
JOSEF SCHOVANEC
DENIS SKOPIN
BÁLINT VARGA
WILLIAM DANIEL JÖEL TALLOTTE
MIHAIL EVANS

Born in 1974, Nairobi, Kenya

Ph.D. University of the West of England, Bristol (2012)
Dissertation: Jacques Derrida – A Politics
MA at the University of Nottingham (2001)
MSt at the University of Oxford (1997)
BA at the University of Wales (1995)

President of the Middle Common Room, Hertford College, Oxford (1996-1997)

Conferences attended in UK, Germany, Netherlands, France, Switzerland,
Lebanon, Slovenia, Poland, Croatia

Studies published in philosophy, historiography and literature journals

Book:
DERRIDA, HUSSERL AND RELATIVISM

Abstract

This paper charts Derrida’s important and often overlooked relation to the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. My primary motivation is to disabuse the persistent misreadings of his work which would portray him as a relativist. Introducing Husserl’s phenomenology, I demonstrate how he exceeds the subject/object divide of post-Cartesian philosophy by a move to an account of consciousness as transcendental. In my second section I follow Derrida’s first major publication, which focuses on the late work of Husserl. Through a consideration of the questions of writing and infinity he demonstrates certain failures in Husserl, yet at the same time we will see that Derrida insists on a fidelity to the given that is very Husserlian. I follow this by an examination of the question of language in Husserl’s early work. Derrida’s conclusion is that language is a trace structure of presence and absence that means that we can never obtain the grasp on what Husserl’s calls ‘the thing itself’ that he believes phenomenology is able to achieve. The structure of presence/absence that Derrida found to undermine Husserl’s transcendental ambitions will be further examined in a section on time and the self. In conclusion, I will suggest that while Derrida engages in a penetrating criticism of Husserl he does not abandon his work but rather, we might say, in showing the impossibility of a transcendental conclusion comes to engage in a quasi-transcendental argumentation that confounds those that would accuse him of relativism.

Keywords: Derrida, Husserl, Relativism, Transcendental, Quasi-Transcendental; Phenomenology, Post-Phenomenology.

Différance, the 1968 essay in which Derrida sums up his early thinking mentions many figures – Saussure, Hegel, Lévinas, Freud, Heidegger, Nietzsche – but Husserl is not named even once. That the paper was republished as part of the volume Speech and Phenomena, the majority of which is taken up with the English translation of La Voix et le Phénomène,
one of Derrida’s two major early works on Husserl, suggests a greater recognition of the very deep debt Derrida’s early work owes to Husserl. It is a debt that has continued throughout his career, although it is not as often remarked upon, by Derrida or commentators, as it deserves to be.¹ Gasché speaks of ‘the unquestionable privilege that [Husserl’s] thought enjoys in Derrida’s work’.² Derrida himself describes phenomenology as “a discipline of incomparable rigour” and recently said of epoché, the reduction, the starting point of Husserlian philosophy: “the notion of epoché, has been and still is a major indispensable gesture. In everything I try to say and write epoché is implied ... I think it is the condition for speaking and for thinking”.³

We might say that what both Husserl and Derrida do is turn from the world as given to think the experience of the world.

The importance of Husserl for Derrida is not surprising if one looks closely at his formation as a philosopher. At the beginning of his career as a published theorist in 1967 – the year of Writing and Différance, Of Grammatology and Speech and Phenomena – Derrida was at the end of serving a fifteen-year apprenticeship in the philosophy of Husserl. He had already published a lengthy Introduction to Husserl’s Origin of Geometry in 1962, written two substantial papers, Genesis and Structure and Form and Meaning, and his book-length master’s thesis on Husserl of 1954 lay in manuscript.⁴ In focusing on phenomenology Derrida’s early career was firmly within the philosophical mainstream of 1950s France. Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Lévinas, Ricouer, among the most prominent philosophers of the time, worked within the phenomenological tradition and created their own distinctive positions out of engagements with Husserl. That said, in returning to Husserl’s texts and failing to make a direct engagement with Sartre or Merleau-Ponty – arguably the two best known contemporary phenomenologists – Derrida was challenging to the status quo, going behind the backs of the acknowledged contemporary masters.

Indeed, it is possible to argue that with the exception of Lévinas, Derrida makes little direct engagement with his philosophical elders, this is because right from the beginning of his thinking he conceives of his project as a much wider cultural one. Far from being austerely philosophical in returning to the detail of Husserl (although, as usual, he is meticulous in that respect too), Derrida is a philosopher making a deep and consistent engagement with the thought of his contemporaries, and particularly with what the French call ‘the human sciences’. Rather than being the dusty scholar of Husserlian obscurities, Derrida sought to take on significant elements of his culture, our culture, in a game, not merely played for the
sake of it but one with the most important political stakes. However, if we come at such work without taking account of Derrida as philosopher, and in particular, his work on Husserl we risk going considerably awry. The frequent accusation of ‘relativism’ levelled at Derrida is the product of such a flawed reading of his work and can only by made by completely misunderstanding his stance vis à vis Husserl, himself one of the most vocal philosophical critics of psychologism and relativism. In recent work Critchley has been among those who stress the importance of Husserl as a source of a strong critique of relativism that runs through Derrida’s work. I will come back to this in concluding that his work on Husserl leads Derrida to a position that could be called quasi-transcendental.

Transcendental Consciousness: Beyond Subject and Object

Husserl commenced his academic life as a mathematician. Indeed, Derrida suggests that, as we shall see: “the mathematical object seems to be the privileged example and most permanent thread guiding Husserl’s reflection”. His 1883 PhD at the University of Vienna was on Contributions to the Calculus of Variations. In 1891 he published his habilitation entitled The Philosophy of Arithmetic. Husserl had yet to articulate his philosophy fully at this stage but a crucial breakthrough was made in his highly original understanding of the concept of number. His argument was that rather than being the product of a sensuous intuition, categorial objects such as number, are given in categorial activity. It is hard to underestimate the importance of this move which Husserl was to fully develop in the decades to come. The two previously existing options had been to say that number can be accounted for solely using logical means (which involves tortuous and unconvincing arguments) or that it is the product of an act, which is more plausible, but leads to accusations of psychologism and subjectivism. What Husserl does is to argue that number is indeed the product of an act of combining but it is not the act of a consciousness that stands in opposition to a world that is being enumerated. Husserl effectively makes a leap here that departs from the notions of subjectivity that have dominated thought since Descartes. An understanding of consciousness that is not a mere psychologism or subjectivism is the first fundamental step of Husserl’s philosophy.

Husserl – along with Aristotle, Descartes and Kant – has been called one of the great beginners in philosophy. He aimed at Philosophy as a
Rigorous Science, to use the title of an early essay and by this he meant to give philosophy indubitable foundations. This lead him to begin with our consciousness as that to which we unquestionably have access. He is not Descartes, for this is consciousness as given, and not some cogito that is deduced and which still remains as the one indubitable thing in a surrounding world. Consciousness itself, not some derived cogito, is what is indubitable and through it we have access to a pure transcendental subjectivity. An important concern in Husserl’s late work is that modern science (and here he included philosophy since Descartes) had led to a ‘theoretical self-objectification’, that modern thought sought to gain an intellectual mastery of the world as a basis for physical mastery. Husserl wished to give an access to the world that opened questions of experience and meaning without making the claims to mastery of the whole that others had, hence the motto he constantly repeated: “back to the things themselves” (“zurück zu den Sachen selbst”). Indeed, it is an almost constant refrain: in Ideas I he spoke of the need “to go away from words and opinions back to the things themselves” and in the text of The Paris Lectures he insisted that “science demands proof by reference to the things and facts themselves, as these are given in actual experience and intuition”. For Husserl, philosophy is concerned not with that which is measurable but with meaning.

Husserl argued that modern, post-Cartesian, philosophy with its central problem of how to connect representations “within the mind” and things “out there” worked on the basis of entirely mistaken assumptions. Thus although he called his philosophy phenomenology, he rejected Kant’s distinction between phenomena and noumena, between the appearance of reality in consciousness and the things-in-themselves: Husserl saw himself as going beyond mere noumena to the things themselves. Engaging in a thorough critique of the modern assumption that the end of knowing is located within the mind’s interior space, he also repudiated Locke’s interpretation of ‘mind’ as an inner space set off from the rest of nature. He argued that the perceived separation of subject and object occurs because of the ‘fatal mistake’ of overlooking the intentionality of thought, that consciousness is essentially orientation towards an object. Intentionality was Husserl’s key to overcoming the subject-object dichotomy. It was in the fifth investigation of Logical Investigations that Husserl first advanced this element of his theory and he continues to return and refine it on numerous occasions.
In arguing that philosophy should focus on intentionality he explicitly asked that we bracket all questions of existence. In the transcendental reduction the ego turns on its own constitutive acts thereby obtaining an apodictic insight that becomes the foundation for a universal science. As Luft notes, “the realization of the essential subject-relatedness of all worldliness necessitates this transcendental turn”. In returning to the subjective Husserl is not stepping out onto some slippery relativist slope, rather, right from the start of his career Husserl is one of the strongest critics of relativism, particularly in the psychologistic form it predominantly took at the turn of the twentieth century. His return to the subjective, through the *epoché*, does not terminate in the culturally bound self but passes to ideality and the universality of the transcendental. Through a focus on the cultural and intellectual objects individual subjects create but which become available for all to use Husserl sought the transcendent in the immanent. As Bernet puts it, “all truth rests on a subjective achievement, namely intuitive fulfilment that is a synthesis of recognition leading to an apodictic certainty and self-assurance”. The meaning arrived at by the phenomenologist at the end of his investigation is not only his meaning but the only valid meaning such objectivity can have. Having abandoned the indubitale foundation within mundane being that Descartes sought for science, Husserl opened what he saw as a whole new realm of indubitable being never noted before; that of transcendental consciousness. We might say that the central insight contained in Husserl’s “discovery” of transcendental consciousness is that the subject does not have an experience of the world but rather is the experience of the world. As Lawlor underlines: “the transcendental ego is not ontically separate from the psychological ego in the way that one thing stands outside of another”. The transcendental that Husserl seeks is not something beyond the world as it is for speculative metaphysics, rather it is a transcendence in immanence. As Derrida pithily puts it, “this ideality is not an existent that has fallen from the sky”.

When Husserl sets out to make philosophy a rigorous science he does not mean that it should borrow some sort of methodology or proceed in the same manner as actually existing sciences. He argues that positive science abstracts and creates an artificial structure divorced from the world of our original experience and it’s results are valid only under certain criteria (which is all very well given what it seeks to do – he is not anti-science). If Husserl approached philosophy with something of the ambitions and inclination of a mathematician, he firmly drew a distinction between the
changeless and static essences of mathematics, describable with perfect exactitude and fixed once and for all, and other types of essence for which he argued the knowledge of them must conform to the types of essence they are. Far from imposing a model taken from the sciences on philosophy, Husserl aimed to place over the particular sciences of the ‘how’, a universal science of the ‘what’. In contrast, in establishing philosophy as a rigorous science, Husserl seeks to place it on an absolutely presuppositionless foundation. The absolute starting point of his philosophy is not a basic concept, a fundamental principle or a cogito but rather the field of original experiences. Hence his philosophy is called phenomenology. “Back to the things themselves” is often presented as a Husserlian motto.

In phenomenology there is no induction or deduction or any of the other methods used by the sciences. Rather, in order to leave what Husserl calls “the natural attitude” and perceive in an original and radical way we must employ what he calls “the reduction”. We thus learn to see originally and radically. Husserl seeks to maintain fidelity to what is presented to us and to avoid abstractions and constructions through the employment of the reduction. There are, in fact, a number of different types of reduction employed in Husserl’s work and endless arguments among commentators about them. One of the most important being “the eidetic reduction”, which allows us to raise our knowledge from the level of facts to that of ideas. By essence Husserl does not mean empirical generalities but rather pure possibilities whose validity is independent of experience. Through ideation, a procedure of variation that owes much to mathematics, we move from individual givenness towards generality rather than the other way around. Husserl is careful to constantly distinguish his descriptive eidetics from the exactness of mathematical essences. A further important step, “the phenomenological reduction” takes us from the world of realities to that of presuppositions. It leads us back from the cultural world of the sciences to primordial experience. Again we must underline that what concerns Husserl is to guard immediate experience and the world as it manifests itself.

Consciousness, Husserl argues, is always consciousness of something, it is always directed in some way. This is what he calls “intuition”. This is a quite misleading name, for what he means is not an instinctive knowing, but rather the fact that the mind is always directed to objects under some aspect. Our consciousness is always orientated to that which it is not and it belongs to the essence of our consciousness to form a meaning and constitute its own objects. The character of the known object depends on
the character of the act by which it is grasped. Intentionally has nothing to do with relations between two objects – and Husserl does not begin with the reality of the object – but always with a unified consciousness. Through intuition we discover the transcendental Ego, a “transcendence in immance”. For Husserl consciousness and it’s directedness is the philosophical key.

Husserl went on to publish a number of other works, among them the *Formal and Transcendental Logic* and the *Cartesian Meditations*, constantly refining and elaborating his position while seeking to provide a definitive “introduction” to phenomenology for his readers (almost all his books contained this word in their subtitle). It is impossible to specify even an outline of this work here but I would like to note the emphasis in the later works on the themes of life-world and history. In taking up these topics, one of Husserl’s hopes was that his phenomenological analyses could serve as correctives to the naturalism and historicism which he recognized as two of the most powerful ways of thinking in modernity. Naturalism, as characterized by Husserl, rests on the thesis that the entire realm of nature, including human nature, is comprised only of entities and processes susceptible of quantitative analysis was of concern for the way in which it occluded questions of meaning and value. Those who advocated historicism, regarded the conceptual systems of both the natural and the human sciences as world views whose presuppositions are determined by contingent historical transformations, were obvious opponents for a philosopher who proposed the existence of transcendental consciousness. But it is to a second hope that lies behind the turn to the lifeworld and history that I will now turn, examining in greater detail the late work of Husserl on “the crisis” and Derrida’s reading of it.

**Derrida’s Intentional Compromise of the Ideal**

Derrida published two main texts on Husserl, both focusing on problems in his treatment of language and on what this might mean for the phenomenological project as a whole. In particular he examines the way in which Husserl uses various accounts of language to act as an assurance for phenomenology’s production of ideality. Of the two major texts, the first, an introduction to the ‘Origin of Geometry’ of 1936, deals with Husserl’s consideration of the relationship between writing and ideality at a very late stage in the latter’s career. In the second, *Speech*
and Phenomenon, his ‘farewell’ to Husserl, Derrida considers the account of signification given in the Logical Investigations, regarded as Husserl’s first major work. In the Origin of Geometry Husserl asserts that writing is an essential condition of possibility for the existence of ideal entities. This is an ostensible reversal of his early position in Logical Investigations, where he champions speech – indeed the internal monologue as the most “pure” form of speech – as providing the only secure form of signification. As we shall see this contrast is only apparent and in both cases Derrida undermines Husserl’s stated position using his own arguments. Derrida’s conclusion is that neither speech nor writing can found ideality yet this is not an argument against transcendentalism tout court (in conclusion, I will have more to say about Derrida’s own “quasi‑transcendental” position). Certainly, Derrida’s account of language from the outset refuses the central tenet of empiricism: belief in the possibility of access to an object given in itself. Language, he reminds us, is already constituted and, in that sense, the empirical is only approachable on the basis of something already existing, beyond the object, something ideal. This is partly what Derrida means when he said in the quotation I made in my first paragraph that the epoché is an “indispensable gesture ... the condition for speaking and for thinking”.21

In his Introduction to ‘The Origin of Geometry’, Derrida underlines Husserl’s own stress on the importance of writing for the constitution of ideality. Culture, from the most basic anthropological sense to the heights of modern art, depends on the possibility of some form of idealization, of the creation of objects that do not occur in the physical world. Derrida accepts what Husserl has to say here about the distinction between real and ideal objects. For Husserl an ideal object has its origin in human activity, and in that sense it is non‑natural, what might be termed “technical”. Human activity, culture, has produced a realm of ideal, or “spiritual”, objects that cannot be perceived by the senses, can only be known in their sense‑content or meaning and have no location in space. Being thus safe from the changes in nature and the possession of no one subject, this gives them the incomparable advantage, for Husserl, of being universally available. They become for him his norm, the “absolute model for any object whatever”.23 As a philosopher who sought ideal and transcendental meaning, it might initially seem surprising to find that Husserl makes a strong and persistent critique of contemporary society.24 Central to Husserl’s critique is a belief that ideal objects have come to be treated like physical objects by ‘unthoughtful repetition’ which has led to
the loss of the original insights and their phenomenological grounding. Husserl, particularly in his late work in the 1930s, speaks of a crisis of reason where science has lost contact with the pre-scientific world from which it emerged. Science makes progress through confining itself within its established logic and not questioning how it came to be what it is and what purposes it serves. Husserl traced the drift of modern science towards reductionism to Galileo’s failure to relate scientific truths adequately to their sources in the life-world, the pre-scientific world in which we live. His stress on transcendence and ideality is thus in opposition to what he sees as a crisis caused by contemporary, scientific, trends to objectivation, formalization and abstraction and he disagrees with the scientific contention that universally valid positions can be reached simply by excluding all that is subjective. Again, there is an insistence on a return to intuition and a rejection of the passively accepted and uncritically repeated but now Husserl is questioning the practice of science and projecting a solution through an historical investigation. As Bernet notes, “Husserl attempts to overcome this crisis due to contemporary materialism by restoring to ideal objects their original – that is, their spiritual – meaning”. Husserl sees contemporary science as an “activity in passivity” that has lost its relation to the lifeworld in which it originates: it throws “a garb of ideas” over objects encountered in the world. Sciences act as if only those structures that can be mathematicized are a proper mode of understanding, thus privileging calculation. In one of his last works Derrida notes how

the Husserlian critique of transcendental evil of a proactively rationalist objectivism is inscribed, in May 1935, in the critique of a certain irrationalism, one whose popularity and air of political modernity in the German and European atmosphere of the 1930s it seemed necessary to denounce.

For Husserl, the perversion of science into an objectivism must be critiqued in order to also undermine that irrationalism that it has allowed to flourish through failing to attend to questions of meaning.

In projecting a return to the “origin of geometry” Husserl needs, in particular, to account for the transmission of idealities over time, to explain how an ideal object is constituted in the process of transmission, communalization and reproduction. His assertion is that an ideal object is first constituted in an “evident grasp of a state of affairs”, while subsequently, as Bernet puts it,
retention keeps the intuition present even when it is gone, and memory actively reproduces and repeats the past intuition and thereby gives it a consistency and sameness within and despite the continuous perspectives from which it can be presently approached ... communication and writing allow such an insight to be shared with others and to become an object of historical tradition.28

Each of these steps, Husserl sees as assuring and constituting the presence of the identical ideal object, a process which is ultimately guaranteed only by writing. What Derrida does is show that each of these steps is also a compounding with a constitutive absence. Husserl himself asserts that the problem, the crisis he wishes to combat, is that the ideal objects have become, in a sense, “too present” or improperly present in that something has been forgotten and repressed, i.e. their origin. Where Derrida departs from Husserl is in suggesting that in the process of historical transmission, forgetting, misunderstanding and concealment are essential and unavoidable elements of the process rather than mere empirical accidents. He concludes that all transmission is both preservation and loss and it is the nature and status of writing that is the key here, given that for Husserl, it is writing that maintains and makes possible ideality. As Derrida puts it, “the possibility of writing will ensure the absolute traditionalization of the object, its absolute ideal objectivity – i.e., the purity of its relation to a universal transcendental subjectivity”.29 Writing, for Husserl, frees the ideal object from possession by any particular subjectivity or community. He is effectively conceding here that writing founds the transcendental subject: as Derrida argues, “writing creates a kind of autonomous transcendental field from which every actual subject can be absent”.30 The structure of the argument Derrida finds in Husserl concerning writing, he will later term supplementary: writing is first used to ‘supplement’ a lack of presence but is then said to produce this presence, which would then, in fact, be constituted by absence. The inherent and inescapable instabilities, the constitutive absence, that Derrida exposes within the “transcendental field” means that he can push Husserl’s argument to the ruinous and unintended conclusion that writing thus makes possible a radical loss of sense, of the original intention and of the world of the author.

Husserl tries to prevent such a move by conceiving of writing as a spiritual body (Leib rather than Körper), one that is self-expressing. By this strange sleight of hand – which can be understood on the basis of the account of language given in Logical Investigations that Derrida discusses
in *Speech and Phenomena* and which we will come to – ideal language is allegedly kept secure from the infirmities of “factual language”. Derrida points out a whole host of unwanted complications this has for Husserl: for example, contrary to the transcendental aims of his philosophy, subjective experience is thereby made “the sphere of absolute certainty and absolute existence”. We will return to the details of this matter latter on, suffice to say here that Derrida criticises the idea that there can be any such thing as a purely spiritual or expressive language, a language that keeps ideality pure, safe and incorruptible. The sign is always material, with feet of clay: which means that meaning has no guarantor in writing. This is a point Derrida returns to many times in his work, for example, within the field of semiotics, Derrida rethinks the sign as gramme, “a movement no longer conceived on the basis of the opposition presence/absence”. Against Husserl, Derrida consequently asserts that ideality is far from safe, that the transcendental is irreducibly compromised by the material. Yet this is not a decision in favour of the empirical but rather a questioning of the possibility of rigidly demarcating the two and one which can be found to be support by elements of Husserl’s own text. It is certainly not critique of the transcendental from some supposed empirical standpoint. For Derrida, is clear that empiricism (if a pure empiricism were possible which Derrida would equally question) is a forgetting of the existence of the ideal, of language, of all that is outside the object and which we bring to the object before we can comprehend it.

By highlighting the effects of the materiality of language Derrida argues the impossibility of obtaining a pure presence but he also shows this by a completely different route. In opposing the narrow objectivism of an instrumentally orientated science, we have seen how Husserl declares that he will return to reactivate the origin of geometry, how he seeks to return to science, as what Derrida terms, “an infinite task as theoria”. In attempting to return to an unconditioned science, it is thus no coincidence that Husserl chooses to return to the origin of the particular discipline of geometry. Geometry is a project that aims towards an infinite progress of knowledge, one orientated towards an Idea in the Kantian sense. The Idea in the Kantian sense can be said, in Husserlian terms, to be an intention without an object: “the Idea is the pole of a pure intention, empty of every determined object”. As such, it’s essence can only ever be intelligible as rules for an process of knowledge which is not possible to complete, never as a finally constituted ideal object. Derrida stresses that the insight into the infinite goal of knowledge, the Idea in the Kantian sense, is also an insight
into its unattainability. Again, this undermines Husserl’s stated project, for it thus might be said that “geometry is on the way toward its origin, instead of proceeding from it”. The origin to which we were supposed to return is not closed and complete and thus is never available for a final return. Derrida argues that this is not a matter local to the “Origin of Geometry”, but rather suggests that Husserlian phenomenology, in declaring itself to be an unconditioned science, is inherently oriented towards such an infinity. Derrida argues that “the Idea is the basis on which a phenomenology is set up in order to achieve the final intention of philosophy”. Again we have presence haunted by absence, the constitutive absence of an infinite orientation. Derrida repeats this point a few years later in his first essay on Lévinas:

*the Idea in the Kantian sense designates the infinite overflowing of a horizon which, by reason of an absolute and essential necessity which itself is absolutely principled and irreducible, never can become an object itself, or be completed, equalled, by the intuition of an object.*

Although Husserlian phenomenology’s stated goals are transcendental, Derrida argues that as it works itself out in practice, particularly in its insistence on intentionality as bounded within horizons that are never finally encompassable, phenomenology is inscribed by “an indefinite opening”. Indeed, Derrida argues that, given its infinite telos, rather than being simply methodological technique, the reduction marks the fact that consciousness can never be a living presence. Phenomenology thus discloses an inevitable deferral, one that must include a deferral of the self-consciousness that Husserl hoped phenomenology could bring about. Against Lévinas’ harsh criticism of Husserl, which we will come back to, Derrida suggests: “is not intentionality respect [for the other] itself?”. While in Husserl the consequences of the infinite orientation of phenomenology are implicit and never fully elaborated, in Lévinas we will see what happens when they become explicit.

Having suggested that the project of ‘The Origin’ is undercut in two major ways, neither of them simply external to Husserl’s thought, Derrida draws the necessary conclusion. His suggestion is that “perhaps we must try to think, on the contrary, something other than a crisis”. Husserl thinks that the dominance of objectivist and instrumental thought in the modern world is something that can be corrected by returning science to it’s “origin”, the everyday world from which it has emerged. For him,
there is a “crisis”, one that has lasted several hundred years, to which we can in principle put an end. Derrida, on the contrary, sees instrumentalism as something which has and will always threaten without denying that there are many different ways we can respond to this situation. There is a similar problematic when Derrida displaces Heidegger on technology by reference to economy.

If Derrida would have us abandon the transcendental goals set by Husserl he continues to be inspired by the ethical impulse that motivates Husserl. Both are persistent in challenging the extent to which conceptuality obscures the thing itself. The question of presence will be the focus of my next section but we might proleptically say that while Derrida would also concern himself with a “crisis” of improper presence, his solution is not a return to an origin in order to recover a proper presence but rather to assert the co-implication of presence and absence. Derrida is indeed interested in a return to the things themselves but he reveals that the approach is inevitably compromised (we will see in conclusion how it can be described as quasi-transcendental). Husserl wishes to use the Rückfrage, the method used in ‘The Origin’ to attempt to return and reactive dead idealities, while Derrida concludes that the origin is never unequivocally accessible. His insistence would be that we cannot overcome the “crisis”, yet this does not mean he would abandon the rigourous scrutiny of idealities, and their limits. Indeed, throughout his work he stresses the need for, as Bennington puts it, “the active, critical memory or reception of an inheritance or tradition which will remember us if we do not remember it”.41 Derrida says, “I insist on inheritance”, while also arguing, in a manner quite different from the Husserl of ‘The Origin’, that “the most unpredictable future may be hidden in a past which has not yet been re-presented or made present or remembered”.42 What Derrida has discovered against the grain of Husserl’s text is that “every return to the origin [is] an audacious move toward the horizon”.43 If it is not already apparent that this presents us with a task that is both ethical and political, we might turn to what Derrida says concerning Nelson Mandela’s relation to European parliamentary democracy:

one can recognize an authentic inheritor in he who conserves and reproduces, but also in he who respects the logic of the legacy to the point of turning it back on occasion against those who claim to be its holders, to the point of showing up against the usurpers the very thing that in the inheritance, has never yet been seen.44
Where, as Bernet puts it, “forgetting is what Husserl fears most”, for Derrida a certain forgetting is an ethical imperative; what he speaks of as “a given and desired forgetting, not as negative experience therefore, like an amnesia and a loss of memory”. In contrast, “memory has no other task for Husserl than to make the past present again with exactly the same characteristics it had when being present for the first time”. Where Husserl seeks a transcendental subjectivity for which meaning is stable and secured, Derrida would argue that we are finite beings who inherit a language and culture which exceeds us but demands that we take responsibility for it. Indeed, for Derrida the very possibility of a future depends on an activity of inheritance:

only a finite being inherits, and his finitude obliges him. It obliges him to receive what is larger and older and more powerful and more durable than he. But the same finitude obliges one to choose, to prefer, to sacrifice, to exclude, to let go and leave behind.

For Derrida then, the lack of an ‘origin’ is both a risk and a chance. It opens the possibility of “betraying the heritage in the name of the heritage”.

Expression: Of Presence

In *Speech and Phenomena* Derrida turns his focus to Husserl’s early examination of language, the account of signification given in the *Logical Investigations*. We have already seen that at a crucial stage in ‘The Origin of Geometry’ Husserl, who is asserting the necessity of writing for the preservation of ideality, attempts to ground ideality’s changelessness in a certain quality of self-expressing. This possibility of self-containment and self-production will be found to have its roots in *Logical Investigations*, where central to the operation of language for Husserl is a conception of the sign that sees it as consisting of two types: expression and indication. This distinction is outlined in the earliest published pages of phenomenology, right at the start of *Logical Investigations*, yet Derrida several times argues that it persists throughout Husserl’s work despite the ostensible shifts of emphasis we have seen in ‘The Origin of Geometry’. With *Logical Investigations* Husserl sought to commence the pure science of essences he believed possible by starting with logical
classifications; the first of its six investigations is devoted to signs and signification. Husserl begins his logical analyses with an analysis of language which attempts to purge it of that element he sees to be the product of the mind. It is to this end that Husserl distinguishes indication and expression. Indication is an object or state of affairs which indicates the existence of another object or state of affairs, e.g. clouds indicate the arrival of rain, symptoms will indicate the presence of a disease and a particular geological formation, oil. By means of an indicative sign a thinking being passes, by thought, from one thing to something else. Such a passage can never be guaranteed, such meanings are never certain. Clouds may make us think of many things apart from rain, a phrase may make us think something other than what the author intended. The indicative sign thus falls short of what is needed to guarantee ideality. Expression, on the contrary – Husserl asserts – allows complete access to intention. Any communication with others can only be indication: in communicating with others we can merely indicate our intentions; expression here is contaminated with indication. For the construction of ideality Husserl needs a pure expression, a certain signification because ideality is based on the possibility of repetition, of an identical repetition. As such it is “the preservation or mastery of presence in repetition”. Husserl grounds the possibility of such repetition in the internal voice of self-consciousness. In soliloquy speech is pure expression with no element of indication. The self is entirely self-contained in this moment, there is no reference to the outside; the soliloquy – Derrida argues – is a speech purged of what he thematizes as writing. Derrida notes the necessity at work here:

The ideal object is the most objective of objects; independent of the here-and-now acts and events of the empirical subjectivity which intends it, it can be repeated infinitely while remaining the same ... The ideality of the object ... can only be expressed in an element whose phenomenality does not have worldly form ... the voice.

So unworldly is the voice that there are no words here, not even imagined words, Husserl says, merely – the weakest phenomenological flickering – “the imagination of the word”. Expression, like the ideality Husserl claims it enables, is nowhere in the world. Derrida notes that by stressing expression Husserl is privileging the voluntary and the conscious, sliding back into a classical metaphysics he claims to exceed. He is also excluding everything that is not animated by intention from meaning,
for example, facial expressions and gestures. Active consciousness thus defines the essence of language for Husserl (we will come back to Husserl on death in a later section).

Presence is what Husserl claims for expression: pure presence, the basis for a secure intuition. Derrida argues against this using resources Husserl himself provides: perception is shown to be not an original presentation but rather a re-presentation (Vergegenwärtigung rather than Gegenwärtigung). This argument lies at the heart of Derrida’s work, not just on Husserl; it is one he will deploy time and again. It is the core of Derrida’s attack on “logocentrism” in Of Grammatology and his insistence on the inescapability of writing, a challenge to philosophy’s privileging of the logos which seeks to think a presence constituted by absence and which necessitates replacing a conventional conception of writing with that of arche-writing. What writing then “presents” us with then is not, or not simply, a present that has been lived by others but the trace or the supplement, a past that has never been present and never lived, a past that does not exist. In a late essay Derrida says: “I substituted the concept of trace for that of signifier”.

That is, he thinks of the material presence of writing as inhabited by an absence that ruins its claims to mastery. With regard to Husserl, the conclusion brought forth is that “the presence of the present is derived from repetition and not the reverse”. Husserlian presence is a sham, only attainable on the basis of a denial of signification and by the false isolation of a place – the monologue – where there is, supposedly, no need of it. Returning to the theme of the relation of the transcendental and the empirical in ‘The Origin’, Derrida notes how the monologue is effectively “the sole case to escape the distinction between what is worldly and what is transcendental’, but, ‘by the same token, it makes that distinction possible’. The relation between perception and presence in Husserl is further elaborated by Derrida through a consideration of his treatment of “temporal objects”, objects like the melody which persists over a period of time that the former discusses at length in the Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness. Husserl argues that through retention (“primary memory”) that which is past can be maintained as a presence. This he distinguished from recollection (“secondary memory”), where there is a compounding of a present perception and a past added by the imagination (which is the position of his mentor Brentano and which he sees as giving us no grounds for distinguishing fiction and reality). In the case of a melody, the “now” of the passing moment would be characterized by primary memory while the
melody as a whole by secondary memory. I will discuss some of the issues this raises in the section on time below; here I will simply note that the sharp difference Husserl sought between perception and non-perception is radically disturbed and deconstructed. Retention and recollection are both a compounding of a present with a constitutive absence.

Derrida thus insists that Husserl cannot maintain a radical distinction between perception and non-perception, that language will not allow such a distinction: “the presence of the perceived present can appear as such only inasmuch as it is continuously compounded with a nonpresence and nonperception, with primary memory and expectation”. Derrida’s conclusion – the central insight, we might say, of deconstruction – is that, as Stiegler puts it, “an absence constitutes the heart of the presence of the Living Present” and that “the constitution of presence by an absence is in fact always already a reconstitution”. The living is, we might suggest, compounded with the dead, a dead that has never and will never live. Paradoxically, Derrida can conclude elsewhere that this “death by writing also inaugurates life” for it is only through the risk of loss that writing carries that there can be conceptuality at all. In Derrida’s late work this thought will be met again in figures such as “the spectral” and “the messianic”.

What Derrida shows is that it is Husserl himself who elsewhere makes this argument. I will again restate Derrida’s argument in the *Introduction to the ‘Origin of Geometry’* using terms that he only came to coin in *Speech and Phenomenon*. In the latter work he argues, as I have already hinted, that the structure of Husserl’s arguments can be frequently said to follow a logic he calls that of the supplement. This is that situation where, as he puts it, “a possibility produces that which it is said to be added on”. We can argue that writing as Husserl considers it in ‘The Origin’ is supplementary for it is presented as being that which is necessary for the material preservation of an ideality but, as Derrida shows in the *Introduction*, it is what makes possible any ideality. In his early work, such as the “Linguistics and Grammatology” section of *Of Grammatology*, Derrida elaborates this structural writing as an arche-writing that needs to be distinguished from the empirical technology of writing, that inheres in any language. He says of this elsewhere, “arche-writing is not writing; it is the structure of elementary supplementarity”. One of the insights contained here is that writing, as the condition of passing from the retention of the individual to the transmission of a tradition, as the production of a common object, is a process that dispossesses the author (an author who might also be suggested never was in a position of mastery anyway). In
later work this is what Derrida calls the archive. In a text on Freud he elaborates how “the structure of the archive is spectral. It is spectral a priori: neither present nor absent”.61 The collective nature of language means we approach perception with the non-perceived at hand and in mind; and this compromises perception.

At the heart of the present, at the heart of perception, there is the non-perceived, all that is preserved and made available by writing. This supplementation of presence by non-presence is central to all that Derrida will have to say. Meaning can only be meaningful on the basis of being re-presentable; reproducible on another occasion. This iterability allows that an expression always be repeatable, reproducible and representable. And thus there can be no pure presence of self-consciousness, no speech uncontaminated by the effects of writing, no expression free from the uncertainty of indication. Thus Derrida’s devastating conclusion for Husserl is that “there never was any perception”.62 As he says elsewhere “as soon as there are words – and this can be said of the trace in general, and of the chance that it is – direct intuition no longer has any chance”.63 The thought of the trace is the ruination of intuition by the demonstration that it is not pure presence but constituted by an absence that is not masterable. Husserl sought to rescue “the thing itself” from metaphysics through the intuition of its essence. Derrida would also insist on a philosophical respect for singularity but at the same time as conceding that “the thing itself always escapes”.64 For Derrida, singularity can only be understood on the basis of that possibility of repetition that he calls iterability: “singularity is never present. It presents itself only in losing or undoubling itself in iterability”.65 The generalizing nature of language thus always threatens “the thing itself” but it is also what enables any defence of it. We can only rescue singularity to the extent that we acknowledge an inevitable “escape”, what Derrida calls elsewhere the “unique disappearance of the unique”.66 Language as a trace structure of presence and absence means that the thing always escapes, its essence always finally elusive. This leads Derrida to say in Of Grammatology: “the thing itself is a sign”.67 Much later he will go so far as to suggest, we come to the “phenomenon as phantasm”.68

As soon as one introduces non-perception as well as perception into language, as soon as one challenges a view of language centred on presence, one finds language to be not merely a medium but an origin. Derrida effects in his reading of Husserl a liberation of the signifier and a demonstration of its productivity: this is what he attempts underscore by coining of the term arche-writing. Husserl in his account of language
sees the signifier as useless, as a temporary medium. Language, for him, makes no contribution but it also poses no major problems while Derrida in his stress on the way language makes possible retention and how the non-present constitutes the present, asserts that signs are far from useless. They form the basis for the possibility of consciousness whether written down or not. And as Derrida points out this is Husserl’s own argument in ‘The Origin of Geometry’. Contrary to what Husserl would assert, they are not passive vehicles but actively transport. Hence Derrida’s work on metaphor, which there is no space to touch on here, abounds with figures of movement and displacement.

Husserl would accept as speech any speech that was intuitable, including accepting outlandish statements which could only be fulfilled imaginatively or those which cannot be fulfilled because they are false or contradictory. But he rejects sentences which do not observe the rules of logic, for example, such phrases as “green is or” and “abracadabra”. In contrast, Derrida defends such irregular sign making: although there is no space to discuss it we might refer here to his reading of the “he war” of *Finnegan’s Wake* in “Two Words for Joyce”. For him, language does not necessarily depend on intuitability in order to create effects; “abracadabra” was used as an invocation and as such was an incantation believed to have the power of producing effects. However, he would have us go beyond even this to see it as, not merely an ‘exotic performative’ in the Austinian sense, but as Caputo puts it: “a way of signalling the productive power of signs as such. It is not so much a signifier as a way that the very act of sign-ing is itself signalled, signified”. It shows that signifiers retain their power in the absence of intuition.

I think it needs stressing that when Derrida turns to discuss questions in ethics or political philosophy he is not turning away from other more abstruse interests to address practical matters. Rather in his discussions of literature and literary uses of language, whether in readings of Celan, Genet, Joyce, Mallarmé, Ponge, Sollers, or Valéry, he is still exploring that problematic realtion of universal and singular that is at the heart of his ethico-political concerns. Although even the most prosaic of Derrida’s texts is highly literary by the standards of Husserl’s very conventional works, he is again doing something quite Husserlian by forcing his readers to actively engage in the work of the text. Far from being simply an indulgence in the sheer pleasure of language (although who would want to deny that it is also that) Derrida’s literary style is also a constant re-marking of that which through the effects of language escapes
conceptual determination, drawing our attention to the non-presence that haunts presence. Critchley suggests that in Derrida, “the name «literature» becomes the placeholder for the experience of a singularity that cannot be assimilated into any overarching explanatory conceptual schema, but what permanently disrupts the possible unity of such a schema”. In texts that foreground certain literary qualities we experience language in a way in which a power that exceeds the everyday instrumental uses of language is foregrounded.

As Wood notes, in both Derrida’s more literary and in his more philosophical writings, there is an insistence on the need for “difficult styles ... as setting up initiatory thresholds to prevent any understanding below a certain level of active recognition and participation”. At the same time what Derrida seeks to do with his challenging texts is also very unHusserlian. In the presentation given in defence of his Doctorat d’Etat he argued that

the reproductive force of authority can get along more comfortably with declarations or theses whose content presents itself as revolutionary, provided they respect the rules of legitimation, the rhetoric and the institutional symbolism which defuses and neutralises whatever comes from outside the system.

Where the manner of Husserl’s text is strictly conventional, Derrida realizes that a return to the thing might mean a break with academic norms. Ultimately, we might find that what is so often glibly rejected as Derridean obscurity and self-indulgence is a firm insistence on the need to undertake the hard work of responsibility.

When we understand that Derrida’s work proceeds by questioning the limits and boundaries of an order and what is excluded by it we begin to see why Derrida does not and never can offer a programmatic politics. Correcting the misinterpretations of certain early popularizations of his thought, Derrida insists “deconstruction is not a method for discovering that which resists the system”. As Critchley puts it, Derrida’s work concerns “not simply the unthought of the tradition, but rather that-which-cannot-be-thought”. It is what forever escapes thought and puts it into question that leads Derrida to challenge any settled political order; it is the call to the responsibility of justice that motivates Derrida in this pursuit. In Spectres of Marx Derrida speaks of what he calls “another concept of the political”. This Derridean concept of the political would be one where
the political is constantly interrupted and forced to account for that which it has excluded; to return – we might say, somewhat provocatively – to the things themselves, if only to mark the political consequences of the concession that they always escape.

It should be clear by now that Derrida is very far from being the relativist he has all too often been accused of being. In Limited Inc Derrida remarks that “as Husserl has shown better than anyone else, relativism, like all its derivatives, remains a philosophical position in contradiction with itself”.84 One always proceeds from a given, there are always standards, rules and constitutions. He insists “that there are and that there should be truth, reference, and stable contexts of interpretation”.85 Thus, “from the point of view of semantics, but also of ethics and politics, «deconstruction» should never lead either to relativism or to any sort of indeterminism”.86 Indeed, that it does not do so is due in part to the extent to which it remains aligned with Husserl’s philosophy: “the transcendental or ontological question ... is the only force that resists empiricism and relativism”.87 To reject relativism, however, is not to assert that either semiotics or the state can lay claim to an unquestionable foundation. But if, as we have discovered in our analysis of Derrida’s critique of Husserl and the notion of “presence”, at the heart of perception is the non-perceived, if presence is inhabited or haunted by non-presence, then “the finiteness of a context is never secured or simple, there is an indefinite opening of every context, an essential nontotalization”.88

In his seminal Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority, a paper given a number of years later at the end of the 1980s, Derrida engages in a reading of the foundation of law that similarly challenges any hypostatization of that institution. Via a reading of Benjamin’s essay Critique of Violence, Derrida deconstructs the distinction made there between the violence of the founding of the law and the violence of the maintaining of the law. His argument, which follows the logic of his reading of the American Declaration of Independence, is that in preservation the law is constantly being refounded and that in this moment of refounding, law returns to its origin, to that on which it is based but excludes: justice. Drawing on an expression of Montaigne”“the mystical foundation of authority”, his suggestion is that the ultimate ground of the legal order is ungrounded. Again, this is not nihilism or relativism, Derrida is not saying that everything is permitted and he does not deny the existence, or the necessity of regulations, statutes, precedents, legal decisions, and rules. Rather what he questions is whether the law (droit) that is made
up of these elements can ever completely instantiate justice, whether it can comprehensively and finally render justice. He would say that law is constitutively violent because it can never fully do justice to singularity. Indeed, concerning the Rights of Man which might seem at first glance utterly unobjectionable he argues: “all the decisions made in the name of the rights of man are at the same time alibis for the continued inequality between singularities”. Derrida does not seek to question universals per se but rather to maintain norms and universals in the possibility of revision in the face of that which they exclude.

Time and the Ex-position of the Sovereign Self

Having established the productivity of writing and signification and the importance of recognizing their relation to perception, Derrida elaborates what this means for some of the key Husserlian philosophical themes. I would like here, in particular, to focus on ‘time’ and the ‘self’. These are not just any topics, for Derrida says of them: “the constitution of the other and of time refer phenomenology to a zone in which its «principle of principles» (as we see it, its metaphysical principle: the original self-evidence and presence of the thing itself in person) is radically put into question”. Derrida’s discussion of iterability, the repeatability of the sign, leads to a re-examination of traditional concepts of time. Temporality is not an explicit theme of Logical Investigations yet in Speech and Phenomena Derrida devotes a chapter to what Husserl’s account of expression implies about thinking temporality. Bernet suggests that “it is a further service of Derrida’s text to have shown that Husserl’s later philosophy of historicity necessitates a revision of his earlier phenomenology of time”. Derrida insists that the dominant conception of ‘now’ in Husserl is as an undivided unity capable of being present to itself without the aid of signs: “if the present of self-presence is not simple ... then the whole of Husserl’s argumentation is threatened in its very principle”. If we follow Derrida in dismissing the possibility of a completely self-present speaking subject, if we allow that meaning is never encapsulated in that moment of speaking but is achieved through language – which casts us out to who knows what other times – then the idea of a punctual now crumbles.

As much as Introduction to ‘The Origin of Geometry’ and Speech and Phenomena are at one in arguing that Husserl’s account of signification has an underlying unity, despite different emphasises in writings from over the
course of his career, so Derrida argues that Husserl’s account of temporality has a similar continuity. In rejecting a conception of the ‘now’ that is claimed to be Aristotle’s, Husserl says, “it belongs to the essence of lived experiences that they must be extended ... that a punctual phase can never be for itself”. Yet Derrida argues that this “spread” is still thought “on the basis of the self-identity of the now as point”. For Husserl, “despite all the complexity of its structures, temporality has a nondisplaceable center, an eye or living core, the punctuality of the real now”. In particular, Derrida highlights Husserl’s use of the metaphor of a comet’s tail in describing the work of retention (primary memory): the implication is of a punctual now that is followed by a trail of retained nows. Also indicative of Husserl’s orientation to a punctual and present now is his rejection of the Freudian conception of an unconscious (we will come back to the question of the self in a moment).

As with the other works on which he comments Derrida finds elements of The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness which undermines the punctual conception of the ‘now’. Husserl conceives of perception as depending on retention (primary memory) insisting that it is distinctive from reproduction (secondary memory); but Derrida points out that the difference between the two is not that of perception and nonperception. Retention, which Husserl would have to contain both perception and nonperception, is (as we have seen) the key to what Derrida argues is really going on in intuition. The inconsistency is not intellectual sloppiness on Husserl’s part but a displacement of what is actually happens in intuition: perception is constantly interacting with non-perception, the now with the non-now. This is not an adding to or an accompanying but rather the two are essentially and indispensably involved. Repetition constitutes the present: presence is possible only because of a simultaneous non-presence. As noted above, the present is haunted by the past and by the future; there is no sure philosophical foundation on the basis of intuition. There can be no pure self-presence of the present; alterity is to use a very Derridean locution “always already” there. Now can never be in itself, it always points beyond itself and in this pointing, there occurs a spatialization: if the now is not only now but also some other time, it is also some other place. Derrida’s critique of the punctual now implies that space and time are not to be thought of as two separate domains. “Space is «in» time”. The radicalism of what Derrida has to say can be seen in his conclusion to chapter five of Speech and Phenomena: “what we are calling time must be given a different name – for «time» has always designated a movement conceived in terms of the present, and can
mean nothing else”.97 Much as he sees Husserl’s stress on a punctual now as problematic Derrida also notes the philosophical necessity of such a conception of the instant: it is “the very element of philosophical thought”.98 To criticize a conception of time as based on a punctual now is not to criticize just one among a myriad of other philosophical theses for without it such conceptions as evidence, truth and sense cannot function, nor can any of the central distinctions of philosophy such as that between form and matter. As Derrida puts it, “within philosophy there is no possible objection concerning the privilege of this present now; it defines the very element of philosophical thought”.99 Yet Derrida makes clear that in displacing presence he is not seeking a non-philosophy, rather that he seeks a meditation on the non-presence which is not the opposite of philosophy but which constantly contaminates and frustrates its attempts to achieve conceptual purity. Derrida’s critique of Husserl’s consideration of temporality is not just about time then but rather is the insistence on that excess that exceeds and defies naming (this is what Beardsworth calls “the aporia of time”).

Not only does Derrida seeks to break open the punctual now – the traditional conception of time – that Husserl assumes, but he also seeks to use similar arguments to suggest that the self is similarly exposed to a play of presence and absence rather than being the foundation Husserl desires it to be. He does this, firstly, by arguing that Husserl’s assertion of the primacy of the present and hence the self-presence of the self is based on a “forgetting” of death. Phenomenology, Derrida asserts is a philosophy of life, seeking to root itself in what is. It fails to thematize death philosophically, relegating it to the status of an empirical accident: for Husserl, “the source of sense is always determined as the act of living, as the act of a living being”.100 Indication is therefore “the process of death at work in signs”.101 The effacement of the sign is also, Derrida points out, the effacement of death, an assertion that “before my birth and after my death, the present is”.102 Derrida would have us live the possibility of our own disappearance, noting that we signify things and ourselves precisely because everything dies for us: nothing escapes time, is purely present but is always a trace.

Derrida further challenges Husserl’s presumption of a self-present self through reference to the latter’s own work via his characteristic close reading of the text which, in revealing its inner workings, shows how it undermines itself. The question of the self and, in particular, its relation to other selves Husserl himself recognized as a difficult problem for phenomenology and he devoted the fifth of his Cartesian Meditations to it.103 There Husserl tackles the problem of the relationship between the subject and the other: if, as
individuals, we transcendentally create an understanding of the world, how are we to understand others, who are also, presumably, in the same position. With a table Husserl asserts that we can obtain a full comprehension of it by, if we are not fully presented with it, moving it around or walking behind it and thereby turning that which is appresented (Husserl’s term for what is not initially available for presentation but could be inferred as existing) into a presentation. The alter ego offers no such possibility but is only ever available as an appresentation. Seeing another body I conclude that the thing there looks like me and behaves as I would if I were there at the place of the foreign body and by a transfer of meaning I conclude that another ego is appresented as acting within or presiding over the presented body-thing. Lévinas, translator of the Cartesian Meditations into French, suggests that Husserl’s position fails to do the other justice and subordinates him/her to the ego, making him or her the ego’s phenomenon. Lévinas in his persistent attempts pose the question of alterity to phenomenology breaks with intentionality, moving to a post-phenomenological position. Derrida is less quick to condemn Husserl and suggests that an insistence on the analogical appresentation of the other itself amounts to an acknowledgement of alterity rather than its subsumption under the ego. Derrida notes that Husserl makes a fundamental recognition of the alterity of the other when he admits, “I cannot put myself in someone else’s place for this is a concession that ‘what is proper to the alter ego will never be accessible as such, to an originarily bestowing intuition, but only to an analogical appresentation’.” It is a point on which he corrects Lévinas emphatically in Violence and Metaphysics, his first essay on him:

the necessary reference to analogical appresentation, far from signifying an analogical and assimilatory reduction of the other to the same, confirms and respects separation, the unsurpassable necessity of (nonobjective) mediation.

Indeed, it is a point Derrida often returns to in late interviews: “we can never have an intuition of what is going on the other side, only what he calls indirect «appresentations», analogous hypotheses or appresentations”. Thus, we might argue along with Caputo that “Husserl’s notion of «ap-perception», far from compromising the tout autre, positively preserves the other ego from direct perception, sheltering the alterity of the other by putting the other off limits to intuition”. The entrance of the alter ego rather marks the appearance of an original non-presentation, of an irreducible
non-phenomenality, the alter ego being, not an object in the world but rather, in a phrase Derrida uses frequently, “another origin of the world”.109 As Morin points out one of the consequences of our inability to access the alter ego other than through appresentation is that “our social space always remains divided between points of view or singular accesses, and it is not possible to totalize or bring those points of view together, not even in an ideal or an idea in the Kantian sense”.110 This is what Derrida argued in the Introduction to the ‘Origin of Geometry’ when he rejected the idea of a transhistorical ‘we’ that he found implied in Husserl’s suggestion that ideality can be repeated indefinitely without corruption.

It needs stressing that if Derrida finds in appresentation a promising respect for the Other, we have seen, he is not convinced by Husserl’s attempt to guarantee meaning through an argument concerning the self-presence of the monologue of a subject who communicates so perfectly with himself it cannot be termed communication. Husserl’s self is complete and immediate (in the sense of its communication not having to pass through any medium). Derrida, we have seen, argues against this self-present self in no need of representation and as Howells puts it, the “fissuring of the present moment fissures in its turn the self-identity of the inner self of the phenomenological reduction, and opens it up to the very alterity it was intended to exclude”.111 Here Derrida departs from Husserl, for as Bernet contends, “self-awareness of the pulsating life of the constituting Ego remains the fundamentum incocussum of Husserl’s phenomenology”.112 In showing that pure interiority cannot be clearly or cleanly demarcated from that which was believed to be exterior, Derrida opens the way for a profound reconception of the self. Here he could be said to depart from Husserl and turn to the work of his almost exact contemporary (and fellow Moravian Jew) Sigmund Freud, as the self becomes troubled by what we might term “an unconscious” that exceeds it and can never be brought fully to consciousness. When the opposition between perception and repetition, memory and imagination becomes unclear the mechanisms active in perception do not essentially differ from the mechanisms of remembering and of the dream: as Derrida said in a recent interview: “thanks to the impulse of the initial Freudian send-off [coup d’envoi], one can introduce the idea of a divided, differentiated «subject» who cannot be reduced to a conscious, egological intentionality”.113 We are no longer simply Husserlian ego’s but are revealed to be troubled by an unconscious which exceeds our conscious control: as Bernet puts it, a “no-man’s land between the borders of the unconscious and external reality”.114 Unfortunately, there is no space
in this paper to discuss Derrida’s writings on psychoanalysis although, as is well known, he discusses extensively the writings of Freud, Lacan and Torok. There is much more that could be said about his conclusion that “I am not proprietor of my «I»”.

The Impossible Names of the Quasi-Transcendental

Derrida might be a sharp critic of Husserl but he is far from saying that we can put the latter to one side. Husserl aimed to establish philosophy as transcendental. In Of Grammatology Derrida insists: “a thought of the trace can no more break with a transcendental phenomenology than be reduced to it”. Caputo suggests that “Derrida is a transcendental philosopher — almost”. In this he concurs with Hobson who argues that Derrida’s critique results in “a position which is rigorously non-transcendental without being not transcendental” and also with Bernet, who contends that “Speech and Phenomena attempts a new understanding of transcendental consciousness rather than its destruction”. Writing, a certain nonpresence inherent in signification, has been revealed as the condition of Husserlian transcendentality. Or rather, transcendentality because of tertiary memory can never be other than a quasi-transcendentality, “irreducibly empirico-worldly”. But as Bernasconi insists, “to say «quasi-transcendental» rather than simply «transcendental» is not to make a point that it is not a transcendental, but rather to say that it is and is not a transcendental”. As François Dastur repeats, “the post-philosophical thinking of trace, if it cannot be reduced to transcendental phenomenology, cannot any more break with it”. Derrida’s deconstruction of the Husserlian attempt to found ideality shows the impossibility of an object that is unwavering, infinitely repeatable, eternal: the transcendental. Yet although Derrida confounds transcendentality by drawing it back into the messy contingency of the real, stressing the materiality of the signifier, this is not a retreat to empiricism: time and again Derrida argues that language, as preceding the perception of the object, means empiricism is equally impossible. This can be seen if we return to what he says of the name and of naming, rejecting the possibility of a pure transcendental or pure empirical in insisting that it is “as if it was necessary to lose the name in order to save what bears the unique”. What constantly contaminates the purity of the present with the non-present, the transcendent with the empirical is an ineffaceable
non-presence or alterity: “when a name comes, it immediately says more than the name: the other of the name and quite simply the other, whose irruption the name uncovers”. This is what leads Derrida to constant resort to the qualifications “a certain’, “another”, and “quasi”.

I will follow Gasché in suggesting that Derrida’s position is ‘quasi-transcendental’, that while he exposes the impossibility of Husserl’s transcendental claims he continues the latter’s project to the extent that he makes statements about the general conditions of possibility and impossibility. Such statements, by the very contradictory nature of what they attempt to do involve Derrida in a complex strategy. As Derrida puts it himself, “one cannot attempt to deconstruct ... transcendence without descending across the inherited concepts toward the unnameable”. An appeal to transcendence is both a condition and an effect of language for Derrida. As Beardsworth argues,

these “quasi-transcendental” structures - “quasi” since they open up and collapse the transcendental difference in one and the same movement – are thus as much a way of formalizing the essential contamination of any principle of thought as of accounting for the history of a principle, norm or institution.

Derrida seeks to use a language committed to the idea of presence in order to speak of non-presence: thus the quasi-transcendental will never be a proposition or thesis but always a demonstration. He thus coins a vocabulary of quasi-transcendental concepts, words that denominate – or rather, attempt to denominate – the non-presence at the heart of presence. While Gasché first coined the term quasi-transcendentals to designate this series of Derridean namings, it is a usage widely taken up by later commentators and even Derrida himself. But much as Derrida can never finally name what he seeks to name, and hence is continually forced forward to new coinages, so the quasi-transcendentals could equally be termed differently and so we find that Hent de Vries calls them “non-synonymous substitutions”, Critchley “palaeonymic displacements”, Naas “Derridean-phemes” or “deconstructo-nyms” and Hobson “lexemes”.

I want now to return to the question of relativism. It is worth underlining, given the frequency of such accusations, that those critics of Derrida who accuse him of “relativism” fail to understand and take note of his quasi-transcendental position. As he clarified in a late interview:
Relativism is a doctrine which has its own history in which there are only points of view with no absolute necessity, or no references to absolutes. That is the opposite of what I have to say. Relativism is, in classical philosophy, a way of referring to the absolute and denying it; it states that there are only cultures and that there is no pure science or truth. I have never said such a thing. Neither have I ever used the word relativism.\textsuperscript{129}

We need to stress the fact that although Derrida insists that something always exceeds naming this does not mean that he would suggest that we can avoid naming or positing concepts but rather that we must employ them with a provisionality appropriate to their quasi-transcendental status. As he argued in the late 1970s: “as Husserl has shown better than anyone else, relativism, like all its derivatives, remains a philosophical position in contradiction with itself”.\textsuperscript{130} Husserl sought to proceed to transcendental consciousness through the mundane and much as Derrida sees him to fail, his own quasi-transcendental position does not abandon the rigorous scrutiny of conceptuality, the scrutiny of that generality without which language would be meaningless; as well as the desire for fidelity to the unique and irreplaceable fact that sets philosophy in motion but which can never be fully achieved.

In his works on Husserl, Derrida only turns to make his quasi-transcendental coinages in the concluding sections. Undoubtedly the most enduring neologism in Derrida’s work on Husserl is \textit{différance}, marginal as is its occurrence to the main body of the work. Indeed, despite its use in relation to a number of other writers and philosophers, as I pointed out by way of introduction Derrida saw fit to use the occasion of \textit{Speech and Phenomena}’s publication to reprint an essay \textit{Différance} which revisits these other contexts. The intertextual reference confirms and emphasises the permeability of the boundary of the philosophical and nonphilosophical, but the context of republication also emphasises the philosophical questions at stake. \textit{Différance} forces us back from speech to writing, the silent, “an irreducible reference to the mute intervention of a written sign”.\textsuperscript{131} \textit{Différance} refers to deferring as delaying (Derrida remarks that this can be both active and passive) but it is also that which differentiates, which produces different things. Derrida elaborates this sense against the structuralist linguistics of Saussure, summarising this point in an early interview: “no element can function as a sign without referring to another element which itself is not simply present” (POS, 26). Derrida thus argues that “nothing, neither among the elements nor within
the system, is anywhere ever simply present or absent. There are only, everywhere, differences and traces of traces” (POS, 26). In examining the condition of possibility of language in Husserl’s work he elaborated a structure similar to that of *différance*, which as Allison puts it, shows that “there can never be an absolutely signified content, an absolutely identical or univocal meaning in language”. As Stiegler argues, it “is both the opening to the possibility of the singular and what always already condemns this singular to be composed with that which reduces it”. As Derrida himself insists: “what announced itself thus as « *différance* » had this singular quality: that it simultaneously welcomed, but without dialectical finality, the same and the other”. Différance leads from the exposure of absence to the announcement of a constitutive alterity yet without radicalizing heterogeneity in the way that a lax usage of words such as ‘other’ and ‘otherness’ often risks doing. In referring to “deferring” and also to “differentiation” it points to the thinking of time we mentioned above, one which is not one of present punctual moments: in time there is always a “delay” as any moment refers us on to yet other moments ad infinitum. Contrary to the early popular presentation of Derrida’s thought as an operation involving the reversal of binary oppositions or revelation of concealed premises, it is a thinking that is a rejection of any simple positivity. *Différence* is an invocation of alterity that disturbs all conventional thinking, whether radical or conservative. Derrida thus insists in one of his last works: “the thinking of the political has always been a thinking of *différence* and the thinking of *différence* always a thinking of the political”.

*Différence* is perhaps one of the neologisms most famously associated with Derrida and it might seem odd that I have got so far without invoking it. Much as I hope what I have said indicates its excellence, I also want to point out the dangers of failing to follow Derrida’s work beyond it. Critchley goes so far as to suggest that there has been a usage of *différence* as a ubiquitous explanation which amounts to obscurantism. We must constantly beware the dangers involved in hypostatizing *différence*, or invoking it (or indeed any of the other quasi-transcendental) in place of thinking through the specifics of each problem. Certainly Derrida himself has never been guilty of such a practice and each time he reads, he reads anew and, if we can detect a certain family resemblance in his vocabulary they are far from being completely interchangeable synonyms. In deploying the word *différence* as a substitute for engaging in such a process, instead of bringing us through a text or process of thought to a place of undecidability,
to simply refer in one word to all the arguments rehearsed here, is a most unDerridean way of working. The necessity is of following a problem through, not to solution, but to an exposure of its inherent difficulties. In recent writing Wood notes how “Derrida talks apparently freely about «an interminable experience», «the [impossible] experience of death», «the experience of the non-passage», «the experience of mourning», and even «the experience of what is called deconstruction»”.\(^{137}\) He goes on to suggest that rather than simply popping Husserl’s idealist balloon, Derrida is engaged in a renewal of phenomenology. Indeed there are parallels between Derrida’s questioning of Husserl and that of many who are regarded as “followers” of Husserl – Ricoeur, Merleau-Ponty and Gadamer – all of whom rejected his transcendental claims. Wood argues persuasively that

> if phenomenology could be thought to have as its focus not consciousness, not perception, but experience, we might come to see that all these features and factors that have been thought to breed a problematic “presence” can return as the wealth of experience.\(^{138}\)

Husserl wished us to not to rely on handed down theories, not to rest in the natural attitude, but to do justice to the things themselves. This is what motivates the subtleties of *epoché, Rückfrage* and the rest of Husserl’s methodological arsenal. Derrida may disagree profoundly as to the possibility of a successful transcendental conclusion to the enterprise as projected by Husserl, yet he also seeks to defend something akin to the things themselves, the singularity of the given. Despite their differences, both philosophers could be said to be impelled primarily by an ethical motivation: as Wood again suggests, “Derrida is taking responsibility for responsibility as Husserl originally laid it out, rethinking reactivation in terms of language rather than intuition”.\(^{139}\) Derrida never moves beyond the central problem in Husserl, in that he sees the necessity both to describe essential structures and to be faithful to lived experience.
NOTES

1  I will not include here, for reasons of space, consideration of Derrida’s late essay on Husserl’s phenomenology of touch which was published as part of On Touching – Jean-Luc Nancy (Stanford U.P, 2005). I simply note Durie’s conclusion that it “demonstrates a profound continuity with earlier readings”. See: Robin Durie, “At the same time: Continuities in Derrida’s Readings of Husserl”, Continental Philosophy Review 41 (2008), 73.


4  This masters’ thesis was eventually published as Le problème de la genèse dans la philosophie de Husserl (Presses Universitaires de France, 1990).

5  In “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences”, the first paper by Derrida to be available in English, Derrida champions “the play of signifiers”, Writing and Différance (Routledge, 1978), 278-94. The dully literal way in which some critics took the word “play” to imply that there were no serious stakes involved seems to have led Derrida to drop the word in latter work although he has recently come back to it, albeit now making sure to remark the Heideggerian and other stakes also involved: Given Time 1: Counterfeit Money (Chicago U.P., 1993), 22; “On the University”, Southern Review (1986) 19:1, 19-20.

6  I would, however, not go so far as Kates who, rather restrictively, would confine Derrida within the context of Husserlian philosophy at the expense of other far more obvious influences such as Heidegger and Lévinas. Joshua Kates, Essential History: Jacques Derrida and the Development of Deconstruction (Northwestern U.P, 2005). His presentation appears to be part of a strategy (far from undesirable) to interest philosophers from the analytic tradition in Derrida.


9  In giving a brief introductory account of Husserl’s thought I will attempt to sketch it as it is generally understood, or was understood at the time Derrida published his writings although the reception of Husserl has changed somewhat in the intervening forty years, partly as a result of the increasing
The availability of a plethora of previously unpublished material (and perhaps even as a consequence of the readings of Derrida and others). Zahavi influentially claims that the late Husserl moved away from transcendental claims but an engagement with this debate is not the purpose of this essay: Dan Zahavi, *Husserl’s Phenomenology* (Stanford U.P., 2003).


The terminology I use here is actually that of *Logical Investigations* from the next decade.


Luft, “Husserl’s Theory”, 204.


Derrida’s initial, and contemporaneous, inroad into the philosophy of Hegel was also through an attack on his account of language and signification. See “The Pit and the Pyramid”, *Margins of Philosophy*. However, this is not the place to follow Derrida’s somewhat neglected work on Hegel.

Derrida, *Husserl’s Origin of Geometry*.


Husserl’s critique of contemporary society is clearest in his late work *The Crisis of the European Sciences* of 1935, to which the ‘Origin of Geometry’ was an appendix, although the critique is also implicit in earlier work. However, Husserl’s direct political interventions were less than critical.
and suggest that his interest in essence led him to stress superindividu

al imperatives in a conventional and, to twenty-first century sensibilities, 

everal unpalatable way. In lectures on Fichte he gave during the First World 

War there are statements that echo Hegel. As Gorner notes, “he presents the 

war as an instrument of renewal of all the ideal sources of strength” brought 

forth from the depths of the German soul by the struggle against Napoleon, 

as stripping away the conventional concealments of death and allowing it to 

regain its sacred primordial right”. Paul Gorner, Twentieth Century German 

Philosophy (Oxford U.P., 2000), 19. Given his background and upbringing, 

as a Jew of Czech birth, these remarks are a little surprising and are perhaps 

testament to Husserl’s desire to assimilate to the German society in which he 

lived and taught.

26 Edmund Husserl, Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental 

Phenomenology (Northwestern U.P., 1970), 52.
27 Derrida, Rogues, 126.
29 Derrida, Husserl’s Origin of Geometry, 87.
30 Ibid., 88.
34 Derrida, Husserl’s ‘Origin of Geometry’, 139.
35 Ibid., 131.
36 Ibid., 141.
37 Derrida, Writing and Difference, 120.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid., 121.
40 Derrida, Rogues, 124.
41 Geoffrey Bennington, Interrupting Derrida (Routledge, 2001), 22.
42 Deconstruction Engaged: The Sydney Seminars (Power Publications, 2000), 

79.
43 Derrida, Husserl’s ‘Origin of Geometry’, 149.

46 Bernet, ibid., 38.
47 Jacques Derrida, For What Tomorrow ... A Dialogue (Stanford U.P., 2004), 

5.
48 Derrida, Rogues, 89.
Derrida argues for the existence of a similar structure in the *Ideas* (from the middle of Husserl’s career) in an essay, “Form and Meaning”, published as an appendix to *Speech and Phenomena*.


*Ibid.*, 44.


Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena*, 52.


Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena*, 64.


Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena*, 89.


Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena*, 103.


Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena*, 104.


Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, 49.


76 Derrida, *Dissemination*.
85 Ibid., 150.
86 Ibid., 148.
88 Derrida, *Limited Inc.*, 137.
89 Derrida, *Negotiations*, 252.
90 Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, 164.
95 Ibid., 62.
96 Ibid., 86.
97 Ibid., 68.
98 Ibid., 62.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid., 10.
101 Ibid., 40.
102 Ibid., 54.


Gasché argues that the quasi-transcendentials or “infrastructures”, as he also calls them, amount to a continuation of the project of “pure logical grammar” established by Husserl in *Logical Investigations*. See Rodolphe Gasché, *The Tain of the Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy of Reflection* (Harvard U.P., 1986), 245-51.

Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena*, 77.


130 Derrida, Limited Inc., 137.

131 Derrida, Positions, 8.


134 Derrida, Negotiations, 366.

135 Derrida, Rogues, 39.


138 Ibid., 136.

139 Ibid.