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ORTHODOX CHRISTIANITY,
SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE AND THE
JAPANESE CHURCH:
THE FIRST CENTURY OF A RELATIONSHIP

Introduction

The history of the Japanese Orthodox Church’s relationship with Southeastern Europe from 1860’s to 1950’s is both the central subject and the central object of the present inquiry. The details and progression of this relationship offer one of the earliest illustrations of what one might call “globalization-as-catholicity” – the refraction of the modern globalization processes in the framework of Orthodox Christianity. However, perhaps even more importantly, the fact that such a relationship existed at all compels a reexamination of some powerful commonplace stereotypes about the composition, geography and character of the Orthodox Church, as well as about the relations among Japan, Russia and Southeastern Europe. These stereotypes include first of all the idea of modern Orthodox Christianity as a parochial and introverted faith, strongly bound to the narrow ethno-political interests of its traditional carriers; the perception that the emergence and experience of Orthodoxy in Japan is wholly a function of the bilateral Russo-Japanese relationship; the notion that the early ties between Japan and Southeastern Europe were largely limited to diplomatic, mercantile and intellectual encounters. Extant historiography does little to challenge these concepts, for which reason this paper also has had to address these wider discursive fields. What is the Orthodox Church’s composition and organization in the modern world? Why does the distinctive notion of the “Church” define and structure the worldwide collective of Orthodox Christians? Whence Christianity – and particularly Orthodox Christianity – in Japan? Which functions did Orthodoxy play in the early contacts between Japan and Southeastern Europe? And finally,
how did the Japanese Orthodox Church become aware and engaged with
coreligionists in Southeastern Europe? These are the questions considered
below.

I became aware and interested in these topics during my dissertation
research about the history of the Japanese Orthodox Church. As part of my
research, I investigated the archives of the Orthodox Church in Moscow;
in New York and Stanford; in Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya and Sendai. One of
the surprising issues that came to light was the religious dimension of the
relations between the Japanese and Orthodox Southeastern Europeans –
the representatives of Greek, South Slavic and Romanian states and
peoples. I then pursued this question as a fellow of the New Europe
College in Bucharest, where I was privileged to conduct research from
October 2011 to July 2012. Under its auspices I furthered my investigations –
most fruitfully at the National Archives of Romania; the Libraries of
the Romanian Patriarchy, and of the Theological Faculties in Sofia and
Thessaloniki; the collection of the St. Panteleimon Monastery on Mount
Athos. The ongoing work on this project has been presented at a Japanese
studies symposium at the University of Bucharest (March 4, 2012) and a
weekly symposium at the New Europe College (March 28, 2012).

The primary data for this study was gathered from the official and
semi-official publications of the Orthodox Church, from private diaries
and letters, from official government communications. The majority of
this data has not been previously introduced into scholarly discourse.
Among the highlights, one must single out the official ecclesiastical
periodicals as the most important layer of sources – above all Seikyō Jihō
(Japanese Orthodox Church); Biserica Ortodoxă Română (Romanian
Orthodox Church); Ekklēsiastikē Alētheia (Constantinopolitan Orthodox
Church); Ekklēsia (Greek Orthodox Church); Tsurkoven Vestnik (Bulgarian
Orthodox Church). Various occasional materials published by the Japanese
Orthodox Church, including the minutes of the annual Church Councils
and the histories of local churches, were also significant. Extensive
diaries of Archbishop of Japan Nicholas1 (Kasatkin) furnished a uniquely
detailed perspective on the pre-revolutionary experience of the Japanese
Church’s external relations. Finally, the Royal House collection at the
National Archives of Romania yielded official letters and reports which
helped illustrate the bridging function of Orthodoxy on the diplomatic and
discursive level. Of course, this study can lay no claim comprehensiveness,
but is rather only a first attempt to discern and contextualize one of the most
remarkable developments in the early phase of the modern globalization of Orthodox Christianity.

1. Orthodox ecumene mapped

Foundational facts and figures on the global state of Orthodox Christianity in the modern world are sufficiently obscure to render the otherwise respectable reference sources suspect. This is especially true with regard to the scope and limits of the communion’s diversification and globalization. Believers outside the historic Orthodox habitat remain off most global religious survey maps, while claims about the total number of followers vary widely. Therefore, a survey of Orthodox Christian adherents, geography and leadership appears necessary to anchor the subsequent discussion. Data from The Catholic Encyclopedia of 1912 will provide the necessary contrast to place present-day trends in perspective.

First, one may consider the number and distribution of Orthodox Christian adherents. A century ago The Catholic Encyclopedia listed about 127.5 million Orthodox, a sizeable 7% of the world. However, this population was overwhelmingly concentrated in its historic heartland – the young nation-states of Southeastern Europe surrounded by the three continental empires. Even in the country with the least density of Orthodox adherents, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, they formed a rather significant 8.5% of the population. The hegemonic pole of attraction inside this Orthodox space was Russia – some four-fifths of all Orthodox adherents were subjects of the vast Russian empire, members of its state Church, and even the non-Russian Orthodox establishments relied considerably on Russian aid. Meanwhile, outside the traditional Orthodox habitat missions and diaspora together amounted to a negligible population within the margin of statistical error.

At present, after the revolutions and persecutions of the 20th century, one finds Orthodox Christian membership significantly dispersed, somewhat numerically grown, and significantly shrunk in percentage terms. Most contemporary independent estimates of “Orthodox” adherents – e.g. 4.03% of the world population according to the current CIA World Factbook or 260.4 million adherents according to the latest Pew Research Center report – confusingly conflate three distinct communions under this umbrella term. In fact, one needs to subtract the anti-Chalcedonian and anti-Ephesian “Oriental Orthodox” to arrive at
a realistic estimate of “Eastern Orthodox” – slightly above 200 million. Thus, even if one accepts the high-end estimate of Orthodox adherents in Russia, – around 100 million, – this makes for barely half of the world’s Orthodox, highlighting Russia’s antireligious turn and imperial collapse in the intervening century. In line with this weakening of the center, the most important global demographic shift has been the growth of diaspora (mostly in the “Global North”) and mission (more notable in the “Global South”). The Western world is now home to a vast and increasingly rooted Orthodox community, with Germany and Italy hosting over a million adherents each. With regard to the “Global South”, missionary advances are usually acknowledged without quantification, so one must largely rely for statistics on fragmentary self-reporting – like the 2004 claim by Patriarch of Alexandria Peter VII that the number of Orthodox in Africa has reached 5 million, or the April 7, 2010 press-release by the Church of Constantinople’s Mexican Metropolis reporting the reception of over 0.5 million converts in Guatemala. An attempt to pull together scattered data suggests that the aggregate number of Orthodox outside their historic habitat has grown well above 10 million, surpassing such a traditional power-house of Orthodoxy as the Greek Church.

A look at the institutional organization of Orthodoxy opens up another perspective. The single worldwide communion is divided into largely independent administrative jurisdictions – technically called “autocephalous Churches”, with defined territory and, usually, corresponding ethno-political units. In 1912 the traditional Orthodox lands in the Near East, Eastern Europe and Northern Asia were split among 14 such bodies. Beyond this familiar geography, only the Russian Church maintained organized missions – in Japan, Korea, China, Persia, Canada and the US, – while many of the world’s regions remained devoid of any Orthodox presence.

At present the “Old world” remains divided into 14 jurisdictions, but a new unit with a claim to North America has burst the boundaries of the habitat. Most of the globe, in fact, remains a “gray zone” in which almost all the autocephalous Churches have joined (and challenged) the Russian Church in maintaining their own institutions. As a result, the list of states without an Orthodox presence has been shrinking steadily, but local administrative coordination remained elusive outside the historic Orthodox homeland. Only in 2009 the Fourth Pan-Orthodox Conference in Chambéry took a major step in ordering the administration of the now-globalized communion by demarcating most of the jurisdictionally
contested parts of the globe into 12 regions, each with its own coordinating assembly of bishops.\footnote{12}

Profiling bishops, – the small leading core of the Church, – offers a third way to apprehend the composition of Orthodox Christendom. The special significance of bishops (literally “overseers”) stems from their exclusive canonically-secured powers to govern, teach, and perform the full array of sacred functions. At the start of the 20th century one would be hard-pressed to find a single bishop with an exotic background in this elite cadre of some 350 persons.\footnote{13} Born and bred in the thickness of Orthodox ethno-cultural space, they were overwhelmingly Slavs and Greeks, with a small selection of other traditionally Orthodox contingents. Only in the Russian Church, with its distinctive ethno-cultural diversity and missionary activity, could one systemically expect occasional figures which stood out from the rank-and-file. In 1912 there may have been only one such “outsider” – the Assyrian bishop Elias (Gevargizov) of Urmia, a convert to Orthodoxy serving the Russian mission in Persia.

As of late March 2012, judging by the names and biographies of today’s 850 Orthodox bishops, the most represented ethno-cultural groups remain unchanged. However, the “outsiders” have grown into a much bigger presence, representing an array of ethnic origins, religious traditions and birth-places.\footnote{14} As many as 84 contemporary Orthodox bishops have an “exotic” background by at least one of these parameters, while 22 probably combine all three markers of originality.\footnote{15} The majority of the “outsiders” are Western-born diaspora figures or Western converts with Christian roots, but over a dozen bishops confound this stereotype.\footnote{16} With nearly 10% of Orthodox bishops deriving from unusual backgrounds, it may be argued that diversification and globalization have been most pronounced in the upper echelons of Orthodoxy.

The Pew Research Center’s 2011 report on *Global Christianity* drives home the point that “Christianity today – unlike a century ago – is truly a global faith”.\footnote{17} The starkest testimony to this is the postcolonial decentering of Europe, home to some two-thirds of all Christians a century ago and only a quarter of the total at present. The verities behind these statistics are gradually being digested with regard to Roman Catholicism and Protestantism, but it has yet to become widely accepted that Orthodoxy – with the collapse of European land empires, decentering of Russia, diasporic spread, and missionary reach, – has been undergoing a similar, albeit delayed, trend. Quickened expansion and intensified exchanges among Orthodox communities – including those of Japan and Southeastern
Europe – have restated with new poignancy the basic questions of personal and collective identity, problematizing what it meant to belong with and be the Orthodox Church.

2. Church as analytical tool

“Church” is the primary collective self-description used by Orthodox believers. Their community is conceived, structured and given theological sense as a “Church”. As a hierarchical institution, the “Church” can legitimately assume diverse configurations which can be described as theocratic, conciliar, monarchical, collegial or democratic with some degree of accuracy. The entire communion as well as its subdivisions at various levels – down to a single parish – may be considered both “complete” and “partial” manifestations of the “Church”. The “Church” is likewise an object of faith, an immutable dogma, and a sought-for ideal. All this renders the “Church” into a basic analytical term and an elusively complex concept. Here we will consider only the primary aspects which have surfaced in the modern East Asian and Southeastern European Orthodox Christian discourses.

Biblical terms for the “Church” – the Hebrew kahal and the Greek ecclesia – mean literally an “assembly”, that is people gathered together. Middle-of-the-road Orthodox definitions of the term today share this sociological focus on the human community. The most influential formulation is likely that of St. Philaret (Drozdov), the Metropolitan of Moscow. His Extensive Catechism has been the basic catechism of the Russian Church from 1827, is widely available even in today’s Romania, and has been periodically issued in Japanese since 1881. In his simple definition, the Church is “a divinely instituted community of men, united by the orthodox faith, the law of God, the hierarchy, and the Sacraments”. While much criticized for its narrowness from various quarters, this definition retains considerable common-sense appeal to the present day.

The most readily apparent challenge to this definition comes from the fact that many of the European peoples which embraced Christianity have encoded the “Church” to mean something else. Most Germanic (church; kirche) and Slavic (tserkov’; crkva) terms derive from the Greek kiriakon, which means the “house of the Lord”. The Romanian bisericǎ (from Gk. basilike, “imperial house”), Polish kościół (from Lat. castellum, “small fortress”), Lithuanian bažnyčia (from Slav. bozhnîtsa, “God’s house”)
or Hungarian egyház (native for “holy house”) all stem from various words, but uniformly refer to buildings. In all these cases the religious community is identified by the same term as its worship-space. Among the many writers which have tried to provide a definition that would explain this identification was the most prominent Japanese Orthodox priest of the early 20th century, Protopresbyter Symeon Mii Michirō. In one of his introductory treatises he writes: “The Orthodox Church of Christ is a place where Orthodox Christians practice and transmit eternally and universally fixed and immutable principles of purity and right”. There are many similar definitions which describe the Church in terms of a temple which one enters or a treasure-house from which one draws goods. These metaphysical statements link the notion of spiritual space to the consecrated physical building which anchors the liturgical and social life of the local community.

Since modern Orthodox were hardly uncontested masters of their language, popular usage has also been shaped by powerful Western influences – most notably Roman Catholic and Communist. Both generated an emphasis on the Church as a two-tier hierarchical polity, run and defined by the clerical elite. Since Roman Catholic terminology forms the basic layer of the contemporary Christian idiom in East Asia, this influence is transparent in the Chinese and Japanese terms for “Church” – jiàohuì and kyōkai. An invention of Counter-Reformation Jesuit missionaries in 16th century China, these terms literally mean the “teaching assembly” and originally referred only to the clergy, as opposed to the “learning assembly” composed of laymen. As for the Communist perspective, one can refer to the basic compendium of late Soviet knowledge – the final edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia. According the article on “Church”, it is a type of religious organization distinguished by “a more or less developed system of dogma and cult; hierarchical character; centralization of governance; division of everyone belonging to the Church into professional ministers of cult (clergy) and ordinary believers (laymen)”. Such pervasive labels have widely entered the popular conception of the Church across Eurasia.

Yet, the buildup of alien influences and outright persecution of Orthodox Christianity generated a powerful reaction in the last century – a new theological quest spurred by mysticism and martyrdom. The 20th century produced more officially canonized Orthodox saints than all previous centuries combined. In East Asia the most famous of them is St. John (Maksimovich), the Russian émigré bishop who was formed in interwar Yugoslavia and became the senior Orthodox pastor of Shanghai
in the 1930’s and 1940’s. Known as an ascetic miracle-worker, he stands as an exceptionally influential exponent of the characteristic mystical theology of the persecuted. His most elaborated statement on the Church defines it as: “unity in Christ, the closest union with Christ of all those who rightly believe and love Him, and the union of them all through Christ.” Unlike the previous definitions, this statement leaves no room for meaning outside of Christ, who figures as the sole center, space and agent of the Church.

In this manner, contemporary Orthodox answers to the question of: “What is the Church?” outline a field of meanings which includes a human community, a sacred space, a hierarchical polity, and Christ-centered union. These may be considered, respectively, as a sociological, metaphysical, institutional and mystical perspective on the same phenomenon. This diversity of approaches is discursively anchored in what remains the sole dogmatically mandated Orthodox description of the Church – “One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic”. This formula from the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed, the basic confession of Christian Orthodoxy since the 4th century, specifically addresses the global quality of the Church in its third term. Derived from the Greek cath ola – “throughout the whole” – catholicity can only be approximated by a translation like “all-pertinence”. Standard catechisms explain this as transcendence of the temporal, spatial, and ethno-cultural boundaries to unite all believers. Although this concept is frequently equated with universality, crafters of the original Christian terminology consistently set aside similar contemporary words – derived from cosmos (“the world”) or ecumene (“the inhabited earth”) – in favor of the more comprehensive and intimate catholicity. Thus, no matter what one’s perspective on the Church, a claim to catholicity amounts to a categorical inevitability of relevance and impossibility of isolation in intra-Church relations.

In light of such a bold assertion, it is remarkable that catholicity finds only a pale reflection in the historiography of the modern experience of the Orthodox Church. In contrast to the statement of the Creed, what the authors mostly write about are the many, fractious, particular and ethnic Churches. There are hundreds of books and thousands of articles devoted to the modern and contemporary Orthodox history, but they are primarily concerned with individual autocephalous Churches in the plural. Even when presenting a single treatment, they are likely to follow the approach characteristically formulated by an English Roman Catholic Priest Adrian Fortescue, who wrote in 1908 that:
The Orthodox Church consists of sixteen separate independent bodies [...]. It is with no malicious pleasure that one has to record the fact that, in spite of their inter-communion, the dominant note of these sixteen bodies in our time is their extreme quarrelsomeness [...] It is the cause of nearly all their activity.25

Due to the focus on divisive isolationism, very few works analyze the comprehensive contemporary experience of the worldwide Orthodox Church as a single entity,26 and there is still no scholarly monograph on the subject. When volumes promise such a treatment, they turn out to be compilations of poorly-integrated articles about individual local Churches and diasporas, or else topical collections bound by the themes of communism and nationalism.27 As a result of this particularist preoccupation, increasing globalization and integration of the Orthodox Church in the 20th century have remained on the margins of scholarly inquiry. However, if catholic interchange and outreach had indeed been as invisible as they are in the literature, Orthodox Christianity would not have emerged as a factor in the relations between Japan and Southeastern Europe, nor would there be a Japanese Orthodox Church at all.

3. Christianity in Japan

To appreciate the distinctive position of Japanese Orthodoxy one must first grasp the general condition of Christianity in the Land of the Rising Sun. Japan was already a deeply rooted and sophisticated member of the Sinitic cultural sphere when its sustained contact with Christianity began in the 16th century. Since then this country’s tortuous engagement with what became known as the “Jesus-teaching” has taken dramatic swings, often narrated as three periods of Christian boom and two periods of official persecution.28 Such conceptual frameworks as antagonism, mission and syncretism offer the primary avenues to access this history.

Perhaps the most important influence of Japan’s early Roman Catholic mission, run by Portuguese Jesuits from the end of the 16th century and brutally suppressed by the Tokugawa shogunate in the early 17th century, has been the elaboration of the characteristic Japanese antagonism to Christianity. Anti-Christianity gave to the syncretic and multi-religious Japan its first unifying ideology and its first comprehensive thought-police network – which included an obligation for every subject to
regularly trample on Christian sacred images and maintain registration with a Buddhist temple. For some thirteen generations, Japanese masses were instructed to fear and despise unknown Christianity as “the evil creed”, while the elites studied the Western world as a premier strategic challenge. By the 19th century, as Japan’s leading thinkers considered the underpinnings of Western strength, they decided to combat the Christian threat by borrowing for the Japanese emperor the qualities ascribed to the Christian God – those of a direct personal lord and father over each individual. When a new Japanese “national polity” was being elaborated in the course of Japan’s precipitous defensive Westernization in the late 19th century, this seminal adaptation from Christianity largely defined the ideological and institutional architecture of the emperor-centered system of State Shintoism under which Japan was run until 1945. Such borrowing, however, occurred under the cover of a traditionalist revival, and was accompanied by the vocal continuity of the refurbished anti-Christian ideological rhetoric. Enduring suspicion of Christians’ loyalty paved the way for draconian official control, isolation, and near-strangulation of Christian activity during World War II. In sum, much of the Japanese Christian experience had to do with hostile alienation.

The above history of conflict went hand in hand with the history of contact, as Japan’s broadening international engagements allowed for the transplantation of Christian missions and their development on new soil. Since Western pressure gradually compelled Japanese authorities to tacitly lift the ban on Christianity, the 1860’s and 1870’s saw the institutionalization of dozens of Western missionary bodies which continue to define the organizational landscape of Japanese Christianity at present. By the time Japan’s first constitution formally granted religious freedom in 1889, three missionary tracks took shape. An abundance of mostly Anglo-American Protestant missionaries focused on developing a high-profile activist and elite ex-samurai urbanite following. A smaller number of mostly French Roman Catholic missionaries and monastics concentrated on a less publicized build-up of core communities which included a major peasant contingent. Finally, a minute Russian Orthodox missionary presence relied on native catechists to carry out Japan’s most locally-attuned mission of the day. Numerical and material superiority of the missionary cadre combined with the choice of Germany, England and the US as new civilizational models to assure for Protestantism the role of Japan’s normative Christianity. Activism in the educational, medical and social fields helped propel Christians into limelight as agents of
“modernity”, securing for them a place in the broader state-sanctioned sphere of normalcy. However, Japan’s two modern “Christian booms” – the period of radical Westernization in 1870’s and 1880’s followed by the period of American occupation in 1940’s and 1950’s – netted no more than 1% of the population into Christian groups. While Christianity did carve out for itself a legal and cultural space in modern Japan, the core of its mainline adherents remained narrowly circumscribed to elite intellectual Western-leaning and leftist Protestants.31

Dominant in the academic discourse, the account of established confessional groups often obscures the most dynamic generative force in Japan’s modern religious history – syncretism, whereby Christian elements became infused into the melting pot of popular faith. Despite opposition from state authorities and established religious leaders, the central protagonists on Japan’s popular religious scene since the 19th century have been the syncretic “new religions” centered on charismatic founders. A digest of folk religiosity, organized lay Buddhism, and Confucian moral self-cultivation, this diverse phenomenon began to actively embrace and remake Christian elements in the 20th century. In fact, rudiments of Christianity have entered the mix even earlier via the so-called “hidden Christians” – isolated descendants of 17th century Roman Catholics, whose distinctive faith both endured and evolved behind the façade of official Buddhism.32 Starting from Uchimura Kanzō’s celebrated No-Church movement in 1901, Japan’s own Christian “new religions” began to take shape around charismatic teachers who broke with mainline Protestantism in the name of deeper indigenization and new revelation.33 Highest circles were likewise no strangers to syncretic adaptations in their efforts to elaborate potent para-religious ritual and ideology for the masses. Perhaps most visibly, observances like St. Valentine’s Day, Christmas, and especially Christian-style marriage, – buoyed by the appeal of American popular culture in the post-war era, – gradually became matter-of-fact fixtures among the Japanese of many persuasions. The common byword which epitomizes this routine syncretism in the rites of passage remarks that today’s Japanese are “born as Shintoists, married as Christians, and buried as Buddhists”.

Submerged amid these contexts, Japanese Orthodoxy had received little attention until recently due to being out of step with the prevailing dynamics of Japanese Christianity. Its endemic theology and attitude often placed it closer to Japanese traditional faith-culture than to Protestant currents which became identified with normative Christianity in Japan.

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Focus and dependence on a central charismatic founder aligns the Japanese Orthodox Church more with Japanese syncretic “new religions” than with mainline groups. Close links to Russia charted an external institutional history radically divergent from that of Western-aligned groups. Indeed, the emergence of a “Japanese Orthodox Church” was a doubly unexpected event. This was so firstly because in Northeast Asia Orthodoxy figured solely as a “Russian religion”, advancing apace with the expansion of the Russian state. Secondly, even in the few cases when the Russian Church did maintain a foreign presence in mid-19th century – as in China or Palestine – its religious activities were largely limited to sustaining the religious life of preexisting Orthodox communities, not building up a new local Church out of converts. Yet, the latter was precisely the vision which animated the young Russian hieromonk St. Nicholas (Kasatkin) when he was appointed chaplain to the newly-opened Russian consulate in Hakodate, Japan. It is above all to his personality that the Japanese Orthodox Church owes its origin.34

Upon arrival to Japan in 1861 Nicholas devoted himself to the study of the Japanese language and heritage. In 1865, after surviving an assassination attempt, he became a missionary by converting his would-be murderer – an ultra-patriotic samurai and subsequently the first Japanese Orthodox priest, Paul Sawabe Takuma. Having procured sponsorship from Russia in 1870, Nicholas went on serve as a charismatic preacher, effective coordinator and tireless translator for the growing Japanese mission. Much of his success was due to his deeply personal engagement with the overwhelmingly native cadre, who formed as Christians and preachers under his close tutelage. Unlike in Western denominations, almost all missionary work in the field was done by the locally-attuned Japanese converts themselves. For example, in 1877 foreign missionaries in Japan numbered 99 Protestants, 45 Roman Catholics, 4 Orthodox,35 – a ratio in which the proportion of the Orthodox would only decline in the following years. Nicholas was, in fact, the sole Russian who remained in Japan during the trying period of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, pastoring both the young native Church and the vast number of Russian POWs scattered in camps across Japan. Upon his death in 1912, Archbishop Nicholas left behind a major establishment – a grand cathedral in Tokyo, an array of ecclesiastical schools and publications, a rich store of liturgical and theological translations, 43 clergymen, 118 preachers, and 33,377 believers.36 A Japanese Orthodox Church had come into being.
Nicholas’ death robbed the young Church of an irreplaceable leader, who had been venerated as a saint already during his lifetime. However, while his demise had been foreseen, the collapse of Russia’s Church-state condominium amid revolutionary violence in 1917 had not. Up to that time Russia remained an indispensable support for the young Japanese Orthodox Church. The bishop himself and a few of his aides were Russian, Japanese theological students received their higher education in Russia, and, most importantly, over 90% of the money for the operation of the mission came from Russia. A constellation of influential figures, – most importantly Constantine Pobedonostsev, the mastermind of the Russian Church for much of the later 19th century, – were committed sponsors of the Japanese mission. Thus, when all links with Russia were suddenly severed, the Japanese Church faced a life-or-death struggle. The poorly known interwar history of the Japanese Orthodox community was one of precarious self-support, unavoidable self-rule and intensive self-reflection. With the collapse of old verities, challenges of defining and enacting collective identity forced an intensive search for meaning. The feat of rebuilding of the Tokyo Orthodox cathedral, once constructed with Russian funds and severely damaged in the Great Kantō Earthquake of 1923, demanded unprecedented sacrificial giving from the Japanese flock who could no longer count on generous foreign aid. The strain of World War II, by removing the community’s sole universally recognized legitimate bishop, rent the Church into quarrelling factions and nearly destroyed it as an institution. Only after the war did the Japanese Orthodox believers begin to restore effective connections with other branches of the Orthodox communion and to receive much-needed support from abroad. Indeed, it has often been asserted by outside observers and later commentators, that, given the Church’s interwar isolation, “it is a miracle for it to have survived at all”.37

The present work aims to show that the “isolation” of Japanese Orthodoxy was primarily isolation from Moscow, not from the entire Orthodox communion. Just as the history of other Christian denominations in Japan, the history of the Orthodox Church must be seen in global terms which go beyond the bounds of Russo-Japanese bilateral relations. The maturation of the Japanese Orthodox community, greatly stimulated by the collapse of Russia, was intimately bound up with the deepening involvement with non-Russian coreligionists – primarily those from Southeastern Europe.
4. Bridging Japan and Southeastern Europe

The Orthodox Church – in its many guises – assumed a variety of bridging functions from the outset of the relations between Japan and Southeastern Europe. The development of these relations from the late 19th century is usually seen as driven by diplomacy, trade and intelligentsia, but religion would appear to be another force to be added to the list. Indeed, in the case of Romania, the letters sent by the Bessarabian missionary Hieromonk Anatolius (Tihai) may have been the first direct correspondence between this country and Japan.\(^{38}\) The Orthodox Church provided a two-way channel for information and personnel through its institutional structures. As a community it anchored an increasing trickle of visiting and resident Southeastern Europeans in Japan. A shared space of cultures and meanings, it became for the Japanese an access-point to European ways, and for Europeans – a conceptual tool-box for apprehending Japanese realities. The spiritual union embodied by Orthodox concepts and edifices gave an added dimension to high-level diplomatic and symbolic exchanges. All major existential aspects of the “Church” combined to give Orthodoxy an important presence in the emerging relationship between Japan and Southeastern Europe.

The intermediary function of the Church is perhaps most plainly seen in its publications. Official press organs of the Orthodox Church – both in Southeastern Europe and in Japan – were important sources about each other’s countries. From the time when such press organs began to appear in 1870’s and 1880’s, they featured sections dedicated to chronicling the events in other parts of the global Orthodox communion. Reportage was irregular – for instance, in the 1920’s the Greek Church’s *Ekklēsiā* carried only two or three mentions of Orthodoxy in the Japanese Empire, while in the 1930’s the Romanian *Biserica Ortodoxă Română* devoted as many as 18 articles and reports to the subject.\(^{39}\) The leading subject of such publications was, of course, the Orthodox Church itself, but occasional updates also dealt with the general condition of Christianity and religion in a given country, on relations between the state and religious bodies, on discoveries, catastrophes, and political developments. The material was overwhelmingly derived from Russian and “post-Russian” sources – the leading Russian pre-revolutionary ecclesiastical journals like *Pravoslavnyi Blagovestnik* and *Khristianskoe Chtenie*, and a variety of post-revolutionary periodicals published by the diaspora in Belgrade, Harbin, Warsaw, Riga, Paris and elsewhere.\(^{40}\) The mediators were also likely to have a link to
Russia – as graduates of Russian theological schools, former Russian subjects, or simply ethnic Russians. But occasional original data can also be found, thanks primarily to direct correspondence between hierarchs and missionaries. Thus, the apparent leadership of Romania in Southeastern European coverage of the Japanese Orthodox Church – reports begin already in 1875 and the first monograph on Japanese Orthodoxy in Romanian appears in 1937, is partly explainable by the fact that there were in Japan as many as three Bessarabian missionaries, which provided added data and interest to the Romanian public.

This opens the discussion of the Orthodox community as a factor in human networking between Japan and Southeastern Europe. First, it should be noted that many figures who ostensibly cut their ties to this community remained, in fact, enmeshed in its life. For instance, one notable Southeastern European religionist who had left the Orthodox Church, the Bulgarian esotericist Peter Dunov, was a cause for a major expose of the Japanese Omoto sect in the 1931 Bulgarian Church’s Tsurkoven Vestnik. Another well-known figure, the Romanian Roman Catholic Priest Vladimir Ghica, during his stay in Japan in January 1933 stormed into the Tokyo Orthodox cathedral and tried to convert the Orthodox Metropolitan of Japan, Sergius (Tikhomirov). Since the majority of Southeastern Europeans who made their way to Japan were not as alienated from Orthodox Christianity as these outlying personages, many found time to visit local Orthodox churches – especially the Tokyo cathedral compound, whose notable pre-war guests ranged from a Greek Orthodox metropolitan to a Croatian Communist spy. Transitory diasporas of Southeastern Europeans in Japan – most notably the Greek merchant colony in Kōbe, Bessarabian POWs during the Russo-Japanese war, and Greek troops during the post-WWII reconstruction period, – likewise made an imprint on the local Orthodox ecclesiastical scene, most poignantly in the form of Greek sections in two cemeteries. Finally, full-time Orthodox missionaries from Southeastern Europe included one Serb – Archimandrite George (Kožić), who served in Japan from 1914 to about 1920, and the Bessarabians Archimandrite Anatolius (Tihai) (in Japan from 1871 to 1892), his brother James Tihai (from 1873 to 1886), and Protodeacon Demetrius L’vovskii (from 1880 to 1921). In this remarkable threesome Fr. Anatolius was the second most significant early Orthodox missionary in Japan after Archbishop Nicholas (Kasatkin); his brother James married a Japanese woman, forming the first known Romanian-Japanese family; and Protodeacon Demetrius was the longest-serving non-bishop in the
Japanese Orthodox missionary staff. These three Bessarabians are mostly noted for their engagement in one field – musical education, which led to the emergence of Japan’s four-part singing.

Indeed, in addition to textual and personal bridges, Orthodox Christianity furnished a space which allowed for the circulation of cultural production. Characteristically, the most visible and renowned monument of Orthodoxy in Japan, – the grand Tokyo Resurrection cathedral which had become a nationally renowned landmark of the capital already before its completion in 1891, – was a domed edifice in the neo-Byzantine style, quite unlike the typically Russian parish churches built in other Japanese locales. Owing in part to this influence, when the Tokyo University dispatched Doctor Itō Shūta to study the remains Greek classical architecture in 1904, the academic emissary contacted the Patriarchy in Constantinople and made special efforts to investigate the major Orthodox shrines of the Greek world. In addition to architecture, Orthodoxy opened the door for a variety of novel artifacts to enter Japan from Southeastern Europe – these included church furnishings, personal devotional items, vestments, books, and above all treasured icons from Mount Athos. These were not only munitions, but a thick deposit of material and spiritual culture which shaped the environment of Japanese believers and served as models for imitation. However, probably the most notable Southeastern European cultural import was intangible. As noted above, the three Bessarabian teachers transposed Japanese liturgical texts unto Franco-Italian-style chants, characteristic of Russian Orthodox music, and trained Japan’s first professional four-port choirs. For many years the Tokyo Orthodox choirs were rated among the best Western-style choirs in the country, helping swell attendance at the cathedral services.

At a deeper level, familiar Orthodox Christian realities – its history, objects, practices and beliefs – helped form cognitive scenarios for Southeastern Europeans facing Japan. Thus, the 1912 Greek article on the history of Orthodoxy in Japan characteristically attempted to draw extended historical parallels from the annals Christian Hellenism. Here, the initial intolerance of the Japanese to Christianity and their subsequent openness to it after the 1860’s are explained by the gap in the “progress of civilization” between the two eras, comparable to the gap between other Greek cities and the enlightened Athens, which welcomed St. Paul’s message at the Areopagus. Much more common were the casual parallels, effortlessly drawn by visitors to Japan – like General C. Găvănescu’s 1920 comparison of the line-up of Japanese royalty to
Above all, the idiom of Orthodoxy systemically emerged in Southeastern European discourse on Japanese religion, wherein novel faith traditions were presented through the Christian lens. The detailed 1928 report on the Japanese imperial coronation ceremony by the Romanian plenipotentiary minister in Tokyo, Vafil, may serve as a characteristic attempt to interpret the refurbished neo-Shintoist practices through contrasts with Christianity. Here, Vafil points out that, unlike the European count of years from the birth of Christ, Japanese periodization restarts with each new emperor’s reign. Instead of a European-type “sovereign by Divine right”, the Japanese emperor is himself considered divine – but, Vafil rushes to affirm, this is not “idolatry”. Shintoism is then defined through a series of reflexive negations of Christian notions – it is “without dogma, without morality, without Holy Books […] doesn’t have priests in the proper sense […] has no liturgy, does not know mysteries, nor initiates”, etc. This typical approach relied heavily on the explanatory power of the Orthodox Christian background in order to portray its exotic “other”.

Yet, the emerging relationship between Japan and Southeastern Europe was far from the characteristic Western-Oriental binary – the West served as the paramount object of authority and anxiety for both, and Japan was a far more consequential power than the states Southeastern Europe. One of the few distinctive structural traits which bonded the pre-World War II Japanese and Southeastern European polities was their model of monarchy which, while constitutional, retained some grounding in spiritual notions. This made Orthodoxy an important presence in the symbolic diplomacy between the Japanese and Southeastern European royal houses. While Vafil’s above-cited text highlighted the contrast between the “Divine right” of European monarchs and the “divinity” of their Japanese counterpart, in practice the latter also used formulas calqued from Christian usage – thus, the letters from Emperor Hirohito addressed “Emperor Mihai of Romania” “by the grace of Heaven”. Symbolic parity and rootedness in spiritual authority ensured that religiously defined rites of passage, – including baptisms, marriages, and funerals, – played an important part in royal-house relationships. And while correspondence went both ways, the Japanese side capitalized on the presence of an Orthodox cathedral in Tokyo to show its special consideration for Orthodox royals in a religious metaphor. Since at least the beginning of the 20th century – and until the abolition of monarchy in Greece – on the occasion of the death of an Orthodox king the Japanese imperial house would organize a solemn
memorial service at the Tokyo Resurrection cathedral, attended by a host of illustrious figures starting from the Japanese Crown Prince himself. In some cases similar honors would be extended even to non-royals – thus the Romanian plenipotentiary ambassador to Japan, Nicholas Xenopol, who died in Tokyo on 18 December 1917, received a similar state-sponsored funeral at the local Orthodox cathedral, with Japanese imperial family representatives in attendance. In this way Orthodox Christianity occupied the shared field of religious reality which made the Tokyo Resurrection cathedral into a “spiritual embassy” of Southeastern Europe and a portal for Japan’s ritual diplomacy.

The various linkages outlined above concentrated on the single community which was inextricably tied both to the national Japanese and to the global Orthodox identity. It was only in this context that Orthodoxy could furnish central meaning-making principles in structuring the relationship between Japan and Southeastern Europe. This was rarely a missionary-convert relationship, but rather a gradual mutual approach and appropriation, in which the Japanese Orthodox Church wielded much of the agency. Indeed, this process corresponded to the Japanese community’s emergence out of its regional Russian cocoon into the shared space of the worldwide Orthodox communion.

5. Japanese Orthodoxy on the global stage

The engagement of the nascent Japanese Orthodox community with the Churches of Southeastern Europe underwent three distinct phases before the 1960’s. During the first half-century this engagement was largely orchestrated and dominated by the visionary founder of the Japanese Church, Archbishop Nicholas. The interwar years – the period of the Japanese community’s isolation from the Russian Church – saw the development of a broader and increasingly proactive Japanese Orthodox discourse of Orthodoxy in Southeastern Europe. The wartime and post-war reconstruction years were marked by repeated attempts at large-scale institutional linkage between Japanese and Southeastern European coreligionists. Beneath this progression one can trace the gradual realization and embrace by the Japanese believers of their membership in the single global communion of the Orthodox Church.

The future Archbishop of Japan, Nicholas (Kasatkin) came of age in the era when the worldwide Orthodox Church was divided almost without
remainder into just two large units – inside the Russian empire there was
the vast Russian Church and outside it a variety of jurisdictions – the
Churches of Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch, Jerusalem, Cyprus and
Greece – dominated by the Greek ecclesiastical elite. He thus spoke of
the collective “Greek Church” as the primary ecclesiastical “other”, the
basic illustration of a non-Russian Orthodoxy. Such an illustration was
crucial because, as Nicholas realized well, in the Japanese environment
Russian links needed to be balanced by a global network to deflect the
widespread anti-Russian sentiment. Another reason for Greek prominence
can be found in the fact that Nicholas led a community of first-generation
converts, who were encountering Biblical geography for the first time
and thus showed a special interest in the life of the Christian Church
in the lands of its origin. Therefore, Nicholas did not miss a chance
to establish and foreground ties with Greek Orthodox communities.
During the turning-point year of 1880, when Nicholas became bishop
and secured enlarged sponsorship from Russia, he attempted for the first
time to recruit a Greek missionary to serve in Japan. Upon returning
to Japan after his circumnavigation of the globe, in a November 1880
sermon to the Japanese believers Nicholas highlighted his encounter with
the most eminent Orthodox prelate in the world, Patriarch Joachim III of
Constantinople, emphasizing that “there was no place in the world that
did not know about the Orthodox Church in Japan, […] However small
our Japanese Church may be, we should know that it has already joined
the One Holy Apostolic Church, become one of its members”.

Proof that the Orthodox Church was not merely a Russian agency was
most acutely needed in Japan during the decade of intense imperial rivalry
leading up to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Unsurprisingly,
during this period Nicholas made special efforts to give national resonance
to each notable Greek liaison. Thus, in early 1894 an unexpected visit
to the Tokyo Orthodox cathedral by a Greek Metropolitan, Dionysius
(Latas) of Zante, was transformed into a vindication of Orthodoxy’s global
character. To commemorate this event, Dionysius’ sermon, spoken in
Tokyo, was translated and widely distributed as a booklet throughout
Japanese Orthodox parishes. Through connections with the Jerusalem
Orthodox Church, in 1895-1897 Nicholas received and publicized a
number of letters and hallowed objects from the Holy Land, making as
many as 500 copies of the portrait of the Greek Patriarch Gerasimus II
of Jerusalem for distribution. As anti-Russianism mounted, the standard
Japanese Orthodox response was to retrace the historical track of
Christianity – through Russia back to Greece and thence to Judea – pointing out the age-old Orthodox presence in each of these lands. Compared to the otherwise common usage of Russian vignettes, the lavishly decorated 1905 album celebrating Japanese Orthodox soldiers of the Russo-Japanese War was striking by the abundance of Greek inscriptions. In sum, even if the Russian Church was the proximate “Mother” of the Japanese Church, it was vital in this period for the young community to assert familial links worldwide, averring that even the “Jerusalem Church, the Mother of Christian Churches… accepts our Church into the number of its Daughters”.

The above events occurred on the background of a permanent exposure to non-Russian Orthodoxy in more subdued forms outlined in the previous section – regular reportage on the state of the worldwide communion in the Japanese Church’s official Seikyō Shinpō; the work of Bessarabian missionary-musicians; the expansion of the Greek merchant presence in Kōbe; the trickle of visitors to the Tokyo Orthodox cathedral compound. These occasional visitors, while total strangers, at times evoked from the rather sober-minded Archbishop some of his more poignant affirmations of universal Orthodox brotherhood. “We both rejoiced over our meeting as if we were family”, – he wrote of one such encounter with a Greek in 1901, – “behold the bonds of Orthodox faith!” However, the most stable and consequential channel of Greek-Japanese ecclesiastical communications was no doubt regular correspondence with Mount Athos, which continued uninterrupted from early 1870’s to the end of Nicholas’ life. As many as three Japanese missionaries developed over time a ramified network of contacts on the Holy Mountain – Nicholas himself, after befriending a number of Athonites during his 1879-1880 visit to Russia; Fr. Anatolius (Tihai), who was at one time a monk of the Mt. Athos Zographou Monastery; and Fr. George (Chudnovskii), who came from Mount Athos to serve in Japan during 1884-1889. These channels not only attracted to Japan a diverse flow of contributions, – including both ecclesiastical objects and considerable sums of money, – but also sustained the perennial plans to lay the foundation for Orthodox monasticism in Japan. However, these plans – along with almost all other educational, publishing, artistic and missionary projects of the Japanese Orthodox Church – were disrupted by Nicholas’ death in 1912, and terminally undercut by the Russian revolution of 1917, which toppled the entire system of external relationships of the young community.
As Russian ecclesiastical structures collapsed, the first reaction of the Japanese Orthodox community was to distance itself from Russia’s conflagration, band together, and attempt to arrange a system of self-reliance. Bishop (later Metropolitan) Sergius (Tikhomirov) who succeeded Nicholas at the helm of the Japanese Church found himself marginalized by the rising native elite of the Japanese Orthodox community. Indeed, since he possessed neither the backing of Russia nor the charisma of Nicholas, the stability of his position depended on the Japanese believers’ voluntary support for the authority of the bishop’s office and, in general, for proper ecclesiastical governance. As a result, being the most internationally-exposed figure in the suddenly isolated community, Sergius endeavored to confirm his standing by raising the Japanese awareness of the global Orthodox communion and its interconnectedness. At the annual Councils of the Japanese Church he would explain the need to seek recognition from the world’s peer autocephalous Churches, fault the Japanese Orthodox establishment for being a “Greek Church that doesn’t know Greek”, and expound on the contemporary Church-state relationships in the Orthodox world. After the Great Kantō Earthquake ravaged the Tokyo Orthodox headquarters in 1923, Sergius reached out for aid beyond the Russian diaspora – for instance, an appeal to help the distressed Japanese Church came through to the Bulgarian Church in 1924, while in 1933 Metropolitan Chrysostom (Papadopoulos) of Athens responded to a similar plea by contributing an icon for the restored Tokyo cathedral. Finally, Sergius’ most noticeable step in “globalizing” the Japanese Church was to introduce the commemoration of the supreme hierarchs of the world’s autocephalous Orthodox Churches at liturgy. This practice, – normally reserved for independent autocephalous Churches, – proclaimed the coexistence of the mutually-recognizing Orthodox jurisdictions within a single common spiritual space.

Sergius’ efforts against introversion were not supported by parallel activity radiating from Southeastern Europe – interwar ecclesiastical outreach to Japan was largely limited to occasional travelers or seekers, like a monk from Mount Athos who came to Tokyo to gather donations in 1931. For this reason it is doubly significant that, despite Sergius’ weak standing, Japanese Orthodox reportage on the Churches of Southeastern Europe gradually expanded in the 1920’s and 1930’s. After the official Japanese Orthodox periodical, Seikyō Jihō, could once again expand its format to the size of a regular journal in the mid-1920’s, it resumed the chronicling of the major developments in the Orthodox world. On the
wave of discussions about the impending union with the Anglican Church and the convocation of a new Ecumenical Council not only reprints from foreign press, but extensive original articles by Japanese authors on the theme of Southeastern European Churches appeared for the first time in the late 1920’s. In the 1930’s the Japanese authors began to reference the ecclesiastical situation in Southeastern Europe to make proposals for domestic reform, citing, for example, the Romanian Church’s experience of shifting to the Gregorian calendar. By the end of the 1930’s, in the context of Japan’s grandiose plans to split the control of Eurasia with Germany, one author even argued for the Japanese to assert patronage and leadership over the global Orthodox communion. One can discern in this progression an increasing realization and acceptance on the part of the Japanese believers of their membership in the wider Orthodox world. While yesterday’s greatest autocephalous Church was being exterminated inside the USSR, Orthodoxy’s tomorrow appeared to lie with the Churches of Southeastern Europe.

This gradual turn was crucial to addressing the dilemma of jurisdictional reordering of the world’s ecclesiastical polities – one of the main questions dogging Orthodox intra-Church relations after the tectonic post-World War I political reconfiguration. After 1918, once the headquarters of the Russian Church in Moscow largely lost its capacity to communicate with territories outside Soviet control, each extra-Soviet fragment of the Russian Orthodox unity faced a corporate existential choice. Some simply attempted to put off the decision as long as they could; a few, like Poland, asserted de-facto independence as new autocephalous Churches; others, like Estonia, joined non-Russian Orthodox jurisdictions; those which remained faithful to the Russian Church eventually had to choose between Moscow and to the newly-established Synod of Russian émigré bishops, which tried to organize a “Russian Orthodox Church outside of Russia” centered on the Serbian Sremski Karlovci. Japan’s Metropolitan Sergius made his stand with Moscow, but, due to the widening discussion of the dilemma, each of the five above options gained followers among the Japanese Orthodox. The matter came to a head in 1939, as the Japanese state declared “national mobilization” and assumed minute and invasive control of the country’s religious bodies. Both Sergius and his allegiance soon proved unacceptable to the Japanese officials, and, under heavy state pressure, the Japanese Orthodox Church embarked on a new round of “globalization”. In jurisdictional terms this meant alignment with the militantly anti-Soviet Yugoslavia-based Church of the Russian émigrés – the
Japanese authorities intimidated ecclesiastical opponents and facilitated the correspondence flows between Sremski Karlovci, Harbin and Tokyo to ensure the ordination of a new Japanese Orthodox bishop, Nicholas (Ono), on April 6, 1941.\(^8\) Escalation of the global conflict largely prevented further development of Orthodox ecclesiastical exchanges between Japan and Yugoslavia, but the deepening wartime relationship inside the Axis camp brought closer contact with Bulgaria and Romania. On the occasion of the establishment of the official Japanese-Bulgarian Society at the start of 1943, Seikyō Jihō foregrounded the intermediary function of Japanese Orthodox believers in Japan’s cooperation with Southeastern Europe.\(^8\) In line with the rising profile of Southeastern Europe in Japan, a visit by the Romanian ambassador to the Tokyo Orthodox cathedral now figured as a newsworthy event.\(^8\) New bridges were being forged even as the tragedy of war rent the world, – and the Japanese Orthodox community itself, – into opposed camps.

Japan’s total defeat in 1945 marked the beginning of a decade, – the years of American occupation and Korean War, – which radically reshaped the life of the country and its people. The Japanese Orthodox community likewise faced new horizons and challenges, personified by the thousands of foreign coreligionists who flooded Japan – mostly hyphenated Americans of Eastern European extraction, new Russian émigré refugees from China, and members of the international UN forces from the Korean front. Leading contingents of new parishioners at the Tokyo cathedral were listed in 1951 as “Greeks, Greek-Americans, White Russians, Serbs, Armenians”.\(^8\) The sponsorship offered to the Japanese believers by the occupation personnel, the engagement of American and Greek military clergy in the local liturgical life, international marriages and lively cultural-exchange activities all became fixtures of the Japanese Orthodox scene. The variety of backgrounds, connections and agendas brought by these international forces was unprecedented in the annals of the Japanese Church, but the most consequential new presence was probably the Greek one. While Greek-American occupation personnel figured in Japanese Orthodox life since early post-war years, the Greeks’ profile rose markedly with the arrival of Greek UN troops to the Korean War front in 1950. Soon the Greeks surpassed the Russians as the dominant foreign group in the Tokyo Orthodox community.\(^8\) Throughout 1951 news of deepening sympathetic Greek involvement in the local Orthodox community were regularly featured in Japanese Orthodox press – the topics included Greek aid to the Japanese Church, service of Greek military chaplains
at the Japanese Church’s headquarters, ecclesiastical celebration of the Greek Independence Day in Tokyo, speeches and church-attendance by Greek troops. The Greeks personified the diverse Orthodox world, which descended upon Japan at the time when the impoverished and disorganized Japanese Orthodox believers eagerly sought to build “close ties with an overseas Church and advance evangelism”.

To be sure, the leaders of the Japanese Orthodox communities at first directed their quest for renewed foreign links toward their historic roots, the Moscow-based Russian Orthodox Church, but the US occupation authorities blocked the entry of Soviet clergy into Japan. Instead, General MacArthur’s occupation administration placed the Japanese believers under the authority of the Russian-American Metropolia, relatively isolated and maximally American of all extant Orthodox jurisdictions. Yet, since the Metropolia was slow to involve itself in aiding its Japanese flock during the first years of the new affiliation, discontent riddled the Japanese Orthodox community. In the meantime, the Greeks appeared to exhibit both the capacity and the willingness to become precisely the kind of international patrons the Japanese believers sought. One of the transitory Greek chaplains in Tokyo promised in 1951 to “relate [Japanese conditions] to the Greek authorities in order to help you thrive”. Soon afterwards Archbishop of Athens Spyridon (Vlachos) began gathering data on the Japanese Church and established indirect contact with the Kyoto University classics professor, Tanaka Hideo. By 1953 this gradual approach progressed toward a program of correspondence between Greek Sunday-school children and their Japanese peers. In that year this dynamic was suddenly interrupted by a decisive turn in the policy of the Russian-American Metropolia, whose new charismatic Bishop of Tokyo, Irenaeus (Bekish), was able to quickly energize and mobilize the Japanese Orthodox community behind himself. However, the developments in the neighboring Korea, – which was at the time also subordinate to the Japanese Orthodox diocese, – continued along the earlier trajectory. There the Greek Expeditionary Force contributed generously to the restoration, provisioning and expansion of the devastated native Orthodox community, helping build a new church, establish a school, and send two Korean believers for theological education to Greece. As a result, in 1956 the Korean believers were received, per their request, into the jurisdiction of the Church of Constantinople. As the Orthodox community of Japan’s former colony submitted to a Southeastern European Patriarch, Orthodoxy in East Asia definitively emerged into the shared context of the worldwide Church.
Conclusion

It is perhaps now possible to recapitulate the argument of this work. Since the inception of the Japanese Orthodox mission in the 1860’s, but especially in the course of the last century, the Orthodox Church has undergone considerable globalization and diversification. While operational definitions of what this Orthodox “Church” is differ, these various perspectives agree on the built-in factor of “catholicity” – the impossibility for one part of the “Church” to become irrelevant or unrelated to another part. The emergence of a distinctive native Japanese Church was, therefore, a globally significant event for the Orthodox communion, a major factor in linking Japan not only to Russia, but also to the heartland of the Orthodox habitat in Southeastern Europe. This bridging function of Orthodoxy had many strands, which converge on the gradual experience of the Japanese Orthodox Church’s deepening engagement with Southeastern European coreligionists. Especially at the time when Russian Orthodoxy appeared headed for destruction, Southeastern Europe appeared to the Japanese believers as a testament to the viability of Orthodox Christianity outside and apart from Russia. The course of discovery, whereby the Japanese Orthodox learned about Southeastern Europe, identified with its Churches, and reached out for deeper contact, is one of the key manifestations of catholicity in the modern global reconfiguration of Orthodoxy.
NOTES

1 In this work all Orthodox Christian names have been standardized to their traditional English-language forms.

2 “Adherents” here refers to those identified by the respective surveys and does not imply active adherence.


The basic reference on contemporary Orthodox bishops is the website maintained by Mark Markou. For the 2012 listings see http://users.sch.gr/markmarkou/2012/2012.htm (accessed July 3, 2012).

Classified by each parameter, there are some 76 bishops born outside Orthodox homelands (as defined by the 1912 boundaries), some 33 converts from another religious tradition, and some 26 members of ethnicities not commonly affiliated with Orthodoxy.

John (Pelushi) and Anthony (Merdani) come from Bektashi backgrounds; Daniel (Nushiro) and Seraphim (Tsujie) are both Japanese converts from the Buddhist-Shintoist tradition; Herman (Kamalov) is an Uzbek convert from Islam; Jonah (Lwanga) and Jerome (Muzeeyi) are Africans from Uganda; Theophanes (Kim) is of Korean origin; Alexis (Pacheco y Vera) is a Native American; Jeremiah (Ferens), Nicandrus (Kovalenko), Silouan (Mousa) and Stephan (Charalampides) have been born in Brazil, Mongolia, Venezuela and the Belgian Congo respectively.


One exception is the field of theological dialogue, where Orthodoxy has been represented – and treated – as a more coherent single entity. An example of such work is Geffert, Bryn, Eastern Orthodox and Anglicans: diplomacy, theology, and the politics of interwar ecumenism, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010.


Basic references on the history of Christianity in Japan are the thorough edited volume by Mullins, Mark R., ed., Handbook of Christianity in Japan, Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2003; the encyclopedic Nihon Kirisuto-kyō rekishi daijiten,


The wartime experience of Japan’s Christian groups vis-à-vis the state is extensively documented by the Special higher police materials in Wada Yōichi, Sugii Rokurō, Ōta Masao, eds., *Senjika no Kirisuto-kyō undō – Tokkō shiryō ni yoru* (3rd ed.), Tokyo: Shinkyō shuppansha, 1981.


As hidden Christians began to emerge after 1850’s, some entered into communion with the restored Roman Catholic structures in Japan, but others found that their faith was too different to be identified with the kind of Roman Catholicism they encountered. For one study of these much-discussed groups see Turnbull, Stephen, *The Kakure Kirishitan of Japan: a study of their development, beliefs and rituals to the present day*, Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library, 1998.

The work that reoriented the historiography by centering on such movements is Mullins, Mark, *Christianity made in Japan. A study of indigenous movements*, Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1998.


Dainippon Seikyōkai shimpin kōkai gijiroku, Tokyo: Nihon Seikyōkai, 1912, final insert.


Biserica Ortodoxă Română, mai 1930, XLVIII, № 5, 491-492; ian.-febr. 1934, LII, № 1-2, 76; mart.-apr. 1934, LII, № 3-4, 218-219; 224; iul.-aug. 1934, LII, № 7-8, 434; mart.-apr. 1935, LIII, № 3-4, 194; mart.-apr. 1936, LIV, № 3-4, 217-219; mai-iun. 1936, LIV, № 5-6, 356; 356-357; 357 (3x); iul.-aug. 1936, LIV, 7-8, 621-622; iul.-aug. 1937, LV, № 7-10, 561-563; 604-605; ian.-apr. 1938, LVI, № 1-4, 283; iul.-aug. 1938, LVI, № 7-8, 477; mart.-apr. 1939, LVII, № 3-4, 354.

When footnotes are given, one often finds references to Voskresnoe Chtenie, Tserkovnaia Zhizn’, Pravoslavnyi Sbeshednik, Glasnik, Khleb Nebesnyi. Less frequent are Pravoslavnaia Rus’, the Bulgarian Pastirsko Delo, the Polish Slovo, the Estonian Usk ja Elu.


Senuma Kakusaburō John, “Fushukyō Serigii-shi no shin-cho ‘Jūnii-ittai no seishito’ ni tsuite”, Seikyō Jihō, 01.06.1938, № 27-6, 5. Notably, this outburst led to the appearance of the only sizeable anti-Catholic polemical monograph to be produced by the Japanese Orthodox Church in the interwar period – see the Russian-language original published in Sergius (Tikhomirov), Met. of Japan, Dvoenadesiatnitsa Sviatykh Apostolov, Paris: YMCA-Press, 1935.

Metropolitan Dionysius (Latas) of Zante in 1894. See more on him in the next section.

Branko Vukelić in the late 1930’s. His involvement with the famous Soviet spy in Japan, Richard Zorge, was perhaps partly responsible for dragging the Japanese Orthodox Metropolitan Sergius into Japanese prison in 1945. On Vukelić see the numerous publications of his wife, Yamazaki Yoshiko, as well as a recent book by Katashima Norio, Zoruge jiken – Vukericchi no tsuma Yoshiko, Tokyo: Dōjidaisha, 2006.

At the start of 1980’s the Kōbe Foreign cemetery contained 22 Greek graves, according to Kōbe Seibo shūshin seidō’ seidō seisei 30-shū nen kinen-shi,
Kōbe: Köbe Harisutosu seikyōkai, 1983, 27. By 1951 a Greek section was set up in the Tama cemetery in Tokyo, for the burial of Greek soldiers who died in the Korean War, according to Seikyō Jihō, 25.02.1951, № 739, 1.


An attempt to collect and systematize the vast amount of scattered writings about these three figures has been undertaken by the Moldovan politician Vlad Cubreacov on his website, http://cubreacov.wordpress.com/. The first major research piece on Fr. Anatolius was the candidate’s dissertation by Gurius (Egorov), hieromonk, Iaponskii missioner arkhim. Anatolii (Tikhai), Petrograd Theological Academy, 1917.

48 The basic work on the Tokyo Orthodox cathedral and its place in the history of the Japanese Orthodox Church is Tokyo Fukkatsu daiseidō shūfuku kinen-shi kankō, ed., Tokyo Fukkatsu daiseidō shūfuku kinen-shi, Tokyo: Tokyo Fukkatsu daiseidō kyōkai, 1998.

For one report of such a diverse donation from Mt. Athos to the Japanese Church see Nicholas (Kasatkin), Abp. of Japan, Senkyōshi Nikorai no zennikki, Nakamura Kennosuke, ed., vol. 9, Tokyo: Kyōbunkan, 2007, 141 (entry for 18(31).05.1910).


55 Letter from Emperor Hirohito of Japan to King Mihai of Romania from 07.11.1940, Arhivele Naționale ale României, 728 Casa Regala – Oficiale Vol. IV, № 35/1940, 1. “King” was a title which, in Japanese domestic
nomenclature, functioned like a princely rank, and was apparently deemed too lowly for fellow sovereigns.


60  For an early case see the description of the 1913 Tokyo memorial service for the Greek King George I in *Seikyō Jihō*, 1913, № 2-8, 21-22. The last such memorial service was probably the one for the Greek King Paul in 1964, attended by Crown Prince (now Emperor) Akihito.


62  The only exceptions were the Serbian-dominated jurisdictions outside Ottoman control – the Churches of Karlowitz and Montenegro.


65  Nicholas (Kasatkin), Bp. of Revel, “Keitei ni tsugu”, *Seikyō Jihō*, 20.08.1933, № 22-8, 18.


67  For an overview of the links between the Japanese and Jerusalem Orthodox Churches see Besstremiannaia, G. E., “Iz Iaponii v Ierusalim,” *Al’fa i Omega*, 2007, № 1 (48), 319-340. For the events of the 1890’s see particularly pp. 331-334. At the time of the events, these connections were not only highlighted in the Japanese press, but also in the Greek papers – see, for instance, *Ekklēsiastikē Alētheia*, 30.06.1898, № 18-28, 235.


72  An extensive collection of correspondence from all these three figures is preserved in the library of the Mt. Athos St. Panteleimon’s Monastery.
For example, in 1888 Archimandrite Macarius and Fr. Michael of the Mt. Athos St. Panteleimon’s Monastery contributed a large sum of 1335 yen for construction of the Orthodox church in Sendai. See Seidō kenchiku kenzai meibō. Sendai Fukuin-kai, 1888, n/n, Sendai Orthodox church archive.


Tsurkoven Vestnik, 26.01.1924, XXV, № 4, 11.

Tsurkoven Vestnik, 04.02.1933, XXXIV, № 6, 67.


Seikyō Jihō, 01.12.1933, № 22-12, 40.


Seikyō Jihō, 01.04.1942, № 32-4, 23.

Seikyō Jihō, 20.06.1951, № 743, 1.

Judging by the proportion of names in the Tokyo Orthodox “Three nations committee” in early 1951, as reported in Seikyō Jihō, 25.02.1951, № 739, 1.
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In Italian
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