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NORMAL POLITICS IN A NORMAL COUNTRY? COMPARING AGRARIAN PARTY ORGANIZATION IN ROMANIA, SWEDEN AND POLAND BEFORE 1947

Introduction

In 1917 following the occupation of Bucharest by German forces, the flight of the Romanian government to Iași, and fearing the spread of Bolshevism, King Ferdinand attempted to rally support among the peasantry by offering two promises: land reform and a larger role in political life. In 1918 legislation was passed granting full male suffrage including the peasantry. Romania was, however, not unique among European nations with universal suffrage and land reform programs taking place across Eastern and Western Europe.

Scant attention has been given to the political life of rural society after 1918. What happens when a social group previously excluded from electoral politics is rapidly granted the vote? What does politics look like within the local environment of that social group? How do established and newly emergent organizations operate and institutionalize themselves? What strategies of recruitment, co-option, assimilation and voice are deployed to ensure loyalty among the new voters? Did parties see the peasants as potatoes in a sack of potatoes to be gathered up or were parties interested in granting peasants voice and agency, did such attempts succeed or did they fail in the face of peasant indifference? Furthermore, what did the timing of the party organization have upon the functioning of the party, were parties that were established earlier more or less successful than those parties that established themselves after 1918? With the parties founded before 1918 under narrow electoral franchises what role did the organization structures established play upon the functioning of these parties after the granting of universal suffrage? To
this end this paper will study three examples: Partidul Național Țăranesc (PNȚ) (and its precursors) in Romania, Stroninctwo Ludowe (SL) in Poland and the Centerpartiet (C) in Sweden. Finally, how does the experience of Romania compare with other European states? Is Romania as exceptional as Romanian historiography often claims?

The historiography of interwar Romania is framed through the prism of nationalism/nation building and nationalism studies which is perhaps unsurprising given the use of nationalist discourses by many key political actors. However, this emphasis presents a monochrome view of political life during this period where national/ethnic/identity issues were the only issues under discussion and that all other questions were subordinated to them. I draw on Tara Zahra’s call to reclaim Central and East European history and political science from nationalism studies. Party politics in Eastern Europe during this period is widely viewed as embodying ‘sham democracy’ where elections were rigged and voters bribed with țuică and salami and hence a ‘game’ that had no real meaning or importance in the greater scheme of things and is not therefore worthy of study. Irrespective of this, all political movements and organizations endeavored to establish formal institutions within the village. Recently political science has sought to re-appraise interwar politics through the prism of historical democratization studies which has thus far focused primarily upon Western Europe during this period. The literature on party formation, organization, strategy and recruitment within periods of socio-economic transformation and how parties dealt with the expanding franchise is extensive but similarly built upon an examination of West European parties, however, the political division of Europe only occurred after 1947 and so it is not unreasonable to apply the framework devised to explain West European parties in the interwar period to East European parties of the same period.

Research Problems

A leitmotif in the literature on rural politics is that the material is rather limited. This is especially so in Romania, contemporary accounts and records are few and far between, the reasons for this are threefold, firstly, in 1912 illiteracy in the Romanian lands ranged from 80.6% in Bessarabia to 48.9% in Transylvania, to expect a rich well developed written archive from a group where many of the protagonists were illiterate is unlikely. Contemporary activists who were literate noted that they were not in the
habit of recording discussions on paper.\textsuperscript{10} Finally, political suppression after 1937 and repression after 1947 meant that records may well have been destroyed by either actors fearful of material being used against them, or by the security forces themselves.\textsuperscript{11} The record that does survive is fragmentary and partial; to this extent it provides snapshots into some political activity in the villages in the interwar period. Hopefully, as the archives are explored in more detail and more material is discovered the picture will become fuller. As a result these limitations the secondary literature has tended to focus upon elite rather than grassroots activity.

With the limited sources of evidence from villages and handling this material we take our lead from Clifford Geertz who noted when describing villages in Bali:

Villages are peculiar, complicated, and extraordinarily diverse. There is no simple uniformity [...] to be found over the whole of the small, crowded countryside, no straightforward form of village organization easily pictured in terms of single typological construction, no “average” village, a description of which may well stand for the whole. Rather, there is a set of marvellously complex [...] systems, no one of which is quite like any other, no one of which fails to show some marked peculiarity of form. [...] Yet all these small-scale systems are clearly of a family. They represent variations, however intricate, on a common set of organizational themes, so that what is constant in Balinese village structure is the set of components out of which it is constructed, not the structure itself.\textsuperscript{12}

Thus the case studies are representative in and of themselves but at a broader level indicative of villages in their diversity.

**Theoretical Framework**

1918-30 represents a period of critical juncture in the development of political life across Europe. The Unification of Romania on the 1\textsuperscript{st} December 1918 joined the old Kingdom of Romania (Moldavia and Wallachia which had been independent since 1859 and Dobrogea after 1878) with the former Austrian area of Bukovina, the Hungarian provinces of Transylvania and the Banat, and Bessarabia which had been under Russian control. România Mare had to develop a system of government, political organization and administration out of three different political and administrative cultures and systems (Russian, Habsburg and Ottoman).
There were two further measures which profoundly altered the social, economic and political life of the Romanian state. The first was the promise of a greater political voice for the peasantry through the expansion of the franchise. Although the franchise had been limited in the Regat and the Hungarian parts of Austria-Hungary, in Bukovina universal male suffrage in elections to the Austrian Diet had existed since 1905. The peasantry as the largest social group in Romania was expected to become the most politically important. In response new parties sprang up seeking to claim this electorate as their own. Established parties which had purported to represent the peasantry now had to actually deal with an electorate who had a political voice, as did parties which had previously ignored the peasantry.

The second related change was the promise of extensive land reform to expropriate the Great Estates and to redistribute the land to the previously landless or dwarf-holding peasants. The intention of this policy was to grant the peasants enough land to allow them to produce a surplus of production which could then be sold either internally or externally. This would (in theory) improve the economic conditions of the peasantry, while supplying the new cities and towns of Romania with food, or the Romanian state with export revenue, both of which could then be invested in modernizing Romania. Thus there was a major re-orientation of economic power within the Romanian state. The Great Landlords who had dominated political life in the Regat and Austria-Hungary were economically (but not necessarily politically) weakened. It was expected the peasantry who made up 72.3% of the population would become the economically dominant class. As a result there was an incentive to either represent or capture their votes. Political organizations had significant choices to make in interacting with a social group that had previously had no economic or political power but who was now potentially poised to play a key role in the future of the newly unified state.

The choices made and implications of these decisions can be best explained by reference to theories of path dependency which argues that once an institution or state starts on a given path the choices available to it later are constrained by the decisions made at earlier moments of critical juncture. The reasons why choices are limited are explained by Margaret Levi,

Once a country or region has started down a track, the costs of reversal are very high. There will be other choice points, but the entrenchments
of certain institutional arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial choice. [...] From the same trunk, there are many different branches and smaller branches. Although it is possible to turn around or to clamber from one to the other – and essential if the chosen branch dies – the branch on which a climber begins is the one she tends to follow.¹⁵

Paul Pierson argues the idea of material returns. Once a party or state starts to follow one path, the choices made available and the ability to change paths are limited because of the costs of reversal.¹⁶ Critical juncture represent moments where opportunities arise for actors to make choices. These choices do not take place on a blank canvas but instead are structured by decisions made earlier. The ‘locking in’ process that results from decisions made during moments of critical juncture can serve as causal explanations of broader political outcomes.

A crucial point of analysis therefore has to be the foundation period. Angelo Panebianco’s analysis of the development of party organization in Western Europe emphasizes that the:

fundamental intuition of classical sociology, in particular Weberian, concerning the importance of the founding moment of institutions. The way in which the cards are dealt out and the outcomes of the different rounds played out in the formative phase of an organization, continue in many ways to condition the life of an organization even decades afterwards. [...] The crucial political choices made by its founding fathers, the first struggles for organizational control, and the way in which the organization was formed, will leave an indelible mark. Few aspects of an organization’s functioning and current tensions appear comprehensible if not traced to its formative phase.¹⁷

Panebianco chooses not to consider any of the parties of Eastern Europe. I apply the basic conceptual framework (in terms of the subject of investigation, and the centrality of founding moments and party organization) to Agrarian parties across Europe.

Theorizing Party Organization

The analytical framework draws upon classical West European party literature. The parties analyzed by in the initial studies are contemporary to those discussed in this paper. The same processes of socio-economic
transformation and the expansion of the franchise were common to Eastern and Western Europe. Does the theory fit in Eastern Europe and what is the role of organizational reform? In Western Europe parties that organizationally reformed were better able to respond to the changing political, economic and social environment. Why are some parties able to reform while others cannot?

Maurice Duverger’s analysis into the organizational structure of parties argues that different electoral conditions produce different forms of party organization. The structure of institutions within the party influences the way in which the party operates and behaves in its interactions with the wider political world. He offers a typology of different forms of party organization. For this study the main distinction we are looking at is between a cadre party with its caucus organization, and a mass party with its branch organization.¹⁸

A cadre party is associated with parties operating within a limited electoral franchise where there are relatively few voters and gaining power is dependent upon obtaining the votes of key individuals. The organizational structure and strategy is designed to maximise the potential to do this. A mass party, in contrast, is associated with an expanded electoral franchise where number of voters and maximising turnout is the main objective of the party. Duverger notes that:

this distinction between cadre and mass parties is not based on their dimensions, upon the number of their members: the difference involved is not one of size but of structure.¹⁹

The organization of a cadre party consists of:

[...] grouping of notabilities for the preparation of elections, conducting campaigns and maintaining contact with the candidates. Influential persons, in the first place, whose name, prestige, or connections can provide a backing for the candidate and secure him votes; experts, in the second place, who know how to handle the electors and how to organize and campaign; last of all financiers who can bring the sinews of war. Quality is the most important factor: extent of prestige, skill in technique, size of fortune.²⁰

This can be contrasted with the mass party where the recruiting of members is a fundamental activity, both politically and financially. The
central objective of the mass party is the political education of the class it is representing to enable it to develop an elite capable of governing and administering the country. The members are ‘the very substance of the party.’ The second objective is financial; the branch organization and mass membership enables the party to collect subscriptions from the members, this then enables the party to fund its daily activity and its education and election campaigns.

In terms of central control over cadre parties and their caucus organization are decentralized and weakly knit, while mass parties with their branch type of organization and are much more centralized and closely knit. Duverger notes:

This distinction, though clear in theory, is not always easy to make in practice. [...] cadre parties sometimes admit ordinary members in imitation of mass parties. In fact, this practice is fairly widespread: there are few purely cadre parties. The others are not in practice far removed from them, but their outward form is likely to mislead the observer who must look beyond the official clauses laid down in the constitution or the declarations of the leaders. The absence of any system of registration of members or of any regular collection of subscriptions is a fairly reliable criterion; no true membership is conceivable in their absence.

The next step is to explain the development and evolution of party organizations, drawing on Panebianco and emphasizing the importance of founding periods. This is when the basic organization structures of the party are laid out as well as the distribution of power and mechanisms for domination and legitimacy. It is, moreover, at this point that institutionalization takes place. Institutionalization is:

the consolidation of the organization, the passage from an initial, structurally fluid phase, when the new-born organization is still forming, to a phase in which the organization stabilizes, develops stable survival interests and just as stable organizational loyalties. Institutionalization is the process which marks this transition from one phase to the other.

The degree of institutionalization depends upon the combination of organizational factors in the first phase. This shapes the degree of institutionalization, some parties become strong institutions, others hardly institutionalize at all, and the forms of this institutionalization.
Some of parties active immediately after the First World War had already institutionalized themselves and their recruitment strategies, while others were still ‘soft’ and institutionalizing or had yet to start the process. Thus we have a range of parties dealing with a moment of critical juncture as the franchise expanded and choosing their organizational and recruitment/membership strategies. What is important for our analysis is the implications of institutionalization in a transitional society. The party ‘freezes’ once institutionalised and further reform becomes harder. The form of party organization institutionalized may become problematic for the party if it is designed for the old forms and style of politics and fails to keep in step with social and political changes within society.

However, this idea of non-reform does not fit with the traditional image of a political party as a goal orientated rational movement that seeks office in order to achieve its goals. Panebianco responds that this misunderstands the nature of a political party. He argues that we can look at parties as just ‘organizations’. Organizations have their own lives, power dynamics and actors have their own internal interests. These may not necessarily intersect with the expressed interests of the party.

Actors may subvert the party organization to further or to defend their personal interests and positions within the party. This has implications for non-reform. Actors may resist organizational changes to the party in order to protect their position and power within it.26

**Developing Duverger and Panebianco**

Anu-Mai Kõll,27 using the Baltic Agrarians as examples argues that the type of party that emerges depends on the ethno-class configuration during the foundation period. Where the dominant class is a different ethnicity to the peasantry then the party uses nationalist discourses to mobilise voters. Where the dominant class is the same ethnicity as the peasantry then the party mobilises around a class discourse. This potentially provides us with an insight into the types of mobilizing discourses deployed and whether this typology applies to the Romania, Polish and Swedish cases.
Methodology: Asymmetrical Comparison

As a result of the gaps within the secondary literature and the difficulties in finding documentary evidence to fill those gaps, this paper uses asymmetrical comparison, with the Romanian case constituting the primary focus of research and analysis, and Poland and Sweden acting as control cases. As a methodological basis is needed for thus restricting the scope of comparison, I shall account for this particular choice.

The question may be posed as to why in the face of so many difficulties associated with locating the primary material for an analysis of PNŢ, I nevertheless decided to dwell on the Romanian Agrarian movement. To echo the theory of path-dependency once I had started investigating the Romanian case, the material costs were too great to abandon my investigation half-finished and start an investigation of the Polish or Swedish case, with no guarantee that I would not find myself in the same position. Although the Romanian case is foregrounded as a result of the research process, I seek to avoid the issue of exceptionalism and so compare as control cases with Poland and Sweden.

Jürgen Kocka notes there are inevitable downsides to using this type of comparison: the instrumentalizing of comparison, by favouring of one case study over another. However, even in its asymmetric form, comparison can lead to ‘questions that cannot otherwise be posed and to answers that cannot otherwise be given’. Asymmetric comparison works as a self-correcting device by motivating further empirical research. It combines comparison and case study, which, ‘can well be mutually reinforcing and complementary undertakings’.

Kocka lists several functions of the asymmetrical comparative method: heuristic, analytical, and ‘deprovincializing’ (Verfremdung). My use of asymmetrical comparison covers these three but adds a fourth: the compensatory, ancillary function. The Swedish and Polish cases provide cognate cases on the basis of which analogies can be drawn and extrapolations can be made in order to compensate for bibliographical and archival gaps regarding Romanian Agrarianism.

The use of comparison avoids the potential danger of omitting concomitant variables, which may not have been recognized due to gaps within the literature. In analytical terms, the comparison will be used to highlight potential causal variables, by pointing out both similarities and differences between the two cases. In the case of differences, this will be used to generate potential hypotheses explaining divergences between the cases.
Agrarianism in Romania: From Foundation to Unification:
Agrarianism in Three Regions 1869-1926.

An analysis of party politics in Romania has to adopt a regional focus because prior to 1918 parties developed in response to local conditions. What was to become Greater Romania was divided between Austria-Hungary, Russia and the Kingdom of Romania and party politics developed along these regional lines. The parties of Austria-Hungary sending representatives to the Vienna or Budapest diets, those in Bessarabia operated under the specific conditions of late Tsarist Russia, and in the Regat new parties emerged under difficult conditions. In each case the local political, social and economic conditions shaped the new parties. Therefore I will provide an overview of organizational development treating the three separately to compare and contrast the respective foundation periods. This helps to explain the dynamics and internal divisions of PNŢ after the fusion of 1926 between Partidul Naţional Român (PNR) from the former Habsburg lands, and Partidul Țărănesc (PȚ) from the Regat.

Rural Politics in Austria-Hungary before 1918

PNR was formed in 1881 when Partidul Naţional al Românilor din Transilvania and Partidul Naţional al Românilor din Banat şi Ungaria merged. Both had been formed in 1869 following the Ausgleich in 1867. It opposed Hungarian centralization and was principally a national movement dominated by the clerical and lay elite. The Romanian elite, because of the ethno-class structure of Transylvania, was relatively small which facilitated the extensive use of personal and familial networks as a way of holding the movement together. The Hungarian Electoral Law of 1874 granted franchise to a small percentage of the total population of Hungary on a complex basis of property, taxation, and ancient rights.\(^3\) This meant that the ethnic electoral franchise was itself largely limited to the members of the Romanian elite. PNR meets Duverger’s criteria of a cadre party in terms of recruitment and organization. The early foundation meant that the organizational structures had become institutionalized by 1926 when the merger with PȚ took place.

From this over-view a number of points emerge. The ethno-class dynamics outlined by Kőll are reflected in the discourses deployed by the party. The Hungarian domination meant that the use of nation rather than
class as a mobilisation device. Although the majority of the Romanian population were peasants the party had limited to no interest in class issues. It did not have strong competition from Socialists or other movements that sought to ‘capture’ the support of the Romanian peasantry. PNR policies conflated the national and social based on the assumption that securing improved political rights would, at the same time, improve the condition of the peasantry. PNR tended to explain the plight of the Romanian peasantry not as a consequence of economic and social conditions but rather as the result of a specific political configuration created by Hungarian domination. They believed that large landholdings should be broken up, the land redistributed amongst the peasants and peasants should be moved from over-populated to under-populated areas. However, they opposed the implementation of the policy believing that the Hungarian government was using it to promote Magyarization rather than economic and social development. The inability of the PNR elite to represent the peasantry was a reoccurring theme in criticism of the party.

Agrarianism in the Regat and Bessarabia

There several differences between Regat and Bessarabia and Austria-Hungary. Following the failure of the ‘Going to the People’ campaign by the Narodniki in 1874-5 many activists fled to the Regat including Constantin Stere. These activists would form and influence the nascent Agrarian movement. One of the legacies of Russian rule for the Romanian and Polish movements was that the repressiveness of the regime served to radicalize and revolutionize the movements. While there was early activism, the formal establishment of Partidul Țăranesc (PȚ) did not occur until after 1918. This is late in contrast to other movements in the region such as the Bulgarian Agrarian Union (BANU). Earlier attempts at establishing a party had been undermined by the Liberal and Conservative elite. Constantin Dobrescu-Argeș, militated for the representation of the peasantry in parliament and the establishment of peasant committees. He established Partida Țărănească in 1895 as the first Agrarian party in Romania. Dobrescu-Argeș, similar to his Polish contemporary Bolesław Wysłouch, sought to improve the cultural life of the peasantry. This early attempt was suppressed by the Liberals in 1899. A second attempt in 1906 was suppressed after the 1907 Peasant Uprising. Although Dobrescu-Arges retired from politics after his harassment and arrest in
1898, continuity was maintained by the active involvement of many former members in PŢ.

The Peasant Uprising of 1907

The 1907 Peasant Uprising had profound implications for Agrarianism in Romania. Unlike 1905 in Russia, 1907 was an uprising rather than a revolution, the origins of which were economic and social rather than political. Although unprecedented in scale, the 1907 uprising was not, however, substantially different in its causality from previous uprisings which had plagued the Old Kingdom during the 19th century (the 1888 peasant uprisings, for instance). It began as a localized dispute over agricultural contracts that the peasants were due to sign with the local arendaşi and quickly spread. The revolt was eventually crushed after bringing down the Conservative government of Gheorghe Grigore Cantacuzino, which was replaced by the Liberal government of Dimitrie Sturdza. There are three points to be made about the uprising. Firstly, it was not political in character, nor did it stem from political agitation and, as such, did not spawn a revolutionary movement. Secondly, the result of the uprising and its suppression was to bring the situation of the peasantry into public and political consciousness and spark off intellectual debates. The third point is that, paradoxically, what did not spring from the uprising and the debate about the plight of the peasantry was a coherent political movement seeking to represent the peasantry.

Formation of PŢ 1918-1926

Partidul Țăranesc came into being after 1918 and built upon the earlier work of Partida Țăranescă. Ion Mihalache had started efforts in 1913 but had been interrupted by the start of the First World War. The new party developed and grew through a series of mergers with smaller regional groups. In July 1921 the party merged with the Partidul Țăranesc din Basarabia of Constantin Stere and Pantelimon Halippa. This strengthened the radical and left wing tendencies of the party. This was followed by fusions with Agrarian groups from Bukovina (June 1922), Transylvania (October 1922) and Partidul Socialist-Țăranesc (Sept 1922). The party did not have a single internal core but instead a number of cores that orientated
themselves around particular individuals namely Stere, Nicolae Lupu and Mihalache. This gave the party an inherent instability and imbued it with strongly centrifugal tendencies. The newly emerged political entity would embark on an ongoing, and never quite successful, quest for legitimation and political strategy.⁴¹

Three points emerge, although the party did not formally establish itself, the continuity of activists and their personal connections within the parties reflects the cadre form of party organization. Institutionalization is about practice rather than formal or official statutes. Secondly Köll’s argument about ethno-class dynamics also appear to fit. In the Regat the dominant class was ethnically Romanian and so the Agrarians used class discourses to mobilize support. Finally, the repressive atmosphere, and the influence of the Narodniks resulted in a movement that was more socially radical than their Transylvanian colleagues.

After 1926 National, Intermediary and Local Level

This paper has thus far addressed the foundation period. In 1926, PNR and PŢ merged to form PNŢ. Iuliu Maniu of PNR became leader, while Ion Mihalache of PŢ acted as his deputy. PNR and PŢ merge in 1926. Writers such as Hugh Seton-Watson argue PNR would have been better suited to merging with the Liberals.⁴² This was because the Liberals and PNR were both formed from the same social strata of the new Romanian urban middle class who were socially and economically conservative but also nationalist. However, PNR with its powerbase in Transylvania and the Banat could not reconcile itself with the centralizing tendencies of the Liberals. In a Cadre organization where members need to be rewarded for their services, the centralization of power would have resulted in fewer material rewards to be distributed within Transylvania to members of the caucus. The merger can be viewed as a marriage of convenience. Due to its late foundation PŢ lacked experienced parliamentarians and administrators gained by merging with it gain access to a well-developed cadre party organization. PNR by merging with PŢ was able to transcend its narrow regional base in the former Habsburg lands and tap into the mass of peasant voters who aligned or were thought to themselves with PŢ. There were thus material political benefits for both organizations.

There were inevitable consequences from the merger. The new party was dominated by the Transylvanian wing. Their conservativism was
blamed for the inability of PNŢ to get to grips with the problems of running a party in post-unification Romania.

A second unusual feature emerged from the merger which reflected the ideological and organizational problems facing the new party. In some areas there were already existing PNR, PŢ and former Partidul Conservator (PC)\(^{43}\) organizations at the time of the merger. At the local level there were pre-existing tensions between the Agrarians, the Nationalists and the Conservatives both ideological and personal. Former local enemies were now supposed to unite within PNŢ. There was unwillingness by the local leaderships to cede any power and this presented a problem for the new party in terms of its organization. The solution at the level of the town and village was to maintain parallel organizations within the party, one for the nationalists and one for the Agrarians. At the local level there were two presidents appointed – one honorary and the other ‘actual’, as a compromise to satisfy all camps. This situation existed in Argeş, Iaşi, Muscel, Buzău\(^{44}\) and elsewhere.\(^{45}\) This reflects the haphazard way in which the new PNŢ party structures, rather than being developed from the ground up, were in fact built upon the old party organization of PNR, PC and PŢ. The structures that emerged after 1926 were designed to keep the local elite who already held power in power, rather to reform.

The party is very unstable experiencing mass defections on several occasions. The table below, while not exhaustive, shows the loss of high-ranking and important members of the PNR/PNŢ from 1920 onwards.

### Table 2: Defections and Splits within the PNR/PŢ/PNŢ leadership 1920-1946

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date Left PNR/PŢ/PNŢ</th>
<th>Position within PNR/PNŢ/Political Leaning</th>
<th>Reason/Where to</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Octavian Goga</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>Poet and Future Prime Minister (during the Carolist period) Right-Wing Nationalist</td>
<td>Joined Partidul Poporului</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicolae Iorga</td>
<td>1926</td>
<td>Historian and Future Prime Minister Right-Wing Nationalist</td>
<td>Never joined – refused to support fusion between PNR and PŢ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>Party/Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexandru Vaida-Voevod</td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>Former Prime Minister Right Wing Nationalist</td>
<td>To establish his own party – Frontul Românesc (FR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mihail Șerban</td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>Former Agriculture Minister</td>
<td>Joined FR – later joined FRN. Did not rejoin PNȚ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demetru I. Dobrescu</td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>Mayor of Bucharest. Left Wing</td>
<td>Established his own party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armand Călinescu</td>
<td>1938</td>
<td>Former Deputy Interior Minister Member of the PNȚ Study Circle Left-Wing</td>
<td>Became Prime Minister in the FRN government until murdered by the Iron Guard in September 1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ernest Ene</td>
<td>1938</td>
<td>Left-Wing Student leader and influential in the Youth Wing of the Party. Member of the PNȚ Study Circle</td>
<td>Left to join FRN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constantin Rădulescu-Motru</td>
<td>1938</td>
<td>Head of the Romanian Academy Member of the PNȚ Study Circle Centre-Left</td>
<td>Left to join FRN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicolae Lupu</td>
<td>1927</td>
<td>Radical Poporanist Left</td>
<td>Left to establish own party. Rejoined in 1933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicolae Lupu</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td></td>
<td>Left to establish Partidul Țărănesc-Democrat – a front party allied with the Communists</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The table also demonstrates that, far from being one single break, it was rather a continuous process. Ion Hudiță, Maniu’s private secretary, suggests that both Virgil Madgearu and Mihalache were at one time seriously considering abandoning PNȚ in favour of the FRN, which indicates the appeal of power even to some of the most loyal members of PNȚ as well as their disenchantment with the direction of PNȚ under Maniu in 1938.46

In terms of policy and political approach the party remained an ethnic ‘Romanian’ party and did not make any attempt to become a pan-ethnic ‘peasant party’. Nor did it shift its policy positions to reflect growing social radicalism from the younger generation after 1929. The question then becomes why? At what point are younger peasants losing their agentive power within the party organization, and does organizational analysis explain reasons why this might occur?

We have thus far dealt with macro level politics and the wider historical development of the party at the national level. To get a sense of the wider party it is necessary to look at the micro level of the village and the intermediary level of the party administration. The latter played a crucial role as interlocutors between the represented and their representatives. The grassroots had to go through this level of administration in order to communicate their views to the leadership, and the leadership had to rely upon these mid-level actors to disseminate their message to the local level, to mobilize and organize local activists.

The material for this analysis is drawn from the Mihai Șerban archive. Șerban’s political trajectory reflects the administrative instability highlighted earlier. He began his career in PNR, he joined PNȚ with the merger. In 1935 he defected with his godfather Alexandru Vaida-Voevod, to Vaida-Voevod’s quasi-Fascist Frontul Romanesc. Finally with the creation of the Royal dictatorship 1938, he followed Vaida-Voevod in joining Carol II’s Frontul Renașterii Naționale. With each move his position within the parties increased. His defections seems to have not been driven by ideology but rather by a personal loyalty to his godfather, and careerism.47

By virtue of his role in PNȚ party administration in the Cluj area, the archive provides a reach source of internal party correspondence. From this we gain a snap shot of life within PNȚ. The archive portrays a party which is run on an informal ad-hoc basis in line with Duverger’s characterisation of a cadre party. Communications between local party organizations and the regional administration are poor, leading to fragmentation. This results
in confusion within the party administration. The lack of organization is highlighted in a series of cross-country Siguranță reports on PNȚ from 1946:

Radiogram deciphered by the Oradea centre, 25 October 1946

[...]

10. The school youth are in their majority with P.N.Ț. they do propaganda on a person-to-person basis organized at district level. //

Constanța

7 November 1946

[...]

The youth from ‘historical’ parties do propaganda in the villages, without being organized in teams, only one by one and on their own initiative (pe cont propriu), also bringing electoral leaflets.- //

Oil centre

Note

The situation of the political parties in Moreni

[...]

The National Peasant Party – Maniu wing: They continue to have the same weak influence as before, they don’t gather at the organization headquarters and they don’t do propaganda.-

The interaction between its members is made on a person-to-person basis.48

Mirroring the national level the intermediary level is also subject to splits and mass defections by whole branches of the organization. This is best illustrated by the case in 1920 when the whole of the Făgăraș PNR party defected to Averescu’s Party, the incident being recorded in a message to PNR in Cluj thus:

Făgăraș county

Almost all the members of the county committee of the National Party together with other notables have crossed over to the Averescu Party. We cannot be sure even of the president of the committee, Mr Mateiu Ziga, as he did not attend the Congress although he had promised to do so.

Consequently, I the undersigned will see to it that the voters in the County are summoned to a meeting where we will regroup, make decisions as to the organization of the party in the county, put together the list of candidates and plan the electoral battle.

A Iulia 25 IV 920

Iacob Popa49
The party relies on personalised networks to function. From Şerban’s correspondence both professional and personal it is clear that very many members of the party are related to one another, either directly, or through marriage. Extensive use is made of baptismal relations as a means of linking actors together within a reciprocal relationship. Şerban was godfather to a number of people who would write to him asking him to intercede on their behalf with the Romanian state. In turn they remained political loyal to him. Şerban’s relationship with Vaida-Voevod mirrors this. He wrote on several occasions asking Vaida-Voevod to intercede on his behalf, and in return he remained loyal to Vaida-Voevod throughout his political career. Similarly the editors of the main party newspaper in Transylvania were the nephews of Maniu which ensured the loyalty of the paper to Maniu at all times. In the absence of a unifying party ideology, personal relations seem to act at this level as the glue that holds the party together and enables it to function. It is clear that such a system rewards those already in PNŢ. Loyalty to your patron can ensure protection and promotion, in turn by providing protection and rewards to your clients, an actor can ensure through material rewards the loyalty of subordinate actors. Any attempt at organizing the party differently would have certainly have run into resistance as reform would have meant the erosion of these networks and in turn the foundation upon which the power of many within the party administration rested.

The party at this intermediary level reflects a cadre party organization within Transylvania that has become institutionalized by the interwar period. The usage of familial networks allows the party to function, however, the deep personal ties between actors mean that when leading figures defect they often take with them their political dependents. The lack of any ideological glue rendered the party unstable and volatile making it vulnerable to those who wished to undermine the party.

Politics in the Village: The Banat and Bessarabia

Having so far seen an upper and intermediate party organization that reflects a cadre organization which seems to be institutionalized and entrenched we now move to the grassroots level. Here, formal party organization was relatively new. As noted, with the exception of Bukovina, the peasant masses had been excluded from electoral politics before 1918. Thus institutionally, there existed a *tabula rasa* upon which
the parties could build. We might expect to see the characteristics of mass parties primarily branch organizations seeking to involve as many people as possible. While electoral politics was new; politics, hierarchy and power within the village had always existed. However, these were being challenged by the structural changes in rural society outlined earlier. Land reform had resulted in peasants gaining land and thus increased economic differentiation within the village, educational modernization had increased literacy reducing the dependence of illiterate peasants upon the literate within the village in their interactions with the state, and the experience of military mobilisation during the First World War had broken the rigid structures of the village for younger peasants.

Reports of local party activity in the countryside are rare. Two collections have been located and will form the core of this analysis. The first is from the village of Berliște in the Banat. The second are reports from the Județs of Tighina and Soroca in Bessarabia. The reports reveal some important regional differences but also similarities. Despite having the lowest levels of literacy in Romania the Bessarabian reports are more detailed and complete than those from the Banat. Although the local party has some features of a mass party as outlined by Duverger, in particular the interest in recruiting large numbers of people into the party, the party still functions as a cadre organization, with limited activity between elections, or political crises. In Berliște the party leadership is dominated by the village elite.

Unlike the party leadership which made no attempts in the press or party literature to reach out to non-Romanians the party in Bessarabia welcomed and recruited ethnic Russians, Jews and women. In Berliște the party remains both ethnically Romanian and male. In Tighina PNȚ kept membership lists in both Romanian and Russian. These decisions appear to have been made locally.

At the local level, the primary interest of the party remains local power and in particular control of the social space. Throughout the 21 year period covered by the Berliște notes, the dominant concern is the party fanfară. As Jan Słomka explains, the importance of the fanfare was that it would play at every public event in the village. Controlling the fanfare enabled the party to control public space within the village. In addition it was an important symbol of prestige and hence recruitment. In Berliște and Bessarabia, local activists note the importance of having prestige auxiliary organizations attached to the local party to recruit members.
The requests for intercession that appear in the Şerban archive, also appear in the Berlişte reports. The party in Berlişte is involved in a dispute with the local mayor and the notary both of whom belong to the Liberals. The party writes to the local MP and asks him to intercede on the behalf of the party leader who claims he is being persecuted by the mayor and notary.54

In both the Banat and Bessarabia we get a sense of dissatisfaction from younger peasants with the direction of the party. In Soroca, the youth wing of the party write an extensive memo condemning the Maniu-Codreanu of 1937.55 They argue eloquently that Maniu cannot defend democracy by aligning with an opponent of democracy and that the Guard represent as much of a threat to democracy as Carol II. In Berlişte we do not have explicit reports as to what the younger peasants were demanding, but we know that the intermediary level party was concerned enough to instruct the local party not to give radical young peasants prominent positions within the party or during election campaigns but instead to adopt a conservative approach.

What follows here is a brief comparison between the Romanian lands with Sweden and the Polish lands.

Poland

In Poland the earliest attempts at organizing the peasants begins among exiles after the failure of the 1831 uprising. This early start was also reflected within the Polish lands. The most profound influence upon Polish Agrarianism in Galicia was the relatively benign Habsburg administrative and governmental system. Although the electoral system for the Sejm was flawed and structured against the peasants, it did allow some peasant political representation. Politics in Galicia was largely a Polish affair with the Polish conservative landlords seeking to protect their political and economic status. Thus it was class politics which dominated the debates within the region, unlike the nationality politics which dominated in Transylvania.

A second difference stemmed from higher levels of socio-economic development within the Polish lands of the Habsburg Monarchy compared to Transylvania. As a result there was more industrialization and urbanization. Stemming from this the Social Democratic movement in Galicia was very much stronger and provided electoral competition for
the Polish Agrarians. The Social Democrats sought to appeal to peasants, in this way directly competing with the Agrarians for support. The SL, unlike PNR, could not ‘take for granted’ the support of the peasantry.

There was a three-stage evolution in the types of people who led the SL. The first stage is embodied by Wysłouch and other leaders from the elite. As their influence waned, they were replaced by the second generation led by Jakub Bojko. Unlike the first wave of Agrarian leaders, Bojko was a peasant whose parents had fled the Congress Kingdom to escape serfdom. He considered himself inferior to the gentry and had no desire to upset the social order. His radicalism was a reaction against reactionary landlords. He cannot be considered to represent a change in approach from Wysłouch. However, he can be seen as representing a bridge from the non-radical elite leaders of the first generation to the more radical peasant leaders of the third generation. This third generation was represented by Wincenty Witos, who was also a peasant but, unlike Bojko, radical in his opinions. In order to make these changes SL however, underwent a period of internecine fighting before the First World War which resulted in the party splitting. What emerged from these splits was a party that was more radical than before and that had a peasant rather than intellectual leadership.

**Polish Agrarianism in the German and Russian Partitions**

The political, economic and cultural situation of the Polish peasants was radically different in the Prussian and Russian partitions of Poland. For this reason Agrarian politics in the two regions was orientated and structured differently to the developing Agrarian politics in Galicia.

In the Prussian (later German) partition of Poland the structure of society differed from Galicia. Serfdom had been abolished gradually by 1848, earlier than in the other Polish lands. Agriculturally the region was far more advanced than elsewhere in the Poland and as a result a different social structure emerged. Land reform had created very prosperous big farms but also a large rural proletariat. Although the region was ethnically mixed between Germans and Poles it was not until the *Kulturkampf* of 1871 that any attempt at Germanization was made. Until that point the dominant political discourses did not revolve around the ethnic cleavage. Instead peasant activity took the form of economic associations which sought to strengthen the economic position of Polish peasants and
farmers. The *Kulturkampf* triggered the addition of a political dimension to Agrarian politics. It targeted peasants and wealthier land owning Poles. Nationalist German groups such as the H.K.T (Hansenann, Kennemann and Tiedemann) sought to strengthen the German rural middle class by buying up land in the province; it was this that posed the greatest threat to the economic position of the Poles. The efforts of the Polish economic associations were thus aimed at trying to defend Polish land holdings within the region rather than developing the political and economic situation of Polish peasants.60

National and social movements were subject to severe political repression in Russian Poland. This was especially harsh following the failed uprisings of 1848 and 1863. Paradoxically, the peasants benefited from the failure of the uprisings. These had been led by the Polish gentry and the abolition of serfdom which followed in 1868 was designed to weaken the power of the gentry. The repressiveness of the regime served to radicalize and revolutionize the nascent movements involved. Unlike in Galicia, parliamentary tactics could not be developed because there was no parliamentary forum. Repression forced the Agrarians to adopt a clandestine organizational structure and also made the elite materially dependent upon their supporters. It was not until after 1904-5 that Polish peasants in the Congress Kingdom were able to organize themselves with the foundation of Polski Zwiazek Ludowy (PZL). Parallel to this, other movements emerged and, like those in Galicia, they were prone to splitting.

In all three regions of Poland Agrarians were forced to respond to the interests of the peasantry by the development of alternative ideologies. Additionally, they had to react to the development of nationalism and also socialism. The strength of these rival movements depended upon the political circumstances. Thus socialism was stronger in the Congress Kingdom and Galicia than in the Prussian partition, since in Prussia socialism was seen as a ‘German’ ideology. These two movements posed significant challenges to the Agrarian movements, and at various times the Agrarian movements allied themselves with nationalists and socialists, in addition appropriating elements from these ideologies in order to enhance their appeal to the peasantry. The threat posed by socialism and nationalism forced the Agrarians to be responsive to the peasantry, thus the potential for peasants to serve as effective agents in articulating their demands was greater.
An important element in the development of Agrarianism in Poland was the contacts between the Agrarians within the partitions of Poland. These contacts allowed Agrarians from each area to serve as active agents and to exchange ideas. Despite the partitions, Agrarianism in Poland did not develop in isolation, but rather in informed and influenced parallel. However, Agrarianism was narrow in the sense that it considered itself to be specifically Polish. It did not consider that class cut across national issues. They did not forge alliances with German, Ukrainian and Russian Agrarian movements. Indeed, in Galicia the Polish Agrarians sought to undermine the Ukrainian peasant representatives. Class existed as a subset of the Polish polity. It was only when Witos was jailed with Ukrainian peasants by Pilsudski after 1926 that he realized the folly of this ‘narrow’ conception of Agrarianism. However, by then it was too late to develop Agrarianism which went beyond the old ethnic political parameters. However, unlike in Romania where PNŢ was a fusion between a middle class regional party and an agrarian movement, in Poland, the fusion was between agrarian parties who were all committed to the peasant issue, but who differed only in their nationalism and radicalism. The SL was much more of a ‘peasant’ movement than in Romania and politically became more radical during the interwar years as peasant radicalism grew suggesting a stronger sense of peasant agency and a more responsive political organization.

**Swedish Agrarianism – Late Start and Early Reform**

The first Swedish agrarian parties were established in 1914-15. Although initially rivals the Bondeförbundet (Farmers’ League (BF)) and the Jordbrukarnas Riksfördbund (Agrarian League (JR)) merged in 1921. The new party kept the name Bondeförbundet, changing to Landsbygdspartiet Bondeförbundet (Rural Party Farmers’ League) in 1943 in an attempt to broaden its appeal to all in rural society and not just farmers. Finally in 1958 the party adopted the name Centerpartiet. The changes in name reflect the process of transformation that the movement underwent from a narrow party into attempting to become a catch-all party.

The party organization demonstrates the forms of a cadre party organization before 1921. However, after the merger and during the interwar period the party undergoes organizational reform and its features particularly in terms of power structures but organizational reform takes
place early before the cadre structures had a chance to institutionalise themselves. This change is reflected in policy as the party shifts across time and the party membership changes. This therefore reflects the success of the organizational structures in allowing supporters agency over party policy which did not exist in PNŢ. Thus reforming and moving to new organization structures appears to be crucial in allowing the party to transform itself.

**Wider Analysis**

PNŢ’s problems have their roots in the foundation period. The domination of the Transylvanian wing meant that the party did not shift its mobilising discourse from nationalism to class issues. The party had no unifying ideology and it was instead held together by personal links. Power was distributed on the basis on interpersonal relations. The party could not abandon its cadre mechanisms of recruitment without fundamentally undermining the power structures of the party. It was not in the interests of actors at all levels to weaken their own positions within the party hierarchy. This organizational sclerosis resulted in a lack of policy innovation and in turn this weakened the party further as it dealt with political rivals on the radical left and right.

**Conclusions**

There was a vibrant mainstream political life beneath the level of elite politics which had a strong emphasis on social, economic interests. Peasants were active within the party and a grassroots analysis brings to life a very different view of the party than a top-down elite centred approach. The question then becomes why did this not transform itself into policy innovation? PNŢ along with the other Agrarian parties fits into Duverger’s model of European party development. The organizational forms and mobilizational discourses adopted reflect the structural conditions in which they were operating. These organizational forms were successful in the short term before 1918 but once institutionalised ultimately made reform of PNŢ impossible. By comparing with Sweden and Poland we can see that the sequencing of organizational reform is crucial in party development – not when the party is established. Even if a party is
established relatively late, if institutional reform takes place early then a party is better equipped to cope with socio-economic changes taking place within society, and to adjust their policies and politics accordingly. In contrast to other Agrarian movements, PNŢ did not reform organizationally because of vested internal party interests and thus village activists were denied agentive power within the party.
NOTES

7. The distinction to some extent exists purely because when the literature on party politics in this period was being developed the Cold War was at its height limiting access for Western researchers and the parties that could have been studied were suppressed making them unable to be studied.
9. Livezeanu p. 36.
10. Conversations between Dennis Deletant and Corneliu Coposu and Constantin (Ticu) Dumitrescu. We are grateful to Dennis Deletant for providing us with this information.
11. ACNSAS, FOND D, dos. 8827/2, pp. 245-246. This is a report about the documents relating to PNȚ found when requisitioning the house of Dr Victor Macavei. A note from Căpitan de Securitate Manon Badea dated 10th November 1948 reads: “Întrucât materialul de mai sus nu poate fi exploatat
Because the above-mentioned material cannot be used as it is old and without importance, we are of the opinion that it should be destroyed by burning.


Table 1: Employment in Romania 1930

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage of Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>13,063,213</td>
<td>72.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>153,423</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>1,560,061</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce, banking</td>
<td>749,508</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation, Communications</td>
<td>508,620</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Services (Civil and Military)</td>
<td>863,572</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Professions and Others</td>
<td>1,158,163</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>18,057,028</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Ibid., pp. 252-253.

Panebianco, pp. xiii – xiv.

Duverger, p. 63.

Ibid., p. 63.

Ibid., p. 64.

Ibid., p. 63.

Ibid., p. 67.

Ibid., p. 64.

Panebianco p. 18.

Ibid., p. 19.

Ibid., p. 41.


Jürgen Kocka, “Comparison and Beyond”, *History and Theory* 42.1, 2003, pp. 40-41.


http://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Partidul_%C5%A2%C4%83r%C4%83nesc (Date Accessed 21st Sept 2008).

Ornea, *Țărănismul*, p. 36.


PC had split in 1918-19. A faction from this split called Partidul Conservator-Democrat then merged in with PNR in 1922.

Iași and Buzău in particular were both former strongholds of PC.


This is examplified in his academic writings. Before 1931 Şerban has a strong and clear interest in agricultural matters. After 1931 he abandons this and addresses ethnic politics only in his writings.

Bucharest National Archives, Fond Președinția Consiliului de Miniștri, S.S.I., 97/1945.


“Centrul petrolifer – Notă - Situația partidelor politice în regiunea Moreni: [...] Partidul Naț. Țărănesc-Maniu: Se bucură de aceiași influență slabă ca și până acum, nu se adună la sediul organizației și nu fac nici o propagandă.”, p. 32.

Uncatalogued Șerban Archive, Muzeul Național de Istorie al Transilvaniei, Cluj:

“Județul Făgăraș
Aproape toți membrii comitetului județian al partidului național împreună cu alți notabili din Făgăraș au trecut la Partidul Averescu. Chiar de Președintele comitetului Dl. Mateiu Ziga? nu putem fi siguri, după ce n’a venit la Congres, deși promisese că va veni.
În consecuență, subsemnatul mă voi îngriji conchemarea alegătorilor din Județ la o constătire în care ne vom constitui din nou, vom lua dispoziții pentru organizarea partidului în întreg județul, vom face candidaturile și vom pune la cale lupta electorală.
A Iulia 25 IV 920
Iacob Popa”


For examples see Arhiva Națională a Republicii Moldova, Chișinău, Partidul Național-Țărănesc Filiala Tighina Fond 1643, 1.2 and Partidul Național-Țărănesc Filiala Soroca Fond 1752, 1.3.


Ibid., p. 50.

Ibid., pp. 50-58.

Ibid., p. 21.
Ibid., p. 90.

Ibid., p. 115.


Widfeldt pp. 4-7.

See Otto Kirchheimer, “The Transformation of Western European Party Systems”, in LaPalombara and Weiner pp.177–200. This is despite Kirchheimer himself claiming that Agrarian parties could not become catch-all parties writing:

“Neither a small, strictly regional party such as the South Tyrolean People’s party, nor a party built around the espousal of harsh and limited ideological claims, like the Dutch Calvinists; or transitory group claims, such as the German refugees; or a specific professional category’s claims, such as the Swedish Agrarians; or a limited action program, such as the Danish single-tax Justice Party, can aspire to a catch-all performance.”


This view has been challenged by David Arter. See David Arter, “From Class Party to Catchall Party?: The Adaptation of the Finnish Agrarian-Center Party”, *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 22.2, 1999 pp. 157-190.
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