

New Europe College Yearbook 2010-2011



IONUȚ FLORIN BILIUȚĂ
DUNYA DENIZ ÇAKIR
ANA-MARIA GOILAV
MARIANA GOINA
SILVIU-RADIAN HARITON
SUSAN MBULA KILONZO
CRISTIAN NAE
THEODOR-CRISTIAN POPESCU
COSMIN GABRIEL RADU
KONRAD SIEKIERSKI
ANDREEA ȘTEFAN

Editor: Irina Vainovski-Mihai

Copyright – New Europe College
ISSN 1584-0298

New Europe College
Str. Plantelor 21
023971 Bucharest
Romania

www.nec.ro; e-mail: nec@nec.ro
Tel. (+4) 021.307.99.10, Fax (+4) 021. 327.07.74



SUSAN MBULA KILONZO

Born in August 1979, in Machakos, Kenya

Ph.D., Maseno University, Kenya (2008)

Dissertation: *Christian Diversity and Community Development in Vihiga District, Kenya*

Senior Lecturer, Department of Religion, Theology & Philosophy, Maseno University, Kenya

Associate research Fellow, Open University, Milton Keynes, UK (2009-2012)

Research Grants and Fellowships: International Development Centre (African Researchers' Grant on Youth and Development in Africa), Open University, Milton Keynes, UK (2009), UPEACE Africa (2008-2010)

Attended conferences, seminars, training workshops and summer schools in over 25 countries across Africa, North & South America and Europe

Book:

Christian Diversity and Community Development: Role of Christian Denominations in Human Physical, Social, Cultural, and Spiritual Development in Vihiga District, Kenya, Lambert Academic Publishing, 2010, ISBN 987-3-8383-9074-1

Published over 20 journal articles and chapters in internationally peer-reviewed volumes

THE POTENTIAL OF THE CHURCH AS A COMMUNITY INSTITUTION IN PEACEBUILDING IN AFRICA LESSONS FROM KENYA'S ETHNIC CONFLICTS

Introduction

The 2007 general election in Kenya is reminisced as an event that exemplified destruction that ethnic politics can have on a country. It was clear that most Kenyan politicians are ethnically aligned and divided in political endeavors. They are using the ethnic card to survive and hang on to power. This paper however argues that in this kind of pandemonium, where human rights find little or no respect from these leaders, there is yet another institution that can be non-tribal and non-partisan because it is a separate entity from the state. This institution is the Church. When politicians are divided and seek to divide the populace along ethnic lines, pitting one ethnic community against the other; when support for political positions is sought along ethnic boundaries and when ethnic enclaves are thought to be the safest anchorages for securing not only political positions but also economic resources; religious groups, and especially the leaders' plausibly, should rise above partisan politics to speak not only for the voiceless in the society but also condemn the atrocities committed by the ruling government and individual political leaders. They have the potential to pull together human capital towards a more unified and autonomous state that is not based on ethnic rifts but on humanity as one race that serves for interests of peace for all. There are however questions that the paper raises from the experience that Kenya has had in pre- and post-election violence in the country which started in 1992, and whose heightened crisis was manifested in 2007 general

elections. Has the Church been able to valiantly condemn the atrocities committed by the government against innocent citizens? Has it been able to rise above bigoted politics and unite people across the ethnic divides? Do politicians respect the voice (if any) of religious leaders? If not, why? Is the Church as an independent institution relevant and credible in Kenyan political environment?

There are two dichotomies that the paper employs to analyze the involvement (or lack of it) of the Church in peacebuilding efforts in Kenya. In the era of Kenya National African Union (KANU), major Christian denominations including the Catholic Church, Anglican Church of Kenya and Presbyterian Church of East Africa were known to be outspoken about the crimes committed by and through the state. In the 2007 general elections however, partisan politics ruled the Church and it became difficult for most of them to stand out from the affiliation and call for a return to peace during the post-election violence. This paper will explore these trajectories in an effort of showcasing the credibility and relevance (or lack of the same) by Christian groups in the country. The arguments and sediments in this paper are triggered by the experience that Kenyans had in the wake of 2007/8 post-election violence that culminated into an orgy ethnic cleansing process in most parts of the country leaving an estimate of 1,200 people dead and over 350,000 internally displaced (IDPs) and over 300 churches burned, but also draws related examples from past ethnic clashes that have, in the history of the country, been witnessed before, during, and after elections.

The paper gives a brief historical account of political and land related ethnic clashes since 1992 so as to have a lens through which the role of the Church can be examined. The discussion may not provide specific case studies to empirically substantiate the arguments but draws examples from the different Christian groups for contextualization. The first part of the paper gives background information about the country and historicizes the genesis of ethnic politics. The second part defines peace, peacebuilding and religious peacebuilding and examines brief case studies where interventions by religious groups have worked towards institutionalizing peace. The third part analyses the efforts of the Church in building peace in Kenya's political ethnic conflicts.

Background Information

Kenya got her independence from the British colony in December 1963 and was led by Jomo Kenyatta as the first president. He died in 1978 and Daniel Arap Moi took over. Moi had served as Kenyatta's vice president since 1966. During Kenyatta's reign, the political regime was dominated by Kikuyu elite from Kenyatta's home district-Kiambu. Kenyatta is also said to have favored those of his tribe by allocating them fertile lands and allowing them to occupy certain spaces in the city (Kagwanja 2005, Turner & Brownhill 2001, Smedt 2009). Moi, unlike Kenyatta, came from a smaller ethnic community-the Kalenjin. He was deemed the right candidate to steer the country towards a more accommodating human rights era without ethnic supremacy. At first, this seemed to work because Moi promised an administration that would not condone tribalism and corruption. In due course however, his concern became the Kikuyus and Luos who seemed to be against his leadership. He therefore began to centralize and personalize power.

In 1982 Moi amended Act number 7 of the Kenyan constitution and introduced section 2 (A) that made the country a de jure one party state to maim the leaders who wanted to campaign for presidency. He criminalized competitive politics and critics of his leadership by use of the security forces. He also banned all ethnic welfare centered associations and extended his control mechanisms to elections. The queue voting system replaced the secret ballot with voters feeling intimidated to line up behind the candidates. The electoral system personnel were all answerable to the president. He interfered with the judicial process and 'kalenjinized' all the public and private sectors as he 'de-kikuyunized' the same. Moi's remaining worry by 1990's however was the Church, particularly the Anglican Church of Kenya, the Catholic Church and the Presbyterian Church of East Africa. These accounted for over 70% of Christians in the country. Together with the umbrella body, National Christian Council of Kenya (NCCCK), they continued to criticize his authoritarian rule. Since 1980s, the Church had remained the central locus of dissent against Moi regime with the pro-democracy and human rights movement using cathedrals and compounds of churches as venues for expressing their views and drawing plans of action.

With continued outcry from both the oppressed and the Church, the international community, especially the U.S Congress condemned the atrocities of Moi's leadership and passed the foreign export financing

and related programs appropriation Act of 1991 requiring Kenya to meet certain conditions before \$15 million in economic and military aid could be disbursed. The government repealed section 2(A) of the constitution allowing multipartyism again in December 1991. Despite the return of multipartyism, Moi and his Kalenjin allies did all they could to hold onto power for 10 more years. Moi not only used divide and rule politics but also instrumented violence and used youth militias and gangs to silence his opponents. Both 1992 and 1997 general election processes were not just quite flawed but characterized by violence that was dubbed 'ethnic' and 'land' clashes (quite a number of scholarly works have historicized the atrocities committed by both Kenyatta and Moi government, some of which include: Kagwanja & Southall 2009, Steeves 2006, Lynch 2006; 2008, Lonsdale 1994, Branch & Cheeseman 2009, Klopp 2002). This political history of violence can explain the repeated occurrence of violence in the country. Much of the ethnic violence that has recently plagued Kenya and claimed several thousand lives has its roots not in fundamental ethnic rivalries, but rather in politics of ethnic coalitions (for explanations see *inter alia* Omolo 2002, Steeves 2006, and Kagwanja 2005).

Kenya is divided into eight provinces and each ethnic group can easily be rightly placed within a given province, as well as a smaller geographical locality-say a district. This means that the political leaders are ethnically elected, especially the members of parliament, who have to campaign within their constituencies. To this end, ethnic identities have been used to tailor the country's politics. A Map of Kenyan provinces and major ethnic groups appears hereunder:




Fig. 1 Map of Kenyan Provinces and Major Ethnic Groups

Kenya's population of 38, 610, 097 (2009 population census) is highly heterogeneous with 42 different ethnic groups. Some of the major ethnic groups include the Kikuyu (22 percent of the population), the Luhya (14 percent), the Luo (13 percent), the Kalenjin (12 percent), the Kamba (11 percent), the Kisii (6 percent), and the Meru (6 percent).¹ Dozens of languages are spoken, with a set of borders imposed on it by an outside colonial power, a national government that asserts authority across those ethnic divides and a system of government not entirely consistent with traditional Kenyan notions of authority or governance.

While the diverse ethnic groups may be seen as a rich socio-cultural diversity they have acted as a tool for political, social, cultural, and sometimes economic divide. The numerous parties in the country have been forming alliances depending on ethnic strengths to support presidential candidates in the general elections. In corroboration with this, Steeves (2006) explaining the role of ethnicity and leadership in the

country notes that big men shift alliances, parties and coalitions for their own and community's interest. These political alliances have therefore been sources of ethnic rivalries in the country. The history behind the land clashes which has been used as a political tool for ethnic cleansing, and which, to a great extent was used as a basis for triggering the ethnic purging during the post-election violence of the 2007/8 in the country, for example, was and is still attributed to the political manipulation of the ethnic differences and ethnic territorial settlements in the country. This touches the very core of peaceful co-existence of the people of Kenya. This is therefore eating into the community's socioeconomic and political institutions, and now the religious groupings, with a worrying effect.

The religious groups are very diverse in the country. Religious diversity ranges from missionary religions from Europe, America and Asia as well as African initiated churches. Christianity is widely practiced though. Statistically, Mbiti (1973:144-5) explains that Kenya is one of the most Christian countries in Africa with 78% of her population following the faith. Christianity has mushroomed denominationally with emergence of sects, cults and denominations which could be characterized as schisms, novels and renewals. Islam is the second largest religion in the country with a following of about 10% of the population. Besides, there are indigenous religious groups that mostly counter Western religiosity and try to maintain the traditional beliefs and practices of Kenyans. This paper will purposively give a keen focus and draw examples from Christianity to explain the relevance of the religion in conflict situations of the country. The term Church will be widely used to refer to the institution of Christian groups in the country, whether mainline, Pentecostal charismatic and splinter groups, or the African Instituted Churches. Reports² of the 2007 post-election violence revealed that more than 300 churches were burned down in different parts of the country. This raises critical questions on the respect and morality of churches that were once vital in the history of the country.

Historicizing Ethnic Clashes in Kenya: A brief Overview

Kenyan political climate has been characterized by ethnic tensions for a long time. These historical tensions are not just related to political positions but also land and other territorial occupations. Smedt (2009) warns that, as most people have tended to argue, it would be oversimplification to

just see the violence in Kenya as an ethnic or tribal problem. There are quite a number of underlying precipitating factors such as land, weakening of government systems (especially the judiciary), and the gradual loss of the state monopoly of legitimate force, allowing proliferation of militias and gangs which are manipulated and used by the politicians in pursuit of electoral victory. Other factors, according to Smedt include economic and political exclusion and ethnicized discourse of Kenyan politics. The history of especially the land clashes can be linked to the influence by the British colonization on land allocations and territorial occupations (for detailed discussion see Rutten and Owuor 2009).³

Discussing the politics of patronage-client in Kenya, Smedt (2009) gives a brief expose of how such politics occupies Kenya's past and present. It sure was one of the characteristics of pre-colonial ethnic communities where local 'big-men' exercised authority by sharing out their wealth with the obedient poor. During the colonial period, the British introduced ethnically defined administrative units (tribes), and as a result ethnic groups became political tribes. The 'big man' stayed. Daley (2006) cites research that has shown that colonial regimes grouped people into ethnic groups and conveniently used them for the purposes of political control. It was however expected that, with the advent of modernity, the social knot from the colonial groupings would vanish and put ethnic enclaves into a halt. These cocoons have however persisted to date. In independent Kenya, Kenyatta encouraged the emergence of 'big men' through patron-client relationships which widened nascent ethnic divisions. The elite colluded with Kenyatta to access privileges without sympathy for the poor. In addition, during colonial times, white settlers worked closely with the Kikuyu in the farms. Then at independence in 1963, some of the best land was taken over by the Kikuyu, even if it belonged to other ethnic groups before colonization. Moi's reign worsened the situation through his approach of 'Kalenjinizing' public and private sectors and also through divide and rule politics. Many politicians resulted into political tribalism, the deliberate use and manipulation of ethnic identity in political competitions.

Serious tribal clashes in Kenya began in the Rift Valley Province on 29th October, 1991 (just before the 1992 general elections), at a farm known as Miteitei, situated in the heart of Tinderet Division, in Nandi District, pitting the Nandi, a Kalenjin tribe, against the Kikuyu, the Kamba, the Luhya, the Kisii, and the Luo.⁴ The clashes quickly spread to other farms in the area and into Kipkelion Division of Kericho District, which had a multi-ethnic

composition of people, among them the Kalenjin, the Kisii and the Kikuyu. Later in early 1992, the clashes spread to Molo, Olenguruone, Londiani, and other parts of Kericho, Trans Nzoia, UasinGishu and many other parts of the Rift Valley Province. In 1993, the clashes spread to Enoosupukia, Naivasha and parts of Narok, and the Trans Mara Districts. In these areas, the Kipsigis and the Maasai were pitted against the Kikuyu, the Kisii, the Kamba and the Luhya, among other tribes. The clashes revived in Laikipia and Njoro in 1998, pitting the Samburu and the Pokot against the Kikuyu in Laikipia, and the Kalenjin mainly against the Kikuyu in Njoro. The raiders were well organized and coordinated. The attacks were barbaric, callous and calculated to drive out the targeted groups from their farms, to cripple them economically and to psychologically traumatize them.

In general, the clashes started and ended suddenly, and left a trail of destruction, suffering and disruption of life. The causes of the clashes have been given as conflict over land, cattle rustling, political differences and ecological reasons among others. It is however evident that the re-introduction of multi-partyism in December 1991 tended to magnify and fuel tribal loyalties and to complicate the resolution of inter-tribal border conflicts not only, along the Trans Mara South Kisii border but also, along the cutline between the Samburu-Pokot and the Kikuyu in Laikipia among other areas (Akiwumi Report on tribal clashes in the Rift Valley, 2005-<http://www.scribd.com/doc/2204752/Akiwumi-Report-Rift-Valley-Province>). Reports by the Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC) indicate that from 1991 to 1996, over 15,000 people died, and over 300,000 were displaced in the contested areas. In the run up to the 1997 general elections, new violence erupted at the Coast killing over 100 people and displacing over 100,000. Other incidences of politically instigated clashes were witnessed between 1999 and 2005 (also see Klopp 2002, Ndegwa 2005 and Odhiambo2004). According to Klopp (2002) the regime pioneered the *Majimbo* (regionalism/federalism⁵) system of leadership that incited the local community (Kalenjins) to evict the minority ethnic groupings in the Rift Valley province.

The continued use of militia by the state to perpetrate violence marked the departure of institutionalization of violence, but also birth and re-birth of a wide range of militia groups, which targeted the need to fight for their territorial occupation. The struggle for land as Musambayi (2005:507) argues, pits those who promote capitalist enterprises against those who reassert a subsistence political economy in concert with others worldwide engaged in popular globalization from below including the springing

up of certain movements in the examples that suffice here are the youth banned movements such as Mungiki and the Kalenjiwarriors.⁶ The violent activities of these movements have been well documented by scholars *inter alia* Jacqueline Klopp (2002), Turner and Brownhill (2005) Mutuma Ruteere (2008), Musambayi Katumanga (2005), David Anderson (2005).

The use of the militia (most of which are founded within ethnic groups, for example, Mungiki-Kikuyu, Baghdad Boys-Luo, Kalenjin warriors-Kalenjin) by the state and at times individual politicians is evident. Branch and Cheeseman (2008:15) argue that though the initial intention of the gang-formation may not have been for political purposes but rather in response to economic issues, the state or individual politicians later use these gangs for instrumentization of violence. The two scholars have more recently included elite fragmentation, political liberalization, and state informalization as factors that explain post-election violence in Kenya but also added that the “origins of each can be traced to the style of rule employed by Daniel Arap Moi”.

The organization of groups and especially into ethnic youth militias is perfectly exemplified in the Kenya’s 2007/8 post-election violence which brought to the surface deep-seated antipathy among the different ethnic groups in Kenya. The announcement of President Mwai Kibaki as the ultimate winner of a highly contested election by extra 231,728 votes over the Orange Democratic Movement’s (ODM) candidate, and the now Prime Minister Raila Odinga in the late afternoon of 30 December 2007 was the final blow for those who anticipated change in the political rule of the country. The chaos that followed in the country was an indication that certain Kenyan ethnic groupings were ready waiting for an opportune time. It was a time for reclaiming “territorial boundaries” that they thought “belonged” to them since before the country’s independence. The massacres left over 1,200 dead while the ethnic cleansing saw over 350,000 others displaced. The attacks were very well pre-planned with certain prominent leaders of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), beginning the preparations of a criminal plan to attack those identified as supporters of the Party of National Unity (PNU). A radio reporter with one of the ethnic FM stations, and a prominent ODM supporter, was a crucial part of the plan, using his radio program to collect supporters and provide signals to members of the plan on when and where to attack. The ODM leaders are said to have coordinated a series of actors and institutions to establish a network, using it to implement an organizational policy to commit crimes. Their two goals were: (1) to gain power in the Rift Valley

Province, and ultimately in the Republic of Kenya, and (2) to punish and expel from the Rift Valley those perceived to support the PNU (collectively referred to as “PNU supporters”).⁷ By 4 January 2008, it was evident that Kenya was facing a crisis not just due to unresolved contention of the election outcome but also what was becoming apparent killing and eviction of innocent ethnic groupings from their lands and occupations in several parts of the country.

As Orobator (2008) argues, the disillusionment of Kenyans with the political class, as well as Kenya’s politics of ethnic groupings has revived the debate over the role of religion in society in the country. The voices of Kenyans questioning the role of religiosities in times of conflicts cannot be ignored. The pictures depicting lack of respect for churches during post-election violence did not go unnoticed. Yet as Abuya (2009) argues, all over the world, places of worship have long provided a haven for those in need of shelter and security. On the other hand, international law recognizes the sanctity of churches. The law of armed conflict for instance prohibits parties from “any acts of hostility against places of worship”. They are places that have served as places of refuge for thousands of victims in different places. Unfortunately during the early days of Kenyan 2007/8 conflict, the most horrific act of barbarity was committed inside a church, where scores of innocent Kenyans were burned to death as they huddled together for safety and comfort. Churches have also served as gathering places for Kenyans seeking divine intervention. Millions continued to throng to places of worship to pray for peace to return to their land. A turn to religion for solace and relief highlights the critical role of religious leaders. The ability of religious leaders, as Orobator (2008) argues, to establish themselves as viable alternative agents and facilitators of peace in a time of crisis remains limited. This crisis proves that the church in Africa still lacks an effective mechanism of sociopolitical engagement towards peace and peacebuilding. The section that follows hereunder tries to explain the meaning of the terms peace, peacebuilding and religious peacebuilding.

Defining and Contextualizing the Term Peace

Generally, peace is described as a state of freedom, rest, quietness and calmness. In peace and conflict studies, the terms “negative peace” and “positive peace” are applied habitually. Negative peace

describes the absence of war or violent conflicts, whereas positive peace includes a comprehensive range of factors related to the creation and institutionalization of justice and freedom (Bangura, 2007:34). The complexity of these factors not only contributes to the absence of war, but also augments the totality of peace in human society. This means that positive peace should gratify human needs as well as contributing towards the fulfillment of human rights. Atrocities such as ethnic cleansing are a clear indication that there are unaddressed issues within communities that can lead to conflict and the use of force and abuse of human rights. This paper conceptualizes peace as a state and process of calmness in which community members through the help of the community institutions (particularly religious institutions) endeavor to maintain peaceful co-existence, and in case of conflicts, they aspire to resolve them amicably and resolute to work towards developing their livelihoods as a way of enhancing transformative and sustainable peacebuilding efforts.

Weber (2004:32) argues that it is not surprising that after the mass slaughter of World War II and the feat of Nuclear Armageddon in the late 1950s, the budding discipline of peace research concentrated on the elimination of international armed conflict. Peace then was interpreted as an absence of war and the discipline of peace research left other social problems to different disciplines. Weber explains that peace is too often simply understood as the damping down of conflicts that are aimed at changing the *status quo*. Galtung (1969a) shows that the search for peace should move from direct violence and its elimination (which is negative peace) to the broader agenda that also includes structural violence and its elimination (thus moving towards positive peace). Structural violence is an indirect form of violence built into social, political and economic structures which give rise to unequal power and consequently unequal life opportunities. It includes exploitation, alienation, marginalization, poverty, deprivation, misery, among others. In the presence of negative peace therefore, the societal structures are still not at peace and so there is a likelihood of a rebound into conflicts. This has been the situation in Kenya since 1992. On his article on [...] *insane nations and insane states*, Galtung (1998) provides three relevant points that illustrate how violence is propagated as well as accepted as a cultural vice within the communities. He gives the following three points:

1. People posing as normal prepare mass murder.
2. Most of us live in systems that repress, exploit, or both and we do nothing about it.

3. Some of us justify, even glorify, the aforementioned as human nature.

These are three forms of violence (direct, structural and cultural-also see Galtung1969b). Violence is prepared, threatened and carried out intentionally (direct) or unintentionally (structural). Failure to address root causes of conflict implies that the grounds for peace are not solid enough and any wrong move, either from the community of the state, could easily trigger violence. In times of violence non-governmental organizations, civil organizations and as well as other community based institutions including religious bodies have been shelters for the targeted communities. They have been active in ensuring peacebuilding processes as well as a strong aid in reconstructing communities that are emerging from effects of wars. They are also strong sources of trauma healing for the affected. This however does not mean that the masses can escape the need for building positive peace which eliminates the root causes of strife and antagonism.

Peacebuilding

Drawing from the works of Johan Galtung (1969a) and other peace researchers, the former UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali Boutros, initially defined peacebuilding in relation to a conflict-continuum that passed from pre-conflict prevention, through peacemaking and peacekeeping. By unearthing this concept Ghali defined it as an action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict (Call, 2008; Barnett, *et al.*; 2007). As a contemporary policy term, 'peace building' has a general but imprecise meaning. It is most usually understood as a set of transitional reconstruction activities undertaken in a postwar phase, designed to lay the foundation for longer-term developments such as democratization, economic development and social justice. As the term progressively came into use in the 1990s, it typically referred to international assistance to implement peace agreements after civil wars, commonly organized under the UN and, more rarely, under ad hoc institutions (Astri, Kristian and Arne 2002:876).

To Call, peacebuilding are actions undertaken by international or national actors to institutionalize peace, understood as the absence of armed conflict and a modicum of participatory politics. It is more than the elimination of armed conflict-a process that aims at creation of positive

peace by eliminating the root causes of conflict so that the actors no longer have the motive to use violence to settle their differences (Call, 2008:3; Barnett *et al.*, 2007). The latter argue that peacebuilding means more than stability promotion. It is designed to recreate a positive peace, to eliminate the root causes of conflict, to allow states and societies to develop stable expectations of peaceful change. According to Butros (1995), peacebuilding as a process facilitates the establishment of durable peace and tries to prevent the recurrence of violence by addressing root causes and effects of conflict through reconciliation, institution building, and political as well as economic transformation. In cases where the violence has resulted from political squabbles, the government takes long to re-examine the effects of her oversights. The situation is even worse in cases where the crises of violence have to be settled through sharing of power, like in the example of Kenya-2007/8 post-election violence. For violence to end, power sharing deal had to be steered by Mr. Koffi Anan through UN initiative. Studies have indicated that in such deals, concerned parties become more focused on what shares go to either side (Yakinthou 2009, Noel 2009, Bercovitch & Kadayifci 2009, Wolpe & McDonald 2008). Little attention is paid to the peace building processes to enhance healing within the affected communities (see Amr Abdalla 2001:159-160).

Donais (2009:6) argues that there are different perspectives of peacebuilding, with the liberals insisting that it entails global norms surrounding principles of good governance which should carry weight. The second vision of peacebuilding affiliated with eminent conflict resolution practitioners such as John Paul Lederach is what has come to be known as peacebuilding from below and a model which this paper adopts. This is concerned with the need to nurture and create the political, social, and economic space within which indigenous actors can identify, develop and employ the resources necessary to build a just, peaceful and prosperous society. As opposed to liberal counterpart, the second perspective is communitarian in character. Communitarian approaches stress the need for tradition and social contexts in determining the legitimacy and appropriateness of particular visions of justice and ethics. In this case, good governance must derive from and resonate with the habits and tradition of actual people living in specific times and places. In some quarters, this has been referred to as "Track II" diplomacy (for example see Jafari 2007). Unofficial or "Track II" diplomacy, demonstrates that civil society actors perform a key role in conflict resolution and may help to facilitate the actions of official government diplomacy. The need for local ownership

is imperative. Active participation of the locals remains relevant because any peace process that is not embraced by those who live with it is likely to fail (Donais 2009). This is the approach that this paper employs.

Conceptualizing the Role of the Church (Religion) in Peacebuilding

The possible role or involvement of religion in politics is still regarded with much distrust, which can be explained by several contributing factors. First, due to the religious wars during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Peace of Augsburg (1555) and the Peace of Westphalia (1648) established the principle of *cuius regio, eius religio* (each region its religion) as a way to deal with religious diversity within Christianity and to ensure that religions would play no role in interstate relations. In other words, tolerance appeared to be the means to establish peace between religions *across* borders. Hence, the problem of religion in the “international” scene was “solved,” namely by keeping it out of this sphere; however, this left many unanswered questions about religious plurality *within* societies. Second, the enlightenment’s suspicion of tradition and its emphasis on the human person as a rational individual led to a shift in focus to this latter, unanswered issue. The birth of “the individual” and the focus on its autonomy played a vital role in the emergence of individual religious tolerance, implying freedom of choice, speech and conscience (Funk and Ellen 2010:740). Debates over involvement of religion in the public have been ongoing (see for example Okullu 2003; Stichel & Deckard 2010). The discussion will not delve attention to these debates since there is already an indication that some religious groups have broken through the ice to take part in ‘secular’ issues, and are already in the limelight as either positive or negative conduits of peacebuilding. The focus is on the involvement (or lack of it) of Christian religious groups in Kenya’s peacebuilding processes.

At a descriptive level, it is important to see that religions do, *de facto*, contribute to society, for better or for worse. Religion is however ascribed to as a force that be used as a tool for peace and development but also a source of destruction and harm. Batson (1993:4) explains that the mass suicide and the murder of the 913 members of people temple in Jonestown, Guyana in 1979 was a chilling reminder of the potentials of destructiveness of religious fanaticism. A relevant example too is the

suicide bombing of the twin towers in America on 11 September 2001 and the bombings of the underground transport systems in London in July 2005. Wars and crusades have been waged in the name of religion as have persecutions and torture. Religion is however a powerful component and tool for effecting change. As Haynes (1998) explains,

“there is no such thing as religion without consequences for value systems. Group religiosity like politics, is a matter of collective solidarities and, frequently, of inter-group tension and conflict, focusing either on shared or disagreed images of the sacred, or, on cultural and class, in short, political matter”.

Kristian and Hanne (2008) aver that religion is not just individual. It is also social, offering each believer a sense of belonging to the community of fellow believers. It serves both as a compass for individuals as well as the community, locating the believers within extended ontological setting. It is an identity indicator which has the potential to gather or scatter for peacebuilding, and conflict as well. Many religions are relatively independent of the state. They may lack official status but not relevance. Neglecting them in issues related to conflicts might therefore be detrimental; one, because these groups are also familiar with people's needs. An example that suffices here is the Oslo Accord where Oslo was brokering peace between Israel and the Palestinians. The religious actors were ignored and to date these actors still ignore the Accord (Kristian & Hanne 2008; Omer 2007:110). With the noted potentials religious groups have the strength for speedy, effective community organization, mobilization and influence.

There is a rapidly growing literature on the relationship between religion and peacebuilding (Appleby 2002; Johnston 2003; Duedet 2006; Kristian & Hanne 2008). According to Kristian & Hanne (2008:352), despite its intensity, influence and magnitude, worldwide, religion is a multifaceted phenomenon which shapes one's explanation of its very role in the society. The two scholars further argue that within the discipline of religious studies, it is common to distinguish between two basic perspectives: On the one hand, there is the substantive approach which focuses on the elements that constitute religion, or what religion is. This is contrasted on the other hand by the functionalist approach, which focuses on the social and cultural consequences of religion, or what religion does for a social group or for an individual.

The question of religion, conflict and peace came to worldwide attention with the decline of the Cold War and the collapse of the former Soviet Union. Discussion of the connection of religion and violent national or civil conflict emerged in earnest in the early 1990s as a result of the dissolution of communism in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (Little 2005:96). However, it is also important to note that even as the Cold War existed, ethno religious conflicts had also persisted in places like Sri Lanka, Bosnia, Israel/Palestine and Northern Ireland. These conflicts were however not taken seriously. In recent years, there has been a rising interest in how religion can be used in both conflict resolution and the peacebuilding process (see Shore 2008). The association between religion and extremism is two-way: religious groups get involved in politics and secular groups utilize religion for political ends (Brewer, Higgins and Teeney 2010:1020).

For Stichel & Deckard (2010:740), there are good reasons to claim that religion should play a good role in peacebuilding and conflict-resolution. This is because religions are already public actors, however, they are not yet sufficiently integrated involved and engaged in peacebuilding. Some religious actors have, from historical evidences, made significant contributions to peacebuilding. This is because, as Stichel and Deckard (2010:746) argue, the processes associated with reconciliation – confession, repentance, forgiveness, mercy, conversion, among others, based on self-reflection and acceptance of personal responsibility – have emerged from religious and not secular backgrounds.

The importance of religious peacebuilding is obvious from the widespread, central role religion plays in the individual and collective identity of warring communities. However scholarly works indicate that religion has been politicized and war-justifying aspects of sacred texts emphasized rather than peaceful teachings (Abu-Nimer 2001, Little 2005). The rise of religious fundamentalism in politics is cited as a barometer of what Putzel (1997) calls the darker side of social capital (also see Shore 2008). There have been controversial views about the involvement of religion in the secular activities including politics. Armstrong (2007: 208) argues that Christian fundamentalists are ambivalent about peace – and especially peace in the Middle East – because their interpretation of the Bible is that the end times will be characterized by war in the region and that the antichrist will disguise itself as a peacemaker.

When we view religion as strictly a promoter of violence or dismiss it as irrelevant to our goals, we risk misunderstanding the local dynamics

of conflict and simultaneously overlook a potent resource for addressing urgent conflicts. Religion, with its unmatched authority among many communities in every region of the world, carries within it a diverse set of traditions and methodologies that promote peace. If attention is paid to religion, the focus remains on the extremist beliefs and actions of a minority, rather than the ways it guides and inspires the majority and can be harnessed for good (Jafari 2007:111-2). Many of today's wars as Haynes (1998) avers are protracted civil wars, causing dramatic societal changes. The wars and the transformation resulting thereby define the opportunities that religious groups have on their potentials either to play a positive or negative role. In this case, their community function can either be weakened or strengthened depending on their ability to (or not to) respond.

"Religious peacebuilding", a term for a relatively new focus within the academic field of conflict and peace studies, makes its own case for the necessity of interaction between religions and political activity (Stichel & Deckard, 2010:744; Boulding, 1986). Religious peacebuilding according to Appleby (2000) can be defined as a "comprehensive, theoretically sophisticated and systematic process performed by religious and secular actors working in collaboration at different levels and at various proximities to conflict zones". This field may involve religious and secular actors working in collaboration at different levels and at various proximities to resolve conflicts in zones of war and conflict. "Religious peacemakers" therefore can be defined as religious individuals or representatives of faith-based organizations that attempt to help resolve inter-group conflicts and build peace (Gopin 2005; Ellis & ter Haar 2005). Appleby (2006: 1-2) explains that these groups are most likely to be successful when they: have an international or transnational reach; consistently emphasize peace and avoidance of the use of force in resolving conflict; have good relations between different religions in a conflict situation, as this will be the key to a positive input from them.

Where social institutions are weak or government is viewed as illegitimate, Sampson (1997) avers that faith-based institutions and local religious leaders often play a critical role in meeting the needs of their communities. Islamic teachings for example advocate for amicable approaches to resolving strife. Both Islamic religion and tradition have a multitude of resources with which conflicts can be resolved peacefully and nonviolently. Islamic scripture and religious teachings are rich sources of values, beliefs, and strategies that promote the peaceful and

nonviolent resolution of conflicts (Abu-Nimer 2000-2001:219, Niazi 2009, Na'im 2006, Manus 1998, Abu-Nimer and Ayse 2008). The faith based institutions therefore carry moral authority, define social values and goals and are often most trusted among the people.

Some relevant case studies

The involvement of religious actors in peacebuilding has not been without success despite the criticisms from peacebuilding practitioners, state agents and the scholarly world. There are efforts by religious groups in different parts trying to take necessary action towards building peace. Taking an example of Poland, the transition from communism was strongly supported officially by the Catholic Church (Herbert 2003). Catholic clubs were formed as intellectual spaces to envision a new Poland but they also facilitated the development of an independent movement of intellectuals, utilizing human rights discourse against the government, and protesting against the government's own constitutional reforms. The church traversed from local parish to diocese, going between national and global networks, articulating on many stages its intellectual challenge to communism. But the political confrontation was not only intellectual, for the church materially and culturally assisted Solidarity in its active engagement with the political peace process. The Pope eventually provided much of the vocabulary for Solidarity on human rights (Herbert 2003:205).

The churches were wholly excluded from the public political process in Northern Ireland that negotiated the Good Friday Agreement, in large part because of anticipated internal disagreements over the settlement. Nevertheless, they were used as back channels of communication prior to the talks, and prominent church people have since been co-opted by the government to lead over-sight of decommissioning and to take forward the question of how the conflict should be remembered. The British government drew up a list of Protestant clergy who they thought they could recruit to sell the Good Friday Agreement, an idea later abandoned when it was leaked to the press; their principal target was Archbishop Robin Eames, Head of the Anglican Church (which is the established church in England, but disestablished in Northern Ireland), (Brewer, *et al.*, 2010).

In Africa, an example that suffices from the efforts of the Catholic Church is the role of Sant' Egidio. Sant'Egidio is a church-based public lay association, formally recognized by the Catholic Church but with

an autonomous statute (See Haynes 2009). While citing Smock (2004), Haynes (2009) explains that during the early 1980s Sant'Egidio became engaged in various international dialogues. The aim was to try to prevent or reduce tension between conflicting groups and to seek to mediate between them. Since then Sant'Egidio has played an active peace-building role in several African Religions in Mozambique, Nigeria and Cambodia 63 countries beset by civil war, including: Algeria, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Coˆte d'Ivoire, Mozambique and Sierra Leone. It has also been active in Colombia, Guatemala and Kosovo. In each case, the country was beset by serious conflict between polarized groups; in some cases conditions were exacerbated by the fact that the effectiveness of central government to administer had diminished significantly.

One of the clearest success stories of Sant'Egidio's peacemaking efforts occurred between 1989 and 1992 when the organization was extremely influential in resolving the civil war that had ravaged Mozambique since the mid-1970s. Following well-intentioned but eventually unsuccessful efforts to end the war emanating from the international community, Archbishop Goncalves thought Sant'Egidio might succeed in bringing the government together to talk peace with the rebels of the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) insurgents. Sant'Egidio could set up a meeting between RENAMO and the government without it meaning that the RENAMO rebels would be regarded as an entity with the same status as the ruling regime. But Sant'Egidio also had a second important asset: 'humble awareness of its own shortcomings in orchestrating international diplomacy, which caused it to seek out the special expertise of governments and international organizations' (Smock 2004: 1). These efforts were complemented not only by the United Nations but also by 10 national governments, including those of the United States, Italy, Zimbabwe and Kenya. Once peace negotiations were successfully completed in 1992, the United Nations assumed responsibility for the implementation of the peace agreement (Haynes 2009, Appleby 2006).

Nigeria can be cited as a case resulting from religious dialogue. Since the 1960s religion has been prominent in Nigerian civil conflict where missionaries and religious partisans see themselves in a zero-sum game to win souls, sometimes entering into deadly conflict. Haynes (2009) argues that there has been a long history of rivalries between Christians and Muslims in the country. A specific case that we can highlight here is the occurrences of the late 1980s when Muslim members of the Constituent Assembly wanted Sharia law in the Nigerian constitution,

while Christians would not countenance such a move. Negotiations on the issue broke down (and were to an extent superseded by other controversies) whilst President Babangida was forced to affirm in October 1988 that Nigeria would remain a secular state. Tensions between the two communities had already escalated into political violence. In early 1987, and again in May and October 1991, anti-Christian riots broke out in parts of northern Nigeria (Maier 2001). In total, over 3,000 people were killed in Christian–Muslim clashes between 1987 and 1993. From the early 1990s, inter-religious violence became a common feature of life in Nigeria, primarily involving Muslim and Christian communities. One of the worst-hit regions was the northern state of Kaduna (Haynes 1996). This led in 1995 to the founding of the Muslim–Christian Dialogue Forum (MCDF), a charity to foster Christian–Muslim dialogue. It was the result of the combined efforts of two former enemies – a Christian pastor, James Movel Wuye, and a Muslim imam, Muhammed Nurayn Ashafa, both esteemed members of their religious communities. They served as joint national coordinators of MCDF, based in Kaduna. Both made the decision to turn away from similar paths of violence and militancy. Instead, they embraced non-violence, reconciliation and the advocacy of peaceful relations between their communities, and sought to encourage others to join them in this goal (Haynes 2009).

The ‘truth’ recovery process in South Africa was led by the churches through the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), and Archbishop Tutu in particular, for they had a residue of legitimacy that came from their strong anti-apartheid credentials (Brewer, Higgins and Teeney 2010). The commission is believed to have played a key role in the political negotiations between Nelson Mandela’s African National Congress and F.W de Klerk’s National Party which ended over 40 years of apartheid (Shore, 2008:161). Though in the proceedings of the TRC there was little or no mention of justice, in the hearings there was an explicit appeal to religion, especially Christianity, as a legitimate method for truth-telling, and as a way to foster reconciliation among former enemies. The TRC adopted a more restorative approach (forgiveness+reconciliation) than a retributive one (Justice=Punishment). This approach was not fair to those who wanted justice and therefore TRC adopted the African concept of *Ubuntu*, which is translated from the Xhosa axiom “*umuntu ngumuntu ngabaye bantu*”, meaning people are people through other people. This approach created artificial polarity between reconciliation (*Ubuntu*) instead of adopting Western retributive approaches of justice. The TRC is an example of an

international conflict resolution process in which Christianity played a central role, and as such considered a prototype by some scholars, policy analysts and others seeking to advance an alternative approach to conventional international conflict resolution (Shore 2008:162).

Religious conflict resolution and peacebuilding processes are therefore alternative approaches to conflict resolution that incorporates religious thought in the resolution mechanisms. The simple thesis according to Shore (2008) is that if religion can be used to fuel conflicts; if it can be used to hurt or harm (thus a source of violence) the, it should be in one way or the other considered in conflict-resolution and peacebuilding processes, otherwise key resources from religion will be overlooked and sacrificed.

Religion and peacebuilding in Kenya

The task here is to explain the participation of churches especially in the ethnic clashes that have preceded or succeeded general elections since the introduction of the multiparty system in the country in December 1991. I will do so by offering an analysis of whether their participation was active and or passive. I begin by looking at their role from a historical perspective in order to contextualize their participation in a post elections violence setting.

Mue (2008) uses critical-historical approach to explain the failure of religious groups and specifically the role of the church in post-colonial Africa. He argues that the Church did well in supporting the colonial administration but did not act to condemn the social injustices of the colonial era, preferring instead to engage in political diplomacy with colonial powers. Though it may be noted that the missionaries and the colonialists were one and the same (as the saying goes; the flag followed the cross), later leadership in African churches would seem was undertaken by African leaders, who did little to condemn the injustices of the political leaders of the time. The leadership of first and second presidents of Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta and Arap Moi respectively, evidence unspeakable forms of injustices, notably the assassinations of senior and junior political leaders who dared expose the ills of the government. Other injustices included harsh laws and restrictions on press freedom and academic freedom, elections rigging and corruption. These injustices took place as religious groups and leadership watched in silence especially during the Kenyatta regime.

During Moi's regime, some Church leaders teamed up to condemn the election rigging as well as corruption and the detentions that people faced without trials. This was in the late 1970s and early 1980s before Kenya became a *de jure* one party state. The Church had remained the central locus of dissent against the Moi regime, with the pro-democracy and human rights movements using Church compounds to express their views. The leaders too remained outspoken and condemned the atrocities committed by Moi against his rivals. For example, Bishop Henry Okullu of the Anglican Diocese of Maseno, teamed up with Bishop David Gitari, Rev. Dr. Timothy Njoya of the Presbyterian Church of Eastern Africa, Rev. Dr. Julius Kobia, the General Secretary of the NCCCK, Bishop Prof. Zablon Nthamburi of the Methodist Church, Archbishop Raphael Mwana'a Nzeki of the Catholic Church, Archbishop Manases Kuria of the Anglican Church of Kenya, Archbishop Zacchaeus Okoth of the Catholic Church-Kisumu Diocese, Archbishop John Njue of the Catholic Church, and Bishop Alexander Muge of the Eldoret Anglican Diocese (Gathogo 2007). Through the NCCCK, the Church consistently criticized Moi's authoritarian regime. The state however seemed to hunt down some of the church leaders in attempted assassinations. In 1989 Bishop David Gitari escaped death narrowly after he screamed as he moved to the top of his storied house thereby inviting his friendly neighbors who thwarted the killing ordered by Moi (Gathogo 2007). Presbyterian minister Rev. Timothy Njoya was arrested in 1988 for suggesting that Kenyans should hold discussions on critical questions affecting the Country. Bishop Alexander Muge was later killed in early 1990 in a mysterious road accident which was blamed on some government functionaries.

Immediately after the re-introduction of multipartyism in Kenya, Moi tactfully engaged in ethnic politics and instrumentized violence by the use of hired militia. This led to massacres and eviction of people from their legally owned lands. The aim was to have the opposition displaced just before elections and therefore prevent them from voting. Fear was instilled to the minority ethnic groups in certain regions through violence. The escalation of ethnic violence at the time saw a few courageous church leaders such as Bishops Henry Okullu, Alexander Muge and David Gitari of the Anglican Church of Kenya, Ndingi Mwana'a Nzeki of the Catholic Church, Rev. Timothy Njoya of Presbyterian Church of Kenya, Rev. Mutava Musyimi the secretary general of the NCCCK, and Fr. John Anthony Kaiser-a Mill Hill missionary priest from U.S.A, become vocal critics of the ethnic clashes instigated by Moi's leadership. The leaders

accused Moi of bull-doing the country without respect for human rights. Some of the leaders like Fr. Kaiser openly criticized Moi and indicated that they were ready to testify against him and his allies at the International Criminal Court on accounts of human rights abuse and death of innocent Kenyans. His outspokenness led to his assassination.

Fr. John Kaiser had lived in the country for over 36 years and was assassinated on August 24, 2000 in an early morning as he drove to Naivasha town in the Rift Valley. In the few years before his death, he had become the Voice of the People, unafraid to speak out against the corruption that permeated the Kenyan government. In public forums and in the Kenyan and international press, Kaiser accused Kenya's president, Daniel Arap Moi, of staging bloody tribal wars in order to drive people from their land and seize it for certain tribes. Throughout the 1990s, Kaiser had been followed, harassed, and even beaten and placed under house arrest by Kenyan police and the Criminal Investigation Department. In 1998, when Moi organized a tribunal called the Akiwumi Commission to look into the causes of ethnic violence, Kaiser was determined to testify. He assembled documents and traveled to Nairobi, where he spent several weeks sitting outside the courtroom waiting to be called. When he finally did take the stand in February 1999, his testimony caused a sensation. He claimed the government had instigated the tribal clashes, and he named Minister of Defense Julius Sunkuli, Cabinet member Nicholas Biwott, and President Moi himself. In the constitution of Kenya, it is written that you cannot defame the president. Fr. Kaiser publicly said Moi should be indicted in the world court at The Hague for crimes against humanity, and he volunteered to testify. The commission never bothered to release the report! Meanwhile, Kaiser had found another crusade. Two girls in his parish claimed they had been raped and impregnated by Julius Sunkuli. Kaiser encouraged them to take legal action against the minister, the second most powerful man in Kenya. Although the two girls succumbed to government pressure and dropped the rape charges against Sunkuli, the case damaged Sunkuli's reputation enough that he lost the 2002 parliamentary election. Fr. Kaiser however paid the cost. The Nakuru police commander Andrew Kimitto described Kaiser's final hours to *The Nation* (one of Kenya's media houses), based on crime-scene evidence. Kaiser's truck was hijacked and driven off the main road into the forest. He was pulled from the truck and forced to kneel. An assassin then shot him in the back of the head. The killers drove the truck back to the Naivasha-Nakuru Highway, dumped his body (for more details see <http://>

[www.millhillmissionaries.com/Death of Father Kaiser.pdf](http://www.millhillmissionaries.com/Death%20of%20Father%20Kaiser.pdf)). The religious leaders despite the threats, assassinations and harassments continued to pinpoint the atrocities of the political leaders.

As ethnic conflicts and other forms of human rights violations intensified in the 1990s, the Church through NCCCK and Kenya Episcopal Conference issued statements protesting the government's inaction in maintaining order and in stopping human rights violations. In one of their pastoral letters addressed to Moi, the Roman Catholic Church wrote:

Although our pleas, requests and advice seem to have been ignored by you, we on our side will not abandon our responsibilities... We have seen and heard so much wickedness perpetrated in Kenya since the clashes began. Innocent people, peaceful and humble, even the churches and mosques have been attacked and destroyed. All these abominations are done in your name by some of your cabinet ministers, your district commissioners, your district officers, your General Service Unit and your police... (Kenya Episcopal Conference, through *The Standard*, Nairobi, October 30, 1993).

The NCCCK, which dates back to 1908, is an umbrella organization for Christian churches in Kenya. It has a long and consistent record of working to spur development at all levels - economic and political as well as spiritual. In campaigning for greater democracy and a more open society, and attempting to serve as the 'voice of the voiceless', it clashed with the authorities many times. In the early stages of the ethnic clashes in the Rift Valley, the NCCCK launched a multi-faceted program called the NCCCK Peace and Reconciliation Project to address the large scale internal displacements, and to try to work for reconciliation among the rival groups. Financial support for the project was provided by the Government of the Netherlands, at the outset (1992-1993) through the Dutch Ministry for Development Co-operation, and later on, via Dutch Interchurch Aid (DIA). The Peace and Reconciliation Projects established by the NCCCK at that time were primarily emergency relief and rehabilitation programs at a time when the victims of ethnic violence required assistance. But the focus gradually shifted from relief and rehabilitation to peace and reconciliation, with concerted efforts to prevent ethnic conflict, improve inter-ethnic relationships, reduce the suffering as a result of ethnic violence, and create awareness on issues causing conflicts. It was during phase II, from 1994 until 1996 that the first efforts were made to present an integrated approach in which relief and rehabilitation efforts were linked to reconciliation

programs with a more social focus. Subsequently, beginning with phase III in August 1996, more extensive reconciliation programs were initiated to not only restore hope to the victims of violence and provide them with a means to earn a decent living, but also to assist them in re-integrating themselves into the communities they had fled. NCKK organized hundreds of Good Neighborliness Seminars, open to elders, local opinion leaders, local politicians, educators, community workers, government workers, and members of other important groups and organizations at the local level. At these seminars, the participants could discuss the causes of the local conflicts and analyze the effects that these conflicts had on their communities, and could examine potential strategies for successfully resolving the conflicts without resorting to violence.

In those meetings held for community leaders, the leaders' own roles in promoting peace and reconciliation were a focus of the discussions. Meetings held exclusively for women gave women the chance to participate in ways that would not have been possible in mixed seminars. In seminars focusing on youth, the participants were challenged to re-evaluate the values that resulted in them perceiving 'the other' as enemy, and encouraged not to allow others to manipulate them into acts of violence, but rather to channel their energies into more constructive activities. Intercultural sports and social activities were also encouraged. Those seminars bringing together elders and traditional leaders were of particular importance, as traditional leaders are held in high regard and retain enormous influence in their communities. In its own description of its activities, the NCKK attributes much of the Peace and Reconciliation Project's success to its 'inclusive' approach and while that is no guarantee of success, it, in the view of the NCKK, helped to reduce the level of violence in the Rift Valley, and enhanced mutual understanding among ordinary people (http://www.gppac.net/documents/pbp_f/3/3_kenya.htm, accessed 26 March 2011).

Here it emerges that churches in Africa and Kenya in particular, and especially the mainstream churches may not have the required resources to steer peacebuilding efforts successfully. Financial stability is just one of such challenges. This implies the shortcomings of religious actors in the field of peacebuilding. Scholars and peacebuilders in the field increasingly agree that the leadership of religious agents for peace is essential to the success of religious peacebuilding (Stichel & Deckard, 2010; Haynes, 1998). The leaders therefore need commitment and training in non-violence and connection with the religious community and beyond state borders that can

inspire and guide them as well as others down that path. Ground support is therefore needed since the views of religious leaders always contradict those of politicians. They are also less visible (from the national picture), mostly able to access members of their congregations.

Kenya's 2007/8 post-election violence

The efforts of the Church before 2005⁸ in Kenyan politics indicated a significant involvement in humanitarian activities. The Church in the Moi era seemed to be committed to condemning atrocities of the government. This however took a different twist since 2005 during the constitutional referendum which was quite enmeshed in ethnic politics. Gabrielle Lynch's research on Kenya's Constitutional Referendum (2006) shows that the referendum process clearly acquired an ethnic logic as the different sides were labeled and adopted orange and banana signs for 'no' and 'yes' respectively. The prevailing image then was communities supporting and following their prominent 'ethnic spokesmen', lining up as generals in a battle. Lynch uses the referendum as a case study, a means of teasing out the role and relevance of ethnicity in Kenya's contemporary and multi-party context. In this case, she observes that the idea of ethnic bloc coming together to form winning or losing coalitions is not new to analyses of post-colonial Kenya politics (also see Branch and Cheeseman 2008 and Smedt 2009). The idea of ethnic voting blocs headed by ethnic 'big men' coming together to form winning or losing coalitions (Rutten & Owuor, 2009) did not spare the Church and thus affected its moral position as well as its authority in the 2007 general elections in the country. The section below explores this observation.

The inability to bring together the warring political parties and their leaders was detrimental to the peace-building processes in the post-election violence of 2007/8. Even though the two leaders were able to agree to power sharing- after intervention from the international community- that in itself did not guarantee peacebuilding and reconciliation as stipulated in the national accord. It is certain that although peace mediation efforts may succeed to restore tranquility in any situation of conflicts, there obviously misses a link between the pacts provided by the mediation process and peace building processes that lead to the healing of the affected and hurting citizens. As Jarstad and Nilsson (2008) and, Nilsson (2009) have argued, for peace to hold, parties must engage in costly concession by turning word

into deeds through the implementation of the agreed provisions to share power. What role then did religious groups play in this political wrangle?

Before the PEV, religious groups had indicated that they were on guard by educating people not to be misused by the political leaders in conflicts. The NCCK had indicated that they will tackle local politicians' lack of accountability. One of the leaders said that: "We want to monitor the political campaign and keep a check on how it unfolds...inflammatory speeches and so on"- This was however by word and not action. For details see this link-(<http://kenvironews.wordpress.com/2007/09/26/kenya-clashes-elections-and-land-church-keeps-watch-in-molo/>, Accessed 26 March 2011). After the elections and with the starting of the violence, as members of the civil society embarked on peace-building efforts, the participation of religious groups was minimal. It was evident they were not visible at the national level to champion for the rights of the displaced and assist in peace-building process as was the case with many Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).

During and immediately after PEV, unfortunately, when the country needed the voices of reason, these voices seemed to have vanished or embedded to the regime. The inability of the religious groups to fully take part in the conflict resolution and peacebuilding processes is attributed to the fact that the worshippers had expected the religious leaders to advise them to vote with dignity and conscience as well as elect leaders of their choice. Instead, the leaders took sides with the political parties and challenged each other on historical issues such as land, which was the main cause of ethnic conflicts and cleansing. An example is cited of Nyanza Catholic Bishops who openly challenged Cardinal Njue after he took an opposing stand on the highly emotive *Majimbo* (federal) debate. Because of his central Kenya origins, Njue was perceived to be playing the ethnic card to back President Kibaki (from central Kenya), while Nyanza Bishops supported Kibaki's opponent, Raila Odinga on his promotion of *Majimbo*.⁹ In the run up to the 2007 general elections, several religious groups were therefore seen as being openly partisan along ethnic lines. Media reports showed "prophesies" especially by leaders of various Christian churches about who would win the presidential elections. The churches also had their preferred presidential candidates according to geographical and ethnic boundaries. Similarly, in Mombasa, Muslims campaigned for their fellow Muslim candidates. Media releases were to comment that they had seen churches and mosques of ODM and PNU but not of the faiths they profess. As a result of the religious alliances over

300 churches were burned during the post-election violence, an indication that religious institutions, especially the church, were no longer respected. Other instances cited are the political alignments of churches that took strange twists when at the height of the general election campaigns, a Nairobi parliamentary candidate was invited to Presbyterian Church of East Africa (St. Andrews Church) to call for support of President Kibaki.¹⁰ This raised eyebrows since the Church is in a cosmopolitan city, drawing worshippers from all political persuasions. The Church had lost her moral authority and as such was not spared.

On the Sunday of 30th December 2007, horrific reports of a mob that torched 80 villagers hiding inside a church in Eldoret among them children, made world headlines. The African inland church (AIC) in Kibera, Nairobi, was also burned on 2nd January 2008. It did not go unnoticed that the Bishop of the AIC church, Silus Yego did not speak against the violence.¹¹ As members of the civil society embarked on peace-building efforts, the participation of religious groups was minimal. It was evident they were not visible at the national level to champion for the rights of the displaced and assist in peace-building process as was the case with many Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).

The IDPs who sought refuge in the camps at least saved their lives despite the noted challenges. Those who sought refuge in places which were thought to be safe haven such as churches faced the wrath of the rioting gangs. One sad story told by a Kikuyu lady suffices here in the Eldoret incident that led to the highest number of lives lost at once.

“On the 1st of January 2008 at around 10 a.m., I heard people yelling that some raiders were coming. I saw smoke coming from some houses in our village and the houses were burning. Everyone in the village started running away to the church (KAG). My mother who was 90 years old was with me at the time. I decided to take my mother into the church for safety. After a few minutes, I saw more raiders coming towards the church...We thought the raiders would not attack the church. Many people were being pushed into the church by the raiders. The raiders threw some mattress into the roof of the church and threw more into the church. They were also pouring fuel (petrol) onto the mattresses. All of a sudden I saw fire break out. I took my mother towards the main door to get her outside, but there were many others scrambling toward the door as well. We both fell onto the floor. I wanted to save my mother from the burning church, but one of the raiders prevented me. I saw the fire had reached where my mother was. I heard her cry for help as the fire burnt her, but I could not help.”¹²

Kikuyu men attempting to defend their people were hacked to death with machetes, shot with arrows, or pursued and killed. The death toll for this horrific incident was 17 burned alive in the church, 11 dying in or on the way to the Moi Teaching and Referral Hospital-Eldoret, and 54 others injured who were treated and discharged. Analysts and U.N. officials saw echoes of the 1994 Rwanda genocide, when churches were turned into slaughterhouses for some of the 800,000 moderate Hutu and Tutsi victims (Read more: <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1699181,00.html#ixzz1Hzbknmks>).

A few of the vocal Christian leaders like Bishop Margaret Wanjiru of Jesus is Alive Ministries and the Member of Parliament of Starehe used their political positions and religious power to call on for peace.¹³ Other efforts noted were by certain churches that tried to re-settle internally displaced persons who were evicted from the camps after a year. In Eldoret, Lilian Nyambura¹⁴ (not her real name) explained that her Pentecostal Assemblies of God church, Kiambaa, re-settled her after her home had been burned down by the “natives” during the skirmishes. She was among the few people who escaped the inferno that claimed over 80 lives in Kiambaa Church that had been set ablaze by marauding youth in Eldoret.

The paltry participation of religious groups in peacebuilding processes raises questions about the expected role of these groups in promoting human dignity following violence that left thousands of Kenyans displaced and dead. Orabator (2002) observes, religious groups in Africa tend to be reaction bodies that watch as events unfold and to the crumbling of what would have otherwise been salvaged. It is only after the situation is out of hand that the groups scamper to collect and bind the pieces when it is already too late. So far, the literature reviewed seems to suggest that there exist expectations for religious groups during and after conflict. The expectation that religious groups should intervene in times of conflict and human suffering is what propelled voices from sections of the Kenyans to challenge the groups to act.

After being silent for almost one year, the religious groups came out in defense of justice and human rights. In the months of February through April 2009, religious groups and other civil organizations were actively involved in persuading the president and prime minister to resolve their difference amicably. What was significant in the response by these religious groups was their condemnation of corruption in the political leadership and poor governance in the country. Philip (2008) insightfully argues that, in the long and difficult process of peace-building in post-conflict states,

corruption has increasingly been identified as a major obstacle to success and as something whose eradication should be of high priority. The public condemnation of the President and Prime Minister centered on the failure to punish corruption in high places, to deal with extra-judicial killings by the police and to resettle thousands made homeless by the post-election violence (The Daily Nation, 20 February 2009). The cheers by Kenyans on witnessing this public act were an indication of what they expected of the religious leaders since the violence had been witnessed. For example, the leaders castigated the coalition government as follows:

“You (meaning the President and the Prime Minister) have been reluctant to punish your friends who are greedy, you have neglected the IDPs; you have not acted decisively on insecurity and extra-judicial killings. Kenyans hoped that the two of you would unite the diverse ethnic communities into one united nation of Kenya; that you would punish those who break the law even if they are your friends; that you would turn your faces from corruption and greed; that you would resettle the IDPs back to their homes; that you would facilitate the creation of jobs for the unemployed especially the youth; but all Kenyans are witnessing are disagreements within the Grand Coalition instead of cohesion and there have been little or no effort towards healing and reconciliation. Kenyans are now disillusioned with your leadership and you should take responsibility for the status of the nation. We urge you to take charge and restore dignity and unity, equity and justice for all the people of Kenya. We pray that God will help you to overcome the challenges facing our nation with courage and devotion (The Daily Nation, 20 February 2009).”

Another public act was a formal apology by the NCCK for taking sides during the 2007 general elections. This was in an effort for the church to recover her credibility, and show support to the peace building and reconciliation process. At the same time, an inter-religious forum consisting of the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM), the International Society of Krishna Consciousness (ISKON), the Episcopal movement, the Hindu society, and NCCK remained outspoken about the ills of the political leaders in the country. NCCK's initiative to collect over one million signatures from all the administrative provinces sought to support the prosecution of leaders who instigated the post-election violence. Similarly, a group of churches formed the “wheels/caravan of hope (*msafara*)” initiative. This is a peace initiative that coordinated prayers for the nation and food distribution to internationally displaced

persons all the way from Mombasa, through Nairobi, Nakuru, Eldoret and to Kisumu. Other initiatives by the churches included collaboration with the provisional and district administrations. For example, churches in the Rift Valley province joined the Rift Valley provincial commissioner to reconcile communities most affected by the 2007-8 elections violence.

The delay in implementing peacebuilding and reconciliation mechanisms is what continues to rally religious leaders to challenge Kibaki-Odinga coalition government to go past partisan politics and redeem Kenyan in the Rift Valley, Western and Nyanza provinces who still feel unsafe and unprotected from their fellow citizens in their own country. However, it is observable that the Church has not gained a strong footing and is not outspoken about political issues as before. Even now as The Hague beckons the "Ocampo six"¹⁵ to get ready to appear for trials for having orchestrated Kenya's post-election violence, the Church are dump-silent about the issues. Not one of them has been heard, either commenting or calling for actions to speed up justice for the victims of violence. A letter in the Daily Nation by Stanley Nganga partly demonstrates concerns from the populace about the silent religiosity in the nation. He laments:

Why is the Church silent as The Hague debates rages? In the history of the struggles, the church has played a significant role since freedom and justice are divine. Here in Kenya, the clergy have reached a spiritual and moral death. The men and women of God have abandoned their divine calling of serving God and humanity. Preachers are no longer the Cardinal Maurice Otungas, Henry Okullus or the Alexander Muges that we used to admire. The Njoyas and Ndingis of Kenya are dead (emphasis added). What they mind is the financial and economic gain from their highly publicized ministries, some with very peculiar names. They are silent about the Hague debates because some of them are partakers of this satanic cup of ethnicity. They are quiet on the tension our political leaders are creating because they also support different camps. Their failure to provide spiritual, moral and political guidance led to the post-election violence. This is a big moral and spiritual tragedy of the church. Church leaders are supposed to be watchdogs of the society. They should give guidance and ensure peace, righteousness, freedom and justice reign (Daily Nation, Monday, 14 March 2011).

Towards a viable solution

As churches are being urged to positively contribute towards peacebuilding processes, it is reckoned that generally, and as Appleby (2006: 1-2) argues, there are a myriad of challenges facing religion as an institution to enable it steer peacebuilding activities. Some of the already mentioned hurdles include financial and skill limitations. There is therefore a need to find out if there are any international affiliations through which these institutions can be aided to successfully reach the congregations, most of which the politicians and civil society organizations might not reach, in an effort to educate communities on the relevance of building unifying institutional structures. Secondly, there is need to check for consistency in the activities of the religious institutions and if they are always advocating for peace. The paper has indicated that there seemed to be unity and consistency of the Church in condemnation of abuse of human rights during the Moi era. The 2005 constitutional referendum however divided the voice of religious leaders and as such their moral authority weakened. The height of this weakness was exhibited in 2007 post-election violence. The paper therefore suggests the need to check on consistency of the Church. One way through which this can be achieved is through engaging the umbrella organizations such as the NCKK, the Episcopal Movement, as well as dialogue with other religious bodies including SUPKEM, ISCON, Hindu Leadership Council and Organization of African Independent Churches (OAICs). It is also important to understand the relations of a given religion with others so as to determine whether, as Appleby (2006) argues, this can be a sustainable way of building peace.

Aapengnuo (2010) explains that, at the core of ethnic conflicts is the relationship between ethnic groups and the state in the search for security, identity and recognition. The Church, in an effort to bridge these gaps of identities, should act as the voice of the masses unifying the people at community's grassroots towards a common front. Though the legal system might not at the moment provide compact solutions to the crises facing the communities, the Church as a community institution that is engaged in peacebuilding activities of the people, is expected not only to voice out the grievances of the people, but bring together warring communities in grassroots development and peace collaborations. Efforts of these activities are now observable in the Eldoret region of the Rift Valley. Bishop Korir of the Anglican Church is calling for unity between the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin living in the area. This he has done through common development

projects such as seed distribution and provision of dairy goats which are to be shared by the two communities through reproduction.

That the masses have been used in times of elections and political referendums for selfish ambitions of the political leaders is a fact that has been evidenced in Kenya's political environment. It is for this reason that the aid of non-governmental bodies, including religious institutions, comes in handy. Religious groups can directly oppose repression and reconcile communities by engaging them in dialogue and transformative development activities to the disadvantage of a selfish government. On the other hand, as Wainaina (2009) recommends, religious groups should fearlessly join the international community and continue to urge the government to hold perpetrators of human rights violations to account and also support initiatives to strengthen judicial independence and the establishment of a society based on the rule of law and human rights. This is the one of the ways to address the root causes of ethnic rivalries. The causes, for example, of land squabbles in most parts of the country are known. This has not only been documented in research done by Kenyan and other scholars, but are within the reports from commissions formed by both the government and private bodies to investigate the land clashes, in the Rift Valley and Western provinces in the late 1990s (see Klopp, 2002; Odhiambo, 2004; Ndegwa, 1997; Turner and Brownhill, 2001; Mueller, 2008).

By all means, religious institutions should be in the forefront to advocate for a long-lasting solution to eminent issues that cause violence in the country. This is because, any peace building mechanisms devoid of the root cause of conflict fail to sufficiently account for past injustices and fail to put forward mechanisms to enable future reconciliation and complete healing (see Omer 2007:110). In particular, Mue (2008) urges religious groups to be in the forefront of fighting tribalism and forging an abiding spirit of nationhood. The groups should advocate against ethnic politics that has divided the 42 ethnic groups, as an effort to form a united Kenya. In sum, advocating for social justice should be the priority of all civil organizations in the country.

NOTES

- ¹ Read more: Kenya - Location and size, Population, Tourism, Financial services, Dependencies, Capital:<http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/economies/Africa/Kenya.html#ixzz1J2HkZax3>
- ² For example, see the Waki report (2008) whose mandate was to investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding the violence, the conduct of state security agencies in their handling of it, and to make recommendations concerning these and other matters
- ³ The two scholars give a chronological account of ethnic rivalries in pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial eras in Kenya.
- ⁴ Despite this observation, literature indicates existence of tribal clashes even in pre-colonial Kenya when the different Kenyan ethnic groups were trying to claim geographical spaces and settle down. The history of the clashes is also recorded during the colonial period and especially the ethnic divisions by the colonialists so as to control and tame the power of interaction of the ethnic groups (Rutten and Owuor, 2009)
- ⁵ For elaborate explanations of these systems of governance see Klopp, 2002 and Branch and Cheeseman, 2008.
- ⁶ Mungiki is a terror movement in Kenyan history known for its brutality to the citizens especially if they, or the state, do not comply with their demands. It is believed to have emerged in the late 1980's in the Rift Valley Province, first with a religious outlook, later as a militia to defend the Kikuyu minorities living in parts of the Rift Valley Province from the Kalenjin Warriors who had been "incited" by certain politicians in Moi's government to evict Kikuyu from their farms. The movement later relocated to Nairobi and asserted themselves in various parts, taking control of certain sectors including the matatu industry (public transport), which is their major source of income. It is now a terror group that masquerades as a religious sect, a social movement "fighting for the rights of the youth", as well as a political group, among many faces.
- ⁷ See the Waki Report (2008) written by the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (CIPEV) that investigated the facts and circumstances surrounding the violence, the conduct of state security agencies in their handling of it, and made recommendations concerning these and other matters. One of the recommendations was the perpetrators of violence should be prosecuted at the International Criminal Court (ICC). Cases for the six key suspected perpetrators of the violence are as of now being handled by ICC.
- ⁸ In the year 2005, the Church generally started taking part in partisan politics, dissatisfied by lack of fulfillment of promises made by the National Rainbow Coalition Party which came into power in 2002. The referendum process was an evidence of a divided Church with some denominations supporting

the Orange team led by Raila Odinga whereas others supported the banana team led by Mwai Kibaki (the then President). The Orange team which was opposing the draft constitution won, and this marked a clear demarcation of the two groups, whose differences were manifested in the 2007 general elections. The Orange Democratic Party (formed after Raila's team won in the referendum) was believed to have won in the rigged elections of 2007. This triggered mayhem in the country unearthing buried animosity of ethnic differences.

⁹ Kweyu, Daily Nation, January 2008, p.11

¹⁰ Kweyu, Ibid

¹¹ Mathenge, G. in the *Sunday Standard*, 6 January 2008, p.11

¹² This story was told to the Commission of Inquiry into the Post Election Violence (CIPEV) otherwise known as the Waki Commission (formed to investigate the causes of post-election violence) by a Kikuyu woman who lost her mother in a church inferno deliberately set on by youth of the host community. It is a story that was confirmed by an official of the Kiambaa cooperative farm where the Church was located.

¹³ The Daily Nation, 8 January 2008, p.9.

¹⁴ Oral interview with Lilian Nyambura at Kiambaa on 23 July 2009

¹⁵ Immediately after the National Accord was signed on the 29th February 2008 to have a government of coalition as a temporary solution to the Kenyan 2007/8 crisis, a task force-Commission of Inquiry into the Post Election Violence-was formed to investigate into the nature and events of the post-election violence. One of the recommendations of the commission was that the key politicians who took part in planning and orchestrating the violence should be tried at the International Criminal Court if the local tribunals are not able to handle the cases. Mr. Kofi Annan who mediated brokered peace agreements was handed an envelope containing six names, which he has handed over to the ICC. The six in Kenya are largely referred to as the Ocampo six (Louis Moreno Ocampo is the Chief Prosecutor from ICC who is handling the Kenyan case).

REFERENCES

- Aapengnuo Mweyang (2010). Misinterpreting Ethnic Conflicts in Africa. *JFQ*.58(3), 13-17
- Abu-Nimer Mohammed (2000-2001). A Framework for Nonviolence and Peacebuilding in Islam. *Journal of Law and Religion*.15(1/2), 217-265
- Abu-Nimer Mohammed (2001). Conflict Resolution, Culture, and Religion: Toward a Training Model of Interreligious Peacebuilding. *Journal of Peace Research*. 38(6), 685-704
- Abu-Nimer, Mohammed and Ayse, Kayadfcı (2008). Muslim Peace-Building Actors in Africa and the Balkan Context: Challenges and Needs. *Peace & Change*. 33(4)
- Abuya Odhiambo (2009). Consequences of a Flawed Presidential Election. *Legal Studies*. 29 (1), 127–158
- Amr Abdalla (2001). Principles of Islamic Interpersonal Conflict Intervention: A Search within Islam and Western Literature. *Journal of Law and Religion*.15 (1/2) 151-184
- Appleby Scott. (2000). *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation*. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield
- Appleby, Scott. (2006). Building sustainable peace: the roles of local and transnational religious actors. Paper presented at the Conference on New Religious Pluralism in World Politics, Georgetown University, Washington, DC
- Armstrong, K. (2007). *The Bible: The Biography*. London: Atlantic Books
- Astri, S., Kristian, H., Arne, S. (2002). After Bonn: Conflictual Peace Building. *Third World Quarterly*. 23(5), 875-891
- Bangura, Karim (2007). The Study of Peace and Conflict Studies: Reflections on a Scientific Approach, in McCandless, Bangura, *et al.* (Eds.), *Peace Research for Africa: Critical Essays on Methodology*, Addis Ababa: University for Peace
- Barnett Michael, Hunjoon Kim, O’Donnell, Madalene, and Sitea, Laura (2007). Peacebuilding: What is in a name? *Global Governance*. 13, 35-58
- Batson, David (1993). *Religion and the Individual: A socio-psychological perspective*. Oxford: New York University Press
- Belshaw David (2001). *Faith in Development: Partnership between the World bank and Churches of Africa*. Oxford: Regnum Books International
- Bercovitch, J. and Kadayifci, A. (2009). Religion and Mediation: The Role of Faith-Based Actors in International Conflict Resolution. *International Negotiation*. 14, 175-204
- Boulding Elise (1986). Two Cultures of Religion as Obstacles to Peace. *Zygon* 21(4), 501-518
- Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1995). “Democracy: A Newly Recognized Imperative,” *Global Governance* 1:1
- Branch Daniel & Cheeseman Nic (2009). Democratization, Sequencing and State Failure in Africa: Lessons from Kenya. *African Affairs*. 108(430), 1-26

- Brewer John, Higgins Garreth, and Teeney Francis (2010). Religion and Peacemaking: A Conceptualization. *Sociology*. 44(6), 1019-1037
- Call Charles (2008). Ending Wars and Building Peace: International Responses to War-torn Societies. *International Studies Perspective*. 9, 1-21
- Daley Patricia (2006). Ethnicity and Political Violence in Africa: The Challenge to the Burundi State. *Political Geography*. 25, 657-679
- Donais Timothy (2009). Empowerment or Imposition? Dilemmas of Local Ownership in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Process. *Peace and Change*. 34(1), 1-26
- David Anderson (2002). Vigilantes, Violence and the Politics of Public Order in Kenya. *African Affairs*. 101(405), 531-555
- Ellis Stephen & ter Haar (2005). *Religion and development in Africa*. Background paper prepared for the Commission for Africa
- Funk Deckard & Ellen Stichel (2010). *Between The "Already" And The "Not Yet": A Peace Perspective And A Catholic Theological Viewpoint on Religion and Politics*. Equinox Publishing Ltd. 1 Chelsea Manor Studios, Flood Street, London Sw3 5sr
- Galtung Johan. (1998). On the Genesis of Peaceless Worlds: Insane Nations and the Insane States, in *Peace and Conflict. Journal of Peace Psychology*. 4(1), 1-11
- Galtung, Johan. (1969a). Violence, Peace and Peace Research. *Journal of Peace Research*. 6(3), 167-191
- Galtung, Johan. (1969b). *Peace by Peaceful Means*. Newsbury Park, CA: Sage
- Gopin, M. (2005). World religions, violence, and myths of peace in international relations, in: G. ter Haar & J. Busutill (Eds) *Bridge or Barrier. Religion, Violence and Visions for Peace*. (Leiden: Brill)
- Gathogo Julius (2007). Church and State Conflict in Kenya 1986-1991: Archbishop David Gitari's Role. *Swedish Missiological Themes*. 95(3), 265-284
- Haynes Jeffrey (2009). Conflict, Conflict Resolution and Peace-Building: The Role of Religion in Mozambique, Nigeria and Cambodia. *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*. 47(1), 52-75
- Haynes, Jeffrey (1998). *Religion in global politics*. London: Longman.
- Haynes, Jeffrey (1996). *Religion and Politics in Africa*. London: Zed.
- Herbert, D. (2003). *Religion and Civil Society*. Aldershot: Ashgate
- Jafari Sheherazade (2007). Local Religious Peacemakers: An Untapped Resource in U.S. Eoreign Policy. *Journal of International Affairs*. 61(1), 111-130
- Jarstad, Anna and Nilsson, Desirée (2008). From Words to Deeds: The Implementation of Power-Sharing Pacts in Peace Accords. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*. 25(3), 206 -223
- Kagwanja Peter (2005). "Power to Uhuru": Youth Identity and Generational Politics in Kenya's 2002 Elections. *African Affairs*. 105(418), 51-75

- Kagwanja Peter & Southall Roger (2009). Introduction: Kenya-A democracy in retreat? *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*. 27(3), 259-277
- Klopp Jacqueline. (2002). Can Moral Ethnicity Trump Political Tribalism? The Struggle for Land and Nation in Kenya, in *Journal of African Studies*, 61:2, pp. 269-294
- Kristian Harpviken & Hanne Røislien (2008). Faithful Brokers? Potentials and Pitfalls of Religion in Peacemaking. *Conflict Resolution Quarterly*. 25 (3)
- Lonsdale, J. (1994). "Moral Ethnicity and Political Tribalism" in P. Karsholm & J. Hultin (Eds.) *Inventions and Boundaries: Historical and Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism*. Occasional Paper 1:11 p. 131-150
- Lynch Gabrielle (2006). The fruits of perception: 'Ethnic politics and the case of Kenya's Constitutional Referendum. *African Studies*. 65(2), 233-270
- Lynch Gabrielle (2008). Courting the Kalenjin: The Failure of Dynasticism and the Strength of the ODM Wave in the Kenya's Rift Valley Province. *African Affairs*. 107(429)
- Maier, K. (2001). *This House has Fallen: Nigeria in Crisis* (Harmondsworth: Penguin)
- Mbiti John (1973). "Diversity, Divisions and Denominationalism." In Barrett D. (Et al; Eds) *Kenya Churches Handbook: The Development of Kenyan Christianity 1498-1973*. Kisumu: Kenya. Evangel Press
- Mueller Sussane (2008). The Political Economy of Kenya's Crisis. *JEAS*. 2(2)
- Manus I. 1998. Democracy and Islam: Implications for Civilizational Conflict and the Democratic Peace. *International Studies Quarterly*. 42(3), 485-511
- Musambayi Katumanga (2005). A city under siege: Banditry & modes of accumulation in Nairobi, 1991-2004. *Review of African Political Economy*. 106, 505-520
- Na'im, A. (2006). *African Constitutionalism and the Role of Islam*. University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia
- Ndegwa Stephen (2004). Citizenship and Ethnicity: An Examination of Two Transitional Movements in Kenyan Politics. *Journal of American Political Science Review*. 91(3), 599-616
- Niazi, S. (2009). 'Peaceful Approaches to Conflict Resolution in Muslim Context' in Kakar, N. and Niazi, S. eds. *Peace Education: Islamic Perspectives, Curriculum/Teaching Module*. Costa Rica: University for Peace
- Nilsson, Niklas (2009). Obstacles to Building a Civic Nation: Georgia's Armenian Minority and Conflicting Threat Perceptions. *Ethnopolitics*. 8(2), 135-153
- Noel, S. (2009). Democratic and Legal Obstacles to Mediator-imposed Peace Plans. *Ethnopolitics*, 8(2), 239-242
- Odhiambo, Atieno (2004). Ethnic Cleansing and Civil Society in Kenya 1969-1992. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*. 22(1), 29-42

- Okullu Henry (2003). *Church and State in Nation Building and Human Development*. Nairobi: Uzima Press
- Omer O'talia (2007) Religion versus Peace: A False Dichotomy. *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*. ASE Conference Special, 7(3), 109-131
- Omolo Ken (2002). Political Ethnicity in the Democratisation Process in Kenya. *African Studies*. 61(2), 209-221
- Orobator, Agbonkhanmeghe (2002). *The Church as Family: African Ecclesiology in its Social Context*: Nairobi: Paulines Publications Africa
- Orobator** Agbonkhanmeghe (2008). A Tale of Two Elephants: Overcoming the postelection crisis in Kenya. *America*, 198(8),14-16
- Putzel, J. (1997). Accounting for the "Dark Side" of Social Capital. *Journal of International Development*. 9, 939-949
- Rutten Marcel & Owuor Sam (2009). Weapons of Mass Destruction: Land, Ethnicity and the 2007 Elections in Kenya. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*. 27(3), 305-324
- Sampson Cynthia (1997). "Religion and Peacebuilding," in William Zartman and Lewis Rasmussen (eds.) *Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques*, (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press)
- Shore, Megan (2008). Christianity and Justice in the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission: A Case Study in Religious Conflict Resolution. *Political Theology*. 9(2), 161-178
- Smedt Johan (2009). No Raila, No Peace!' Big Man Politics and Election Violence at the Kibera Grassroots. *African Affairs*.108 (433), 581-598
- Steeves Jeffrey (2006). Beyond Democratic Consolidation in Kenya: Ethnicity, Leadership & Unbounded Politics. *African Identities*.4(2), 195-211
- Stichel Ellen & Deckard Julianne (2010). Between the "Already" and the "Not Yet": A Peace Perspective and a Catholic Theological Viewpoint on Religion and Politics. *Political Theology*. 55(5), 738-763
- Synod of Bishops (1992). "Justice in the World," in David Shannon and Thomas O'Brien (eds.) *Catholic Social Thought: The Documentary Heritage* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1992)
- Turner, T. and Brownhill, E. (2001). African Jubilee: Mau Mau Resurgence and the Fight for Fertility in Kenya, 1986-2002. *Canadian Journal of Development Studies*.22, 1037-1041
- Wainaina, Ndung'a (2009). *Kenya Let Opportunity for Change Slip*, *Daily Nation*, 27 February 2009
- Weber Thomas (2004). The Impact of Gandhi on the Development of Johan Galtung's Peace Research. *Global Change, Peace and Security*. 16(1), 31-43
- Wolpe, H. and McDonald, S. (2008). Democracy and Peace-building: Re-thinking the Conventional Wisdom. *The Round Table*. 97(394), 137-145
- Yakinthou, C. (2009). Reflections on a 'Meditrated' Conflict. *Ethnopolitics*. 8(2), 243-246