

New Europe College Yearbook 2008-2009



EVELINE CIOFLEC
ȘTEFAN COLCERIU
CHRISTIAN FERENCZ-FLATZ
NICOLAE GHEORGHÎĂ
ALEXANDRU GICA
ADRIAN MURARU
ALEXANDRU SIMON
ANCA ȘINCAN
ATTILA SZIGETI
ADELA TOPLEAN

Editor: Irina Vainovski-Mihai

Copyright – New Europe College
ISSN 1584-0298

New Europe College
Str. Plantelor 21
023971 Bucharest
Romania

www.nec.ro; e-mail: nec@nec.ro
Tel. (+4) 021.307.99.10, Fax (+4) 021. 327.07.74



ALEXANDRU SIMON

Born in 1979, in Cluj-Napoca

Ph.D., *Babeş-Bolyai* University, Cluj-Napoca (2008)

Thesis: *East-Central Europe and Concept of Gate of Christendom. 1456-1526*

Researcher. Romanian Academy, Center for Transylvanian Studies (Cluj-Napoca)

Member of the Global Young Academy [National <American> Academy of Sciences – Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie] (Washington DC-Berlin)

Co-editor of *Eastern and Central European Studies* with Peter Lang
(New York-Oxford-Frankfurt-am-Main-Basel-Vienna)

Dimitrie Onciul Award of the Romanian Academy (2009)

Fellowships:

University Paris IV-Sorbonne (2000-2001)

University of Geneva (2004)

Europa Institute - Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest (2006)

Menachem Elias Foundation of the Romanian Academy - University of Vienna (2007)

Main research interests: medieval diplomacy, medieval and modern geopolitics, state and nation building

Author and (co-)editor of 20 books and volumes (published in Austria, Germany, Hungary and Romania), as well as the author and co-author of around 110 studies and articles in journals and volumes (published in Austria, Croatia, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Macedonia, Romania, Spain and the UK)

Director and deputy-director of 10 national and international (EU) public and private projects and research grants (since 2004)

Member in 14 national and international (EU) public and private projects and research grants (since 2005).

Organizer and co-organizer of approximately 40 international conferences and sessions (in Austria, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Romania, Spain and in the UK)

THE SAINT AND THE JEWS

In July 1504, Stephen III of Moldavia, the only *Greek* rite crusader of Rome and Venice after the fall of Byzantium, died (by the 1570s, he was worshiped as a purely Orthodox saint). The combats with Mehmed II had born his fame. In the early 1520s, a well-trained Jewish scholar and administrator from Venetian Crete, Elijah Capsali (c. 1485-c. 1550), wrote that the Jews had actually been the cause of the (first) war between Stephen and Mehmed (1473/1474-1479/1480). Persecuted by Stephen, they had turned to the sultan, who immediately left again the Moldavian *tyrant*. Capsali however did not explicitly mention the source of the dispute between Stephen and the Jews (dated 1475).

[Educated in Padua and Venice, well-learnt in the political art of hiding history behind words, but also with a significant Venetian administrative experience (he was *condestabile* of the Jews of Crete on several occasions), Elijah Capsali only wrote that Stephen III had tried to force his Jewish subjects (especially the merchants) to ransom themselves. According to Capsali's main work *Seder Elijahu Zuta* (Elijah's Minor Chronology), written around 1523, which developed, in a much more analytical and less descriptive manner, the data in *Dibrej ha-Yamim le Malkhut Venezia* (The Chronicle of the Venetian Realm), authored some six years earlier, Stephen III of had imprisoned all Jews from a *settlement* (probably one of his Pontic or Danubian harbors) and demanded each of them to pay *1.000 gold pieces*, *for if not, I will take out the right eye of each of you and shame all the sons of Israel* [The Jews responded vigorously]. *We are Turkish citizens* [in the Romanian translation; i.e. *subjects*] *and you will not be able to treat us as slaves and neither will you be able to touch our fortunes*. [The ruler of Moldavia won however the dispute, angered moreover by the fact that the Jews, alike (several) Genoese living in Moldavia did not regard themselves as his subjects, but as the subjects of another – greater – (foreign) authority: the Ottoman sultan, respectively the Crimean city of Caffa].

This history apparently completed the sensibly negative inter-confessional and inter-religious contemporary image of Stephen III of Moldavia (who, in return, was never directly accused during his life of

being a *schismatic*, a rarity both for a *Greek* rite Christian monarch and for a ruler who had spent a significant part of his first year of reign in the anti-unionist camp). During his main 'crusader period' (mid 1470s-mid 1480s), he was accused of (mainly financial) oppression by the Hussites (initially sheltered by Stephen III) and – seemingly also – by the Armenians (in 1476 they formed a special military unit in Stephen's host facing Mehmed II's invading army; in 1479 the Armenians had to turn to the sultan against the ruler; Mehmed intervened in their favor and Stephen immediately stopped his abuses, at least according to ecumenical patriarch Maximos III Manases in his letter to the republic, which – after the conclusion of the Ottoman-Venetian peace – he tried to impress with the sultan's tolerance and force). In fact the conflict narrated by Capsali completed another image of Stephen III, glorious in particular in the Latin rite worlds, that of (Greek rite) crusader arm. The victories of the Turks had 'converted' the Jews in another fifth column of the new power. After 1453, they were viewed even as Ottoman guardians of Constantinople, where, under Mehmed II, their chief-rabi was Elijah's uncle, Moses Capsali. Stephen, the new hope of the Cross, could not be cut-off from the Jewish problem, furthered by holy wars and Muslim and Christian administrations. The new and old crusaders needed money. Not all costs could be covered through booty and monarchical promises. Crusader financing was further complicated by the disputes between Venice, Stephen III and Mathias Corvinus, the official holder' of the crusader mission in the East. Fiscal pressure could not grow indefinitely, even for a holy cause (the tyranny, often synonymous in medieval speech with excessive fiscality, significantly contributed to the domestic abandonments that Stephen overcame with great difficulty in 1476 when Moldavia was invaded by Mehmed II)¹.

In mid spring 1475, the impact of Stephen's victory of Vaslui over the army sent by Mehmed against him grew daily. The experienced diplomat Paolo Morosini was sent by Venice to Rome. He was instructed not only to present (realist) military options, but also financial solutions (as basis for the negotiations in view of the crusade) for the anti-Ottoman support of Matthias and Stephen, *the voivode of Serbia and Moldavia*. Like throughout Christendom, the Jews of Hungary and Moldavia represented a very useful financial option, as neither the Italian powers, nor the Latin rite neighbors of Matthias and Stephen appeared willing, in spite of previous engagements, to substantially participate in the holy war of the Cross. Fifteen years earlier, at the Diet of Mantua, Venice, still anxious to avoid war with Mehmed II, had requested her representative to explain to pope Pius II that she could barely

raise 5.000 ducats from the Jews in her lands, which was not worth the effort. Her position had radically changed, probably due also to Morosini. He knew Hebrew, had worked as an administrator of Venetian finances, and had written, a few years earlier, a treatise against the *perfidy of the Jews*, dedicated to Paul II. His recent missions in the Orient, especially to Usun Hassan, who, apparently, used Jewish resources and networks on a large scale, had strengthened Morosini's conviction that the Jews had to be extensively exploited for the greater cause of the Cross.

[Passages from the 'military half' of Morosini's instructions in Latin, form in which they were presented in front of the papal curia, after the discussions based on the 'financial half' of the instructions, issued by the republic in Italian in order to facilitate the negotiations]. [...] *Exercitus igitur hoc ordine conficiendus/ bellumque quatripartito inferendum opera precium arbitrantur, quo celerrime maxima/ Europae parte pellendum hostem non dubitant. Polonus namque Serenissimus Rex [Casimir IV Jagiello] facile ex-/pertioribus bello Polonis ac Boemis viginti quinque millium conflabit exercitum./ sumptoque simul Stephano Servie sive Mundavie Vayvoda [Stephen IV of Moldavia] cum quinque millibus,/ transacto Danubio per Bulgariam per hostem invadant. Ungarie vero Serenissimus Rex [Matthias Corvinus]/ cum viginti quinque millibus ex suis militia aptioribus et experist per Serviam/ et iuxta Bossinam partier aggrediantur hostem [...]. [Morosini did not talk of immense military figures, defining for other projects from the same year 1475, according to which, Matthias 'commanded' over 100.000 soldiers from Hungary, Walachia and Moldavia. From this point of view too, the Venetian project of 1475 featured several of the coordinates presented in her name, again by Morosini, at the Reichstag of Regensburg in 1471, when also the idea of using the *Walachians* against the sultan had resurfaced. The major difference between the two presentations was that in 1475, following king Matthias' recent anti-Ottoman actions, emperor Frederick III of Habsburg lost his crusader front-seat. In parallel, Venice fueled the tensions between Matthias (*her strange ally*) and Stephen (whom she had promoted as eastern crusader alternative) by further 'overlapping' their areas of interest (Serbia, 'given' to Stephen was an old Hunyadi target of Matthias and father John, to whom Bulgaria had been promised as well, a Bulgaria now 'granted', though less publicly, by the republic to Stephen). There were grounds enough for the project's success and for the project's failure. Morosini knew that even if only because he had passed through Moldavia at the time of the battle of Vaslui and his testimony on the combats had fortified the credibility of the victory in *Italia*, used with Venetian exaggeration and disinformation (a year earlier, she had even invented 'crusader victories' for her new favorite Stephen III of Moldavia)].*

[Passages from the ‘financial half’ of the instructions received by Morosini, at some moment between the end of March and the beginning of April 1475] [...] *Et perche stante le firmitra fra la Maiesta Imperiale* [Frederick III of Habsburg], *li Re de Polana* [Casimir IV Jagiello] *et de Boemia* [Wladislaw II Jagiello], *et il Re de Ungaria* [Matthias Corvinus] *et/ temendo loro, che ogni auctione et grandeza de forze che li habea ad dare el pon. Luy le habea ad/ volgrie contro de loro, non e da credere ch’el dicto Re* [Matthias] *posse may usire del suo regno per andare contro el/ Turco, se ad questo non sia facto debito proveditione. Se ricorda che a casone, ch’el dicto Re de Ungaria/ possi andare ad resistere allo inimicho et sucocere alle cose cristiane con gente utile et experta/ ch’el pontifice* [Sixtus IV] *li provedi, et manda quanto havera ricevuto delle decime de Chiexesi* [i.e. the members of the clergy] *et vigessime de Zudei in/ Italia. Mediante li quali, et le decime et vigessime de <Chiexesi et de> Zudei del suo regno, el* [Matthias] *possi fare quello pui numero de bona et experta gente <proveniente [?] del suo stato et de Valachia* [i.e. Moldavia], *ch’el potra/ al meno fin al numero de 25^m in zoia [...] dale contributione de decime et vigessime de Zudei, drino contradire li Signori de Italia, essendo [...] ci fermo de loro questa pocha summa, et essendo loro subvenuti dal pon delle vigessime de li seculari delli loro stati [...].* [Morosini knew that financing the crusade was at least as difficult as politically supporting it, and that it implied most often a political double-game, which he himself practiced and which was quite familiar to the Walachians. At Regensburg in 1471, where Frederick III had appointed Morosini imperial councilor, the crusader involvement of the Walachians had been re-discussed, an involvement dependent however on Matthias’ return to the anti-Ottoman front, as Matthias was – as Venice too was forced to admit – the only one who the Walachians would have followed. Yet Matthias was in open conflict with Frederick. Meanwhile, John Vitez and Janus Pannonius, the Hungarian friends of cardinal Bessarion, Morosini’s old patron, prepared, together with Casimir IV, Matthias’ dethronement. Nonetheless, Matthias withstood the attack and Venice had to reconsider her position (a rather substantial part in this decision was played by the fact that, though at the end of Frederick III still considered Stephen III, who had aid Matthias against the conspirators in 1471, his *captain* for *Walachia*, Stephen chose to support the king and not the emperor). In 1475, Morosini and Venice presented the dispute between Matthias and Frederick as virtually settled, but kept on engulfing Matthias in western and eastern tensions, especially after the latter had reached a matrimonial agreement with Ferdinand of Aragon, king of Naples, Venice’s main Italian adversary. The same ‘duplicitous’ coordinates applied in the ‘crusader case’ of the Jews. The major political effects of working with the Jews (both favorable – in Usun Hassan’s case – and unfavorable – in Mehmed II’s case – for the republic) were obvious and accepted. However there was the need of money, money most easy to get through violent pressures, and also a

'more modern' Humanist anti-Semitism, embraced by Morosini as well. Furthermore, in the case of the Jews there existed neither a basic Christian common ground, nor a Union of Florence that could have justified, on the grounds of the *Turkish* problem, a rapprochement and a compromise, like those that turned Stephen III (and then Bogdan III and Stephen IV) and his Walachian subjects into Rome's only Greek rite crusaders after 1453. Though the practical conditions, of which the Christian side was aware, justified a different approach, in the crusader relation to the Jews matters were – pushed in equally conscientious manner – to the limit. The only one who most likely refrained himself was Matthias, a monarch otherwise in great financial need, whereas Venice and – apparently – Stephen (violently) went after the money. It was therefore perhaps not an accident that a pogrom took place in Venice in 1480, a few months after the official announcement of the peace between the Porte and the Republic that left Venice with her pride wounded – since then she began calling herself the *Serenissima* – and with finances bleeding – which was at least as important as the injured pride].

In 1475, the Roman money that Matthias should have received for Hungary and Moldavia (as whose suzerain, even if only in crusader matters, he was perceived – by Venice's as well – already prior to the Moldavian-Hungarian treaty of Iași of July 1475) should have been (at least) supplemented through the contributions of the Jews in the areas under his (nominal and real) authority. These contributions were significant and justified enough for the *lords of Italy*, reluctant towards such 'co-financements', to keep their lay subjects' *vigessimae*. At average Hungarian wages (the regular monthly wages were 2 florins for a foot-soldier and 3 florins for a rider), the sum required for the – at least three months long (in order to be successful) – campaign of a host commanded by the king' (with a minimal effective of 25.000 men – as proposed by Morosini –, mostly riders in such endeavors) went beyond 170.000 florins (1 Hungarian florin was the equivalent of 1 Venetian ducat). Given the expenses involved – over the same time span – by 5.000 Moldavian riders (most often earning Hungarian wages or similar, yet smaller wages; one of the reasons for the increase of crusader attention given to the Walachians in the 1460s and early 1470s was the fact that the Walachians costed far less, up to 50%, than other – mainly Western, and especially German – soldiers that should have joined the Hungarians against the *Turk*), the sum eventually rose above 200.000 florins².

This was solid crusader expeditionary construct, well calculated and motivated. Stephen III belonged to it, not only by name or common

purpose, but also through the fiscal edifice sustaining the expeditionary construct. More than the use of the tithes, the use of the Jewish taxes for the support of Stephen's riders indicates that he was legally (at least from Rome's and Venice's perspective) a member of the judicial and military structure of Western Christendom, as the Oriental spearhead of her crusader organism. The Venetian calculus further reveals that the Jews in Moldavia were a non-neglectable financial (and perhaps demographic) reality. If we use in this crusader "Jewish funded" context the Venetian proportions (5/1) established between Matthias' and Stephen's armies (proportions that roughly reflect those between the populations of Hungary, of at best 3.000.000 inhabitants, and Moldavia, of around 500.000 before the Ottoman campaign of 1476), the result is a far more numerous Jewish population than previously admitted (in Hungary the tendency was to limit number of the Jews to approximately 5.000, which would have been impossible as Matthias had a Jewish military core, made up from 500 to 1.000 men, and as the minimal proportion between community members and soldiers in non-military communities – such as those of Szeklers and Walachians – was 1/10). The minimal figures for the Jew would therefore be 10.000 in Hungary and 1.500 in Moldavia (the maximal estimates would be 2.5 times greater). An important part of the Jews in Moldavia consisted of the Jews that had fled Hungary due to Louis I of Anjou's persecutions in the 1360s (basically they had come to Moldavia together with the 'founder' of the local state: Bogdan I). More Jews apparently came however from the East and the South, from territories dominated by Muslim powers (in particular the Tartars, with whom the Jews collaborated and who controlled for at least half a century the urban centers at the Danube and Dniestr Mounds). Another significant Jewish contingent came from Poland, moving south with their traditional Armenian rivals (the old protégés of the Moldavian rulers). The largely urban Jewish communities represented up to the 20% of the population of Moldavian boroughs, towns and cities (an 'urban' population that, like in the rest of the region, in Hungary too, stood for 5, as in the Western "more developed" parts of the continent, to 10% of the total population of Moldavia). Such a percentage placed the Jews at the same level of commercial urban power with the Armenians, the Germans (Saxons) and Italians (mainly Genoese), and probably above the Walachians and the Hungarians. Elijah Capsali's text thus has a different weight³.

The Jews were not at the origin of the confrontations between Stephen III of Moldavia and Mehmed II (the decisive factors were the Pontic-Genose

and Danubian-Walachian disputes of the Moldavian ruler, Venice's anti-Ottoman failures, the plans of the papacy and the Byzantine emigration in *Italia* and Usun Hassan's Oriental actions). In return, given also the Venetian calculations drawn after Vaslui, we have to accept that the Jews (too), their money, gave substance to the conflict between the ruler and the sultan on the eve of their direct clash of summer 1476 (Capsali emphasized the link between Stephen's persecution and Mehmed's Moldavian campaign, substantiating the 'personalization' of the conflict between the two, marked by human and financial sacrifices and excesses, beyond the limits of the pragmatism specific to both rivals: in 1475 and especially in 1476, in the months preceding Mehmed's Moldavian campaign, both Mehmed and Stephen sacrificed family members, lives and money, as none of them was willing to actually settle their conflict and as both were under the growing influence and pressure of their *Latin* and *Greek* Christian and Muslim contemporaries – to be found on Stephen's crusader, as well as on Mehmed's imperial side – calling for more blood). The Moldavian domestic consequences of the conflict are difficult to estimate. Due to the urban position of the Jews they directly touch the fate of the Moldavian harbors. In winter 1474-1475, the harbors welcomed in the *Turks*. Stephen III re-took them shortly after Vaslui. In the summers of 1475 and 1476, the harbors withstood the Ottoman attacks. In 1484, they fell forever to the *Turks*. The list of the accused for this disaster was long from beginning. Venice too featured on the list. In late 1492, the Ottoman fears of the republic and the growth of Stephen's regional importance after Matthias' death in 1490, officialized however the reconciliation between the *Serenissima* and the ruler, who (re)became Venice's *captain-general* in the East. He was paid by her with at least 70.000 ducats to represent her interests at the European borders of the *Turk* (with this money, in the memory of the crusader failures of 1476 and 1484 and under their influence, Stephen built and re-built princely courts and churches). The restoration of the relations between Suceava and Venice determined the republic not to 'release' anymore delicate information on the ruler's actions (like she had done in 1477 when Stephen had tried to coerce her to grant him more subsidies). Consequently, in all likeliness, Elijah Capsali's voice remained isolated, although the attitude of the republic towards the Jews had gradually evolved over the last decades, becoming more tolerant in its hostility towards the Jews, who lived for generations or only since recently in the vast lands of Saint Mark⁴.

NOTES

- ¹ Mayer J. Halévy, 'Les guerres de Etienne le Grand et d'Uzun Hasan d'après la *Chronique de la Turquie* du candiote Elie Capsali (1523)', *Studia et Acta Orientalia* (Bucharest), I (1957), pp. 189-198 (initially the voivode of Walachia in Capsali's text was erroneously identified with Vlad III *the Impaler/ Dracula* of Walachia by Moses Gaster, 'Vlad Țepeș și evreii' [Vlad the Impaler and the Jews], *Anuar pentru Israelii* [Yearbook for Israelites] (Bucharest), VIII (1885), pp. 160-162; the passages were re-published in *Izvoare și mărturii referitoare la evreii din România* (Sources and Testimonies on the Jews of Romania), I, edited by Victor Eskenazy (Bucharest, 1986), no. 15, pp. 16-17). For the life and work of Capsali: Elia Capsali, *Seder Eliyahu Zuta*, edited by Aryeh Shmuelevitz, Shlomo Simonsohn and Meir Benayahu (Tel Aviv, 1983); Nathan Porgès, 'Elia Capsali et sa chronique de Venise' (I-III), *Revue des Études Juives* (Paris), LXXVII (1922), pp. 20-40; LXXVIII (1923), pp. 15-34; LXXIX (1924), pp. 28-60; Martin Jacobs, 'Das ambivalente Islambild eines Venezianischen Juden des 16. Jahrhunderts: Capsali's Osmanische Chronik', *Judaica* (Berlin), LVIII (2002), pp. 2-17; Giacomo Corazzol, 'Sulla Cronaca dei So-vrani di Venezia (*Divre' ha-yamim le-malke' Venesiy'ah*) di Rabbi Elia Capsali da Candia', *Studi Veneziani* (Venezia), XLVII (2004), pp. 313-330; Aleida Paudice: *Between Several Worlds. The Life and Writings of Elia Capsali. The Historical Works of a 16th-Century Cretan Rabbi* (Munich, 2009), pp. 20-23, 44-45, 57-64, 112-118. For Venice and her relations to the Eastern Churches, as well as for Stephen III's relations to the Hussites and the Armenians (with emphasis on the potential conflict between him and the Armenians of 1478-1479 when it had become clear that Venice would not continue her war with the Porte, in spite of the 10.000 ducats she had secured for Stephen from Rome just a couple of months before the conclusion of the Ottoman-Venetian peace): Petre Ș. Năsturel, 'L'attitude du Patriarcat oecuménique envers les Arméniens des Pays Roumains (fin XIV^e-début XVI^e siècle)', in *L'Arménie et Byzance. Histoire et culture (=Byzantina Sorbonensia, XII)* (Paris, 1996), pp. 145-158 (p. 150, note 27); Andrei Pippidi, *Byzantins, Ottomans, Roumains: le Sud-Est européen entre l'héritage impérial et les influences occidentales* (Paris, 2006), pp. 36-37; Al. Simon, 'The Relations between the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople and Venice in a Venetian Document of 1480', in *Românii în Europa medievală (între Orientul bizantin și Occidentul latin). Studii în onoarea Profesorului Victor Spinei* [The Romanians in Medieval Europe between the Byzantine Orient and the Latin West: *Festschrift* <for Professor> Victor Spinei <on his 65th Birthday>] edited by Ionel Cădea, Dumitru Țeicu (Brăila, 2008), pp. 587-600. For the problem of Moldavian authority over the Genoese during Stephen III's rule, see in general: Ștefan Andreescu, 'Date noi despre *Teodorcha de Telicha*' [New Information on *Teodorcha de Telicha*], in *Prinos lui Petre Diaconu la 80 de ani* [Festschrift Petre Diaconu on his 80th

Birthday], edited by I. Cîndea, Valeriu Sîrbu, Marian Neagu (Brăila, 2004), pp. 625-634; Idem, 'Un nou act genovez cu privire la Ștefan cel Mare' [A New Genoese Document regarding Stephen the Great], *Studii și Materiale de Istorie Medie* [Studies and Materials in Medieval History] (Bucharest-Brăila), XXII (2004), pp. 132-136. For the Jews in crusader contexts after 1453: Steven J. Mc Michael, 'The End of the World, Antichrist, and the Final Conversion of the Jews in the *Fortalium Fidei* of Friar Alonso de Espina (d. 1464)', *Medieval Encounters* (Leiden), XII (2006), 2, pp. 224-273; Christian Gastgeber, 'Die Rede des Iacobus Camp(h)ora an Kaiser Friedrich III. und Ladislaus Posthumus über die Situation im Osten (1456)', in *The Age of the Jagiellonians (=Eastern and Central European Studies, IV)*, edited by Florin Ardelean, Christopher Nicholson, Johannes Preiser-Kapeller, Al. Simon (New York-Oxford-Frankfurt-Basel-Vienna, 2011), in press; Al. Simon, 'Ways to Liberate Constantinople after 1453: Notes on a Document in the State Archives of Milan', *Bizantinistica* (Bologna), NS, XI (2011), pp. 277-286. In Ottoman comparison, see also: Franz Babinger, 'Ja'aqûb Pascha, ein Leibarzt Mehmeds II., Leben und Schicksal des Jacopo aus Gaeta', *Rivista degli Studi Orientali* (Napoli), XXVI (1951), pp. 87-113. Crusader promises and profits (the Moldavian case): Al. Simon, 'Anti-Ottoman Warfare and Crusader Propaganda in 1474: New Evidences from the Archives of Milan', *Revue Roumaine d'Histoire* (Bucharest), XLVI (2007), 1-4, pp. 25-39; Idem, 'The Costs and Benefits of Anti-Ottoman Warfare: Documents on the Case of Moldavia (1475-1477)', *Revue Roumaine d'Histoire*, XLVIII (2009), 1-2, pp. 37-53 (in May 1477, Stephen asked Venice again for money in order not to make peace with the Turk and she 'reminded' him that in the summer of 1475 he had made over 100.000 ducats in profit from the Christian prisoners and goods from Crimean Caffa, just conquered by the Ottomans). In comparison, to Stephen III's Moldavia, one must also note the unexpectedly favorable conditions enjoyed by the Jews in Hungary during Matthias' reign. Unlike during the reigns of most of his predecessor, mainly since the end of the 13th century (Nora Berend, *At the Gate of Christendom: Jews, Muslims and 'Pagans' in Medieval Hungary c. 1000- c. 1300* (Cambridge, 2001), pp. 39-40, 91-100). King Matthias Corvinus further had a Jewish army core, 'similar' to Stephen III's Armenian military core of 1476 (the existence of such ethnic-religious military cores, in particular in the cases of well-defined communities, consisting especially of merchants/ traders, such as the Armenians and the Jews, implied the existence of a Armenian/Jewish population of at least 5.000 souls). This Jewish army core was part of Matthias' triumphant parade through Vienna taken from emperor Frederick III of Habsburg in the summer of 1485 (see also Al. Simon, *Ștefan cel Mare și Matia Corvin. O coexistență medievală* [Stephen the Great and Matthias Corvinus: A Medieval Coexistence] (Cluj-Napoca, 2007), pp. 279-280).

- ² The cited passages: Archivio di Stato di Milano, Milan (ASM), Archivio Ducale Sfozesco/ Archivio Visconteo-Sforesco (A.D.S.), Potenze Estere, *Venezia*, cart. 381, *Giugno-Dicembre 1493*, fasc. 4, *Settembre*, nn. [March-April 1475; the 'second half' in Italian of the instructions for Morosini; the 'first part' too of Venice's instructions of spring 1475 for Morosini, a close collaborator of cardinal Bessarion, apparently the uncle of Stephen III's second wife, since September 1472, *Mary of Mangop/ Crimean Theodoro*, was misplaced and erroneously labeled; for the 'first half', in Latin: ASM, A.D.S., Potenze Estere, *Illiria, Polonia, Russia, Slavonia*, cart. 640, fasc. 2, nn; see Al. Simon, Cristian Luca, „Documentary Perspectives on Matthias Corvinus and Stephen the Great”, *Transylvanian Review* (Cluj-Napoca), XVII (2008), 3, pp. 85-112, pp. 87-88). The Jews of Walachia and Moldavia: Șerban Papacostea, 'Jews in the Romanian Principalities during the Middle Ages', *Shvut: Studies in Russian and East European Jewish History and Culture* (Tel Aviv), XVI (1993), pp. 59-71 (pp. 61-65). Military costs, 'European co-financing' and demographic-military proportions: Gyula Rázsó, 'Military Reforms in the Fifteenth Century', in *A Millennium of Hungarian Military History*, edited by László Veszprémy, Béla K. Király (New-York, 2002), pp. 54-82 (pp. 70, 76); Benjamin Weber, *Lutter contre les Turcs. Les formes nouvelles de la croisade pontificale au XV^e siècle*, PhD Thesis (Toulouse, 2009), pp. 296-297, 376-377; Al. Simon, 'Between the Adriatic and the Black Sea: Matthias Corvinus and the Ottoman Empire after the Fall of Negroponte', *Radovi Zavoda za Hrvatsku Povijest* [The Proceedings of the Croatian Institute of History] (Zagreb), XLII (2010), 2, pp. 359-375. For Venice's earlier stand (at Mantua) towards the Jewish financing of the crusade: G[iovanni]. B[attista]. Picotti, *La Dieta di Mantova e la politica de Veneziani* (= *Monumenti Storici Pubblicati dalla Deputazione Veneta di Storia patria*, III, 4) (Venice, 1912), Appendix, no. 28, p. 469. Morosini and the impact of his actions: Margaret L. King, *Venetian Humanism in an Age of Patrician Dominance* (New Haven, 1986), pp. 412-413; Marino Zorzi, *La libreria di San Marco. Libri, lettori, società nella Venezia dei Dogi* (Milan, 1987), pp. 35-36; Gian Maria Varanini, 'Tra fisco e credito: notte sulle camere degli pegni nelle città venete del Quattrocento', and 'La Terraferma al tempo della crisi della lega di Cambrai. Proposte per una rilettura del caso veronese', in *Idem, Comuni cittadini e stato regionale. Ricerche sulla Terraferma veneta nel Quattrocento* (Verona, 1992), pp. 125-161, 397-435. For the crusader projects of the 1470s: Mihai Berza, 'Der Kreuzzug gegen die Türken: ein europäisches Problem', *Revue Historique du Sud-Est Européen* (Bucharest), XIX (1942), pp. 42-74 (pp. 70-72), Kenneth M. Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant. 1204-1571* (= *Memoirs of the American Philosophical Society*, CXIV, CXXVII, CLI, CLII), II, *The Fifteenth Century* (Philadelphia, 1978), pp. 320-325, 381-382. With emphasis on the double-deals in which Morosini was involved (he was also a good friend of Gregor Heimburg, probably the

main councilor of George Podiebrad, the *Heretic king* of Bohemia, Matthias' former father-in-law and the target of his 'northern crusade'), see also Paul Joachim-sohn, *Gregor Heimburg* (Berlin, 1891), pp. 107, 241-250, 275; Paul-Joachim Heinig, *Kaiser Friedrich III. (1440-1493) - Hof, Regierung und Politik*, II (Cologne-Weimar-Vienna, 1997), pp. 536-537; Ingrid Baumgärtner, 'Bartolomeo Cipolla, Venezia e il potere imperiale: politica e diritto nel contesto della Dieta di Ratisbona (1471)', in *Bartolomeo Cipolla: un giurista veronese del Quattrocento tra cattedra, foro e luoghi del potere. Atti del convegno internazionale di studi (Verona, 14-16 ottobre 2004)*, edited by Giovanni Rossi (Padua, 2009), pp. 277-316 (among those elevated to the rank of eques and imperial count by Frederick III during his Italian visit of 1469 was Gentile Bellini, the future court artist of Mehmed II; similar good relations with emperor were enjoyed by Zaccaria Barbaro, then sent by the republic to Usun Hassan, and Giovanni Erno, the Venetian negotiator of the alliance between the republic and Matthias in 1471, who, like the future *Serenissima*, took in 1471 the side of the emperor).

- ³ For the questions of medieval Walachian demography: Ş. Papacostea, 'Populație și fiscalitate în Țara Românească în secolul al XV-lea: un nou izvor' [Population and Fiscality in Walachia in the 15th Century: A New Sources], *Revista de Istorie* [History Review] (Bucharest), XXXIII (1980), 9, pp. 1779-1786; Idem, 'Din nou cu privire la demografia Țării Românești în secolul XV' [Again on the Demography of Walachia in the 15th Century], *Revista de Istorie*, XXXVII (1984), 6, pp. 577-581. For the Jews and the other urban communities in the *Walachias*: Matei Cazacu, 'La tolérance religieuse en Valachie et en Moldavie depuis le XIV^e siècle', in *Histoire des idées politiques de l'Europe centrale*, edited by Chantal Millon Delsol, Michel Maslowski, Paris, 1998 (pp. 109-125) (p. 114; unfortunately the source for the refugiation of the Jews of Hungary to Moldavia and Walachia in the 1360s is not clearly indicated); Laurențiu Rădvan, *At Europe's Borders: Medieval Towns in the Romanian Principalities* (Leiden-Cologne-Boston, 2010), pp. 439-442. For the Jews of Hungary in the late 1400s, an overview: András Kubinyi, 'Ethische Minderheiten in den ungarischen Städte des Mittelalters', in *Städtische Randgruppen und Minderheiten*, edited by Bernhard Kirchgässner, Fritz Reuter (Sigmaringen, 1986), pp. 183-199; Idem, 'Zur Frage der Toleranz im mittelalterlichen Königreich Ungarn', in *Toleranz im Mittelalter*, edited by Alexander Patschovsky, Harald Zimmermann (Sigmaringen, 1998), pp. 187-206 (pp. 191-196). Populations and social structures: Simon, *Ștefan cel Mare și Matia Corvin*, pp. 238-246, 279-280. The 'exchange rates' of the age: Şevket Pamuk, 'Money in the Ottoman Empire, 1326-1914', in *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914*, edited by Halil Inalcik, with David Quataert (Cambridge, 1994¹), pp. 947-980 (pp. 951-956). For the medieval 'urbanization', see also Wijnand W. Mijndhardt, 'Urbanization, Culture and the Dutch Origins of the

European Enlightenment', in *The International Relevance of Dutch History* (= *The Low Countries Historical Review*, CXXV, 2-3), edited by Klaas van Berkel, Leonie de Goei (Amsterdam, 2010), pp. 141-177 (in these matters: pp. 143-144). For the Walachias in the 1470s, in case of a 'general crusader mobilization', we must accept a fraction of 1/15 between the population of the state and its 'great army', like in the case of other projects from that same year 1475. Walachia was listed with 38.000 soldiers and Moldavia with 32.000. In effect, the 'professional army' of Moldavia consisted at best of 12.000 men, out of which about half could have been regarded as the real standing army of Moldavia, including the troops stationed in Moldavia's fortresses (under Peter IV Rareș, in the 1530s, 3.000 soldiers were in the permanent paid service of the ruler and apparently formed a sort of personal guard of the ruler). In Hungary the number most likely fluctuated between 20.000, maybe even 25.000, in the 1460s, and around 40.000 including the approximately 8.000 border soldier stationed at the Ottoman frontier of the realm, as well as different paid auxiliaries of the Holy Crown of Hungary. In the age of the Jagiellonians the number of soldiers in the paid annual service of the kingship did not exceed 8.000 and, at best, in the years to come, the king could rely on up to 25.000 soldiers, if the troops of the barons joined him (in these matters, starting with various case studies of the confrontations and military decisions of the 1460s and 1470s: A. Kubyini, 'Die südlichen Grenzfestungen Ungarns am Ende des Mittelalters', in Idem, *Matthias Corvinus. Die Regierung eines Königreiches in Ostmitteleuropa 1458-1490* (Herne, 1999), pp. 188-201; Pál Fodor, 'The Simurg and the Dragon. The Ottoman Empire and Hungary (1390-1533)', in *Fight against the Turk in Central-Europe in the First Half of the 16th Century*, edited by István Zombori (Budapest, 2004), pp. 9-35 (pp. 19-24); Al. Simon, 'The Arms of the Cross: Stephen the Great's and Matthias Corvinus' *Christian Policies*', in *Between Worlds, I, Stephen the Great, Matthias Corvinus and their Time* (= *Mélanges d'Histoire Générale*, NS, I, 1), edited by László Koszta, Ovidiu Mureșan, Al. Simon (Cluj-Napoca, 2007), pp. 45-86 (pp. 62-65);); Idem, 'Brancho's Son and the Walachians: A Milanese Perspective on the Battle of Baia' (I-II), *Historical Yearbook* (Bucharest), VII (2009), pp. 187-200; VIII (2010), pp. 195-220). As for the Jews, a possible method of estimating the number of the Jews in Moldavia should start from the *1.000 gold pieces* per person that, according to Capsali, Stephen III had demanded as *ransom* from the Jewish merchants. The sum was most likely expressed in Turkish aspers. In ducats or florins it would represent a small fortune that at times not even wealthier Moldavian boyars were able to take out of the country. The sum was rather small: 20-25 ducats (in the 1470s the exchange rates between ducats and aspers fluctuated between 1/40 and 1/50). Depending on the duration of their involvement in the campaign (from 3 to 6 months), and on the wages paid to these riders (probably smaller than the 3 ducats/

florins paid to a Hungarian rider, yet no below 2 ducats/florins), the 5.000 men strong crusader army core comanded by Stephen III in Morosini's project would have costed between (at least) 30.000 and (at most) around 80.000 ducats (the last figure is strikingly similar to sum sent by Venice to her *captain* Stephen III of Moldavia at the end of 1492 in order to represent her interests at the border of the Ottoman Empire who the republic feared was about to go to war with her). Assuming that Capsali refered to a tax for all of Stephen III's Jewish subjects, the number of the members of the Jewish communities of Moldavia would have fluctuated between (at least) 1.500 and (at most) 4.000 souls, i.e. between roughly 0.3 and 0.9% of the population of the state, but between around 3 to 8% (in case the 'urban population' stood for 10% of the total population of the state) and 6 to 16% (if the 'urban population' represented only 5% of all the inhabitants of Moldavia) of the 'urban population' of Moldavia in the mid 1470s. From an interpretative point of view, this would be the safest option, however questioned by the almost five decades elapsed between Capsali's chronicle and the narrated Moldavian events, by the currency usually used in Venetian Crete (naturally the Venetian ducat), by the fact that in general such medieval taxation were per family, not per subject (yet the so-called *Opferpfennig* was collected in the Roman-German empire from all Jews above the age of 12; Peter Rauscher, 'Widerspenstige Kammerknechte. Die kaiserlichen Maßnahmen zur Erhebung von *Kronsteuer* und *Goldenem Opferpfennig* in der Frühen Neuzeit', *Aschkenas. Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Kultur der Juden* (Vienna), XIV (2004), pp. 313-363), and also by existence, since the 14th century, in a city, like Cetatea Albă (the main harbor at the Dniestr Mounds), inhabited by around 10.000 people, of a Jewish quarter (Gheorghe I. Brătianu, *Marea Neagră* [The Black Sea], edited by Victor Spinei, II (Bucharest, 1988), p. 89). In the end, we must stress out the fact that (only) in the 1930s the Jews represented (at least) 4 % (the percentage was probably double in the eastern parts of the state) of the total population of 'Great Romania' (see 'Populația României' [The Population of Romania], in *Enciclopedia României* [The Encyclopedia of Romania], I (Bucharest, 1938), p. 148).

⁴ For an overview: Al. Simon, 'The Limits of the Moldavian Crusade (1474, 1484)', *Annuario del Istituto Romeno di Cultura e Ricerca Umanistica* (Venice), IX (2007), pp. 193-244; Idem, 'Să nu ucizi o pasăre cântătoare: soarta unui *fortissimus rei Christiane athleta* în ochii Veneției' [To Kill a Mocking Bird: The Venetian Fate of a *fortissimus rei Christiane athleta*], in *Pe urmele trecutului. Profesorului Nicolae Edroiu la 70 de ani* [On the Tracks of the Past: *Festschrift* for Professor Nicolae Edroiu on his 70th Birthday], edited by Susana Andea, Ioan-Aurel Pop, Al. Simon (Cluj-Napoca, 2009), pp. 159-169; Idem, 'De la Porturile Italiei la *porturile ungurului*. Drumurile *valahe* ale cruciadei în secolul XV' [From the Italian Harbors to the *Harbors*

of the Hungarian: The Walachian Roads of the Crusade in the 15th Century], in *Istoriografie și politică în estul și vestul spațiului românesc* [Historiography and History East and West of the Romanian Space], edited by Svetlana Suveică, Ion Eremia, Sergiu Matveev, Sorin Șipoș (Kishinev – Oradea, 2009), pp. 107-133. For the (controversial, especially in reference to the actual events occurred during the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople and to the Islamic turn of the state under Bayezid II) relation between the Jews and the sultans (up to the 16th century): H. Inalcik, 'The Policy of Mehmed II toward the Greek Population of Istanbul and the Byzantine Buildings of the City', *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* (Washington DC), XXIII (1969), pp. 229-249 (here pp. 235-236); Joseph Hacker, 'Ottoman policies towards the Jews and Jewish attitudes towards Ottomans during the Fifteenth Century', in *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society*, edited by Benjamin Braude, Bernard Lewis (New York, 1982), pp. 117-126; Idem, 'The Sergen System and Jewish Society in the Ottoman Empire During the Fifteenth to the Seventeenth Centuries', in *Ottoman and Turkish Jewry: Community and Leadership*, edited by Aron Rodrigue (Bloomington, 1992), pp. 1-66; B. Lewis, *The Jews of Islam* (New York, 1984), pp. 135-136; M.R. Cohen, *Under Crescent and Cross: The Jews in the Middle Ages* (Princeton, 1994), pp. 3-8; **Minna Rozen**, *History of the Jewish Community in Istanbul: The Formative Years, 1453-1566* (Leiden-Boston, 2002), pp. 27-33 (at the end of 15th century, following especially the expulsion of the Jews and Moors from Spain after 1492, the Jewish population of Istanbul had risen to 30.000); M. Jacobs, *Islamische Geschichte in Jüdischen Chroniken* (Tübingen, 2004), passim (underlines Capsali's repeated pro-Ottoman overtones). For Venice and the Jews in the 15th century, see in general: Riccardo Calimani, *Storia del ghetto di Venezia* (Milan, 1985), pp. 9-12 (the first Jewish ghetto was established in Venice in 1516; the name *ghetto* comes from the Venetian dialect); *Gli ebrei e Venezia, secoli XIV-XVIII. Atti del Convegno internazionale organizzato dall'Istituto di storia della società e dello stato veneziano della fondazione Giorgio Cini. Venezia, Isola di San Giorgio Maggiore, 5-10 giugno 1983*, edited by Gaetano Cozzi (Milan, 1987); with emphasis on the crusader problem in Venice's relation to the Jews: Robert Chazan, *Medieval Stereotypes and Modern Antisemitism* (Berkeley, 1997), pp. 10-14; Reinhold C. Mueller, 'Lo status degli ebrei nella Terraferma veneta del Quattrocento: tra politica, religione, cultura ed economia. Saggio introduttivo', in *Ebrei nella Terraferma veneta del Quattrocento: atti del convegno di Studi. Verona, 14 novembre 2003 (=Reti Medievali. Quaderni di Rivista, II)*, edited by G.M. Varanini, R.C. Mueller (Florence, 2005), pp. 9-30 (pp. 20-23). Venice's attitude evolved from open hostility (since the 1420s, the Jews could not own led or build synagogues in Venice), passing through a pogrom in 1480 (after the Venetian-Ottoman peace of 1490; the pogrom was however reduced in comparison to other parts of Europe) to

'hostile tolerance' (professor Papacostea formula for the Walachian attitude towards the Jews can be applied in this case as well), and Venice, like Rome, began to shelter more and more Jews who fled from Germany (1470s-1480s) or from Spain (1490s). Passing to Moldavia, three aspects have to be underlined. First the 15th century urban Moldavia proportion of the Jews, as derived from Morosini's presentation of 1475 and Capsali's chronicle from the early 1520s, is more suiting for 19th-20th century relations (when the Jews represented, in different Moldavian towns and cities, even up to 50% of their population) than for the conventional images of medieval Moldavia (e.g. Andrei Oișteanu, *Inventing the Jew. Antisemitic Stereotypes in Romanian and Other Central-East European Cultures* (Lincoln-London, 2009), passim, and the explicitly modern anti-Semitic references in relation to Stephen's 'thinking' in Maria-Magdalena Székely, Ștefan Sorin Gorovei, 'Semne și minuni pentru Ștefan cel Mare' [*Signs and Miracles for Stephen the Great*], *Studii și Materiale de Istorie Medie* [Studies and Materials in Medieval History] (Bucharest), XVI (1998), pp. 47-66, pp. 63-64). Second, other than in Stephen III of Moldavia's case, Matthias Corvinus' relation with the Jews did not deteriorate following their anti-Ottoman taxation, most likely because of the way in which the taxation was implemented/ ransomed with the king's approval, as well as under the influence of one of Matthias' most trusted councilors, the treasurer, Johann Ernuszt, a converted Jew (he greatly helped organize the Jews under the authority and protection of the crown, especially from the late 1460s on e.g. László Zolnay, *Buda középkori zsidósága* [The Jews of Medieval Buda] (Budapest, 1968), pp. 23-26). Thirdly, we thus draw the attention to the fact that Stephen III's treasurer in the last third of his rule (after the Ottoman conquest of the harbors in 1484 and the Moldavian-Ottoman peace of 1486) was Isaac, one of the most influential Moldavian magnates (in power until the 1510s), without any known ascendancy (his non-Moldavian origins – either Jewish or Greek Crimean – are rather obvious like in the – Hungarian – case of Stephen's brother-in-law and chastelan of Suceava, Șandru/ Șendrea/ Sándor (Ștefan Andreescu, 'Amintirea lui Ștefan cel Mare în Țara Românească' [Stephen the Great's Memory in Walachia], *Revista Istorică*, NS, XV (2004), 3-4, pp. 5-10, here p. 7, nota 13, based on the analysis of Nicolae. A. Alexandru]. Constantinescu, *Dicționar onomastic românesc* [Romanian Onomastic Dictionary] (Bucharest, 1963), p. 7). Consequently the Jewish problem in Stephen III's Moldavia as an anti-Semitic problem must be submitted to a prudent and balanced analysis, and, further, cannot be separated from the problem of Stephen III's and Evdochia Olelkovic of Kiyv's daughter, Helena; she married in 1482 Ivan Ivanovic, the son of heir of Ivan III of Moscow, and was later accused of being a key-member of the influential 'sect' of the so-called *Judaizers* (George Vernadsky, 'The Heresy of the Judaizers and the Policies of Ivan III of Moscow', *Speculum* (Oxford), VIII (1933), 3, pp. 436-454;

Dmitrij Cyzevskij, 'Die Judaisierenden und Hussiten Litterarische Lesefrüchte', *Zeitschrift für Slavische Philologie* (Heidelberg), XVII (1940), 1, pp. 120-122; John V.A. Fine Jr., 'Feodor Kuritsyn's *Lao-dikijskoe Poslanie* and the Heresy of the Judaizers', *Speculum*, XLI (1966), 3, pp. 500-504; it should also be noted that Feodor Kuritsyn, Ivan III's envoy to Buda and Suceava for the conclusion of the Hungarian-Moldavian-Muscovite alliance of 1483, played an essential part in the spread in the Greek rite environment of the Hungarian-Moldavian stories on Vlad III *Dracula* of Walachia). It is possible that after 1484, anti-Semitic feelings spread (this might be the possible interpretation of a Moldavian monastical representation from Putna, Stephen III's necropolis, from the spring of year following the Ottoman conquest of the harbors in southern Moldavia; see in this respect the image and the information in *Repertoriul monumentelor și obiectelor de artă din timpul lui Ștefan cel Mare* [The Repertory of Monument and Artifacts from the Time of Stephen the Great], edited by M. Berza (Bucharest, 1958), no. 89, pp. 295-296). It is (equally) possible that such feelings were quite rapidly neutralized after the Ottoman-Moldavian peace of 1486 (this is the possible meaning of Stephen III's reglementations in favor of the Armenians, Greeks and Jews, 'the main non-Muslim associates of the *Tuk*', reglementations mentioned under his nephew Stephen IV in 1526; see the source in *Izvoare și mărturii*, I, pp. 155-156).