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Our purpose in the present paper is to look into the process of metaphorization of names of body parts in Arabic, Hebrew and Syriac, as it is reflected in various literary sources and lexicographical works, from the viewpoint of their relevance for the mental shaping of different concepts having various degrees of abstractness, ranging from concepts directly related to space to those pertaining to the realm of human emotions. We have adopted as a tool of analysis for this purpose the theory of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson about conceptual metaphor, of which parts that are relevant for our topic will be exposed in the next section.

The three languages involved in this research have been selected not on the basis of some special representativity they would be entitled to claim for the Semitic group as opposed to other languages belonging to it, but mainly because they all have acquired, within the boundaries of their respective cultural areas, the status of classical, literary and liturgical languages, which made them privileged, if not exclusive, tools of expression for a large amount of literary works, unlike some other Semitic languages, dead or alive, much more poorly and sporadically attested. Moreover, these languages also represent, in their written form, something of a temporal and spatial continuum, given that the Hebrew biblical writings, the main source on the basis of which a classical norm for this language was built, seem to have taken shape within the boundaries of the first millennium BC, Syriac flourished during the first half of the first millennium AD and written Arabic began to be heavily attested from the 7th century onwards; as for the areas in which they have developed, they are also contingent,
stretching from the Arabic peninsula to the Fertile Crescent, and at times even overlapping each other.

The corpus we have relied upon in carrying out this research is formed by literary works relevant for the classical period in the development of each language, namely the works of the Arabic writers Ibn al-Muqaffa (8th century) – Al-‘Adab al-Kabīr (henceforth AK), Al-‘Adab as-Ṣaġīr (AS), Risālat aṣ-Ṣaḥābah (RS) and Kalīlah wa-Dīmmah (KD), Ibn Ḥazm al-‘Andalusī (10th-11th centuries) – Ṭawq al-Ḥamāmah (TH), al-Ǧāḥiz (8th-9th centuries) – Al-Maḥāsin wa-l-‘Adād (MA), a selection of hadīths collected by al-Buhārī – Gwāhir al-Buḥārī (JB), along with the biblical writings, the Syriac version of the Bible known as the Pešīṭā, the Lexicon Syriacum of Carl Brockelmann (1928) and the thesaurus-type lexicon of Thomas Awdo (Šimtā d-Leššānā Suryāyā, 1985). However, given that many of the books of the Pešīṭā Old Testament seem to have been translated directly from Hebrew, we have refrained from adducing samples of material furnished by it unless the names of body parts occurring in them weren’t matched by their counterparts in the Hebrew text. As regards the translation into English of the material included in this paper of the aforementioned writings, we have strived to make it as literal as possible, so as to make it reflect to a maximum extent the structure of phrases and expressions as they appear in the original, with a special emphasis on those involving names of body parts. Whenever this wasn’t possible, we have included the names in question between round brackets. The translation of the quotations adduced from the Hebrew Bible and the Pešīṭā, on the other hand, is largely based on the literal translations of Robert Young (1898) and James Murdoch (1852).

**About Metaphor According to Lakoff and Johnson’s Theory**

The classical and, at the same time, one of the most common visions about metaphor treats it as a figure of speech consisting in a syntactically abridged form of simile: if the simile signals a likeness between two concepts that represent literal meanings for two names based on common yet unspecified features (A is like B), the metaphor goes a step further and identifies the two elements (A is B). The cognitive linguists George Lakoff and Mark Johnson challenge all the assertions of this theory, beginning with metaphor being ascribed the quality of a mere figure of speech:
“metaphor is for most people a device of the poetic imagination and the rhetorical flourish – a matter of extraordinary rather than ordinary language... We have found, on the contrary, that metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action. Our ordinary conceptual system... is fundamentally metaphorical in nature” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, p. 3).

The main argument adduced for placing metaphor at the level of thought, and not necessarily or only of language, is the fact that, according to their analysis, a lot of abstract concepts related to matters of our daily life are structured in terms of other concepts, which makes it right to see them as metaphorical. This structuring or mapping is not highlighted by explicit identifications of different concepts with others at the level of discourse (we do not often find outside theoretical meta-discourse statements put forth by Lakoff and Johnson to exemplify such metaphors, like “argument is war” or “life is a journey”, which justifies their claim that these metaphors do not represent figures of speech nor are they a matter of language). However, there are lots of other statements, that are pervasive in every day discourse and we normally don’t pay heed to, that testify for the systematic way in which many basic concepts, like “argument” and “life” cited above, are metaphorically structured and thus are dealt with, in everyday life, on the ground of a metaphorically based view. As a way of exemplifying the way in which such metaphorical concepts function at the level of discourse, various statements are brought forth that seem to be grounded in different conceptual metaphors (like, e.g. in the case of the “argument is war” metaphor, “your claims are indefensible”, “I’ve never won an argument with him”, “his criticisms were right on target”, etc.). This is why metaphors appearing at the level of language, while not being discarded altogether, are considered a reflection of conceptual metaphors lying at the level of thought:

“since metaphorical expressions in our language are tied to metaphorical concepts in a systematic way, we can use metaphorical linguistic expressions to study the nature of metaphorical concepts and to gain an understanding of the metaphorical nature of our activities” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, p. 7).

It is also postulated that metaphorical concepts often manifest themselves in a systematic way, given that, if a concept is viewed in terms
of another in a certain culture, people sharing that culture talk about and relate to the first concept in terms of the second. Moreover, if one concept is mapped on more than one other concept, meaning that there are more conceptual metaphors lying at the basis of its understanding, these metaphors have the tendency to form a system based on subcategorization. The example brought forth to illustrate this claim is that of the conceptual metaphors of “time” in Western culture (“time is money”, “time is a limited resource” and “time is a valuable commodity”) which seem to form a unitary system, “since in our society money is a limited resource and limited resources are valuable commodities” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, p. 9). Another aspect of the systematicity of conceptual metaphors is the function of “highlighting and hiding”, as these metaphors give us a partial account of the concepts understood on their basis; thus, if one concept is understood in terms of another, only those aspects will be systematically highlighted in actual statements related to it that are characteristic of that second aspect, while other aspects are usually discarded (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, pp. 10-13). On the other hand, conceptual metaphors make use only partially of the concepts upon which they map other concepts: in the “theories are buildings”, taken as an example in this case, only the foundation and the outer shell of a building are usually used in statements about theories that can be deemed pertaining to literary speech; if this metaphor is taken beyond its usual frame and names of other parts of a building are used in statements about theories, then we enter the field of figurative and imaginative language, or what other theorists deem “live metaphors”, that are, however, no less grounded in the conceptual metaphor “theories are buildings” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, pp. 52, 53). A special case of conceptual metaphors is reflected by “idiosyncratic metaphorical expressions that stand alone and are not used systematically in our language or thought”, of the type represented by phrases like “the foot of the mountain”, that, although they do give an account of an underlying conceptual metaphor (in this case, “a mountain is a person”), are marginal and relatively “uninteresting”, as “they do not systematically interact with other metaphorical concepts because so little of them is used”. These are the metaphors that deserve to be called “dead” in the two linguists’ view, although they do have a “spark of life” that can be extended by activating their unused portions in non-literal speech (Lakoff and Johnson, pp. 54, 55).

Along with structural metaphors of the “argument is war” type that Lakoff and Johnson used in demonstrating how some concepts are
understood in terms of other concepts, they also record other types of conceptual metaphors, one of which is the orientational metaphor, seen not as a relation between two concepts, but as a mapping of a whole system of concepts on another, based on spatial orientation: up-down, in-out, front-back, on-off, central-peripheral, etc. These metaphors arise from our physical experiences as beings having bodies functioning in a physical environment, and based on these experiences they give certain concepts spatial orientation: “good is up – bad is down”, “happy is up – sad is down”, “having control or force is up – being subject to control or force is down”, etc. These orientations are not arbitrary, but conditioned by “our physical and cultural experience”, which means that they are at the crossroads of the observation of natural phenomena and some of the culturally conditioned attitudes, or, in Lakoff and Johnson’s terms, they have an experiential basis, that is moreover ascribed to all types of metaphor: “in actuality we feel that no metaphor can ever be comprehended or even adequately represented independently of its experiential basis” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, p. 19).

Another type is the ontological metaphor, whereby abstract concepts acquire physical properties that make them suitable to be operated with as with physical objects and substances. Ontological metaphor is grounded in our physical experience in dealing with different kinds of objects and substances, and allows us to relate to the concepts whose understanding is mediated by it as we do to concrete entities that are to be found in nature. The existence of such a kind of conceptual metaphor is motivated in the author’s view by the need of the human being to establish boundaries between things so that he can relate to them as to clearly delineated entities, much to his own likeness:

“when things are not clearly discrete or bounded, we still categorize them as such, e.g., mountains, street corners, hedges, etc…Human purposes typically require us to impose artificial boundaries that make physical phenomena discrete just as they are: entities bounded by a surface” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, p. 25).

The subtypes of ontological metaphor are those labeled as entity (or physical object) and substance metaphors by which different notions are reified as entities and substances subject to different kinds of operations: quantifying - “there is so much hatred in this world”, identifying aspects – “the brutality of war dehumanizes us all”, setting goals – “he went to
New York to seek fame and fortune”, etc. (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, pp. 26-28), and container metaphors, which project upon abstract concepts and surrounding objects the vision we have of our own: “each of us is a container, with a bounding surface and an in-out orientation”. Another subtype of ontological metaphor is personification, whereby “the physical object is further specified as being a person”, so that it can be conceived of as acting like humans: “life has cheated me”, “inflation has pinned us to the wall”, etc., in a way that helps us to “make sense of phenomena in the world in human terms – terms that we can understand on the basis of our own motivations, goals, actions, and characteristics” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, p. 34).

A special mention deserves to be made about the cultural dimension of conceptual metaphors according to Lakoff and Johnson’s vision, as they emphasize at various stages of the exposition of their theory that many of the conceptual metaphors are deeply grounded in specific types of cultures and subcultures (see chapter “Metaphor and Cultural Coherence, pp. 22-24), and that

“cultural assumptions, values and attitudes are not a conceptual overlay which we may or may not place upon experience as we choose. It would be more correct to say that all experience is cultural through and through, that we experience our ‘world’ in such a way that our culture is already present in the very experience itself” (p. 57).

This is what makes a semantic approach of a limited corpus based on this theory a search not for universals of human language and thought, but for conceptual metaphors specific to certain cultural and linguistic areas.

**Conceptualization of Space**

Before beginning the actual discussion of the material we have gathered from our corpus, it is worth mentioning that we have refrained from distinguishing between “dead” and “live” metaphors in the traditional meaning of the terms, as such a distinction would have entailed a too high degree of subjectivity and would prove to be rather problematic especially in dealing with works written in classical languages centuries or even millennia ago, and also because instances of figurative, non-literal
speech can also be deemed, according to Lakoff and Johnson’s theory, as reflecting conceptual metaphors, or, more exactly, parts of the underlying concepts that are not used in literal speech.

The first cases we will focus our attention on are those of passages in which names of body parts appear to take on the meaning of parts of different entities more or less easily identifiable in our physical environment (mountains, gardens, different places), according to the position they occupy within the human body, in a way that makes their metaphorization a means to conceptualize, on one hand, different positions in space taking as a reference point the human body, and, on the other, to conceptualize, at least in part, those entities singled out from our environment in terms of a human body. The concept of “center” is expressed, in corporeal terms, by the names of the heart in all the three languages (Ar. qalb, Hebr. lēb, Syr. lebbā), in addition to the Arabic name for “chest” or “bosom”, šadr, which may be used metonymically for “heart”, as we shall see in other cases:

AR: —— wa-‘amara ... ’an tuhšā ’aḡwāfuḥā ... wa-tulbasā wa-tuqaddama ’amāma ʂ-ṣaffī fī l-qalbi. (KD, p. 14) “and he ordered that their interiors be filled, and that they be dressed up and advanced in front of the row, at the center (heart)”.

- ’aḡlasathu fī šadrī firāšihā... (MA, p. 145) “she seated him at the forefront (chest) of her bed”

HEBR: ...qāʾū ṭhōmóť bér-lēb yām (Ex, 15: 8) “congealed have been the depths in the heart of the see”

SYR: sab(w) ṭkōn bφ-yawmā qaḍmāyā ... lebbawātā ṭq-deqlē... (Lev, 23: 40) “take to yourselves in the first day ... the marrows (hearts) of palms”

—-hākannā nehwe bērēh ṭq-(‘)nāsā bēr-lebbāh d-arčā t-lāṯā ʿīmāmīn wa-r-lāṯā laylawān (Mat, 12: 40)“so will the Son of man be in the heart of the earth three days and three nights”

The front part of an entity can be designated in Arabic by the name šadr (“chest”, “bosom”), but the data provided by our corpus show this metaphor at work in contexts which provide us with some already abstract entities, not allowing us to trace back a complete semantic trajectory from the most concrete to the most abstract, some of the instances lying somewhere in between (in the passages from TH, p.94 and TH, p. 264, for example, the names risālah and ḥikāyah (here, “treatise” and, respectively,
“story”) suggest an abstract entity represented by a text, whereas in the passage from MA, p. 185 the name *ruq’āh*, which could be translated both as “piece of paper” and as “letter” or “message”, allows us to think both of a text and of a material object), while some other transcend the spatial dimension altogether and move to the temporal one (as in “the beginning of the day”):

-wa-lā yazunna zānnun ʿanna hādā muḥālifun li-qawlī l-muṣaṭṭari fi ṣadri r-risālati (TH, p. 94) “and let no one think that this is different from that which I have written down at the beginning (chest) of the treatise”

-...ʿid kāna l-ladī ʿindī minhu qad ḍahaba bi-n-nahbi fi s-sababi l-ladī ǧakartuḫu fi ṣadri hādīhi l-hikāyati (TH, p. 264) “for what I had from him was gone through plunder for the reason I exposed at the beginning (chest) of this story”

-tarkī d-duṭāʾa fi ṣadri *ruq’atī* yun碧ʿu can taqṣīrī (MA, p. 185) “not putting the invocation at the beginning (chest) of my letter would be a sign of my shortcoming”

-ʿinna ṣadra hādā l-yawmi qad waliya... (MA, p. 45) “the dawn (chest) of this day has gone…”

In Hebrew and Syriac, the body part chosen to designate this part of an entity or object, tangible or not, is the head:

**HEB:** -ʿel kol rōʾī derek bānīt rāmāṭēk... (Ez, 16:25) “at every head of the way thou hast built thy high place”

-hahodēs hazzeh lākem rōʾī hādāsīm ri ʾsōn hūʾ lākem l-ḥodshe haṣṣānāḥ (Ex, 12: 2) “this month is to you the chief of months, it is the first to you of the months of the year”

**SYR:** nēšarrē mekkēl bē-ṭakṣā wē-men rēš mawʿītēh qaḍmāyṭā (SLS2, p. 531) “we begin therefore the ritual from the beginning (head) of its first mawʿītā”

As for the space stretching in front of an entity, one way of designating it in Arabic is by means of the compound preposition *bayna yaday* (lit. “between the hands of...”), where the name *yad* appears to have past beyond the limit of metaphorization into grammaticalization (or at least a partial one, given that the noun hasn’t completely lost its flexion – see
the plural form used when the preposition governs a noun in the plural, as opposed to the dual form accompanying nouns in the singular): 3

- fa- ‘adīna lahu fa-dāḥala wa-waqafa bayna yadayhi (KD, p. 23) “and he let him in, and he entered and stood before him (between his hands)”
- wa-la- ‘in kuntu ʾinda maqāmī bayna yadayi l-maliki ʾamsaktu ʾani btidāʾihi bi-l-kalāmī (KD, p. 27) “and if I am in my place before (between the hands of) the king, I don’t speak to him out of my own initiative”
- wa-l-kalāmī bayna ʾaydiķum (KD, p. 172) “and the speech is before you (pl) (between your hands)”, i.e. “you (pl) know the speech”

The name pānīm (“face”) in the Hebrew preposition li-pēnē (“before”), on the other hand, appears to be completely grammaticalized, as this preposition governs names designating all sorts of entities, in both spatial and temporal contexts:

EBR: - wayyiḥyū mēšār̥tim li-pēnē miškan ʾohel mōʾēḏ (1Chr, 6: 17) “and they were ministering before (at the face of) the tabernacle of the tent of meeting…”
- . . . . wayyarʾ ‘et kol kikkar hayyardēn kī kullāh mašqeh li-pēnē šahēt yhwh ‘et sē ʾdôm wē-ʾet caʾmōrāh (Gen, 13: 10) “and saw that the whole circuit of the Jordan was all a watered country, before (at the face of) God destroying Sodom and Gomorrah”

When the entity serving as the reference point is provided with a front entrance, Arabic and Syriac exhibit also another possibility of rendering this meaning, as it is shown in the following two passages where the name used for this purpose is that of the mouth:

AR: fa-yulqawna fī nahrīn bi-ʾafwāhī l-ğammati… (JB, p. 725) “and they will be thrown into a river at the gates (mouths) of Paradise…”
SYR: wē-qāḏ šēmāʾ ʾeliyā ... nēʾpaq wē-qām bē-ʾumāh da-mēcarṭā (1 Kings, 19: 13) “and when Elijah heard it, he went out and stood at the opening (mouth) of the gate”
The upper part of an object can be designated in Arabic and Hebrew languages by the “head”, based upon an obvious analogy with the position of this organ within the human body:

AR:-…ka-’annahu ʿalamun ʿalā raʾsihi nārun (MA, p. 106) “…as if it were a flag with a fire on its head”
-wa-tuğʾalū l-ʾasā fi raʾsi rumḥīn... (MA, p. 162) “and the stick is placed at the head of a spear”
-zdaʾamū ʾanna ḥamāmatan kānat tufriḥ fī raʾsi naḥlatin ṭawīlatin dāhibatin fī s-samāʾi… (KD, p. 332) “it has been said that a pigeon was hatching its eggs at the head of a long palmtree that was reaching for the sky”
HEBR: bā-ʾaṣīrī bē-ʾehād la-ḥōdeš nir ʿū rāʾśē heḥārim (Gen, 8: 5) “in the tenth month, on the first of the month, appeared the heads of the mountains”
In Syriac, we find similar types of phrases in Thomas Awdo’s Sīmtā : rēšā ʾt-tūrā, d-ilānā (SLS 2, p. 530) “the head of the mountain, of the tree”.

In what appears to be a process of semantic polarization, the names of the head in Arabic and Syriac can also assume the meaning of “end”, “extremity” of an entity, a portion of space or a distance, this time, however, suggesting a conceptual metaphor based not an a vertical, standing body, but on a horizontally stretched one (in such cases, it is actually believed that the the source of the metaphor is not the body of humans, but of animals – see Anghelescu, 2000, p. 101):

AR: kāna ʿumaru ʿalā farṣaḥayni, bal ʿalā raʾsi ṯālāṭati ʿamyālin min makkata… (MA, p. 192) “Umar was at two parasangs’, nay, rather three miles’ distance (at the head of three miles) from Mecca…”
-ḡufira li-mraʾatīn mūmisatin narrat bi-kalbin ʿalā raʾsi rakiyyin… (JB, p. 487) “forgiven was a prostitute that passed by a dog, close to a well (at the head of a well)”
SYR: kenšā sagīʾā šāb (h)wā l-e-dītā ʾr-rēšēh ḥad maṭṭī (h)wā wa-ḥrēnā ʾdakkēl raḥḥīq (h)wā (SLS 2, p. 530) “a great group of people headed towards the church, one end (head) of which had already got there while the other (head) was still far away”

In one passage of our Arabic corpus, time also appears to be conceived of as a stretching entity, composed of portions having “ends”: 

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For the meaning of “back” or “backside”, the Arabic corpus provided us with instances where the name ًَاًَ ("heel") is used, whose semantic evolution in these contexts can be traced from a concrete spatial meaning to a more abstract one that accounts for a transition from the spatial to the temporal plan involving also a metonymy, namely the meaning of “offspring”:

-\(\text{wa-}^{3}\text{alā} \text{dālika fa-maw' idukumā}^{4} \text{inda} \text{s-sa'garātī l-lawātī}^{5} \text{inda} \text{'a'qābi l-buyūti} \text{(MA, p. 178) "that is why you must meet by the trees, behind (at the heels of) the houses"}

-\(\text{wa-'innahu 'in 'ah}^{7}\text{t'a'shu} \text{'āgīlu}^{8} \text{l-}^{9}\text{uqūbatī, lam yuḥtī'hu l-}^{10}\text{ğīlu; ḫattā} \text{'}innahu yudriku l-}^{12}\text{qāba wa-'a'qāba l-}^{13}\text{qābi} \text{(KD, p. 264) "and if swift retaliation doesn't reach him, later retaliation won't miss him, so that it will hit his offspring (heels) and the offspring of his offspring"}

-\(\text{fa-'idā huwa qad 'abs}^{14}\text{ara}^{15} \text{... fa'dla r-ra'yī l-}^{16}\text{ğāmi'i l-}^{17}\text{qāmī l-ladī tas}^{18}\text{luluihu bihi l-}^{19}\text{anfusu wa-l-}^{20}\text{a'qābu}^{21} \text{(AS, p.40) "and if he realized the advantage of the common opinion by which both oneself and one's progeny (heels) thrive..."}

In the case of the Hebrew name ًََ ("heel"), we have found a similar metaphorical development, restricted however to the spatial realm:

-\(\text{wayyāśimū hār}^{22}\text{am 'et kol hammah}^{23}\text{neh }^{24}\text{a}^{25}\text{šer mish}^{26}\text{pôn lā-}^{27}\text{ię w}^{28}\text{et }^{29}\text{a'qēbō}^{30}\text{miyyām lā-}^{31}\text{ięr}^{32} \text{(Josh, 8: 13) "and they set the people, all the camp which is on the north of the city, and its rear (heel) on the west of the city"}

In Syriac, the noun ًََ ("end", “extremity”, “foot (of a mountain)”, “trace”, “consequence”) (Brockelmann, p. 541), manifesting, like its Arabic counterpart, its capability of transcending the borders between the concrete and the abstract, the spatial and the temporal, as it is also shown by the denotative verb derived from it ًََ (verbal name ًََ) – “to follow”, “to investigate”, “to inquire”:
A similar disposition is also exhibited by the Arabic name *dubur* ("rear", "rear end", "back"), which, coming to designate the end of a prayer, or, more accurately, of the recitation of a prayer, seems also capable to extend its semantic area into the abstract and temporal field:

‘...anna n-nabiyya ... kāna yaqūlu fī duburi kulli ṣalātīn maktūbatīn: ‘lā 'ilāha 'illā llāhu...'’ (JB, p. 195) “that the prophet was saying after (at the back of) every prescribed prayer: ‘there is no god but Allah...’”

The Hebrew and the Syriac names *yād* and, respectively, *īdā* ("hand"), having as referent an organ found at the outer limits of the human body, display an extension of their semantic area that covers, inter alia, the meaning of “limit”. With this meaning the Hebrew *yād* is included in the compound preposition *‘al yad* ("beside", "by the side of"), thus providing us with yet another case of grammaticalization:

wּ-hiškîm ḥabšālôm wּ-‘āmad ‘al yad derek haššācar... (2Sam, 15: 2) “And Absalom hath risen early, and by the side (the hand) of the way of the gate...”

The Syriac *‘īdā* is can acquire a similar meaning, as it is shown by the following noun phrases: *yād ʿurhā* ("side of the road") *yād yannā* ("seashore"), *yād nahrā* ("river bank"), *yād nahlā* ("side of the valley") *‘ar‘ā rwaḥtā d-‘īdayyā* ("vast land", lit. "wide handed land") (SLS1, p. 422).

For the rendition of the meaning of “surface”, both Arabic and Hebrew make use of the names *wagḥ* and, respectively, *pānîm* ("face"), accounting for the face being the most visible and conspicuous part of the human body:

AR: -tumma 'innahā tamāwatat fa-ṭafat ‘al waḡhi l-mā‘i... (KD, p. 126) “then she played dead and floated on the surface (face) of the water”
HEBR: ‘ēd yar‘aleh min hā ‘āres wּ-hišqāh ‘et kōl p‘nē hā ‘adāmāh (Gen, 2: 6) “and a mist goeth up from the earth, and hath watered the whole face of the ground”
The Arabic names *batn* (“belly”, “stomach”, “womb”) and *zahr* (“back”) engage in a relation of antonymity, unequivocally attested by their being used in pair in two of the examples listed below, when acquiring the meanings of “inner side”, “interior”, “depth” and, respectively, of “outer side”, “exterior”, even “surface”:

- *wa-ka-*’anna l-*’ahyāra yurīdūna batna l-*’ardi* (KD, p. 92) “as if the good ones headed for the interior (womb) of the earth”
- *wadidtu bi-*’anna zahr*na l-*’ardi batnun / wa-*’anna l-batn*na minhā šāra zahrā (TH, p. 211) “I wish the exterior (back) of the earth were its interior (womb) and its interior (womb) became its exterior (back)”
- *kunnā fī zahrīhā ... wa-l-yawma yağma’unā fī baṭnīhā l-kafanu* (MA, p. 62) “we were on its (the earth’s) back, and today the shroud gathers us in its womb”
- *fa-nuhˇ rigˇ u lahumu t-*ṯ-ṯ.acāma ‘ilā batn*ni l-*wādī* (MA, p. 164) “so we will take the food to them at the bottom (womb) of the valley”

From this antonymic pair, only *batn* has a counterpart in the Hebrew *beṭen* for this particular meaning:

- *mibbet* še’ōl šiwwactî šāmactā qəlî (Jonah, 2: 3) “from the depth (womb) of Sheol I have cried, Thou hast heard my voice”, whereas Brockelmann signals for the Syriac *hassā* (“back”), inter alia, the meaning of “surface” (p. 250).

The names *waḡh* and *zahr* seem to be drawn rather close to each other when carrying the meaning of “surface” and, respectively, of “outer side” or “surface”; however, they do not become perfect synonyms, for when examining the sememes corresponding to each of them we can see that the semes they include are quite different: thus, whereas *waḡh* designates a plain surface like that of the water, the examples listed below suggest that the surfaces designated by *zahr* are of a different kind – surfaces of roads, houses, places of worship, cities, dunes, tents, i.e. of places that are one way or another more elevated than their surroundings, which makes us believe the the sememe of *zahr* in these cases includes the seme “elevated place” and even, in the case of the road or the dune, “elongated structure”: 
These facts lead us to believe that, just like in the case of the Arabic ra’s and Syriac rêšā bearing the meaning of “extremity”, “end”, the model for the conceptual metaphor underlying these statements is not that of the human body, but of the animal body, whose back is located in its uppermost part and is, generally, elongated.

The next case we are dealing with takes us one step closer to the next panel of our inquiry, as it is one of conceptualizing an abstract notion, namely the orientation or the direction taken through space; this is realized, in Arabic as in Hebrew or Syriac, largely by expanding the semantic field of the names having “face” as a primary meaning, in a process that could best be described as a metonymic rather than a metaphorical transfer, given that the body part which is the most obviously used in turning towards a direction is used for the direction itself. This process is also reflected in the lexical derivational process based on the root of the Arabic waḡh, whereby the denominative verbs waḡga (“to turn”, “to direct”, “to guide”) – as in the passage from AS, p. 52 – and its reflexive form, tawagga (“to head”, “to turn”) – as in AS, p. 63 – have emerged:

- min ‘abwābi t-taraffiqi wa-t-tawfīqi fī t-ta’līmi ʿan yakūna waḡhu r-raḡuli l-laḍī yatawaḡgaḥu fīhi mina l-sīlmi wa-l-ʿadabi fī-mā yuwāṣiṣu ṭāʾatan wa-yakūna lahu ʿindahu maḥmalun wa-qabūlun... (AS, p. 63) “one of the means of achieving subtlety and success in teaching is that people take a direction (face) in science and education that can acquire them obedience and acceptance”
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-wa-yatahaffațu min ‘an yuwağıha ‘ahadan wağhan lâ yahtâgu fihi ‘ilâ murū’atmin (AS, p. 52) “and he refrains from leading anyone in a direction (face) in which he needs no virtue”

-‘innamâ l-mâlu ya’tlubuhu sâhibuhu wa-yagmac’u hu min kulli wağhin li-baqâ’i hâlihi ... wa-šaraфи manzilatîhi fi ’ad’yuni n-nâsi, wa-stiğnâ’ihi āmmâ fî ’ayďihim, wa-šarfîhi fî wağhihi (KD, p. 74) “one looks for money and gathers it from all side (face) in order to preserve his situation, secure an honorable status among people, avoid needing their money and spend his for its (right) purpose (face)”

-zA‘amû ’annahu kâna bi-’ardi kadâ tâğirun fa-’arâda l-ľurūga ‘ilâ ba’di l-wuğêhi li-btiğâ’i r-rizqi... wa-dâhaba fî wağhihi (KD, p. 156) “it has been said that there was a merchant in a certain land, and he wanted to travel some place (in a certain direction / face) to acquire wealth, and he went his way (face)”

-wa-’anâ ka’tîru l-madâhibi wa-’argû ‘allâ ’adhaba wağhan ’illâ ‘așabtu fihi mā yuğnîni; fa-’inna hîlalan hamsan man tazawwadahunna kafaynahu fî kulli wağhih... (KD, p. 270) “and I have many ways, and I don’t want to follow one direction (face) unless I achieve what suffices me, for there are five features that help their possessor in the pursuit of any goal (face)”

The Hebrew pânim (“face”) appears to convey a similar meaning in the verbal locution šâm pânim (“to turn”, lit. “to set face”):

HEBR: …wayya’abôr ’et hannâhâr wayyâsem ’et pânâw har haggîl‘âd (Gen, 31: 21) “and passed over the river, and set his face towards the mount of Gilead”

This meaning is also attested for the Syriac ’appê (“face”) - b-appayk hallek (SLS2, p. 157) “go your way (face)” – that subsequently undergoes a process of grammaticalization in the compound preposition l-appay (“towards (the face of)”), both in the spatial and temporal realms:

-...wa-r’law ’armênôn zêq’orâ l’-rûhâ d’-nâśbâ wê-rûdên (h)waw l-appay yâbshâ (Act, 27: 40) “and (they) hoisted a small sail to the breeze, and made way towards the land”

- wê-l-appay r’sâ’ sâ’in qêc’a yešû’ bê-qâlâ râmâ... (Mat, 27: 46) “and about (towards) the ninth hour, Jesus cried with a loud voice”
As in Arabic, this semantic development is reflected both in Hebrew and Syriac by verbs sharing their root with the name pānîm (Hebr. pānâh, Syr. p‘nā) and bearing the meaning of “heading”, “turning”:5

HEBR: wayyišnû miššām hâ”nāšîm wayyēlkû sēdōmâh (Gen, 18: 22) “and the men turned from thence, and went towards Sodom”

We have registered so far textual attestations of names of body parts acquiring metaphorical meanings that seem to reflect the conceptualization of concrete, spacially circumscribable entities in terms of the human body, with a few notable exceptions where the conceptual metaphors seem to be built upon the image of the animal, horizontally stretched body (see Ar. ra‘s and žahr, Syr. rēšā), and also excepting the case of the names of the “face” acquiring, through metonymy, the meaning of “direction”, a concept linked to space though not definable as a spatial entity. We could see how different entities of the most diverse nature are conceptualized as (generally human) bodies: beds have chests, sees and trees have hearts; flags, spears, palmtrees, mountains, gatherings have heads; houses and camps have heels; roads, sees and valleys have hands; the earth has a face, a womb and a back; all this means, in the terms of Lakoff and Johnson’s theory, that each of these statements is based on a conceptual metaphor that can be formulated as “a bed (or a see, a tree, a mountain, a camp, the earth, etc.) is a (human) body”. All these conceptual metaphors, however, fall in the category of what Lakoff and Johnson describe as “idiosyncratic, unsystematic and isolated” conceptual metaphors, that are reflected by only one or a few metaphorical expressions (actually, based on our corpus, all conceptual metaphors have singular attestations, with the exception of those involving as target domains the house – which has heels and a back – and the earth – which has a face, a womb and a back). Given the obviously limited character of our corpus, these statistics cannot be deemed totally representative of the general situation from this viewpoint, but they are remarkably relevant in the light of an important point in Lakoff and Johnson’s theory, that has to do with determining the concepts, or the conceptual domains, that are most likely to be defined through metaphor, as they state that the target domains, i.e. those that are metaphorically understood, are “basic domains of experience like
love, time and argument”. As for the source domains, they are “other basic domains of experience” that are “structured clearly enough and with enough kind of internal structure to do the job of defining other concepts” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, pp. 117, 118). Now, if we compare the concepts that we have dealt with so far with those that are, according to this theory, understood through conceptual metaphors, we can easily see that the fundamental difference between them is that the former are abstract concepts with a high degree of complexity, whereas the latter have as referents material objects whose qualities can be ascertained by sheer observation with no great need of conceptualizing them outside their natural environment. Even so, their conceptualization does abide by the aforementioned rule, as it involves one of the few, if not the only conceptual domain closer to our experience than physical objects found in our environment, and thus, capable of contributing to their understanding, our own body.

Some of the names of body parts involved in this section have their semantic areas stretching beyond the limits of the purely spatial concepts into the field of abstract ones, thus contributing to the conceptualization in terms of the human body of treatises, letters, stories, months, periods in one’s lifetime, prayers, which makes their cases seem as accounting for spatialization of concepts rather than conceptualization of space. We have, however, chosen to include them in this section, for with the exception of the treatise, the letter and the story, that, as we have already pointed out, lie at the boundaries between the abstract and the concrete and allow us to view them as both material objects and texts, all these notions (including the prayer, which stretches over a period of time when recited) are related to time, and the names of body parts involved in their metaphorical understanding have their semantic field stretched in the process over areas that are mere continuations of space-related metaphorical meanings. These facts justify, in our view, the treatment of space and time, and, subsequently, of space- and time-related concepts, in a unitary fashion, as time seems, based on the present material, to be conceived of as a projection of space beyond the realm of the concrete.6

Based on the material we have viewed so far, we can say that the concepts related to space (and time) to whose understanding contribute conceptual metaphors involving body parts lie at the very fringes of the conceptual domain that is, according to Lakoff and Johnson’s theory, the most prone to be metaphorically defined and understood, and are therefore conceptualized through metaphor in an unsystematic way.
Spatialization of Concepts

We continue our inquiry with cases of metaphorical expressions involving names of body parts whose underlying conceptual metaphors have as target domains abstract concepts unrelated to time, that are understood, related to and operated with by their means as spatially definable objects. We begin by looking at the situations that are the closest to those investigated in the precedent section, namely those in which the target concepts are partially conceived of as human bodies. The concepts found in this situation fall into two categories, the first one being represented by groups of humans of different sorts whose leaders are spoken of as “heads”, which implies, as in the precedent cases, the unsystematic conceptual metaphor “human groups are bodies”:

AR: -wa-‘ahũhu huwa ra’su l-mu’tazilati bi-l-‘andalusi (TH, p.131) “and his brother is the head of the mu’tazili sect in Andalusia”

-‘aḏara fīhā s-sababa l-laḏī min ‘aḏlihī c-amilā baydabā l-faylasūfu l-hindiyyu ra’su l-barāḥimaṭi li-dabšalīma maliki l-hindi kitābahu (KD, p. 11) “in it he mentioned the reason why the philosopher Bidpay, the head of the Brahmins, made his book for Dabshahim, the king of India”

-…wa-‘idā kāna l-ḫufātu l-urātu ruʿūsa n-nāsi fa-dāka min ’aṣrāṭiḥā…(JB, p. 561) “…and when the bare footed and the naked become the leaders (heads) of mankind, this will be one of the signs (of the final hour)”

HEBR: wayyō’mer šemû‘ēl ha-lō’ ‘im qātōn ‘attāh bे-ēnēkā rō’ š sibṭē yiśrā’ēl ‘attāh… (1Sam, 15: 17) “Art not thou, if thou art little in thine own eyes, head of the tribes of Israel?”

-…’ēlleh rā’šē “ha-hēti wiyyīm l-mišrēhōtām (Ex, 6: 25) “these are heads of the fathers of the levites, as to their families”

SYR: ‘āp men rêšē dēn saggī’ē haymen(w) bēh ‘ellā meṭṭul pērīšē lā mawdēn (h)waw (John, 12: 42) “And of the chiefs also, many believed in him, but on account of the Pharisees they did not confess”

-wē-malkē d-arē ’èwē-rawē bēnē wē-rēṣay ’alpē … ūšēw ṅapșēhōn ba-mēcarrē (Apoc, 6: 15) “And the kings of the earth, and the nobles, and the captains (heads) of thousands… hid themselves in caves”

The second category is that of abstract notions such as facts, knowledge, manners, qualities, states of mind, the “head” of which designates either their most important part or, as in the case of the Hebrew šimḥāh (“joy”),
their most intense manifestation, in a way that entails, like in the precedent cases, their being partially viewed as human bodies:

AR: \( \text{wa-kāna ra’}\text{s}\text{u mā ‘ażamahu ‘indī šiğara d-dunyā fī ‘aynīhi} \) (AK, p.186) “and the most important thing (the head) of what made him look great to me was that the world looked insignificant to him”

-…‘alima ‘annahu ‘ašlu kulli ‘adabin wa-ra’su kulli ‘ilmin … (KD, p. 46) “he realized that it is the origin of all good manners and the beginning (head) of all science”

-wa-wağadtu l-faqra ra’sa kulli balā’in… (KD, p. 196) “and I found out that poverty is the origin (the head) of all torment”

-…wa-ra’su l-kulli l-ḥazmu wa-ra’su l-ḥazmi li-l-maliki ma’rifatu ‘ašhābihi… (KD, p. 280) “and the pinnacle (the head) of everything is judiciousness, and judiciousness for the king means knowing his companions”

HEBR: \( \text{tidbaq lēšônî lē-hīkki ‘im lō’ ezkērēkī ‘im lō’ ‘ażleh ‘et yērūšālayim ‘al rō’š simḥātî} \) (Ps, 137: 6) “let my tongue cleave to my palate, if I do not remember thee, if I do not exalt Jerusalem above my chief joy (the head of my joy)”

Besides the conceptual metaphor directly related to the expressions involving the names of body parts, these two categories of statements can also be explained on the basis of an orientational metaphor that arranges concepts on an UP-DOWN oriented axis, and that can be further refined into more detailed metaphors: the first category, where groups of humans are corporealized, can be interpreted as reflecting the metaphors “having control or force is up; being subject to control or force is down” or “high status is up; low status is down” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, pp. 15, 16), thus explaining why the leaders occupy the position of the head within the body; for the second category, one may assume the existence of two underlying orientational metaphors, one of which is an extension into the domain of abstract concepts of the same metaphors accounting for the leader being the head, and the other, underlying the metaphorical expression \( rō’š simḥāh, \) is the “more is up; less is down” metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, p. 15).

The next set of passages can be interpreted as reflecting, unlike the two precedent sets, a solely orientational metaphor, also having an UP-DOWN axis, and serving to conceptualize the idea of possession and/or authority, whereby something or someone being under someone’s possession or
authority is viewed as being under his hand. The underlying orientational metaphors can be deemed to be the same as those mentioned earlier. The absence of an ontological metaphor correlated with the orientational ones entails another difference, namely that the concept of possession or authority is not reified, in this case, but rather understood as the spatial relation itself:

AR: qāla l-ʿarnabu: al-maskanu lī, wa-taḥta yādī, wa-ʿanta muddāʿ in lahu (KD, p. 217) “the rabbit said: the abode is mine, and I own it (it is under my hand), and you only pretend its ownership”

-ʿihwānukum ḥawalukum, ʿaṭ-alahumu llāhu taḥta ʿaydīkum, fa-man kāna ʿaḥīhu taḥta yadihi fa-l-yutʿimhu mimmā yaʾkul (JB, p. 59) “your servants are your brothers that God has placed under your authority (under your hands), and whoever has his brother under his authority (under his hand) should feed him from what he eats”

HEBR: wē-ʿēn yeš pōh tahat yādkā hʿnit ʿo ḥāreb…(1Sam, 21: 9) “and is there not here under thy hand spear or sword?”

SYR: ʿāp ʿenā ʿabdā (ʿ)nā tʿheṭ ʿīdā (SLS1, p. 423) “I am also a slave under (someone’s) authority (under the hand)”

One of the most productive means of spatializing concepts in relation with metaphors of names of body parts has proved to be the metaphorical conceptualizing of internal organs, and mainly of the heart, as containers for different kinds of feelings, emotions, knowledge, information, as the understanding of an organ as a container entails the understanding of the aforementioned abstract concepts as objects or substances that can find a place inside the organ, which makes them ultimately be conceived of as spatially definable entities, having a volume of their own and other specific properties. In Arabic, the organ assuming this role is predominantly the heart (named mostly qalb and, sometimes, fuʿād), that can sometimes be metonymically replaced by the chest (ṣadr), whereas all the attestations that our corpus furnished us with for the other two languages involve the heart (Hebr. lēb, lēbāb, Syr. lebbā). The overwhelming presence of the heart in these conceptual metaphors is by no means surprising, as it is perceived in many cultures as the seat of emotions and also as an agent engaging in different kinds of relations with them. In the next examples, we can see how the heart is shown to contain different abstract concepts like feelings, commitments, experience, God’s law:
As a development of the basic metaphor “the heart is a container”, abstract concepts appear not just to be inside it, but to have a place of their own within it, in a way that further enhances and explicitates, at the level of linguistic expression, their spatialization:

AR: \( \text{saliqatu l-\text{caqli makn\u0161atun f\u0161 ma\text{grizih\u0161 mina l-qalbi}... (AS, p.22) “the property of reason is concealed in the place where it has been planted within the heart”} \)

-\( \text{\text{\v{c}lam \ ‘anna l-\text{\‘ahq\u0161a lah\u0161 f\u0161 l-qul\u0161bi maw\text{\v{a}q\u0161} u mukammanatun m\u0161\u00f各\u0161atun. Fa-l-‘alsunu l\u00e6 ta\text{sduqu f\u0161 \text{\v{h}abarih\u0161 \‘ani l-qul\u0161bi wa-l-qalbu \’\u00ea dalu \text{\v{s}ah\text{\u0161}datan mina l-lis\u0161\u0161i \‘al\u0161 l-qalbi (KD, p. 265) “be aware that resentments have hidden and painful places inb the hearts; tongues do not speak the truth about hearts, and these give a more accurate testimony about themselves than tongues”} } \)} \)

A situation consistent with the “the heart is a container” metaphor is that in which the heart is viewed as filled, occupied by a certain feeling, emotion or quality, in a way that involves their conceptualization as substances that can fill a container to its capacity or, on the contrary, be poured out of it and leave it empty:

AR: \( \text{wa-\text{\v{c}alayka bi-l-\text{\‘ah\d{a}ri f\u0161 \‘amrika wa-l-\text{\‘ar\d{a}’ati f\u0161 qalbika \text{\v{h}att\u0161 tamla’a qalbaka \‘ar\d{a}’atan... (AK, p. 163-164) “you must be cautious and brave at heart, so that you fill your heart with bravery”} } \)} \)
-ḥāḡatī ... ʾan yaʾmura l-maliku wazīruḥu...wa-yuʿqṣima ʾalayhi ʾan yuʿmila fikrahu ... wa-yuṣrīḡa qalbuḥu fi naẓmi taʿlīfi kalāmin... (KD, p. 57) “my need is that the king command his vizier and decree upon him to put his mind to work... and pour out his heart in the composition of a speech...”

-wa-s-suluwwu ... yanqaṣimu īlā qismayni: suluwwin ṭabdīyyin, wa-huwa l-musammā bi-n-nisyāni, yaḥlī biḥi l-qalbu wa-yafraḡu biḥi l-bālu... (TH, p. 243) “solace comes in two types: natural solace, which is named oblivion, through which the heart is emptied and the mind is voided”

-fi kanafi llāhī wa-fī sitriḥī / man laysa yaḥlī l-qalbu min dikirīḥī (MA, p. 72) “under God’s protection and guard is he whose heart isn’t void of His remembrance”

HEBR: lēb ḇnē hāʾādām mālēʾ rāʾ (Koh, 9: 3) “the heart of the sons of man is full of evil”

-biṭhū ḇb- khôl ēʿt ēʾām šiḥkū ḻ-pānāw ḻḥabkem (Ps, 62: 9) “trust in Him at all times, oh people, pour forth before Him your heart”

When more than one reified concept finds its place inside the heart, we may assume with a fairly high degree of certainty that the ontological metaphor found at work in their conceptualization has them reified as physical objects occupying certain volumes of space inside the container, rather than liquid or fluid substances, as in the precedent cases:

AR: ...fa-yāḡmaʾa dālika kullahu fi ṣadrin ʾaw fī kitābin (AS, p. 43-44) “...so that he may gather all this in his mind (litt. “a chest”) or in a book”

-li-yaḡtamiʾ fī qalbika l-ṣifiqāru ʾilā n-nāsi wa-l-istiqāru ʾanhum... (AK, p. 177-178) “let the need for people and the ability to dispense with them reunite in your heart”

-ʾiṁnahu lā yaḡtamiʾu ʾs-ṣiḥḥu wa-l-ṭīmānu fī qalbi ʾabdīn ṣāliḥīn ʾabdan (MA, p. 50) “avarice and faith have never reunited in a righteous man’s heart”

One of the properties of a container is that of hiding its contents from view, of making them invisible to the ones looking from the outside; in this case, the quality of the contents is less easy to establish than in the two precedent cases, but they are no less materialized as entities perceivable with human senses, since their placement inside a container prevents their being seen from the outside:
Among the most evidently spatializing and materializing effects of, or rather complementary phenomena to the conceptualization of internal organs as containers is the quantification of their contents, whereby the abstract concepts contained therein, be they qualities or feelings, become measurable in terms of quantity and, as such, may be compared with material entities found in the physical environment like, in this case, barleycorns or dinars:

AR: ...ḥattā yaf'lama sirra nafsihi wa-mā yuḏmirhu qalbuḥu (KD, p. 49) “...so that he may know his secret and what his heart conceals”

- katamtu hawākumu fī s-ṣadri minnī / ʿalā ʾanna d-dumīʿa ʿalayya nammat (MA, p. 111) “I have hidden my passion for you in my heart (chest), although the tears have betrayed me”

HEBR: ʾidqātkā lōʾ kissītī b-ʾtōk libbī... (Ps, 40: 11) “Thy righteousness I have not concealed in the midst of my heart”

-...kī ḫūʾyǒḏēʾaʿ ṭāʾ calumōt ḫēb (Ps, 44: 22) “for He knoweth the secrets of the heart”

A container has a limited capacity, and, as such, can hold what may be placed inside only it to a limited extent; this is why, in various circumstances, we see how the heart is or is not capable of holding or containing feelings, worries, pieces of information, secrets, entailing, as in the other cases, complementary conceptual metaphors whereby abstract concepts become spatialized as entities that have a certain volume that can or cannot fit the capacity of the container, be they solid entities or fluid substances:
Among the physical experiential bases of the way we relate to our environment is the comfort we generally feel in wide spaces, and the stress that narrow spaces usually inflicts upon us, whence the conceptual metaphor that underlines the passages listed below, and that could be formulated as “wide is good; narrow is bad”, being also coherent with the more general metaphors “bigger is better; smaller is worse” and “more is better; less is worse”. In connection with the understanding of internal organs as containers, the first panel of this metaphor – “wide is good” – is put to work in conceptualizing different positively valued qualities, like generosity, forbearance, acceptance, knowledge:

AR: …mā lam tattasi‘ asmā‘uhum li-stimā‘ihi wa-lā qulūbuhum li-fahmihi (RS, p. 199) “…that which nor their ears were large enough to hear nor their hearts to comprehend”

-laysa fī l-qalbi mawḍū‘un li-ḥabībayni (TH, p. 95) “there is no place for two loved ones in the heart”

-wa-‘innī l-humūma ‘ilgā‘ tarādafat fī l-qalbi dāqa bihā (TH, p. 138) “if worries pile up inside the heart it cannot contain them”

-sami‘athu ‘ugūnāya wa-wā‘āhu qalbī wa-‘abṣarat-hu ēyāya )__īna takallama bihi… (JB, p. 511) “my ears heard it, my heart contained it and my eyes saw it when he said it”

-mā dāqat ṣūdūrū r-rīgˇāli ‘an say’in kamā taḏīqu ēani s-sirri (MA, p. 22) “people find it most difficult to keep a secret (people’s chests have a hard time containing nothing as they have containing a secret)”
“...and the mobed felt comfortable with her and laid his heart (chest) open for sleeping with her”

HEBR: wayyttēn ʾēlōhîm ḥokmāh li-šēlōmōh ʿu-tōbūnāh harbēh mēʾ ʿōd wē-rōh ab lēb ka-hōl ʿašer ʾal šēʾat hayyām (1Kings, 5:9) “and God gave wisdom to Solomon, and very much understanding, and breadth of heart (knowledge), as the sand that is on the edge of the sea”

As for the second pannel of the aforementioned metaphor – “narrow is bad” – it naturally plays a role in conceptualizing negatively valued qualities or states, like downcastness and unforbearance:

AR: wa-qad ǧamaʾta n-naḏdata wa-l-līna fa-lā tūḏadu ḡabānan āinda l-liqāʾi wa-lā ḍayyiqa s-ṣadri āinda mā yanūbuka mina l-ʾāṣyāʾi (KD, p. 335) “you have reunited courage and suppleness, so that you are not found to be coward in confrontation, nor downcast (narrow chested) when hardship befalls you”

-...ʾilāʾ an ḍāqa ṣādrūhu wa-bāḥa bi-mā nuqila ʾilayhi (TH, p. 147) “...until he couldn’t stand it anymore (his chest narrowed) and revealed what he had been told”

It is also worth noticing that the passage from TH, p. 147, in which the narrowing of one’s chest leads to his revealing of information entrusted to him, bears an obvious relation with the metaphorical statements previously listed that are built upon the idea of the limited capacity of a container, that can be sometimes exceeded by its contents and thus reveal them by pouring them out. The overlapping of conceptual metaphors in this case is a natural occurrence, since the contact between the concepts of wideness or narrowness and that of container does have as a result the emergence of the concept of (limited) capacity.

When an entity is conceptualized as a container, it is also implicitly understood as having an in-out orientation, which enables it to engage with other entities in spatial relations that are specific to this orientation, in that these other entities can be either inside or outside the container, and they can also be seen as moving or being moved so as to enter it or get out of it. Thus, alongside the understanding of a range of concepts as entities spatially related in one way or another to a container, their capacity of moving or being moved enhances their reification and marks
the transition from understanding “what they are” (in this case, objects or substances) to defining “what they do”. When the objects appear to enter the container themselves, with no mention of an exterior agent, they are shown as falling, entering, penetrating:

AR: ‘iyyāka ‘an yaqā’a fī qalbika taʿattubun ʿalā l-wālī ʾawi stizrāʿun lāhu; faʿin ’ānasta ‘an yaqā’a fī qalbika badā fī waḡhika ‘in kunta ḥalīman, wa-badā fī lisānika ‘in kunta saṭīhan (AK, p. 126) “beware of having blame and disdain for your superior falling into your heart, for if you let it fall into your heart it will appear on your face if you are mild-tempered, and in your speech if you are foolish”
-wa-qad qālāti l-ḥukamāʾu ‘īdā daḥāla qalba ṣ-ṣadīqi min ṣadīqihī rībatun… (KD, p. 242) “the wisemen have said that, if suspicion enters someone’s heart about his friend…”
-waʿammā ‘an yakūna … mutamakkinan min ṣamīmi l-fuʿādi nāfīdan fī ḥīgābi l-qalbi fa-mā ʿuqaddiru dālika (TH, p. 93) “as for (love) taking possession of the innermost part of the heart ane penetrate it’s cover, I don’t think this holds true”

When they go into the container as a result of an exterior agent, the passages recollected from our corpus show them as being thrown, brought or put inside the container:

AR: ‘inna š-šaytāna yabluġu mina l-ʿinsāni mablaġa d-dami, waʿinnī ḥaṣītu ‘an yaqīdīa fī qulūbikumā šayʿan (JB, p. 281) “Satan is as close to man as his own blood, and I feared lest he should throw something in your hearts”
HEBR: …w’e-hēbēʾ ti mōrek bi-lḵbābām b’e-ʾarṣōt ṭōye’hēhem… (Lev, 26: 36) “I have also brought a faintness into their heart in the lands of their enmemies”
-w’e-ʾet yirʾātī ʾettēn bi-lḵbābām … (Jer, 32: 40) “and My fear I put in their heart”

We now part completely with the conceptualization of internal organs as containers and focus solely on their understanding as physical objects engaging with emotions and other concepts in relations based on motion and different kinds of spatial reports that do not imply the organs having cavities in which objects can find their place. In these cases, both the organs and the abstract concepts with which they are seen as coming
in contact are conceptualized as physical, most probably solid objects forming couples of which one part is the stable element, and the other the element in motion or adopting a certain position towards the other. The closest situation to those registered in the previous sets of passages is that where the stable element is represented by the organ, while the notion conceptualized as the other element enters with it in one of the aforementioned relations. In the following examples we can see how the heart can be reached by remembrance, ideas, sharp words or whatever might present itself to the human mind from the outside world, or, on the contrary, can be broken away from:

AR: ʿalā l-ʿaqili ʿan yadkura l-mawta fī kulli yawmin wa-laylatin mirāran dīkran yubāširu l-qulūba wa-yaqdaʿu ʿ[t]-timāha (AS, p. 43) “intelligent people must remember death every day and night many times, in a way that touches the hearts and hinders ambition”

-ʿaʿadtu li-ʿibādī ʿs-sāliḥīna mā lā ʿaynun raʿat wa-lā ʿudnun samīʿat wa-lā ḥaṭara ʿalā qalbi bašarin… (JB, p. 481) “I have prepared for my righteous servants something no eye has seen, no ear has heard and has never come / occurred to the mind (heart) of a human”

-wa-l-lisānu lā yandamilu ʿušrānu wa-lā tuʿsā maqāṭiʿuḥu ... wa-ʿašbāhu n-našli mina l-kalāmī ʿidā wašālat ʿilā l-qalbi lam tuzaʿ wa-lam tuṣtaḥraḡ (KD, p. 219) “wounds inflicted with the tongue don’t cicatrize and its cuts don’t heal, and words that resemble blades can’t be pulled out or extracted once they have reached the heart”

-...wa-staḍkirū l-qurʿāna fa-ʿinnahu ʿašaddu taqāṣṣyan min šudūri r-riḡāli mina n-naʿami (JB, p. 583) “memorize the Qur’an, for it is faster than livestock at breaking away from men’s hearts (chests)”

SYR: saggīʿē šītē d-ṭeb(w) ʿal kursyā ḏ-malkūtā wa-ḥ-lā ʿalīqīn (h)waw ʿal lēbba l-ḥeš(w) l-būšā d-īqārā (Sir, 11: 5) “many despised men sat on the throne of royalty, and those that nobody was thinking about (that didn’t come up on (anyone’s) heart) were clad in clothes of majesty”

As for love, it can also stick to the heart or, as it is shown in the next passages, to other internal organs:

AR: wa-kaṭīran mā yakūnu luṣūgu l-ẖubbi bi-l-qalbi min naẓratin wāḥidatin (TH, p. 89) “and love often sticks to the heart after one single look”
“and this shows that love sticks to the livers of those endowed with this feature”

“love never stuck to my entrails but after a long time”

In some cases, the concept in question can assume towards the organ a position relevant to its importance, like in the following biblical verset, where God’s commandments are supposed to be on the heart, which suggests the possibility of there being also a partially systematic orientational metaphor structured on an UP-DOWN axis reflected in this statement:

HEBR: w^e-hāyū ḥadd ebārîm hā'ēlleh ‘ašer ‘ānōkî m^esaww^e kā hayyóm ‘al l^ēbēkā (Deut, 6: 6) “let these words, which I am commanding you today, be on thine heart”

Organs can also be reached as a result of another agent, as it appears in this verse, where the remembrance of a fact is depicted as a physical action (in this case, the turning back of the fact unto the heart) performed by the human subject himself:

HEBR: w^e-yāda^tā hayyóm wa-h^ēbōtā 'el l^ēbēkā kî yhwh hû ‘hā^elōhîm… (Deut, 4: 39) “and know today, and turn back unto thy heart, that yhwh is God”

The alternative kind of spatial relation established between organs and concepts, whereby the organ represents the mobile element and the concept in question the stable one, is also represented by a number of passages from our corpus, among which we find, as in the precedent case, instances where the organ acts of its own, without receiving an apparent stimulus from the subject or some other, exterior factor. In these instances the heart appears to stand firmly upon, incline towards, or turn onto something:

AR: fa-‘idā kāna hādā l-xalqu… qad qadara ‘alā t-taḥalluṣi min marābīti l-halakati… bi-mawaddatihi wa-ḥulūṣihā wa-ṭabāti qalbihi ‘alayhā… (KD,
“and if these creatures … were able to escape places of perdition … through pure affection and their heart’s firmness upon it…”

-«ağibi li-qalbī kayfa yaśbū ‘ilaykum / ‘alā ‘uzmi mā yalqā wa-laysa lahu șabrū (MA, p. 115) “you wonder at my heart, how it inclines towards you and has no patience, despite the hardships it endures”

HEBR: ‘al yēš ‘el dārākēhā libbēkā… (Prov, 7: 25) “let thy heart not turn unto her ways”

The heart does not engage in spatial relations only with abstract concepts, but also with entities of the material environment, such as another person or mosques, which has as an effect the understanding of the abstract concept involved (in this case, love or (emotional) attachment) not as a physical object but as the spatial relation itself, on the basis of a conceptual metaphor that could be formulated as “physical attachment is emotional attachment”:

AR: fa-qultu ‘inna l-latī qalbī bihā sīliqu / qabbaltuhā qublatan yawanā ‘alā ẖaṭarī (TH, p. 158) “and I said: she to whom my heart is attached received from me one kiss one day, despite the peril I exposed myself to”

-…fa-mā ra’aytu ‘ašadda tabagˇg˚uhan ... min muḥībin ‘ayqana ‘anna qalba maḥbūbihi cindahu... (TH, p. 181) “I’ve never seen anyone being more conceited than a lover who knows for sure that the heart of his beloved is with him”

-…wa-raḡulun qalbuhu mu callaqun bi-l-masg˚idi ‘idā ẖarağa minhu ḥattā ya‘ūda ‘ilayhi (TH, p. 307) “…and a man whose heart is attached (suspended) to the mosque when he leaves it, until he returns to it”

-…qalbī kulla yawmin wa-laylatin / ‘ilayka bi-mā tuḥfī l-qul˚ubu mu callaqū (MA, p. 142) “day and night my heart is attached to you by that which hearts conceal”

The types of movements and positions of the heart attested in the presence of another agent, be it the human subject or something else, are quite similar to those encountered in the absence of such agent: hearts are either attached, inclined, made to stay firm or moved. As for the concepts with which hearts come in contact this way, they also seem to be generally reified as physical object, with the notable exception of hawā (“passion”) in the passage from MA, p. 69, that is apparently understood as a domain, almost as a container, inside which the heart can be moved:
In this last section of our paper we have tried to trace patterns followed by the conceptualization of some abstract notions through their spatialization, realized in its turn in close connection with the metaphorization of names of body parts. We began by investigating a type of conceptual metaphors similar to those that we saw at work in the precedent section, whereby human groups, facts, knowledge, manners, qualities, emotions are partially understood as bodies and thus acquire some vague spatial dimensions as physical entities, the only differentiating factor between the two types being that the former contributes to the conceptualization of concrete physical entities and the latter to that of abstract concepts. Another case that presented itself to our attention was that of internal organs, and especially the heart, being conceived of as containers for different abstract concepts like feelings, emotions, information, etc., which triggers the assumption that these concepts are in their turn understood as different kinds of entities engaging in various spatial relations with the container. We saw how these reified concepts can have places of their own inside the heart, how more concepts can find themselves inside it at the same time, in which cases it is to be assumed that they are understood as solid objects. Some passages provided us with instances where the heart, as a container, is filled with emotions or feelings in a way that suggests their conceptualization as liquid substances. A considerable number of passages exhibit some specific features of the heart seen as a container, that help
emphasize in their turn particular characteristics of the objects it comes in contact with: the heart has a certain limited capacity and in some conditions it can or cannot hold whatever is found inside it, meaning that the concepts in question are reified as objects having volumes; similarly, the objects found inside it are quantified by different means, thus acquiring also a weight of their own. Finally, the heart has, like other containers, the capability to conceal the things it contains, which means that these things have their own visibility that they, as other physical objects, may lose in certain conditions, the conclusion being that, in contact with the heart conceptualized as a container, concepts become entities seen either as substances, or as physical and spatially identifiable objects, endowed with volume, weight and visibility. Another means that has proved to be effective in this conceptualization process is that of seeing both the internal organ and the concept in question as two physical objects engaging in spatial, either motional or static, relations: we could thus see how they can form a couple in which either the heart assumes a stable position while the concept, receiving an external stimulus or not, enters in certain spatial relations with it, or the heart engages in such relations with the concept seen this time as a stable element. A pattern of conceptualization in relation to names of body parts more scarcely reflected in our corpus is that by which concepts are understood as mere spatial relations or features, with no reification or corporealization involved: possession or authority is seen as something or someone being under the hand, positive qualities like generosity, forbearance or knowledge are seen as wideness of the heart or chest, the heart’s attachment to something is seen as love or affection.

As far as the types of conceptual metaphors found throughout this inquiry are concerned, it was only too natural and predictable to find that, being linked to space and spatialization, they fall within the categories of ontological and orientational metaphors, their vast majority belonging to the ontological type, along with some orientational metaphors and some cases of overlapping between the two.

One of the most interesting conclusions that can be drawn, however, is that names of different body parts interact differently with the metaphorical understanding of concrete or abstract concepts, and that the referents of these names are relevant to the part they play in this process. Thus, names of external organs appear in metaphorical expressions that reflect conceptual metaphors directly contributing to the understanding of various concepts: the phrases “the head of the tree” or “the head of the group”
are underlied by the metaphors “a tree is a human body” and “a group is a human body”, that give us a partial account of the understanding of the concepts “tree” and “group”. Names of internal organs, on the other hand, when included in metaphorical expressions like those registered in this paper, reflect not only single conceptual metaphors, but pairs of complementary metaphors, for the interaction between these organs and abstract concepts seems to make it necessary that the organs themselves be metaphorically conceptualized: in an expression like “to fill one’s heart with bravery”, for example, the heart is understood as a container and bravery as a substance; in an expression like “love sticks to the heart”, both love and the heart are seen as solid objects, the heart being the stable element and love being the mobile one that sticks to it.

Given the limited character of the data basis that could be included in this paper and the focusing of our attention on a very specific topic, these are but partial observations about the way parts of the human body interact with the mapping of various concepts in some of the languages belonging to the Semitic group. We have also deliberately concentrated mainly upon the cases of convergence between the three languages, which doesn’t imply our denying or ignoring that each of them has also other means, that do not bear any relation with the metaphorization of names of body parts, of expressing the ideas and concepts that were the object of our scrutiny. We do hope, however, that this case study sheds some light upon different aspects of the part played by the human body and its components in the process of metaphorical conceptualization as it is reflected by Arabic, Hebrew and Syriac.
NOTES

1. This kind of conceptual metaphors is often reflected at the level of language and discourse by metaphors qualified by rhetoricians and metaphor theorists as “dead”, i.e. metaphors that do technically qualify as such, having words used with obviously non-literal meanings, but in a manner that has become quite common and void of any stylistic value; see, e.g., some of John R. Searle’s remarks about the use of the adjective “cold” to describe an unemotional person: “there is some evidence, incidentally, that this metaphor works across several different cultures: it is not confined to English speakers... Moreover, it is even becoming, or has become, a dead metaphor. Some dictionaries... list the lack of emotion as one of the meanings of ‘cold’” (“Metaphor” in *Metaphor and Thought*, 1994, pp. 82-111)


3. As it happens, our corpus only provided us with sentences in which prep. *bayna yaday* exhibits yet another symptom of the partial grammaticalization of the noun *yad*, namely its governing only names of human beings. This sentence appearing in a Qur’anic verse, however, offers us an alternative view: *lan nu’mina bi-hādā l-qur’āni wa-lā bi-l-ladī bayna yadayhi* (XXXIV, 31) “we shall neither believe in this scripture nor in any that came before it”; in it not only does the preposition govern the name of an inanimate object, but it also bears a temporal meaning.

4. Metonymic concepts, while being distinguished from the metaphorical ones, are reckoned with by Lakoff and Johnson as lying, like them, at the basis of our conceptual system and as being “grounded in our experience” even more obviously than metaphorical concepts, as they emerge from “direct physical or causal associations” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, pp. 35-40).

5. The Syriac vocabulary (and also that of other Aramaic idioms) misses, however, a name meaning “face” and sharing its root with the Hebrew *pānîm*, as the name bearing this meaning, *appē*, a plurale tantum, seems to have acquired it through metonymy (or, more exactly, *pars pro toto*) from the original meaning of “nose” (as it is attested by the names of the nose in Arabic and Hebrew – *‘anf* and, respectively, *‘ap*, that share with *appē* the consonantal root ‘.n.p.’).

6. This fact is also stated by Lakoff and Johnson in relation to their own data basis: “the experience of time is a natural kind of experience that is understood almost entirely in metaphorical terms (via the spatialization of time and the TIME IS A MOVING OBJECT and TIME IS MONEY metaphors)” (1980, p. 118); “time is metaphorically conceptualized in terms of space” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, p. 126).
In discussing the concept of romantic love in the English speaking world, Kövecses states that “in addition to the body, the heart can also serve as a container for this purpose (i.e. the containment of emotions)...or, indeed, it may well be that the HEART metaphor is in a sense more basic than the BODY AS A CONTAINER metaphor... in the sense that the physiological effect of increased heart rate is one of the most important bodily responses associated with love, and also with many other emotions” (Kövecses, 1986, p. 83).
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