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THE ANTI-ZIONIST IDEOLOGY
OF THE SATMAR (SATU MARE)
HASIDIC COMMUNITY.
ITS MAJOR TENETS AND IMPLICATIONS

“The Messianic era will not renew [the order of Creation] […]; it will solely make us renew ourselves so that there will be no need of signs and miracles, because we will all be saints.”1

Hasidism, a movement that unsettled the order of traditional East-European Jewish communities at the beginning of the eighteenth century, was the expression of a crisis within the traditional religious universe as well as a provocation addressed to the rabbinic authority. It deeply questioned the existent structures through a mystical and messianic reviviscence and reaffirmed the role played by the community in religious life. This reassessment, which shook the foundations of the century-old framework of Ashkenazi Judaism, both transformed and reinforced rabbinic tradition.2 It resettled its heritage on a new basis, a fact that enabled Hasidism to become the major carrier of the traditional form of Judaism in the contemporary world.3

After the second half of the eighteenth century and until the Second World War, in Northern Transylvania and Bucovina, where – similarly to the Austrian Empire, Galicia and Russian Empire – traditional communities were dominant,4 Hasidism was a constant presence. Two of the Hasidic communities in these provinces would gain preeminence: the Sadagura Hasidism in Bucovina – one of the places legendarily related to Israel Ba’al Shem Tov, the founder of Hasidism,5 – and Satmar (Satu Mare) Hasidism in Northern Transylvania.

In an ethnically composite Transylvania, Hungarian-ruled till 1918 and in between 1940-1947, the Jewish community of Satu Mare numbered
6,446 members in 1920 and is reduced to 4,160 around the Second World War. The founder of the Satmar community (around 1760) is Moses Teitelbaum, a highly charismatic figure and a disciple of the famous tzadiq7 the Seer of Lublin. Like other celebrated Hasidic figures, Rabbi Moses Teitelbaum, author of an extensive commentary on the Bible,8 put at the center of his spiritual quest the messianic idea and its paradoxes. His work, Satmar Hasidic stories and parables speak amply about the expectation of Messiah and about the believers’ responsibility in hastening or in indefinitely postponing his coming.9

Yet, the personality that gave the movement its present features and made it one of the main representatives of traditional Judaism in contemporary times is Rabbi Yoel Teitelbaum (1887-1979). One of the best-known Hasidic figures of his age, Yoel Teitelbaum took a very clear and uncompromising stand with regard to the newly born Zionist movement, a position that met and continued the views of the Hasidic dynasty in Munkacs.10 The rise of Zionism coincided, in Transylvania as elsewhere, with a critical period of tension and exposure to riots. Under Romanian rule (from 1918 to 1940), the situation of the Jewish communities was aggravated by their identification with Hungarian oppression11 and after 1940 – under Miklos Horth collaboration regime and the Arrow-Cross Party anti-Semitic vehemence (1944-1945) – all traditional communities in Hungary were decimated. Escaping Holocaust in a convoy ransomed by the Zionist Organization, the Satmar Rabbi joined the religious community in Jerusalem for a short while, turned down the proposal of becoming its leader and moved on to the United States.

A revered tzadiq and a major rabbinic authority, Yoel Teitelbaum shows the path for many contemporary traditional communities12. Nowadays the second largest Hasidic center in the world, the community he founded in Williamsbourg, Yetev Lev B’Satmar, had scarcely a dozen of members in 1948.13 A community very faithful to the rabbinic tradition, housing the biggest center of Jewish religious studies (yeshiva) in the world,14 Yetev Lev B’Satmar is at the same time the keeper of Hasidic tradition, rituals and social structures. It uses both traditional rabbinic and Hasidic lore in order to legitimize and continue Yoel Teitelbaum’s lifelong struggle against what he considered to be “the biggest misfortune in Israel’s entire historical existence”.15 political Zionism. Primarily an opposition to a political and national definition of Jewishness, it aims at rebuffing the claims of “the Zionist State” of being representative for the entire Jewish community in the world. Satmar opposition to Zionism is essentially an opposition to
a new definition of identity and to the utilization of ideas and values of Judaism in order to construct and render efficient a nationalist ideology and a political structure which is, in Satmar Rabbi`s view, radically opposed to Jewish tradition.

I. The Zionist Idea and its Jewish Opponents

Traditional Judaism and Zionism unquestionably correspond to two opposing definitions of identity. Zionism characterized and continues to characterize itself as both a revolutionary movement and an achievement of century-long aspirations. As a lay political ideology, it aimed at defining Jewishness on a new political and national basis and at constructing an identity similar to that of the newly created nation-states of Central and Eastern Europe. The emergence of these new national identities, following the dismemberment of greater imperial structures at the end of nineteenth century, offers the model and the legitimacy of this new idea. In the attempt to constitute a virtually functional nation-state, the first problem that the inchoate movement had to solve was the finding of practical criteria for designating a ‘Jewish nation’, that is, the articulation of an efficient and persuasive definition necessary to the construction of a national ideology.

Finding an applicable ‘intentional definition’ of the Jewish nation, taking as a model the existent or emerging European nation-states, would not be an easy task. In order to functionally define a named human population as a ‘nation’, some of the following elements – we recur to those proposed by Elie Kedourie16 – have to be included among the definitional differentia: an historic territory, the sharing of common myths (religion) and memories, a common language, a public culture and common laws for all members (elements which are continually reinterpreted in the course of history). Thus, in this particular instance, the cultural and religious/‘mythical’ dimensions were the only criteria – the only elements common to the entire world Jewish population – which could serve as a specific difference. A fact which would soon enough lead to major inconsistencies, since neither cultural, nor religious criteria were to be the nucleus of Zionist definition. A lay definition of Judaism – and one that could urge to political action – should be based on something politically relevant and effective. One of the main critiques addressed by anti-Zionism and post-Zionism alike concerns this apophatic definition
of Jewishness, a definition that does away with the historical, cultural, religious and moral values having represented Jewish communities throughout the world for nearly two thousand years. In the view of its religious and non-religious antagonists, Zionism asserts the necessity of a State that defines Jewish identity – and it defines it merely because it has been created in order to define it – claiming implicitly that there is no other possible valid definition.

The first attempt to give a definition of the Jewish nation on political grounds is Theodor Hertzl’s manifesto of Zionism, Judestaat, published in 1896. Throughout this momentous pamphlet, anti-Semitism seems to represent the efficient element in the definition of a community having a common destiny and common interests: “We are a people: our enemies have made us one without our consent.”17 Race and “human resources” available for the construction of a state are also evoked as elements to be taken into account for legitimizing the need of a state. The danger of assimilation, yet another negative element for a functional definition, is spoken of in racial terms as the possibility of “dissolving in surrounding races”.18 With no positive element envisioned except for that of race, and in the need of a more coherent definition, Hertzl resorts to the knotty question of traditional Judaism and Jewish religion. Religion seems necessary as a legitimating element, despite the fact that the announced objective is that of finding a lay definition for a modern, non-religious state. Including traditional Judaism in the general representation is all the more necessary in the given context of the end of the nineteenth century, when the religious communities constitute the overwhelming majority of the Jewish general population. Thus, although the new movement aims at the foundation of a lay modern state, based on European models, Hertzl presents obtaining the support of religious authority as one of the movement’s main immediate aims. He expresses his conviction that the rabbis will “feel the need to follow the cause of the State”, since the missing element for a coherent definition of the ‘Jewish nation’ will be eventually provided by religion: “We feel our historic affinity only through the faith of our fathers, for we have long absorbed the languages of different nations to an ineradicable degree.”19 New European nation-states surely offered the image of an association between nationalism and religion, where the state ideology used religious elements as functional political myth or where nationalism tended to become a “political religion”.20 But Herzl fails to indicate the concrete elements a proper definition and, although religion is evoked in terms of “affinity” and is thought of as an indispensable support, it cannot
become a defining trait. The negative definition he constructs on social and political grounds misses out both religion-defined communities and non-European groups.

Religious opposition was immediate: from the formation of anti-Zionist religious organizations, like Ha-Lishkah ha-Shehorah and Agudat Israel, to the absolute refusal of any kind of compromise in the case of religious communities like Munkacs21 and Satmar. Opposition to this mode of politically defining Jewishness, separated from its cultural and religious history, was not restricted to religious communities. Herzl’s political Zionism had been questioned ever since the first Zionist Congress at Basle, by Ahad Ha`am,22 who continued to oppose it even after the fifth Zionist Congress in 1901 decided to adopt as a defining element Kultura, as materialized in general education in national spirit, Hebrew language and history of Israel. Ahad Ha`am, though dissociating Judaism as a religious system from Jewish culture in general, opposed to both a nationalistic definition and to the political exploitation of the Messianic idea. For, even though it was not in cultural terms that the new and vigorous movement would define the community it wanted to create, the messianic idea and its pendant, the (Holy) Land of Israel, were the necessary components of a mobilizing national myth. The political use of traditional religious symbols was overtly advocated by leading Zionist theoreticians, like Aaron David Gordon (1856-1922). In Gordon view, Torah and Jewish religion, though not to be regarded as divine revelations and accepted as such, offer the proper justification for ‘a conquest of the Holy Land’.23

Voices of prominent cultural personalities from the beginning of the twentieth century, like Claude Montefiore,24 drew attention to the fact that the Zionist idea as defined by political Zionism risks to encourage or create anti-Semitism and accused the error of a racial and national definition of Judaism. Jews all over the world form “a religious community” and its spokesmen should be careful in emphasizing the fact that Jews outside Palestine do not form a nation.25 The aperture of Judaism is that towards a “universal religion” and not that aiming at the formation of a national state; a state which, on the one hand, could not house entire world’s Jewish population (most of them would refuse to join this state structure) and which, on the other hand, would have unfortunate consequences upon the entire Jewish Diaspora. Declaring that he views “the movement which is to end in the formation of a new Jewish national life and a new Jewish state, with profound anxiety”,26 Claude Montefiore is one of the first
Jewish intellectuals to thoroughly discuss the question of Jewish identity as faced with a tremendous challenge.

Despite the vivid controversies it raised within Jewish communities worldwide, Zionism disposed of a symbolic keystone which legitimized its claims for the necessity to found a Jewish State in Palestine and upon which the movement drew its appeal and stamina: the messianic idea. The Land of Israel, inseparable from its messianic component, was the idea that would legitimate the claim for a regained “national home” in Palestine, a ‘chosen Land’ for a ‘chosen People’. A “regulative idea” in Judaism, the King Messiah is a notion shaping and being shaped by the religious, cultural and historical becoming of Judaism. Like the notion of political revolution, messianism implies a new world order, a dramatic change, yet this is only one of the many, and often contradictory, significances it bears. The opposition of the traditional religious communities to the political use of the messianic idea is founded both on its symbolic complexity and on the role it has actually played in Jewish history, a role that, more often than not, has not been that of legitimating national and territorial claims. Since Messiah became the synonym of a State in its nationalistic form, its religious, symbolic and metaphysical significances have been irremediably perverted. According to religious anti-Zionism, whose most outstanding representative is today the Satmar community, nationalist positions – including the extreme right religious nationalism in contemporary Israel, the Gush Emounim, – who use the messianic idea as a basis of conquest, expansionism and war, do not represent the accomplishment of messianic aspirations but their outright betrayal.

II. Messiah and the State

At the basis of both Zionist and anti-Zionist ideology, messianism cannot be reduced to its Biblical roots, if there are any. It is an idea unquestionably embodying national aspirations, hopes of redemption and utopic projections and therefore Maimonides established the belief in messianic restoration as one the major (thirteen) principles of faith. Yet divers and contradictory conceptions – like those exposed in the treatise Sanhedrin of the Babylonian Talmud (97a-99b) – make it impossible to reduce this ideal to its restorative component. The versatile and often contradictory character of this idea, as well as its lack of roots in Moses’ Torah, made Joseph Albo, the most famous Jewish philosopher of the
fifteenth century, deny its statute of principle (*yqqr*) of faith. According to Albo’s celebrated *Book of Principles*, messianism is merely a derivative branch (‘*`anaf*) and, although Messiah plays a role which is determinative for the Jewish ‘doctrine of faith’, this idea cannot lay at the core of this ‘doctrine’, being in no way a specific difference in defining Jewish religion.

This apparently surprising denial of the status of messianism and of the Land as essential elements in the definition of Jewish identity formed at the end of the nineteenth century the basis for a modern redefinition of Jewish religion. Thus, in 1885, an important branch of the American religious community, Reformed Judaism (the biggest Jewish community in North America)\(^30\), decided – in the Pittsburgh Platform – to utterly abandon the messianic idea. This act corresponded to the formal renunciation to define Judaism in national terms: “We consider ourselves no longer a nation, but a religious community. And therefore expect neither return to Palestine, nor a sacrificial worship under the administration of the sons of Aaron, nor the restoration of any of the laws concerning the Jewish State.”\(^31\) The seemingly natural association between messianism and a national definition of Judaism motivates in this case the abandonment of this idea. Possibly determined also by its utilization in the European space, the Pittsburgh Platform represents an attempt to cut the very roots of any political messianism and territorial claims.

For the Reformed community, as well as for many Orthodox and Hasidic Jewish groups, Zionism is exclusively a state,\(^32\) without any legitimacy of being founded on Jewish religious, traditional or cultural bases. Though national redemption is one of the most important aspects of the Messianic idea, its concrete embodiment seems to have never been really envisioned by rabbinic thought. As Yeshayahu Leibowitz – one of the most famous contemporary opponents of political Zionism in its Israeli nationalistic form – remarked, the very conception of state does not exist in the *halakha*\(^33\) and in Maimonides’ grand legislative code there is no mention whatsoever of a law applying in the Jewish State.\(^34\) Gershom Scholem, in his analysis of the messianic idea,\(^35\) laid stress upon the tension – co-originating with rabbinic Judaism – between the normative aspect of the *halakha* and the restorative function of messianism. Being in some aspects mutually exclusive, the return to the Land, implying the reenactment of the pristine cult, and the new form of religion and spirituality, based on study, interpretation and prayer, are situated in Judaism on two different (ontological) levels. Judaism does not define itself
as a provisory religion in between the destruction and the restoration of the Temple. And the return to the Land, to the Temple and to its cult is not a question of historical probability.

In the course of their millennial exile, Jewish communities throughout history seem to have avoided establishing in the Land of Israel. During long periods when settlement was not formally prohibited – like the nearly five centuries of the Arab Empire –, after the Spanish expulsion or even at Napoleon’s invitation in 1799 of establishing a Jewish State in Palestine, something prevented an entire exiled people from returning to what it considered its original home. There was no proper mass immigration in Palestine before nineteenth century. Among the first settlers, the followers of the Gaon of Vilna, marking the beginnings of modern colonization in Israel, were cautious not to break an important rabbinic commandment that had been preventing a mass return all through history. Even for some of the religious groups that, influenced by the Zionist ideas, established in the Land of Israel at the end of the nineteenth century (Hovevei Zion), living in the Land was far from being an accomplishment of the messianic idea. The leader of the newly established settlers, Rabbi Berlin of Volozhin (1817-1893), head of Jerusalem Ashkenazi community, repeatedly advocated keeping the colonization of the land separated from the idea of redemption.

A certain mystical idea of the Land, present in the Kabalah, had never met a political interpretation before Abraham Isaac Kook (the Rav Kook). For this important twentieth century rabbi and mystic, Zionism can be understood by merging mystics and politics and thus fully realizing the means by which redemption can be wrought in history. His alluring legitimization of Zionist on mystical bases derives from a panentheistic conception of an essential non-differentiation between the sacred and the profane. The inherent mystical power of the Holy Land – a power which could be and shall be activated by the State – could make people return to faith and could mark the beginnings of a new era, an era of which the State and nationalism were necessary steps. The State is “the beginning of redemption”.

For many Jewish religious groups, however, the sacredness of the Land was neither something granted nor a support for national political aspirations. For Hasidic groups like Satmar, Munkacs or Lubavitch, it is not only Shkhina that dwells in the Land of Israel, but also the devious side, Sitra Ahra. The Land is not only the (virtual) bearer of the divine Presence, of extreme sacredness, but also the (virtual) bearer of evil, of
extreme impurity, and this is not simply the manifestation of the essential ambiguity characterizing any sacred object. The Land of Israel is the greatest of dangers because it has the power to lead into the temptation of perpetrating one of the gravest transgressions: that of “forcing the end”. The interdiction of “forcing the end” is enounced in the *Sanhedrin* treatise of the Babylonian Talmud (92b) and it will become an important issue in the medieval mystical tradition. It marks the boundary between belief and projection, expectation and self-affirmation, freedom and obedience. At the core of the argumentation against “forcing the end” – by a return to the Land of Israel and by national and political self-affirmation – are the three oaths that Israel took before God, a tradition stemming from the treatise *Ketuvot* of the Babylonian Talmud (111a):

They shall be carried to Babylon, and there shall they be, until the day I remember them, says the Lord (Jeremiah 27:22). And R. Zera? The text referred to tells about the vessels of the priestly function. And Rav Yehuda? Another text says: I adjure you, O daughters of Jerusalem, by the gazelles, and by the hinds of the field, [that you awaken not, nor stir up love, until it please] (Song of Songs 2:7). And R. Zera? That implies that Israel shall not go up [immigrate] [as if surrounded] by a wall. And Rav Yehuda? Another “I adjure you” (Song of Songs 3:5) is written in Scripture. And R. Zera? That text is required for [an exposition] like that of R. Yose, son of R. Hanina, who said: ‘What was the purpose of those three oaths? One, that Israel shall not go up [immigrate] [as if surrounded] by a wall [mass immigration]; the second, that whereby the Holy One, blessed be He, adjured Israel that they shall not rebel against the nations of the world; and the third is that whereby the Holy One, blessed be He, adjured the gentile nations that they shall not oppress Israel excessively.

The three oaths take the function of a *halakha* (legislative) item at the end of the Middle Ages, exerting a prescriptive force and preventing mass emigration in decisive moments in Jewish history. The current religious opponents of the anti-Zionist stand argue that the three oaths cannot be considered a *halakha* item; they are merely a matter of *aggada* (non-legislative item of the Talmudic commentary) and therefore cannot accomplish a prescriptive function. The main argument in this direction is the absence of the three oaths from Maimonides’ momentous legislative compendium, *Mishneh Torah*. Thus, the possibility of legitimating or illegitimating the return to the Land of Israel and a certain interpretation
of the messianic idea within rabbinic Judaism depend upon what seems to be a textual detail.

From sixth century piyyutim to Maimonides, from major Middle Ages` Talmudic and Cabalistic figures to sixteenth century Maharal of Prague, from eighteenth and nineteenth centuries Hasidism and anti-Sabbatian reactions and up to contemporary religious anti-Zionism, the three oaths have been put forth particularly during periods of messianic fervor or when the return was socially and politically achievable. And they seem to have been – at least till the end of the nineteenth century – efficient enough. Maimonides, who had not included the three oaths in his systematized summary of Jewish law, Mishne Torah, posits them as fundamental in his 1172 letter to the Yemenite community, which was being shattered by a powerful messianic movement and inflamed by redemptive expectations.

In the mystical tradition, the existent gulf between belief and historical accomplishment is deepened though the projection of the ideas of messianism, Land of Israel and exile on a cosmic and divine scale. In Kabalistic literature, exile and messianic redemption are central theosophical and cosmogonic elements and in Isaac Luria`s mystical school of sixteenth century Safed (in Palestine), they take the form of a recuperation of the divine sparks spread throughout the world, a process which takes place both in history and in the divine world. The most disconcerting of the messianic movements, Sabbataism, which stirred a new wave of immigration and its subsequent opposition, reinforced the paradoxical status of Messiah and of the Land. The impressive number of adherents it gained and the upset following Sabbatai Zvi`s conversion cautioned once more about the perils underlying the messianic idea. The Hasidic movement continued to contemplate these essentially ambiguous subjects, wavering between messianic fervor and profound mistrust in any messianic accomplishment.

III. Va-Yoel Moshe. The Anti-Zionist Creed

The Zionist – anti-Zionist conflict within modern Judaism is not only extremely significant socially and politically, it is first and foremost a battle for identity, a battle whose battleground is messianism. In this context, Va-yoel Moshe, Yoel Teitelbaum`s main work and the fundamental reference of the anti-Zionist traditional stand, is essentially a defense of
traditional Judaism as defining Jewish identity. First published in 1959, its argumentation is based on the main sources of Jewish tradition: the rabbinic corpus (Mishnah, Talmudic halakha and aggada, midrashim and Responsa), Talmudic and Biblical commentators, mystical tradition (the Book of Zohar, Ezra of Gerona, Nachmanides, Lurianic Cabbala and Hasidic lore) and philosophy (Sa`adia Gaon, Maimonides, Abraham ibn Ezra). The guiding theme of this vast monument of Jewish lore is represented by the three oaths. They are primarily legitimated as a foundation stone of Jewish tradition and, having been legitimated, they are employed as the main argument in dismantling the Zionist idea. The tremendous importance of the three oaths stems from the fact that they are more than simple commandments; they are the foundation of all the other commandments, since the act of adjuring before God is the original religious act. This is the explanation of the title (alongside with the word pun), based on the treatise Nedarim of the Babylonian Talmud (65a) commenting upon the fact that wherever the phrase “Moses consented” (Va`yoel Moshe) is found in the Torah, it is the expression of acquiescing to an oath. The fundamental act of the founding figure, Moses, is to pledge his existence and that of his people to God. Being consentient to an oath is not therefore a mere act of moral loyalty, it is the original act defining Israel’s identity as a community in a contractual state with the divinity.

In essence, the three oaths are the bases of the Revelation at Sinai and of the commandments contained in the Torah (both written and oral). Their betrayal is an act of self-destruction: “An oath betrayed consumes that which fire cannot” (Shavuot 39a). Breaking the three oaths by an independent action in history, by becoming the agent of redemption and by instituting a government before the advent of the Messianic age is an act of betrayal of the Jewish faith (kefirah). It is a graver sin than all those mentioned in the Torah. And this all the more so, since the act of founding a state is an attempt to imitate the nations, making the enactment of Israel’s unique destiny impossible and denying divine providence.

Consequently, not only do the three oaths constitute a matter of halakha, but they are the most significant of the halakhic rules and it is thus necessary to analyze them as essential for the reassertion of Jewish religious tradition. Like the Maharal of Prague he often quotes, the Satmar Rabbi ranks these three commandments among the fundamental three negative commandments (interdictions), which are to be placed above life (the interdiction of murder, of incestuous relations and of idolatry). The three oaths are reducible to two interdiction which have to be respected with
the risk of losing one’s life; the interdiction of “climbing the wall” and that of revolting against the nations. The unusual expression “to climb the wall” \( (\text{la’a lot `al ha-homah}) \) may have, according to Rabbi Teitelbaum’s analysis, three meanings: (1) to immigrate in large groups; (2) to immigrate in Israel as a majority; (3) to immigrate by faring an illegitimate war against nations living there – or, according to the interpretation of Rashi, “together with a strong hand” \( (\text{yahad be yad hazaqah}) \). Mass immigration and violence against local population are not only a contravention to the three oaths, but they are implicitly a defiance of the Torah, which sources like the \textit{Baba Batra} treatise of the Babylonian Talmud (9a) call “the wall”. Israel’s violent intervention in history, their impatience and their self-assurance constitute thus the major sin of “forcing the end” or, by reference to the \textit{Song of Songs}, of “awakening the beloved”.

To break the three oaths or to “force the end” means, on the one hand, to give up hope and belief and consequently to put off redemption, and on the other hand to break the profound rapport between Messiah and the Land of Israel and render both conceptions meaningless. The separation between the holiness of the Land and the Messianic element is advocated in the history of Jewish thought, not without arising vivid reactions and controversies, by mystics like Jacob ben Sheshet or Nachmanides (the latter’s establishment in the Land of Israel during the last years of his life raised opposition among his disciples and fellow mystics). Yet, the sacredness of the Land of Israel is generally considered to be a corollary of the past existence of the Temple. After the destruction of the Temple, the Land is sacred through the possibility of return, through the indefinite expectation of messianic times. Its sacredness is thus a temporal sacredness, not a spatial one.

The analysis of Talmudic passages which seem to oppose to the interdiction of immigration, such as the discussions in the treatise Gittin 45a around the Biblical verse of Deuteronomy 23:16 – stating not to expel a slave escaping into the Land of Israel – lead to the same conclusion: Jerusalem and Israel were sacred due to the Temple. A slave coming to the Land of Israel could not be expelled because it was the only place free of idolatry and the refuge for those trying to escape idols. It was the uniqueness of its faith, of the Temple and of its worship that made the Holy Land holy. This does not deny the sacredness of the place; rather it defines sacredness as something not embodied in anything concrete. The Land separated from its messianic value is a mere idol. Consequently, the temporal dimension does not only carry the sanctity
of the Land, but it also protects against idolatry. The Promised Land is not an object to be revered or fought for, but the very ideal that gives faith both its steadiness and its dynamics. The return is a belief and it cannot become a political desiderate, since, from a religious point of view, the Land of Israel is inaccessible, impossible: only he who is without sin has the right to go in the Land of Israel. The two conceptions express therefore two reciprocally exclusive beliefs: “the belief in this (Zionist) state and the belief in the sacred Torah are absolutely opposed and cannot coexist under a single crown.”

Alongside with the non-dissociable rapport between messianic times and the Land of Israel, the rapport between the messianic times and exile is another central, non-dissociable aspect shaping Judaism. Rabbi Teitelbaum quotes Nachmanide’s Ma’amor ha-Geulah interpreting a remarkable historical fact: Ezra himself gathered around him only a part of those in exile; most of them remained in Babylon despite the fact that the interdiction was to be formulated later on and that the act of return was then a divine commandment. If the end of exile corresponds to the return of the Divine Presence herself – erring ever since Israel’s first exile (Babylonian Talmud Yoma 9a) – this fact transcends historical determination (Israel actual situation). Thus, even if the entire Israel had returned in its Land in the time of Ezra, the Divine Presence (Shekhinah) would have nonetheless remained in exile. The exile is as constitutive as the Torah itself. It is an original, founding divine rule. The rapport to the transcendence and the act of belief are also rooted in this fundamental reality. Being just means accepting exile and hoping for redemption.

The theological significance of the exile and the metaphysical, rather than eschatological, charge of the messianic idea make them impossible to reduce to human action in history. As the indefinite time of transcendence within historical time, as indefinite expectation, messianic time is the divine aperture of history, the very name of God’s longed for, impossible Presence. Thus, true believers will continue to dread the three oaths even after the arrival of Messiah and – an idea drawn upon Abraham ben David’s commentary to Mishnah Edot 9 – similar to the period following the Egyptian and Babylonian exiles, even after the advent of Messiah, Israel will still err for an indeterminate lapse of time in the desert. They will err until repentance is perfect, because “there is no redemption without repentance” – a phrase insistently repeated throughout the book. And therefore, the first divine gathering (kibbutz) of Israel shall not be in the Land of Israel, but in the desert.
place of purification and trial, the traditional dwelling of Samael (Satan) and the site of theophany, a space where Israel’s absolute act of belief will mark the leap unto another existential level. The act of repentance is an unconditional, supreme one: the repentance should be perfect and – according to the Zohar – it should be done by all “as one”, an absolute act in an absolute moment.

If the coming of Messiah is marked or triggered by the achievement of moral and spiritual perfection, a pious accomplishment, it is not however an empire of the miraculous. The only ‘sign’ Messiah will give will be his power of bringing Israel to a life in Torah. No other signs or miracles. The transformation he brings is an interior, spiritual one; and if this seems to contradict the miracles Maimonides mentions in his Mishne Torah, this is only one of the many seeming contradictions implied in the messianic idea. Correspondingly, the absence of the three oaths in his legislative opus is only the sign of their deeper, more fundamental meaning.

But the exile is not only constitutive; it is, in itself, redemptive. An idea rooted in the rabbinic literature and developed in Medieval mystical tradition is that Israel brings salvation to the world through its dispersion. The famous Lurianic conception of the reintegration of divine fallen sparks is often referred to in supporting the necessity of Israel’s presence throughout the world. According to another famous anti-Zionist rabbi, Dov Baer Shneerson, “to free oneself from the burden of the exile is to free oneself from the burden of Torah”.

Despite the complex and contradictory messianic signs and definitions that Maimonides synthesizes in Mishneh Torah, the essence of messianism may be reduced to the idea of religious redemption (belief in the Torah). But the causal relation is here paradoxical, a paradox defining the very act of belief. Thus, repentance and belief trigger the advent of Messiah, it is not Messiah who brings about salvation as a deus ex machina solution. Moral and religious self-redemption brings about messianic times, which mean, first of all, moral and religious redemption. This circular argument translates both expectation of divine intervention and the effort of creating its moral and religious conditions in history. Human effort is made even with divine intervention.

Other elements of the messianic times – pertaining to an eschatological dimension – are announced as articles of faith, yet they are seemingly out of place within the general religious framework: the return of the prophet Elijah and the mythical war of Gog and Magog, the resurrection of the dead as the last step of the messianic triumph, the prophecy, which will
return to Israel before the advent of Messiah, and, the most problematic of all, the reconstruction of the Temple with its corollary, the restoration of the sacrifice. Like the Land of Israel, the Temple is not a simple human construction. It is – according to the *aggadot* – descended from heaven or built by men, but sanctified by a celestial model. Its time of advent is as indeterminate as that of messianic times. According to the *Sanhedrin* treatise of the Babylonian Talmud (98a-b) the end should not be disclosed and no temporal determination whatsoever should be given or searched for, only perfection in moral and religious acts. The messianic idea, the exile and the restoration of the Temple are “things concealed and sealed and known to the Saint, blessed be He, alone”, they are another name for transcendence “and this is the reason why we ward off so insistently not to take ourselves any action whatsoever regarding redemption, but to worship the Name, blessed be He, and to expect salvation”.

As for the third oath, it is not an interdiction but a promise: that the nations will not oppress Israel beyond endurance. It is here that the argument of the unbelievers (Epicureans) intervenes: if the nations betrayed their oath, so can we. An argument that the Satmar Rabbi deems as the “vanity of vanities”, since the oaths are in no way interdependent. They aim at protecting from the disaster of ‘forcing the end’, that is, of revolt and idolatry, of transforming the Messianic idea into a historical idol, a goal in a teleological representation which could legitimate any political action. Messiah is not the goal of history but its transcendence.

### IV. Political ideology and “the Zionist State”

Is the new state a ‘miracle’, or ‘a sign’? Is it an instrument of redemption, as religious Zionism, following its leading figure, Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook, understood it? In the effervescence felt by the Russian religious Zionist group *Hovevei Zion* and by Rav Kook’s followers, political Zionism was understood as a means of historically significant divine intervention. They do not force the end, “the end forces them” (*doheq `otam*). Zionism claims to be a ‘miracle’, that is the expression of divine Will accomplished by means of historical, significant action. One of the main aspects upon which *Wa`yoel Moshe* insists is therefore prudence towards miracles, a fundamental virtue. An analysis of the Zionist ‘miracle’ is necessary since a part of the Jewish religious community has given in to its appeal.
So far, messianism has been discussed in its religious, moral and metaphysical aspects. The second part of Yoel Teitelbaum’s argumentation comes closer to the historical and political realities: the Zionist use of the messianic idea, the actual existence of “the Zionist State” and its repercussions upon Jewish communities, the Holocaust and its political use. In his denunciation of ‘Zionist’ actions and discourse, lay and religious Zionists are referred to in a non-differentiated manner. Both groups are heretics (minim), that is, they are guilty of idolatry but they rest within the confines of Judaism. By describing them as minim, the Satmar Rebbe admits that they are still part of the Jewish community. The Zionist government, as “a government of heresy” (memshalah shel minut) represents the danger within.91

The addressees of this message are the religious groups that met Zionism halfway, and the most referred to is Agudat Israel92. After 1948, the positions of different religious groups differed: from total, uncompromising rejection to indifference, from ambiguity to compromise or extreme right militant extremism. Most of the traditional religious groups, with the exception of the extreme right wing, determinedly reject the associations of religious practice and symbols with political matters. Accordingly, they see the introduction in the prayer order (Seder) of the prayer for the State of Israel written by S.Y. Agnon, Reshit geulatenu (“the beginning of our redemption”) – a considerable political and symbolical act – as a desecration,93 as mistaking colonization for redemption.

How do a lay legal system and a “democracy” stand for Torah?94 The argumentation is not in this case politically coherent: Rabbi Teitelbaum labels the “Zionist State” both as a “democracy” and as a military nationalism dominated and dominating through fear and violence.95 The actions of the “State of impurity which they named Israel”96 bears direct results upon the rest of the community. The first of these results is the Holocaust. It may seem astonishing that the Satmar Rebbe considers the death of 6 million Jews during the Second World War as being, from both a theological and a political point of view, the result of Zionist actions and propaganda (ta’amulah). This weighty accusation is based upon a theodicy scheme, a retributive structure that sees in the Holocaust the punishment for Zionist transgression and idolatry. This tragedy is a divine manifestation in history, the manifestation of the attribute of Stern Judgment (Din).97 But the explanation is not left solely on the theological level. From a historical and political point of view, it was violent Zionist actions and propaganda that made the nations want to drive them out of
their borders and nurtured anti-Jewish feelings – an idea already expressed before the Second World War by some important rabbinic figures.98 This attitude legitimates Zionist claim for the necessity of a State which would be a shelter in an anti-Semite world, yet, he argues, the world has been rendered anti-Semite by their very actions. If there is no place left to go for many dislocated Jewish communities (particularly those in Arab countries), this situation is generated by Zionist pernicious acts.99 The hatred is born with and because of Zionist actions. In occurrence, there was no Jewish hatred in the Arab states before Zionism100 – a discourse which tries to integrate the mizrahi (oriental) position.101

If Zionism brings about impurity in the Land (or brings about the impurity of the Land),102 being in a Land of Israel transformed into a Zionist State and being instrumental to this idol-structure – a structure that is a goal in itself – becomes an idolatrous act. Zionists` only aim is to have “a powerful state” (medinah hazaqah), indifferent to its citizens and devoid of other values. Zionist propaganda is that of “love for the land” (hibat ha-aretz), which is a trap, an expression of a pure will of domination by showing force towards other peoples.103 They allowed the immigration of those necessary to the cause of the State and use the religious factions and parties to “to shut the eyes of the world” 104 and to legitimize themselves as representative for Judaism, in an attempt to create a positive international image.105

Religious collaboration helps them to “wash away their shame”106 and it is therefore an act as grave as that of Zionists themselves. Religious collaboration in Israeli political life renders impossible real political actions because of “the corruption of money” and of manipulation. Real politically meaningful action would be the denial of its representative status and the foiling of their legitimacy claims.107

These mingled arguments (theological, social and political) aim at convincing the other Jewish religious groups that the best political results may be obtained through non-political action or resistance. The best way to fight “the Zionist State” is the refusal to identify with it and to support its legitimating discourse. Only in this way may the heretics (minim) become simple idolatrous peoples (`akum) and stop menacing the very existence of historical Judaism.
V. Being a Jew/Being Jewish

More than two opposing worldviews, the question of religious opposition to Zionism is that of two opposed conceptions of Jewish identity. The notion of Jewish identity holds indeed today two not only different, but also contradictory meanings.108 The self-definition of the newly created State as representative for all the Jews triggers an extremely complicated situation. Regarded from this perspective, the discourse of the State of Israel, as that of incipient Zionism, appears as lacking coherence. Thus, “young Hebrews trying to purge Jewish history of its religious content”,109 the myth of “the New Hebrew Man” as opposed to the “primitive” religious population – an anti-Judaism propaganda which dominated Israeli journals in the period following the formation of the state,110 and all the rhetoric means of legitimating the State despite Jewish religious opposition speak of a Zionist attempt of liberating itself from the intricate and disturbing relationship to traditional Judaism. David Ben Gurion111 tagged Judaism as “the historical misfortune of the Jewish people”112 and recent Zionist propagandistic literature bluntly affirms the Biblical essence of Judaism, which has been obscured for nearly two thousand years by the “Rabbinic non-imaginative tradition”.113 Nevertheless, the State’s need of a representative stand and legitimacy, momentous in its incipient times and still necessary now, make it impossible to cut the cords attaching it to historic Judaism.

For the new State, the question of identity was and remains one of the thorniest and confusing. The wavering and equivocating positions betray the difficulty of finding serviceable criteria of identity, which could serve practical issues like granting citizenship or organizing immigration. In 1947, the representatives of the Jewish Agency to the United Nations’ Special Committee on Palestine declared that in order to be considered a Jew “technically and in terms of Palestine legislation, the Jewish religion is essential”, but also that “generally, we accept as Jews all those who say they are Jews”.114 In the Law of Return of 1950 the term ‘Jew’ is not defined, yet Israel turned in 1970 to the halakhic (traditional Jewish) definition: a Jew is a person of Jewish religion having a Jewish mother or who is formally converted to Judaism.115

The increasing gap between Zionism and Rabbinic Judaism triggers a repositioning of both Jewish religious communities and Zionist official ideology. While traditional religious groups such as Satmar reproach the fact that identity in Israel, “is not determined through Torah or belief, but
through a signature on a letter”,\textsuperscript{116} Zionist claim for a lay perspective is far from being coherent. Jewish identity is established in Israel on Rabbinic grounds for lack of a better criterion. Yet, an idea advocated by many Israeli intellectuals – among them, the celebrated Israeli writer A.B. Yehoshua – is that a ‘normal’ lay state should adopt the “citizenship” criterion. Accepting a definition non-related to religion implies admitting citizenship and civic rights for a Christian or a Muslim Jew.\textsuperscript{117}

Yet, for the Jewish state, none of the criteria is really practicable. The anti-Zionist non-religious opposition and the post-Zionism stand both reproach the fact that Zionism has been sharing with anti-Semitism “a nationalist conceptualization of the Jew”.\textsuperscript{118} The impossibility of clarifying this intricate situation may stem from this very nationalist position. As pointed out by Dan Segre\textsuperscript{119} in a remarkable study, in this particular case, nationalism seems to be inversely proportional to national conscience. Denouncing Zionist messianic scheme as “mythical” and “irrational”,\textsuperscript{120} non-religious opposition to Zionism, as well as the post-Zionist opposition to a nationalistic state conception and politics meet, paradoxically enough, the arguments of religious anti-Zionists. Many of the aforementioned Satmar stands coincide with those of representative intellectuals like Hannah Arendt – her lifelong reflection on the problems and paradoxes of a nation-state often led her to discuss the problem of Jewish identity\textsuperscript{121} –, Martin Buber and Judah Magnes,\textsuperscript{122} Franz Rozenzweig, Claude Montefiore, Albert Einstein\textsuperscript{123} or, more recently, Yeshayahu Leibowitz. For these and for many other Jewish intellectuals, whom we could describe, using the expression forged by Isaac Deutscher, as “non-Jewish Jews”,\textsuperscript{124} manifesting one’s Jewishness means adhering to the traditional definition of Judaism. For the “post-Zionists”, the fact of advocating the renunciation to what has been Zionist nationalism in its bellicose and intolerant expression is accompanied by a steady support for a traditional definition of the Jew through Judaism. Assuming one’s Jewishness through Judaism is today the expression of a moral and political conscious stand. In Yeshayahu Leibowitz’s words:

The danger is that of seeing national identity transforming into state control and will of power, into a national identity in the sense Mussolini gave it […]. Yet, a part – a minority, but a consistent minority – of the human group considered so far as the Jewish people attaches itself to maintaining alive its historical religious inheritance by rejecting this national identity and its symbols. We thus find ourselves today in the situation where the notion of ‘national Jewish identity’ possesses two significations, nay, two contradictory significations.\textsuperscript{125}
NOTES

1 ALKABETZ, Solomon (sixteenth century Kabalist) quoting a major thirteenth century Cabalist, Joseph Gikatilla, in Sefer Ayelet Ahavim, Venice, Daniel Bomberg, 1552, p. 3.


5 ALFASI, Isaac, The Hasidism in Romania (Hebrew), Segula, Tel Aviv, 1973, pp. 14-16.


7 “Righteous man”, denomination of the leader of the Hasidic community.

8 TEITELBAUM, Moshe, Ysmach Moshe (Moses Rejoiced), Lemberg, 1849.


18 Ibid., p. 60.

19 Ibid., p. 106.

20 One of the three forms on modern nationalism in Kedourie’s scheme. In SMITH, Anthony D., op. cit., pp. 13-16.
Major Hasidic dynasty from Muckachevo, Ukraine, Munkacs keenly opposed Zionism till the death of its revered tzadiq Hayyim Elazar Spira in 1937. The contemporary Munkacs community in Brooklyn, New York, is loyal to the anti-Zionist position and has a strong affinity to the Satmar group.

Ahad Ha`am, Asher Hirsch Ginsberg, (1856 – 1927) is the main promoter of the Cultural Zionism. He saw his conception of Judaism as a cultural heritage which needs to be revived and embodied in the Jewish homeland as being in acute opposition with Herzl’s political nationalistic view. For a few of his most important texts on this issue, see: HERTZBERG, Arthur (ed.), The Zionist Idea. A Historical Analysis and Reader, Doubleday & Co., New York, 1959, pp. 248-278.

RABKIN, Yakov, op. cit., p. 28.

Claude Joseph Montefiore (1858-1938), great nephew of Moses Montefiore, was an important Jewish intellectual, lay preacher and theologian, founder of the radical Reform movement in England. He also made a significant contribution to the study of Christian religion.


Ibid., p. 29.

The idea of a messianic personality originates doubtlessly in the inter-testamentary period. The only two occurrences of the word (moshiyah) in the Hebrew Massoretic texts in a very obscure passage from the later Book of Daniel (9:25; 9:26).

ALBO, Joseph, Sefer ha-Yqarym, Soncino, 1485, Ma’amir I, Pereq 23.

http://reformjudaism.org/


RAVITZKY, Eliezer, op. cit., p. 97.

The halakha is the legislative, prescriptive corpus of Judaism, as opposed to the aggadah, non-legal parts of rabbinic literature.


Elijah ben Solomon Zalman of Vilna (1720-1797), one of the most important Rabbinic figures of modernity, Talmudist, Cabalist, astronomer, mathematician and leader of the opposition to Hasidism (hitnagdut) in the eighteenth century.


RABKIN, Yakov, *op. cit.*, p. 93.


God’s presence in the midst of His people. A Rabbinic idea developed on the basis of Bible occurrences (Exodus 40:35; Jeremiah 33:16; Genesis 9:27), which would play a very important role in the Medieval Jewish mystical tradition.

*Sitra Ahra*, the Other Side (in Aramaic), is a central Cabalistic conception. It represents the left, evil emanation within the divine world or originating in the divine world, a complex representation of the metaphysical evil.


Poetical compositions for liturgical purposes.

Judah Loew ben Bezalel or the Maharal of Prague (1525-1609), major rabbinic figure, Talmudic commentator, philosopher and mathematician.


*Ibid.*, ch. 32, p. 64.


Solomon ben Isaac (1040-1105) is the most important and widely quoted Bible and Talmud exegete.


Jacob ben Sheshet Gerondi, mid thirteenth century Cabalist, one of the most important of the Gerona circle.


NACHMANIDES, *Ma`amar ha-Geulah*, Sha`ar I in TEITELBAUM, Yoel, *op. cit*, ch. 12, p. 44.

TEITELBAUM, Yoel, *op. cit*, ch. 12, p. 42.

R. Abraham ben David of Posquières (~1125-1198), one of the most important rabbinic authorities and Talmudic commentator of the twelfth century and a founding figure of Kabala.

TEITELBAUM, Yoel, *op. cit*, ch. 21, p. 64.


*Midrash ha-Ne`elam* 40a, ed. Muncacs.


See: the treatise *Avodah Zarah* of the Babylonian Talmud (3b).

Isaac ben Solomon Luria Ashkenazi (Ari) (1534-1572), leading figure of the 16th century Kabala, founder of an innovative and highly complex Kabalistic school of thought, whose main representatives are: Hayyim Vital, Joseph ibn Tabul, Israel Sarug, Menahem Azriah de Fano, Hayyim Luzzatto and Abraham Cohen de Herrera.


RABKIN, Yakov, *op. cit.*, p. 33.


TEITELBAUM, Yoel, *op. cit*, ch. 49, p. 95.


The main Haredi (conservative form of Orthodox Judaism) party, established in 1912.

KATZ, Jacob, “Israel and the Messiah” in SAPERSTEIN, Marc (ed.), *Essential Papers on Messianic Movements and Personalities in Jewish History*, p. 475.


RABKIN, Yakov, p. 193 et suiv.
For an example of Jewish Oriental (Mizrahi) anti-Zionist discourse, see: SHOHAT, Ella, “Mizrahim in Israel: Zionism from the Standpoint of its Jewish Victims”, Social Text, 19-20/ Fall 1988, pp. 1-35.
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