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SUBVERTING THE CANON: OLIGARCHIC POLITICS AND MODERNIZING OPTIMISM IN PRE-COMMUNIST ROMANIA

1

Can one indicate precisely the moment when the figures of the literary critic Eugen Lovinescu and of the social analyst Ștefan Zeletin were established, in Romanian scholarship, as the quintessential examples of ideological “rightness” and intellectual honorability? A positive answer to this question could alter our general understanding of the pre-communist intellectual heritage of Romania.

As for Lovinescu, his disciples in the field of literary criticism were already numerous at the end of the pre-communist period,¹ and they did not avoid to pay homage to the person who had waged, from the first decade of the twentieth century up to the 1940s, long intellectual wars against nostalgic traditionalism, and who most energetically claimed a literature with “urban” overtones and a “modernist” orientation, resonating with – and openly displaying its inspiration from – the most novel European trends of artistic experimentation. Still, Lovinescu’s accomplishments in the related field of social and political thinking were by far not as widely acclaimed at the time. When his most important work of this kind was published, in 1924-1926, it raised bitter criticisms from various ideological² camps. Presented as a sociological interpretation of the process of Romanian modernization since the beginning of the nineteenth century, the impressive three-volumes *History of Modern Romanian Civilization*³ was most often accused – by both professional and self-styled sociologists – for sociological amateurism and naïveté, as well as for arbitrary intellectual syncretism and emphatic juxtaposition of theories, ideas, and schools of thought⁴. Lovinescu’s rejoinders on this side were never conclusive, and the “hard” social thinkers of the age accordingly

never accepted him as a fellow member of the profession or as a significant voice in the discipline.⁵

Outside this narrower circle, among the various authors who engaged in the ideological debates of the time, Lovinescu's ideas did not score much better either. The few works with a wider historical and comparative coverage published short before the installation of communism that claimed – more often than not undeservedly – the status of unbiased researches into the history of Romanian social and political ideas did indeed treat him as a significant representative of one major ideological orientation: together with Zeletin, Lovinescu was already seen as the thinker who had given the most vocal and efficient argumentation for modernization on the western model.⁶ However, this very last intellectual attitude was either presented, in the same works, as a choice with no special claims to validity over the rival views of national social, cultural and political evolution, or dismissed from the standpoint of an indigenist or third-way conception of development.⁷

Given the internal and international political constellation of the time, it is understandable that Lovinescu's advocacy of westernization, associated as it was with his avowed appreciation for "old-fashioned" liberal democracy, did not manage to attract in those years a large audience, and neither enthusiastic approvals from fellow social and political writers. Romania was not an exception in the general (Central and East) European drive to radical right political solutions, of which radical nationalist rhetoric was a natural ingredient.⁸ When communism was installed, the political culture of the right was reigning supreme in Romania. There was no time for the alternative discourses to recover, before any kind of free intellectual debate was interdicted. With a host of followers in literature and literary criticism that managed to maintain his influence alive even during the decades when his name and works could not be openly invoked or cited – or had to be used with extensive precaution –, Eugen Lovinescu was "rediscovered", together with a large part of the pre-communist national cultural heritage, in the period of the (relative) "liberalization" of the regime, starting with the mid 1960s.⁹ For obvious reasons, his social-political output – which contained polemical references to the doctrines of historical materialism – was recovered more reluctantly than the literary one. Still, this partial recovery was enough for starting to transform Lovinescu into a genuine "classic" of Romanian political thinking.

The posthumous career of Zeletin's ideas was a bit different. Unlike Lovinescu, Zeletin was accepted, in the interwar period, as an original and provocative (however mistaken) social thinker, whose intellectual constructs – advanced in his two works *The Romanian Bourgeoisie* (1925) and *Neoliberalism* (1927)¹⁰ – had to be taken seriously and deserved to receive careful responses. Although trained as a philosopher, his credentials as a social analyst were not generally denied, and authors much better placed institutionally within the (emerging) discipline took pains to give detailed commentaries of his interventions.¹¹ As his political ideas resonated much better than Lovinescu's with the right-wing culture of the late thirties and forties, Zeletin was even occasionally eulogized as a giant of Romanian social thinking.¹² His professed disciples in the field were not, however, as numerous as the literary figures who closely followed Lovinescu. Then, in the first decades of communism, Zeletin – a much more resolute defender than Lovinescu of the social and economic arrangements of “bourgeois” Romania – was energetically criticized as a philosopher of plutocracy.¹³ The beginning of his “recovery” was due to the gradual process of reinserting the nationalist dimension into historiography:¹⁴ praising the *status quo* of the capitalist society, Zeletin nevertheless presented a positive view of the pre-communist modernization story. His strivings to de-dramatize the history of the nineteenth century, and to present it as a success story, fit well with the widespread ideological strategy of the time which consisted in fusing the tenets of the nationalist and Marxist historical views, by presenting the advent of the socialist society as the fulfillment of the entire record of a centuries-long heroic past – in which the internal emancipation of the socially exploited classes went hand in hand with the struggles of the entire nation against encroachments by foreign powers. In the end, Zeletin joined Lovinescu as a classic of the most “valid” brand of social-political thinking produced in Romania before 1945.¹⁵

It might seem paradoxical that the scholarship produced in the communist period managed to do for Zeletin and Lovinescu, the two pre-communist “official” defenders of capitalist modernization, precisely what the pre-communist scholarship never did in a firm way: namely, to elevate them to the status of classics. This reevaluation of the two intellectual figures derived in a natural way, however, from the more general structure of the interpretations provided by the scholarship in question.

2

As emerged during the communist years, the dominant way of presenting the pre-communist period in the history of ideological trends in Romania consisted in placing them along an axis whose ends were defined by different pairs of terms whose classificatory meaning was virtually the same. "Modernism" was opposed to "traditionalism", in the same way as "progressive" thinking stood in opposition to the "reactionary" one, and "rationalist" tendencies were contrasted to the "irrationalist" philosophical views. The classical dichotomy between "left" and "right"¹⁶ was superimposed on these couples of opposite notions. Thinkers who gravitated towards the first of the two poles – that of the left, of rationalism and progressivism – were supporters of industrialization and defended forms of cultural expression with an "urban" resonance. Those who stood closer to the other pole – that of the right, of irrationalism and of reaction – promoted a view of economic development based on agriculture, being at the same time vocal admirers of the cultural universe of the village.

The way the positions along the ideological axis were distributed among authors and intellectual currents is not difficult to guess. There could be no doubt, before 1989, which thinkers and ideological tendencies embodied best the ideas and values associated with left-wing progressiveness: they were the Marxists, and among them, of course, especially the communists. Extreme right-wing reaction was embodied by the obscurantist defenders of tradition, who made use of religion and of the mystics of the soil as intellectual materials of their theories. Somewhat more desirable than them were the moderate conservatives, or the *Junimists*: although not enthusiasts of industrial modernization, they were nevertheless content with the parliamentary regime and held reasonable views of cultural and economic development. The place immediately to the right of the socialists was being contended, however, by two categories of authors. Both the "official" modernists and the populists-peasantists¹⁷ presented good credentials for this position on the "hierarchy" of ideological tendencies. In comparison to the first of them, the populists were more "democratically" inclined, and therefore had better claims to be ascribed a place closer to the "left" pole. At the same time, however, they were skeptical about industrialization, and cherished the dream of propelling Romania on the path of progress in the framework of an "agrarian" economy. It was generally accepted, to be sure, that their agrarian views were motivated by purely "pragmatic" considerations,

having nothing in common with the “romantic” nostalgia for the village universe characteristic to the traditionalists of the right. Still, their inability to understand that industrialization was the unavoidable fate of modern societies made of them dubious protagonists of modern public life, and linked them to those trends of thought which were to become most easily associated with fascism and radical right.

The “modernists” – who spoke in favor of the Liberal Party’s strategy of modernization – were identified, in the main, with a “liberal” political view in the generic sense of the term¹⁸, being preferred to most of the other contenders of the ideological spectrum. Indeed, while not scoring as well as the Marxists when placed on the modernist/rationalist/progressive – traditionalist/irrationalist/reactionary evaluative axis, the two “bourgeois” ideologues Lovinescu and Zeletin nevertheless fell on the good side, when measured with the help of it. They indeed were not militants for social justice – and neither were they as energetic advocates of extensive democratization as the agrarian populists and the peasantists –, but they reasonably qualified as supporters of the constitutional system and of personal freedom, defending them against the obscurantist forces of the radical right – comparing well even with the moderate conservatives on the same ground. While not very far, thus, from the Marxists, with respect to their political wisdom, they virtually identified with them with respect to their economic wisdom: supporting industrialization and urbanization, they pleaded for precisely the economic structure that the Marxist theory indicates as the only conceivable basis of progress under the aegis of socialism.

Moreover, the good score obtained by Zeletin and Lovinescu in this confrontation of ideological symbols was also due to a certain disqualifying of the available protagonists. Indeed, neither of the thinkers and ideological currents of the left – the only significant competitors – was appropriate for a very emphatic consecration as a classic. On the one hand, both the social democrats and the populists exhibited “revisionist” interpretations of Marxism¹⁹ – as seen from the standpoint of the rigid historical materialism of the time – that could be perceived, in the end, as more insidious ideological poisons than the frank bourgeois advocacy of the Liberal apologists. On the other hand, Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu, the only intellectual representative of the Komintern brand of Marxism in pre-1945 Romania,²⁰ could never be entirely appropriated by the regime due to the embarrassing episode of his purging, in the 1950s.²¹ There was a void place left, thus, in the very center of the communist ideological

pantheon, that the official modernists Lovinescu and Zeletin were called upon to fill.

The kind of scholarship that we referred to above was the soundest produced in the communist period. It was also of the sort whose ideological bent resonates best with our post-communist intellectual concerns related to creating a liberal-democratic order. And this is so because the reevaluation of pre-communist modernism during the period of communism responded not only to the need to retrospectively criticize interwar fascism, but also to the (related) need – intensely felt by significant parts of the intellectual opinion of the time – to oppose the perverse discourse of chauvinistic nationalism officially promoted by the regime of Nicolae Ceaușescu.²² As a response to this pressure, there has constituted, at the time, the intellectual strategy, embraced by a part of the university and publishing establishment, to look at the pair of interwar “modernists” Lovinescu and Zeletin as to the perfect antidote against the isolationist tendencies recurrent in Romanian culture, and to present them, together with a score of several other figures – of which a large part were disciples of the former – as both the symbols and the fountainhead of all cultural attitudes opposed to isolationism, xenophobia, fear of change and rejection of modernity.

This tendency has only radicalized after 1989. The picture presented above has been altered in the most representative works of intellectual history with a wider coverage produced in the post-communist period by further elevating the “official” modernists to the position of the supreme instances of “truth” in Romanian culture, this time to the detriment of their adversaries of both right and left.²³ Besides, the general tendency now has been to expel from the historical account the left-wing component of the ideological spectrum, as also the social-economic layer of the ideological debate, by concentrating instead on the genealogy of Romanian fascism²⁴ and on the trends of anti-western nationalism that had been incorporated into the nationalist-communist synthesis and its post-communist avatars.²⁵

Of the types of works that contributed to shaping this argumentative structure, by far the most significant were those intended not as historical accounts devoted to various disciplines, but as general – and, as such, by definition “interdisciplinary” – explorations into the development of ideological tendencies and intellectual currents. And of the authors who wrote in this vein, it goes without saying that the hugely prolific Z. Ornea stands out as the most important, due not only to his massive output, but

also to the documentary soundness, coherence, clarity and literary value of his works. Trained as a sociologist but cohabitating, for the longest part of his career, with the community of the literary historians, this author came closest of all exegetes of Romanian culture to offering a global investigation of the interrelationship between literary, philosophical, sociological and economic ideas that confronted and influenced each other in the intellectual debates of the period 1860-1945. His books of synthesis give general presentations of *Junimism*,²⁶ of the vision of cultural nationalism that developed, before the First World War, around the journal *Sămănătorul*,²⁷ of the socialist thought of the same period,²⁸ and of the left wing agrarian ideology of populism-peasantism.²⁹ The interwar period – also touched on in the book on peasanism cited above – was approached by him in a somewhat different manner, being treated in two works intended to offer general accounts of the intellectual debates in the 1920s and 1930s, respectively.³⁰ Besides a large amount of articles compiled in a series of volumes (and of which some were first published as introductory studies to his many editions of classical texts) and several biographical works devoted to the figures of T. Maiorescu, C. Dobrogeanu-Gherea and C. Stere – the founding figures of the *Junimist*, socialist and populist intellectual currents respectively – he approached the social, economical and political ideas of the hardly classifiable thinker A. D. Xenopol.³¹

In order to comprehend how Ornea's ideas – symptomatic, as already said, for a large part of the Romanian scholarship – changed after the demise of communism, a comparison between the two books devoted to 1920s and 1930s is very enlightening. What it shows is that he did not significantly modify his general framework of interpretation. As expected, the major revisions appeared in the treatment of Marxist thinking: while before 1989 the socialist and communist authors stood as the best embodiment of progressive and “modernist” ideas, with the official “modernists” Zeletin and Lovinescu and the populists/peasantists occupying the position next to the right of them, now Zeletin and Lovinescu started to be celebrated, without any qualifications, as both “liberal” thinkers and the only cogent analysts of modernization. In more general terms, while the blame put on the intellectual currents of the reactionary or radical right was maintained, the left-wing ideas were depreciated – as compared to the previous works –, with a corresponding reevaluation of the “liberal” center. Unfortunately, this re-positioning of cultural symbols was accompanied by a very visible tendency to avoid approaching some

topics that would have required extensive interpretative revisions, and by thus dropping out of the historical account large sections of the historical record of intellectual history. Indeed, while *Tradiționalism și modernitate* is broad and ambitious in scope, paying equal attention to social-economic as well as to literary-philosophical debates, and trying to present a complete picture of the intellectual concerns and intellectual trends of the age, *Anii treizeci* is quite narrowly focused on the rise of the extreme right and on the reactions this phenomenon raised among the thinkers of a different orientation. Marxist authors do not feature at all as protagonists of the book, the peasantists are also left aside, social-economic issues are neglected. The general impression one gets, after this comparison, is that Ornea – together with his fellow Romanian researchers – avoided to make the effort to re-comprehend, in post-communist terms, the problems connected with the sociological and economic component of the pre-communist doctrines and ideological currents, as well as to discover a new, post-totalitarian “language”, fit for presenting the vagaries of the Romanian left.

3

To contend the need of revising a cultural canon is certainly a far-reaching and risky enterprise. Yet, the present article advances the idea that such a reconfiguration of the canon described above in broad outline is needed, and derives inescapably from adopting a perspective on the field which yields into disclosing certain elements of it that have constantly been missed from the previous historical pictures. The field of our research is represented by the entire record of thinking on modernization, national identity and political programs voiced in the period comprised between the publication by Titu Maiorescu in 1868 of his seminal article “Against the present direction in Romanian culture”³² – that inaugurated a new mode of discussing the problems connected with the adjustment of the local society to the embracing modern civilization – and the last occurrences of free intellectual exchanges before the installation of the official communist discourse in 1947.³³ And the new perspective that we vindicate rests on the demand to highlight a central thread running through all such debates of the time: namely, the ideological struggle waged over the issue of assessing the performances of the political establishment in charge of the modernizing policies.

In other words, we vindicate the need to grasp the interconnection between two types of theories that have most often developed hand in hand, but whose histories have tended to be told separately. The first of these intellectual debates was concerned with the character of the Romanian political establishment, and of the society over which it ruled. The second of them was concerned with the relationship between this society and the larger world – or, in other words, the relationship between Romanian society and modern western civilization. Faced with the challenge of modernization on the western model, Romanian intellectuals debated the prospects of westernization and at the same time assessed the behavior of the modernizing elite. They spoke about the danger that the national culture might be dissolved under the impact of foreign influences, while at the same time blaming the ruling strata for the wrong way the process of cultural importations was being conducted. They discussed about the effects that the spread of western capitalist market had on local peasant economy, criticizing the indigenous economic elite for its role as an agent of global capitalism. They despaired over the bad prospects of development of the national industry, condemning the dominant classes for their wrong approach to the objective of industrialization. We claim that, in order to be more historically sensitive, the proper target of our historical account has to be the connection between the narrower critique of the elite and the larger topics of social and cultural criticism, those concerned with the adjustment of a backward society to the modern world.

To be sure, several more “specialized” debates were involved in this ideological conversation. Genuine or self-styled experts made technical analyses and offered technical solutions for the problems of industry or agriculture; constitutional jurists studied the functioning of the institutions and the legal system; the specialists of the field, and virtually everybody besides them, debated the right balance that had to be observed, in literature and art, between foreign fashions and national traditions. There is no question to follow all these debates in detail. As in the larger research of which the present piece is a part,³⁴ our focus is put, first, on those authors, texts and intellectual currents in which we can identify a general characterization of the political system, in terms of its peculiarities by comparison to the developed countries of the West – which were taken, by the theorists in question, as a model of “normal” development; and, second, on the most general conceptions regarding the issue of national identity and the patterns of social-economic development. We intend to

set the debate about the ruling “oligarchy” against the background of the larger debate about modernization and models of development. Or, in other words, we take a new look at the debate about Romanian developmental peculiarities, by focusing on the narrower debate about who was responsible – and to what extent – for all the features of “peripheral” development.

The conversation reconstructed in this way is interesting not only for the historian of the process of modernization, but also from the standpoint of a more “regular” political history of Romania. Besides their (relative) intellectual sophistication, the topics involved in it were the ones most hotly and intensely debated in the country during that period, constituting the privileged ideological references for parties and political groups, and marking the dividing lines between contending political factions. Romanian intellectuals *spoke* about many things during these decades; they actually *debated*, however, only over a limited number of them. If we accept that the task of the historian of political ideas is to engage into a “wide-ranging investigation of the changing political languages in which societies talk to “themselves”,³⁵ then we claim that the path of research indicated above can best help us to understand the way this self-examination of Romanian society proceeded, from the time of the foundation of the political regime of constitutional monarchy, in the 1860s, up to the installation of communism. In other words, we think that precisely by studying the relationship between the debate on modernization, the discussion on domestic political issues in terms of a general characterization of the political system, and the political values adopted by various authors, one can better grasp the “core” issues, ideas and concepts around which the ideological orientations were built, in Romania, in the period under coverage, and better identify “what was actually discussed” by influential intellectual groups in a country where the most recurrent, intensely debated and politically relevant topics that feature in the public discourses tend to differ from those prevailing in the West.³⁶

Because domestic political issues were debated – at a more elevated level – in terms of the modernizing performances of the ruling elite, and because political projects were advocated by reference to the failures of modernization, we consider that we are justified in using such terms as “social criticism” and “political thinking” as interchangeable, in order to refer to the ideological trends in view. “Political theory” in a more technical sense of the term – that is, the type of inquiry into political

values and norms that goes under this name in the standard works of western intellectual history – was of a lesser importance in Romania at the time. As in all countries of “belated modernization”, westernization was perceived as the most pressing intellectual challenge, and political matters were accordingly discussed primarily in relation to the urgencies of social-economic reform, or of the building or conservation of the national culture, and not by reference to abstract philosophical principles.

It does not follow from this that intellectual concerns that can more easily be included under the rubric of “political theory” were completely absent at the time. Sometimes they were openly exhibited, but most often, they were inscribed in the texture of social and cultural criticism of the kind we have spoken about so far. Moreover, philosophical options were to a great extent determined by the more fundamental options made by the respective authors, within the range of the interconnected debates on modernization and the modernizing elite. A further task of our approach is, correspondingly, that of better disclosing the properly political views held by the authors in question.

This last kind of research is actually the one whose need has most intensely been felt in the post-communist period. The exit from totalitarianism and the attempt to erect – or resurrect – a liberal-democratic political regime has been accompanied by the search for an indigenous tradition of liberal-democratic thought. There has emerged a widespread opinion that the importation of recent theories from abroad is to be joined by the effort to “sanitize” the heritage of Romanian political thought, and to sharply dissociate between those elements that can be accommodated with a desirable political system – contributing as such to creating a political culture propitious to it – and those that are unpropitious for the project of political reform. We think that it is precisely our more detailed anatomy and more careful classification of the ideological trends that can help us to better characterize the political conceptions of the pre-communist thinkers, and eventually to identify intellectual alternatives that have hitherto been neglected.

4

The labels under which the protagonists of the first of the two ideological struggles referred to above – that on modernization in abstract terms – were placed are common to the history of most countries in the

area.³⁷ From the “right”, various brands of “conservatives” and indigenist nationalists condemned the rapid introduction of western institutions and practices, on the view that they had broken the course of “natural” or “organic” social evolution.³⁸ From the “left”, socialists and populists criticized labor relationships in agriculture and the inefficiency of the industrial sector.³⁹ A “traditionalist” component was openly present in all these intellectual currents except socialism, while it was sometimes argued at the time that this last one also displayed a strange tendency of longing nostalgically for the traditional ways.⁴⁰ Finally, there existed, of course, a trend of “official” westernism or “bourgeois” modernism, which met the challenge of the contestations from both right and left, offering retrospective and prospective justifications for the advance of modernity to the detriment of the traditional world – as well as for the continuation of the modernization processes under the aegis of a non-socialist political regime.

When we look, next, at the second of our inter-related ideological debates – the one on the modernizing elite –, we can notice that the contending camps were still more sharply separated. It emerges that, from very early on, a part of the political spectrum was targeted by various social critics as constituting the “core” of the ruling elite, and started to be identified with it in general terms. More precisely, the Liberal Party, officially founded in 1875,⁴¹ but whose antecedents went back as far as the period of the “preparation” for the revolution of 1848 – and itself grouped around the powerful Brătianu family –, was taken to embody a certain approach to modernization, inaugurated in the first half of the nineteenth century and never abandoned – so the argument went – by the Romanian establishment. Before 1918, the Liberals were attacked from right and left, by critics placed on different layers of society and using arguments of various sorts – but whose ideological orientations can be classified under the four rubrics of (*Junimist*) “conservatism”, (autochtonist) “nationalism”, “socialism” and “populism”. The Conservative Party, founded in 1880 but having older historical antecedents, was considered, by the representatives of the last three ideological trends, as sharing with the Liberals the guilt for the failures of modernization and for the unjust structure of society. Still, they all agreed that, as the fortunes of the Conservatives had never stopped to decrease to the benefit of the other party of the “oligarchy”, a sound social analysis had to concentrate on the constitutive principles and the functioning of the Liberal establishment.

After the First World War, this criticism of the Liberal-dominated oligarchy⁴² was met by arguments meant to offer a defense of it. They gave rise, in their turn, to reinforcements of the arguments provided by the old schools of social-political thinking, and to new types of criticism. The ideological spectrum was modified, partly under the influence of wider European trends of thought.⁴³ The conservative school virtually disappeared as a significant voice – although we can follow its survival in the works of an individual author from the old generation, Constantin Rădulescu-Motru.⁴⁴ Autochtonist nationalism gradually adopted the political stance of the radical right, being appropriated, in the end, by fascism. Populism was rejuvenated as peasantism. The socialism movement split into social democracy and communism, each of them with a peculiar intellectual discourse. Corporatist ideas gained ground, one of the representatives of this doctrine – Mihail Manoilescu – eventually becoming a figure of European and world notoriety.⁴⁵

Before 1918, skepticism towards westernization was deeply interconnected with the criticism of the Liberal Party, as the main agent of westernization. Anti-Liberal arguments acquired a specific traditionalist resonance, while traditionalism came to be associated with a negative stance towards the Liberals. This is why the pro-Liberal arguments that developed, after 1918, in response to the previous social criticism – being associated mainly with the figures of Lovinescu and Zeletin –, spoke the language of modernism and anti-traditionalism, while the westernist ideas embraced by the same thinkers came to be seen as inseparable from their pro-Liberal apologetics. The two types of argumentation – in favor of westernization and in praise of the westernizing practices of the Liberal elite – are so strongly linked in the works of Lovinescu and Zeletin that we came to look at the connection between them as to a matter of logical necessity. As modernizing skepticism – together with socialist criticism – was intimately linked with targeting the oligarchy for the failures of modernization and for the mistaken way the predicament of adopting the western model was approached in Romania, so modernizing optimism came to be epitomized by authors, like Lovinescu and Zeletin, who tightly associated a modernist stance with an apology of the same oligarchy, systematically defending it against all previous criticism. This last intellectual attitude has been considered, as such, as the only form in which bourgeois modernism was voiced in pre-communist Romania. Against this widely shared view, we argue that, alongside the anti-traditionalist and anti-Marxist authors that subscribed to the

mainstream social-political developments, offering a rationalization for them, in the vein of Lovinescu and Zeletin, there could be heard at the time some voices that have subsequently been forgotten and missed from the record of intellectual history: a score of political authors who conjoined a vocal opposition to nationalist traditionalist and anti-western cultural trends, and a critical departure from the Marxist designs, with a no less resolute criticism of the mainstream politics, considered as the root of social distortions and as the cause of political extremism of right and left. We set out to recover and sharply characterize this family of thinkers, by placing it on the ideological map of the time. Before proceeding with this, however, we shall first have to take a brief look at the inner logic of both the arguments leveled by the “critical culture”⁴⁶ against the establishment and those provided by Lovinescu and Zeletin in its defense.

5

The main blame put by the different political writers on the Romanian ruling stratum was the fact that it was not true to its professed self-definition. The elite of the Liberal Party recommended itself as the representative of a bourgeois middle class, the main agent of global capitalism in Romania, with the mission of propelling the country on the path of development characteristic to modern societies. In fact, the social critics argued, the members of the political establishment were only the representatives of a class of bureaucrats, making their living on the spoils of the state, and manipulating the state apparatus to their own benefit. The principle of social cohesion of the elite was not given by the role its members played in the economic process, but by the position they occupied within the state structure. Moreover, to the extent that they did play an economic role at all, this one was dependent on their entrenched political power. The industry they manned was not a genuine one – able to survive by the sheer mechanisms of the free market – but an artificial one, kept alive by protectionist policies and state subsidies. And the agrarian economy largely dominated by the same class of false bourgeois and state functionaries was a semi-feudal one, particular mixture of medieval and modern elements. The peasants, laboring under economic and legal conditions that brought together both feudal serfdom and capitalism, but with none of their benefits, had to bear on their shoulders the heavy state apparatus, fashioned on the model of the western states,

but superimposed on a primitive society and a feeble economy. The fiscal system functioned in such a way as to systematically drive away the national wealth from the society at large, and to direct it to the small bureaucratic oligarchy and to the nascent faked industry created to its sole benefit.

A virtual “sociological theory” about the hidden character of the Romanian “oligarchy” was put forward, thus, by the political authors belonging to the four ideological camps of the “critical culture”. The components of this theory did not appear all at once, but entered the intellectual scene at successive moments. They were present in all ideological discourses, but not always fully elaborated. They were sometimes held by authors not entirely conscious of the intellectual traditions they shared with many of their devoted allies and some of their avowed ideological rivals. Our historical reconstruction of this overall view of the Romanian state and society has to proceed, therefore, through a careful identification and gathering together of small pieces of theory and intellectual building blocks spread across various utterances belonging to all parts of the ideological spectrum. It can only be an exercise in grasping the “tacit dimension”⁴⁷ of an age in the intellectual history of Romania – that is, of the entire welter of assumptions and semi-articulated ideas and presuppositions, cherished by most of the participants in the ideological conversation of the time.

When approached in this way, the four “ideologies of opposition” that criticized the establishment before and after the First World War will appear as much more unitary on the side of their descriptive sociology than previous historical accounts have presented them. They diverged mainly when moving from social analysis to projects of social and political reform. The alternative models of development they offered were based, however, on much the same ideas about the existing characteristics of Romanian society: over-bureaucratization, oligarchic politics, semi-feudal agriculture and imitative culture – this was the diagnostic of Romanian society posed, with different accents and by using various terms, by the social critics that undertook the task of exploring in depth the dilemma of Romanian modernization. And foremost, there was the overarching idea that the social and political elite of the time had to be characterized as neither “feudal” nor “bourgeois”, but rather as a social configuration with no counterpart in the historical experience of the West, its cohesion being determined by the participation of its members in the bureaucratic machine, together with the tendency of the state apparatus itself to act

as an instrument of income extraction to the exclusive benefit of the political class.

The intellectual matrix from which the sociological analyses targeting the oligarchy were derived was the famous theory of “forms without substance”. The basic idea – first formulated by the conservative *Junimists* and their intellectual leader Maiorescu in the article already mentioned – that Romanian society was evolving in a distorted way, due to the uncritical grafting of western “forms” onto a society unprepared to sustain, to assimilate them, or to enable them to function according to their original (western) design, pervaded the entire intellectual history of Romania until the Second World War. First formulated by reference to the problem of cultural imitation, it soon acquired a dimension of social analysis and criticism. Alongside their vindication of cultural authenticity, the *Junimists* claimed a Romanian social order in accordance with its cultural environment. Condemning the falsification of western ideas in the Romanian setting, they underscored the social dysfunctions produced by the demagogical politics that made use of the very same ideas. Indicating the Liberals as the main representatives of this type of politics, they sometimes depicted them as naïve enthusiasts of modernization, and some other times as cynical professionals of the political industry. While themselves prominent participants in the political game – or at least members of the “political class”, in the most general sense of the term –, they were the initiators of a discourse of social criticism that was to be taken over, later on, by political writers originating from outside the circle of wealth and power. Turned to more radical uses and infused with a more “populist” and “democratic” spirit, these ideas, born within the confines of political conservatism, were to become – after corresponding re-elaborations – the meeting-ground of social reformers of all persuasions and the rallying-point of both left-wing and right-wing revolutionaries.

Disclosing the underlying unity of the critical culture leads us to question, once again, certain deep-seated tendencies prevalent in the scholarship on the topic. The point is made, this time, by reference not only to the Romanian scholarship but also to the foreign literature that has approached the Romanian and East European pre-communist heritage of social thought from the standpoint of international “development studies”, on the view that the East European periphery shared important structural features with the non-European regions of the world, all of them evolving on a path of development different from the one followed by

the West.⁴⁸ Most of this last kind of scholarship tends to give a good assessment of the sociological wisdom displayed by left-wing (socialist and populist) authors,⁴⁹ but equally to disregard their larger cultural and ideological setting, and eventually to dismiss as irrelevant the insights given by their ideological rivals from the right. At the same time, in so far as it has embarked on the task of advancing evaluative judgments concerning the old schools of social criticism, Romanian scholarship has either tended to concur with the same views⁵⁰ or, to the contrary, it tended to downplay the “skeptical modernizers”⁵¹ in favor of the modernist apologists – invoking either the former ones’ reactionary leanings⁵² or their Marxist heterodoxy.⁵³ Subscribing to the above-mentioned literature with a development studies perspective in validating the “critical” sociologists against their “apologetic” rivals, we are led to underline the fact that the basic recurrent ideas of the “critical culture” were born, in Romania, within the headquarters of the political right: emerged in the footsteps of the conservative school of *Junimea*, they became the common ground of all ideological orientations. Sometimes conjoined with proposals of reform and political solutions that certainly look unacceptable with the hindsight of the twentieth century’s experience, they still encapsulate an intimate understanding of the predicament of Romanian modernization.

6

Of the pair of classical authors who epitomize the modernist attitude – and of the score of lesser figures who wrote in the same vein – Ștefan Zeletin was certainly the one whose works most openly display and most systematically elaborate a chain of arguments meant to offer an apology of the modernizing elite. Zeletin’s stance of an ideological defender of the Liberal Party does not need to be read between the lines. On the contrary, it is emphatically adopted as an official position, by this author who stroke one of his commentators as “an unalloyed example of Antonio Gramsci’s ‘organic intellectual’, providing an elaborate rationalization of the existing distribution of wealth and power”.⁵⁴ Zeletin can best be credited for giving wide currency, in Romanian political parlance, to the very term “oligarchy”, as a designation of the modernizing establishment and as the most convenient catchword for cursorily describing its authoritarian and interventionist policies. Accepting the argument of the previous social critics that the Romanian oligarchy was something different

from the western bourgeoisie, Zeletin sets out to offer retrospective justifications for all these differences. He presents the apparently non-capitalist behavior of the self-professed Romanian capitalists as the only possible strategy by which genuine capitalism could have been introduced to the country, explaining all the other reprehensible features of the social-political system as unavoidable concomitants of the best possible long-term approach to westernization, that in the near future would be recognized by everybody as episodes of the glorious record of progress. Sometimes, Zeletin's ambition to offer final refutations to all the arguments advanced by the "critical culture" borders on paradox, and we cannot avoid the feeling that he consciously defies our common sense, by claiming a positive role to horrific social phenomena and to cynical political maneuverings. In short – and unlike Lovinescu, in whose case this apologetic dimension stands somehow in the back-stage – Zeletin writes as an "integral" defender of the Romanian economic, social, and political elite.

This characterization of Zeletin as a resolute defender of the *status quo* can only be reinforced if we take into account the genesis of his system of thought. As we reconstructed it with another occasion,⁵⁵ Zeletin's intellectual evolution looks very surprising. Indeed, if in *The Romanian Bourgeoisie* and *Neoliberalism* Zeletin speaks as both an apologist of the Liberal elite and as a devout westernist, it appears that, in previous pieces with a social and political content, he argued as a kind of traditionalist and – still more significantly – as a bitter critique of the same political elite. It seems that, until the very last moment before launching the series of works in which he formulated a sophisticated defense of the strategy of westernization followed by the Liberals, Zeletin was nothing else but one of the host of anti-Liberal social critics. At some point in his intellectual evolution, he started to build an impressive rationalization for everything that he had beforehand used to blame as historical monstrosities. This fact can only shed a revealing light on the true character of his apology of the Romanian oligarchy.

As the ideas of the "first Zeletin" had derived from his adoption of the social diagnostic of "forms without substance", so the system of ideas that Zeletin developed when embracing the opposite stance is based on his rejection of the very same social diagnostic. As he now argues, the description of Romanian society in such terms comes from the fact that the social analysts of all persuasions cannot discern where to look in order to perceive the social-economic base that corresponds to the

institutional imports from the West. They rightly argue that a genuine parliamentary state with a large bureaucratic apparatus can only be based on an authentic bourgeois, capitalist society. Comparing local realities with those prevalent in the West, they conclude that such social-economic preconditions for organic development are not met in Romania. Hence, their characterization of Romanian society as a distortion of the western one. The error of this social diagnostic can be easily disclosed, however, if we understand that the social and economic realities of a backward country like Romania have to be compared not with those of the contemporary West, but with those prevalent in the West centuries before. Romanian capitalism appears as a sham only if it is measured by the criteria of nineteenth century western economic life. It compares well, however, with the economic arrangements of the western European countries in the age of mercantilism, that is, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The political structure of a parliamentary liberal state has not been erected, in Romania, on the shallow basis of an agrarian, feudal economy, but on the firm foundation of a capitalist economy that is passing through its first stages of evolution. And the modifications that the nineteenth century political structure imported from the West suffered in Romania are themselves not arbitrary distortions, but the result of a necessary effort – and of a spontaneous social reflex – to adapt the state forms to the economic base.

Zeletin offers justifications, thus, for both the social-economic and the political deplorable aspects of the Romanian life, which were condemned by the social critics of the previous decades. They all appear as nineteenth century approximations of older phenomena recorded by western history. Romania has not followed an “abnormal” or “monstrous” path of development, he argues, but only repeated, at a latter time and in different circumstances, the stages of development previously followed by the West. He makes this claim not only by reference to Romania, but also with respect to the category of the “backward” countries generally. He explicitly takes issue with the idea – clearly formulated in Romania by the socialist Dobrogeanu-Gherea⁵⁶ but implicitly accepted by virtually the entire “critical culture” – that retarded countries are bound to follow a trajectory of social evolution of their own. There is only one single succession of developmental stages that a society might take in its progression from the traditional to the modern world. If a major difference exists between early and late developing countries, it consists in the fact that latecomers to modernization advance on the course of evolution at

a much accelerated pace, occasionally skipping some of its stations. This intellectual artifice enables Zeletin not only to retrospectively justify the authoritarian politics, interventionist economy and social misery of the previous age, but also to offer prospective rationalizations for an even tighter economic interventionism and a still more authoritarian political system – ingeniously designated as “neoliberalism” –, that Romania, this time together with the West, was expected to experience in the nearest future.

7

As the various arguments developed by the critical culture can be traced back to the overarching idea of “forms without substance”, so the pro-establishment arguments of Lovinescu and Zeletin can be described as deriving from the effort to reject this general idea. The intellectual strategies they employed in order to accomplish this task were very different, however. In the account of Zeletin, the error of the critical culture lays at the deep level of the very description of the process of modernization. The social critics of all persuasions are wrong in not being able to distinguish the “substance” – that is, the capitalist economy of a commercial, mercantilist type – that stood as the counterpart of institutional innovation, although it is conspicuously displayed in open light. In the account of Lovinescu, on the other hand, the critical culture is right on its descriptive side, and only fails when moving to prescriptions. The failure of the social critics comes from their refusal to accept the inevitability of the evils they scorn. In other words, Lovinescu accepts the diagnostic of “forms without substance” as valid, at the same time arguing that, in countries like Romania, it could have not happened otherwise, and everything is to the better. The imitation of the West is the fate of all latecomers to modernization, and such imitation can only be done by first adopting the western-type political, institutional and ideological “superstructure”,⁵⁷ in the absence of corresponding social and economic foundations. Modernization necessarily proceeds, here, “from upside down”, and it has to be implemented in the field of institutions before taking roots at the deep levels of society. Certain distortions result as unavoidably from this reversal of the developmental stages. In the long run, however, all these unintended consequences of the process of modernization-through-imitation would disappear, both the social base

and the political superstructure coming to approximate those of the western countries. Thus, while for Zeletin there is no such thing as a special path of development for a backward country, Lovinescu holds that Romanian development is indeed different from that of the West, but nevertheless natural for any country outside the confines of the West. Both arguments, however, amount to presenting the social phenomena denounced as abnormal by the critical culture as necessary evils that arise on the path of westernization, and to understand westernization itself as desirable, in the long run benefic, and ultimately both unavoidable and irreversible.

No predecessor of Zeletin has been identified to the present. Otherwise, the argument that Lovinescu employed when joining Zeletin's struggle against the "reactionary forces" did have an easily detectable pedigree. It is most probable that the author who can be credited to have been the first that responded to Maiorescu's denunciation of the disjunction between forms and substance with the argument that (legal and institutional) forms could be expected to generate, in the predictable future, the corresponding (cultural, social and economic) substance, was the philosopher and historian Alexandru D. Xenopol. His reaction against the *Junimist* modernizing skepticism was as rapid as it could have been. Already in 1868, immediately after reading, when studying in Germany – with a scholarship paid by the *Junimea* cultural society –, Maiorescu's "Against the present direction of Romanian culture", he sent a letter to Iacob Negruzzi – one of the founders of the *Junimea* society and for many years director of its journal, *Literary Conversations* –, in which he warned against the mood of general skepticism that Maiorescu's rhetoric was likely to bring forth.⁵⁸

Xenopol broadened his arguments, meant to dispel the feeling of pessimism regarding Romania's prospects of modernization that irresistibly irradiated from *Junimist* criticism – and also to counteract the reactionary implications that could have been drawn from Maiorescu's otherwise very moderate conservative rhetoric –, in a series of articles published in 1870-1877, under the general title "Studies on our present condition". Granting that institutional imports could be damaging, indeed, if unfitted to the general social structure, he underlined the fact that there was no reason whatsoever to question the applicability to the Romanian setting of the most general principles of legislation and institutional organization brought into being by western modernity. The only legitimate concern, he said, was to carefully adjust those principles and institutional devices

to the specific configuration of the society that adopted them, or in other words to observe the difference between their basic structure – with universal relevance – and the peculiar forms they had taken in their place of origin. When contemplating the splendid functioning of the major principles of governance in the advanced countries of Europe we have to distinguish, thus, between their inner “core” and their outward “package”, to reject the second and to adopt the first, and to enmesh this last one into a new cover, fit for the new realities that the same principles are now expected to address.⁵⁹

Xenopol takes several steps further in approximating the general position that most easily comes to mind when the name of Lovinescu is invoked several years later, in his works with an economic content. Joining the growing opposition – initiated by the economists Dionisie Pop-Marțian and Petre S. Aurelian – against the free-trade ideas that had been dominating in the country up to that time, Xenopol broadens his arguments – to the extent that state intervention was required for the Romanian infant industry to take off – into a more general statement related to the precedence that political artifice unavoidably has, in a backward country, on spontaneous social and economic processes.⁶⁰

Another author who (implicitly) contributed to the unfolding of the argument that imported forms can generate their corresponding substance was the literary historian Pompiliu Eliade. In a doctoral dissertation published at Paris in 1898, and dealing with the impact of French ideas in the Romanian principalities, at the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth, this enthusiastic supporter of acculturation went as far as to say that, when looking to the influence that the western country exerted on the eastern one, what we can see is not the image of a backward people in the process of being regenerated, through the contact with a more developed civilization: in fact, French influence meant the very birth of the Romanian people, for the first time molded and disentangled now from the amorphous barbarity of the late Turkish domination.⁶¹

In Lovinescu’s *History of Modern Romanian Civilization*, the argument that imitative modernization is natural and legitimate is split up into several theoretical statements that all lead to the same conclusion.⁶² According to the author’s own understanding, they should be seen as historical “laws” with universal relevance. The relationship between these laws and the historical narrative of the creation of modern Romania is twofold. On the one hand, they are heuristic instruments with an

explanative function: the story of Romanian's encounter with western modernity becomes intelligible, so Lovinescu thinks, only if approached from the standpoint of these sociological generalizations. On the other hand, the record of Romanian history is itself used in order to compile empirical evidence supporting the same generalizations. The theoretical statements are established through the parallel analysis of, and the continuous comparison between, two series of historical developments: first, the process of Romanian modernization, studied in detail; and second, a kaleidoscopic collection of facts and phenomena, picked up – quite randomly, one might add – from across the entire record of European and world history. While Lovinescu moves back and forth between these two areas of study throughout the entire work, the explorations into the Romanian case are concentrated in the first volume – *The Revolutionary Forces* – and the considerations of a more general character are largely placed in the third one – *The Laws of the Formation of Romanian Civilization*.

Although Lovinescu never makes an inventory of his “laws”, we can easily identify four such general statements, which can be ordered in a somewhat “logical” sequence and according to their level of generality. The first of them concerns the principle of “synchronism”, or “imitation”, or else “interdependency”. It says that nations and civilizations naturally interact with each other, most often the less developed of them imitating the one placed on a higher level on the developmental scale. This fact should not be seen as an evil, Lovinescu thinks, but simply as the only means for the improvement of societies. The second historical law says that, when it occurs, imitation will proceed from upside down, starting with the institutional forms and not with the social substance. The third statement is related to the opposition between revolutionary and evolutionary change. It says that, far from being inescapably calamitous events, revolutionary episodes are natural occurrences in the history of virtually all societies. Gradual transformations are not always possible, and sometimes a violent break with the past – of which the sudden and enthusiastic imitation of another civilization is an example – is beneficial. Finally, the last theoretical statement says that ideological transfers from one society to another take precedence, chronologically, on economic influences, and have to be seen accordingly as the first and most important of the mechanisms by which the synchronization of societies is accomplished.

As reconstructed in the framework of these laws, the history of the creation of modern Romania appears as full of rationality. The social and political arrangements of past and present Romania are legitimated as embodying this rationality of the historical process, and the Liberal Party, as the leading “revolutionary force”, is consecrated as the arm of historical destiny. Lovinescu also employs his set of historical laws as a polemical device. In the second volume of the book – *The Reactionary Forces* –, and occasionally in other parts of it, the criticisms adduced against the modernizing elite of the Liberals by the four ideological currents of *Junimism*, nationalism, socialism and populism are taken one by one and evaluated – and their claims of scientific social criticism are rejected – in light of Lovinescu’s own conception of historical evolution. Responding to the anti-establishment and “traditionalist” (or socialist) political writers from a pro-Liberal standpoint, Lovinescu also sets himself against the author who preceded him in offering a rationalization of the Liberal-sponsored modernization and a systematic rejection of the anti-Liberal arguments. The materialistic determinism of Zeletin is condemned, not in the name of voluntarist principles or of “methodological individualism”, but in order to be replaced by a “softer” determinism of an “idealist” sort.

Unlike Zeletin, Lovinescu never argues that the liberal-democratic order has run its course and has to be replaced by a new political system. Still, his theoretical allegiance to the foundational principles of liberal democracy never turns into a significant pleading for their more effective institutionalization in the Romanian environment. Following Zeletin in this respect, Lovinescu accepts the “oligarchic” politics of the Liberals as a fact to be taken for granted,⁶³ never taking pains to openly criticize its most deplorable features. To the extent that they can be detected at all in his writings, Lovinescu’s hopes for a broadening of the political system and a restructuring of the social arrangements are placed in a hardly foreseeable future, and never give rise to any open disagreements with the establishment of the day. As Zeletin’s oligarchic apologetics, Lovinescu’s strategy of muting his general political views for the sake of defending the Romanian political elite emerges more clearly when he is compared with some of his contemporary fellow-travelers of the anti-traditionalist camp.

As said above, as far as their sociological conceptions – related to the desirability of western-type modernization – are concerned, the classical modernists have most often been granted unqualified good assessments in the scholarship of the field. The corresponding assessment of their political stance has generally led, however, to two different and opposite opinions. Indeed, in so far as it addresses the problem of the political views that went together with the various conceptions about social modernization and national development voiced in pre-communist Romania, the existing literature has reached one of the following conclusions: it either assimilated the modernist stance with a liberal-democratic attitude – due to the fact that the classical modernists spoke as defenders of the Liberal Party, as well as due to the common, and to a large extent misleading, identification of the westernists of non-western societies with the generic liberalism born in the West;⁶⁴ or, taking account of the avowed argumentation in favor of interventionist and collectivist practices given by these authors, or else of the frailty of their liberal-democratic advocacy, it concluded that no intellectual trend resonating with the major concerns of post-communist democratization can be found in the pre-communist cultural heritage of the country.⁶⁵

Taking advantage of the identification of a formerly neglected intellectual attitude, we can take a departure from these trends of scholarship. As we already pointed out above, we think that the pre-communist political authors who conjoined a modernist stance – in much the same way as Lovinescu and Zeletin – and an adverse stance towards the Liberal Party “oligarchy” – in much the same way as the “critical culture” scorned by both Zeletin and Lovinescu, and sometimes coming in its footsteps –, were driven by this fundamental intellectual choice much closer than the “official” modernists to a significant pleading for liberal-democratic values.

In a previous article, we considered at great length the figure of maybe the most interesting of these political authors.⁶⁶ The stream of articles published, over four decades, by the intriguing journalist, literary critic and former socialist militant H. Sanielevici display precisely that combination of vocal disagreement with the anti-modern culture whose efficient rejection was mainly responsible for the glory acquired by Lovinescu and Zeletin, with a no less resolute and open disagreement – advocated by plain references to the *Junimist* tradition of social thought

– of oligarchic politics and interventionist economy. In the end, his social analyses even enable Sanielevici to point precisely to the same Liberal establishment as to the main source of cultural obscurantism and ideological reaction. While not as ingenious a social thinker as Zeletin, and neither such a powerful commentator of cultural phenomena and intellectual trends like Lovinescu, Sanielevici emerges, at a closer scrutiny, as a valuable representative of the critical culture's sociology, and as a political thinker that exemplify much better than any of the two an engaged involvement with the extension of liberal and democratic values.

In fact, the intellectual trend opposed to interventionist economy, occasionally broadened towards the stance of political liberalism, was not as feeble in pre-communist Romania as both a historiography indebted to the ideas of economic nationalism and protectionism and the power of the "Zeletinist" tradition⁶⁷ made us to think. Authors like Eugen Demetrescu,⁶⁸ George Strat,⁶⁹ Gheorghe Tașcă⁷⁰ or Anastasie Gusti⁷¹ are good cases in point, while the inexplicably forgotten Ștefan Antim came closest to Sanielevici in offering an original interpretation of the sociology of "forms" and "substance", with the task of explaining the nature of the Romanian ruling oligarchy.⁷² Other examples could follow.⁷³

This liberal – and avowedly anti-Liberal – tradition of thinking will not constitute the object of the remaining of this article. Instead, we shall focus on an intellectual figure which, set in the same comparative perspective with Lovinescu and Zeletin, appears as a better example of open involvement with the ideals of social justice and democratic political participation. This comparison will also enable us to take a look on a topic that has featured heavily in recent Romanian cultural debates: namely, the necessity to go back to the political wisdom of the "1848 generation", eventually using the works of the inter-war modernists as a way of access to this pre-*Junimist* period in the evolution of Romanian culture.

Indeed, there has been a widespread tendency in Romanian scholarship to depict interwar modernism as a resuscitation of the modernizing optimism characteristic of the 1848 period, after several decades of growing modernizing skepticism.⁷⁴ As embodied in the works of Lovinescu and Zeletin, this twentieth century mode of thinking is considered to exemplify a kind of intellectual attitude that incorporates that "openness" towards things modern and foreign characteristic of the pre-*Junimist* era, while avoiding – due to the lessons of *Junimist* criticism – both patriotic

exaggerations and political naiveté. Besides, Lovinescu and his disciples are indicated as the legitimate heirs of both “fortyeightism” (in the political field) and *Junimism* (in the artistic field): taking from the second the doctrine of the “autonomy of art”, they dissociated it from any conservative ideological leanings and infused it with the political values of liberalism and democracy.⁷⁵ Zeletin, on the other hand, appears as the thinker who placed the modernist attitude of the “fortyeighters” on firmer intellectual foundations, by adding to it the dimension of social and economic analysis.

While it is true that, in Zeletin and Lovinescu, modernizing optimism was only the reverse side of their attempt to offer final and systematic refutations of the various expressions of post-1848 skepticism – of *Junimist* progeny – regarding westernization, we shall argue that this mode of thinking in favor of the adoption of the western model has to be seen as a new departure in the intellectual history of Romania, rather than as a reinforcement of the 1848 tradition. This should not be taken to mean, however, that the last mentioned intellectual tradition was extinct in the first half of the twentieth century. On the contrary, we aim to disclose an intellectual attitude that can legitimately be characterized as a continuation of it.

As a matter of fact, this second type of formulating a pro-western case is present, to some extent, in the very body of Lovinescu’s *History of Modern Romanian Civilization*. This book that has generally been seen as offering a unitary and firmly consistent line of reasoning is actually build around two different – and heterogeneous – kinds of argumentation. Lovinescu’s main discourse, presented in brief above, is accompanied by an underlying discourse, whose normative conclusions – the desirable character of westernization – is similar, but whose basic principles and intellectual premises are different.

According to the first discourse, the Romanians are likely to succeed in integrating themselves into the western-type civilization because all civilizations necessarily interact with each other, being continuously molded by external influences. In other words, westernization is legitimate because there are no such things as immutable national essences, mutually irreconcilable to each other, which cannot be fused together into a functional synthesis. According to the second discourse, the Romanians are likely to adopt western civilization successfully precisely because they are western by their innate essence. The Latin component of their national identity – that Lovinescu, in a confusing way very characteristic

to the times, often refers to as about their “racial characteristics”⁷⁶ – is the defining such building block of “Romaniannes”. Although defined by reference to cultural facts, and not to ethnic or racial ones, Latinity is presented thus, by, Lovinescu, more as an unchanging essence than as a cultural texture likely to be remolded by historical processes of acculturation. And it is precisely their defining Latin character that somehow predetermines the Romanians for an unproblematic westernization, had the “reactionary forces” not been unfortunately present for hindering the inescapable process of historical change. Joining the western civilization, Romanians are actually returning to where they rightly belong, after a long historical period when nefarious – and contingent – non-western influences prevented them from developing their latent potentialities.⁷⁷

The discovery of the West was thus, for the Romanians, the rediscovery of their occidental brethren. This way of looking to occidentalization was certainly not peculiar to Lovinescu. It was only a common view that rested – in the words of a foreign observer of Romania – on the idea that

Romanian society is essentially a part of Western society and [...] is moving along with it. This has been the position of those that have stressed Romania's Latinity and French connections, who like to regard Bucharest as the little Paris of the Balkans, and Romanian civilization as the outpost of Western culture against a Slavic and Barbaric East.⁷⁸

At the time Lovinescu was writing, the general “autochtonist” twist of Romanian nationalism – taking place around 1900 – had already transformed such a view into a minority one. Several decades beforehand, however, this vision had been dominant in Romanian culture. Before the *Junimists* identified westernization as an intellectual challenge – and before Xenopol, Lovinescu or Zeletin set out to offer their elaborate responses to the *Junimist* objections against rapid westernization – a form of spontaneous – and, by comparison to the later forms, mentioned above, naïve – kind of westernist stance had been characteristic to the Romanian educated strata. Before Maiorescu and his colleagues posed the question of westernization in terms of the dichotomy between “forms” and “substance”, the generation of the “fortyeighters” had anticipated an answer to the puzzle of modernization thus formulated. This first Romanian westernist discourse was nothing else than the emerging nationalist ideology itself. The nationalist thinking of the first half of the nineteenth

century rested on the view that the inner substance of the Romanian national identity was itself of a western kind, and thus it was prone to rapidly integrate into the expanding European civilization. The discovery of the West was nothing else, according to this view, than a rediscovery of the national essence.⁷⁹

Moreover, far from being specific to the Romanians, this articulation of ardent nationalism and acceptance of western influences was actually a feature of virtually all the East European national ideologies, in the first part of the nineteenth century. Throughout the region, the shaping of national identities and the rise of nationalist ideologies went hand in hand with admiration for the West, and with the eagerness to emulate it.⁸⁰ Comparison to the West, with the accompanying embarrassment, was everywhere – and somewhat paradoxically – a component of the new patriotic pride, and the inflation of this national pride was the reverse side of the drive to westernization. The (real or imagined) “virtues” of western civilization were taken as the privileged reference for any attempt at understanding and further forging the national character. The same was true for the historical explorations – accompanied by a great degree of imagining – into the national past of each of the peoples from the region. This one – together with the supposed national *psyche* that had evolved from it – was scrutinized in the attempt at identifying, beyond the recent centuries of degradation and beyond the present condition of misery, those historical episodes and traits of character which could certify that the people in question had sometime been – and in spite of the appearances still was – the repository of the same kind of virtues as those exhibited by the great peoples of the West. Recipes of national regeneration were formulated accordingly, by the means of which those virtues were to be re-enacted.

The Latin component of the Romanian identity was a privileged such certificate of noblesse. While not employing the very terms of “form” and “substance” explicitly, the authors of the first half of the nineteenth century implicitly argued that the substance of the Romanian nation, as Latin, was of the same essence as the forms of western civilization, and as such the discovery of the West by the Romanians was only a rediscovery of their inner self, for centuries hidden to themselves and to others by the “forms” of an alien, Byzantine-Slavic-Oriental civilization. By imitating “Europe”, the Romanians were not doing anything else than to let free their own identity from the chains of accidental historical influences. The Latinist ideology of the period was thus only the Romanian form of

the incipient westernist discourse characteristic to the entire area. While their neighbors had to search for such proofs of compatibility with the West in the heroic record of national history, the Romanians – although doing the same thing no less extensively – could invoke their very national “essence” as the supreme argument.

This type of nationalist discourse, and the form of historical consciousness that went together with it, entered into decline after the 1860s under the attack of *Junimism*.⁸¹ Later on, after 1900, this type of pro-western nationalism was gradually replaced by a new variety of nationalist discourse, that of autochtonism.⁸² The new brand of nationalism was not arguing any more that the Romanians were worthy of being rescued by the West from among their Slavic and Oriental neighbors. On the contrary, it argued that they stood, either by themselves or together with the other Orthodox peoples, as a self-contained civilization, whose values could not and must not be compared to the western ones, and certainly were not hierarchically inferior to them. However, after 1900, the old, pro-western, nationalism still glimmers in the works of several authors. Driven away from the field of historical studies and philology – that had constituted their former privileged preserve – by the *Junimists* and the new nationalist thinkers, it resurfaces, under the guise of another discipline – social psychology – in the book *On the Psychology of the Romanian People*, published in 1907 by the sociologist Dumitru Drăghicescu.⁸³

The best way to succinctly characterize Drăghicescu’s thinking on the relationship between Romania and the West is as a sample of pre-*Junimist* nationalist discourse that has survived the attacks of *Junimist* criticism. Overall, the characterization of “a fortyeighter in the twentieth century” best suits Drăghicescu, of all the interwar modernist writers, precisely because, unlike the other authors of the period who looked at the design of westernization with optimism, he is not much concerned to set himself against the tradition inaugurated by Maiorescu. Most of the time, Drăghicescu seems to ignore the “critical culture”, although he appears to have been entirely conscious of it.⁸⁴ In particular, Drăghicescu’s understanding of the issue of national identity, as it related to the challenge of modernization, is a reinforcement of the dominating nationalist discourse of the 1848 period. It is an expression of the belief that westernization should not be seen as a major problem, precisely because, far from running counter to the deep characteristics of Romanian society, it resonates with its inner life and its defining traits.

As a work which sets the task of identifying the national psychology of the Romanians, *On the Psychology of the Romanian People* seems to belong together with the long series of attempts at formulating a metaphysics of the Romanian nation in an autochtonist guise that the Romanian culture has produced.⁸⁵ Its general orientation is, however, strikingly different. Drăghicescu's approach to the subject as a social psychologist involves a great deal of historical considerations, distilled from the works of the classical Romanian historians A. D. Xenopol, N. Iorga, I. Bogdan, and D. Onciul.⁸⁶ In an age of scientism, Drăghicescu likes to compare his investigations on the characteristics of a nation to those of a chemist on the structure of a substance. Like the latter one, he has to separate the basic, and indivisible, elements that entered into the composition of the national substance. These are the defining traits of the various national groups fused, along history, in the Romanian synthesis, or influencing it from outside. Further, he has to establish the external conditions in which the "chemical" reactions of national fusion took place – that is, the influence of the historical environment on the process of national elaboration, in its successive stages. Present collective Romanian psychology will thus become intelligible as a combination of primary elements under specific economic, social, and political conditions.

The national substance has a hard core and several secondary additions. The original nucleus of the Romanian mind is composed of two components: the Dacian and the Latin, with the predominance of the latter. All further additions in fact corrupted this original synthesis. The predatory barbarians, the Slavs – whose imprint on the Romanian mind is acknowledged as most profound of all –, the Turks, the Phanariot Greeks, and even the Russians during their protectorate over the Romanian principalities at the beginning of the nineteenth century, exerted on the Romanians influences that went against their original frame of mind. And an unlucky history acted in such a way as to make the Romanians an easy pray for all such nefarious influences. While naturally inclined, by virtue of their Latin ancestry, towards the West, they were gradually dragged to the East by the successive waves of invaders, intruders, and imperial rulers. When they were on the edge of having their (basically western) identity fully dissolved in the Levantine melting pot, the West unexpectedly intervened and put an end to this (seemingly unending) process of decay. Under the influence of the West, that most conspicuously manifested itself as a French influence, national

regeneration started, and it is still underway in Drăghicescu's time. Romanian psychology still bears the scars of the unhappy past, and it is not even by far fully configured. Several decades of western influence stopped the degradation of the national substance but could not decide yet its future positive evolution.

Which way will it evolve? At a time when the main nationalist leaders had already engaged on the campaign for making the Romanians truer to their own nature, irreducible to any set of values valid for all mankind, Drăghicescu still thinks that only by looking to the achievements of the great nations of the West one can learn the principles of a fertile national pedagogy. Even among these ones, only few have acquired a clear-cut collective psychological profile. And of these last, only one can actually be taken as a model. There is nothing comparable, for Drăghicescu, with the harmonious national features of the French, except, perhaps, those of the ancient Romans. The old Latinism is replaced, in Drăghicescu's work, with a no less enthusiastic Francophilia that looks striking if related to the dominant pro-German cultural orientation of the period.

At the time he published this book Dumitru Drăghicescu was already – and unlike Lovinescu and Zeletin – a member of the Liberal Party, and he was to remain a lifelong admirer and fellow-traveler of it. Moreover, after arguing his pro-western case in 1907, Drăghicescu was to come back for a while in the stream of public debate, this time with writings that contain his pro-Liberal case. However, Drăghicescu's Liberal Party apologetics – contained in the two volumes *The Evolution of Liberal Ideas* (1921) and *Political Parties and Social Classes* (1922)⁸⁷ – is of a very different nature than the one offered by Lovinescu and Zeletin. Indeed, as his westernist rhetoric is echoing the national discourse of the “fortyeighters”, so his political stance is strikingly reminiscent of their corresponding ideas. The political conceptions of Drăghicescu display the same combination of democratic radicalism, confused liberalism, utopian socialism and vague humanitarianism characteristic of the 1848 period.⁸⁸ In such quality, they have very little in common with the actual policies of the Romanian Liberals. Drăghicescu celebrates the Liberal Party as the artisan of modern Romania and as the inspirer of all generous political projects, culminating with the introduction of universal suffrage and the agrarian reform. Nevertheless, he presents a glorious brief history of the party only to remind his readers that, “after the death of the enthusiastic liberals of 1848 [...] the leaders of the Liberal Party” have generally been “lacking of the sacred flame of generous liberal ideals”.

By contrast to the great ancestors, “they were moderate persons, essentially bourgeois, for whom the conservative opposition and the resistance met from above” (that is, from the part of the Crown) were “reasons enough to determine them not to tackle, for a long period, the problem of land distribution”.⁸⁹ What was true for the persistent reluctance of the Liberals to tackle the intricate agrarian issue was also true for many other aspects of their policies. Accordingly, the party has to be rejuvenated, by a re-infusion with the half-forgotten political temper of the 1848 generation:

It is obvious that the Liberal Party needs now an ideal akin, indeed similar to that prevailing in 1848. If we want this party to have a future and to score achievements of the same rank as it did in the past, we must find a new political creed, an ideal suited to our age and aspirations, in the same way as the idea of liberty responded to the expectations of the oppressed masses in 1848.⁹⁰

The new political creed that Drăghicescu offers to the Liberal leaders as constituting both the key to future success and the link to the glorious predecessors is based on a very broad idea of social justice. According to Drăghicescu, “in relation to the no less fundamental principle of liberty, [...] the principle of social justice appears as a logical corrective”.⁹¹ As such, it should not be seen as merely a second-rank element of liberal democracy, but as one of its central pillars. This is so because

social justice or equity is virtually identical with democracy. [...] Saying that mankind evolves towards democratization, and saying that it evolves towards the fulfillment of the principle of social justice, is to say one and the same thing in two different ways.⁹²

All efforts must be made, Drăghicescu maintains, for expanding the welfare policies and for associating the workers unions in the affairs of government. In order to face these new tasks, the ideological outlook of the Liberal Party has to be dramatically updated: “What brought forth the glory and the power of the Liberals in the past was the fact that they were a vanguard party; and the party will not succeed in preserving the same leading position if it becomes a rearguard one.”⁹³ In more precise terms, the

Liberal Party cannot afford to remain simply liberal. The notion of liberty has to be adjusted according to the notion of justice. [...] The bourgeois regime is everywhere being transformed into a democratic-social regime. The future belongs neither to bourgeois liberalism, nor to the social-democratic utopia, but to a kind of social liberalism, in which the bourgeoisie will associate with the industrial proletariat, for acquiring both the political and the economic leadership of the state [...]. In accordance with an inexorable social evolution, the Liberal Party has to transform itself into a practical socialist party, that is, a liberal-socialist one, something of the kind of radical or radical-socialist or social-reformist parties in the West nowadays.⁹⁴

The last sentences sound confusing. As Sanielevici's literary tastes, Drăghicescu's political constructs do no stand the test of time – and were certainly not brilliant even by the standards of his own time and place. And as the former one's enthusiastic pleading for free-trade economics must be evaluated against the circumstances of the time, so the latter's bizarre proposals for social reform and democratization must be appreciated by reference to the general ideological confusion of the age. It may happen that neither Manchesterian economics nor welfare policies – even better conceived than in Drăghicescu's political manifestoes – were easily at the hand of Romania's interwar political establishment. Figures like Sanielevici and Drăghicescu remind us, however, of the need to preserve a principled allegiance to the values of individual freedom and participatory democracy even under the terrible pressures of peripheral modernization. While some of their ideas sound naïve, and certainly so by comparison to the impressive intellectual edifices erected by the great masters of interwar modernism in defense of the rich and powerful of the day, they enable us to take an important insight into the cultural heritage of a country strained between the demands of successful integration with the global modern economy and its corresponding type of civilization, and the demand of complying with basic principles of political morality and public behavior. Under the guise of a vigorous and appealing optimistic belief in the chances of adopting the model proposed by the western modernity, Eugen Lovinescu and Ștefan Zeletin have induced us, for a long time, into subscribing to false sociologies of modernization and to wrong assessments of the historical forces at work on the course of Romanian social transformations. Moreover, by convincing us to read Romanian cultural history through their own eyes, as it has too often been done, they blocked our access to any intellectual

attitude that could not be ascribed a role on their seductive historical pictures. From behind the canvases on which Lovinescu and Zeletin painted their allegories of progress under the rule of an iron handed political elite, the “anti-oligarchic modernists” of pre-communist Romania can still convey a penetrating message that resonates with our belief that freedom and justice can be defended even against the urgency of catching up with a world historical stream which is ever deepening its terrifying speed.⁹⁵

NOTES

- 1 The influence of Lovinescu's ideas at the time is testified by the most important works of his followers: see, for example, Șerban CIOCULESCU, Vladimir STREINU, Tudor VIANU, *Istoria literaturii române moderne* [1943], Ed. Eminescu, Bucharest, 1985. The range of this influence can also be measured, against the competing cultural orientations of the age, in Iordan CHIMET, ed., *Dreptul la memorie*, vols 1-4, Dacia, Cluj, 1992-1993.
- 2 The notion of "ideology" is notoriously ambiguous, and can have an unpleasant resonance especially for the Romanian readers. We use it with a very broad meaning, which rests on the basic idea that "political life itself sets the main problems for the political theorist, causing a certain range of issues to appear problematic, and a corresponding range of questions to become the leading subjects of debate", with the qualification that "this is no [...], however, [to] treat these ideological superstructures as a straightforward outcome of their social base", see Quentin SKINNER, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, vol. 1: *The Renaissance*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1978, p. XI. For a narrower understanding of "ideology" see for example Kenneth MINOGUE, *Alien Powers: the Pure Theory of Ideology*, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1985. For more bibliographical references related to the "contextualist" approach to intellectual history that we take here see below, note 35.
- 3 Eugen LOVINESCU, *Istoria civilizației române moderne*, vols. 1-3, ed. by Z. Ornea., Minerva, Bucharest, 1992.
- 4 The best testimony of this are Lovinescu's own responses to such criticisms, see LOVINESCU, *Istoria civilizației*, vol 3: *Legile formației civilizației române*, pp. 7-34, 46-54.
- 5 Many years afterwards, in the communist period, the most important survivor of the interwar sociological school could still not hide his contempt for Lovinescu's dilettantism. See Henri H. STAHL, *Cânditori și curente de istorie socială românească*, Ed. Universității din București, Bucharest, 2001, pp. 217-218.
- 6 Traian HERSENI, *Sociologia românească. Încercare istorică*, Institutul de Științe Sociale al României, Bucharest, 1940; Ion ZAMFIRESCU, *Spiritualități românești* [1941], ed. by Marin Diaconu, Ed. Vivaldi, Bucharest, 2001.
- 7 For a recent interesting restatement of the desirability of western-type modernization against the various schools of cultural relativism, by direct reference to Eastern Europe, see Daniel CHIROT, "Returning to Reality: Culture, Modernization, and Various Eastern Europes. Why Functionalist-Evolutionary Theory Works" in [Tr@nsit-Virtuelles](http://www.iwm.at/t-21txt2.htm) Forum 21, 2002, at <http://www.iwm.at/t-21txt2.htm>. At a more general level, see Ernest GELLNER, *Postmodernism, Reason and Religion*, Routledge, London, 1992.

- ⁸ For a sharp presentation of the drive to the radical right of political regimes in East-Central Europe in the first half of the twentieth century, see Ivan BEREND, *The Crisis Zone of Europe*, transl. by Adrienne Makkay-Chambers, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986. See also Andrew C. JANOS, *East Central Europe in the Modern World. The Politics of the Borderlands from Pre- to Postcommunism*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2000, pp. 166-217.
- ⁹ A work that contributed significantly to this recovery is Ileana VRANCEA, *Confruntări în critica deceniilor IV-VII. E. Lovinescu și posteritatea lui critică*, Cartea Românească, Bucharest, 1975.
- ¹⁰ Ștefan ZELETIN, *Burghezia română*, ed. by C. D. Zeletin, Humanitas, Bucharest, 1991; IDEM, *Neoliberalismul*, ed. by C. D. Zeletin, Ed. Scripta, Bucharest, 1992.
- ¹¹ The most important such polemical reactions came from the part of the socialist and the peasantist theorists. See Lothar RĂDĂCEANU, "Oligarhia română", in *Arhiva pentru știință și reformă socială* 5: 3-4, 1924, pp. 497-532; 6: 1-2, 1926, pp. 160-184; 6: 3-4, 1927, pp. 435-459; Șerban VOINEA, *Marxism oligarhic. Contribuție la problema dezvoltării capitaliste a României*, Ed. Brănișteanu, Bucharest, 1926; Gheorghe ZANE, "Burghezia română și marxismul", in *Viața Românească* 19: 2, 1927, pp. 244-260; 19: 3, 1927, pp. 323-334; Virgil MADGEARU, *Agrarianism, capitalism, imperialism* [1936], ed. by Ludovic Bathory, Dacia, Cluj, 1999.
- ¹² See Valeriu D. BĂDICEANU, *Ștefan Zeletin, doctrinar al burheziei românești*, n. p., Bucharest, 1943.
- ¹³ Characteristic for this condemnation is Ernő GALL, *Sociologia burheză din România. Studii critice*, sec. ed., Ed. Politică, Bucharest, 1963. See also Miron CONSTANTINESCU, Ovidiu BĂDINA, Ernő GALL, *Sociological Thought in Romania*, transl. by Silviu Brucan, Meridiane, Bucharest, 1974.
- ¹⁴ For this transformations of the Romanian historiography see Vlad GEORGESCU, *Politică și istorie: cazul comuniștilor români 1944-1977*, ed. by Radu Popa, Humanitas, Bucharest, 1991; Lucian BOIA, *Istorie și mit în conștiința românească*, Humanitas, Bucharest, 1997.
- ¹⁵ The best expression of this consecration of the two figures as classics of social-political thinking is Z. ORNEA, *Tradiționalism și modernitate în deceniul al treilea*, Ed. Eminescu, Bucharest, 1980, that will be considered below. Also characteristic for this cultural canon are Constantin CIOPRAGA, *Literatura română dintre 1900 și 1918*, Junimea, Iași, 1970; Ov. S. CROHMĂLNICEANU, *Literatura română între cele două războaie mondiale*, vols. 1-3., Minerva, Bucharest, 1972-1975; Dumitru MICU, *Gîndirea și gîndirismul*, Minerva, Bucharest, 1975. To pick up one of the most recent restatements of this way of thinking, see Bogdan MURGESCU, "Introduction", in Bogdan MURGESCU, ed., *Romania and Europe. Modernization as Temptation, Modernization as Threat*, ALLFA and Edition Körber Stiftung, Bucharest, 2000, pp. 1-12.

- ¹⁶ As the notion of “ideology”, so that of a “left”-“right” political dichotomy can be met with suspicion. The most important restatement of the usefulness of this distinction is Norberto BOBBIO, *Left and Right: the Significance of a Political Distinction*, transl. by Allan Cameron, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1996. Also relevant for the way we refer here to the polarization of the political spectrum is J. L. TALMON, *The Myth of the Nation and the Vision of Revolution: the Origins of Ideological Polarization in the Twentieth Century*, Secker & Warburg, London, 1981. See also, Noël O’SULLIVAN, ed., *The Nature of the Right: European and American Politics and Political Thought since 1789*, Pinter, London, 1989; Geoff ELEY, *Forging Democracy: the History of the Left in Europe, 1850-2000*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002.
- ¹⁷ We use the term populism to refer to a specific developmental ideology which does not reject the values of modern science and rationality, as the term is used in such works as David MITRANY, *Marx Against the Peasant. A Study in Social Dogmatism*, Collier Books, New York, 1961 [1951]; Arthur P. MENDEL, *Dilemmas of Progress in Tsarist Russia. Legal Marxism and Legal Populism*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1961; Andrzej WALICKI, *The Controversy over Capitalism. Studies in the Social Philosophy of the Russian Populists*, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Ind., 1989 [1969]; Gavin KITCHING, *Development and Underdevelopment in Historical Perspective. Populism, Nationalism and Industrialization*, rev. ed., Routledge, London, 1989. By contrast, other works present the populist movements, and specifically the East-European ones, as varieties of semi-fascism, see Joseph HELD, ed., *Populism in Eastern Europe. Racism, Nationalism and Society*, East European Monographs, Boulder, Colo., 1996; Ivan BEREND, *Decades of Crisis. Central and Eastern Europe before World War II*, The University of California Press, Berkeley, 1998, pp. 76-83.
- ¹⁸ For some historical avatars of liberal ideas in various non-western societies, and the difficulties of their translation into local cultural idioms, see Andrzej WALICKI, *Legal Philosophies of Russian Liberalism*, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Ind., 1992 [1967]; Gale STOKES, *Legitimacy through Liberalism: Vladimir Jovanovic and the Transformation of Serbian Politics*, University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1975; Douglas HOWLAND, “Translating Liberty in Nineteenth Century Japan”, in *Journal of the History of Ideas* 62: 1, 2001, pp. 161-189.
- ¹⁹ For the relationship between the communist use of Marxist theory and its original sources see John PLAMENATZ, *German Marxism and Russian Communism*, Longmans, London, 1954. For an attempt to delineate the original content of Marxism from its subsequent re-elaborations see Raymond ARON, *Le marxisme de Marx*, ed. by Jean-Claude Casanova and Christian Bachelier, Éditions de Fallois, Paris, 2002. For a brief presentation of the theoretical foundations of Marxism see Isaiah BERLIN, “Marxism and

- the International in the Nineteenth Century”, in *The Sense of Reality*, Pimlico, London, 1997, pp. 116-167.
- 20 His intellectual involvement with the main issues of modernization is mainly displayed in Lucrețiu PĂTRĂȘCANU, *Problemele de bază ale României*, Ed. Socec & Co., Bucharest, 1944; IDEM, *Un veac de frământări sociale, 1821-1907* [1945], Ed. Politică, Bucharest, 1969; IDEM, *Sub trei dictaturi* [1944], Ed. Politică, Bucharest, 1970.
- 21 For the evolution of the Romanian Communist Party see Vladimir TISMĂNEANU, *Stalinism for all Seasons: a Political History of Romanian Communism*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 2003.
- 22 For the synthesis between nationalism and communism and the intellectual reactions it has arisen see Katherine VERDERY, *National Ideology under Socialism*, University of California Press, Berkeley 1991. One of the earliest, very perceptive treatments of this issue is George SCHÖPFLIN, “Rumanian Nationalism”, in *Survey* 20: 1, 1974, pp. 77-104.
- 23 Most characteristic is Z. ORNEA, *Anii treizeci. Extrema dreaptă românească*, Ed. Fundației Culturale Române, Bucharest, 1995, to be considered below. Also characteristic are Adrian MARINO, *Pentru Europa. Integrarea României. Probleme ideologice și culturale*, Polirom, Iași, 1995; IDEM, *Politică și cultură. Pentru o nouă cultură română*, Polirom, Iași, 1996; Leon VOLOVICI, *Ideologia naționalistă și “problema evreiască” în România anilor “30*, Humanitas, Bucharest, 1995; BOIA, *Istorie și mit în conștiința românească*; Marta PETREU, *Un trecut deocheat sau “Schimbarea la față a României”*, Dacia, Cluj, 1999; Virgil NEMOIANU, *România și liberalismele ei*, Ed. Fundației Culturale Române, Bucharest, 2000.
- 24 See the books cited above by Ornea, Volovici, Petreu; Dan PAVEL, *Etica lui Adam*, Ed. Du Style, Bucharest, 1995; Sorin ALEXANDRESCU, *Paradoxul român*, Ed. Univers, Bucharest, 1998; Alexandra LAIGNEL-LAVASTINE, *Filosofie și naționalism. Paradoxul Noica*, Humanitas, Bucharest, 1998; George VOICU, *Mitul Nae Ionescu*, Ars Docendi, Bucharest, 2000; Matei CĂLINESCU, “The 1927 Generation in Romania: Friendships and Ideological Choices (Mihail Sebastian, Mircea Eliade, Nae Ionescu, Eugène Ionesco)”, in *East European Politics and Societies* 15: 3, 2001, 649-677; most recently Alexandra LAIGNEL-LAVASTINE, *Cioran, Eliade, Ionesco: l’oubli du fascisme: trois intellectuels roumains dans la tourmente du siècle*, Presses universitaires de France, Paris, 2002; Florin ȚURCANU, *Mircea Eliade: le prisonnier de l’histoire*, La Découverte, Paris, 2003.
- 25 For a general overview of post-communist nationalism see Vladimir TISMĂNEANU, *Fantasies of Salvation: Democracy, Nationalism, and Myth in Post-communist Europe*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1998.
- 26 Z. ORNEA, *Junimea și junimismul*, Ed. Eminescu, Bucharest, 1975.
- 27 IDEM, *Sămănătorismul*, Ed. Fundației Culturale Române, Bucharest, 1998 [1970].

- 28 IDEM, *Curentul cultural de la Contemporanul*, Minerva, Bucharest 1977;
 IDEM, *Opera lui C. Dobrogeanu-Gherea*, Minerva, Bucharest 1983.
- 29 IDEM, *Țărănismul. Studiu sociologic*, Ed. Politică, Bucharest, 1969; IDEM,
Poporanismul, Minerva, Bucharest, 1972.
- 30 IDEM, *Tradiționalism și modernitate în deceniul al treilea*; IDEM, *Anii treizeci. Extrema dreaptă românească*. See the full titles above, at the notes 15 and 23.
- 31 N. GOGONEAȚĂ, Z. ORNEA, A. D. *Xenopol. Concepția socială și filosofică*, Ed. Științifică, Bucharest, 1965.
- 32 See Titu MAIORESCU, "În contra direcției de astăzi în cultura română" [1868], in *Critice* [1908], ed. by Domnica Filimon, Ed. Elion, Bucharest 2000, pp. 161-170.
- 33 We can realistically indicate the books by Pătrășcanu cited above as marking the end of the pre-communist debate about modernization.
- 34 The present article rests on the yet unpublished Ph.D. dissertation "Debating Modernization as a Debate on the Modernizing Elite: an Approach to the History of Social and Political Thought in Romania, 1868-1947", defended in June 2003 at the Department of History of the Central European University in Budapest.
- 35 Quentin SKINNER, *Liberty before Liberalism*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998, p. 105. Some essential works that define the "contextualist" approach to the history of political thought are Reinhart KOSELLECK, *Futures Past: on the Semantics of Historical Time* [1979], transl. by Keith Tribe, Columbia University Press, New York, 2004; Richard RORTY, J. B. SCHNEEWIND, Quentin SKINNER, eds., *Philosophy in History: Essays on the historiography of philosophy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1984; Anthony PAGDEN, ed., *The Languages of Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987; James TULLY, ed., *Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and His Critics*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1988; Terence BALL, James FARR, Russell L. HANSON, eds., *Political Innovation and Conceptual Change*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989; Melvin RICHTER, *The History of Political and Social Concepts: a Critical Introduction*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1995.
- 36 We argued for studying the intellectual history of non-western societies in their own terms, by direct reference to the peculiar "contexts" creating specific "questions to become the leading subjects of debate" (see note 2 above), in the article "Romania as "Periphery": Social Change and Intellectual Evolution", in MURGESCU, ed., *Romania and Europe*, pp. 29-40.
- 37 Roumen DASKALOV, "Ideas About, and Reactions to Modernization in the Balkans." In *East European Quarterly* 31: 2, 1997, pp. 141-180; Chantal DELSOL, Michel MASLOWSKI, eds., *Histoire des idées politiques de l'Europe Centrale*, Presses universitaires de France, Paris 1998.

- 38 For the genesis and unfolding of “organicist” thinking, see for example Carl SCHMITT, *Political Romanticism*, transl. by Guy Oakes, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1986; Karl MANNHEIM, *Conservatism: a Contribution to the Sociology of Knowledge*, ed. and transl. by David Kettler, Volker Meja and Nico Stehr, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1986; Klaus EPSTEIN, *The Genesis of German Conservatism*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1975; Peter Hans REILL, *The German Enlightenment and the Rise of Historicism*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1975. For the Romanian reception of these trends of thought see Al. ZUB, “Impactul bucklean în cultura română”, in *Cunoaștere de sine și integrare*, Junimea, Iași, 1986, pp. 152-166; IDEM, “Ranke și directiva organicistă în cultura română”, in *Istorie și finalitate*, Ed. Academiei, Bucharest, 1991, pp. 109-122.
- 39 Essential for the understanding of Romanian Marxism and populism are the usually neglected articles of Michael KITCH, “Constantin Stere and Rumanian Populism”, in *The Slavonic and East European Review* 53: 131, 1975, pp. 248-271; IDEM, “Constantin Dobrogeanu-Gherea and Rumanian Marxism”, in *The Slavonic and East European Review* 55: 1, 1977, pp. 65-89.
- 40 As argued at the time for example by the populist thinker Garabet IBRĂILEANU, *Spiritual critic în cultura românească* [1908], ed. by Rodica Rotaru and Alexandru Piru, Litera, Chișinău, 1997, pp. 161-172.
- 41 For some comparative perspectives on the rise of political parties in Eastern Europe see Bruce M. GARVER, *The Young Czech Party, 1874-1901, and the Emergence of a Multi-party System*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1978; Gale STOKES, *Politics as Development: the Emergence of Political Parties in Nineteenth-Century Serbia*, Duke University Press, Durham, 1990. For the general background of Romanian history at the time see Keith HITCHINS, *Rumania, 1866-1947*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994.
- 42 For an approach to oligarchic politics in another East European historical context see Andrew C. JANOS, “The Decline of Oligarchy: Bureaucratic and Mass Politics in the Age of Dualism”, in Andrew C. JANOS, William B. SLOTTMAN, eds., *Revolution in Perspective: Essays on the Hungarian Soviet Republic of 1919*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1971, pp. 1-61; IDEM, *The Politics of Backwardness in Hungary, 1825-1945*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1982.
- 43 For the general landscape of European thought at the time see H. Stuart HUGHES, *Consciousness and Society: the Reorientation of European Social Thought, 1890-1930*, Octagon Books, New York, 1976 [1958]; Karl Dietrich BRACHER, *The Age of Ideologies: a History of Political Thought in the Twentieth Century*, transl. by Ewald Osers, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1984; Richard BELLAMY, *Liberalism and Modern Society: a Historical Argument*, Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, Pa., 1992; J. W. BURROW, *The Crisis of Reason: European Thought, 1848-1914*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2000.

- 44 For the intricate thinking of Constantin Rădulescu-Motru, taken as a revelator of the entire intellectual tradition of the “right” in Romania, see our forthcoming article “De ce naționalismul totalitar nu este și anti-semit? Cu Rădulescu-Motru, despre bulgari, evrei, unguri și țărani”.
- 45 For the range of this notoriety see Philippe. C. SCHMITTER, “Still the Century of Corporatism?”, in *The Review of Politics* 36: 1, 1974, pp. 85-131; Joseph LOVE, *Crafting the Third World. Theorizing Underdevelopment in Rumania and Brazil*. Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1996.
- 46 Let us underline that the notion of “critical culture” was recurrent in the debates of the time: see, for example, Ștefan ZELETIN, “Romantismul german și cultura critică română”, in *Neoliberalismul*, pp. 55-72. The way we employ the term has only the slightest resemblances with its usage in Ilie BĂDESCU, *Sincronism european și cultură critică românească*, Editura științifică și Enciclopedică, Bucharest, 1984, and does not carry the implications deriving from that usage.
- 47 Albert O. HIRSCHMAN, *The Passions and the Interests*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1977, p. 69.
- 48 To mention some of the most relevant pieces of this bibliography: Henry L. ROBERTS, *Rumania. Political Problems of an Agrarian State*, Archon Books, Hamden, Conn., 1969 [1951]; MITRANY, *Marx Against the Peasant*; Charles JELAVICH, Barbara JELAVICH, eds., *The Balkans in Transition*, Archon Books, Hamden, Conn., 1974 [1963]; the articles by Michael Kitch cited above at the note 39; Daniel CHIROT, *Social Change in a Peripheral Society. The Creation of a Balkan Colony*, Academic Press, New York, 1976; IDEM, “Ideology, Reality, and Competing Models of Development in Eastern Europe between the Two World Wars”, in *East European Politics and Societies* 3: 3, 1989, pp. 378-411; Daniel CHIROT, Thomas D. HALL, “World System Theory”, in *Annual Review of Sociology* 8, 1982, pp. 81-106; Daniel CHIROT, ed., *The Origins of Backwardness in Eastern Europe*, The University of California Press, Berkeley, 1989; Kenneth JOWITT, ed., *Social Change in Romania, 1860-1940. A Debate on Development in a European Nation*, University of California, Institute of International Studies, Berkeley, 1978; Andrew C. JANOS, *Politics and Paradigms. Changing Theories of Change in the Social Sciences*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1986; IDEM, *East Central Europe in the Modern World*; LOVE, *Crafting the Third World*.
- 49 See especially Daniel CHIROT, “Neoliberal and Social Democratic Theories of Development: the Zeletin-Voinea Debate Concerning Romania’s Prospects in the 1920’s and Its Contemporary Importance”, in JOWITT, ed. *Social Change in Romania*, pp. 31-52.
- 50 See for example STAHL, *Gânditori și curente de istorie socială românească*. For a valuable insight into Stahl’s thinking see Zoltán ROSTÁS, *Monografia ca utopie. Interviu cu Henri H. Stahl*, Paideia, Bucharest, 2000.

- 51 For the notion of “skeptical modernization”, as opposed to “enthusiastic modernization” see Richard J. CRAMPTON, “Modernization: Conscious, Unconscious and Irrational”, in Roland Scöfeld, ed., *Industrialisierung und gesellschaftlicher Wandel in Südsteuropa*, Südsteuropa Gesellschaft, München, 1989, pp. 125-134.
- 52 For an instance of this see ORNEA, *Junimea și junimismul*, pp. 194-197.
- 53 Many instances of this can be found in ORNEA, *Poporanismul*; IDEM, *Opera lui C. Dobrogeanu-Gherea*. Also a case in point is Ștefania MIHĂILESCU, *Poporanismul și mișcarea socialistă din România*, Ed. Politică, Bucharest, 1988.
- 54 LOVE, *Crafting the Third World*, p. 47.
- 55 This entire section is based on our previous article “Un critic al Partidului Liberal: ‘primul’ Ștefan Zeletin”, in *Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review* 1: 3, 2001, pp. 841-872. For other opinions on Zeletin’s evolution see Cristian PREDA, “Insula România”, in *Occidentul nostru*, Nemira, Bucharest, 1999, pp. 49-58; Balázs TRENCSENYI, “The Munchansenian Moment. Modernity, Liberalism and Nationalism in the Thought of Ștefan Zeletin”, in Balázs TRENCSENYI, Cristina PETRESCU et al, eds., *Nation-Building and Contested Identities. Romanian and Hungarian Case Studies*, Regio-Polirom, Budapest-Iași: 2001, pp. 61-80.
- 56 See especially Constantin DOBROGEANU-GHEREA, “Post-scriptum sau cuvinte uitate” [1908], in *Opere complete*, ed by Ion Popescu-Puțuri et al, vol 3, Ed. Politică, Bucharest, 1977, pp. 476-504. See also Henri H. STAHL, “Théories de C. Dobrogeanu Gherea sur les lois de la penetration du capitalisme dans les ‘pays retardaires’”, in *Review* 2: 1, 1978, pp. 101-114.
- 57 Once again, we need to underline that thinking in terms of “base” and “superstructure” was shared by political authors of all orientations at the time – as yet another formulation of the dichotomy between “forms” and “substance” –, and it did not imply (Lovinescu is a good case in point) a wholesale adoption of Marxist thinking. For analyses of Marxist sociology as against the Weberian and other traditions of social thought see, for example, JANOS, *Politics and Paradigms*; Philip ABRAMS, *Historical Sociology*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1982.
- 58 See A. D. XENOPOL, “Scrisoare către Iacob Negruzzi” [1868], in *Scrieri social-filozofice*, ed by N. Gogoneață and Z. Ornea, Ed. Științifică, Bucharest, 1967, pp. 146-155.
- 59 IDEM, “Despre reforma așezămintelor noastre” [1874], in Ioan STANOMIR, Laurențiu VLAD, eds., *A fi conservator*, Meridiane, Bucharest, 2002, pp. 56-68.
- 60 IDEM, “Comerțul exterior al României” [1881], quoted in John Michael MONTIAS, “Notes on the Romanian Debate on Sheltered Industrialization”, in JOWITT, ed., *Social Change in Romania*, p. 60. See also LOVE, *Crafting the Third World*, pp. 71-74; A. D. XENOPOL, *Opere economice*, ed. by Ion Veverca, Ed. Științifică, Bucharest, 1967.

- ⁶¹ Pompiliu ELIADE, *Influența franceză asupra spiritului public în România* [1898], ed. and transl. by Aurelia Dumitrașcu, Humanitas, Bucharest, 2000.
- ⁶² For another recent analysis of Lovinescu see Dragoș PETRESCU, "Debates on Development in a European Suburb: Eugen Lovinescu's Theory of 'Integral Imitation'", in *Xenopoliana* 9, 2001, pp. 82-93.
- ⁶³ LOVINESCU, *Istoria civilizației*, vol. 2: *Forțele reacționare*, pp. 31-32.
- ⁶⁴ Cases in point are ORNEA, *Anii treizeci*; PETREU, *Un trecut deocheat*; NEMOIANU, *România și liberalismele ei*.
- ⁶⁵ It appears that this is the opinion prevalent in – although not necessarily the main focus of – such works as Daniel BARBU, *Republica absentă*, Nemira, Bucharest, 1999; IDEM, *Bizanț contra Bizanț*, Nemira, Bucharest, 2001; Alexandra IONESCU, *Le bien commun et ses doubles: deux rencontres roumaines entre morale et politique*, Ed. Universității din București, Bucharest, 2001; Cristian PREDĂ, *Contribuții la istoria intelectuală a politicii românești*, Meridiane, Bucharest, 2003. For an older approach to Romanian intellectual history from the standpoint of political philosophy, and reaching a somewhat different conclusion, see Victoria F. BROWN, "The Adaptation of a Western Political Theory in a Peripheral State: The Case of Romanian Liberalism", in Stephen FISCHER-GALATI, et al., eds., *Romania between East and West*, East European Monographs, Boulder, Colo., 1982, pp. 269-301. Other recent authors have been mainly interested in rescuing the *Junimist* tradition from its association with political reaction and integral nationalism, and in validating it by reference to the underlying ideas of European conservatism. See in this respect Adrian-Paul ILIESCU, "Conservatorismul lui Eminescu", in *Polis* 5: 2, 1998, pp. 57-64; Ioan STANOMIR, *Reacțiune și conservatorism: eseu asupra imaginarului politic eminescian*, Nemira, Bucharest, 2000. Ciprian ȘIULEA, *Retori, simulacre, imposturi: cultură și ideologii în România*, Compania, Bucharest, 2003, pp. 68-130. For a somewhat different approach to Romanian conservatism see Alexandru MAMINA, "Conservatorismul românesc în secolul al XIX-lea, între paseism și evoluționism", in *Studii și materiale de istorie modernă* 15, 2002, pp. 149-167.
- ⁶⁶ We refer the reader to our article "Înțelepciunea nebulunii sau gândirea politică a lui Henric Sanielevici", in *Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review* 2: 3, 2002, pp. 725-760.
- ⁶⁷ Relevant titles from the bibliography on the history of Romanian economic ideas are Costin MURGESCU, *Mersul ideilor economice la români*, vols. 1-2., Ed. Enciclopedică, Bucharest, 1987-1990; Ioan SAIZU, *Modernizarea României contemporane. Perioada interbelică. Pas și impas*, Ed. Academiei, Bucharest, 1991; Radu-Dan VLAD, *Gândirea economică românească despre industrializare, 1859-1900*, Ed. Mica Valahie, Bucharest, 2001.
- ⁶⁸ Eugen DEMETRESCU, *Liberalismul economic în evoluția României moderne*, n. p, Bucharest, 1940.

- ⁶⁹ George STRAT, *Elogiul libertății*, Tipografia de artă Leopold Geller, Bucharest, 1937.
- ⁷⁰ Gheorghe TAȘCĂ, *Liberalism, corporatism, intervenționism*, n. p., Bucharest, 1938.
- ⁷¹ Anastasie GUSTI, *Scrieri sociale, politice și economice*, ed. by George Strat, Editura Librăriei Universitare I. Cărbăș, Bucharest, 1940.
- ⁷² Ștefan ANTIM, *Chestiunea socială în România*, Imprimeria "La Roumanie", Bucharest, 1908; IDEM, *Chestia evreiască. Studiu Social*, "Librăria Nouă" Carol P. Segal, Bucharest, 1918; IDEM, *Chestia țărănească. Studiu Social*, Institutul de Editură "Samintca", Craiova, 1919; IDEM, *Capitalul mobilier. Studiu Social*, Institutul de Editură "Samintca", Craiova, 1921; IDEM, *Problema rurală. Exproprierea. Datoriile agricole*, n. p., Bucharest, 1932; IDEM, *Studii și portrete*, Ed. Ramuri, Craiova, n. d. [1936]; IDEM, *Alte studii și portrete*, Ed. Adeverul S. A., Bucharest, n. d. [1937].
- ⁷³ See in this respect Marian DRĂGAN, "Liberalism și concepții despre libertate în România anilor 1930. Cazul revistei *Libertatea economică, politică, socială, culturală*, 1933-1940", unpublished B. A. thesis defended in June 2003 at the Department of Political Science of the University of Bucharest.
- ⁷⁴ Cases in point are, once again, works such as MARINO, *Pentru Europa*; IDEM, *Politică și cultură*; NEMOIANU, *România și liberalismul ei*. Many instances of the same way of thinking can be found in Adrian MARINO în dialog cu Sorin ANTOHI, *Al treilea discurs: cultură, ideologie și politică în România*, Polirom, Iași, 2001.
- ⁷⁵ Virgil NEMOIANU, "Variable Socio-Political Functions of Aesthetic Doctrines. Lovinescu vs. Western Aestheticism", in JOWITT, ed., *Social Change in Romania*, pp. 174-207. For a book-length defence of the "autonomy of art" by a *Junimist* theorist see P. P. NEGULESCU, *Polemice* [1895], ed. by Gheorghe Vlăduțescu, Ed. Fundației Culturale Române, Bucharest, 1992.
- ⁷⁶ LOVINESCU, *Istoria civilizației*, vol.1: *Forțele revoluționare*, pp. 5-6.
- ⁷⁷ *Ibidem*, pp. 6, 10, 36.
- ⁷⁸ ROBERTS, *Rumania. Political Problems of an Agrarian State*, pp. 339-340.
- ⁷⁹ For the development of national and political ideas in the first part of the nineteenth century, before the age of *Junimea*, see Paul CORNEA, *Originile romantismului românesc: spiritul public, mișcarea ideilor și literatura între 1780-1840*, Minerva, Bucharest, 1972; Vlad GEORGESCU, *Istoria ideilor politice românești, 1369-1878*, Jon Dumitru Verlag, München, 1987; Sorin MITU, *Geneza identității naționale la românii ardeleni*, Humanitas, Bucharest, 1997; Alexandru DUJU, *Political Models and National Identities in "Orthodox Europe"*, Babel, Bucharest, 1998.
- ⁸⁰ See for example, JANOS, *East Central Europe in the Modern World*, pp. 54-64. See also Robin OKEY, *Eastern Europe 1740-1985: Feudalism to Communism*, sec. ed., Unwin Hyman, London, 1989, pp. 59-83.

- 81 For the attack of *Junimea* against the Latinist ideas see Titu MAIORESCU, "Contra școalele Bărnăușii" [1868], in *Critice*, pp. 387-428; George PANU, "Studiul istoriei la români" [1874], in Eugen LOVINESCU, ed., *Antologia ideologiei junimiste*, Casa Școalelor, Bucharest, 1942, pp. 283-322.
- 82 See ORNEA, *Sămănătorismul*. For the general trends in European nationalism see, for example, Hagen SHULZE, *States, Nations and Nationalism: from the Middle Ages to the Present*, transl. by William E. Yuill, Blackwell, Oxford, 1996.
- 83 D. DRĂGHICESCU, *Din psihologia poporului român* [1907], ed. by Elisabeta Simion, Albatros, Bucharest, 1995.
- 84 As testified by his booklet *Titu Maiorescu. Schiță de biografie psicho-sociologică*, n. p., Bucharest, n. d. [1940].
- 85 For interesting explorations into the history of the continuous vacillations of the Romanian culture and public consciousness between the extreme attitudes of enthusiastic imitation of the West and, respectively, cultural isolationism with an anti-western slant, see Sorin ANTOHI, *Civitas imaginalis. Istorie și utopie în cultura română*, Litera, Bucharest, 1994; IDEM, "Romania and the Balkans: from Geocultural Boverism to Ethnic Ontology" in *Tr@nsit-Virtuelles Forum* 21, 2002, at <http://www.iwm.at/t-21txt8.htm>.
- 86 For the Romanian historiography at the turn of the century see Al. ZUB, *De la istoria critică la criticism*, Ed. Enciclopedică, Bucharest, 2000 [1987].
- 87 D. DRĂGHICESCU, *Evoluția ideilor liberale*, Imprimeriile "Independența", Bucharest, 1921; IDEM, *Partide politice și clase sociale*, n. p., Bucharest, 1922.
- 88 For an exploration into the 1848 period as a laboratory of conflicting intellectual traditions, see ANTOHI, *Civitas imaginalis*, pp. 18-103, 136-174; See also Dan DIONISIE, "Socialism, liberalism, utopie, milenarism. O incursiune în ideologia revoluției de la 1848 din Țara Românească", in *Polis* 5: 1, 1998, pp. 142-158.
- 89 DRĂGHICESCU, *Evoluția ideilor liberale*, p. 10.
- 90 *Ibidem*, p. 18.
- 91 IDEM, *Partide politice și clase sociale*, p. 11.
- 92 *Ibidem*, p. 14.
- 93 *Ibidem*, pp. 81-82.
- 94 *Ibidem*, pp. 83-84.
- 95 Emphasizing the divide between the "West" and the rest of the world is sometimes dismissed today as a residue of both historical metaphysics and colonialist arrogance. For a more "old-fashioned" work which argues in precisely such terms see Theodore H. VON LAUE, *The World Revolution of Westernization: the Twentieth Century in Global Perspective*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1987.