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ALEXANDER BAUMGARTEN
IONELA BĂLUŢĂ
GABRIELA BLEBEA NICOLAE
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OCTAVIAN GROZA
ISTVÁN HORVÁTH
ANCA MANOLESCU
RALUCA RĂDULESCU
Editor: Irina Vainovski-Mihai
ALEXANDER BAUMGARTEN

Born in 1972, in Bucharest

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Associate Professor, Department of the History of Philosophy and Logics, “Babeș Bolyai” University, Cluj-Napoca
Corresponding member, Pontificia Academia Sancti Thomae Aquinatis, Vatican
President, “St. Thomas d’Aquinas” International Society, Romanian Branch
Editor, Revue des Etudes Anciennes et Medievales

Research grant at Université de Geneve (1999)

Several translations and researches on ancient and mediaeval philosophy
Participation in international conferences and symposia in Romania and abroad
At the time when I had just become a baccalaureate, I saw a certain great master who was in Paris: wishing to take the part of the Commentator, he was of the opinion that man has no understanding but to the extent to which the heavens have understanding; man understands because the propeller of heavens understands, that it is what separate intellect that holds the understanding.

Aegidius of Rome, In Librum sententiarum, II, 17

In some famous paintings that show St. Thomas Aquinas, Averroes, the philosopher, is shown in positions that appear to have been conferred upon him by the painter under the pressure of an ideological context. As they are probably both an echo of the doctrinal disputations of the end of the thirteenth century between the Latin Averroism, Franciscans and Dominicans, and of the sanctification of St. Thomas in 1323, these representations tacitly correspond with the unique moment of doctrinal adversity between St. Thomas and Averroes: namely, that of the treatise On the Unity of the Intellect Against the Averroists in which St. Thomas addresses a critique of the opinions expressed by Averroes in The Great Commentary to Aristotle’s treatise On the Soul. It was probably the wish of Christian theology to express the theological triumph of the Aquinate when in Benozzo Gozzoli’s painting, St. Thomas’s Apotheosis (1480, Paris, Louvre), Averroes writhes, a volume in his hand, at the feet of St. Thomas, in whose hands, conversely, there is a book out of which the light emerges. Andrea di Bonaiuto effects an analogical representation in a fresco in Florence (Santa Maria della Novella Church, fourteenth century) in which Averroes appears disproportionately small, meditating,
his arm leaning on the volume, while St. Thomas comments on the Scriptures. The same situation is encountered in another Florentine fresco pertaining to Fra Angelico’s school, *St. Thomas’s School*, where Averroes appears low down, weakly besmearing the volumes opened apparently at random, while St. Thomas presents his disputations in the midst of the students. Each of the three works of art suggests a conflict of interpretations (the omnipresence of the volumes out of which a given paradigm is interpreted). They are reminiscent of the Parisian university disputation of 1270-1277 and the way in which Catholic theology wanted to remember it: as a triumph of Christian ideas over the Greek-Arab ideas of cosmology, ontology, the theory of the soul and ethics.

This disputation on the unity of the intellect has a much wider history and cannot be defined simply within the context of St. Thomas Aquinas’ treaty *On the Unity of the Intellect* and Siger of Brabant’s works, *Quaestiones in tertium de anima*, or *Questiones super librum de causis*, the answers provided by Aegidius of Rome (*De erroribus philosophorum*), or the famous *Reportatio* of 1271, recently discovered by Concetta di Luna. The disputation actually starts from the ambiguities of Aristotle’s treaty, *About the Soul*, from the neo-Platonist commentaries written with respect to this text, as well as with the encountering of the neo-Platonist theme of intelligence inherited from the anonymous Arab treaty *Liber de causis*, translated into Latin by Gerardus of Cremona at the end of the 12th century (compilation after *Elementa Theologiae* by Proclus, attributed until 1268 to Aristotle).

There were several stages to the reception of this disputation in the history of medieval philosophy during the twentieth century: on the one hand, a first generation of medieval experts, initiated by Pierre Madonnet, exposed in theoretical form the Catholic ideology implied by the aforementioned paintings, in which St. Thomas victoriously dispels the errors of Averroism, re-establishes Aristotle in Christian theology and “denounces” the double truth of Siger of Brabant and Boetius of Dacia, both Averroists. This is, however, the very same message that the manuscripts have preserved. A second generation of medieval experts (mainly F. van Steenberghen and Etienne Gilson) doubted the justice of this view and accepted the sympathy of St. Thomas towards the commentaries made by Averroes on the Aristotelian corpus (excepting the treaty *On the Unity of the Intellect*), but admitted the fact that the theory of double truth attributed to Siger and Boetius by both St. Thomas and the bishop Etienne Tempier has no grounding. A third, far more
advanced view was developed by Alain de Libera. His main thesis was that the idea of the existence of a unique [single] intellect for all people was an interpretation of Aristotle’s treaty *On the Soul* by Averroes, which marks an important moment in Arab thinking – even if it is clearly non-concordant with the Aristotelian text, and if this interpretation could have been taken to an extreme by Siger of Brabant and probably other anonymi, whom St. Thomas righteously criticizes, proving their incoherence. Moreover, for Alain de Libera, St. Thomas’s position in the disputation on the unity of the intellect implies the re-establishment of the coherent relationship between the Dominican theory and Aristotle and the elimination of Averroes from the peripatetic tradition.

Later, we will aim to continue the line of study established by these stages of analysis and attempt a fourth lecture on the documents. Our presupposition for the lecture and, at the same time, the first of the theses we want to demonstrate in this study, refer to the fact that the roots of the idea of the unity of the intellect, Aristotelian and neo-Platonic, are reciprocally coherent and are part of a common vision of the world; we would also like to show that, contrary to previous opinion, Averroes’ interpretation of Aristotle sees nothing incoherent or inadequate in the Aristotelian text. On the contrary, St. Thomas’ understanding can be questioned (as we shall see, his counter-arguments to Averroes of 1270 had already been criticised by the Franciscan Aegidius of Rome in 1271), and this questioning does not mean re-establishing the link between Aristotle and Christian theology. Rather, it is proof of the endeavour to form a mutual idea out of two absolutely incompatible doctrines, such as the individually non-defined subjectivity of Aristotelian and neo-Platonic origin and the Christian theology of the person. We must not ignore the fact that the events at the end of the thirteenth century occurred at a moment when European history was close to giving in to the alliance between ontology and cosmology, close to setting the universe of hierarchy apart and on the verge of philosophical nominalism and the cosmologic revolution. In this highly varied context of events in the history of philosophy, it is possible for the meaning of the disputation on the theory of the unity of the intellect to be explained, less from the perspective of correct or incorrect filiations with respect to the Aristotelian text, and more from the perspective of a change in meaning of the subjectivity issue at the dawn of the Middle Ages. As a result, we wish to demonstrate that the thesis of the unity of the intellect pertains to a coherent image of the world, of which both Aristotle and Averroes, Siger, Albertus Magnus,
and to some extent even St. Thomas, form a part, but one which St. Thomas attempts, more or less successfully, to remove from the realm of philosophy.

If such a thesis can be proved, in close connection to this first thesis, it would then be possible to formulate a second thesis from our research: the theory that the unity of the intellect is coherent with the institutional moments of the university crisis of 1270-1277 and that the ethics of intellectual felicity formulated by Boetius of Dacia in the treaty *De vita philosophi* represents a program that was intended to grant a statute to the university intellectual at the end of thirteenth century. As a consequence of these likely coherences, we shall argue the idea that the theory of the unity of the intellect that was rejected by Christian theology became an integral part of the corporatist conscience of the Parisian intellectuals, playing an essential role in formulating the relationship between science and faith, representing a theme that is part, under one name or another, of the statute of any intellectual group that aims to be an autonomous corporation and to have its own statute.

In order to support these assertions we must first re-tell the disputation on the theme of the unity of the intellect and consider the arguments at stake that gave shape to a general view of the world brought into discussion by pre-modernity at the end of the thirteenth century. Later, we will correlate the theory of the unity of the intellect with the so-called disputation of the “double truth”, as well as with the statute of the intellectual in the view of the supporters of the unity of the intellect.

1. The unity of the Intellect in the 1277 Censorship. Stating the Issue

In the two series of phrases censored by the bishop Etienne Tempier of Paris on December 1, 1270 and March 7, 1277, respectively, the thesis on the unity of the intellect occupies a relatively large part: in the first series (1270), there are two sentences (phrases) and in the second series (1277) there are a minimum set of twenty sentences which directly support or imply this thesis. In a rephrasing that uses these sentences as a starting point only, the theory of the unity of the intellect is summarised in the following theses: intellect is unique for all people; intellect does not essentially define man; intellect is analogous (or identical) to the intelligible heavens; the intellect (active and passive) is an eternal
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substance, separate and impersonal. Bishop Etienne Tempier’s wording approves in a single context the unique [single] intellect for all people, however it repeatedly prohibits associating intelligence with the propelling force of the heavens:

32. [That] the intellect is one in number for all; even if it is separated according to a certain body, still, not according to all.
33. [That] God could not make more souls in number.
34. [That] the human intellect is eternal…
35. [That] the heavens’ soul is intelligence and the celestial plants are not devices of intelligences, but organs, such as the ear and the eye are organs of the sensitive faculties.
10. [That] the motions take place in view of the intellective soul, whereas the intellective soul or the intellect cannot become manifest but by mediating a body. 

These sentences represent the result of a long disputation in which the Christian theme of the person encounters the analogy between the soul and the heavens. This I will illustrate later. Since this “encounter” also represents the gradual assumption of distance towards Greek-Arab thought by Christian theology, it is possible that the Paris disputation on the theme of the unity of the intellect encouraged various Latin authors, who saw the theme of the soul according to Aristotelian principles, to attempt, paradoxically, to deny the unity of the intellect. If St. Thomas places himself in a mode of thought in which eternity and individuality are not simultaneous attributes of the soul, then his attempt to show their simultaneity inside the same paradigms might be a failure, no matter how sophisticated his theoretical construction. Let us now revise the diverse actualizations of the Aristotelian noetic and the genesis of the theme of the unity of the intellect.

2. The “Pre-history” of the Disputation on the Unity of the Intellect: from Aristotle to Averroes

The commentaries that followed the neo-Platonic lecture of Aristotle’s treaty About the Soul differ so much that it is believed the function of certain theses of the Aristotelian treaty was that of a condition of possibility of actualization on behalf of the commentator himself, rather than being
a doctrinal body to which correct or erroneous understanding or perception could be attributed. Having accepted the idea that Aristotle’s treaty represented for his author a non-concluded research program, (in the way F. Nuyens suggests, for example), we can recapitulate the major themes of the peripatetic theory of the intellect. The first designation of the theory also presents its first difficulty. It refers to the coherence between the definition of the soul as a “primeval act of the natural body endowed with organs” and the assertion of the same treaty by which the intellect is a function of the soul, although it does not subject itself to the above-mentioned definition, since it has no corporeal organ. It comes “from outside”, it is divine, although it resides, for all its distinctions, within the soul. These difficulties are only the beginning of the problems. In the opinion of the Philosopher, the distinction between act and potency is to be found at the level of the intellect, whereas the intellect is generally immortal, impassive and non-mixed, despite the fact that what is passive in the intellect (if such really exists within the intellect) is evanescent. Are these theses contradictory? Are they the result of an evolution out of which we retain a synchronous and deceiving testimony?

The functions of the soul are enumerated by Aristotle in several lists, and of these the most complete seems to be that of Book II, chapter 3, 414a, where the soul possesses the faculty of nourishing, wish, sensation, motion and thought. These are presented in a qualitative hierarchy, so that simple beings possess a minimum required amount and complex beings a maximum possible amount of these faculties. They are ordered according to the way the soul succeeds in a more and more ample manner in each and every faculty, including one another. This allows for the remark: the definition of soul always refers first to the first term of the series and secondly to the others: man is thus primarily defined by means of his most complex function (the intellect), the plant by feeding, etc. There was intense speculation on this matter by Albertus Magnus and St. Thomas, in 1270, against Siger: if man is defined mainly by intellect, how then are we to admit that the intellect is not proper to man, and instead of being a subject of thought, it is its instrument or object? Except for a number of passages of Nicomahean Ethics, Aristotle does not clarify the problem. The construction of the theory of the intellect seems to contradict that of the definition given in 412b 5: the intellect is separated from matter (428b 5), non-mixed and simple (405a 15, 429a 18), devoid of corporeal body (429a 24-25), divine and eternal (408b 19-29), and his activity resembles the senses to the extent to which, in the same faculties,
there is someone affected and someone affecting (427a 20), and differs, among other differences, according to the way in which the too intensely sensitive can alter the sense; whereas the intellect is never altered by too intensely intelligible persons because in act they become identical. Moreover, in a difficult passage, the intellect is said to be “another kind of soul” (413b 24 – 26), although the abstraction cannot be made without continuity between the senses and the intellect, out of which the image, not missing from the intellect, results (431a 16).

As a result, the intellect is nothing before knowing (429a 24), but it is pure receptivity, so that thought can be an affectation. Does his non-affectability contradict this? Aristotle’s negative answer is remarked upon by Averroes and also by St. Thomas: the presupposed affectation of the intellect is but its transition from potency to act, which implies that the intellect can be receptive, but it can never be passive (that is it can receive intelligibles, but it is not consumed by this, like matter). Though seemingly trivial, this finding has important consequences: if being is an “act” (according to Metaphysics, VII, 1048a, 30), then for the intellect thinking [reasoning] means fulfilling [accomplishing] itself together with its own intelligible. Generally, it can be accepted that for Aristotle, a thing is what its actualization reveals, since it is “what it was in order to be”; it forms part of a species and is the ontologically consistent individual in this world. The pure possibility of the intellect is not part of this world where “what it was in order to be” is functional: Averroes asserted, as a solution to the dilemma exposed by Aristotle relative to the intellect, that it is even the fourth kind of person, whereas St. Thomas compared it to the Platonic gauge. As a minimum, it can be said that this pure possibility would be self-contradictory if it has something determined or something plural. To Aristotle, in De anima, it bears two, most likely synonymous denominations: it is a place for the species (429a 28) and it is species of the species (432 a 2).

Besides this, “to know” has, to Aristotle’s mind, three meanings which diversify the transition from the pure possibility to the whole act of cognition: there exists pure possibility, about which we cannot assert anything; then there is the determined possibility of knowing something, which already is a plurality of this pure possibility; and thirdly, there is the science exercised into the act (417a 21 – 417b 2). What is surprising, however, is that this process never takes place completely, but “when the intellect becomes each and every of the intelligibles, the way the literate person who is in the act is called, … even then he is, in a sense,
in potency, but not the same as before the acquisition, or the discovery” (δύναμις πώς – 429b 8-9). In other words, this means to Aristotle the consistency of the ego: a pure non-determination, the individuality, which has a degree of fulfillment and achievement equal to the activity of the ego. In this context, to think means fulfilling oneself as an individual. It means that the difference between the act and the potency of the intellect is found before it is individuated by its own activity, that is to be within the act or even in habitu, according to the 3 afore-mentioned stages.30

In this sense, chapter 5 of Book III, Aristotle suggests the extending of the distinction act-potency to the level of the whole nature, at the level of the intellect:

The way as in the whole nature there is something like a matter for each kind (and this is all others in potency) and something else as cause and producer, by which everything is produced, and as art towards the matter out of which it is to be produced, it is necessary that inside the soul should persist these differences (430a 10-14).

We can now assume that in this interpretation, the idea that the (active) intellect comes “from without”: (De gener. anim., 736b 27) and the idea that it is “within the soul” (of the phrase quoted, 410a13) are non-contradictory. The two assertions have created serious problems to the commentators: to Themistius,31 the intellect agens [agent] is a divine reality, similar to the unity and plurality, which can be multiplied by the “lights” of the divine intelligence, meaning us, ourselves; to Averroes32 it is separated and unique for all people; to Avicenna, it is the intelligence of tenth sphere of the super-lunar world. St. Thomas, as opposed to Siger, invoked the 430a13 passage in order to sustain the immanence of the intellect agens [agent], whereas Siger invokes the passage in On the Generation of Animals in order to emphasise its transcendence. Aristotle, conversely, only clarifies the difference of principle between the possible intellect and the active one:

There is an intellect which becomes [in] all things and another one which produces all the others, the way as a disposition does, such as the light (430a9-10).

The theme of light in this passage requires the rigorous application of the Aristotelian theory according to which any perception requires an
intermediary between the organ of perception. According to this theory, the individuation of the one that perceives is the result of its own activity of perception.\textsuperscript{33} To the intellect, this means that it is the thinking itself that is its own determination. In fact, in the text of the chapter analyzed, a phrase appears, the first word of which is open to different grammatical interpretation: “And this intellect is separated and not affected and not mixed (430a 17-18).”

From a morphological point of view, the word “and” could be an adverb if it refers to a series of attributes applicable both to the possible intellect and the active one; but it can also be a conjunction which links the two phrases in which it occurs meaning the series of the three attributes refers only to the active one, so that the possible intellect might be easily mistaken for what Aristotle later calls “passive intellect”. Averroes implicitly opted for the first variant, without discussing the two possibilities.\textsuperscript{34} In a different way, as shall be seen, St. Thomas, who in other passages also attributed these determinations to the whole intellect,\textsuperscript{35} chose the same variant, and this is more appropriate to the sense of the Aristotelian text. In their own ways, both Alexander of Aphrodisia\textsuperscript{36} and Themistius\textsuperscript{37} opted for the second variant. Following this function, the difficulty of the last lines of the chapter can be interpreted; after Aristotle applies the theory of the anteriority of the act as opposed to the potency (enunciated in \textit{On the Soul}, as well, 415a 1-20) to the relationship between the possible intellect and the active intellect, asserting that in a relative relationship to time, potency is anterior, whereas in an absolute sense the act is anterior,\textsuperscript{38} the last lines tell about its immortal character:

It is, being separable, only the one that it is, and only this way is it immortal and eternal. Since we do not remember with it, as it is not affected, whereas the passive intellect is mortal, and without this it does not comprehend anything. (430a 22-25).

The problem of this phrase commences from the expression “passive intellect” (\textit{intellectus passibilis}”: if it is synonymous with the possible intellect, the way Themistius believed,\textsuperscript{39} then the subject of the sentence is the active intellect. This is hard to believe, in particular because this then forces us to accept the previously mentioned status of “and” as a conjunction and to deny the fact that the enunciations concerning the impassibility of the intellect refer to the possible intellect. An interpretation started by Ioan Filopon,\textsuperscript{40} developed (or maybe reinvented)\textsuperscript{41} by Averroes
is the synonymy between the above-mentioned expression and imagination. Indeed, imagination has, for Aristotle, a sensitive source, and an intellectual one (428a 31 – 428b), and it allows the intellect to achieve the concept by actualising something intelligible into something similar to the sensitive. This reasoning suggests that all the concepts of the intellect are associations of two terms, out of which none can be, in human order, conceived in itself: we can never think of being unequivocally as a pure act, in fact it always has several significations, and neither can we conceive of the primeval matter other than analogically.

In conclusion, it can be presupposed that Aristotle conceived of the soul as a reality that does not pertain in itself, as an object, to the sub-lunar world, but which is present in this world by its own activity, so that the theory on the unity of the intellect, the same as the theory of its plurality [multiplying] in itself are possible interpretations of the same text. Clearly, the previous variant is more coherent. But how far is it possible to advance in the act/potency transposition from the whole nature to the intellect? Could it possibly be assimilated to a reality of the order of the world? Indeed, Aristotle makes reference on several occasions to a possible link between the soul and the heavens. Moreover, the intellect is divine, without being a pure act, that is an intellect totally devoid of potency, the same as the heavens, which knows the act/potency distinction, but is divine. In practice, this means that an analogy is functioning tacitly in the Aristotelian text. Just as the “plurality” of the heavens does not eliminate the movement of the planets and thus it retains the act/potency distinction according to the place, similarly, the “plurality” of the intellect never eliminates assumption of the images in intellect nor has access to any cognition excepting predication. On the other hand, we have seen already that Aristotle’s heavens have an intelligible character, without them being other than the visible heavens, which might have lead to a re-editing of the Platonism of ideas. The heavens seem to be to the sub-lunar world what the intellect is to man. The sub-lunar world imitates as far as possible the eternity of the heavens whereas the heavens envelop the whole world and it collaborates in the birth of living creatures. The following is the famous passage from On the Generation of Animals in which Aristotle announces these correspondencies:

It results from those mentioned above that only the intellect comes from the outside and it is, of course, heavenly/divine. None of its acts
communicates with the corporeal act. On the other side, the whole potency of the soul seems to be united with a body and the mentioned elements, closer to the divine. The souls differing between themselves as more noble and more humble, these natures differ, too. For all these, there is something in the seed which makes this fertile, and that is why it is called warm. This is neither fire, nor a potency of this kind, but a certain blow contained in the seed and the foam, which is an analogy with the elements of the stars.49

From this moment on, it is only one step to say that the intelligible heavens (as locus speciem and species specierum) need subject (corporality) in order to become manifest. The step (textual) has been made, as we already know, by one of the propositions/statements censored by Tempier.50 Therefore, it is possible for Aristotle that there exists at least one analogy between the soul and the heavens. And it is then an acknowledged fact that for Aristotle the heavens govern the sub-lunar world and it is an intermediary between the primordial propeller and this world.51 However, for this theory to be transformed into the theory of the unity of the intellect required Averroes’ interpretation of Aristotle’s text, contrary to the interpretation of Alexander of Aphrodisia and Themistius, such as the assembly of these problems in Aristotle’s psychology of the world’s neo-Platonic hierarchical structure in Liber de causis.

In this view, it stands out as a remarkable fact that all authors who enlarge upon the treaty On the Soul appeal to the metaphor of the heavens in order to clarify the difficulties of the intellect. In the document dated 7th March 1277, the problem of the heavens as an intelligible mediator recurs frequently; in sentence 74, the heavens become analogous to the lively body and, in the proposition 14, it is maintained that “of man it is said that he understands to the extent of the heavens’ perception”. Though Aristotle sees the problem of the analogy between soul and the heavens seems possible, he never says that the heavens is the prime/primordial act of the soul, despite the fact that all plausible re-editing of Aristotle’s theories can sustain this, keeping in view the analogy between soul and the whole nature and also the difficulties of the unity of body and intellect. In his treaty, On Intellect, Alexander of Aphrodisia analyses the status of the active intellect, identifying it, naturally, with the intelligible heavens: “this intellect either governs by itself (my underline) what is here on Earth, without the help of the holy bodies, (...) or it takes action helped by the regular movement of the heavenly/ celestial bodies”.52 This passage
does not certify a direct connection between heavens and soul, but a hypostasis of it: the active intellect is associated with the intelligible heavens. Themistius re-edits the same analogy, but within a different relationship. Talking on the active intellect’s problem of immortality, Themistius presents a *scala naturae*, in which nature gradually updates an ever increasing number of noble subjects until the active intellect is reached, “a synthesis of all species”.\(^5\) Here, the active intellect becomes a neo-Platonic intelligence whose intermediary role between divinity and world is justified by the famous image of the active intellect as one-multiple, illuminated and illuminating (*illustrati et illustrantes*).\(^5\)

For Averroes, the degree of pure receptivity/responsiveness of the possible intellect is reminiscent of the status of the celestial bodies: “only this nature (of the possible intellect – my note) retains in an absolute sense. In the same way, the celestial bodies can intercept separate forms which retain understanding”.\(^5\) However, the most clear expression of this analogy belongs to Alfarabi, in his treaty *On Intellect and Its Object*:

> Yet, it is obvious that the subjects the agent intelligence is acting upon are either bodies, or some faculties in bodies generated and corruptible. This is because it has been proved in *On Generating and Corruptibility* that these causes, which are parts of the celestial bodies, are the primordial principles that act upon the body.\(^5\)

Whether it is a literary form or whether it is sustained by a doctrine, the analogy between soul and heavens was to blame in the eyes of the theologians of 1277. There is also a text, dated July 7th 1228, in which Pope Gregory addresses an appeal to the Parisian scholars urging them to avoid the doctrine of both the animated and the divine heavens: “Others have said false and vain things. Such as Plato, who considered that the planets were gods, and Aristotle, who considered that the world was immortal”.\(^5\)

In the introduction to his treaty – *On the Unity of the Intellect* (1263) – Albertus Magnus presents the double standpoint of the “philosophers” regarding the separate substances: some sustain that the intelligible heavens move both the stars and the understanding in man,\(^5\) and this attitude would belong, generally speaking, to peripatetics,\(^5\) while others sustain that the agent intellect is subordinated and not super-ordinated to stars\(^6\) – this standpoint is also attributed to Anaxagora.\(^6\) Albertus’ great merit is that of having understood the extent to which the peripatetic
way of thinking required a connection between soul and the heavens. Throughout the treaty, the thesis re-appears without being contradicted. Furthermore, it is the founding of a tacit assumption in an argument against the thesis of the unity of the intellect: if the intelligence of the heavens multiplies the stars, the same should occur to rational souls:

The one that suffers is man’s body, which is, to a large extent, proportional to the heavens whose propeller is intelligence itself. Therefore, in that body, the intelligence is producing an act resembling itself, and this is the rational soul.62

This approach occurs again for Albertus in *On Fifteen Problems* (1270), which demonstrates the fact that Albertus did not understand the nonsense: to ascertain that the intellect is analogous to the intelligible heavens required good communion with the thesis of the unity of the intellect: “From these it results that man’s intellect, which has a soul of a such nature and which is organic, is possessed and adopted from a superior nature.”63 This superior nature is the intelligence of the heavens’ tenth sphere.

In St. Thomas’ treaty, *On the Unity of the Intellect*, there are some occurrences of the analogy between soul and heavens. In order to reject the materiality of the intellect, St. Thomas quotes the above passage from *On the Generation of Animals*, in which the soul is analogous to the elements of the stars.64 In another passage, in order to reject the analogy between the idea that the “heavens understands through its propeller”65 and that we could understand in the same way through our superior intellects, St. Thomas accepts the terms of the analogy, inverting them: “For it is through human intellect that we reach the knowledge of the superior intellects, and not vice-versa.” In order to explain how it is possible that a form belongs to a body, but that it also posses non-material faculties, St. Thomas says:

For we see in the cases of many people that a form is indeed the act of a body made up of mixed elements, and yet, it possesses a faculty which is not the faculty of one of the elements, but it corresponds to such a form because of a higher principle, as one of a celestial body.66

As can be seen, Averroes also belonged to the group authors who allowed the analogy. For him, the problem of the Aristotelian intellect is...
both a matter of the theory of knowledge and a matter of ontology: how can a human be placed into the order of reality who is completely undetermined and receptive, non-individuated but open to any kind of individuation, without a proper form, but open to every form, as the Aristotelian intellect used to be? Taking into account the difficulties related to the definition of the soul as a primordial form (the main meaning of the Aristotelian substance) and its effect upon the next interpretation, Averroes decided that in the classical definition in De anima, 412b 3-5, the term “primordial/primeval” names the existent principle to the extent that it establishes something and becomes manifest. Averroes confirms this interpretation in at least two passages: in commentary no. 18 of On the Soul (III, at 430a 14-17), where Averroes admits that “in the whole nature” there are three types of reality – act, potency, and that which is manufactured – and the differences between them are also realized in the intellect; for Averroes, the intellect is manifest only when it thinks, the rest, the discourse about its plurality, is groundless:

usage and the exercise are causes of the production of the potency agent of the intellect, which is in us, having in view the abstraction, and the material intellect, having in view the reception.

Averroes respects the Aristotelian canon of images which necessarily accompany thought, they are a semblance of the material, and they take over the function of multiplying the individuals of the same species: “This intellect which Aristotle calls passive (= imagination – my note) is the one which distinguishes people.” Therefore, this principle rigorously develops the Aristotelian theory of the intellect, and thus only what is manifest can be plural, and what is prime and is principle is unique for all people.

These statements show Averroes’ adoption of Alexander’s terminology (material intellect, agent and in habitu), but used in a fundamentally different interpretation, repeatedly criticizing the Greek commentator for his materialism. Both the material intellect and the active intellect belong to the soul’s primordial act, albeit in different ways, and the in habitu intellect and the in actu intellect, without being different, belong to the plural manifestation of the intellect in the sub-lunar world. Therefore, it is the intellect that is actually “unus et multa”. Here we recognize a reminder of Plotinus, for whom the place of intelligence is, hierarchically speaking, intermediary between One and the multiple? The possibility is
better given by a common way of thinking than a literary source, but, in order to make plausible his own draft, Averroes had to give several clear assertions of the intellect as such, of the distinction between the material intellect and the active intellect, a description of the agent intellect and the material intellect, a rejection of the in habitu intellect, and an explanation of the process of intellection (the theory of the two subjects of knowledge).

From analysis of each of these themes, it can be said that Averroes is interpreting the famous formula from On Soul, III, 5,430a 17, καὶ ὁ νοῦς ὁ νοῦς, where καὶ is an adverb. The option implies the fact that the attributes “incorruptible, eternal, impassive, separate” refer to both intellects. Alain de Libera explains that in this interpretation Averroes is helped by a different alternative on Aristotle’s text where there is also a reinforcement adverb (in the Latin text: et iste intellectus est etiam abstractus). In our opinion, the word etiam, though indeed surplus in the Greek, purely serves to update one of the two grammatical possibilities already given by Aristotle’s text. The difference between the two aspects of the intellect is related to their actions – production and reception, respectively – though they are one, “for the material intellect is perfected through the agent intellect and the agent intellect is thought by it”. But is the unity of these two intellects operational or functional? This situation produces the intellect in act, as the active intellect contributes to this fact “as the light” becomes adopted intellect (intellectus adeptus).

For Averroes, the active intellect has two ontological functions, as H.A. Davidson has noticed: it is the cause of existence in the sub-lunar world (therefore a step in the emanation of the order of the universe), and it is a step in human knowledge. However, the material intellect has a special status, it is the receptor without altering itself and this has three consequences: it cannot be form, for it contains the forms, it cannot be material, for it would be something corporal, nor can it be the compound thereof, for it would then not be receptive. The result is that it does not belong to any of the Aristotelian meanings of substance, but that it is the fourth gender of the human being. For Averroes, it leads to the doctrine of the intelligible heavens (“the separate driving virtues have to be some intellects”):

The third matter, as to whether the material intellect is a certain human being and whether it is not one of the material forms and not a raw
material, is solved as follows. We propose that the material intellect is the fourth human gender. For, no sooner has the sensitive human been divided into form and matter/material, than, in the same way, the intelligible human is divided into something resembling form and something resembling the material.

Just as St. Thomas observed when regarding this idea of Averroes, we also notice that the way in which Averroes talks about the fourth human gender is reminiscent of Plato, who, in *Timaios*, postulates the existence of the third human gender, real non-determined and all-comprehensive. There is a difference that persists: for Plato “the third gender” is not receptive to the intelligible, a fact admitted by both Aristotle and Averroes in the doctrine of the possible intellect (material). However, the two realities belong unquestionably to a common family of ideas.

Averroes offers an explanation for the way in which cognition takes place, through the so-called “theory of the two subjects” of knowledge. For the intellect is what it becomes, following the resemblance with the senses, both feeling and knowledge having two subjects (as Aristotelian *substratum*) when talking about the intellect, the image and the possible intellect (its updating and association with an intelligible means thinking, both for Averroes and Aristotle). However, in this act, accomplishment of the possible intellect actually takes place. This possible intellect is unique for all people and the image is proof of its plurification at the moment of thinking. Saint Thomas criticised this theory which maintains that this continuity does not represent unity as, in imagination, an intelligible species is potent in image, when it is in the possible intellect in act, whereby the act of knowledge is necessary in order that it be unique. Therefore, if the eye, through light, sees color on a wall, which itself cannot see but is seen, and if, according to Averroes, this thing is accomplished by two subjects, it means that the possible intellect, through the active intellect, knows the image which is in the known man, but who does not know. In conclusion, for St. Thomas the theory of the two subjects is one of transforming the subjects into known objects. As we will attempt to show, this critique, which we have summarised, has Siger in view, rather than Averroes. The strange standpoint of the Thomism must also be mentioned. In this, of the “two subjects”: though St. Thomas criticizes it, his arguments are criticised by Aegidius of Rome, and with Petru Aureolus the theory of the two subjects of knowledge becomes the way of foundation of internationality and is then taken over by Francisco Suarez in the distinction between formal and objective reality,
which, in this last form, serves to demonstrate its heavenly existence in Descartes’ 3rd meditation.

The difference between Averroes and St. Thomas is easily noticed: each has a different understanding of what man is, as a singularity. For St. Thomas, from a Christian point of view, the soul is the person thinking, whilst for Averroes, the man is what his thought accomplishes as individuality.

The *in habitu* intellect (which is *in actu* that that thinks) bears the influence of the active intellect and it is but the material “one”. On the contrary, it is it the material intellect which became “*aliquid hoc*”, entered the world as a particular occurrence of the possible intellect and of the active intellect.  

We can now see the most delicate aspect of Averroes’ comment: he names (in Mihail Scotus’ Latin translation) the relation between man and intellect *coniunctio* or *copulatio*. This leaves the impression that there is a distance between the intellect and man, which transforms man from author into an instrument of knowledge. The impression is that produced by the question which Christian thought asked of Averroes’ text: who is it that thinks, the heavens-intellect or man? Averroes’ comment on *On Soul* had no reason to solve a problem he had not raised. In the spirit of Aristotle’s thought, to think means the individuation of the person who thinks. That is to say, on the one hand, it is the compound that is thinking, whilst, on the other hand, it is *nobody*, that is, that primordial/prime act which establishes the “individual” intellect while nonetheless not being something specific, different than through its second acts. Yet, the Parisian Latin Averroism, as we will see, accepted the above question and chose the alternative that “it is not man who understands”, rather he is the instrument of understanding.

Like Aristotle, Averroes considers the intellect’s particular individuality to be evanescent for it represents the identity between intellect and intelligible, when the first is thinking accompanied by a vanishing image. Within the 20th commentary of his work, he lists three arguments of the *in habitu* intellect destructibility: if it is immortal, the analogy between intelligible and intellect versus sensitive thing and sense/feeling disappears because the intellect has an immortal product. Following the same analogy, if the *in habitu* intellect is immortal, the sensitive species should be eternal; lacking images, images which would be eternal, the soul also does not conceive in the case of the *in habitu* intellect immortality; the material intellect equates the primordial act, while the *in habitu* intellect equates the images. However, man is corruptible,
which leads to the fact that he is corruptible after his primeval act of not conforming to the intellect eternity. The fact that in habitu intellect is not eternal causes the individuality and eternity of the soul to become contradictory attributes. All these statements led Averroes to expose a theory of intellection, already discussed here, to which St. Thomas’ three arguments against were added. The theory emerged from the difficulties of updating the intellect through thought: though evanescent, the in habitu intellect has a minimum degree of participation in eternity for the human species is eternal. However, the updating of the intelligibles requires two subjects, one of which guarantees by means of its own singularity the fact that we are thinking the same things and that we can understand each other, while the other, in its diversity, guarantees the fact that we are not compelled to think the same thing simultaneously.

These sources of the Latin dispute regarding the unity of the intellect need to be completed with the inclusion of Liber de causis, the aforementioned Arabic compilation from the nineteenth century of Proclus’ Elements of Theology, who brought to the scholars’ universe the neo-Platonic vision of world hierarchy, combining elements from Plotinus, Proclus and Aristotle, as recently argued Cristina d’Ancona Costa. There are two remarkable theses in Liber de causis which have given direction to the perception of peripatetic psychology. The first of these considers the status of reality made up of the finite nature and the infinity, of the eternity and non-eternity of the intelligence (prop. 22): “The human being which is after eternity and above temporality is the soul, for it exists within the horizon of the eternity below than <eternity> and above time” or prop. 67: “Intelligence does not exist in time, but on the contrary, it exists together with eternity”). Although they do not refer directly to the human soul, at least these ideas enlighten us as to the sense in which the intellect used to be placed in the thirteenth century philosophers world vision: it is an intermediary between world and God, making intelligence a “compositum ex finito et infinito” (prop. 42). As a result, it presents the status (Plotinian) of the one and multiple intellect (prop. 45).

The second thesis we are interested in relates to the degree in which intelligence really mediates between world and God; proposition/sentence 91 says that the influence of the primeval/primordial cause upon the rest occurs “through the intelligence mediation - mediante intelligentia”. The expression reappears literally in several sentences from Liber de causis and is mentioned almost literally in Tempier’s condemnations of 1277, sometimes in the analogue form “coeli mediante”. However, if
intelligence is mediating, what has this to do with the intelligence which contains the forms? An observation by Cristina d’Ancona Costa can help us at this point: Liber de causis, says the author, combines the Aristotelian idea of the identity between intellect and intelligible with the neo-Platonic idea of the mediante intelligentia creation. The observation shows Aristotle’s noetic to have survived and the way of thinking initiated by her to be relatively compatible with Liber de causis.

In conclusion, we can recognize that the censorship of the thesis on the unity of the intellect accomplished by Bishop Tempier had in mind a very coherent paradigmatic structure, which developed Aristotelian problems by neo-Platonic means (the case of the identity between intellect and intelligible and how they sit in the world hierarchical structure) and neo-Platonic problems by Aristotelian means (the case of the intermediary intelligence).

3. The Reception of Averroes by Albertus Magnus, St. Thomas Aquinas and Siger of Brabant

As a result of the priest R.A. Gauthier’s research, it is well known today that Averroes’ Great Commentary on About the Soul was translated between 1225 and 1230, and his influence was not significant until 1263 when Albertus Magnus edited De unitate intellectus, despite the several disputes concerning the actual time period. There were several quotations from Averroes recorded between 1229-1250: in 1231-1232, Guillaume of Auvergne quotes Averroes in De universo, and Phillippe le Chancelier quotes Averroes’ comment on the 11th Book of Metaphysics in his treaty Summa de bono. Short of a complete listing of authors quoting Averroes, two aspects can be observed. None of these authors ascribes the thesis of the unique intellect to Averroes and the majority does not understand the difficulty of accepting a heavens-intellect, even if they ascribe this idea to Plato. For example, Guillaume d’Auvergne, even if he were acquainted with the idea of the unity of the soul, calls Averroes “philosophus nobilissimus”, while Albertus Magnus, in Summa de homine, considers the agent intellect to be something related to man: “Following Aristotle and Averroes, ... we can say that the agent intellect is related to man’s soul”. Even in 1228, on 7th of July, Pope Gregory edited a document in which he sees the origin of the idea of the heavens
being divine with Plato. The same assertion is ascertained by Albert Magnus, too, in *Summa de creaturis*:

The opinion of the Platonicians is examined: for they believed that the souls have been multiple the same as stars, when they descended into bodies, and as a result of corrupting the bodies, they became the same as stars. ¹⁰¹

However, in the same period, the idea of the unique intelligence of all people starts to become known in the Latin world. William of Auvergne, for example, ascribes it to Aristotle, Alfarabi and Avicenna, though he offers no argument against the thesis: “Anyone intelligent can reject the latter’s theory”. ¹⁰² More prudently, in *Summa de creaturis*, Albertus Magnus explored the idea (“utrum anima sit una vel multae in omnibus animatis”)¹⁰³ and initiated a strategy which St. Thomas Aquinas transformed in *On the Intellect’s Unity*, a philological weapon against Averroes; the arguments with which Albertus rejects mono-psychism (the generic and vague form of the theory of the unity of the intellect) are taken from Aristotle in the order of the enemy’s sources. This procedure is remarkable and is even used by St. Bonaventure when disputing the same problem,¹⁰⁴ where he invokes the same Aristotelian arguments against it. We believe this procedure can be explained by the fact that these authors did not possess the conscience of a common family of thought which was under their very eyes and thus they did not know how to reject it completely.

On the other hand, the sources Siger of Brabant, who started to lecture at the Beaux Arts Faculty in Paris in 1265, belong both to Averroes’ *Great Commentary* and the theme of the mediating intelligence in *Liber de causis*, as well as, paradoxically, the way in which up to 1270 Albertus and St. Thomas Aquinas presented the idea of the unity of the intellect.¹⁰⁵ Probably beginning with the university year 1269-1270, Siger of Brabant started to lecture at the Beaux Arts Faculty in Paris on Aristotle’s *On Soul*, III. The first of Siger’s considerations was to state a thesis which seemed to have been extracted from Averroes’ *Commentary*. Siger openly claims that the ratio between the soul’s faculties (the vegetative and the sensitive) and the intellect is equivocal, meaning that the connection between man and intellect resembles that of a compound, and this connection is produced only when the intellect comes from the outside:
For the intellect is simple, when it penetrates the right in the moment of its coming, it becomes united with the vegetative and the sensitive, and thus united they do not make something simple, but a compound.\textsuperscript{106}

From this passage it can be deduced that, in \textit{Quaestiones in tertium de anima}, the definition of soul provided by Aristotle must have seemed equivocal to Siger, or that the source of this passage was double for Siger: on one hand, he sustains the idea of the unity of the intellect from Averroes’ Commentary, and on the other hand, he retains the problematic of the intellect intermediately in \textit{Liber de causis}. We believe that the meeting of the two lectures, as a minimal formula, produced a new model for the theory of the unity of the intellect, somewhat different from Averroes’ model.

\textit{Quaestio 9} of the same treaty analyses “if the intellect is unique/singular for all people”, although the problem of the genesis of the intellect was already analyzed in a number of previous passages of the text, inspired by the problem of the intelligible mediation in \textit{Liber de causis}: in \textit{Quaestio 2}, Siger says that the intellect is created non-mediated by the primeval cause, “immediate factum est a Primo”.\textsuperscript{107} The statement resembles proposition 37 from \textit{Liber de causis}: “the first of the things created is the human being – prima rerum creatarum est esse”, and proposition 42, in which this \textit{esse} is made up of finite and infinity, and prop. 45, in which it is called intelligentia. In \textit{Quaestio 3}, Siger sustains that the moment of this creation neither belongs to time (\textit{nunc temporis}), nor eternity (\textit{nunc aeternitatis}), but that it belongs to a time made up of these two. Seen from the point of view of a doctrine, the content of this statement resembles proposition/sentence 210 in \textit{Liber de causis}, which asserts the existence of an intermediacy between the “moment of eternity” and the “moment of time”.\textsuperscript{108}

In conclusion, this means that the intellect to which Siger refers is analogous to the mediating intelligence in \textit{Liber de causis}. This fact creates a difference as compared to Averroes: if for the Commentator the fact of thinking means that an intelligible has to be updated through image and simultaneously through the possible intellect (which by its exertion creates a plurality of the thought), then in Siger’s case only the images existing in us offer the plurality of thought.\textsuperscript{109} Apparently, there is no difference; indeed, both of them proposed the imagination as the diversifying principle of the thoughts of the same intellect. In reality, it exists: Averroes said that “the liaison of the intelligibles with us, other
people, is accomplished through the liaison of the intelligible intentions with us (...), and these are the imagined intentions”. In the next line, Averroes explains this with statement: “a child is intelligent” has two meanings: a) his images are intelligible in potency; b) the possible intellect is related to him in potency. These remarks of Averroes’ show how the regime of images, for him, is not only sensitive but intelligible, too, and these two subjects of knowledge overlap reciprocally. This fact should not come as a surprise, for it is a result of the Aristotelian description of the image. On the contrary, for Siger, the status of the image is purely sensitive: “And do not believe that the unique intellect is previous in two or three or a thousand <people> as regarding the imaginary concepts, but it is rather reverse.”

This thing simplifies Averroes’ noetic: if the intellect does not contribute at all to accomplishing the representation, it means that the man is not a rational being, rather man is just a place where thought becomes manifests, so that it cannot be said about this “place” that it “thinks”, for it is only a simple support/prop of thought. We could speak, in this case, of master Siger as a representative of the extreme form of the theory of the unity of the intellect. Averroes actually wanted to explain the way in which thought becomes manifest; on the contrary, Siger renounces the idea of an “unos et multa” intellect, retaining only its uniqueness. Master Siger maintains, in the same Quaestio 9, that there is nothing in the nature of the intellect to multiply it. He invokes, in support of this thesis, the classical arguments of the intellect’s immateriality, the analogy with the heavens, the plurality of thoughts through images. For of these reasons, the unity between man and intellect is operative without also being substantial for the master of Brabant.

Instead, the text which develops the unity of the intellect with maximum clarity is the well known manuscript Merton College, 275, edited in 1971 by F. van Steenberghen, M. Giele and B. Bazán, written after 1270, which assumes Siger’s thesis on the operative unity man – intellect (ut motor) and openly states:

You say: I feel and perceive the fact that I understand. I say that this thing is false: on the contrary, the intellect is united with you naturally, like a propeller and an ordinator of your body (...) and even that the agent intellect is using your body as an object, communicating with this compound as I said.
Three differences between Siger and Averroes can be stated: Siger considers a pure sensitive status of images, whereas Averroes (and Aristotle) also implies their intelligible status; the unity between intellect and man is, for Siger, purely operative, while for Averroes, the intellect is unus et multa even due to the fact that it thinks; Averroes saw in the possible intellect a receptacle of the reality which contains some basic ideas and of a maximum generality, while Siger totally rejects this idea. On the contrary, in order to think, the intellect needs corporality (eget corpore).\textsuperscript{117}

As it can be seen from the analysis of other two Siger texts,\textsuperscript{118} the author was extremely preoccupied, just like Boetius of Dacia,\textsuperscript{119} with establishing a discourse proper to philosophy and with formulating a precise intellectual ideal. Siger’s theory is coherent with the idea of intellectual happiness secured through its unity with the agent intellect.\textsuperscript{120} St. Thomas Aquinas’ texts answer this treaty directly. After 1270, under the pressure of St. Thomas’ answer, Siger restrains his position in \textit{De anima intellectiva}, ch. 7 and in \textit{Commentarium super Librum de causis} ch. 27. However, it is possible, as R. Imbach\textsuperscript{121} suggests, that Siger’s formulation changes to respect the university status of 1272, which forbade masters of arts to present theses opposed to faith. Whatever the historical truth, it is certain that between 1270 and 1272, a real philosophical dialogue took place between St. Thomas and Siger.

* St. Thomas notices precisely the difficulty inherited from Aristotle: why is the soul the primordial act of the organic body, though the incorporeal intellection is a faculty of the soul?\textsuperscript{122} Alexander used this theory, and he constructed his model of the material intellect, Themistius who isolated the agent intellect in transcendence, and Averroes with the idea of the unity of the intellect. Saint Thomas, once returned to the sources of the paradigm by formulating this question, offers another solution. In \textit{De unitate intellectus}, he does not want to recognize the equivocation of the Philosopher’s definition: “it is worth mentioning the solicitude/care and the amazing order of Aristotle’s work”.\textsuperscript{123} On the contrary, St Thomas begins by establishing a problematic term: “separate – separatus”,\textsuperscript{124} which does not mean the distinction towards body, but the lack of a corporal organ.\textsuperscript{125} This thing implies that in the sense of the
phrase “from the outside – de foris” in *On Animals’ Generation*, 736b 27 sqq., which designates the intellect’s genesis, it would not be synonymous with “separate”. In spite of all these, the intellect is not a body (*non est virtus in corpore*). The Thomist conclusion seems to be, in § 26, that the intellect is defined by the soul as an act of the material body, though it is incorporeal.

In *De unitate intellectus contra averroistas*, St. Thomas has tried to isolate Averroes from the peripatetic tradition: declaring Averroes “denigrator of peripatetism”, he himself quoting tendentiously Themistius and Alexander, changing the topic from the field of Metaphysics to that of psychological experience (according to Steenberghen’s observation), St. Thomas was hoping to prove the incoherence in the logic of Averroes’ thesis, and, implicitly, that of Siger’s, although St. Thomas enounces none of the differences between the two authors. St. Thomas develops an impressive argument in this treaty, resuming a series of arguments previously set forth by Averroes, Albertian themes, new and old Thomist standpoints. E.Wéber saw in the new Thomist standpoint a real dialogue with Siger of Brabant, in which each author reshapes his own point having in view the reaction of the counterpart. Although Bernardo Bazán denied a possible reshaping of the Thomist standpoints during the dispute with Siger, there is at least one sure fact: the text addresses Chapter 9 from Siger of Brabant’s *Quaestiones in tertium de anima*. We are going to resume these arguments, the most important ones.

An analogy from Aristotle’s treaty, already used by Albertus, is at St. Thomas’ beck in order to clarify his own point of view: the faculties of the soul are geometrical shapes, one in another alike: meaning that the shape which includes all others defines the whole. The conclusion: the intellect is a *shape of the body*, therefore it is plural. As E. Wéber suggests, for St. Thomas, the analogy of the geometrical shapes corresponds to the principle of hierarchy where the imperfect form is contained in its superior degree, in *The Commentary to Liber de causis*. It means that the intellect is mainly in man and it uses his organs. Paradoxically, Saint Thomas motivates this plea, implying the connection between soul and heavens, as “a higher principle” from where the intellect originates (for St. Thomas, the same thing happens with the magnet and the jasp). The example is strange for it comes from the paradigm which led Averroes to accept the unity of the intellect. Did St. Thomas tacitly accept the same way of thought?
But the most important argument of the text is the rejection of Averroe’s theory concerning the two subjects of knowledge. We have already analyzed the way in which Averroes presented this theory and St. Thomas rejected it. St Thomas wants to show that this theory is not functional, for, in its case, it is not the man who understands, rather it is he who is to be understood, like the wall on which the color is seen. From the three different arguments, the first one (§ 64) says that man would not possess intellect except when he thinks, if this theory is taken into consideration. Or, this statement is not unknown to Averroes, which means that the observation does not present an incoherence, but a difference of opinion. The second argument (§ 65) and the third one (§ 66) have a common substance: the admission of Averroes’ theory would cause man not to think, but be a support for the thought, and the draft of the analogy understanding/view would place the seen wall on the same level as the thinking man. Our opinion is that this critique touches Siger without touching Averroes because the wall on which we see the color is analogous to the faculty which is producing the image. Or, we saw that for both Aristotle and Averroes it was a synthesis of the intellect with feelings, while for Siger it was a product purely sensitive. This means that what supports this image, man, is defined by Averroes as a unity of the intellect with the feelings, while for Siger it is only a sensitive unity. That is why the Thomist critique has Siger in view rather than Averroes.

Another important argument was the critique of the idea that the relation between man and intellect is analogous to that of propeller and the moved thing (“ut motor”), an idea that Averroes had never agreed with. Siger suggested a union between intellect and body analogous to that between the moving and the moved thing. St. Thomas’ reply is similar: if we admit this theory, the singular man cannot be defined, for he does not have a unique gender, does not have a proper action, and he is thought instead of thinking by himself. Then, § 70 brings along a striking argument for St. Thomas’ attempt to detach himself of Averroes: if we accept Siger’s thesis, then there will no longer be a correct analogy between soul and heavens! “And if you say that in the same way heavens understand by its propeller, this is an assertion of something even more difficult. For by human intellect we have to reach the knowledge of superior intellects, and not the reverse”. This means that man has to reach the knowledge of the heavens (the separate intelligence) by his own intellect, just like heavens must reach the cause of its movement/action through its own intelligence. In other words, both cases must
accomplish an act of the intelligence by itself and not something superior to them, for then, the act would be exterior to them (§ 71-73). Once more, St. Thomas shows Siger’s incoherence without affecting Averroes, for whom the intellect was unique as principle and primordial act, but plural in its manifestation (unas et multa), a fact never stated by Siger.

Paragraph 94 has a paradoxical structure, enunciating the aporia of the intellect’s eternity: if the intellect has been already updated through understanding, we cannot update it in our turn, and if the possible intellect represents an absolute non-determination, we have nothing to update anymore. Without being a straight counter-argument to Averroes, the problem is clearly the line of disputation with Siger and it rediscovers the paradox in Menon (80e-81a). The problem exists if the author of the knowledge is the separate intellect and if he is not individuated through knowledge. But his individuation in knowledge was conditioned, for Averroes, by the vanishing images. This means that death forgets the whole worldly experience. As regards the mechanism of learning, the aporia is not concerned with the theme of the unity of the intellect, but with that of the nature of the understood intelligible. This is, as we will see, the most delicate point of the dialogue (direct this time) between St. Thomas and Averroes.

In order to reject the plurality of the intellects, Averroes considers that what was thought could not be plural numerically from a man to other and unique in species only with the risk of a reduction to infinity. As an example of understanding, Averroes analyses the rational between master and disciple: they conceive the same “understood thing” through different images (scitum in Mihail Scotus’ Latin translation, intellectum in the Thomist reply). Themistius drew attention to the same problem, with the same example and Averroes’ idea has already been analyzed by Albertus in On the Unity of the Intellect and been condemned by Bishop Tempier in 1277, sentence/proposition 117. St. Thomas’ reaction is an extension of that in which he was trying to sustain the plurality of the soul through form. The primordial “act” of the reply takes place in Contra Gentiles, II,75, ad resp. 2, after he had dealt with the same problem in On Being and Essence, III. Here, St. Thomas suggests a distinction (classical according to Boetius) between what is understood (quod intelligitur) and that through which something is understood (quo intelligitur). The first is the thing that is understood, the second is the intelligible species, which, for St. Thomas, differs from man to man. The same, the species sensitive through eyes, must be multiple, otherwise
there would be only one witness/viewer, otherwise, in order to follow a common example from the two quoted passages, if the species were not multiple, we could not think individuals unique in their species, such as the sun and the moon. (Actually, Saint Thomas’ example hides an Angelo logical problem, for the angels, too are unique in their species). Actually, the example given is not valid if we admit that the sun and the moon possess substance, but in the case of the immaterial being, it becomes clear: if what we think (quod) is identical with that through which we think (quo), then the angel is not a person in its species, rather it is only its species. But why, when talking about material things, must this distinction be applied? It is restated almost in the same terms in Quaestio disputata de spiritualibus creaturis, art. 9 and De unitate..., § 106-113. In these passages, St. Thomas sustains that his thesis rejection leads to platonism, for knowledge would not need sensitive things. Restating our question: what is the role of the image, taking into account the distinction between quo and quod at the level of understanding? Obviously, the consequences of these two theories (Averroes versus St, Thomas) are different: for Averroes, the master lingers in the disciple, an intelligible species, for St. Thomas, the disciple understands through a natural ability, an expression of the intelligible species (quo intelligitur) existing in him. The Thomist distinction is operative if there are more intellects, Averroes’ formula is also operative if the same intellect is pluralized through thought. The Thomist theory is coherent, but does not correspond to the goal of the treaty On the Unity of the Intellect, that is of showing that in Aristotle’s opinion the intellect is individual and immortal.

We can draw conclusions from the fact that St. Thomas never touched Averroes’ doctrine because he had Siger in mind, without taking into consideration the differences between the two and himself, and he does not rebuild an imaginary Aristotelism, but he creates a theoretical background of peripatetic and neo-Platonic elements in order to arrive at an argument of the individual immortality of the soul. The theory is blocked in deconstructing Siger’s themes without touching Averroes, or in the concession made to the possibility of a unique agent intellect. His “victory” (from the point of view of a doctrine) over Siger is a failure of tradition and the “strategic” placing of St. Thomas is more uncomfortable than any other commentator. The Aristotelian paradigm used to impose on the commentator a number of compulsions (the analogy soul/heavens, the manner in which act and potency can be distinguished within the
intellect act and the potency, etc.), which imposed at least an incomplete
individuation of the soul. And St. Thomas, far from “defeating” Averroes
or Siger, assumes the same manner of thought, although he hopes to
achieve a possible Christian reading of it.

Therefore, we can conclude from the presentation of this disputation
between Siger of Brabant and Saint Thomas, who was in the shadow of
Aristotle, Averroes, and Themistius, that for all these authors, the intellect
is personal when it understands, though in differing ways. Siger of Brabant
applied this principle in a radical manner, reaching the conclusion that
the singular intellect is a reality which does not become particular through
its activity. St. Thomas specifies this incoherence and wrote his famous
treaty *On the Unity of the Intellect*. Yet, the Thomist model is incapable
of building an Aristotelism adapted to the person’s doctrine. Averroes’
*Great Commentary* represents a different way of updating the same
paradigm in which both St. Thomas and Siger are thinking. Averroes has
the merit of having speculated, within the same paradigm, the reality
theme of limit-receptacle, a frequent theme with Albertus Magnus, too,
but difficult to assimilate for Catholicism, for it implies the intermediate
of the intelligence divided into world and God. For the Aristotelian
paradigm created many difficulties in the idea that the soul is eternal
and individual. Aristotle’s appeal against Averroes for St. Thomas ended
with a inconsistent theoretical project: the analogy between soul and
heavens could not be preserved simultaneously and it said that the soul
is eternal and individual. The disputation concerning the unity of the
intellect brings Christian theology (which postulated the existence of the
plurality given substantially to the plural persons) face to face with the
philosophy of Aristotelian-neo-Platonic inspiration for which the soul (and
together with it, the intellect) was a principle incompletely individuated
and whose activity was its own individuation. On the other hand, it is
possible that the idea of the unity of the intellect offered European culture
interrogation of the thinking subject, suggesting that the distance between
an absolute universality and a radical particularity is infinite, and the
thought is engaging its own eternal act on this road. To think means to
create the one who thinks.

The study of this disputation gives way to another level, more concrete,
that of the opposition between Thomists and Averroes’ attainments. Those
who were disputing the idea of the intellect’s unity displayed this
disputation within a space whose status was on its way to crystallization:
the university. For this reason, the parties of the disputations outlined a
new plan, that is that of the discourse and its ratio to the truth. On this competitive plan it was established what Bishop Tempier of Paris has called, in the manuscript of 1277, the theory of the two truths. Demonstrating the fact that this theory necessarily implies the disputation on the unity of the intellect, it can in fact be seen where the connection lies between the status of the university intellectual/scholar and the disputation on the unity of the intellect.

5. The history of the “double truth” disputation and its link to the disputation of the unity of the intellect

Upon examining the theory of the unity of the intellect, we have noticed the coherence of this theory with the vision of the world of those who supported it, and we have seen a paradoxical situation according to which the Dominican critics of this theory also shared the same view of the world. Let us now relate this topic to the Universe of the discourse, in support of the idea that the “double truth” disputation is, in reality, related to the same vision of the world and that it is unthinkable in the absence of the theory of the unity of the intellect. The documentary history of the period 1270-1277 records two texts of an official character that announce the conflict between reason and faith in its particular occurrence that would stem from the disputation between theologians and “artists” (i.e., masters and students of the Faculty of Arts). The first of these texts is a document issued on April 1, 1272 in the Church of Saint Geneviève of Paris, which forbade anyone in the university milieus of Paris to come up with theses contrary to faith:

Being convoked for this reason all the masters and each of them in the Church of Saint Geneviève from Paris we decide and command that none of the masters and of the bachelors of our Faculty should ever engage himself in the determination or in the discussion on a theological problem, as would be on the Incarnation or on the problem of Trinity and the other similar topics, going far beyond his own established limits; as the Philosopher said: it is entirely unfitted for someone who does not have the knowledge of geometry to dispute with someone who does. ... moreover, we decide that if someone disputes somewhere in Paris any problem which seems to concern both philosophy and faith, and if that person determines it contrary to our faith, then he is going to be rejected as a heretic from our community forever...
The value of this text is extremely high because it extracts from Aristotle a principle of the autonomy of knowledge, while targeting this principle against the Aristotelians themselves. The first part of the interdiction is clear: it is desired that the autonomy of theology should be established in relation to philosophy, a statement which leads one to think of a principal separation. However, the second part contradicts the newly framed principle of autonomy by propounding the idea that it might be possible for some (common!) problems to be solved either in favor of faith, or in favor of science. The historical consequence (a courageous one, reached with admirable academic consistency), was the separation of the Faculty of Arts from the University, so that for three years (until 1275, when Pierre of Auvergne reunified the University) there were two rectors in Paris, and a document appears to suggest that the rector of the “artists” was none other than Siger of Brabant. Nevertheless, all that the text of 1272 warrants us to assume for the time being is that there are problems which might be settled in favor either of faith or reason. Far more radical, however, is the formulation of the document of 1277, which itself mentions a theory of the double truth that it condemns:

In order to avoid the appearance of actually sustaining what they suggest, their answers are so uncertain that when they wish to avoid Scilla, they are crushed by Caribda. They say that according to philosophy some facts are true, but not true according to the catholic faith, as if two contrary truths could exist...

The formulation of the two truths, as I have mentioned earlier, was quite an influential factor in the reception of Averroism as professed by Siger and Boetius, the consequence being that the philosophy of the two “artistae” was categorized as sophistic. Still, the document itself warns of the fact that Averroist texts were not as clear as they appeared with respect to the truth-value of the theories that they asserted. The masked, understating nature of Siger’s texts on the theory of the universal existing in itself has already been remarked. The idea of a discourse prepared for the censors does not appear to be an absolute novelty because, a few decades before the events of 1277, Roger Bacon had remarked about the artists that their discourses did not always have as an aim the proper expression that would facilitate understanding, but they were rather striving to introduce Averroist theses in forms difficult to recognise:
Saying that neither through philosophy one could say otherwise, nor by the way of reason one could obtain anything else, but only through faith, they pale each time when the error of Averroes is announced. But they lie as the most common heretics.  

The accusation of insincerity formulated by Roger Bacon might be of particular significance. It is known about Siger of Brabant that he was often wont to dissimulate his true theoretical position. For instance, with regard to the theory of the unity of intellect, in his *Commentary to Liber de Causis*, Siger pays polite reverence to the Christian faith without renouncing the premises that lead him to the thesis of the unique intellect. Instead, as we shall see, the accusation cannot be extrapolated to refer also to the text of Boetius of Dacia, *On the Eternity of the World*, in which we find once more the bases for the Averroist formula of truth.

Let us remark, however, that the accusation of the double truth did not surface only in 1272 and in 1277, but was already present in 1270, in the closing of Thomas Aquinas’ treatise *On the Unity of the Intellect* and was directed at Siger of Brabant:

[123.] It is more serious what he says in the following words: “I necessarily conclude through reason that the intellect is one in number; but without avoidance I sustain through faith the opposite.” Therefore, his opinion is that faith deals with some facts from which one could contradictorily conclude by necessity. But because by necessity one can conclude only for those who are truly necessary, whose opposite is impossible and false, it results from what he said that faith should be concerned with the impossible false, with what God couldn’t do: but the ears of the true believers cannot be put through this. He doesn’t courageously keep himself close to those which do not belong to philosophy but to pure faith and he dares to discuss the latter; for example, if the infernal fire affects the soul, and he dares to say that the opinions of the doctors on the question have to be refuted. He could dispute with a similar argument the question of the Trinity, the Incarnation and others of the same kind about which he could only talk with an unclear sight.

As Bruno Nardi has stated, who was vouched for by Borbély Gábor in the Hungarian edition of the treatise by Saint Thomas, no such citation is to be found among the remaining Siger treatises. This is an extremely important fact: it may mean that St. Thomas was, in a sense,
inventing his adversary in order to refute him, thus exaggerating his position. We do not know whether Siger of Brabant was, at an initial stage, of the opinion that there were two truths, yet the remaining texts written by Siger, as we shall see below, are more ambiguous than St. Thomas would care to expose. All four of the passages that we have examined (being, to the best of our knowledge, the only ones from the period that introduce the accusation of the “double truth”, which is precisely the reason I have preferred to quote them in extenso) raise a number of questions; namely, who invented the theory of the double truth: Siger of Brabant, Boetius of Dacia, St. Thomas Aquinas, or Etienne Tempier? Similarly, what was the position of Averroism itself with respect to the theory of truth?

The cliché started by Raimundus Lullus, Sajó Géza, the editor of Boetius’ On the Eternity of the World, states that, for the historiography of medieval philosophy, the discovery of Boetius’s treatise confirms the presence of the double truth doctrine within the current of Latin Averroism. In a famous volume, employing a quaint formulation (without reference) of the double truth, Jacques le Goff maintained precisely the same idea, namely that the Averroists were those who “invented the doctrine of the double truth”. The myth of this theory, launched by historians of medieval philosophy, has enjoyed a long career from Victor Cusin and P. Mandonnet to the more recent M. de Joos.

On the other hand, the opinion contrary to that of the aforementioned authors was shared by such authors as Etienne Gilson, F. van Steenberghen, and Alain de Libera. In an exposition from 1955, Etienne Gilson claimed that none of the known Averroist texts contain an affirmation of the double truth, that it constitutes a subsequent and disingenuous myth, and that, to the contrary, all that the treatise by Boetius of Dacia attempts is to assert the autonomy of the sciences in relation to faith. Gilson makes a point that is extremely important to our discussion in what concerns master Boetius: in On the Eternity of the World, the opposition is never established between philosophia and theologia, but always between philosophia and fides. This implies that there is no point of contradiction between the two domains because one refers to a truth in itself (simpliciter), while the other has relative significance (secundum quid); he identifies a passage in Boetius’ treatise which indeed puts this duality into relief and to which I shall refer in the paragraph below. To the same extent, F. van Steerberghen commented on the inadequacy of categorizing heterodox
Aristotelianism (the name he gives to Latin Averroism) as a doctrine of the “double truth”, a fact ostensibly invalidated by Siger’s treatises.\textsuperscript{163}

Alain de Libera pursued two distinct contentions with regard to the origin of this myth. This situation is somewhat disconcerting considering that in 1991, in his work \textit{Penser au Moyen age},\textsuperscript{164} the medievalist suggests that the treatise that induced Tempier to write the foreword to the censorship document was indeed that of Boetius of Dacia, inasmuch as Tempier rejected the idea of a peaceful coexistence of faith with philosophy, in the form proposed by Boetius.\textsuperscript{165} This fact indicates that Tempier invented the doctrine himself, however this time Alain de Libera does not further specify the reason for Tempier’s rejection of the doctrine in so far as it did not contain any contradiction of faith. On the other hand, in 1994, in his preface to the French translation of St Thomas Aquinas’ treatise \textit{On the Unity of Intellect}, Alain de Libera considers § 123 of the Thomist text, quoted above, and remarks that the double truth is a “piège logique” set by St Thomas for Siger of Brabant.\textsuperscript{166} This conjecture implies that Tempier’s formulation was, in fact, the resumption of an idea of Thomas Aquinas’ or was, as is extremely plausible, the product of the intellectual climate at the faculty of arts in which tolerance for some version of the double truth might have been a fact.

However things might have stood, even if it is virtually impossible to reconstruct the exact historical disputation because of the physical impossibility of knowing the totality of the text that circulated at that time, it is clear that we can determine neither the falsity of the double truth nor whether its attribution is correct. The reason for this being that the question I have implicitly formulated above (who launched the theme of the “double truth”?) is a question that has a historical and philological horizon; on the contrary, we might ask ourselves “what is the proper sense of the doctrine, irrespective of who first formulated it?”. By posing the question in this way, one is in the position to make a small but a novel step forward in the research of this issue so that it now becomes evident that the philosophical meaning of the theme must be split, with, on the one hand, respect to the dispute between Siger and St Thomas and, and, on the other, with respect to the disputation between Boetius and Tempier’s commission of censors.

Alain de Libera showed in his analysis that in \textit{Quaestiones in tertium de anima}, IX, and later in \textit{De anima intellectiva}, VII, Siger of Brabant thought that God could not effect contraries at the same time, and that the making of multiple intellects was such a contradictory accomplishment

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as it is matter alone that multiplied, while the intellect was immaterial. Where Siger never states what he believes with any clarity, St. Thomas was, according to de Libera, setting him a logical trap: divine omnipotence should be believed in through faith, while the theory of the unique intellect was said to result solely from the assumed philosophical principles (matter that individuates the species). This, for de Libera, means that Siger fell into the trap laid by St. Thomas, namely by asserting in *De anima intellectiva*, VII, that in the undecided or heretical situations of philosophy one has to follow the faith that goes beyond all human reason.\(^{167}\) Despite this, it does not follow that Siger followed the doctrine of the double truth. On the contrary, in the same treatise he invoked a precept that concerned the autonomy of the sciences\(^{168}\) in relation to the divine miracle:

> Nothing concerning ourselves, but related to God’s miracles as long as we normally talk about those of nature...

The principle is important in two ways: it is taken from the work of St. Thomas Aquinas, who inherited it from Albertus Magnus,\(^{169}\) and it comes to influence Boetius of Dacia, the creator of a system of the autonomy of sciences in direct relation to the idea that the beginning of creation is indemonstrable. Hence, one observation can be joined with de Libera’s analysis: irrespective of whether it was St. Thomas or Siger from which the doctrine of the double truth originated, both *the one and the other* were about to engage in a discussion on the value of truth that neither of them had fully clarified. St. Thomas had, for instance, given his opinion that the eternity of the world was a coherent thesis, though invalidated by faith, while Siger affirmed the unity of intellect, though he says that the imperative of his faith compels him to follow the opposite of this idea. All this indicates that that which was at stake from the philosophical point of view in the theme of the double truth has not yet been accounted for in discussing the conflict between Siger and St. Thomas.

Master Boetius announced in his treatise that there was no contradiction between faith and philosophy. I have quoted earlier that Etienne Gilson has noted the absence of the term *theologia* in this text; still, the reputed medievalist left this event uncommented from the point of view of the possible status of theology in Boetius’ thinking. Boetius’ text produces one clarification with respect to faith and philosophy: “And then, there is no contradiction between faith and the philosopher. […] For this reason,
the Christian, provided he comprehends with subtlety, is not constrained that from his law to obliterate the principles of philosophy, but saves both faith and philosophy”.

The logic in which this is achieved is valid only in the event that there is a hierarchy of the world, in which the sublunary world has as a plane superior to itself, the skies and then God, and also where there is, symmetrically, one ‘specialist’ for each type of reality, which is to say, a naturalist, a mathematician, and a metaphysician. Yet this was the very gist of Boetius’ text: the eternity of the world has to be a working assumption for the naturalist and for the mathematician (because both of them study motion, the real and the ideal), but also for the metaphysician, because the latter studies the prime cause in its quality as sufficient cause and not as voluntary cause (because the latter cannot be known). From this scheme comes the result that science comprises the whole field of the real. The most important observation here is that, at most, the prime cause in the sense of voluntary cause might correspond to faith, while nothing can correspond to theology because, in the given scheme, it does not vie with metaphysics.

For this reason, the thesis I would endeavour to establish, in prolongation of Gilson’s observation concerning the absence of Boetius’ considerations on theology, implies that it is precisely the absence of the term under discussion from the text that confirms that Boetius’ intention was polemical, inasmuch as he could not, when the eternity of the world was accepted as a working assumption for all of science in general, admit to theology being a science due to its lack of a discursive object. This also ties in with what Boetius stated in his treatise on the mission of the philosopher insofar as “there can be no issue that can be disputed through arguments which the philosopher is not bound to debate and to determine with respect to how truth in particular is to be found in it …” Consequently, the dissociation of the concept of God into sufficient cause and voluntary cause (or else, a God of ‘philosophers’ and a living God) splits the unity of theology because it either states the truth, and in that case it is not to subject to dispute, or it is disputable, and thus does not state the truth. This is, in my opinion, the motive that drives not only St. Thomas, but also Tempier, to pronounce the people who undermine their own theological cogitation as guilty of the double truth. In essence, Boetius demonstrates in the subtext that reason and faith do not come into conflict if, and only if, theology is not a science. In favor of this assertion there are two arguments that I can bring.
The first is represented by a passage of the treatise that shows why, from a logical point of view, faith and reason do not contradict themselves. This passage has already been commented upon by Alain de Libera, who used it in order to support the idea that putting reason on the same plane as faith would mean a fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter, as already exposed by Aristotle in Sophistic Refutations, 25, 180a-b. The sophism amounts to saying, for instance, that Socrates is simultaneously white and non-white if he is white in truth while his hair is black, thus weighing an absolute statement in relation with a negative one. Master Boetius does indeed suggest this possible relation:

The conclusion in which the naturalist states that the world and the first movement could not be new is false if we take it absolutely (absolute) by itself. However if one recalls the arguments and the principles from which such a conclusion is drawn, this results from them. Furthermore, we know that both the he who asserts that “Socrates is white” and the he who denies it both speak with truth in a certain way (secundum quaedam).

The opposition between absolute and secundum quid is convincing in the text: it means that the propositions of faith are absolute, while those of science are relative. Yet this observation is not, in my opinion, sufficient, as Boetius’ observation does not fall entirely under the sophism enounced by Aristotle. In fact, Boetius had already announced the framework in which philosophy (whose branches are physics, mathematics, and metaphysics, ordered by the planes of the world) needed to place itself in relation to its problems: in the passage quoted above, the philosopher had the duty to determine all that pertained to the sphere of dispute with (disputabile) arguments. This means that no affirmation made absolute (or: simpliciter) could fall within the realm of the philosopher, while, on the other hand, the word disputabile and the expression secundum quaedam are synonymous. This observation implies that affirmations made simpliciter (those that pertain to faith) are not knowledge proper (as is, however, the proposition “Socrates is white”, defining difference between Boetius and Aristotle’s sophism). The result of this is that philosophy absorbs the entire domain of knowledge (that can be formulated in propositions or, in other words, in relationships secundum quid between predicate and subject).
This implies, therefore, that theology is not a science, rather it is the subject of a tacit polemic of Boetius’, which would fully motivate Tempier’s reaction. At any rate, if it is true that the difference between Boetius and Tempier was that the former did not believe theology to be a science (and consequently that there can be no room for theologians within the university), we are then also able clarify the historical-philological aspect of the “double truth” disputation: though we should not base our account on any malicious intent of the persons involved in the polemic, we can simply maintain that, convinced that theology was not a science, Boetius applied the distinction secundum quid/absolute to the philosophy of faith; while, in the eyes of Tempier, who accepted theology to be a science and that it was its lot to deal with disputable problems (which, as a consequence, would give it a place in the university), Boetius’ statements inevitably led to the double truth without malicious intervention from Tempier. As a result, only the elimination of theology as a science would also eliminate the double truth.

The second argument that can be cited in favor of the idea that the way in which theology is or is not considered a science regulates, in reality, the relation between faith and reason, is the competition against which Boetius wrote his treatise. In essence, Boetius maintained that any discourse that produces knowledge deals with nature, the sky, or with the sufficient cause of all of this, and is, as a consequence, a branch of philosophy that “reflects the entire being, in a natural, mathematical, or divine sense”. This implies that all science is subordinated to philosophy. One cannot exclude the possibility of this message being targeted polemically against the idea that all sciences are subordinated to theology. This idea was maintained only a few years prior to Boetius’ writing by Saint Bonaventure in a famous treatise, On the Reduction of Arts to Theology, in which he had claimed that the entire domain of knowledge was reducible to theology because in any science a structure analogous to Trinity, which forms the proper scope for Scripture interpretation, or a theology with an evident hermeneutic character can be discovered. The institutional opposition between the faculty of arts and that of theology, analogous to a competition between the theologian and the secular intellectual (already noted by Alain de Libera) could, in my opinion, be also analogous to competition between the idea (maintained by St. Bonaventure) that theology is the fundament of any science and the idea (present in the subtext of Boetius’ treatise) that theology is not even a
science, because about the volition of the living God there can be no dispute.

As a result of this analysis, we are able to claim that the fundament of the double truth myth should not be merely historically non-verifiable in Averroist texts, but that it is also something other than a malicious invention of the censors of Averroism. In reality, the myth of this theory may have been the result of a misreading of Siger’s intentions by St. Thomas Aquinas, or a misreading of Boetius’ intentions by Tempier, set against the conflict-laden background in which theology often finds itself.

If to Siger, and particularly to Boetius, a much more rigorous and careful thinker than the master of Brabant, theology is not a science, then there is no double truth because the truth secundum quid is the only truth that produces knowledge; whereas the other truth, that of faith, has a role that, at its limit, we might say exceeds human discourse. If, on the other hand, this discourse was not beyond the scope of human language, as St. Thomas Aquinas and equally Etienne Tempier presupposed, then Boetius’ demonstration, together with the idea that theology was indeed a science, does indeed appear to have lent support to the idea of a double truth, no matter how fond Boetius’s mind might have been to the idea that he might defend himself against this accusation by invoking fallacia secundum quid et absolute: in that case, theology and philosophy remain irreconcilable.

It must be observed that, if Siger had not maintained the unity of intellect, the idea that God cannot create several souls (in the context in which we accept an Aristotelian definition of the soul) would not have existed and with it, no “logical trap” as offered by Aquinas. In essence, this logical trap reveals that, if we impose the Aristotelian paradigm of knowledge on a theology that wishes to be accepted as a science, we obtain a double, and absurd, truth; whereas a realization that theology is not a science causes the double truth to disappear.

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In the same vain, if, in the wake of Boetius, we come back to the idea that the world is eternal, the result is that the domain of the philosophical sciences covers the hierarchy of the world, leaving no room for theology. Had space for theology been made nevertheless, it would have meant that creation was rationally demonstrable, or else, all that Boetius would not allow reason to achieve. In a similar way to the previous situation, the acceptance of theology as a science could have given rise to a double
truth (in between the situation of metaphysics and theology), while its dismissal eliminates any possible contradiction within the disputable propositions. The true meaning of this disputation may offer an image of the possible relation between miracle and discourse. In fact, Latin Averroism develops an excellent secular example of discourse of the miracle: maintained within the rigorous province of the ineffable, the miracle is indirectly signaled through a clear delimitation of the predictable space, reserved to what is human.

6. The Parisian university intellectual from the perspective of the disputations on the unity of the intellect and the double truth

Before enunciating the final thesis of the research undertaken hereto, let us review the main stages of the research: first we have supported the idea that the disputation on the unity of the intellect was not “an error of the philosophers”, nor a cleavage from Aristotelism. Rather it was the natural result of the problems raised by Aristotle’s treaty *About the Soul*, in respect of a view of the world that is common both to Aristotle and his commentators up to and including St. Thomas and according to which the intermediate intelligence encountered in *Liber de causis* can be joined to the theme of the possible intellect in *About the Soul*. Secondly, we have supported the idea that the theory of the double truth does not stem either from an error of the Averroists, as some believed, nor from any ill-will nor logical trap of the theologians, as others believed. It comes, in fact, from the sincere way in which the theologians understood the texts of the Averroists, for these theologians had assumed that theology is a science but they disagreed with the idea of the intermediary intelligence between God and the sub-lunar world; whereas the Averroists would tacitly deny that theology was a science and explicitly maintained the existence of the intermediary intelligence as a unique support of any disputable science. We may ask ourselves in this context: can the statute and the self-awareness of the academic [university] intellectuals really be the result of these disputations? If this is true, then do the idea of the unique intellect and the rejection of theology as a science form part of the defining statute of the European intellectual consciousness?

It should not be forgotten that the doctrinal disputations of the thirteenth century occurred at the time of certain institutional conflicts:
the disputation on the permission of the beggar monks to teach in universities, the various and inefficient papal prohibitions of teaching Aristotelianism at the university, the separation of a part of the Arts Faculty from the university between 1272 and 1275 under the guidance of Siger of Brabant. As mentioned by J. le Goff, Luca Bianchi, F. van Steenberghen, and Alain de Libera that these doctrinal disputations can, to a certain extent, be viewed in relation to the institutional disputations. On the other hand, the answer given by these authors was quite different from the question: how did these conflicts, institutional and doctrinal, contribute to the consciousness of intellectuals of their actors?

On the one hand, for J. le Goff and for F. van Steenberghen, institutional conflicts have played a major part in this and have determined the conflicts. J. le Goff followed by Pierre Michaud Quantin insist on the corporatist values of the Paris University, upon the consciousness of intellectual workers of both the students and professors. For these authors intellectual consciousness is given by the team [group] work, by the common statute, by the rites of initiation in the University, by the conflicts to which they have taken part in common, etc. No doubt this level of lecture is highly important, and it can explain the way in which university statutes have evolved, or the premises of the appearance of the humanist intellectual.

Another type of lecture pertains to Luca Bianchi, for whom the forming of the consciousness of the Parisian university intellectual at the end of the thirteenth century has two important sources: on the one hand, the phenomenon of university censorship, by which a dissident, elite group consciousness of the Averroists is developed; and on the other hand, in the doctrine of intellectual felicity, launched by Boetius of Dacia in *De summo bono*. According to Boetius, there exists a parallelism of the faculties of the soul with the levels of the world, and the top, supreme, level to which man has access is intelligence, corresponding to intellectual activity. As a result, the supreme activity is intellectual activity, and in society, the intellectual has to have the main role. The idea seems to have been spread in the Averroist milieu. A series of anonymous commentaries to Aristotle’s *meteorologica* have been preserved, in which the philosopher’s supreme virtue (magnanimitas, to which we shall come back to later) places the philosopher’s activity above all activities: “and I say that this science (philosophy – n.n.) is the utmost and most perfect one than any other science, so that the philosopher’s
state is the best state in relation to any other one ... the philosopher’s state is better than that of the prince”.  

These assertions correspond to sentence number 40 prohibited by Etienne Tempier at 1277: “[That] there is no more brilliant state than cultivation of philosophy”.  

Luca Bianchi’s lecture on these assertions summarizes with the thesis: the intellectual consciousness has emerged further to the intellectualist morals which the Latin Averroism launched at the Faculty of Arts of the University of Paris.

Alain de Libera launched a new type of lecture in his volume Penser de Moyen Age, having changed these grounds for interpretation. To this author, essential to the formation of the intellectual consciousness is the “experience of thought” (a term explicitly borrowed from Heidegger’s vocabulary) in the sense of the correct answer to the question: “who offered an intellectual consciousness to Latin Averroism?”; the answer has to be found for the way in which those authors have experimented with thought, that is, as Alain de Libera claims, by the magnanimity formula, of the supreme value of the intellectual virtues, which comes back to the contemplation of concepts and the intellectual life. This life style produced a competition with the monastic ascesis, and its most important representatives were, of course, Siger of Brabant and Boetius of Dacia, though also Dante and Meister Eckhart. The consistency of this disputation is given, for A. de Libera, by the opposition between magnanimitas and humilitas, so that the famous questio in which Siger of Brabant wonders whether humiliation is a virtue and answers: “but magnanimity represents a greater virtue than temperance in so far as honor is concerned” seems to be the centre of gravity for intellectual self-awareness of the epoch. If the possession of this magnanimitas, understood as possession of the intellectual virtues since Aristotle’s Etica Nicomahica and Politica, had lead to the assertion of a group identity, then the genesis of the medieval intellectual undoubtedly received sufficient explanation by resorting to these concepts.

However, there is an unexplained problem here and this may change the center of gravity of the discussion, to a given extent. The document of 1277 preceded a fundamental change in the vision of the world: the appearance in the following century of nominalism, for which the disappearance of the ontological support of the universal realities produced the negation of their existence, and then the change of the cosmologic horizon by Copernicus and Galilei, which succeeded the similar change in ontology achieved by Galilei and, in order to look
towards an even more far-off epoch, namely the end of the thirteenth century, we can say that the idea of Cartesian subjectivity that occurs after the end of the Middle Ages put an end to the analogy between soul and body as in the analyzed Parisian disputations.

Consequently, Tempier’s document can be analyzed in the context of the enormous impact it had on the genesis of the modern conscience. This means that the central theme of this document, i.e., the mediation between God and the sub-lunar world (as a unique [singular] intelligence, as a guarantor of the eternity of creation, as a propeller of heavens in the sense of intelligible heavens, etc.), must be placed into context with the source of the intellectual identity of the those incriminated. Knowing exactly what its aims were, Tempier’s document also needed to show naturally the origin of the legitimatization of the identity of those around Siger and Boetius. But Etienne Tempier refused the Averroist masters their statute of independence and competition in relation to the theologians, simultaneously rejecting the thesis of the unity of the intellect, together with the other theses coherent with this, as enumerated above. Thus, as a result of our research, we are able to formulate the idea that the theory of the intellectual felicity, the corporatist statute and all the other formulations on the identity of the Parisian intellectuals, can be subordinated to the theory of the unity of the intellect. In other words, accepting the fact that the intellect is unique for all people, that the link created with this intellect imposes the real experience of thought (according to Alain de Libera’s thesis), but at the same time that this singular, unique intelligence is a real existence in the world, a condition of any reality (the fourth gender of the being with Averroes, being in itself and the first of the things created after Liber de Causis), means to assume an image of the world in which the intellectual occupies the maximum place and in which he is born naturally as an assumption of the hierarchy of the world.

Etienne Tempier nonetheless dismantles this image of the world. If this is so, why did the intellectual not perish once and for all with it, in an epoch of nominalism, of the cosmologic revolution, of Cartesianism? The answer provides us with a new subject of research, beyond the limits of this study: because the intellectual knew how to preserve his inheritance and to reinvent it timely, in the language of each epoch. For instance, to Descartes himself, the “formal concept” by which he sustains divine existence is clearly identical to Averroes’s concept of a possible intellect from the theory of the two subjects of knowledge – the theme of the
Kantian transcendental subjectivity legitimizes the unity of human subjectivity, the dialogue and the intellectual identity of species, and the theme of the subject achieved by the experience of inter-subjectivity is a resumption of the same principle of individuation by the intellect’s own activity, inherited from the tradition of the Parisian university conflicts.
NOTES


7. Cf. Mandonnet, P. Siger de Brabant et l’averroisme latin au XIIIe siècle, première partie; Louvain, 1911.


9. We shall name our theme everywhere in this study “the unity of the intellect”. It is true that this thesis is related to the neo-Platonic idea of a singular soul, but this cannot bring about the generic denomination of “mono-psychism” for the whole problematic disputed, the way Claude Tresmontant (cf. La metaphysique du christianisme et la crise du XIIIe siècle, ed. Seuil, Paris, 1964) and F. van Steenberghen (La philosophie au XIIIe siecle Paris, 1966) have done.

10. A similar systematization of the idea is to be found with Alain de Libera (in Saint Thomas d’Aquin, Contre Averroes, Ed. GF-Flammarion, Paris, 1994, pp. 45-46).

11. Prop. 32. Quod intellectus est uno numero omnium, licet separetur a corpore hoc, non tamen ab omni. 27. Quod Deus non posset facere plures animas in numero. 31. Quod intellectus humanus est aeternus ... 102. Quod anima coeli est intelligentia, et orbes coelestes non sunt instrumenta intelligentiarum sed organa, sicut auris et oculis sunt organa virtutis sensitivae. 110. Quod motus coeli sunt propter animam intellectivam; et anima intellectiva sive intellectus non potest educi nisi mediante corpore.


14. According to Aristotle, De anima, for the complete list of the functions of the soul in 414a 30.

15. Cf. Aristotel, De anima, 408b 18-19, 413a 6, 429b 5.


There are several occurrences of the attributes of the intellect, following Anaxagoras (405a 15, 409a 29, 413b 24-26, etc.)

According to Aristotle, \textit{De anima}, 430a 24-25 for the expression “passive intellect” which represented the imagination for Ioan Filopon, Averroes and St. Thomas.


According to Aristotle, \textit{Etica Nicomahica}, 1178a 6-7, a passage often quoted by both St. Thomas and Albertus Magnus in order to show that the essence of man is expressed by the intellect.

Aristotle actually establishes several differences between the senses and the intellect: a) the too intense sensitives destroy the sense, whereas the intelligibles never destroy the intellect (424a 29); b) sense is generated from outside the soul (417b 17 sqq); c) the intellect can enunciate the possible, whereas the sense achieves only the act (426b 26); d) the error exists only at the level of the intellect because, we could argue, predication exists at the level of the intellect (427b 8-14).


According to St. Thomas, \textit{On the Unity of the Intellect}, §24. We understand by the expression “gauge in a Platonic sense” the theme of the third kind/gender of being from Timaios, 48e sqq.

Consequently, the distinction between the “passive” and “active” intellect is vulgarizing, wrong, meant to trouble us: a correct distinction might be that of between the possible intellect and an active intellect, keeping the expression “passive intellect” for the enigmatical sense of line 430a where Aristotle talks about this passive evanescent intellect, identified by Averroes, Filopon and St. Thomas with the imagination.


Both Themistius and Avicenna, in order to quote but two names from many, have endeavored a longer lecturing/reading of the passage: the light has its origin in the sun, analogical to Plato to the good, the same as the intellect agent contains the divine aspect of the intellect (although Aristotle named the whole intellect “divine”). We believe, however, that a more simple
interpretation is also possible: in *About the Soul*, the light is a special application of a general law of perception, which postulates the necessity of a mediation between the sense and the sensitive object. We have to notice the fact that this theory is a radicalization of a Platonist principle, which is to be found in *The Republic*, 507d, where Plato referred to the perception by intermediary only at the level of the sight and that of thought. To Plato, only the sight enjoys a middle term, as light, whereas the other senses are more 'humble'. Aristotle radicalizes this principle and applies it to all senses: sight has light as a middle term (418b 2-3), hearing has water and air (419b 18), and most interestingly, touching has as a middle term the very body itself (423a 15). Who is in this case the author of thoughts and perceptions? It is obvious that in a way that he who thinks is the compound (408b 14-15), in which, at least in the case of the tactile sense, the intermediary body is contained. But removing all intermediaries (body, water, light, intellect agent), we do not find anything consistent and present (for Alexander of Aphrodisia, the board on which there is nothing written, compared by Aristotle to the possible intellect – 4301 – is the sign of the absence of writing, and not the consistency of an empty board).


According to Filopon, ed. Verbeke, commentary to 430a 23-25, pp. 42-45. This is because Averroes does not quote Filopon in his commentary.


Cf. *Metafizica*, 1003a 31-33.


There are several Aristotelian allusions to the idea that the world of individuals imitates the eternity of heavens by the eternity of its species: *De anima*, 415b 2-7, *Physics*, VIII, 7-9, *De gener. et corruptione*, II,10, *Metaphysics*, 1072a 9-17. In a passage from *Physics* (212b 11-12), the place is accidentally attributed only to the soul and heavens.

Cf. *Metafizica*, 1050b 6-34.


It is true that such an assertion seems entirely to neglect the passage in *Metaphysics*, 1072b-1073a, which makes an analogy between the divine non-predicative thinking and the human intellect, saying that exceptionally
and rarely the intellect might know the previous. In reality there is no contradiction, since Aristotle refers in *De anima* to the current and natural usage of the intellect and in the passage from the *Metaphysics*, to its exceptional usage, which might loose its statute in its turn, if the previous would be set apart.

47 Cf. *De anima*, 415b 2-7.

According to Alexander of Aphrodisia, *About the Intellect*, §.20. It is possible, though, that this text not be authentic because of a large number of controversial theses at the beginning of the treaty – according to B.C.Bazan, *L’authenticité du « De intellectu » attribué a Alexandre d’Aphrodise*, in *Revue Philosophique de Louvain*, 1973, p. 468, sqq.


58 According to *Alberti Magnittractatus de unitate intellectus*, in *Opera omnia*, vol.XVII/b, Ed. Aschendorf, 1975, ed. Hufnagel, p.1, line 55: “They say that the movement of heavens is the movement of the intellectual substance”.
59 Cf. ed. Hufnagel, p. 2 r. 41-42.
60 According to the Hufnagel ed., p.2, line 42-46: “There is another position of the Arabs, which asserts that besides the intellect determining the movement of the planet, there is [also] the agent intelligence, which is inferior as an order to the celestial one, and this is the one that acts in the active and passive ones.”
61 Cf. ed. Hufnagel, p. 2 r. 50.

Cf. De unitate intellectus, §70.

Cf. De unitate intellectus, §7.


I.e., The matter, form and compound, according to De anima, 412a 3sqq. According to the Crawford ed., p. 409: Tertia autem .... The name can be criticized for of three reasons: (1) it leads to the illusion that the material intellect is the only subject of that agent, which is false because the other subject of cognition is the image; (2) the active intellect is also actualized by another matter with a relative degree of intelligibility, namely the celestial ether; (3) the denomination creates the illusion that the material intellect (as any matter) plurifies the received form within individuals, which is inexact – in Averroes’ case, intellect is non-determined for the material.

Cf. Timaios, 52d.


Cf. ed. Crawford, pp. 391-392 We have cited already these arguments and the theory of the two subjects in the paragraph devoted to the Aristotelian possible intellect.

According to the Crawford ed., p. 408: “As a consequence, it is possible that the philosophy to have existed always in the greatest part of the world, the way as man exists due to man and the horse due to the horse. Thus, theoretical intellect is neither to be generated nor corruptible.”

Cf. Liber de causis, prop. 22: “Esse vero quod est post aeternitatem et supra tempus est anima, quoniam est in horizonte aeternitatis inferius et supra tempus”.

Cf. Liber de causis, prop. 67: “Intelligentia non est in tempore, immo est cum aeternitate”.

Cf. Liber de causis, prop. 137, 149.

According to proposition 84 of Tempier’s censorship in Chartularium …

According to prop. 30, 61, 65. The logical corollary of the propositions we make reference to is proposition 189 from the same document of 1277.


Cf. R. de Vaux, La premiere d’Averroes chez les Latins, Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Theologiques, 1933 pp.193-245, sustains that it is possible that Gerardus of Cremona had already translated Averroes’ paraphrases to On the sense and sensed thing in 1175, although R.de Vaux sustains that there are no serious arguments in this sense. Reasoning according to the dedication which Mihail Scotus makes to Etienne de Provins in his translation of Averroes’ Commentary on Aristotle’s De coelo, it is possible for De Vaux that the year 1230 could have been a first year of influence for Averroes in Paris. Cf. R de Vaux, op.cit., p. 212. Another argument for R. de Vaux comes from a letter which he attributes to Frederic de Hohenstaufen, in which books were donated to the University of Paris around the 1230s; however, R.A. Gauthier (1982, cf. infra) rejected this argument, maintaining with philological arguments that the letter belongs to Frederic’s son, the young Manfrof of Sicily and is dated around 1260. Emphasizing this position, F.van Steenberghen , (op.cit., 1966), p. 111, is of the opinion that Averroes had no influence whatsoever before 1225, and that it would have been cited for the first time by Guillaume of Auvergne in Summa de Universo and in De anima, then by Phillipe le Chancellier in Summa de Bono, for real influence to be enjoyed after 1250 – cf. Steenberghen op. cit p 115. Zdzislaw Kuksewicz, in the volume De Siger de Brabant à Jacques de Paliance, La theorie de l’intellect chez les averroistes latins des XIIIe et XIVe siecles, Ossolineum, Editions de L’Academie Polonaise des Sciences, Wroclaw, Varsovie, Cracovie, 1968, mentions a manuscript dated 1263, which contains the majority of Averroes’ works translated into Latin, Cf. National Library of Paris, Latin manuscript, 15435, quoted in Z.Kuksewicz, De Siger de Brabant a Jacques de Plaisance, Ossolineum, 1968, p. 13. A new endeavour of taking attitude belongs to the priest R.A.Gauthier, Cf. R.A. Gauthier, op. cit., pp. 321-374, who maintains the idea of a philosophical influence enjoyed by Averroes during the second half of the century sets the year 1225 as terminus a quo for the translations from Averroes and suggests
a series of stages by which Averroes was received in the Latin world starting from this year.


99 Cf. Albertus Magnus, *Summa de homine*, q. 55: “sequentia enim Aristotilem et Averroym, ... dicimus intellectum agentem humanam esse coniunctum animae humanae“.


102 Cf. *Summa de universo*, II, 2, 9: “Sufficit autem intelligenti unicumque ad destructionem sermonis istius“.

103 Cf. *Summa de creaturis*, II, q.5, a.1.

104 Cf. S. Bonaventura, in II Sent., dist. XVIII, art. 2, q.1, *Utrum animae omnium hominum sint una substantia an diversae*.

105 Privileging the latter aspect, Alain de Libera noticed as follows: “The Latin Averroism was not set forth by Siger, it was initiated by the theologians and adopted by the master of Brabant” (according to *Penser au moyen Age*, Ed. Seuil, 1991, p. 41).


108 Cf. Siger of Brabant, Ed. Bazan, p. 9, line 20-22: *Dico quod intellectus non fuit factus in nunc temporis, nec in nunc aeternitas, sed in tempore non continuo, sed composito ex ipsis nunc*. – I say that the intellect was not produced at the moment of time, nor at the moment of eternity, but in a discontinuous time composed of these moments. Liber de causis prop. 210 : *Inter rem cuius substantia et actio sunt in momento aeternitas et inter rem cuius substantia et actio sunt in momento temporis existens est medium, et est illud cuius substantia est ex momento aeternitas et operation ex momento temporis*. – Between the thing whose substance and action are at the moment of eternity and the thing whose substance and actionare at the moment of time there is a mediation, and its substance comes from the moment of eternity and its action from the moment of time.

109 Cf. ed. Bazán, p. 56, r. 69-71 : “Et necessarium est ei cui ponit unum intellectum omnibus quod hoc sit per intentiones imaginatas”.


112 Cf. ed. Bazán, p. 28, r. 74 –78: “Nec intelligas quod intellectus unus prius sit in duobus vel in tribus vel in mille quam intentiones imaginatas, sed potius e converso est".


Cf. *** Trois commentaires ..., p. 76, r. 77-82: “Commentator secundo huius dicit quod corpora supercoelestia manifeste videntur intelligere et Aristoteles secundo Coeli et mundi hoc vult, cum tamen illa dicantur intelligere ex unione quae est ipsius intelligentis ad illa corpora, non quod intelligens sit unitum eis tamquam forma materiae sed solum ut motor”.


For all this, the ambiguous formulations are not missing, either from Siger’s text: for instance, although man is not his intellect, Siger says: “Intellectus enim noster apprehendit se ipsum sicut operari” (Questio 4, ed. Bazan, p. 14).

According to §4 of this study.


Is is an expression of the magnanimity of the philosopher, as opposed to the Christian, ascetic ideal. According to R.A. Gauthier, Magnanimité, l’ideal de la grandeur dans la philosophiepaïenne et dans la theologe chrétienne, ed. J.Vrin, Paris, 1951, pp. 466-488.


Cf. De unitate ..., § 1-14, Summa contra Gentiles, II, 61.

Cf. De unitate ..., § 15.

Cf. De anima, 403a 10, 413a 3, 429b 4, 429b 21

Cf. De unitate ..., § 9. Also in Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 79, art. 5, sol. 1: “Intellectus dicitur separatus quia non est actus alicuius organi corporalis (...), non quasi sit aliqua substantia separata”.

The expression is taken from Averroes, according to ed. Crawford, p. 384, also according to note 106 of Alain de Libera, op.cit., p. 231


Cf. Bernardo Bazán, Le dialogue philosophique entre Siger de Brabant et Thomas d’Aquin, in Revue Philosophique de Louvain, 1974, p. 55 sqq

Cf. De quindecim problematibus, VII.

This idea had been already formulated by Albertus in On Fifteen Problems, 7 and by St. Thomas in Summa theologica, Ia, q.76, a.3 and also in Summa contra Gentiles, II, 68.
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132 Cf. E Wéber, op. cit., p. 188.
133 Cf. S. Thomae Aquinatis Super librum de causis Commentarium, lectio 18.
134 Cf. De unitate ..., §89.
135 Cf. De unitate ..., §27.
137 Cf. De unitate ..., §67-75, Contra Gentiles, II, 59, sed contra 1, 2, In de an. ad. 429a 20.
138 According to Quaestiones..., q 8, ed. Bazan p.25, line 26-27: “[that] the intellect is moving the body or driving force/propeller in the body – id est intellectus est movens corpus vel motor in corpore”.
140 Cf. De unitate ..., § 94-96, Contra Gentiles, II, 73.
141 In the spirit of Aristotle’s indication in De anima, 430a 23-25.
142 Cf. De unitate ..., 106-113, De ente et essentia, II, 110-120, Contra Gentiles, II, 75, arg.2 pro sqq. Q. disp. de sp. creat., art. 9, şi Averroes¹⁴³, Comm. Magnus ..., 5, Albert the Great, De unitate intellectus, arg. 27 pro.
143 Cf. ed. Hufnagel, p. 29, line 6-64. The argument in favor of Averroes’ point of view has, however, nothing of the Thomist distinction quo/qu; it even seems to be in accordance with Averroes with regard to this intelligible species: Albertus is contented to say that receiving an intelligible species in the possible intellect is not an actualization, a fact which Averroes did not deny. “Haec enim receptio per actum, qui esta cuts possibilis, est receptio speciei hoc modo quo species specierum recipit speciei, et est receptio loci hoc modo quo id quod recipitur, non particulatur per ipsum recipiens” (ed. Hufnagel, p. 29, line 52-56).
144 After mentioning the idea of the unity of the intellect as deriving from the uniqueness of intellectum in this treatise (the leonine ed., line 95-110, translation E. Munteanu, Iasi, 1999, pp. 64-65), St. Thomas says: “quis non est universalitas illius formae secundum hoc esse quod habet in intellectu, sed secundum quod refertur ad res ut simillimudo rerum, sicut etiam si esset una statua corporalis repraesentans multos homines, constat quod illa imago vel species statuae haberet esse singulare et proprium .... - that the universality pertains to this form and not according to the coming into being which it detains within the intellect, but to the extent to which it refers to things as an embodiment of them; thus, for instance, if there was a corporeal statue representing several people, it is obvious that the image or the aspect (the species – my note) of the statue would be embodied in a singular and own species.” (translation E. Munteanu). One can see that in this text imago and species have, for the time being, a synonymous value.
145 Cf. De unitate ..., § 87-88.
146 Cf. De unitate ..., § 102.
We have to remember that for St. Thomas, the image is not missing from intellection, which is always a *conversion ad phantasmata* (according to *S. Theol.*, Ia, q. 83).

Our presupposition seems to be supported also by the analysis which father Weber has made of the notion of *species intelligibilis – quo intelligitur*. The author sustains that it is about an extra-Aristotelian source of this idea, namely the areopagitical theory of enlightening cognition by God. Cf. E. Weber, *op. cit.*, Chapter VIII, *L’origine de la forme intelligible*, p. 312: “La façon thomiste de comprendre ‘intellect chez l’homme s’inspire également du grand néoplatonicien (Plotin – my note) mais interprétée avec Denys et ses sources”.

In *Contra Gentiles*, II, 53, the intelligible form is but an *intentio rei intellectae* produced by the divine enlightening of the intellect. Cf. Dyonisos Pseudo-Areopagita, *On the Divine Names*, Chapter 5. We must note that if this enlightening is sufficient for cognition, it can also ensure the intellection after death.

Cf. *De unitate*, § 86.

Cf. Chartularium ... 499-500, doc. nr. 441: ... convocatis propter hoc magistris omnibus et singulis in ecclesia sancte Genovefe Parisiensis, statuimus et ordinamus quod nullus magister vel bachellarius nostrae Facultatis aliquam quaeestionem pure theologicam, utpote de trinitate et incarnatione sicque de consimilibus omnibus, determinare seu etiam disputare praesumat, tanquam sibi determinatos limites transgrediens, cum sicut dicit Philosophus, non geometram cum geometra sit penitus inconveniens disputare ... statuimus insuper et ordinamus quod si quaestionem aliquam quae fidem videatur attingere simulque philosophiam, alicubi disputaverit Parisius, si illam contra fidem determinaverit, ex tunc ab eadem nostra societate tanquam haereticus perpetuo sit privatus.

Cf. Chartularium ..., p. 523, doc. Nr. 460, which comprises the expression “Procurator vero partis adversae, quae pars Sigerii communiter nominatur ...”.

Ne autem, quod sic inuunt, asserere videantur, responiones ita palliant quod, dum cupiunt vitare Scillam, incidunt Caribdim. Dicunt enim ea esse vera secundum philosophiam, sed non secundum fidem catholicam, quasi sint duae contrariae veritates ...


Cf. Sancti Thomae Aquinatis tractatus *De unitate intellectus contra averroistas*, editio critica, <curavit> L. W. Keeler, Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, textus et documenta, series Philosophica, 12, Roma, 1936, § 123: *Adhuc autem gravius est quod postmodum dicit: “per rationem concludo de necessitate, quod intellectus est unus numero; firmiter tamen teneo oppositum per fidem”. Ergo sentit quod fides sit de aliquibus, quorum contraria de necessitate concludi possunt. Cum autem de necessitate concludi non possit nisi verum necessarium, cuius oppositum est falsum impossibile, sequitur secundum eius dictum quod fides sit de falso impossibili, quod etiam Deus facere non potest: quod fidelium aures ferre non possunt. Non caret etiam magna temeritate, quod de his quae ad philosophiam non pertinent, sed sunt purae fidei, disputare praesumit, sicut quod anima patiatur ab igne inferni, et dicere sententias doctorum de hoc esse reprobandas. Pari enim ratione posset disputare de trinitate, de incarnatione, et de aliis huiusmodi, de quibus nonnisi caecutiens loqueretur.*


The text was discovered by the Hungarian researcher in a private collection of anonymous manuscripts in Budapest and subsequently identified as the purportedly lost opuscule by Boetius. Cf. *Un traite recement decouvert de Boece de Dacie De mundi eternitate, texte inedit avec une introduction critique par Sajo Geza*, avec en appendice un texte inedit de Siger de Brabant *Super VI Metaphysicae*, Budapest, Akademiai Kiado, 1954, reprinted in Berlin in 1964 (for the 2-nd ed., cf. supra).

Cf. the 1953 edition of the treatise, p. 37.


Cf. F. van Steenberghen, *La philosophie au XIlleme siecle*, Louvain, 1966, p.389: “Let us first note that there is no trace in Siger’s writings of the famous theory of the double truth that has often been attributed to him after P.Madonnet”.


Cf. Alain de Libera (1001), p. 123: “This is precisely what Tempier rejects: the possibility of a peaceful coexistence of the philosopher and the believer. For this reason he invents the double truth.”


Cf. Ed. Bazan, p. 84, r. 47-48: Sed nihil ad nos nunc de Dei miraculis, cum de naturalibus naturaliter disseramus.
Cf. Albert the Great, *De generatione et corruptione*, in *Opera*, vol. IV, p. 363 and St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, I, q. 76, a.5, ad 2m.


Cf. Boetius of Dacia, *op.cit.* §. 8: Unde conclusio in qua naturalis dicit mundum et primum motum non esse novum, accepta absolute, falsa est, sed si referatur in rationes et principia ex quibus eam concludit, ex illis sequitur. Scimus enim quod qui dicit Socratem esse album et qui negat Socratem esse album, secundum quaedam uterque dicit verum.


“Quod non est excellentior status quam vacare philosophiae”.
