New Europe College Yearbook 1998-1999

RADU BERCEA
DANIELA RODICA JALOBEANU
KÁZMÉR TAMÁS KOVÁCS
MIRCEA MICLEA
MIHAELA MIROIU
MIHAI-VLAD NICULESCU
RADU G. PĂUN
IOANA POPESCU
MONICA SPIRIDON
MIHAI-VLAD NICULESCU

Born in 1967, in Bucharest

Ph.D. student, Philosophy Department, University of Toronto
Tutor in philosophy, University of Toronto

Associate Member of the Canadian Society of Patristic Studies
Associate Member of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy
Member of the Classical Studies Society, Romania

Herder Scholarship, University of Vienna (1991-1992)
Mellon Scholarship, Catholic University of America (1992-1997)
Connaught Scholarship, University of Toronto (1999-2001)
University of Toronto Fellowship (2001-2003)

Participation in international conferences, symposia, etc., in Romania and Canada.

Articles and essays published in Romania and abroad.
Empathic Meeting
From an Intentional to an Expectational Model of Phenomenological Intersubjectivity

Phenomenology as the Change from a Naturalist to a Personalist Attitude

The absolute novelty brought by phenomenology is, according to Husserl, one of philosophical attitude (8/36-37; 7/110sq.; 5/99sq.). The phenomenologically modified attitude consists in the switch from the naïve involvement of the naturalist philosopher or scientist with the world viewed as an absolute, external datum or, for the same reason, from the naïve involvement of the naturalist psychologist with the “inner experience” of the psyche as an absolute inner datum, to the realization of the intentional structures which correlate the object with a world-constituting ego.

The attitudinal switch of interest from the object as “natural” absolute fact to the object as merely intended and as correlate of an intending subject is not only a change of perspective but, one might affirm with full confidence, the first comprehensive thematization of the intentional perspective as such. Only by admitting that the internal or external objectualities are objects-for-somebody, more exactly, for me as an ego, and that all apperceptive process is intentional (that is, it is performed in the mode “for me” or “for another ego like me”), one can talk of a true perspective on the world and of the world as truly perspectival.

The concept of attitude (Einstellung) used by Husserl in describing the main contribution of phenomenology represents a programmatic assumption of perspectivalism. Phenomenology ascertains the need for assuming a full perspectival approach to the world and to our mundane selves, which represents the foundation for a new, more rigorous type of philosophy. In that respect the change brought by phenomenology is not simply the replacing of one theory or system with another, but rather the revaluation of the possibility of all sciences and of philosophy itself on the ground of the intentional life of the ego and of the inter-subjective community of monadic egos.
The abstract discussion about the contrast between the sensualistic and psychologist realism of the sciences and the phenomenological attitude can be better understood if it is drawn on a more personal level. Material nature and material objectualities are “at hand” for us in the privileged experience of our body, while the soul (as viewed in the naturalist perspective) is immediately evident as the aestesiological stratum which animates the body and is localized in the body. However, our dissatisfaction with the purely naturalist approach to our body and its soul as naturally introjected aesthesiological stratum is obvious. We notice an “excess of reality” both in the objectively but naturally considered body and in the naturalistically considered soul. The body that I use to call mine is not just another thing in the world of things (although it indubitably is also that), but the instrument of my will and of my free movement and is ruled by what I can roughly identify as “the me myself”. However, my aesthesiological access to the body is not lacking perspective and, thus, it manifests a certain “distance” from this taken for granted “me myself.” I do not, for example, see my face as I can see my hands, although I consider them both as “obviously mine;” I can touch my eyes but this experience will not match the internal sense of ownness that I have over my eyes as conveyed in sight. In other words, my senses complement each other in a sophisticated net of perspectives, perspectives which give me the sensual reality of my body as a perspectively constituted “mine” and not (as I was first inclined to think) as a taken for granted “me myself.” This means that even my body as the first mundane object available to me has its objectual transcendence when considered by me myself and, thus, that the apperception of my body leaves an objectual rest, which makes room for renewed approaches over the same thing “body” in renewed experiences and under new biases.

This example of the body and, by extension, of the body-soul compound as it is understood by the naturalist approach is crucial for the rejection of the commonsensical naïve or the scientifically naïve perspectives on the absolute givenness of the “natural” objectualities. Even at this bodily aesthesiological level perception is perception through the senses and therefore perception for somebody that is intentional perception. The objectual residue (the “more than what can be perceived in a single perspective”) which has been taken, in the case of the body, as a clue for the transcendence of the object over against the “me myself” refers us back to the constituting subject as this person here, that is as a concrete subject in which converge a multitude of intentional actions and passions.
But even in this subject there is an “excess of reality” or a subjectal residue left over each perspectival act of self-analysis.\(^5\) The ego is not simply a world constituting ego and a sum of all intentionalities; it is also a world-transcending ego, that is, it transcends not only the world of objectualities constituted by him, but also himself as a subject which takes part in this world (as “this person here”). As transcendental ego he is both one with the mundane, psycho-physical ego and also a “something” more than this mundane ego.

The two transcendences, namely that of the object and that of the subject, are not evident in the naturalist attitude, but, as the transcendental phenomenologist knows, they are anonymously “at work” in it. Detaching the transcendent dimension from the natural one is, therefore, the task of transcendental phenomenology and this can be accomplished only by a rigorous carrying over of the transcendental reduction of all mundane evidences to the transcendental ego (5/122-123). It is this reduction that marks the change of attitude from the naturalist to the phenomenological and the phenomenologically transcendental dimensions, therefore reduction should be considered as a performance that empowers the phenomenologist to disenchant the man of science or the naturalist philosopher kept under the spell of the worldly object as absolutely given.

Reduction brings for the first time on the scene the ego as a world-constituting instance and as the pole in which converge all the mundane objectualities. Nevertheless, reduction is solely a reduction to the ego and this raises important questions about the possibility of constituting other egos than myself. To put it differently, I, as performer of the reduction, do not have the feeling that my reductive experience fully accounts for my experience of the others as egos ruling over their bodies and instituting their perspective on the world (including myself) from their standpoint. This dissatisfaction is legitimate and calls for further analysis. It is also important because it conveys a basic fear of mine as transcendentally reduced ego, namely that of ending up in mere solipsism.

There are two ways in which Husserl suggests that the matter of solipsism should be addressed:\(^6\) first it should be noted that the transcendence of the object by comparison with all egologically performed intentional acts makes us aware not only of the finitude of the perspectival approaches of my ego, but also of the co-possibility of other finite perspectival approaches carried over by egos other than myself. In other words, the object is a pointer not only to myself but also to others like myself, co-focussed on the same transcendent object.
Secondly, if I consider the body of another as a worldly object I have the strange evidence of an immediately apperceived body instrumented by a per se inaccessible ego, an ego that, although it is not mine, manifests in the same way as I do. Thus, this other ego appears not simply as an objectual transcendence or as the egologic transcendence of my ego, but rather as the analogically considered transcendence of another ego like me. The question is if reduction could account for this experience. This is a question which Husserl has tried to answer in different ways and in different contexts but not always with convincing results. The significance of the difficulties raised by this question will constitute an important part of the argumentation in the following sections of this essay.

Starting from Husserl’s phenomenological “scenario” of the reduction as delineated in *The Cartesian Meditations*, I would like to show first that the egological reduction is, in fact, only the manifest stratum of a latent, anonymously presupposed inter-subjectivity. This will lead me next to a revaluation of the Husserlian notion of empathy for which Buber’s personalism and some key concepts of the Kleinian school of psychoanalysis will use as valuable sources of clues and indications. The comparison between these approaches will hopefully allow me to reshape the Husserlian understanding of empathy by integrating in the discussion the possibility of letting the other be otherwise than in strict accordance with the intentional structures of my ego.

**The Phenomenological Reduction as Primal Uncovering of the Polarity I-Other**

*The Crisscrossing of Prospective Intentionality and Retrospective Pointing*

The motivation for initiating the phenomenological reduction is, for Husserl, the necessity of an absolutely fundamented science, a science based on apodictic evidences (8/28–30). In the first Cartesian meditation, this aim to an apodictic evidence was identified as “a vague idea of science” which the philosopher uses tentatively as a precursory presumption (7/8–10). The reason why such a tentative presumption does not fall under the epoche along with the other presumptions is not immediately evident. There is, in fact, what one may call an originary “trust” which Husserl preserves from suspension, the trust that such a
rigorous science is possible and that it is within one’s power to find it. Such a presumption has, indeed, a powerfully motivating role, but, at the same time, it could be suspected of the same naïveté as the one manifested by the naturalist attitude of the common sense or of the sciences of fact.

For Husserl, the epoche, or the suspension introducing the reduction, consists in the canceling of the naïve beliefs in the facts of the world. This allows an attitudinal change, which consists in beginning to treat the worldly objects not as given but as merely intended, as merely supposed, as phenomena in need of an apodictic legitimization. This methodical distrust in the evidence of the world and of the sciences of fact, in so far as they are not apodictically grounded, is still trustful, that is non-skeptical. In the very distrusting, the philosopher preserves the aim for an apodictical evidence and pays heed to this aim as to a teleological clue. This aim is something that he trusts in order to verify rather than verifies in order to trust.

In order to validate or to invalidate this pre-reductively trusted aim, Husserl proposes one’s immersion (einleben) in the noematic phenomenon science. This immersion implies the full assumption of the naïve attitude of the sciences and a reenactment in oneself of this naïveté as the starting point of the phenomenological suspension. However, this regression to the naïve fascination for the objects as if absolutely given is guided not by a rational project, but by a pre-rational trust in the possibility of making sense of the naïve experience in a scientific way. We realize now two aspects that distinguish this teleological trust from the naturalist naïveté: first, as a precognitive aim, it survives the epoche, while the naïvely constituted evidences are given up; secondly, the preservation of this aim in the form of the vague idea “science” is based on a tentative crediting of what will be later called “the noematic phenomenon” without any recourse to a trans-intentional presupposition such as those of the naturalist or psychologist realism. The aim of apodictical evidence is something that awaits verification within the same stream of consciousness in which it first appeared, i.e. in the intentional life of the ego.

This aim is pursued as it is given in the imperfectly grounded act of cognition pertaining to the particular sciences, but it is not credited as fully valid until the apodicticity of the ego cogito has been reached. Thus, it is worthwhile noticing that the ego trusts what he attempts to legitimate and legitimates what he has pre-cognitively trusted. It also means that the reduction was made possible by a trust motivation, which is anonymously supporting the intentional performances of the ego.
The actual performance of the phenomenological reduction comprises a two stages transition: first, from a naive straightforward position to a systematical overthrow of worldly evidences, then, from this overthrow to a re-legitimization of the old evidences on a new, transcendental basis. During these two stages the intentional performance (first anonymous, then thematized) develops along the same trajectory, namely the one deployed between the subjective and the objective poles and it is motivated by the at first vague, then actualized, aim to an apodictically grounded science.

The reductive uncovering of this trajectory, which was anonymously present in all the naïve relations of a subject to an object, starts with the discrediting of the naive belief in the factuality of the world; it, then, proceeds to the overthrow of the straightforward positivity of concrete sciences and ends up in a general epoche in which the unconcealed aim at apodictic cognition brings to thematization the until then unthematized, anonymous, voice of the transcendental ego.

But is the voice of the ego alone that is being heard in the transcendental reduction? Had the reduction implied only the cogito and its correlative cogitata, we could have said so in full confidence. Nevertheless, the primordial aim, which motivated the ego for the undertaking of the reduction, and accompanied him throughout his immersion in the naïveté of the sciences and all the way through the actual performance of the reduction, might indicate otherwise. Since the vague idea science is something that we would not look for unless we had somehow already found, could we truly say that this protointentional aim validated by the reduction is an index of the ego only? A closer analysis of this pre-reductive aim shows that it points toward a foundation of science in an other-trusting-ego, an ego that takes the risk of appropriating himself only after it has fully immersed himself in the world phenomenon as if in an all engulfing other. Thus, unlike the intentional approach expressed in the cogito and the cogitational reduction which are rather defensively dealing with the alterity as something that needs to be egologically preconditioned, this aim is heterologically oriented from the very beginning.

Let us examine, for a moment, the two attitudes that were put in stark contrast by the reduction, namely the naïve and the reductive one. Both are intentional performances, which we carry on while being immersed in the world phenomena. This means that the trajectory of the two is the same (the subject-object), while the directions marked by the shifts of intentionality (the perspectival attitudes) are different. The object-fascinated
fact-orientation of the ego in the straightforward, naive attitude is reversed by
the reduction and it is turned into a world-for-me orientation. Thus, in
the reductive reversal, an irreducible polarity is finally revealed, namely
the I-other, in which the worldly other is presented as an other-for-me,
into the egological sphere of my consciousness.

After being reduced to the ego cogitans as to the apodictic evidence
able to ground an absolute science, the straightforward perspective
preceding the reversal is reestablished on a different basis with a new,
phenomenological, legitimization. The fundamental structure of this newly
constituted straightforwardness is correlative or polar (noetic-noematic);
in it the subjective and the objective poles are distinctly united in the
same stream of cogitationes. The apperceived object, as cogitatum, is a
pointer, or clue (Leitfaden), referring us back to the constituting cogitatio,
which, in turn, refers us back to the genetic intentional life of the
transcendental ego (to the ego cogitans) (7/52). Each objectivity, as a
transcendent immanence appearing in the stream of consciousness, is
synthesized according to eidetic rules and, when cognition is properly
performed, the egological synthesis gives us the synthesized state of affairs
both in the mode “my very own” (subjectively constituted sameness) and
“it itself” (the sameness of the object back-pointing toward the ego). Thus,
the object, in its it-selfness, is referring us back to the intending ego,
therefore its immanent appearance in the stream of consciousness
represents not only a delimitation of two polar realities, one of egological
ownness and another of ego pointing objectual otherness, but also the
delineation of two correlative performances pertaining to the two poles,
namely an egological object-pointing intending and a heterological ego-
pointing spontaneity. I shall call the first perspective an ego-fugal one,
and the second an ego-petal one.

These two perspectives orientations or attitudes (object intending and
ego pointing) crisscross within the same intentional trajectory and, thus,
they coincide in a perfect equivocation. In order to break this equivocation
we have first to take it for granted and to trustfully immerse ourselves in it
so that we can proceed from within to a phenomenological “delving”
into the constitutional “history” of the naively posited evidences. Only so
we shall be able to distinguish between the various evidential strata given
therein.
The Reduction as the Uncovering of the Self-Sameness of the I over against the Sameness of the I’s Other

On the trajectory ego-cogitatio- (the other as) cogitatum the reduction represents the egopetal itinerary from the cogitatum to the ego cogitans. Thus, in the first meditation Husserl starts by raising the problem of the legitimacy of the naïve attitude or the naïve fascination with the cogitatum. In the second meditation Husserl lays open the field of transcendental experience and delineates the basic correlative structures of the intentional life of the ego (noetic-noematic). The focus has now drawn back from the cogitatum to the cogitatio. This position will be also characteristic of the third meditation, which presents this correlative, or polar, structure in terms of truth and actuality and brings into discussion the material and formal ontological regions as pointers toward the ego. The uncovering of the whole trajectory cogitatum-cogitatio-ego cogitans is accomplished in the fourth Cartesian meditation when the focus will move entirely on the ego as the world-constituting pole.

In the fourth Cartesian meditation Husserl raises for the first time in this work the idea of a separate investigation on the ego, first as transcendental ego, then as mundanized psychological monad. The reduction following the overthrow was only the beginning of the delimitation of the sphere of transcendental subjectivity as an apodictical basis for possible world constitution, but it is only now, in the fourth meditation, that issues such as the relationship between the transcendental ego and his cogitationes, and the identity of the ego as inner temporal evidence, are raised. It is not the ego within the cogitationes that we are now looking at, but the cogitationes as pointers toward the transcendent ego.

Husserl considers that in each process of identification synthesis I am abidingly the ego who synthesizes the state of affairs. The judgment resulting from my judging is part of my stream of consciousness and, due to its eidetical reiterability it can be recognized as the same in various performances. Verification or cancellation account for the sameness of the judgmentally articulated state of affairs which, in turn, points back to the original self-sameness of the synthesizing ego, as basis for any objectual identity whatsoever. If viewed under the mode of identity, the transcendental ego represents the starting point of genetic phenomenology, the sphere in which all transcendent immanence is presented as noematic phenomenon with a history formation of its own.
The self-sameness, which is given in our transcendental experiencing of I myself during the constitutional intending of mundane objects, is a very complex reality. Although the object is in straightforward intending the first to refer us back to our ego identity, in eidetic terms the identity of the eidos ego always has precedence. The eidos ego is a purely possible ego that comprises all pure possibility-variants of my de facto ego and this ego itself qua possibility together with all its variants of objective ownness (7/70-75).

But defining the ego as the unity pole of the stream of intentionalities is only one way of approaching the ego. As a matter of fact, the ego as the point of convergence of the multiple cogitationes appears more in the mode “one” rather than “one and the same.” It is not because the cogitationes converge in one point that we have an evidence of the ego as the same (this would be somehow a relapse in the psychologist error), but rather because the reduced intentionalities leave us with a primal, irreducible evidence of a transcendent ego. The problem with considering this ego as absolutely “one and the same” is indeed very important. On the one hand, the ego is not a unified bundle of intentionalities as the psychologist thinks, while, on the other, its ‘pre-givenness” is never a trans-intentional one. Moreover, the self-reflection of the ego is submitted to the same eidetic rules as any other intentional act, which means that a self-reflecting ego is both an ego cogitans and an ego cogitatum that is a subject-object. The capacity of the reflexive ego as noematic phenomenon or cogitatum to refer us back to an ego as performer of the noesis presents us with the strange evidence of an originally alienated ego which is at the same time a subject and its primal object of reflection.

I would like to suggest that approaching the ego through reflexivity, be it the reflexivity of the ego on himself or his reflection on the eidetic structure of experience, is not the most originary way in which the evidence of the ego can be given. The phenomenological reduction involves, indeed, also reflexivity, but it is not essentially reflexive. In order to make this more evident I shall contrast two attitudes that the ego has during the reduction, namely abstention and reflexivity. Both of them refer the ego back unto himself but while reflection thematizes each intentional act transforming it into a second-degree object, abstention refers us back to the ego without objectifying it. In abstaining from crediting a certain fact, what appears most evidently is the fact as dis-credited or parenthesized, while what we call the ego as the subjectal rest (as what’s left after the discredited object has been blocked out from our horizon) is an anonymous
self-experience (that of the ego as merely abstinent) which can be, indeed, further thematized through reflection. Thus, what gives the ego to himself in a sui generis prereflective thematization is the abstention not the reflection and, therefore, the ego as abstentive is more originary than the ego as reflexive. This abstentive ego is what Husserl sometimes calls (with a somehow awkward formula) the Pre-ego (das Vor-Ich).\textsuperscript{8} I shall avoid this denomination due to the misinterpretations to which is exposed by seeming to imply the possibility of a trans- or pre- intentional ego. Instead I shall call this ego an abstentive one or a subjectal rest, which rules out any detachment of the ego from the intentional stream.

It is very important to notice that the transcendental ego as subjectal rest is not absolute (in the etymological sense of the word, that is “unbound,” “disconnected” from the intentional stream), and therefore that the suspicion of solipsism has no serious motivation even when dealing with the so-called egological reduction. What is left from the reduction is only the ego as abstentive, that is the ego negatively pointing to the objectualities from which he has abstained as blocked out positivities. To put it differently, the abstentive ego is the self-same pole of the ego-petal performance, which is the reduction, and it continues during the reduction to point (albeit negatively) to an other pole. The reflection of the ego on himself is just a secondary development following the abstention and it is designed to thematize what has been prereflectively given in the performance of the abstention.

With this realization I would like to introduce another terminological distinction that Husserl does not make explicitly but which, I think, is implied by his description of the reduction. I shall from now on use the term reduction in a narrow sense (which is also the etymological one, that of “drawing back upon”), by contrast with intention, which I shall apply only to the straightforward propagation of the intentional gaze (in accordance with the etymology of the term “intention”). For Husserl both the reduction and the intentional focusing on a thing thematized as such are indiscriminately called intentionalities. In giving up the Husserlian broad use of the terms intention and intentionality I hope to be able to emphasize what remains equivocally hidden in the Husserlian discourse, namely the complementarity of the naive straightforward attitude and the reduction. They represent the ego-fugal pro-ponent and ego-petal abstinent performances of the same ego, which institutes two different phenomenological attitudes, the radical naturalist (ego-fugal) and the radical
phenomenological (egopetal) one, which need to be correlated and thus balanced.⁹

Summing up the results of the above investigations, I would say that the reflection of the reduction has delineated a primordial self-sameness of the ego first as abstinent then as self-reflexive and has pointed toward a transcendence of the object as the residue of the many perspectival approaches to the object. The mundanization of the subjectal and objectal rests represent the person as intending psycho-physical monad and the worldly object as intended in the horizontal region of the ego. The reduction has also delineated the basic attitudes of the two poles (if I may use the word “attitude” in a larger sense than the anthropological one), namely the egopetal and egofugal attitudes on the side of the subject and the heterofugal attitude on the side of the object. This proves that the so-called solipsistic reduction is basically a delineation of an egological-heterological trajectory, and the uncovering of a heterological disposition of the ego. Both in forward intention and in abstentive reduction the ego is an ego-to-the other, the role of the other remaining to be filled either with natural or with personal objects.

The Intersubjective Attitude and the Contrast between the Alter and the Aliud as Distinct Regions of the Heterological Domain

The fifth Cartesian meditation introduces the problem of intersubjectivity, parting, therefore, with the so-called solipsistic reduction in the first four meditations. Thus, we can remark a shift of interest in the course of the Cartesian meditations from the ego as solely world-constituting instance to the world as co-constituted by a community of ego-s bound by empathy.

The question, which now arises, is if such a shift has indeed a Cartesian precedent and which would it be. The closest analogy with the Cartesian approach would be the fourth and the sixth parts of The Discourse on the Method, which I had the opportunity to analyze in a previous essay. In both the fourth and the sixth sections of The Discourse the figures of alterity are prominent and they seem to put pressure on the ego cogitans to acknowledge some sort of intersubjectivity, an intersubjectivity which, in Descartes’ case, was a theological one. Moreover, intersubjectivity in the form of an originary relation with a truthful God is the one that assures man not only of the consistency of his cogitations regarding the world as
cogitatum, but also of the truth or the adequacy of these cogitations to the substrates of the merely intended world.

Beside the basic analogy consisting in the fact that both for Husserl and for Descartes intersubjectivity is viewed as the main response to the solipsistic position, the differences between the two approaches are considerable. First of all it should be noted that the theological setting of Descartes’ discourse on alterity introduces a sort of intersubjectivity in which the personal partners occupy very disproportionate positions. While man’s position is finite and perspectival, God’s position seems to be infinite and trans-perspectival or, maybe, maximally perspectival (it comprises all possible perspectives in full actuality). This is not the case for Husserl who takes into discussion the appresentation of the alter ego in a strictly mundane context, that is as a community of equally finite partners having before them the infinite task of apperceiving, critically verifying and validating a common world of natural objects.

Another difference which has to be pointed out is that, while for Descartes the divine veracity is used as an assurance of the adequation of the cogitations to the intended world, for Husserl inter-subjectivity is a theme in its own rights which precedes genetically the so-called solipsistic apperception. Thus, Husserl delimits a whole region of otherness besides that of the natural or ideal objects as transcendental clues, namely the region of personalistic otherness as presented in the experience of empathy. From now on I shall call the objects of the naturalist world by the generic name of aliud and the objects (actually the other subjects) of the personalistic sphere as the alter.

Although constituted into two different ontological regions, the alter and the aliud do not split the noematic phenomenon into two types of evidences, an aliud-type and an alter-type. The alter ego as world-constituting ego outside of me as the I-here is apperceived within the same horizon of egological syntheses in which the aliud is apperceived but cannot be reduced to the evidences of the apperceptive mode. In a fellow man I first perceive his body as aesthesiologically animated body, but within this apperceived body I get the evidence of an ego other than myself ruling over his psycho-physical monad in the same mode that I do. Thus, the alter ego is synthesized by my ego as the other-than-me-as-analogue-of-me and as a foreign world constituting pole besides me. Consequently it is in the I-pole of my experience that I have to learn to distinguish between an aliud as belonging to the sphere of my ownness and an alter as an exterior pole of a world of ownness outside me.
The two modes in which the two distinct regions of otherness (the transcendence of the natural objects and the transcendence of the other ego) are constituted are also distinct. While the natural objects are given in apperception and belong to my sphere of ownness, the other egos are given by analogical apperception or appresentation also called by Husserl empathy. In other words, the alter egos are given by a process of pairing which associates the bodily apperceived evidences of another’s body with an analogous ego of another ruling over that body that I now see, an ego to which I do not have an immediate, apperceptive, access. Thus, appresentation correlates the various egos in an intersubjective community of monads, which co-intend from various positions the same world and which create by this cointending an intersubjective co-spatiality and co-temporality.

With the differentiation of the region of otherness into two, an aliud and an alter, we are now forced to admit the following fact, namely that through the identification synthesis we have direct (non-analogical) access only to the sphere of the aliud (the transcendent immanence) which is apperceived as “my own.” The awakening of a sense of otherness as alterity (an otherness which is not my own) represents, for Husserl, a secondary, analogical shift within my ego when he pairs himself as an I-here with the apperception of the organism of the other as an I-there.

Given the difference in the domain of otherness between an alter as a cointending ego and an aliud as a cointended worldly objectuality, we should reformulate the conclusions of the previous chapter regarding the evidence formation, adjusting them to the new, intersubjective setting.

The Folding and the Deployment of the Evidences in Accordance with the Ego-Fugal and the Ego-Petal Tendencies

The history of the self-constitution of the ego coincides with the history of the constitution of the egological sphere of ownness. Because of this coincidence, the ego appropriates his history while achieving constitutively the formation of world objectivity. This can be an explanation for the fact that, after the attempt to a full thematization of the subject pole in the fourth Cartesian meditation, in the fifth Meditation we find an outline of the constitutional history of the sphere of objectivity attached to the proper discussion of the constitution of the intersubjective world.
Keeping in mind the profound interdependence between the fourth and the fifth Cartesian meditations, let us delineate the evidential history of the world- (and thus of the self-) constitution. This history can be reduced to a hierarchy of evidences covering the full deployment of intentionality from the actual experience of the individual substrates, to the purely egological experience of self-givenness.

The first, most concrete evidence (which I shall call E1) is that of the presentation of the state of affairs themselves in the rather passive synthesis of experience (i.e. association). This is the kind of evidence that both the doxic (naive) and the scientifically naive intending are able to articulate and, as such, it represents the basis for the following critical shifts of intentionality.

The second evidence (which I shall call from now on E2) comes with the reflexive shift of intentionality, which focuses on the structures of the straightforward intending as such and its correlative evidence (E1), uncovering the judgmental conditions for the possibility of actual truth. Adequation and verification are issues, which are now examined at a critical level. It is at this stage that we first realize that in the naively doxic or naively scientific synthesis of E1 was, in fact, laying hidden an anonymous structure, that of a grammar of pure logic and of a syntax articulated in order to match the requirement of consistency. We realize at this stage that the sameness of the object given in E1 is due both to a material coherence of the substrate and to the distinct (consequent) and clear (coherent) eidetic articulation of this experientially given substrate.

A third evidence (E3) is acquired after the performing of the phenomenological reduction and the epoche when the ego appropriates himself as transcendental ego first in the abstentive mode (subjectal rest) then in the reflexive mode (intra-subjective subject-object). This third evidence uncovers the egopetal and the egofugal performances of the ego and raises the question about the possibility of a fulfilling response to these tendencies from an other ego in the form of a heteropetal and heterofugal reaction.

The third evidence E3 represents a critical shift of intentionality focusing on E1. The purpose of this shift is to genetically ground E1 and, possibly, also E2 in the transcendental sphere of the ego. If both the active and the passive syntheses are possible, it is only because the unity of the ego, as self-same, provides the transcendental basis for an all comprehensive synthesis of the regions of objectivity into a unique, harmonious world.
The basis for any investigation into the intentional history is the straightforward perspective, while the critical shifts can be seen as layers of thematization and explicitation of the anonymous structures (eidetic and transcendental) in E1. This critical explicitation is, undeniably, an enrichment of cognition and a deepening of our insight into the possibility of truth and adequation, but it would be a mistake to think of its results (the eidetic structure) as to a third, meta-intentional realm. The critical, reflexive turn takes place while we are still immersed into the noematic phenomenon as such, therefore it would be better defined as a transition from anonymity to thematization. The same can be said about the critical-transcendental shift.

The inter-relatedness of the three evidences above can be represented schematically as follows:

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reflexive shift

Ego | mundane <(E3) egopet reduction< mundane heterologous rest
rest | ego >egofugal intending(E1)> other rest

reflexive shift
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The trajectory beginning with the subjectal egological rest goes continuously until it reaches the mundane other or the psycho-physical evidence of the other as merely apperceived, and breaks before reaching the other as equally transcendental ego or heterological rest. Thus, apperception stops at the bodily aspect of the other or at his aliud. The gap between the other as alter and my ego is bridged by appresentation which gives me the analogical evidence of an alter like me ruling over his body. Although mediated and analogical, appresentation precedes, genetically speaking, the apperceptive process, as a priori presupposed by my ego in all apperceptive performances.

The question which might be raised in connection with the Husserlian articulation of the inter-subjective world regards the possibility of an immediate and still not apperceptive way of givennes of the alter or, in other words, the question whether the absolute equating of apperception
with immediacy (non-analogy) and appresentation with mediacy (analogy) is legitimate. This further raises the question whether the ego-alter relation is a pregiven one, or rather a secondarily ego-constituted intersubjective accord. Although very complex and profound, Husserl’s solution seems to point toward the latter option. By contrast, I shall try to argue for the former option and for a revisited concept of empathy.

The Empathic Relation as Given in the Emergence of a “Meeting” Moment

My investigation on Husserl’s theory of inter-subjectivity has ended up in a dilemma, namely whether one can do more than recognize the egofugal and the egopetal tendencies as indicative of the possibility of an appresentative, analogic, harmonization of the monads. The alternative would have been to consider the relation I-other as a pre-supposed, pre-given basis for the intentional constitution of intersubjectivity, a foundational situation which is not itself intentionally constituted. Another way of describing this alternative would be to treat empathy as an intersubjective rest.

The above question is important in so far as the truth of all evidence as adequation and not simply as judgmental consistence depends, for Husserl, on the possibility of an intersubjective accord between the egos. The options that we have in dealing with this dilemma are in my opinion two. We could either consider the empathic harmonization of the monadic egos as a commonly constructed intentional accord aiming asymptotically toward a perfect, that is totally empathic, sociality which can never be attained or actualized de facto or, rather, we can take the egologic-heterologic tendencies uncovered by the reduction as indices of an originary empathic I-Thou relation which could not be perfectly retrieved in the actual dealings of an I with his other, but at least it can be approximated in an analogical manner. The first model seems to be Husserl’s solution and, indeed, the solution of his followers Max Scheler and Edith Stein. By contrast, the second solution is representative for the personalist approach of Martin Buber.

In the following I shall summarize some of Buber’s basic ideas on this issue, which could be very useful for the progress of our investigation. Buber’s basic assumption is that the world is dialogic and that the original reality is also dialogic, that is an I-Thou. This fundamental relation could
be imperfectly found in man’s association with objects of the inorganic, vegetal and animal nature, but it reaches its fullness in the man-to-man relation. There is also a privileged instance of this relation which is man’s relation with the divine Thou.

The main transformation (or perhaps one should say depreciation) that the originary I-Thou relationship can undergo is the transformation of one of the dialogue partners into a That, or, in other words, reification. The relationship I-That is characteristic of the naturalist and psychologist sciences, for the ontologist metaphysics as well as for the idealist and existentialist phenomenologies. I shall not insist on this somehow catastrophist verdict, which Buber puts on modernity, although his suggestions for a re-reading of the history of philosophy and of the sciences in a personalistic manner is a very insightful one. For the time being I am more interested in the attitude which Buber proposes, namely that of starting a philosophy from the dialogic as primary evidence.

If we take a closer look at the way in which Buber suggests that the evidence of the dialogic is given, we realize that it is neither a naïve realistic impression, nor a metaphysical presupposition, which constitute the main enemies of the phenomenological approach. However, the dialogic does not seem either an intentionally constituted reality. By contrast with the dialogic (the I-Thou) relation, the reified dialogic relation (the I-That) is intentionally constituted and covers both what we called the ego-aliud relation and the analogically constituted ego-alter. For Buber the most common situation is that of the I-That, and, indeed, the Cartesian project is for him a reificatory one.

Buber’s understanding of the primary evidence of the dialogic relation as given by what he calls the experience of meeting (Begegnung) is different from Husserl’s empathy. The Husserlian empathic relation is based on an a priori egological intentionality (that of appresentation) actualized in various encounter experiences, while for Buber the true encounter is not apriorically or intentionally conditioned. It represents a moment that retrieves anamnestically a foundational dialogic reality. It is also true that the intentional egopetal and egofugal performances approximate the dialogic within the realm of the I-That, but this approximation cannot account for the relational transfiguration brought by the meeting moment. Consequently we have to decide whether we want to preserve empathy in the a priori intentional structures of the ego or if we would like to place it outside the intentional realm as a moment of pure meeting.
For Buber the meeting is not an association out of two monadic instances (in this case humans), but rather the emergence in the intentional flux of an originary I-Thou relation and a dereification of the I-That relation. The meeting occurs, indeed, in time, both in the “objective” time of the world and in the inter-subjectively constituted time of the I-That, but its occurrence modifies the historiality of the reified relation drawing it back upon an originary “moment” of intimate mutuality. The best terminological approximation for the temporality of this experience is the Greek word *kairos*, which designates both a moment and an opportunity. Seizing this opportunity might lead to a transformation of the daily I-That into an I-Thou (empathy revised in accordance with Buber’s dialogic principle).

Our final question in the previous section of this essay was conveying our mistrust in Husserl’s either-or way of regarding empathy. I was suggesting at that point that Husserl’s opinion that only apperception (which has as object the *aliud*) is immediate, while appresentation (which deals with the *alter*) is mediated, might have been based on an unnecessary defensiveness. In his attempt to defend the autonomy of the personalistic region from the realistic-naturalist reifications, Husserl considered that treating empathy as immediacy (as non-analogical) would automatically imply the transformation of the other ego into a mere phenomenon constituted within my ego. Even if I can understand and perhaps also empathize with Husserl’s concern, in my opinion the alternative “either apperceptive immediacy or mediated appresentation” is based on insufficiently analyzed presuppositions.

In my sketch of the deployment and wrapping up of the evidences which lead to the delimiting of the two regions of otherness (the *aliud* and the *alter*), I attempted to show how the polarity subject-object can be deepened and turned into a more originary polarity, namely the I-other, which can be further drawn back to the ego-alter relation. It is also useful to remember that in my previous analysis the presentation of the constitutional process as polar has revealed a dynamic perspective comprising the two orientations, which crisscross each other, namely the egofugal intending and the egopetal reduction. These two orientations point toward a subjectal rest as well as to an objectal rest which may be either the *aliud* as transcendental clue or the *alter* as transcendental ruler over his bodily *aliud*. The question which I cannot help asking at the end of my investigation is whether the above mentioned egological-heterolgical structures and attitudinal orientations could be treated as mere a priori conditions to which an other should conform in order to become an
evidence for me, or rather they are meant as indices toward an empathic relation (in Buber’s sense) which the correlative eidetic a priori cannot actualize. If Buber’s I-Thou is such an immediate relation (not in the intentional sense, but in the sense in which the intentional structures point to), its mode of manifestation in the intentional life of the monadic egos is an occurrence, the seizing of a kairos. Paradoxically enough, this kairos is presupposed by the egopetal and egofugal attitudes, as a guide-idea and an ideal telos, but their mere egologic or heterologic performances are not sufficient to actualize it. In this perspective the phenomenolgical reduction is not a precondition for the presentation of the other as other but rather a preparation for his occurrence.

I would like to suggest that the Husserlian reduction is, perhaps, still too much indebted to the cognitivistic aim motivating the Cartesian reduction. Although for both Descartes and Husserl the cogito involves more than the cognitive intentionalities it seems to me that the cognitive aspect is surreptitiously implied as a model for all intentional performances to the detriment of the relational aspects. This implicit emphasis on cognition tends to identify the reduction with reflexivity and the transcendental self-appropriation of the ego with transcendental reflexivity. By contrast with Husserl, my tendency was to preserve the reduction in its originary medium, which is the naïve, straightforward perspective, and to treat the abstinent position of the ego if not totally independent from reflection, at least different from it.

In final analysis I think that it all comes to the attitudinal issue and the originary trust with which reduction is initiated. If the reduced ego is attitudinally involved as abstinent in the heterolgoical relation (mundane I-other, or in Buber’s terms I-That), then there is always room for the occurrence of a dialogic transformation within this mundane relation. By conditioning the manifestation of the other on the a priori appresentative structures of the ego, Husserl inhibits any discussion about the possibility of an immediate empathic evidence, which can be neither ascertained, nor de plano ruled out on a phenomenological basis. An a priori experience can expect only what it can presuppose, but it could not rule out the occurrence of something unexpected. This is why empathy cannot be an a priori constituted relation but an occurrence, a moment of well-met mutuality (kairos).
The Change of the Phenomenological Attitude in View of the Emergence of a Meeting Moment

Instead of a conclusion I would like to say a few words about the way in which Husserl’s inter-subjectivity could be used for a revised perspective on empathy.

The pattern intending-actualization (or fulfillment through identification synthesis) constitutes the essence of Husserl’s description of apperception and, as we have previously emphasized, apperception is for Husserl the only immediate evidence that one can have of another as aliud. However, a closer look to the apperceptive process might indicate that even for Husserl the pattern identification-actualization cannot be roughly identified with the correlatives of active and passive synthesis. The apperception as intentional and constitutional performance is in a certain sense active (in so far as it articulates the state of affairs and it is its dator for the ego) but it has also a passive or receptive feature in so far as it constitutes only those states of affairs, which are there to be intended. Thus, the ego is not only (and perhaps not even mainly) the dator of the state of affairs but also the receptor of this datum. Another way to put this would be to say that the egofugal attitude aiming to reach “the things themselves” is surreptitiously relying on a pre-constitutional availability of these “things” as being there for the constituting ego.

The same can be said about the object (or, more radically, about the other) as transcendental clue. Articulated primary into a passive synthesis of association, we expect the object to have encoded into its ontical worldliness a donative orientation toward the ego. Thus, for us, the other is not only the given but also the letting-itself-be-given toward a further articulation into the egological synthesis. The thematization of this spontaneity of the other is more difficult, but, nevertheless, absolutely necessary, since the most accomplished idea of adequation and, therefore, of truth, has to account for both the egological tendencies and the heterological spontaneity presupposed to meet in the apperceptive act. The simplistic treatment of the egological intentionality as the only dator of the state of affairs and of the objectual other (the aliud) as a purely passive instance is, therefore, countersensical and amounts to a new, more refined solipsism.

The new solipsism is more subtle since it acknowledges the presence of the object as “it itself” in the immanent transcendence of apperception, although this presence does not yet represent a receiving of the given in
the mode in which it is there to be given, but rather only its receiving as given according to the eidetic rules of egological possible receiving. Although the world cannot be now viewed as a “consistent dream” or a split otherness (noumenon/phenomenon), it, nevertheless, is only what the ego (or a community of eidetically identically equipped egos) can and wills to receive of it.

In order to avoid such a position phenomenology has to do more than to show how a certain object is intentionally constituted in egologic experience. By analyzing and de-constituting through the reduction the intentionally constituted condition for the presentation of any alterity whatsoever, phenomenology clears the ground for a less prejudiced letting of the other present himself to me spontaneously. Thus, it convokes the other out of its anonymity into thematization. An alternative understanding of phenomenology as a heterologically convoking performance or as a heteragogy, as I like to call it, is, I think, the step further, which the Husserlian interpretation of the Cartesian reduction invites us to take. It also represents the first major parting with the Cartesian project and a new basis for understanding empathy as the preparation for a meeting moment.

The new both egologic and heteragogic scenario of phenomenology begins with the full immersion of the ego in the noematic phenomenon as the medium where the two attitudes (the egofugal intention and the egopet reduction) coincide equivocally within the same intentional stream. This means a full regression to the naïve stage of the egological consciousness, a stage where the apperception of the aliud is equivocally coincident with the appresentation of the alter.

Reduction as the gradual suspending of all straightforward intentional attachments to the object will then disintentionalize the objectual other leaving it bare of what the ego has intentionally cast upon it, that is of a whole range of cogitata be they theoretical, axiological or practical ones. In the reduction the abstended-from other is potentially an other-let-be. But an other-let-be in desintentionalized apperception is not an aliud any more, although it may not yet appear also as a spontaneous alter. It represents a dereified and reductively convoked other who is being let to appear in the expression of its own attitude.

The final stage of the reduction in the above scenario is, thus, the adoption of an expectative attitude by the abstinent ego in view of a meeting moment. This abstinence from casting intentions upon an other in which
the reduction leaves the ego faces the ego with a novel attitude, that of blank (in the sense “learnedly ignorant by epoche”) container of an awaited heterological spontaneity. This attitude is clearly distinct from all egofugal or egopetal attitudes and represents the empathic disposition for seizing a meeting moment (kairos).

It is time now at the end of this essay to notice that the irreducible aim at empathy has anonymously guided us all the way through the reduction. Its first appearance was in the guise of the pre-reductive trust in the possibility of an apodictic science, a trust which has allowed us to immerse ourselves in the naïve position and then to perform from there the Husserlian epoche. Its next appearance was the need that we felt for disequivocating the intentional life of the ego, which allowed no clear distinction between a reified alter as aliud and a properly speaking alter, except by way of analogy. At the end of this reductive, dis-intentionalizing process we reached the receptive-containing attitude which was expected to convoke the other as other in the emergence of a meeting moment, a moment which is usually missed due to the pretenses of the ego to be receptor only in so far as he can also be a dator. At this point phenomenology turns into a maieutical praxis and it, thus, appropriates its personalistic project in stark delimitation from any naturalist realism and any transcendental idealism whatsoever.
NOTES

1. For all the references to Husserl’s works in this essay, see Edmund Husserl, *Gesammelte Schriften*, Band 1-8 Herausgegeben von Elisabeth Ströker, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg, if not indicated otherwise.


3. Ideas II, pp. 96-147.


6. Dan Zahavi counts in his book *Husserl und die Transzendentale Intersubjektivität*, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Doderecht/Boston/London 1996, p. 67, four such options, but only the two mentioned above are relevant for our discussion.

7. The fifth Meditation is somehow atypical in so far as it introduces the theme of the other and of the heterologically constituted world. I shall discuss its position within the economy of the Cartesian Meditations later on in this essay.


9. The importance of the above distinction for a better understanding of Husserl can be verified in the treatment of the theme of the sameness of the object both as apperceived phenomenon and as transcendental clue. The object as transcendental clue refers us back to an intending ego. This reference-back can be considered, on the side of the subject, as an anonymous (not yet reflexively thematized) ego-petal tendency, while on the side of the object it can be identified as a heterofugal tendency. This heterofugal tendency of the objects (be they natural or personal) I shall call from now on “spontaneity.” About a hetero-petal tendency of the object we can discuss only in relation to the other egos as objects that is only in a personalistic context.

10. The concepts of *kairos* and *meeting* have been recently used by The Process of Change Study Group from Boston, M.A. to describe the patient - psychoanalyst interaction. See their article “Non-Interpretative Mechanisms in Psychoanalytic Therapy” in *The International Journal of Psychoanalysis* (1998) 79, pp. 903-921.

11. The containing function of the empathic ego is a new attitude besides the naïve egofugal and reductive egopetal ones. I have borrowed the terms of *containing* and *container* from psychoanalysis. The two terms have been proposed by Wilfred R. Bion on the basis of Melanie Klein’s description of the phenomenon of projective identification. Later on they became major concepts in the psychoanalytical discourse. See for more details: Thomas
H. Ogden, *Projective Identification and Psychotherapeutic Technique*, New York, Jason Aronson, London; Joseph Sandler, Ed., *Projection, Identification, Projective Identification*, International Universities Press, Madison, Connecticut. The name of “expectational” which I ascribed to phenomenology in the title of this essay is in close connection with the containing attitude described by psychoanalysis and with the maieutical position assumed by Socrates according to Plato.