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POLITICAL EUROPE, SPIRITUAL EUROPE

The following pages are meant to be a meditation on the relationship between the political and the spiritual (culture, religion) dimensions in Western and Eastern Europe, starting from the new historical circumstances created in this century by the prospects of European unification (in the West) and European integration (in the East).

European unification is undoubtedly the most important phenomenon witnessed in the second half of our century and it will most likely dominate the beginning of the following century as well. It's a design which has been dreamt of for centuries by a Europeans divided on national and denominational grounds, inheritance of 28 centuries¹ of "European" thought and "conscience" (a "European idea"). European unification has asserted itself as the political, economic and military co-ordinate of our continent for the 21st century. European thought and the creation of this design were strongly stimulated by the major historical crises which have constantly endangered the existence of Europe, be it in the form of external aggressions - the almost constant attacks of Islam lasting from the 7th to the 17th century, or the communist aggression - "the Islam of the 20th century" (J. Monnerot) - or of an endless civil strife between the European nations themselves. The culminating point of this conflictual paradigm was reached in this century - a "century of extremes"², indeed - in the form of the great "European Civil War"³ of 1914-1915. The "hot" version of the two World Wars was doubled by a "Cold War" between opposed principles and alliances. It ended only in 1989-1991 with the East European revolutions and the collapse of the USSR. During all this period, the destructive spectrums of totalitarian utopias and ideologies based on race hatred (Nazism) or on class hatred (communism) hung over Europe, as both were seeking to impose their continental and world hegemony. Radically denying the traditional sources of European identity (Greek rationalism, Roman law and Biblical morals) in their Christian synthesis as seen by a modern liberal civilisation based on capitalism, democracy, separation between the fields of social existence and the sets of values (religious, political, economic, aesthetic etc.), communism and Nazism

came to be authentic totalitarian "political religions"⁴. Unjustly combining politics and theology in a *sui generis* mixture of secularised religion and consecrated politics, they basically resulted in some "pervert imitations" of Judaism (Nazism) and, respectively, Christianity (communism)⁵. Bringing together, through the myth of the revolution, the cult of the particular and the mysticism of the universal, nationalism and imperialism, the totalitarian ideologies competed one another into creating a "new Europe", post-liberal, post-democratic and post-Christian. They aimed at creating a "new man" and a "new society" by means of a violent attempt to level all categories of natural existence. According to a secularised "Gnostic" scenario⁶ inherited from romanticism, all natural realities were to be melt into the phoney "supra-reality" of a perverted eschatology, guided by the totalitarian ideology which provided for the confiscation of the entire society by an all-powerful state, worshipped and with an imperialist call.

The disappearance of the old Europe which begun in the year 1871 with a mounting of antagonism, nationalism and imperialism - on the background of the domination of a late capitalism and of the devastating recrudescence of totalitarian ideologies in our century - was doubled by a deep crisis of the classical European values (Ortega, Spengler, Toynbee, Husserl). Reason, science, liberalism, democracy, Christian morals, all seemed to shift towards a legitimisation of force and of social levelling. Technology, economy, politics, all came to question the spiritual values of Europe. Original thought and spiritual freedom seemed to irreversibly succumb to their utilitarian manipulation, the accumulation of wealth and knowledge; the stir in the mass-media, the economic, technical and political mobilisations of the masses were announcing a deep "crisis of the spirit" (Valery)⁷ and an irreversible "forgetfulness" of the ultimate being. "The calculating thought" of technology and the mass mobilisations of the totalitarian systems were thus irreversibly blocking the access of man to the real "meditative thought" of poets, the gentle and careful voicing of which is the only refuge of the real being in front of technological aggression, political conspiracy and expansion of globalising economies (Heidegger)⁸. Western Europe seemed to find its last shelter in the spirit of its poets and of some philosophers, yielding in front of ideological violence, techno-scientific invasion and military and political mobilisations which were announcing an imminent *finis Europae*.

In the meantime, "the other Europe", Central and Eastern Europe, was concentrating its efforts towards a forced modernisation (capitalism, democracy, liberalism) and a political consolidation of the young national

states which had emerged after 1918 from the ruins of the previous empires. This effort was considerably undermined by the tensions existing between this policy of modernisation and national consolidation and the archaic background of the traditional folk civilisations defining most of the East-European populations, on the one hand, and the existence of strong minorities within the new national or federal states, on the other. The obsession of national homogenisation and of revisionism, the economic and political crises that occurred, made these states easily turn towards authoritarianism, while their unfavourable geopolitical location between great empires with expansionist tendencies made them extremely vulnerable to aggression and annexation. Trapped between the imperial ambitions of Germany and Soviet Russia, in 1945 Central and Eastern Europe fell under a Soviet domination which was to last for almost half a century. Communist ideology, economy and politics were to isolate it from Western Europe for five decades. Utopian social engineering and the collectivist, totalitarian system were to result here in tremendous economic failure and moral disaster. During all this time of internal occupation, the resistance to the anti-European aggression of the communist "humane barbarism" was concentrated into spirituality and culture. Faced with poverty, moral humiliation and ideological oppression, Central and Eastern Europe would, in its turn, seek shelter in the spirit of some poets, writers and philosophers who refused to accept the "captive thought".

Thus, the year 1945 meant a turning point in the history of Europe, marking not only a painful split of the continent into two blocs with opposed political, social and ideological systems, but also, as a reaction to Soviet expansionism, the revival in Western Europe of the idea of European unification. The history of the two Europes and of the European idea were divided for half a century before meeting again in 1989. These two distinct "histories" (*stories*) are the object of our essay. Central will be issue of the relation between the political and the spiritual in the understanding and the accomplishment of the European idea. At the end of the two stories we shall attempt to draw a conclusion applying to the present moment.

West Side Story

In the West the idea of European unification took shape and gained momentum following the demands created by the European resistance to

the attempts of Nazi enslavement. Under the pressure of history, the Europeans were forced to remember their living sources, the European values and virtues. The end of the Hitlerite nightmare and the real prospective of Sovietization under the strong pressure of communist parties, increasingly strong in the West, made the clear-headed politicians of the time understand the imperative of passing "from cultural unity to political unity", from "cultural organism to political organisation". And, as European culture had the form of "unity in diversity", the political unity it inspired could only be a "federal union"⁹.

We must not forget that Western Europe's cure from the schizophrenia of totalitarian ideologies and its double reconstruction within the states and as interstate union were largely inspired from the thought and actions of the great Christian-democrat politicians and theorists (R. Schuman, A. de Gasperi, K. Adenauer a.o.)¹⁰. It is to them that we owe not only the revival of Christian democracy as a political alternative ("the third way") to liberalism and communism and the economic reconstruction along the lines of social market economy, but also the concrete initiation in the free West of the European unification along federal lines. These outstanding Christian-democrat politicians - true "Founding Fathers" of a united Europe - saw the federalisation of the continent, the integration of European nations along the spiritual-cultural model of unity in diversity as merely the application, at a regional as well as at a national and international level, of the principles of communal personalism¹¹ of Christian extraction (taken from the social doctrine of the Catholic Church). It's on this basis they operated the denazification, defascization and the internal anti-totalitarian and democratic political reconstruction of post-war Germany and Italy.

At the core of this unique attempt at political reconstruction one could identify the theoretical and practical redefinition of the relations between individual, society, state, as well as of those between states. The ambition of the programme was to avoid, within a new version of democratic capitalism and social market economy (a Christian-democrat concept, not a socialist one!), the dangerous extremes of the anarchical ultraliberal individualism as well as those of the centralising socialist collectivism, nevertheless preserving the legitimate concern of liberalism for individual freedom, initiative and creativity and the just as legitimate socialist commitment to social justice. To the idea of freedom exulted by liberals and to that of equality worshipped by socialists, the social doctrine of the Catholic Church and the Christian-democrat one as vision of an "integral humanism" (Maritain) oppose as an integrating principle of absolute value,

the ontological dignity of any human being as “image of God” (*imago Dei*). But human dignity is what authenticates real freedom and equality. Therefore, the normative purpose of society is ensuring the dignity of the human being against the corruption of both liberty and equality: anarchical libertinage and levelling egalitarianism. But the basic goal of the entire programme was the reconstruction of the civil society through a limitation and reform of the modern Jacobite-Napoleonic state. Bureaucratic, centralist and national state, it was operating as an authentic Providence-State. Claiming absolute sovereignty outside as well as inside, it was practising absolutism inside and autarchic or imperialist selfishness outside. To the modern national Providence-State, the “Founding Fathers” opposed the model of the subsidiary and federal State.

Taken from the social doctrine of the Catholic Church whose theoretical axis it is, the principle of subsidiarity¹² was included in the constitutions of the post-war Western federal states, as well as in article 3b of the Maastricht Treaty. Subsidiarity expresses a certain outlook on authority, reflecting the pre-eminence of society over state: between individual and state we have the multitude of autonomous intermediate groups, with the various elements which make up the social entity. The political authority, serving the needs of this social entity, offers the support (*subsidium*) necessary to these groups and acts in those matters mutually considered as pertaining to the accomplishment of common welfare and social justice. Thus, the intermediate communities have all the prerogatives normally belonging to states with the exception of the competencies freely granted to the central authority. The principle of subsidiarity demands that authority should not interfere with the autonomy of the social groups and at the same time that it should positively act in matters pertaining to the mutual agreement of groups and to social justice. Consequently, it allows a conciliation between a decentralised state and a social policy, “paying this paradoxical combination with a double abandon: that of socialist equalitarianism in favour of the value of dignity and, respectively, that of philosophical individualism in the formation of a structured and federate society”¹³. This realistic anti-ideological and antiutopian outlook proceeds upwards, “from the roots of the grass” (M. Şora), from individual to community, from community to state, from states to federation. Consequently, it involves a radical acceptance of pluralism and of the finitude of human existence, giving thus back to individuals their dignity, their ontological pre-eminence (as the only existing real substances) as well as their theological pre-eminence (as different beings, equally created

in the image of God, nonetheless). We are not talking about an anarchical denial of the state existence or of a central authority; these are not secondary, but second, namely subsidiary, they must be actions of the state in relation to the individuals, because the accomplishment of common welfare must pass through individuals and groups. The main problem of subsidiarity and of federalism is the sharing of competencies: the freedom of action and the proximity of authority and individuals claiming the consolidation of autonomy (and stressing the non-interference of the state), while the need for justice, security and solidarity leads to a shift of competencies towards the central authority (stressing the interference of the state). The subsidiary state is a limited and decentralised one which requires considerable effort and discretion from the part of the authority as well as maximum initiative from individuals or groups; therefore, it is an anti-natural state, to the extent in which the natural tendency of authority is its monopolisation, multiplication and enhancement, while that of individuals is the search for protection and security, resulting in the destruction of the unstructured civil society. The subsidiary state protects the state from abusive groups or individuals and at the same time it protects the society and its groups from the abuse of the state. It offers a solution to the dilemma of the Jacobite-Napoleonic democratic regimes, in which equality is obtained through a forcible atomisation and levelling of society, resulting in a suffocation of individual initiative, disappearance of intermediate groups and excessive development of a bureaucratic absolutist state, the modern Providence-State. The superiority of Anglo-Saxon evolutionist democracy lies, as Tocqueville himself had noticed (1840), precisely in the existence of autonomous associations which leads to an alternate, federal and non-invading state.

Still, subsidiarity and federalism are not tied to a specific form of government, but to the manner of exercising authority (answering not to the question *which?*, but *how?*). Consequently, examples of subsidiary and federal theories and practices are also to be found in the Western Middle Ages, with the jurists of the Roman-German Empire (Baldus, Dante, Ockham, Marsilio of Padua) or with the canonists supporting the conciliary theory of the Church (Gerson, Cusanus a.o.)¹⁴. The imperial constitution was based on an articulated and pluralist outlook on law, society and politics. "Christianity" (*christianitas*) was a federation of local corporations and associations (cities, republics, lands etc.) based on the rule of associative consent; each level had its own dignity, independent and not coming from the upper one. (See the remarkable book of the

Emden jurist Johannes Althusius, *Politica methodice gestita* (1603), authentic manifesto of the subsidiary and federal state, of surprising actuality¹⁵). The sovereignty of the prince or of the emperor was in its turn subordinated to associative consent and did not absorb that of groups, it was a global sovereignty based on the Aristotelian theory of spontaneous political association of people, and not on the stoic, Augustinian and modern one of trading protection for submission. The unity of this *christianitas* was based on the reference to a common law, the Roman one, and to just one emperor, whose sovereignty was global and not absolute, with clearly defined competencies. But the model of this European "Christianity" was undermined by the papal absolutism which repressed conciliatoriness, and also by the confiscation/secularisation of this spiritual absolutism by the kings of the modern nations (especially France) (cf. J. Bodin's *Republica*, 1576). Based on this monist and absolute (not global) idea of sovereignty, they were to claim complete monopoly over law and political power, as well as the full centralisation of their exercise. This idea and practice came to define the absolutist national monarchies and remained unchanged in the democratic republics that followed, which only transferred the sovereignty of the monarch to the people. Nevertheless, the model of the national absolutist state was a derived one, historically conditioned; it appeared in the 16th century, in a Europe torn by endless religious wars and internal instability for which the imperatives of ensuring unity and maintaining internal security, as well as that of a massive military presence abroad were essential. This model became dated in the 19th - 20th century when, against the background of an uncontrolled upsurge of nationalism, revolutions and nationalism, the Providence-State confiscated not only the political structures, society, but also the religion which it secularised, and the imperial ideology it nationalised. The effects of these confiscations were to be seen in the expropriation, or more precisely, in the nationalisation of the universalist discourse on man as member of a universal community of judicial nature (*romanitas*), or of a religious one (*christianitas*). Each nation will see itself as the only one expressing the essence of mankind, the Europe of democratic or authoritarian absolutisms becoming "a collection of tiny empires" (B. Farago) stirred by bellicose ideologies, as European unity could now be imagined only through the brutal hegemony of the strongest nation. It was thus that we came to have the "extremes" and the historical catastrophes which have characterised our century. Their common denominator: the absolutism of the Providence-State and

the triumphant march of the late capitalism were to result in the considerable de-personalisation of social existence within the liberal democratic societies centred on the individual, as well as within the totalitarian ones promoting socialist collectivism.

The thought of the Founding Fathers of united Europe had the merit of having pointed out the essential connection between personalism - subsidiarity - federalism. The policy of the united Europe can only be the "policy of the Person", the policy of responsible freedom and of community solidarity. Authentic *articulus stantis et cadentis Europae*, the person is nevertheless a reality, or rather a theological-political design inextricably tied to the Christian faith. According to this outlook, Europe was born in Nicaea in the year 325¹⁶ with the first Ecumenical Synod of the Christian Church, convened as a reaction to the Arian heresy. The latter were preaching a Unitarian and subordinationist view of the divinity (only the Father is the real God, the Son and the Holy Spirit are inferior entities, later created by Him to serve as tools in the creation of the world). This outlook was to be actively supported for an entire century by the emperors from Constantinople, as they saw in Arianism an ideological legitimisation of the absolutist theocratic monarchy they were exercising (there is a God in heavens who sends a Redeemer to earth, Jesus, who later ascends back to heaven and leaves the emperor as His vicar). Opposing this political theology, the Nicaean Synod drew up the orthodox creed, namely the fundamental dogma on God, revealed in Jesus Christ as Trinity: *comm*-union of Love in the relationships of which the ontological *con*-substantiality of Three divine Persons is expressed: the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost.

So, Jesus Christ is not a creature, a mere prophet. He is at the same time God and man, one Person in two natures (divinity and mankind), and His Person as Son reveals God in Him at the same time as One and as Three. The understanding of the mystery of this revelation as unity in difference required and still requires a new relational and paradoxical manner of thinking (and living); it keeps a tension between two opposed and irreducible, but equally valid terms (their reduction was the distinctive mark of the heresy as compared to orthodoxy). This manner of thinking - opposed not only to the dialectic reduction to a monist identity, but also to the alternative dualism - has become through Christianity the true *forma mentis* of Europe, spreading in the most various fields, leading to a relational-personal outlook not only on God, but also on man, world and history. Based on this, Europe could assimilate the most various traditions and cultural inheritances, becoming an open culture.

Now the key-notion of European culture and unknown as such in Asia, the person - distinct from the individual - has (as shown by Denis de Rougemont) a double genesis: theological and political¹⁷. Politically, it managed to integrate the two opposed acceptations previously given to man: as "individual" existing in himself and by himself (discovery of ancient Greece, in fact of the revolution of the "axial" era mentioned by K. Jaspers¹⁸) and as "citizen" existing exclusively through and for the state (ancient Rome). If the individual is exposed to the temptation of selfishness, scepticism, profanation and anarchy, the citizen is exposed to the collectivist-totalitarian one. Bringing - through the virtues of faith, hope and love - a new "vertical" reference axis, that of the personal transcendence of the three-and-one God, the person breaks the vicious "horizontal" circle of the vacillation between individualism and collectivism. This vertical relation sets the believer free from the terror of the social and of the arbitrariness of the individual, compelling him to an infinite responsibility towards his neighbour and to the creation of a new type of community: the supra-natural, and therefore universal, comm-union of the Ecclesia (Church) whose model is the Trinitarian Communion. Through faith and grace, the person goes beyond the arbitrary and selfish individual and also beyond the citizen unconditionally subservient to the community. Relational entity, the person means therefore not only the leap to a paradoxical "logic", but mainly the adoption of a new, paradoxical "manner" of existence, at the same time solitary and solidary, personal and communal, that of the comm-union. The asymptotic aspiration towards this convergence between the personal and the communal marks the entire history of Europe, the "dialectics" of which Denis de Rougemont views in the form of the following structure:

 " Sacred TRIBE Magic in the Orient and in the Middle Ages
 Profane INDIVIDUAL Reason in the Greek Polis and in the Renaissance
 Official cult STATE Civicism in Rome and in the French
 Revolution+Napoleon
 Scepticism SOCIAL VACUUM Absurd in the Hellenistic Society and
 in the 18th century"
 Which basically leaves two possibilities:
 " EITHER Nationalism - STATE-NATION - Fanaticism - Totalitarian
 regressive collectivism
 OR Democracy - FEDERATION - Faith - Progressive Community"¹⁹.

This personalist-communal wisdom of Europe representing the "orthodoxy" of the authentic Europe is undermined by the subversion of three "heresies" or "idolatries" perverting its inner structure, either the person or the communion, "turning them into nothingness"; these are the "worshipped" erotic "passion", the revolution or the "socialised passion", and the "nationalism" or the divine "call" of the "socialised" man²⁰.

Rejecting both the "heretic" perversities of communal personalism as well as its "gnostic" ideological subversion, Europe has therefore to reassume not only the theological-philosophical "orthodoxy", but also the social-political "orthopraxy", accomplishing the personal-communal comm-union in the form of the pluralist institutions of the subsidiary and federal state. This will be regulated by the old scholastic adage *distinguere per unire* or *ex pluribus unum*.

The problem with the subsidiary and federal state is that it *presupposes* (and does not create) the existence of a society articulated into dynamic groups. Subsidiarity and federalisation proceed upwards and do not identify with the decentralisation ordered and imposed from the top to the bottom²¹. They can be achieved in those societies in which communities prosper and allow the development of individual freedom and creativity and the capacity of creative and spontaneous association, as individuals need such communities for the development of their capabilities. Beyond the mere natural communities (family, nation, people), the cultural, political and economic consensus of the free persons leads to the creation of new free communities: communities of faith (the Church), political (parties, society) and economic ones (free markets). The creationist perspective of human diversity and the existence of finitude, of evil and sin, require not only the separation of powers, but also the division of the systems and institutions of society, three-one system of plural systems: the political system; the economic system; and the moral-cultural-religious system as in- and interdependent systems. The institutionalised operation of these three systems in the spirit of communal personalism results in freedom within the community, and this is the "key for Europe": "through freedom in community, Europe imitates the life of God"²². But the real freedom in the community cannot be taken apart from the economic dimension and is best ensured and turned to account by the system of democratic capitalism. The right to property and to economic initiative are an inalienable expression of human dignity and creativity. In spite of the long anti-capitalist tradition of the Western spiritual and cultural elite, democratic capitalism is based upon undeniable moral and religious

resources. The most defining invention of the democratic capitalist system (says M. Novak) is not the possessive individual or the citizen subservient to the state, but the free association or the *corporation*²³. Markets have a centripetal force, they take individuals out of isolation, put them into stimulating contact with their fellow men, even with those at a great distance²⁴. Markets are highly social institutions, they presuppose a series of special virtues, like for instance creativity, trust, openness. The markets and the trade in goods have always accompanied and enhanced the exchange of ideas, the market of cultural values. The analogy between the economy of material needs and that of spiritual values, between the economic categories and the spiritual ones was identified long ago²⁵. A free economy is centripetal, and not centrifugal. Economic freedom pushes individuals to co-operation and association, and not to anarchy²⁶. Nevertheless, according to the classical theorists of liberal economy, economic freedom has as a moral pre-requisite, Christian freedom of the individuals who feel responsible for their deeds in front of God and of their fellow men. This is a "third" concept of freedom (theorised by Jefferson, Lord Acton), different not only from the "negative", liberal one, but also from the "positive", socialist, totalitarian one (theorised by Isaiah Berlin)²⁷. We are talking about the freedom gained through a determination to do what has to be done, and not what you would like to do. But this can only be promoted in an indirect manner: positively through education and rational persuasion, and negatively through a clear cut sharing and limitation of social authority. All this in order to avoid the risks of dogmatism and constraint in the education of a guided "positive" freedom, risks which affected the Christianity and the socialism of the "great inquisitors", as well as the indefinite vacuum of "negative" freedom. The cultivation of responsible freedom in each human soul is "the supreme art of human reason - the work of practical wisdom"²⁸. The presence or the lack of equilibrium in the moral-spiritual field are reflected in the sphere of economy as well as in that of politics.

It is precisely the political nature of the European Union which was and still is at the core of all ambiguities manifested in the process of European construction. "The paradox of political Europe"²⁹ has remained the supreme challenge for the architects and the supporters of European unification. The entire process of European construction has been taking place "under the sign of provisionality"³⁰, taking advantage of the two great fractures in the world order that made it possible, in 1947 and in 1989. The first stage of Western European construction began together

with the Cold War. The European political federalist impetus was dampened by the failure of the European Constituency and of the European Defence Community in 1954. The 1957 Treaty of Rome put an end to these attempts, resetting European construction in the framework of the Economic Community initiated in 1950 with the Coal and Steel Community. Thus, the economically integrated Europe stood at the centre of European construction until the late 80s. In thirty years, economic integration resulted in a bizarre accumulation of European technical and political institutions with supranational characters, approximating what is supposed to be an executive, two legislative bodies, a court of law, covering the member nation-states and deprived of authentic democratic legitimacy and of efficient mechanisms for applying the communal decisions. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, that of communism, German unification and the prospects of Union enlargement towards the east radically changed the terms of the matter. The Maastricht Treaty, solid from a monetary point of view, leaves a lot to be desired from the political one and keeps postponing the key issue of institutional reform before the planned eastern expansion. There is a crisis of European institutions accused of lacking in of transparency, efficiency and democratisation. There are economic problems related to the decline of industrial competitiveness (Asian competition) and to the prospects of globalisation. The Yugoslavian crisis and the soaring unemployment rates have eaten into the prestige of the Union and consolidated the Euro-scepticism. There are different outlooks regarding the Union: a Europe-space for Britain, a Europe-power for France; a considerable gap can be seen between the German model focused on economy and security, aimed at surpassing the sovereignty of the nation-state and the creation of a federal European *Wirtschaftsnation* under the NATO umbrella, and the French one stressing the political dimension and the subordination of economic matters to a grandiose European political adventure (dream of General de Gaulle): a Europe from the Atlantic to the Ural Mountains, independent from America³¹. Therefore, there is talk about "taking Europe out of the mud"³², about surpassing "the political infirmity of Europe" which is "a fact", about avoiding the "Polish syndrome" represented by the "scenario of decision paralysis"³³. It was requested to drop the "Monnet method" of creating institutions from above (to which the adhesion was to be imposed from the outside). As opposed to this method it was finally requested to "begin a popular debate on the objectives of the European process", the "design resulted from this debate being the one to dictate the European institutions and

procedures"³⁴. "The great market is the engine, but essential is the model of the society"³⁵. No less important is the issue of the political model: "federation of peoples" (Monnet), "confederation of states" (de Gaulle), "federation of nations" (Delors). Anyway, the passing from economic integration to political unification is the strategic issue of European construction. Paradoxically, a major difficulty is represented by the absence of a foreign threat (Soviet) and that of an internal centripetal force.

Neither state, nor mere league of states, Europe continues to be an "unidentified political object" (Delors), a political pseudo-entity, practically reduced to mere institutionalised inter-government conferences. Vacillating between a "helpless confederation" and an "illegitimate federation", Europe could be seen as a real "empire of helplessness" (similar to the Austrian-Hungarian Kakania described by Musil), a "pseudo-empire" with a "phoney citizenship" and a "phoney parliament". The solution would be a break with the existing non-political and antidemocratic federalism based on a technical-judicial pseudo-legitimacy and the adoption of an authentic democratic and political federalism, with a real citizenship and efficient European sovereignty. A democratic and federal political Europe, finally master not of others, but of herself, "could be the 'republican' empire of the future that we need"³⁶. The Europe of today appears as an artificial object, a technocratic and pseudo-federal construction, a "political forgery" suffering from a "incurable political deficit". European norms express a purely economic logic whose ultimate foundations are the dogmas of the ultra-liberal ideologies of the four liberalisations and of the free circulation of people, services, goods and capitals imposed by the multinational corporations quite often in conflict with the regional and national civil societies. These reflect the tendency of "depolitisation" in European matters, transforming the latter into "infra- and para-political" ones, taking them out of public debate and democratic control. The conclusion: if the two tasks currently assumed by Europe - expansion and consolidation - will be pursued within the existing European mechanisms, there is considerable risk that, just like the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, the European Union might become "the threatening image of our irreparable decadence"³⁷. A solution would be the creation of a united and democratic federal Europe as one Nation-State of the American type. But for this we need to invent or rather recover (Europe is facing the task of "re-striking roots" - *réenracinement*) a "European" political "nation" which would not replace but complete the cultural nations of Europe by creating its "mystical body" and serving as foundation for an authentic sovereignty.

“Such sovereignty could only be rooted in the only European reality whose traces are still present in the cultural identity of Europe. Before becoming a Europe of nations, Europe was essentially a *romanitas* and *christianitas*, realities marking the absolute priority of the city and of man, anterior and superior to the division into nations. In fact, it was only by assuming these two attributes that the “all Christian” nations of the continent centred around the “empire” of their kings could find the way towards their diversifying developments. “Isn’t it time for them to give back to Europe a part of this inheritance precisely in order to be able to preserve what they have essential?”³⁸ Patterns of a “universal people”, *christianitas* and *romanitas* can be a “paradigm creating a new possible citizenship and a new European cultural universalism”. Anyway, Europe must turn back to this tradition, “buried for a moment by the historical developments and betrayed by ideologies to the national royalty”³⁹. But the vision of a federal Europe does not have to be connected to the dated prospects of the Nation-State. It should rather use the Roman-German Empire as term of reference. Even a very brief examination of the European judicial history will reveal the surprising actuality of the subsidiary and federal model of the old medieval imperial jurists (like, for instance, the polymorphic and decentralised empire of Baldus Ubaldi); this “must be brought out of oblivion”, “a return to the debate abandoned by political philosophy in the 16th and 17th centuries”⁴⁰ being the theoretical pre-requisite essential for the rediscovery of political analysis and practice required by the European construction.

Contrary to what one may think, the process of European unification does not mean going beyond nations. Europe can only be a common action of the European nations. The moral and political axis of European construction (the French - German reconciliation) was created through a political decision taken by nations, and not by supranational institutions. If immediately after World War II federalists saw in nations the source of all evil and were pleading for abandoning them, the European federalists of today clearly plead for their political resuscitation. Europe is now seen as a “federation of nations” meant to consolidate and not annihilate them⁴¹. Only the nation can offer “substance” to democracy, serving as warrant of individual rights and as source maintaining and rebuilding social cohesion. But one point has to be made: we must make a difference between nation in a “cultural” sense as a distinctive feature, passive, past identity, which must be preserved and defended, and nation in a “political” sense, source of active identification, operating, which must be built within

a particular activity frame open to the universal. The nation must be recovered, "not as particular feature, but as a political body, not caring for particularity but for universalism"⁴². The nation can be also rendered obsolete, but only by developing its features as political entity, and not forgetting them, aware of the fact that "the road towards Europe is by developing and opening the national political cultures"⁴³.

But the political and democratic deficit of the Union expresses through the faults of its political culture a deep spiritual crisis of Western liberal societies. "There is no passion for the public matters. The phenomenon is a serious one and it endangers the vitality, the prosperity and the acting capacity of our democracies. I am not talking about the behaviour of those elected, but about the efforts made by a citizen to go beyond his own problems and take an interest in the public matters. There is no democracy without minimum virtue"⁴⁴. The decline of democracy was essentially caused by the "so-called media *fast food policy*", a simulacrum of political culture made by the mass-media through opinion polls and talk shows. "It is clear than in such an environment one cannot exercise ambitious policies, meant to set the society moving and make it capable of both memory and future"⁴⁵. Moral and philosophical relativism, the intellectual decline caused by the global levelling and mediatisation of societies are leading to a crisis of reason and of communication, weakening the wills and causing a decline of interrogation and argumentation, of dialogue. The phenomenon of political decline is connected to the religious changes occurred in the liberal societies of the late modern period, a time of denominational involution and "triumph of Godless religions"⁴⁶. Secularism appears today just as fragile as Christianity, declining along with the latter. The comeback of religion is a fact, but it marks the triumph of some new religious forms (from sects to esoterism and neo-Buddhism up to the cult of paranormal phenomena) which cancel the classical borders between the realm of God and that of Man. The great religions vacillate between extreme politicisation (the Islam) and complete lack of involvement (Buddhism). The triumph of the new religious forms reflects the recoil of the classical Jewish-Christian culture, a suspension of the symbolic and spiritual elements which structured in depth the European identity as well as the classical modernity, the European spirit and democracy. Their intellectual and spiritual framework (the spirit of the distinction between values: political, religious, aesthetic etc. and the institutions they represent) is questioned or rejected. Centred on the personal search for a meaning and a supreme care for oneself (an

Epicureanism of a stoic type - very much in vogue), they take the form of equivocal wisdom, of the autistic-comforting and pietistic utopias of interiority, practising the fideism, sapientialism and the sentimental outbursts. The dominant feature is the refusal or the clear attack on the political and its autonomy. At the same time, we are witnessing a decline of hope and faith (generated by the collapse of the great messianic philosophies of history), an end of linear time through a devaluation of both past and future and a unilateral fixation on the present moment and on the self. The refusal of the future is also accompanied by the decline of transcendence and of the vertical axis, the new spiritual techniques being structured on "horizontal" polarities (meaning/non-meaning; life/death; self/non-self; unity/duality; reality/unreality etc.). The split of the classical religious-political articulation under the form of the State-Church duality affects not only the political but also the religious. The withdrawal of the political causes the privatisation of both philosophy and religion, reduced to the status of practical wisdom or mysticism without God or transcendence. The situation seems to repeat that of the Hellenistic and Roman-Greek periods, when the advent of stoicism, Epicureanism and neo-Platonism as techniques of individual salvation marked the end of the ancient city, the passing from the *polis* to an apolitical *cosmopolis*. Interesting is the fact that the connection between democracy, pantheism and cosmopolitanism had been noticed by Tocqueville (1840): the idea of equality finds separation and transcendence hard to bear, "as democratic nations are naturally tending towards pantheism", "this system, albeit destroying human individuality or precisely because of this, will have a mysterious influence upon those living in a democracy... nurtures the pride of their spirit and encourages laziness". Therefore, "all those believing in the true greatness of man must rally and fight against it"⁴⁷.

So far, there are two global scenarios imagined for the new geopolitical situation created in Europe and in the world after 1989. To various extents, they set into question within different, even opposed approaches, the relationship between the political and the spiritual. We are talking about the scenario of the "end of history" and, respectively, that of "civilisation clash". Both mean to give a global interpretation of the post-1989 era.

The "End of History?" scenario was born in 1989 together with the famous essay with the same interrogative title of the American political scientist of Japanese origin Francis Fukuyama⁴⁸. The entire demonstration was taken and enhanced three years later by the same author in the book "The End of History no question marke and the Last Man"⁴⁹. Starting from

the suggestion of A. Kojève's Hegelian interpretation⁵⁰, Fukuyama considers that the fall of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989 mustn't only be seen as an end to the Cold War and a death of ideologies. The victory of liberalism, the triumph of market economy and democracy, marking the exhaustion of alternate resources, signifies, through a universalisation of liberal democracy, of market economy and of consumer capitalism, in its media version, the end of the ideological and philosophical evolution of mankind. "The end of history" announced by Hegel for the year 1806 took in fact place in 1989 after a century and a half of Marxist and totalitarian parenthesis. Western - American and European - societies of liberal and democratic capitalism are the ones which in fact secure prosperity and egalitarianism, equal and universal acknowledgement of human beings, of a classless society as seen by Marx, moving towards the universal and homogeneous State in which Hegel saw the "end of history". Satisfying material needs and reaching equal and universal acknowledgement, the liberal state solves in principle all intellectual and social contradictions (between "master" and "servant") which have marked our history, and all mankind has to do now is to solve the technical and ecological problems connected to a more refined consumption and environment protection. With this, liberal societies reach the post-history. The place of wars and conflicts is increasingly taken by economy, trade and consumption. World politics and international relations enter a process of "Common Marketisation". A symbol of this evolution would be precisely the countries of Western Europe in the post-war period, "flaccid and prosperous countries, dominated by self-satisfaction deprived of will, whose major project did not challenge heroism beyond the creation of a Common Market"⁵¹. The world will be divided into two large camps: the developed societies of liberal democracies and capitalism who enter the post-history, and the historical ones, underdeveloped, torn by religious, nationalist or ideological conflicts, by sacrifice and endless struggle for prestige or superiority.

The weak point of this description lies, on the one hand, in the mirage of any neo-Hegelian philosophy of history: favouring one sense of society development and correlatively disqualifying others, implicit in the understanding of the wars and totalitarianisms of the 20th century as huge and pointless parentheses and aberrations of history on its road towards a liberal-democratic post-history. Fukuyama seems to vacillate between Hegel/Kojève and Spengler/Sorokin. Is the present situation of liberal societies an essential mutation within world history, an end of history as

such, or a just symptom of decline for a mere historical cycle, the exhaustion of which opens the way for the following cycle⁵²? On the other hand, this hesitation is rooted in the anthropological risk of describing the situation of the post-historical man (detailed by Fukuyama in the 1992 book). Kojève's interpretation of the "end of history" comes here close to the description made by Nietzsche to the "last man". If the end of history is the road towards a generalised common life, then this means for Kojève that the world has been demystified: all myths, arts, philosophies, sciences have in the long run contributed only to the satisfaction of our original animal needs. We are witnessing the ultimate trivialisation of man, as reason, history and philosophy bring him back among the beasts. We have now "the last man", the "bourgeois", the "democratic" man of Tocqueville, the "slave" man of Nietzsche, deprived of ambitions and aspirations, made only of "reason" and "desire", but with no "soul", "heart", "impetus". For the sake of self-preservation, consumption, of petty interests and designs, of peace and prosperity he gives up the fight and the risking of life for an immaterial ideal and prestige; the only purpose of this struggle being to create in battle free men, "masters".

In his analyses, Fukuyama outlines the surprising actuality of Plato's psychology from the book IV of his "Republic". The soul is made up of three faculties: a transcendent one - the intellect - oriented towards the immaterial, of divine origin and located in the brain, an immanent one - concupiscence, desire - oriented towards matter, of animal extraction and located in the abdomen, and an intermediate one, constituting as such the essence of *human* soul, represented by "impetus" - or "spirit", with the stoics -, located in the heart. The "thymos" is source not only of violence, tyranny, will of domination, but also of virtues like courage, justice, civic spirit. If the activity of the intellect leads to knowledge, science, and the activity of desire creates economy, politics and religion come from the passion of the heart or of the spirit. They are the main forms of education for "impetus" or for "spirit", of gaining acknowledgement and cultivating the aristocratic or chivalrous feeling of moral superiority, but at the same time they are the main sources of conflicts for supremacy and domination. This is why the *thymos* was the constant concern of practical philosophy from Plato to Nietzsche⁵³. They all meant to educate or resuscitate it. An essential mutation in this respect was brought by the modern era. Obsessed with the eradication of aristocracy and the accomplishment of democratic equality, this era tried through Hobbes and Locke to completely eliminate the *thymos* from public life, replacing

it with a combination of desire and reason, respectively economy and science, combination typical for the "bourgeois" man. According to the new social contract, the philosopher becomes a scientist (intellect is reduced to reason), the warrior is supposed to become a merchant, giving up risk and glory for the sake of material gain and the prospect of a happiness understood as quiet life secured by the endless accumulation of wealth and possible for everybody. The modern liberal and democratic state was meant to ensure a universal rational acknowledgement of all individuals bent on the pursuit of some rational personal interests. Economy and science were encouraged at a social level, while nationalism, religion and politics had to become private or subordinated to the first two. The democrat and liberal capitalist man (bourgeois) "was a deliberate creation of early modern thought, an effort of social engineering trying to create social peace by changing human nature itself"⁵⁴. The apparition of the "heartless man", of the "last man" brings an internal crisis within modern liberal democracy itself, also undermined by the constant pressure for egalitarianism and relativism. These came to erode the very values of liberalism and democracy, whose political culture, as Tocqueville had demonstrated, cannot afford the luxury of abandoning the pre-liberal traditions (religious, philosophical, national, ethnic etc.) of cultivating the *thymos* or the spirit, without seriously endangering its existence. And this because the best political system is the one satisfying all *three* Platonic parts of the soul. The generalisation of the "last man" deprived of *thymos* would clearly mean the "end of history", the death of politics, of philosophy, of art, the end of human creativity and the prospect of "a very sad era", of "centuries of boredom" which might make the human beings reduced to a state of post-historical animals (Kojève) feel the need to reaffirm their human nature, to regain through revolt their "impetus" in the form of an unleashed *megalothymia*; they will thus return to the conflicts forming the "first man", opening the era of "tremendous wars of the spirit" (Nietzsche), much more dangerous as they will put together fanaticism and advanced technology. Because, on the one hand, the elements of human nature can be repressed or sublimated, but never completely eliminated, and on the other, the stability of all regimes is eroded by the corrosive power of time. Aristotle and Plato seem to be much closer to the truth than Hegel or Kojève, at least from a conservative standpoint. The fall of communism does not necessarily mean the unconditional triumph of liberalism. "Fascism was defeated on the battlefield, his possibilities were not completely exhausted"; in various forms, under the guise of

racism, nationalism, fundamentalism “it has a future, if not *the* future”. Paradoxically, it was precisely the opposition to fascism and communism, the evils that Western democracies had to face, that has “revealed what is best in them”, “the external threat disciplined us within”, “gave us clear moral and political, albeit negative goals”⁵⁵. “In spite of our triumphant air, American democracy is in danger... We have won the Cold War, but this means that now we are the enemy, and no longer them”⁵⁶.

In fact, Kojève’s theories had received a theoretical reply of great depth in the fifties, from the part of Léo Strauss. The Strauss/Kojève debate upon the interpretation given by Strauss to Xenophon’s dialogue “On Tyranny”⁵⁷ was rightfully considered as “probably the deepest debate between two philosophers of our century”⁵⁸. Léo Strauss thoroughly demonstrates the inconsistency of historicism, the superficial and precarious character of Kojève’s simplifying anthropology, brilliantly outlining the unmatched depth and the actuality of classical philosophy as compared to its modern reductions. Neither war, nor work or consumption, but thought is seen by the ancients as the expression of human nature; it is not through universal acknowledgement, but by ensuring the conditions of a search for wisdom and of a new contemplation for each man that the universal and homogeneous democratic state can gain legitimacy. Given the weakness of human nature, the ancients believed that universal happiness is impossible, as the best regime could only give it the conditions to happen, its accomplishment being conditioned not by history, but precisely by the individual separation from history. On the other hand, the moderns believe that they can secure universal happiness within history, but for this they lower the ideal of man replacing moral virtue with universal acknowledgement and understanding happiness as coming from this acknowledgement and from material wealth⁵⁹. Believing that it broadened the horizon of ancient and medieval “idealism”, modern philosophical and political “realism” only brings an unfortunate narrowing of the anthropological and philosophical horizon. Rejecting the transcendence of spirit and the horizon of eternity (the access to the “heliological” truth from the parable of Plato’s cave), it condemns man to the captivity of natural, social and historical determinisms (holding him prisoner of the “speological” truth of the cave).

The other post-1989 scenario is that of the “civilisation clash” theorised in 1993 in a famous essay by the Harvard professor and director of the “Olim” Institute for Strategic Studies, Samuel Huntington⁶⁰. According to him, far from heading towards a liberal democratic and increasingly

economic post-history, post-communist mankind will find itself increasingly wrapped up in history and politics. The *thymos* will experience a dramatic world-scale escalation. Conflicts will become a common sight, but they will no longer be ideological or economic in nature, but rather civilisation conflicts. The future will not see the advent of a world civilisation. 7-8 civilisations will compete on the political arena of the world (Western, Slavic-Orthodox, Islamic, Confucianist, Japanese, Hinduist, Latin-American, African). Nations will be grouped according to cultural, spiritual and not ideological and economic criteria, following the "sister country syndrome" and that of the spiritual "sister nation". The axis of international relation will be "the West vs. the rest of the world". During the separation into civilisation blocs there will be a number of "torn" countries (Turkey, Mexico, Russia, Romania) which are at risk of repeating the example of Yugoslavia (rehearsal of a universal scenario). Based on fragile arguments (confusion between politics and culture, D. Bell) and on easy and simplifying generalisations which set Huntington among the descendants of Spengler and Toynbee, the essay takes the risk of compensating for the absence of one explanatory paradigm, unavoidably distorted (P. Hassner), for the geopolitical situation of the world after 1989. But he is of top interest, as he seems to actually inspire American foreign policy, and even that of the institutions of the European Union. He is trying to impose the idea that the real Europe is only that of the Western civilisation, implying that Eastern Europe (Orthodox), belonging in fact to another civilisation, should not be included in the European Union. The boundaries of the latter would be, according to Wallace's map (1990), those of Western Christianity around the year 1500, stretching as far as the former boundaries separating the Habsburg Empire, Poland and the Baltic states from the Ottoman and Tsarist Empires. "The velvet curtain of culture has replaced the iron culture of ideology as main separation line for Europe"⁶¹. It might also indicate the possible limits of European Union expansion.

The presentation of these two scenarios brings about a legitimate question: what is left of the classical Europe in the gentle apocalypse of post-history and in the historical Armageddon of civilisations? How much spirit and politics will survive in a Europe implacably dissolved by the effects of economic globalisation or reduced to the role of defence bulwark for a besieged civilisation with its centre outside? Everything seems to confirm the extremely lucid diagnosis of the European condition developed by Paul Valery as early as 1919 in his reflections on the "crisis of the

spirit" or "on the greatness and the decadence of Europe". The utilitarian reduction of European spirit to science and of science to ware, the transformation of culture in economy, all made possible the global spreading of technology. Together with the democratic levelling, in his opinion this would lead to an unavoidable *deminutio capitis* of Europe. In a civilisation determined by figures and quantities, by some statistics in which "forces become proportional to masses", "there is still some confusion, but we shall witness, in the long run, the advent of a miraculous animal society, perfect and ultimate anthill". Europe unavoidably succumbs. Or, "the superiority of Europe had to be determined by the quality of man", by the European spirit or soul (*psyche*), characterised by "active eagerness, burning and unselfish curiosity, a fortunate mixture of imagination and logical rigour, a certain unpessimistic scepticism, an unresigned mysticism"⁶². "Europe conspicuously aspires to be lead by an American commission. This is the direction of its entire policy". But "Europe will be punished for its policy", or rather for the discrepancy between its subtle spirit and crude policy, marked now by "an amazing lack of poise". "Any policy implies (usually it has no idea that it implies) a certain outlook on man and even an opinion regarding the destiny of the species, an entire metaphysics, from the most crude sensualism to the most daring mysticism"⁶³. "Be them parties, regimes or statesmen, it could be most instructive to draw from their tactics and actions the ideas they have or they are making on man"⁶⁴. Or, Europe meant above all the creation through Romanisation, Christianisation and Hellenisation of a *homo europaeus*, stake of its entire historical design⁶⁵. The crisis of European politics is the crisis of the European man, or rather of the European "soul" and of the European "culture" - this is the message sent to Western Europe by the philosophers from the centre and the east of the continent, from Prague, Păltiniș or Bucharest.

Central-European interlude

One of the most disturbing reflections regarding the essence and the historical and contemporary destiny of Europe, and at the same time a spiritual and political design, belongs to Czech philosopher Jan Patočka. Strong disciple of Husserl and Heidegger, private philosopher kept in the shadow for decades by all totalitarian regimes oppressing the Czech Republic, Nazi as well as communist, reduced to a secret existence in the

basements of Prague where he kept underground seminars, he became particularly known as the philosopher-martyr. His short activity as spokesman (together with Vaclav Havel) of the "Charta '77" movement, Socratic gesture of sublime philosophical testimony, was to cost him his life in consequence of the brutal questionings to which he was subjected at an age of 70 by the political police. But his sacrifice was to bring to the European public opinion a vast philosophical work, centred around an original re-argumentation of the natural world phenomenology and completed with a fascinating philosophy of history⁶⁶, at the centre of which we find the problem of Europe's destiny.

The Czech philosopher begins his meditation by noticing the general fatigue and decline felt by contemporary Europe. Uncertain as to its essential values and institutions, Europe seems crushed by its gigantic successors: America and Russia, and increasingly dispossessed of its technical-scientific inheritance by the non-European nations now free from its colonial rule.

The central idea of the Prague philosopher is concentrated in a statement which at a first glance seems exclusive: History is in fact the history of Europe - all that the rest of the world knows is historiography - and it appears together with the creation of philosophy and politics in the ancient Greek city, to disappear with the loss of this spiritual inheritance. According to him, there are three types of societies based, in their turn, on the existence of three fundamental movements of human life in relation to the natural world⁶⁷: - the movement of unconditional *acceptance* of natural life, specific to the an-historical societies whose life takes place in the timeless anonymity of the cyclic rhythms of nature; - the movement of *self-defence* typical for the developed archaic and traditional societies which have a collective memory in the form of mythical traditions and whose life, oriented towards an archetypal past, takes place still in the pre-history; - the movement *towards truth*, specific to European societies and cultures. These have cut all ties with nature and mythical past and assumed the *problematic* character of existence, the risk of uncertainty and of the search for a rational meaning of existence. This meaning was found not in the past but in the stable and eternal presence of real and ultimate principles behind the phenomenal and changing manifestation of the natural flow of things. Real history is the expression of *this* movement towards truth; it only exists where existence itself receives a *problematic* character, because, according to Patocka, neither labour nor myth can effectively break the circle of natural life.

History - and consequently Europe - appear thus only with the emergence, as individual and social ideal, of the virile movement of the soul which lives the risks and the tension of an existence in truth and freedom, resisting the double temptation of the comfort of a usual natural existence and, respectively, of the orgiastic outburst (sexual, violent, passionate) compensating for its annoying routine - outlets offered by the natural sacredness of archaic religions.

For him who accepts the movement towards truth, world and man are taken apart doubling themselves into a natural phenomenal side, obvious and varied, but subjected to accident, illusions and falsehood, perishable and ending in finitude and death, and another, less obvious, spiritual, essential, eternal (and consequently divine), real and authentic. Facing this dilemma, the problematic man must freely and rationally assume responsibility for accomplishing his essential spiritual and authentic dimension (see the Platonic myth of the choice between the two ways of life made by Hercules at a cross-roads). Based on a philosophical *belief*⁶⁸, a reasonable decision not deprived of risks though, it is this individual design of real and authentic existence - of the care for one's soul, for oneself through oneself (cf. *Alcibiades* 132c) - expanded to social dimensions that constitutes, according to Patocka, the essence of historical development.

Thus, the principle of historical existence is the struggle⁶⁹, the acceptance of the problematic nature of existence and the exposure to the risks of an unnatural existence in order to attain a true, free and consequently fearless life. History is thus lived not only from the diurnal angle of acceptance, but also from the nocturnal one, that of the night and of the open battle, dangerous and terrifying; it lies in fact under the sign of *Polemos*. History, philosophy and politics are born of *Polemos* and *Eris* - as said by Heraclitus himself: "We must know that war is common and justice is struggle and that all are born of struggle and need" (fragment 80) or: "war is father to all and emperor of all; some he showed to be gods, other humans, some he made slaves, others he made free men" (fragment 53). Beyond the destructive aspects, the violence of war has a positive nature - metaphysical as well as sacred. He creates among those fighting a unity of thought (*phrónesis*), a special "solidarity" "of the shaken but fearless". The means of this struggle are, alongside war, philosophy and politics; only when the last two appear can we speak of History, says the Czech philosopher. In fact, philosophy and politics were born during Athens' struggle for freedom and democracy against the Orient represented

by the Persian Empire, as well as against the internal tyranny and the Spartan militarist tribalism⁷⁰.

But the internal crisis of the Greek city is marked by the killing of the philosophical man par excellence, Socrates, by the representatives of the most free and democratic society of the time, the one which had defeated the Persians. The testament left by Socrates to his disciples was that, while meditating upon this catastrophe, they should create a city in which philosophers could no longer be killed and justice would not be based on fluctuating traditions or on the irrational tyranny of the power-hungry or of the crowds manipulated by them, but on the reason and the science of philosophers. Yet, the creation of this rational state requires first a recovery of the unity of the soul. Consequently, the Greek philosophical-political design centred on the "care for the soul" in all its relations: with the cosmos, the city and the self, would take the form of a "total science" (A. Cornea) made of the triptych generated by the sum of three sub-designs: 1) *onto-cosmological*, 2) *psycho-political* and 3) *metaphysical-religious*⁷¹: the first would be centred around the definition of the medial position of the soul in the general architecture of existence; the second would explain the analogical relations existing between the functions of the psyche and those of the polis; the third would establish, in contrast with the finitude and morality of physical existence, the eternity of the *Psyché*, as a corollary to its nature as principle of movement (that *autò heautò kinoûn*, "moving itself" from *Phaidros* 246a).

From this unitary fundamental design - developed in other but not centrifugal directions by Plato, Democritus and Aristotle and later taken by the stoics and the neo-Platonists - Europe was born. In spite of the catastrophes leading to the successive falls of the Polis, the Roman Empire and the medieval Christian one, and of its successive historical metamorphoses, the philosophical design of creating a community based on the aspiration towards the complete and ultimate truth of existence was preserved - according to the Czech philosopher - until the 16th century⁷². Gradually replacing the "care for the soul", that is for truth and being, with the passion for possession and dominance of the outside world, the Renaissance, the Reform, the Enlightenment, modern scientism and technocracy would unavoidably lead to the nihilism, scepticism and social and moral crisis of contemporary Europe. In front of man's will of knowledge and power, the being finds shelter behind the beings turned into simple things. In his desire to dominate the external objects, man comes in fact to be dominated by the realities of the world turned into a

mere network of forces⁷³. The absence of a global metaphysical design, the collapse of the impetus towards an absolute meaning and truth of existence under the circumstances of an utilitarian operation of reason, have come to generate a gigantic *boredom* (*taedium vitae*), sign of a false existence, dominated more and more by a dull, absurd and impersonal present. According to Patocka, the main problem of Europe is therefore not the solution to the West-East, liberalism-socialism, democracy-totalitarianism alternative, but the paradox of an increasingly involution of history towards pre-history, towards the situation of a society satisfied with natural life, with reproduction and material sustention⁷⁴. The boredom and the anxieties of this society are solved by the eternal orgiastic rites: sex, drugs, violence, revolutions and especially "war", the perfect revolution for the world of everyday boredom. This has made the 20th century practically an "endless war"⁷⁵.

The only chance of avoiding this strong decline of Europe (and America) from history to pre-history (the utopia of liberal post-history belonging to Kojève-Fukuyama) - the only possibility of maintaining mankind on the track of history is conditioned, says Patocka, by a "huge, unseen before" philosophical "*metanoia*" of the European elite⁷⁶. In other words, he is talking about the rehabilitation of the ancient ideal of the "spiritual man", the ideal of a problematic and truthful existence which nevertheless requires a break with the naive natural meaning of existence and taking the risks of fighting falsehood.

Exemplary figure, the archetype of this European "spiritual man" would be *Socrates* in whose myth drawn up by Plato (and continued by the neo-Platonists) the Czech philosophers think he can find all the essential features of Christ - the same distinction between the dishonest but reputedly honest man and the perfectly honest sentenced to death by the pseudo-honest⁷⁷. Therefore, in his opinion (very close here to that of Simone Weil), Europe is *not* based upon two pillars - the ancient tradition *and* the Jewish-Christian one - as it is generally accepted, but just on one, the ancient Greek one which "Hellenised" both the Jewish and the Christian elements entered in its spiritual corpus.

"Europe as Europe was born of the care for the soul. It has perished because it was once again left in oblivion"⁷⁸.

East Side Story

Extremely interesting and suggestive reflections on the cultural “soul” of Europe have also been given by the East-European space. Just like in the Central-European space, they were generated in reply to the historical terror represented by the Soviet occupation and communism, felt as ideological and historical forces aiming to “take Romania out of Europe”. But the European reflections of the Romanian philosophers and intellectuals were not something new, their apparition did not only have the value of a reaction to unfavourable historical circumstances. They belong to a vast national cultural “debate”⁷⁹ which still goes on today and the origins of which are to be found in the 19th century, at the beginning of Romania’s modernisation, as it accompanied the main stages in the creation of the modern national and unitary Romanian state. This vast debate has come to involve the supporters of two great cultural and social-political trends: the modernists, pro-European, pro-Western synchronists, on the one hand, and on the other the traditionalists, Orthodoxist, autochtonist, protocronist. The former are the representatives of the bourgeoisie, promoters of liberalism, capitalism and Western democracy, the others are the champions of the peasants, advocating a rural economy and an authoritarian, patriarchal political regime.

Common to all East-European nations, the debate in Romania gains unique complexity, as it comes to tackle the thorny issue of the “Romanian specific” and identity. In the structure of this Romanian national specific we can find, due to the geo-spiritual setting and to historical circumstances, contrasting and often contradictory notes which render extremely difficult a clear and final identification. Formed as a nation and located right between the great European empires (Roman, Byzantine, Ottoman, Austrian-Hungarian, Russian), the Romanians have managed to survive and politically exist due to the weakness of the empires in whose area of influence they were and with regard to which they had to secure a difficult autonomy. Latin nation of Eastern Christian faith, from a linguistic and ethnic point of view they belong to Western Europe, but from a religious and spiritual one to South-Eastern and Eastern Europe. Consequently, they never fully identified with nor were fully acknowledged as such by any of the political and spiritual entities fighting for domination in Europe. Quite significantly, *romanitas* and *christianitas* have become for the Romanians formulas of *national* self-identification (designating the Romanian “people” and “law”) and not of integration in supranational political or spiritual

structures, like the Empire and the Church in the West. The general tendency was instinctively that of locally absorbing the universal resources of acknowledgement and identification, using them to the advantage of a national policy of solitary, isolationist independence, defined by a stubborn refusal of integration in, or co-operation with, the supranational political or religious structures perceived as potential factors of spiritual annexation and alienation. Consequently, typical for the entire Romanian culture and politics was a fixation of the spirit on the idiomatic, the tendency to render universal the already existing particular, proclaiming universalist orientations, and not that of rendering particular the universals independently or previously existing by including them in the autochthonous. The specific movement was therefore one from local to general, and not the other way around. Thus, the action of forced universalisation through the Catholic faith (13th-14th century) or, later, through a modernisation along Western lines was seen as an aggression against the Romanian nature itself. The reaction to the strong demands of modernisation was a double one. The first was the utopian attempt to adopt a right-wing nationalist political-cultural attitude, traditionalist-Orthodoxist, authoritarian, violently irrational, anti-Western, anti-Semite and xenophobe⁸⁰, doomed to fail by history itself. The second was the attempt to affirm in front of the harsh dilemmas, typical for a developing society, the national specific sublimating it into cultural creativity. Avoiding the extremes of regressive autochthonism and "progressive" imitation, the representatives of this trend tried to find surprising combinations and identify new thought formulas which would fruitfully combine tradition and modernity. Their purpose was to offer "coherent visions to a deeply schizoid society, trapped between an archaic and pre-feudal way of life and a stratum of modern urbanisation, a society which had begun only late, in a twisted and incomplete manner, the modernisation of a social psyche haunted by the complex of marginality"⁸¹.

One of the dominant features of Romanian philosophy is the absence of a political philosophy of the classical type, the social-political field being, with some notable exceptions, confiscated by a reductionist sociological outlook of Marxist extraction and with materialist overtones. On the other hand, a privileged place and a dominant role went to the aesthetic values⁸². Their importance is explained by the essentially contemplative character of Orthodox theology and religious practice, through which the patristic neo-Platonism (to which the romantic one was later added) became one of the fundamental constituent elements of

Romanian culture⁸³. "We might say that, in fact, the modernisation of Romanian public life and its full access to a European *status* and sovereignty were accompanied by an option for aesthetic and mystical-rational connotations, ultimately of neo-Platonic extraction; this special type of philosophical tradition can be identified in the very fabric of most intellectual discourses on Romania". It explains why "within Romanian culture the aesthetic values kept a long and rare prestige, being superior to the political and ethical ones". The aesthetic was offering an ideal space for mediation and harmonisation between the "archaic" tradition of "instinctive faithfulness" belonging to the Romanian society and the "rationalist, contractual and modernising impulses"⁸⁴ defining the public and intellectual sphere. Romanian philosophers were to seek thus formulas for the relativisation of the classical oppositions within Western thought (man-nature, subject-object, identity-difference, empiricism-rationalism etc.) which would go beyond the dialectics of final contradictions and offer epistemological alternatives and ontological options meant to rehabilitate the secondary, the nuance, the imperfection, the individual⁸⁵. Avoiding the antithetical negation and choosing to adopt the inclusion, they will attempt intellectual constructs meant to rehabilitate and reconcile under the sign of a generous humanism science and tradition, West and East (Aron Dumitriu), dogma and science, conscious and unconscious, philosophy and poetry (Lucian Blaga), archaic and modern, sacred and profane (Mircea Eliade, Sergiu Al-George), theology and philosophy, faith and reason (Mircea Vulcănescu, Mihai Şora), being and becoming, idiomatic and universal (Constantin Noica).

All these outstanding representatives of Romanian thought have manifested at the same time a real cultural fury inspired by the desire to compensate through creativity the historical delay and for fragility of political constructions. This feeling consolidated after 1945. As Romania was Sovietised, "culture came to replace politics; creation became an almost mystical technique to fight and defeat time"⁸⁶, being invested with a quasi-soteriological function. The terms of the "great debate" reversed their sign: the "progressive attitude" and the modernisation became anti-European through Sovietisation and traditionalism became pro-Western⁸⁷. Europe was shown that because of an excessive feeling of guilt towards the abandoned East, its elite fell victim to Marxist propaganda⁸⁸ and accepted with an irresponsible frivolity the division of Europe by the Iron Curtain⁸⁹. Accepting the suicidal amputation of the East-European patrimony, Europe basically agreed with a large scale attack

on the diversity which gives it its richness. "We cannot imagine a European culture reduced only to its Western forms. From a cultural and spiritual point of view, Europe is completed by everything that the area of the Carpathians and the Balkans has created and preserved". Therefore, "today Europe can no longer afford to once again abandon Dacia", this sacrifice might "endanger the very existence and spiritual integrity of Europe"⁹⁰.

In Romania, the model of "resistance through culture" to the communist era was best represented with all his accomplishments and ambiguities, by philosopher Constantin Noica. "Culturalism as access to a more authentic history" and as measure of the real history, plus the "paideic dimension" turned cultural creativity into a secular esoterism and into a modern version of sacredness which both had, due to his disciples from the "Păltiniș School", an enormous echo in the Romanian culture of the 80s⁹¹. The central theme of Noica's philosophy is metaphysical in nature. It aims to recover from a reversed perspective Hegel's plan of speculative reconciliation between ancient philosophy and the modern philosophy of becoming in the form of the so-called "becoming into being"⁹². Between being (absolute) and becoming (nature) there is a unilateral contradiction: becoming contradicts being, it is not being but tends towards being (without having to reach it when it remains a mere "becoming into becoming"), while being does not contradict becoming, it is becoming accomplished in the form of "becoming into being". The latter takes the form of subjective, objective and absolute reason embodied in man and appearing as person, community and mankind in morals, politics and religion, and also has a life of its own, as absolute reason, ideal model which makes possible all its embodiments. This model has three terms: individual, determinations, general. The terms of this model enter various binary combinations, representing just as many ontological uncertainties ("diseases of the spirit" at a conscious level) before reaching the ternary order of being. Different from Hegel's version: general - determinations - individual (G-D-I), and from the Marxist one: determinations - general - individual (D-G-I), with Noica it finds the Platonic form individual - determinations - general (I-D-G): something individual gives its determinations which, by means of their constituent fields or elements, turn it into something universal. In a highly general analogy, Noica's ontological model has the following synthetic formula: the individual "body" of becoming passes through the "soul" made up of elements (as possibility of becoming) into the general "spirit" of its becoming which is being. But the modulations of being and the entwinement of being and becoming are, according to Noica, "a priori"

embedded in the Romanian language⁹³ and especially in the preposition "întru" (towards, into) which gave the philosopher the ontological operator for the integration of being and becoming, man and nature, one and multiple, impossible to reconcile for the religions and the philosophies of the world.

The Romanian solution to the becoming into (towards) being under the form of the multiple One offers the philosopher, in one last book with the value of a legacy, the principle for the recreation of the scheme, structure and model of the European culture⁹⁴, considered to be the culture *par excellence*, the "culture of cultures". The general classification of cultures is operated by Noica according to the criterion of the five possible solutions to the fundamental metaphysical problem of the relation between One and multiple⁹⁵: 1) One and its *repetition* - totemic cultures; 2) One and its *variation* - monotheistic cultures (Islam, America); 3) One *in* multiple - pantheistic cultures (India); in all these three forms the multiple is shadowed by the One which, in its turn, is degraded and reduced to the rank of mere unit; 4) One *and* multiple - polytheistic cultures (Ancient Greece); and, finally, 5) multiple One, the only to legitimate the multiple distributing itself without *splitting* - the Trinitarian culture of Europe⁹⁶. The trinitarian culture, the culture of Europe as such, was born not how Spengler believed, in the Germany of the years 900-1000 as a Faustian culture, but in the Byzantine East, "namely in the year 325 of our Lord, at Nicaea"⁹⁷ together with the Trinitarian *idea* and the *myth* of the embodiment. This theological beginning left a decisive mark on the entire European culture which, in all its authentic forms of manifestation, even in the most secularised ones, has a Trinitarian constant: all that is authentic has the form of law - embodiment - manifestations (general - individual - determinations), and an incarnational orientation⁹⁸. To the unifying, reductive unity of synthesis of the ancients, the European trinitarian model opposes a new kind of unity, the synthetic unity characterised by diversification and expansion. This type of synthetic unity seeks itself in all creations of the European spirit: religious, artistic, scientific, technical⁹⁹.

C. Noica thinks that the periods of European culture can be understood as chapters in an original morphology of culture, which includes the "grammar" of the logos and of being with the uncertainties of the ontological model imperfectly or partially accomplished¹⁰⁰: 1) Middle Ages - age of the noun; 2) Renaissance - age of the adjective; 3) Reform, Counter-Reform, Classicism - age of the adverb; 4) Renaissance, Enlightenment, Revolution - age of the pronoun (from the individualist "I"

to the collectivist “we”); 5) modern and contemporary era - era of the numeral and of the conjunction (stagnation, alienation, absurd, nihilism) and, finally, 6) future - age of the preposition (of the “intru” - into, towards), of synthetic units, with no correctives, of the multiple One type. This will mark the end of the tyranny of generalisations and the complete rehabilitation of the individual (obviously proportional with the accomplishment of the ontological model, namely universalised). On the basis of this argumentation, Noica feels entitled to a final suggestion¹⁰¹: as the mathematical logos has today drifted into formalism and the historical one into nihilism, the only chance of Europe is to recover the ontological model on the open line of the cultural logos. We are talking about a real cultural eschatology: this culture is the chance for surpassing not only the cyclic character of the ancient natural time, but also the linearity of the entropic Christian historical time. It introduces a new, ecstatic temporality of the non-gentropic “kairotic” kind, similar to that of the mystics, not static and contemplative, but active and dynamic. As it offers access to being in its ideal model, culture even comes to tame time itself, which it encapsulates in creations and turns from devouring it. By accelerating time, it allows access to the good infinity (and not to a bad one, as inert as the eternity of mysticism) of a *sui generis* cultural super-nature and super-history: authentic transcendence without transcendence, the endless culture will finally render superfluous even the platitude the of millennia-old fundamental obsession of mankind: death¹⁰².

There are two main objections to Noica’s cultural Platonism, the exclusivism and attachments of which have never ceased to cause protests and condemnation. A first objection has in view the confusion, or rather the reduction of spirit to reason. But reason is different from intellect (the former operating with ideas or meanings, the latter with mere concepts or knowledge) and also from the soul (made of intellect - feeling - will). Noica’s “spiritual”/cultural man could very well be a man with no heart or soul; he is comfortable “offending the world”, taking interest only in the “logical (or ontological) individual” and not in the “statistical one”, concern of the “politicians, common logicians and theologians with no preference”. “The politicians, logicians and prophets do not have the courage to say: ‘I’m not interested!’”¹⁰³ Or, from the perspective of the “spiritual”/cultural man, there are “three things which we can ignore: politics, history and time. All that is good, all that is culture goes out of time”¹⁰⁴. Such proud indifference and philosophical superiority towards the real human community expressed so directly were quick to cause

critical reactions, this attitude being openly accused in the press of that time as the expression of elitism or cultural gnosticism¹⁰⁵. Dissident intellectuals were to radicalise their objections denouncing in Noica's cultural utopia not only the compromise with Ceaușescu's aggressive national communist regime, but also some other negative features enhanced by the economic and moral disaster lived by Romania in the 80s: lack of responsibility, social indifference, ethical inconsistency, speculative retreat in front of the seriousness of reality, cultural provincialism, the inadequacy and the aggressive complex of Romanian pride by means of which Noica found excuses for Ceaușescu's regime¹⁰⁶. Noica was indeed paying no attention to the issues of political regime or economic system. Without being a supporter either of socialism, or of capitalism, totalitarianism, democracy, his outlook on politics found an ideal in the utopia of a "state of culture", at equal distance between the excessive prosperity of the West and the poverty of the East, as both were hindering cultural creativity. According to his disciples, Noica "did not imagine post-communist Romania at all", and even if he would have lived to see it, "his lesson in terms of philosophy of history would have been that we must leave the communist inferno without heading for the false paradise of the West"¹⁰⁷. In his opinion - similar up to a certain point to that of Heidegger on contemporary Western civilisation -, by choosing the consumption and libertarian kind of society, the technical civilisation of the Faustian type, the West has betrayed the Europe of spirit and culture for the sake of the Europe of "butter", has lost the being and the philosophical meanings of existence for the sake of an endless accumulation of wealth and knowledge. In front of a diseased Europe, lost in statistics and nihilism, the real resurrection of European spirit can only come from the East, where its ontological model was miraculously preserved in the Romanian language¹⁰⁸. With this we come to the second major objection that can be raised to Noica's thought. Identified even by his own disciples, it is connected to the "unsolved tension between the idiomatic and the universal"¹⁰⁹. As I was trying to show above, this is not specific to the Păltiniș philosopher, but to the entire Romanian traditional culture which has always had the tendency to consider that the universal, the "spirit", the being (Christianism, culture) are to be found in the particular, in the "body" of Romanian autochthonous realities, appearing as a mere exhalation or aura of these, after the model of the manifestation or exteriorisation of something hidden, and not after that of the embodiment or the interiorisation of an external universal "spirit" into a particular "body".

The model of the “manifestation of the universal”, with its determined presence, accounts for the resistance to the idea of European integration which is perceived and operates along the model of its “embodiment”. It also accounts very well for the tensions and the debates appeared in Romania after 1989. The Romanian intellectual elite, dominantly pro-European, is now once again divided, “the great debate” of Romanian culture continues in a new form between the supporters of the “return” to Europe through a fast integration and adoption by Romania of European Union legislative and economic standards and demands¹¹⁰, on the one hand, and the supporters of the theory according to which, by its culture and spirit, Romania has “remained” in Europe, never abandoning it, in fact¹¹¹. According to the former, Romania’s European identity must be imposed from the outside and built against the Romanian tradition, while the latter say that it only has to be manifested from within in the direction of the same tradition¹¹². The former lay stress on uniformity and institutional identity, the latter on diversity, difference, culture, tradition.

But the main challenge brought by the historical events of 1989 to Romanian society obviously regards the extraordinary opportunity it has to reinvent and redefine itself in a new, more flexible and beneficial manner. This would first of all mean to discipline and adapt our economy and society so as to meet the criteria of performance and legislative compatibility allowing us to hope for an adhesion to the European Union. Second, we have to face the hardships of post-communism and gather the courage to rethink from the very foundations the state and the type of society we want. Finally, this requires a cultural redefinition of national identity as Romanian and at the same time as European identity, which would freely combine, in a creative and beneficial manner, the multiple and stratified resources present in the seemingly ill-assorted and heterogeneous elements of the Romanian traditional identity as well as of the European identity. Refusing here, on a cultural and spiritual level, any form of exclusivism or uniformity (like, for instance, the adoption of a levelling “European rhetoric” of the ideological kind, a new “continental wooden language”, with “new propaganda agents and party workers”)¹¹³, beneficial would be precisely the adoption of an ever open dialectics between “imitation and identity” which would imitate not the static, but the “dynamic” side of the Western world. “The example to follow would be that of an abundant and ingenious culture, of a respect for human dignity, of a fascinating and tenaciously supported diversity, of liberty as supreme guide in human relations, of the creative openness towards the

potential of transcendence (rather than blind obedience to a set image), of the endless search for new relations between the material and the ideal"¹¹⁴. This does not exclude, but implies a critical attitude towards the social-political developments in the Western society, but only on the basis of a consciously assumed solidarity of destiny. Lucid foreign observers, solidary with the Romanian phenomenon, are today drawing the attention on the obsessively repeated slogan of the "entrance in Europe". We are suggested that, before proclaiming the adhesion, the interrogation regarding the space called "Europe" should be much more radical, reaching even the extreme: "Is there still a Europe? Or, in Heidegger's terms: Which is the essence of the European being (*Seiende*)?" And then we may have the surprise to see that this "space of our hopes" has become completely separated from the transcendent, a space now of pure economic immanence whose "Holy Trinity is: Production, Consumption, Profit" and in which "being" (*être*) has become one with "welfare" (*bien-être*) (R. Guideri), being ultimately reduced to the exchange value (according to G. Vattimo, equation representing the essence of nihilism). Reduced to a social model of the alliance between techno-science and productivity in the service of consumption and profit, Europe is seen as already dissolved in the global nature of world economy, in the Westernisation of the world and the third-worldisation of the West¹¹⁵. Under such circumstances, it may be possible that the Eastern cultures will have to become the defenders of the classical European spirit, or rather of the "spiritual man", as archetype of *homo europaeus*. Surpassing the fixation on the idiomatic and rediscovering the pluralist, democratic, universalist potentialities implicit in *christianitas* and *romanitas*, using the open modernising and diversifying resources of tradition in front of the unsettling prospects of uniformisation by turning to account the differences opened by a late, post-modern modernity, a Christian democracy¹¹⁶ aware of the meaning of its choices could play a decisive part in the European reconstruction of Romanian society in a tolerant and natural spirit.

Romanians are today faced with the transition from a "free Europe" to the more prosaic demands of a "united Europe", seriously risking to become the "victims of a bad investment of freedom" in front of a "united Europe" which seems less and less like a "crowning of the 'free Europe'"¹¹⁷ and of the spirit, in which administrative unification tends to increasingly erase all differences. The integration is also rendered difficult by the perception dominant in the West that this is a process of reintegration of a "diseased world" (the East) into a "healthy world" (the West). Or, more realistically

that this triumphalist outlook is that of the “two infirmities” caused by the “pampering” or by the “barbarity” of history, which have to complete one another to attain common health¹¹⁸. In front of the Western “new Europe”, Eastern Europe is aware of being the past of Europe, the “old Europe”, the Europe of the “rejuvenating elixir” of the spirit, but also of the “dangerous toxins” of nationalism. Its problem is that of “using the elixir and transubstantiating the toxin”, while the problem of the “new Europe” is that of being a Europe “in which the prestige of the eternal and ancient Europe would be visible through transparency”¹¹⁹.

The object of this essay was to present the actual situation of the discussions regarding European unification in the West and European integration in the East. We have briefly presented the debates in France and in Romania in the form of two stories, West-European and East-European, with a Central-European interlude. At the core of these debates the *political* nature of the European design has appeared as inextricably tied to the destiny of the European *spirit*. Taking into account the difference of temporal sequences between West and East, the political and spiritual nature of European unification is challenged from an economic point of view (West) and, respectively, from a cultural one (East) within the two scenarios drawn up for the post-communist era: “the end of history” and “the civilisation clash”. Institutional Europe needs spiritual Europe and the other way around, provided that the spirit be not confiscated by the economic dimension (West), or by national civilisations and cultures (East). Consequently, the accomplishment of a unitary political Europe demands an extremely serious redefinition of spirit in order to defend both its transcendence and universality.

From what has been presented so far, we believe that two correlative theories can be considered as demonstrated:

1) Spiritual Europe cannot be taken apart from political Europe. The spiritual “soul” of Europe, created along a Trinitarian model, as Christian synthesis between Greek rationalism, Roman law and Biblical ethics, needs in order to survive the “body” of adequate institutions. The political expression of the philosophy of European spirit is given by the distinctions and the articulations brought by communal personalism and the principle of subsidiarity on which in the 50s the Founding Fathers of United Europe centred their design of European federalisation.

2) Political Europe cannot be taken apart from spiritual Europe. Because, in a classical meaning, politics is “the art of governing *free* people” (Aristotle). The communal body of political institutions can be animated

by the spiritual "soul" of Europe only by means of the individuals who embody this spirit. The analysis of the work of several important West- and East- European philosophers has pointed out the great actuality of *homo europaeus*, shaped along the lines of the archetype of the ancient or Christian "spiritual" man (the person), in ensuring and maintaining the political pulse of a unitary European organism.

Given that to any "body" animated by a "spirit" (individuals, communities, nations) corresponds an "angel", the "new Europe" - a Europe at the same time political and spiritual - cannot be deprived of an "angel". But this indispensable protective spirit, this mysterious *angelus Europae* has a strange behaviour, similar to the paradoxical structure of the entity it protects. "He is behaving like the mysterious *angelus novus* of W. Benjamin in front of history: he is flying rapidly towards the future, but backwards, so that his eyes recover every second the entire past of mankind, a past that is always and completely *actual*, a seminal past, the only vital substance of any renewal"¹²⁰.

NOTES

1. Cf. Denis de Rougemont, *Vingt-huit siècles d'Europe. La conscience européenne a travers les textes d'Hésiode à nos jours*, Paris, 1961, and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, *L'idée d'Europe dans l'histoire*, Paris, 1965.
2. Cf. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes*, and the debate around this book in *Le Débat* no.
3. Cf. Ernst Nolte, *Der europäische Bürgerkrieg 1917-1945. Nazionalsozialismus und Bolschevismus*, Berlin, 1987.
4. Cf. the monumental monograph of Jean-Pierre Sironneau, *Secularisation et religions politiques* (Religions & Society 17), Mouton, The Hague - Paris - New York, 1982.
5. Alain Besançon, *La confusion des langages. La crise idéologique de l'Église*, Paris, 1978. Romanian translation by Mona and Sorin Antohi, Humanitas, București, 1992, p. 54, 52.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 75 sq.
7. Paul Valery, the essay "Criza spiritului" (1919) in *Criza spiritului și alte eseuri*; Romanian translation by M. Ivănescu, Polirom, Iași, 1996, p. 260 sq.
8. Martin Heidegger, *Die Frage nach der Technik* (1954) and *Brief über den Humanismus* (1946); Romanian translation by Th. Kleininer and G. Liiceanu, introductory study by C. Noica in *Originea operei de artă*, Univers, 1982, p. 106 sq, 321 sq, and in *Repere pe drumul gândirii*, Ed. Politică, București, 1988, p. 297 sq.

9. Denis de Rougemont, *Vingt-huit siècles d'Europe*, 1961, p. 333 sq, 390 sq.
10. Cf. Jean-Dominique Durand, *L'Europe de la démocratie chrétienne* (Questions au XX^e siècle), Éditions Complexe, Bruxelles, 1995, p. 143 sq and *passim*.
11. Jean Lacroix, *Le personnalisme, sources, fondement, actualité*, Lyon, 1981 and Roberto Papini (dir.), *L'apporto del personalismo alla costruzione dell'Europa*, Milano, 1981.
12. Chantal Millon-Delsol, *L'Etat subsidiaire. Ingérence et non-ingérence de 'Etat: le principe de subsidiarité aux fondements de l'histoire européenne*, PUF, Paris, 1992.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 14.
14. Cf. Antoine Winckler, "Description d'une crise ou crise d'une description?", *Le Débat*, no. 87, nov.-dec. 1995, p. 59-73. With references to the works of some historians specialised in medieval law and politics: O. Gierke, Q. Skinner, W. Ulmann etc.
15. On Althusius and his *Politica*, cf. Ch. Millon-Delsol, *L'Etat subsidiaire*, 1992, p. 45 sq. The crucial importance of Althusius's thought for federalism had been noticed by Denis de Rougemont, *L'avenir c'est notre affaire*, Paris, 1977.
16. Denis de Rougemont, *L'aventure occidentale de l'homme*, Paris, 1957, p. 55 sq, 85 sq, 161 sq. Also cf. C. Noica, *infra*, note 97.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 57 sq, 62 sq.
18. K. Jaspers, *Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte* (1949) and the documents of the 1983 seminar edited by S. N. Eisenstadt, *The Origins and Diversity of Axial Age Civilisations*, New York University Press, 1986.
19. Denis de Rougemont, *L'aventure occidentale de l'homme*, Paris, 1957, p. 78.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 94 sq.
21. Millon-Delsol, *op. cit.*, p. 193, 217.
22. Michael Novak, "Ex pluribus unum: Perspectives of European Common Cultural Action for Unity and Pluralism", in : *The Common Christian Roots of the European Nations*. An International Colloquium in the Vatican, 3-7 November. 1981, Le Monnier-Florence, 1982, p. 245-252, here p. 251. There are seven "stamps" of European spirit: 1) pluralism; 2) person; 3) consensual community; 4) emergent possibility (history is open, but not determined, progress in contingent); 5) sin, coneracted through 6) separation of powers and triple-one division of political, economic and moral-cultural systems, leading to pluralist institutions; and 7) commercial and industrial skills extremely necessary given the demographical explosion and multimedia culture.
23. Michael Novak, *Morality, Christianity and Democracy*, IEA Healthal Welfare Unit, London, 1990, p. 13.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 13-14.
25. Cf. Paul Valery, the essay "Libertatea spiritului" (1939) in *Criza spiritului si alte eseuri*, 1996, p. 100 sq.
26. M. Novak, *Morality, Christianity and Democracy*, 1990, p. 14-22.

27. Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty" (1958), in: *Four Essays on Liberty*, Oxford, 1969; Romanian translation by L. Ștefan-Scalat, Humanitas, 1996, p. 200sq; cf. the C. Preda's review in *Polis* nr.1/1996, p. 183 sq.
28. M. Novak, *op. cit.*, p. 23.
29. Cf. Dominique Bocquet, "Le paradoxe de l'Europe politique", *Le Débat* no.87, nov.-dec. 1995, p. 50-58.
30. Cf. Perry Anderson, "Sous le signe du provisoire", *Le Débat* no. 91, sept.-oct. 1996, p. 115-133, analysing the books of Alain Milward (*The Reconstruction of Europe*, London, 1984, and *The European Rescue of the Nation-State*, London, 1994). The latter is a supporter of the "neo-realist" outlook in explaining the process of European construction. According to this perspective, European integration was based on a plan of the founding nation-states founded on the similarity and compatibility of social-economic interests and democratic consensus, and was consequently meant to strengthen and not to weaken the nation-state. The European Union would be in this case a mere institutionalisation of an inter-government conference. The "neo-realist" outlook is opposed to the "neo-functional" one promoted by one of its main architects in the 50s, Jean Monnet, according to whom European unification will be the result of a process of creation and development of communal institutions, the gradual accumulation of which will turn the "community" into a "union", respectively, into a supranational democratic federation. Cf. Paul Thibaud, "Jean Monnet, entrepreneur en politique", *Le Débat* no. 97, sept.-oct. 1996, p. 142-162. For the conflict between federalists and inter-governmentalists from a federalist perspective, cf. Martin Holland, *European Integration. From Community to Union*, London, 1993 [fragments translated into Romanian in *Polis* nr. 3/1995 (special issue dedicated to *Instituțiile Uniunii Europene*), p. 5-46].
31. Cf. the debate on "L'Europe sera-t-elle allemande?" "Allemagne - un 'phare' pour l'Europe?" in *Esprit*, no. 221, mai 1996; Marc Olivier Padis, "Au coeur du débat européen" (p. 5-9), L. Debattre, "La logique allemande" (p. 10-23), and especially Paul Thibaud, "L'Europe allemande... définitivement?" (p. 53-62).
32. Jean François-Poncet, "Désembourber l'Europe", *Commentaire* no. 68, hiver 1994-1995, p. 797-801.
33. D. Boquet, *op. cit.*, p. 54, 53.
34. Henri Prévot, "La fin de la 'méthode Monnet'", *Esprit* no. 221, mai 1996, p. 168-172.
35. "Le moment et la méthode: entretien avec Jacques Delors", *Le Débat* no. 83, jan.-fevr., 1995 (issue dedicated to the topic "L'Europe de Delors, l'Europe après Delors"), p. 22.
36. Bela Farago, "L'Europe, empire introuvable?", *Le Débat*, no. 83, jan.-fevr., 1995, p. 42-58.

37. Bela Farago, "Le deficit politique de l'Europe", *Le Débat*, no. 87, nov.-dec., 1995 [dedicated to the topic "Nation, federation - quelle Europe?"], p. 26-43. Bela Farago's essay is critically analysed in the same issue by Olivier Beaud (p. 44-49) and Antoine Winckler (p. 59-73), the debate being concluded with the succinct considerations of the same Bela Farago, "Exorciser les voeux pieux" (p. 74-81).
38. *Ibid.*, p. 43 (Bela Farago).
39. *Ibid.*, p. 78 (Bela Farago).
40. *Ibid.*, p. 72, 68 sq (A. Winckler).
41. J. Delors, *Le Débat* no. 83, 1995, p. 17-19 and P. Thibaud, *Esprit* no. 221, 1996, p. 63-64.
42. P. Manent, "La démocratie sans la nation?", *Commentaire* no. 76, été 1996, p. 569-575.
43. P. Thibaud, *op. cit.*, p. 64.
44. J. Delors, *op. cit.*, p. 20.
45. *Ibidem*.
46. Cf. the essays from the massive group (327 p.) recently dedicated by the *Esprit* review, no. 233, juin 1997, to the topic "Le temps des religions sans Dieu". For the following pages we shall use the description of the overall situation from the introductory synthesis essays (p. 4-6) and the conclusive ones (p. 321-327), as well as the useful survey of Jean-Claude Eslin, p. 7-19.
47. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Despre democrație în America* II (1840) partea I, cap. VII; Romanian translation, Humanitas, București, vol. II, p. 37-38.
48. Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?", in the American foreign policy review *The National Interest*, summer 1989, with comments by Alan Bloom, Irving Kristol, Pierre Hassner a.o. French translation in *Commentaire* no. 47, automne 1989; Romanian translation by D. Bercea, *Sfârșitul istoriei?*, Ed. Vreimea, București, 1994.
49. Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, New York, 1992; Romanian translation: *Sfârșitul istoriei și ultimul om*, Paideia, București, 1994.
50. Alexander Kojève, *Introduction à la lecture de Hegel*, Paris, 1947; Romanian summary by E. Pastenague: *Introducere în lectura lui Hegel*, Editura Apostrof, Cluj, 1996. Cf. Dominique Duffret, *A. Kojève: La philosophie, l'état, la fin de la philosophie*, Paris, 1990.
51. Fukuyama, *Sfârșitul istoriei?* I, p. 15.
52. P. Hassner, in Fukuyama, *Sfârșitul istoriei?*, p. 64.
53. Cf. Fukuyama, *Sfârșitul istoriei și ultimul om*, cap. 13-19, p. 129 sq. Cf. Catharina Zuckert, *Understanding the Political Spirit: Philosophical Investigations from Socrates to Nietzsche*, Yale University Press, 1988.
54. Fukuyama, *ibid.*, cap. 17, p. 164.
55. Alan Bloom, *ibid.*, p. 58, 53.
56. Irving Kristol, in Fukuyama, *Sfârșitul istoriei?*, p. 75.
57. Cf. Léo Strauss, *De la tyrannie*, Gallimard, 1954; A. Kojève, *Tyrannie et sagesse* (p. 215-280) - L. Strauss, *Mise au point* (p. 283-344).

58. Alan Bloom, in Fukuyama, *Sfârșitul istoriei?*, p. 57.
59. Léo Strauss, *De la tyrannie*, Paris, 1954, p. 339-340 (Mise au point).
60. Samuel Huntington, "Will Civilisations Clash?", *Foreign Affairs*, 1993, French translation in *Commentaire*, no. 66, été 1994 (Le monde au XXI^e siècle?), p. 238-257: "Le choc des civilisations?". With critical comments by Daniel Bell, Alain Besançon, Pierre Hassner, Giuseppe Sacco, Francis Fukuyama a.o.
61. *Ibid.*, p. 242.
62. Paul Valery, the essay "Criza spiritului" (1919) in *Criza spiritului și alte eseuri*, Polirom, Iași, 1996, p. 266-272.
63. The essay "Reflecții despre măreția și decadența Europei", *ibid.*, p. 6-7.
64. "Divagația despre libertate" (1938), *ibid.*, p. 31.
65. "Nota (sau Europeanul)", *ibid.*, p. 227-240.
66. This is included in a wide study on *Europa și post-Europa. Epoca postmodernă și problemele ei spirituale* (late 60s, early 70s), ideas developed within the private seminars of 1973-1975, the lectures and debates of which circulated underground (samizdat) in Prague under the titles: *Plato and Europe* (summer seminar 1973) (translation by Erika Abrams, *Platon et l'Europe*, Verdier, 1983) and *Heretic Essays in the Philosophy of History* (1975) edited by the Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen (Wien) in the series Jan Patocka *Ausgewählte Werke: Ketzerische Essays zur Geschichte der Philosophie und ergänzende Schriften* (hg. v. K. Nellen u. J. Nemeč), Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart, 1988. Cf. Olivier Mongin, "Jan Patocka, notre contemporain", *Esprit*, no. 220, avril, 1996, p. 175-176.
67. *Ketzerische Essays*, p. 52 sq.
68. *Platon et l'Europe*, p. 149.
69. Without explicitly quoting him, Patocka describes under other forms "the struggle for rebirth" (creator of the "master-slave" relation) as a mechanism of history theorised by Hegel in his *Phänomenologie des Geistes* (1806).
70. *Ketzerische Essays*, p. 64-68.
71. *Ibid.*, p. 265-285; *Platon et l'Europe*, *passim*.
72. *Ibid.*, p. 183 sq.
73. *Ibid.*, p. 109 sq.
74. *Ibid.*, p. 140 sq. In 1964, Emil Cioran was giving, in his *La chute dans le temps*, the amazingly similar diagnosis of a second, unavoidable and final fall of mankind: after the paradisiac fall *in time*, it is now experiencing the "fall from time into the inert, in the inferno of the sub-temporal historical time, which is the * that does not move, this tension in monotony, this reversed eternity which opens towards nothing, not even towards death".
75. *Ibid.*, p. 146 sq.
76. *Ibid.*, p. 101-102, 162.
77. *Platon et l'Europe*, p. 138-159.
78. *Ibid.*, p. 79.
79. Cf. for details Keith Hitchins, *Romania: 1866-1947*, Oxford University Press, 1994; Romanian translation: *Români: 1866-1947*, Humanitas, București,

- 1996, cap. VII, p. 311-358. The most comprehensive anthology with the texts of the "great debate" is the one edited by Iordan Chimet: *Dreptul la memorie*, Ed. Dacia, Cluj, 1992-1993, vol. I-IV.
80. Details in Zigu Ornea, *Tradiționalism și modernitate în deceniul al treilea*, București, 1980, and *Anii '30. Extrema dreaptă românească*, București, 1995.
81. Virgil Nemoianu, *Diagnostic românesc: trecut, prezent, viitor*, the anthology of Iordan Chimet (ed.), *Momentul adevărului*, Editura Dacia, Cluj, 1996, p. 134-142, here p. 139. This dense text dated "Washington D.C., December 1989" offers the most interesting and challenging re-evaluation of the Romanian culture of the years 1860-1950 made in the recent years. Its essential merit is that of going beyond the extreme polarisation in the evaluation of the creativity of Romanian philosophers and traditionalist intellectuals within the clichés of the Manicheist ideology of the "reactionary-progressive" kind cultivated by their democrat or communist opponents. The right-wing or nationalist stance of some remarkable "reactionary" thinkers on the line of M. Eminescu or N. Ionescu, like for instance L. Blaga, M. Eliade, C. Noica a.o., be it firm or opportunist, must be (just like in the case of Heidegger, for instance) carefully dissociated from their non-conventional and daring ideas which, when read in an epistemological key, prove to be of surprising actuality, anticipating similar intentions manifested in the Western thought of the last decades (cf. Virgil Nemoianu, *A Theory of the Secondary. Literature, Progress and Reaction*, John Hopkins University Press, 1989; Romanian translation by L.S. Câmpeanu: *O teorie a secundarului*, Ed. Univers, București, 1997, p. 168 sq = cap. 9: Dialectics of Imperfection: Girard, Blaga, Serres). Considered from a processual and dynamic point of view, rather than from a particular and static one, as interaction in the context as "continuous debate started around 1840" "in the general context of the developing societies everywhere", the Romanian intellectual debate of the pre-communist century "becomes much more clear, but also escapes the full and radical condemnations" (p. 140, 139). Consequently, the "debational" perspective of Professor Nemoianu allows one to avoid in interpretation the idolatric exaltations as well as the iconoclast exaggerations, giving a calm, lucid perspective, free of any resentment. "Impressive, above all, is the diversity of the debate: from the left-wing considerations of Stere, Dobrogeanu-Gherea, Șerban Voinea and Ibrăileanu, to the liberal centrism of Zeletin and Lovinescu, to the conservatorism of Maiorescu and Blaga, through the nationalist populism of Iorga or the integrating or progressive "peasant"-ism of Spiru Haret, Gusti or Madgearu, to the ontological localism of Noica or the rationalist idealism of Vianu, and to the existentialist vitalism of Eliade or Cioran - a gallery of creative and original voices" (p. 140).
82. *Ibidem*, p. 136.
83. Virgil Nemoianu, "Neoplatonism și cultură română" (conference at the New Europe College, May 1995), *Revista de istorie și teorie literară*, 43 (1995), no. 3-4, p. 261-271.

84. Virgil Nemoianu, "Mihai Șora and the Traditions of Romanian Philosophy", *Review of Metaphysics*, 43 (March 1990), p. 591-605, here p. 594; Romanian translation by Mona and Sorin Antohi: "Mihai Șora și tradițiile filozofiei românești", in S. Antohi and A. Crăiuțu (coord.), *Dialog și libertate. Eseuri în onoarea lui Mihai Șora*, Nemira, București, 1997, p. 186-201, here p. 189.
85. *Ibid.*, p. 596-600; Romanian translation p. 190-194.
86. Mircea Eliade, "Destinul culturii românești" (article from the exile, 1949), in *Impotriva deznădejdii. Publicistica exilului*, Humanitas, București, 1992, p. 28-37, here p. 35, 49-50.
87. *Idem*, "Probleme de cultură românească" (1951), *ibid.*, p. 73-79, here p. 76.
88. *Id.*, "Infelix culpa" (1952), *ibid.*, p. 147-150.
89. *Id.*, "Europa și cortina de fier" (1952), *ibid.*, p. 151-160. The entire article is a remarkable *avant la lettre* reply to the "Huntington doctrine". "The Iron Curtain corresponds only to a balance of forces and to nothing more", "it does not separate two 'worlds', two opposed lifestyles of two opposed 'philosophies'". "The East is not necessarily a bloc because the dominant religion is the Orthodox one", as the Orthodox churches maintain their distinctive features. "There is no exclusive solidarity anywhere in Eastern Europe", but only "multiple cultural solidarities".
90. *Id.*, "Destinul culturii românești" (1953), *ibid.*, p. 164-176, here p. 176.
91. The popularity of the Noica model was imposed by the enormous success of the two books edited by Gabriel Liiceanu, *Jurnalul de la Păltiniș 1977-1981, un model paideic în cultura umanistă*, București, 1983, and *Epistolar*, București, 1987, with the main reactions to the *Jurnal*.
92. Presented in a speculative form in two versions: "Încercare asupra filosofiei tradiționale" (1950) and "Tratat de ontologie" (1980), both published in the volume *Devenirea întru ființă*, Editura Științifică, 1981.
93. Cf. Constantin Noica, *Sentimentul românesc al ființei*, Editura Eminescu, București, 1978. For a basic criticism from a Heideggerian angle of Noica's entire approach attempting to perform a metaphysical synthesis between being and becoming, itself expression of the transcendent harmony between tradition and modernity, as solution to the identity crisis of Romanian culture, see Claude Karnoouh, *L'invention du peuple. Chroniques de Roumanie*, Arcantère, 1990; Romanian translation: *Români. Tipologie și mentalități*, Humanitas, București, 1994, p. 171 sq (chapter: "C. Noica, metafizician al etniei-națiune"). For the French anthropologist tradition and modernity, state and city are basically incompatible, each belonging to a different "age of being".
94. *Modelul cultural european*, Humanitas, București, 1993. This is the last book of the philosopher and had been published in the form of articles in the cultural press of the years 1986-1987. To be found in the German version of G. Scherg: *De dignitate Europae*, Editura Kriterion, București, 1988.

95. Solutions already presented in the article "Unu și multiplu" published in: *Izvoare de filosofie. Culegere de studii și texte*, ed. C. Floru, C. Noica and M. Vulcănescu, București, 1942, p. 233-241.
96. *Modelul cultural european*, 1993, p. 42 sq.
97. *Ibid.*, p. 64 sq. Also cf. *Jurnal de idei*, Humanitas, București, 1990, p. 337: "Europe begins in 325 with the Council of Nicaea. This gives the model. Faustian Europe will perish, as it has been foreseen, but that of pluralism in being will not. The Norse replaced Europe in the year 1000 and made it more dynamic. But it continues to be the trinitarian one. This remained in the deep structure. Christianity is the "religion of religions" and Europe the *culture of cultures*".
98. "The embodiment (G-I) is the core of our world. Philosophy follows the model of Christ. I know no other divinity than Jesus Christ. He gives truth to history and to speculative thought" (*Jurnal de idei*, p. 366). "The absolute *synaethism*, that of divinity (G and D and I)" (*ibid.*, p. 377). "People are divided into believers and arians. The former believe in the multiple One (Trinity), the latter in One *and* multiple, or only in the multiple, the only one that can be "seen". These are the enlightened ones, but know nothing of the Taborite light of good philosophy" (*ibid.*, p. 361).
99. *Modelul cultural european*, p. 54 sq.
100. *Ibid.*, p. 82 sq, ch. IX-XVII.
101. *Ibid.*, p. 177 sq, ch. XVIII-XIX.
102. *Ibid.*, p. 185.
103. *Jurnal de idei*, p. 290.
104. *Ibid.*, p. 373.
105. Cf. Nicolae Steinhardt's article, "The Cathars form Păltiniș" (*Familia*, decembrie 1983), also included in: G. Liiceanu, *Epistolar*, 1987, p. 324-327.
106. Cf. the essay of Gabriel Andreescu, "Resurecția spirituală la Păltiniș" (nov.-dec. 1986), published in: *Spre o filosofie a dizidenței*, Editura Litera, 1992, p. 78-93.
107. Andrei Pleșu in Gabriel Liiceanu, "Despre Constantin Noica" (interview with R. Țurcanu), *Euphorion* (Sibiu), nr. 6-8/1991, p. 16, 26.
108. Cf. the pathetic "Scrisoare către un intelectual occidental" set as preface to *Modelul cultural european* (1993, p. 7-10), the harsh reproofs of which caused the indignation of pro-European intellectuals (Ion Negoïtescu, Virgil Ierunca, Adrian Marino).
109. Gabriel Liiceanu, *Jurnalul de la Păltiniș*, 1983, p. 230 sq. Also cf. Claude Karnoouh's criticism, *supra*, note 93.
110. Adrian Marino, *Pentru Europa. Integrarea României. Aspecte ideologice și culturale*, Polirom, Iași, 1996; Gabriel Andreescu, cf. *infra*, note 112; Alina Mungiu, "Identitate politică românească și identitate europeană", *Cuvântul* nr. 12/1995 also published in *Revenirea în Europa* (*infra*, note 112), p. 281-291 and *Momentul adevărului* (*supra*, note 81), p. 253-260. The support of this unconditional Europeanisation is accompanied by a harsh criticism of Nae

- Ionescu's traditionalist thought and of his school represented by P. Țuțea and N. Ionescu, accused of "reactionary" (anti-progressive) thinking, of "nationalism", "anti-European attitude", "anacronism" and "bad" influence upon the present intellectual circles, cf. the polemic essays of Al. George and M. Petreu (vs. N. Ionescu) or A. Marino (vs. N. Ionescu, Țuțea, Noica). "Teorii antieuropene", "Cazul Noica", in the chapter "Modele fictive, modele nocive" of the anthology *Momentul adevărului*, p. 294-382. Perfectly legitimate and natural, the critical debate of the "reactionary" Romanian thinkers of the inter-war generation is a useful and necessary approach. Unfortunately, it often unjustly combines thought with the political involvement and the private opinions of the thinkers and often degenerates in an ideological trial with inquisitorial overtones resulting in anathemae and exclusions passed in the name of a "canon" of in triumphant liberal-democratic "vulgata". The result of these "disclosures is a profound understanding, an unacceptable impoverishment of the Romanian cultural landscape in which only the "politically correct" authors could find a place".
111. For instance, Octavian Paler, Alexandru Paleologu, cf. *infra*, note 112.
112. See the articles in A. Marino's anthology, *Revenirea în Europa. Idei și controverse românești 1990-1995*, Editura Aius, Craiova, 1995, 448 p. and the recent debate of 1995-1996 between G. Andreescu, on the one hand, and O. Paler and Al. Paleologu, on the other, partially included in Gabriel Andreescu's book, *Naționaliști, antinaționaliști. O polemică în publicistica românească*, Polirom, Iași, 1996.
113. Cf. Andrei Pleșu, interview by M. Sin in the 22 magazine, Nov. 1992, also published in *Revenirea în Europa*, 1996, p. 311-315.
114. Virgil Nemoianu, "Imitație și identitate", 22 magazine, nr. 355 (49), 1996, p. 17-18.
115. Claude Karnoouh, "Mai există oare Europa?" (May 1993), as introduction to the volume of essays *Adio diferenței. Eseu asupra modernității târzii* [= *Adieu à la différence*, Arcantère, 1993], Editura Dacia, Cluj, 1994, p. 7-19.
116. Cf. Virgil Nemoianu, "Ce rost are mișcarea creștin-democrată?", 22 magazine, nr. 361, ian. 1997.
117. Andrei Pleșu, "De la 'Europa liberă' la 'Europa unită'", *Dilema* nr. 124, mai 1995, also published in *Chipuri și măști ale tranziției*, Humanitas, București, 1996, p. 282-284.
118. "Europa între două infirmități", *Dilema* nr. 45, nov. 1993, and in *Chipuri și măști...*, p. 237-239.
119. "Noua și vechea Europă", *Dilema* nr. 44, nov. 1993, and in *Chipuri și măști...*, p. 233-236.
120. *Ibid.*, p. 236.