

# New Europe College Black Sea Link Program Yearbook 2012-2013



---

ANNA ABAKUNOVA  
KATERYNA BUDZ  
VOLODYMYR KULIKOV  
ALEXANDR OSIPIAN  
HUSEYIN OYLUPINAR  
ARAM TERZYAN

---

Editor: Irina Vainovski-Mihai

Copyright – New Europe College  
ISSN 1584-0298

New Europe College  
Str. Plantelor 21  
023971 Bucharest  
Romania

[www.nec.ro](http://www.nec.ro); e-mail: [nec@nec.ro](mailto:nec@nec.ro)  
Tel. (+4) 021.307.99.10, Fax (+4) 021. 327.07.74



## **KATERYNA BUDZ**

Born in 1986, in Ukraine

Ph.D. Candidate in History, National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy  
(Kyiv, Ukraine)

Dissertation: *Preserving Identity: the Clandestine Ukrainian Greek Catholics in  
the Soviet Union (1946-1968)*

DAAD Fellowship, European University Viadrina, Frankfurt (Oder) (2007-2008)

Research interests: history of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in the 20<sup>th</sup>  
century, history of post-war Galicia, history of the Soviet Union, oral history,  
identity studies, historical anthropology, sociology of religion

Participation to conferences in Ukraine, Russia, Romania, Germany, UK  
Research papers published both in Ukraine and abroad



# BETWEEN GOD AND CAESAR: THE CLANDESTINE UKRAINIAN GREEK CATHOLIC CLERGY IN THE SOVIET STATE (1946–1989)

The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church<sup>1</sup> (hereafter UGCC), a Church of Byzantine tradition with ties to Rome, united almost the entire Ukrainian population of Eastern Galicia in the interwar Second Polish Republic.<sup>2</sup> During the Second World War Eastern Galicia underwent a triple (Soviet, German, and again Soviet) occupation and since 1944 it became a part of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (hereafter the Ukrainian SSR).

Considered by the Soviet regime as a satellite of Vatican and a spiritual basis of the anti-Soviet nationalist armed resistance, the UGCC was attacked soon after the Soviet reoccupation of Galicia.

In the article “With a cross or with a knife”, which appeared in the newspaper *Free Ukraine* on April 8, 1945, Volodymyr Rosovych (a pseudonym of Lviv Communist writer Iaroslav Halan) associated the UGCC with “treason”, “Fascism”, and “bourgeois nationalism”. After the Metropolitan Iosyf Slipyi, a head of the UGCC since 1944, and Bishops Hryhorii Khomyshyn, Mykolai Charnetskyi, Mykyta Budka, and Ivan Liatyshevskyi were arrested on April 11, 1945, the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church (hereafter CAROC, Council) in cooperation with the Council for the Affairs of the Religious Cults (hereafter CARC), state security organs, Russian Orthodox Church (hereafter ROC), and the so called Initiative group for reunification of the UGCC with the ROC (hereafter Initiative group)<sup>3</sup> launched the “reunion” campaign. The latter envisaged a series of “soborchyky” (“little councils”) in each district, where, usually in the presence of the state security agent, the members of Initiative group tried to convince other priests to join this group. Before the illegal council of Lviv (March 8–10, 1946),<sup>4</sup> which officially declared the

break of ties with Vatican and “reunion” with the ROC, 997 out of 1,270 Greek Catholic priests present in Galicia at that time formally joined the Initiative group.<sup>5</sup> The “resistant Uniates”,<sup>6</sup> in turn, were often convicted of “anti-Soviet activity” and deported to Gulag.

Between the abolition of the UGCC in 1946 and its legalization in 1989–1990, the majority of the Greek Catholics existed as a “Church within a Church” (a term introduced by Vasyl Markus to describe the self-perception of the “reunited” Greek Catholic community within the body of the ROC<sup>7</sup>), whereas the opponents of “reunion” formed a clandestine UGCC.

This study focuses on the clandestine clergy, both the Greek Catholic clergymen who refused to join the ROC in 1945–1946 and those ordained already after the UGCC’s delegalization. Because of the high level of secrecy in the underground, an exact number of the active clandestine priests is hard to estimate. According to the information provided by the CAROC in January 1948, 75 Greek Catholic priests “stubbornly refused to join” the ROC, from which only 18 conducted religious services.<sup>8</sup> However, this number excludes those priests who were already arrested and deported to Gulag because of their refusal to join the ROC. In 1958, that is after the imprisoned priests were released, the Council reported about the presence in Western Ukraine of 273 “non-reunited” Greek Catholic priests and even a greater number of the monks.<sup>9</sup> It is assumed that a number of the underground priests, both monastic and secular, which was estimated at between 300 and 500 in the 1970s, doubled till the end of the 1980s.<sup>10</sup> However, without the Orthodox priests who joined the UGCC on the wave of the Greek Catholic activism, there were fewer than 500 active clandestine Greek Catholic clergymen in the 1980s.<sup>11</sup>

The abolition of the UGCC in Galicia (1946) drew the incomparably great amount of scholarly attention.<sup>12</sup> The pioneering and the most comprehensive study about the UGCC’s abolition in the context of the Soviet nationality and religious policy was written by Bohdan Bociurkiw, a Canadian political scientist of Ukrainian origin.<sup>13</sup> Most studies on the clandestine UGCC also concentrated on the state repressive policy towards the Greek Catholics,<sup>14</sup> although some researchers analyzed as well the impact of the Soviet regime’s policy on the Greek Catholics’ identity.<sup>15</sup> In particular, a problem of the clandestine clergy’s attitude to the Soviet regime was touched by Ukrainian researcher Natalia Dmytryshyn in her article about resistance and accommodation strategies adopted by different generations of the Greek Catholic clergy.<sup>16</sup>

In fact, such terms as “resistance”, “opposition”, and “accommodation” became widely used by historians to describe the attitude of the underground UGCC to the Soviet regime. Whether any particular action, be it a complaint to the Soviet authorities or an illegal religious service, is an expression of any of the above mentioned concepts depends on the meaning attributed to them. As American political anthropologist James Scott accurately remarked, “It is no simple matter to determine just where compliance ends and resistance begins”.<sup>17</sup> Scott’s concept of everyday (passive) resistance, even though broadly defined, emphasizes the protestor’s intention to resist as crucial to the notion.<sup>18</sup> However, arguing that subordinate groups were deprived of possibility to resist openly, Scott intentionally politicizes their undeclared resistance.<sup>19</sup> According to a social historian Elena Osokina, Russian historians who apply Scott’s concept of resistance to Stalinism tend to interpret disobedience to authorities as resistance to regime.<sup>20</sup> She argues instead that everyday disobedience is not a form of pre-political protest, but a survival strategy, and, therefore, an anthropological rather than political phenomenon.<sup>21</sup> In regard to the Church, Kenneth Westhues, for example, withholds from interpreting a defensive stance on part of the persecuted religious groups as opposition to the established authorities.<sup>22</sup> In his view, the oppositional stance of religious body is defined by its intention to change a wider society, not to secure the autonomy of a group.<sup>23</sup>

The specifics of the Soviet archival data and domination of political history in most studies on the UGCC resulted in overemphasizing the political and national motivation of the clandestine clergy’s opposition to the Soviet state. However, the fact that the Soviet authorities interpreted the clergy’s resistance to “reunion” or their underground religious activities as a threat to regime does not necessarily mean that the clandestine priests considered their actions to be such. Therefore, the present article looks at how the Greek Catholic clergymen themselves defined their attitude to the Soviet State.

Obviously, in comparison with the ROC, which enjoyed the most preferential status among the religious groups in the Soviet Union,<sup>24</sup> the UGCC’ stance towards the Soviet authorities was definitely oppositional. On the one hand, it seems natural that the clandestine Greek Catholics maintained a hostile attitude to the nationally alien and atheistic regime that outlawed their Church and persecuted the “non-reunited” clergy. On the other hand, such stance would be contrary to the position advocated by the Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytskyi, a head of the UGCC in 1901–1944,

whose relations with political authorities were guided by a principle of obedience to civil authorities without compromising Christian identity.<sup>25</sup> In his first pastoral letter after the Soviet occupation of Galicia in 1939, the head of the UGCC wrote:

Our agenda is the following: we will comply with the civil authority; we will obey the laws insofar as they do not contravene the law of God; we will not meddle in political and secular affairs, nor will we cease to work tirelessly for the Christian cause among our people.<sup>26</sup>

In this article, I argue that many clandestine priests shared Sheptytskyi's view on the Church-State relations and prioritized religious identity over national and political matters. This was true both during the "reunion" campaign with the Russian Orthodoxy in 1945–1946 and further existence of the Church in the underground (1946–1989). Therefore, I offer to view the clergy's resistance as an indirect result of the wish to preserve their Church, not the aim by itself. Although the clandestine community was far from being a cohesive group, in their attitude to the Soviet authorities most clergymen distinguished between loyalty to the state on the one hand and the attitude to the Communist and the atheist ideology on the other one. The aim of this article is not to dismiss the national and political motives of the clandestine clergy's opposition to the Soviet regime, but to demonstrate the crucial role of religious motivation in shaping their political attitudes.

This article is mostly based on the unpublished archival material from the collections of the Soviet governmental institutions controlling the religious sphere<sup>27</sup> as well as published reports from the archive of the former KGB [Russian abbreviation for *Committee for State Security*]<sup>28</sup> and the interviews with the clandestine hierarchy, clergy, nuns, and laypeople from the Archive of the Institute of Church History.<sup>29</sup> The research questions are analyzed with the help of the methodology of identity studies, historical anthropology, and sociology of religion.

Geographically, this study focuses on Western Ukraine, namely the territory of Eastern Galicia, which, before the Second World War, belonged to Galician Metropoly of the UGCC. According to the Soviet administrative division it united Lviv, Drohobych (since 1959 – a part of Lviv region), Stanislav (renamed as Ivano-Frankivsk in 1962) and Ternopil regions. The time frame under consideration is the underground period of the UGCC (1946–1989).



The article begins with a theoretical overview of the different modes of behavior adopted by the UGCC and the ROC in relation to the Soviet authorities. Next, it looks at the “reunion” campaign of the UGCC with the ROC as a part of the postwar Sovietization of Western Ukraine, with a special attention to the national and religious motives of the clergy’s resistance to the forced Orthodoxization. Finally, the article focuses on the attitude of the clandestine clergy to the Soviet authorities and Communist ideology.

### **The Church and the Soviet State: The Cases of the ROC and the UGCC**

The theological foundations of Christian attitude to the secular power were formulated by St. Paul in the Epistle to the Romans. However, Christian churches interpreted Pauline teaching about divine nature of every authority and necessity of civil obedience in different ways.

A tendency to link opposition to the secular authorities with sectarianism comes from a classical church-sect dichotomy by Ernst Troeltsch, who defined Church as an integral part of the social order and a sect as a religious group in opposition to the state and society.<sup>30</sup> Since Troeltsch’s theory was based on the history of pre-1800 Europe, where Christianity enjoyed religious monopoly and state support,<sup>31</sup> it can be hardly applied to the context of the modern atheistic state. American sociologist Benton Johnson criticized Troeltsch’s typology for containing too many variables and offered instead to define church and sect by a single criterion, namely acceptance/rejection of the social environment.<sup>32</sup> Johnson’s approach blurred the boundaries between church and sect, as he maintained that the Catholic Church in the Communist lands took on some sectarian characteristics.<sup>33</sup> Therefore, sociologist Werner Stark amended Johnson’s church-sect typology by proposing a third type, namely the universal church, to which he counted the Roman Catholicism.<sup>34</sup> According to Stark, the universal church’s principle of the separation of Church and State does not necessarily imply hostility to the secular surrounding, as it is in the case of sectarians.<sup>35</sup> In turn, Kenneth Westhues’s study of conditions that lead to embracing oppositional stance by different religious groups revealed inadequacy of Johnson’s typology by establishing no necessary link between opposition and church-sect typology.<sup>36</sup>

Generally, the Catholic Churches demonstrated a higher level of opposition to socialism than the Orthodox ones, with Hungarian Catholic Church and Georgian Orthodox Church to be the only exceptions.<sup>37</sup> Similarly, whereas the Russian Orthodox Church in the postwar USSR adhered to a principle of the “unconditional political loyalty”,<sup>38</sup> the outlawed UGCC was regarded by the Soviet regime as disloyal.

The differences in the attitude of the official ROC and the clandestine UGCC to the Soviet authorities can be better understood in the light of a conceptual distinction between the state and the universal church. Whereas the ROC was historically affiliated with Russian Tsarism, the UGCC never identified itself with a particular state power. In contrast to the ROC whose spiritual centre was located in Moscow, the UGCC as a part of the universal church was subordinated to the Holy See. Since the Soviet authorities in the postwar time envisaged Vatican as a “defender of fascism” and the UGCC as an “accomplice” to papacy, scholars often consider the abolition of the UGCC to be a part of the Soviet anti-Vatican policy.<sup>39</sup> Thus, Stalin’s wish to use the ROC as alternative “Vatican”<sup>40</sup> to unify the Church life in Eastern-Central Europe resulted in the “reunion” campaigns of the Greek Catholic Churches with the Orthodox ones not only within the Soviet Union, namely in Galicia (1946) and Transcarpathia (1949), but also in Soviet-controlled Romania (1948) and Czechoslovakia (1950).

Another difference between the ROC and the UGCC lies in the national compatibility with the Soviet regime. Although the ROC was severely persecuted by the Bolsheviks after their ascension to power in Russia in 1917, the Second World War brought Church-State rapprochement. Having decided to use the tools of the 19<sup>th</sup> century Tsarism, that is, Russian nationalism, Pan-Slavism, and Orthodoxy, to regain control over the territories in the Western borderland after their temporary occupation by the Nazi Germany, Stalin allowed the elections of the Patriarch in 1943.<sup>41</sup> As Werner Stark remarked, Communist Russia and Orthodox Russia shared the same “ethnocentric and messianic spirit”,<sup>42</sup> therefore, the fact that the Orthodox hierarchy helped the Soviets to abolish the UGCC should not be surprising.

So, differences between the UGCC and the ROC in political philosophy, Church jurisdiction and national character caused both different treatment of these Churches by the Soviet regime and the Churches’ different attitude to the State and its dominant ideology.

## The UGCC and the Nationalist Resistance in the context of the “Reunion” Campaign of 1945–1946

Since the mid 19<sup>th</sup> century, when the Greek Catholic clergy played a main role in the Ukrainian “national revival” in Habsburg-ruled Galicia, this Church associated itself with the national cause. During the first half of the XX<sup>th</sup> century, when Eastern Galicia underwent a kaleidoscopic change of state powers,<sup>43</sup> the Church was headed by the Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytskyi, who reinforced the role of the UGCC as a representative of Ukrainian interests. In the words of Volodymyr Tselevych, an interwar Galician politician, UGCC was a “national Church of Galician Ukrainians in the sense that only Ukrainians belong to this Church and that the change of confession amounts to the change of nationality”.<sup>44</sup>

Therefore, the postwar forced merger of the UGCC with the ROC was both designed and perceived as a means of Russification and Sovietization of Western Ukraine. The Soviet authorities regarded the UGCC as “anti-people” in character, since the Church allegedly aimed at “spiritual separation of Ukrainian and Russian peoples”.<sup>45</sup> The members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (hereafter OUN)<sup>46</sup> argued that the abolition of the UGCC would lead to a “forced reunion of Ukrainian people with a Moscow one”.<sup>47</sup> The latter assumption was not groundless, as in 1953 the CAROC plenipotentiary in Drohobych region Shapovalov reported about the successes in the “separation of believers from the Union [*Uniate (Greek Catholic) Church* – K.B.] and their reunion in one family with Russian people”.<sup>48</sup>

The anti-Soviet armed resistance in Western Ukraine constituted one of the major problems in the Soviet Western borderland. Being convinced of a tight link between the UGCC and the nationalist underground, the Soviets expected that the UGCC would be able to persuade the nationalist guerillas to stop the fight.<sup>49</sup> This issue was touched in December 1944, when the Greek Catholic delegation went to Moscow to discuss the possibility of the future existence of the Church under the Soviet rule.<sup>50</sup> However, the leadership of OUN rejected the offer to start negotiations with the Soviets via the Greek Catholic priests.<sup>51</sup>

Despite Metropolitan Sheptytskyi’s confrontation with a radical wing of OUN, Bandera faction,<sup>52</sup> the latter was widely popular among Galician Ukrainians and even young Greek Catholic clergy, a tendency that only strengthened after the Soviet reoccupation of Galicia in 1944.<sup>53</sup> The reports by NKVD [Russian abbreviation for *People’s Commissariat*

of *Internal Affairs*] and the CAROC as well as the oral history sources demonstrate a tight link of many Greek Catholic clergymen to OUN and UPA (hereafter Ukrainian Insurgent Army).<sup>54</sup> A former clandestine believer Maria Nakonechna perceived such connection as natural, arguing that the priests could not be against “our people”.<sup>55</sup> She remembers that in her native village in Lviv region Fr. Danylo Guglevych in his Sunday sermons encouraged believers to provide food, clothes and medical assistance to insurgents who might visit their homes.<sup>56</sup>

Since the clergy’s refusal to join the ROC hindered the Soviet plans of homogenization of the Western borderland of the USSR, the Soviet functionaries persistently linked the clergy’s resistance to “reunion” with the anti-Soviet activities of the nationalist guerillas in Galicia. They blamed, for example, the dwellers of the Greek Catholic monasteries for giving shelter to the members of the nationalist underground, holding religious services on the latter’s tombs, printing and spreading “anti-Soviet literature”, and agitation among the believers not to join the ROC.<sup>57</sup> In the words of one of the regional CAROC plenipotentiaries, Greek Catholic monasteries were “hotbeds of Uniatism”, “seats of papism” and “places, where everything which is hostile not only to the Orthodoxy but also to the Soviet power is concentrated”.<sup>58</sup>

Hence any support of the nationalist guerillas, no matter if it was voluntary or forced,<sup>59</sup> was regarded as “complicity”, many Greek Catholic clergymen including ordained monks from the closed monasteries were arrested according to the article 54 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR adopted in 1927, mostly paragraphs 54-1 “A” (“high treason”), 54-10 (“anti-Soviet propaganda”) and 54-11 (“belonging to the counterrevolutionary formations”).

However, it was rather the clergy’s opposition to “reunion” than a link to Ukrainian national movement that led to persecutions. To illustrate, in the report of NKGB [*People’s Commissariat for State Security*] from April 2, 1945, a future head of the Initiative group Fr. Havryil Kostel’nyk was characterized as “Ukrainian nationalist and the enemy of the Soviet State” maintaining connections with the leadership of OUN and UPA.<sup>60</sup> Besides, most other “reunited” priests as well as the “non-reunited” priests who left priestly activities and found secular employment usually managed to avoid the arrest.<sup>61</sup>

A tight link between religious and national identity characteristic of the UGCC indeed makes it difficult to differentiate between religious/confessional and national/political motives of the clergy’s resistance

to the forced Orthodoxization in the postwar years. In this respect a concept of “identity salience”, which presupposes that “self” incorporates different identities organized in the hierarchical order, might be useful.<sup>62</sup> Contemporary identity theorists who redefined George Mead’s formula “society shapes self shapes social behavior” as “commitment shapes identity salience shapes role choice behavior” assume that behavioral choices are made in accordance with the most salient identity.<sup>63</sup> For example, if the Christian, precisely Greek Catholic, identity is more salient than a national one, a decision to resist “reunion” would be shaped by the former. On the one hand, this assumption might be problematic for the reasons stated above: one might argue that, first, national component is inherent to the Greek Catholic identity; second, that “reunion” campaign was never planned as a solely Church matter, but aimed at Russification and Sovietization of Western Ukrainians. On the other hand, one should not overstate the role of national factor in the clergy’s resistance to “reunion” campaign.

Although the rhetoric of both OUN and the “non-reunited” Greek Catholic clergy against the forced merger of the UGCC with the ROC overlapped in some aspects, their motivation was not identical. Being a radical right movement professing the ideology of integral nationalism, the OUN prioritized the national cause over the principles of Christian ethics.<sup>64</sup> Besides, the OUN’s resistance to “reunion” was anti-Soviet and anti-Russian rather than anti-Orthodox in character. To illustrate, in their written appeal to Ukrainian Greek Catholics against the “reunion” (July 1945), the members of OUN wondered “why it should be necessarily “russian” orthodox church, and not, for example, ukrainian orthodox church [*capitalization is absent in the text* – K.B.]?”<sup>65</sup> Similarly, the threatening letters the “reunited” priests received from OUN contained a remark that organization opposed not the Orthodoxy in general, but the Orthodoxy led by NKVD.<sup>66</sup> In the view of Ukrainian nationalists, the “reunited” priests were “betrayers of Ukrainian people and Church” and the “agents of NKVD”.<sup>67</sup>

However, in order to save the “local cadres” and prevent the arrival of the Orthodox priests from outside Galicia, at least a part of OUN did not oppose “reunion” and even encouraged the Greek Catholic priests to accept the Orthodoxy.<sup>68</sup> In the view of the CAROC plenipotentiary in Lviv region Anatolii Vyshnevskiy, the “reunited” priests connected with the nationalist underground and playing a “double-dealing role” were even more dangerous than the “non-reunited” ones.<sup>69</sup>

In contrast to the nationalists, the Greek Catholic clergy saw a main hindrance to “reunification” in the differences between the Catholicism and the Orthodoxy. For example, the parish priests who participated in the meetings organized by the Initiative group in 1945 motivated their unwillingness to join the ROC by their loyalty to the Pope, the oath given to a Greek Catholic bishop, the conviction that only within the Catholic Church the salvation is possible, and the perception of “reunion” as a betrayal of the faith.<sup>70</sup>

Consequently, the “resistant” Greek Catholics condemned the head of the Initiative group Fr. Havryil Kostel’nyk and his followers mostly in religious terms, as “betrayers of the faith and people”, “Judas” and “betrayers of the Christ”.<sup>71</sup> Such rhetoric was rooted in the contemporaneous Catholic theological thought, which viewed the Catholic Church as the only Christ’s church.<sup>72</sup> Therefore, according to the head of the UGCC Metropolitan Slipyi, no distinction between renouncing Pope and renouncing Christ could be made.<sup>73</sup> That is why many “resistant” priests and monks as well as Roman Catholic priests informed believers that the clergymen who joined the ROC had lost their “spiritual power”.<sup>74</sup>

In his report to the Soviet state security organs (August 3, 1945), Fr. Havryil Kostel’nyk maintained that, apart from the papacy, the main hindrance to “reunion” was the clergy’s fear of Russification of the Church.<sup>75</sup> However, as follows from the reports of the NKGB representative Ivan Bohdanov, who accompanied Fr. Kostel’nyk at his meetings with the clergy in Lviv region in August 1945, the priests who expressed such doubts nevertheless joined the Initiative group.<sup>76</sup>

Besides, the clergy’s unwillingness to “reunite” can be also explained by the ROC’s discredit through cooperation with the atheistic regime.<sup>77</sup> By defining the Russian Orthodoxy as the “Soviet church” or “state religion like police”,<sup>78</sup> the Greek Catholic clergymen showed their adherence to the universal Church with its principle of division between the Church and the State.

Although both Ukrainian nationalists and a part of the Greek Catholic clergymen opposed “reunion”, their motivation differed on a fundamental level. Whereas the former were driven by the national motives, the latter opposed forced Orthodoxization mainly for religious reasons. Moreover, no direct link between the clergy’s sympathy with OUN and their resistance to “reunion” can be established.

## **The Greek Catholic Clergy and the Soviet State: A Problem of Political Loyalty**

The “reunion” campaign was designed as a test of clergy’s political loyalty, though the Soviets realized that the majority of the clergymen “signed the Orthodoxy” trying to adjust to “current political situation”.<sup>79</sup> As Ivan Bohdanov, a NKVD representative engaged in the “reunion” campaign, observed in 1945, after joining the Initiative group the Greek Catholic priests “remained the same Catholics with the same political views and religious convictions”.<sup>80</sup> Nevertheless, at the meeting of Western Ukrainian plenipotentiaries of the CAROC ten years later (1955), the Council’s representative from Moscow Sprydonov once again emphasized that the clergy’s formal break of ties with Vatican and “reunion” with the ROC was a demonstration of their “loyal attitude to the Soviet rule”.<sup>81</sup> As the all-Union plenipotentiary of the CAROC Georgii Karpov blamed Ukrainian republican and regional plenipotentiaries for underestimating the “political relevance of the Union’s abolition”,<sup>82</sup> the leadership of the CAROC in Kyiv also began to interpret the clergy’s refusal to join the ROC in political terms.<sup>83</sup>

Many Greek Catholic clergymen, however, attempted both to maintain a dialogue with the Soviet power and preserve the Greek Catholic identity. For example, at the meeting of the clergy of Stanislav deanery in September 1945, Fr. Mykola Boryslavskyi and Fr. Ivan Ustyianovskyi refused to join the Initiative group, though emphasized their loyalty to the Soviet power.<sup>84</sup> Fr. Ustyianovskyi motivated his choice in a following way:

As a Greek Catholic priest, I am loyal to the Soviet authority. As a Catholic, I will serve and obey the Pope. I know that unless I go over to the Orthodoxy, I will be sent to prison and Siberia.<sup>85</sup>

Fr. Zadvorniak, a priest in Lviv region who escaped both “reunion” and arrest by leaving his priestly activities, actively agitated believers to participate in the elections to the Supreme Soviet, but afterwards, contrary to the expectations of the regional plenipotentiary of the CAROC Anatolii Vyshnevskyi, did not “reunite” with the ROC.<sup>86</sup> Similarly, Fr. Sokol in Drohobych region actively supported all state campaigns including grain procurements, but refused to break his oath and join the ROC.<sup>87</sup> The above mentioned examples, which reveal predominance of religious motivation of the clergy’s resistance to “reunion” over political one, seem

to be mostly consistent with the wartime instructions of Metropolitan Sheptytskyi to fulfill the secular orders unless they contradict Christian values.<sup>88</sup> In the eyes of the Soviet authorities, though, the Greek Catholic clergy's statements about their political loyalty to the Soviet State were not valid without "reunion" with the ROC.

The Soviet perception of the "non-reunited" Greek Catholic clergy as "anti-people" and "pro-nationalist" hardly changed after the death of Stalin in 1953. The return of several hundred Greek Catholic priests and about 20,000 convicted nationalists to Western Ukraine after dismantling of Gulag put at risk the successes of Sovietization of the previous decade.<sup>89</sup> The Greek Catholic priests agitated against the "reunited" clergy and spread rumors that the UGCC would be soon restituted.<sup>90</sup> In 1956, the head of the CAROC in the Ukrainian SSR Hryhorii Korchevyi noted that the "Uniate" clergy's activities were aimed against the interests of the Soviet State".<sup>91</sup>

Instead of perceiving the returned clergy as "anti-people element", many Western Ukrainian believers joined the underground Church having a deep respect for the "martyrs for the faith".<sup>92</sup> Moreover, inspired by the XX Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (hereafter CPSU) and upheavals in the neighboring Poland and Hungary in 1956, the Greek Catholics started to send petitions with a request to register their parish as Greek Catholic.<sup>93</sup>

Although the "Uniates" did not belong to religious groups which according to the Instruction of the CARC on the Application of the Law on Cults (1961) were deprived of right to registration because of their alleged "anti-state and monstrous character",<sup>94</sup> none of the petitions sent by the Greek Catholics up to legalization of the Church was answered positively. Since there was no legal explanation of the ban of the UGCC, the plenipotentiaries usually informed petitioners that their Church did not exist after its "reunion" with the ROC in 1946.<sup>95</sup>

On the one hand, the Greek Catholics' letters to power were a legitimate form of protest against the violations of religious freedom. On the other hand, the petitions sent by the members of the "non-existent Church" undermined the official narrative about the "voluntary reunion" and put in question the Soviet vision of the "Uniates" as "enemies of the people" and "counterrevolutionaries". In his complaint to Stalin (1947), Fr. Ivan Hanytskyi assumed that the discriminatory actions against him resulted from his refusal to join the ROC.<sup>96</sup> In October 1956, Fr. Omelian



Shuplat addressed his grievance to the head of the Soviet of Ministers of the USSR Nikolai Bulhanin:

We [*“non-reunited” Greek Catholic priests – K.B.*] are still forced to observe that we are called bandits in front of people. We are still regarded not as equal citizens, but as counterrevolutionaries based on the argument that we do not obey to Lviv council, etc.<sup>97</sup>

Fr. Shuplat went even further by rejecting the alleged “anti-Sovietness” of the clandestine priests:

Nobody of us thinks and has a right to oppose the state we live in, nobody can allow himself not to respect the Constitution. The only thing we do not agree with is the atheism, and this does not equal with the hostility to the state.<sup>98</sup>

Considering the declaration’s consistency with a principle of division between Church and State that defined the UGCC’s attitude to the secular authorities before 1946 in general and the wartime instructions of Metropolitan Sheptytskyi in particular, one should not dismiss Fr. Shuplat’s letter as a demonstration of fake political loyalty or another attempt to “speak Bolshevik”.<sup>99</sup> In 1993, that is, after the UGCC’s legalization and collapse of the Soviet Union, another “non-reunited” priest, Fr. Mykola Tsaryk, also stressed that the UGCC never positioned itself against the State, only against atheism, since the Church’s task was to deal with religion, not with politics.<sup>100</sup> Both priests suffered from the local police organs and KGB, but they escaped the postwar deportation to Gulag, therefore, their position might differ from the attitude of the Gulag returnees like Pavlo Vasylyk.

A student of theology arrested in 1947 for his link to UPA, Pavlo Vasylyk was secretly consecrated as a Greek Catholic priest upon his return to Western Ukraine in 1956.<sup>101</sup> Between 1956 and 1959, thousands of believers gathered from all over Galicia in the village of Nadorozhna in Ivano-Frankivsk region to participate in the Liturgies openly celebrated by Fr. Vasylyk.<sup>102</sup> The priest allegedly described the Soviet power as diabolic and stressed the need to destroy it almost in each of his sermons.<sup>103</sup> He was arrested in 1959 and sentenced to five years for “the formentation of interconfessional hostility” and for “possessing an indefinite quantity of anti-Soviet religious literature”.<sup>104</sup> When caught by police in the city of

Ivano-Frankivsk Fr. Vasylyk used the opportunity to tell the passersby about the UGCC and its struggle against “Bolshevik atheism and violence”.<sup>105</sup> As a clandestine bishop (since 1974), he played a leading role in the struggle for legalization of the UGCC during Perestroika.

However, the behavior of both Fr. Shuplat and Fr. Vasylyk, who used legal and illegal means of protest respectively, was marginal to a dominant guideline of the clandestine hierarchy advocating for the high secrecy in the underground. Since petitions to the Soviet authorities could provoke new repressions, many clergymen in the 1970s considered open struggle for legalization of the UGCC to be betrayal of the Church.<sup>106</sup> In 1987, Bishop Vasylyk was the only clandestine hierarch to sign a letter that declared the UGCC’s coming out from the underground.<sup>107</sup>

So, the labeling of the “non-reunited” clergymen as “counterrevolutionaries” and “enemies of the people” transcended the Stalinist era and continued in the next decades. The clandestine priests, who transgressed the Soviet law on religious cults for the sake of preserving their religious and national identity, in general did not opt for open resistance to the authorities. Moreover, in the contacts with the state officials they often presented themselves as loyal Soviet citizens whose constitutional rights should be respected.

## **The Attitude of the Clandestine Greek Catholic Clergy to the Communist Ideology**

The official position of the UGCC on Communism was formulated in Metropolitan Sheptytskyi’s pastoral letter “Warning against the Danger of Communism” (1936), in which the head of the Church condemned the Communist ideology and declared any cooperation with the Communists to be betrayal of the Church and nation.<sup>108</sup> In 1937, the Communist ideology was condemned by the Pope Pius XI in his encyclical “*Divini Redemptoris*” (“About the Godless Communism”), which was spread in Galicia in 1938.<sup>109</sup>

With the Soviet conquest of Western Ukraine, those Greek Catholic clergymen who once publicly expressed their anti-Communist views could escape arrest only through cooperation with the new power. For example, Fr. Oleksandr Bodrevych-Buts’, an author of several anti-Communist booklets in the interwar time, avoided the arrest after he promised to stop the anti-Communist activities in his letter to the Supreme Soviet in 1940 and joined the ROC in the postwar time.<sup>110</sup> A similar strategy was

used by many other priests, to whom the imprisoned head of the UGCC Metropolitan Iosyph Slipyi appealed in 1957:

Nobody was forced to speak against the Communism as such. And if somebody personally made statements in press with a fuss, he should not later save his skin at the cost of destruction of the Church.<sup>111</sup>

In the postwar time, the anti-Communist stance became one of the core elements of the clandestine Greek Catholics' identity. Since the ROC was closely linked to the Communist regime, many Western Ukrainian laypeople and even some "reunited" priests believed in rumors that the Orthodox hierarchs as well as a part of the "reunited" clergy had membership in the Communist Party.<sup>112</sup> As a "reunited" priest Bohdan Nud remembers, many believers called him "Communist" just because he officially served as an Orthodox priest.<sup>113</sup>

In contrast to the Orthodox theologians who attempted to reconcile Christian and Communist ideologies by developing the concept of "Christian Communism",<sup>114</sup> the Greek Catholic clergymen considered those identities to be mutually exclusive, which can be best exemplified by the clergy's attitude to the membership in the Communist organizations.

The analyzed interviews with the clandestine clergy, monks, nuns, and believers reveal no reference to their membership in the Communist Party. Most clandestine priests, especially from among the Gulag returnees, occupied low-profile positions that did not demand "ideological training." To illustrate, the Archbishop Volodymyr Sterniuk (born in 1907), who was consecrated as a secret bishop in 1964 and became a head of the clandestine UGCC in 1972, upon his return from the banishment in 1952 and up to his retirement in 1967 worked as a watchman in a park, assistant accountant, hospital attendant and a medical assistant.<sup>115</sup> However, the priests of a younger generation, namely those consecrated after 1946, as well as the candidates to the priesthood, often experienced ideological pressure at their workplaces. During Khrushchev's antireligious campaign (late 1950s–early 1960s), Stepan Stoliarchuk (born in 1930, consecrated as a clandestine priest in 1982) was encouraged to join the CPSU, an offer he persistently declined. As he informed the Party representatives at the plant, he found the Party program acceptable and "humane" and would have gladly joined the CPSU if he had been allowed to attend the church.<sup>116</sup> When asked about his attitude to Marxism-Leninism by his superior at a kinescope factory, Mykhailo Sabryha (born in 1940, ordained in 1974)

answered that as a Christian he did not regard Marxism-Leninism as a teaching and professed “faith of Christ, Catholic Church” instead.<sup>117</sup> Soon afterwards he was attacked by the administration for his alleged belonging to a sect and was forced to quit this job.<sup>118</sup>

In the context of the postwar Galicia, the Communist Party Youth League (hereafter Komsomol, VLKSM [Russian abbreviation for the *All-Union Leninist Young Communist League*]) fulfilled a political rather than a “militant atheistic” function. Considering the scale of the nationalist underground in the 1940s–early 1950s the teachers in Western Ukraine usually forced schoolchildren to join the VLKSM.<sup>119</sup> Thus, the reluctance to join the Komsomol in the postwar time might be interpreted in the terms of broader resistance to the Soviet regime. However, the respondents among the clandestine Greek Catholics usually emphasize that it was the atheistic character of the Komsomol that made their membership in this organization problematic.

There were two main views regarding the participation in the Communist youth organizations within the clandestine Church. The proponents of the nonconformist position considered the membership in the Komsomol incompatible with their religious beliefs and were usually forced to drop their studies or were expelled from the school.<sup>120</sup> The second position can be described as a formal membership in the Communist youth organization without ideological attachment to it. While explaining their choice, the proponents of this position emphasized the formal and forced character of their membership in the VLKSM.<sup>121</sup>

The attitude of the clandestine Greek Catholics to Pioneer organization and the Komsomol was formed by the religious education at home and instructions of the “non-reunited” priests, who usually had a radical anti-Communist stance. Fr. Porfyrii Chuchman (born in 1906), for example, did not allow the believers to join the Komsomol, considering it to be unacceptable “for Christians, *especially Catholics* [*emphasis mine* – K.B.]”.<sup>122</sup> Fr. Zenovii Kysilevskii (born in 1893), arrested in 1963 for “underground nationalist activities”, was also accused of convincing children during the confessions not to join the Communist youth organizations and giving similar instructions to their parents.<sup>123</sup> Fr. Roman Bakhtalovskyi (born in 1897), an author of a manuscript article “About the Communist Youth League”, where he wrote that the young people in the Soviet Union were afraid to express their views, was arrested in 1968 for the “anti-Soviet activities”.<sup>124</sup> In the 1986, however, the spiritual leaders of Oleh Hovera (born in 1967), who was preparing to become

a clandestine priest, allowed him to join the Komsomol for the sake of receiving a diploma after graduation from a medical school.<sup>125</sup>

In her prominent work on religious activists in the Russian countryside in the 1920s, American historian Glennys Young showed that whereas the Russian Orthodox believers could reconcile their religious identity with the membership in the Communist Party and Komsomol, Orthodox sectarians found it unacceptable.<sup>126</sup> Apart from the church-sect dichotomy, she also explains this phenomenon by a difference between ritual and dogmatic understanding of religion typical for the traditional Orthodox believers and the Orthodox sectarians respectively.<sup>127</sup> It seems that the clandestine Greek Catholics shared the dogmatic understanding of religion, though their attitude to the membership in the Communist organizations was less uncompromising than in the case of some marginal religious subcultures.

The Greek Catholic clergy who rejected “reunion” with the ROC precisely because of the dogmatic differences between the Catholicism and the Orthodoxy preserved the Catholic view on the Communist ideology as irreconcilable with the Christian one. The fact that both clergymen and believers resisted Communist organizations because of their nominally atheistic rather than Soviet character is an additional proof that the clandestine clergy’s behavior was motivated primarily by religious considerations.

## Conclusion

After the forced merger of the UGCC with the ROC in Galicia (1946), the Greek Catholic clergymen who opposed “reunion” with the Russian Orthodoxy were persecuted by the Soviet regime for their alleged “anti-Soviet” activities. Considering the generally negative attitude of the Greek Catholic clergymen to the Soviet regime and the Communist ideology before and during the Second World War, most priests were persecuted for their resistance to “reunion” rather than for their actual “anti-Soviet” dealings. The clergy’s refusal to join the ROC, though rooted predominantly in the individual perception of the faith and salvation rather than political views, was qualified by the Soviet authorities as a sign of disloyalty to the state.

As Christians, the clandestine Greek Catholic clergymen rejected atheism and Communist worldview. As Ukrainian Greek Catholics, they protested against the ban of the UGCC in the Soviet Union, using both legal

and illegal means. Unlike many other outlawed religious groups in the Soviet Union, the clandestine UGCC did not reject the secular surrounding, but accommodated to it as long as it did not contradict Christian values and Greek Catholic tradition. The clandestine clergy's view on the Christian identity as exclusive and irreconcilable with the Communist one, in fact, did not alter substantially from the position expressed by the Catholic and Greek Catholic hierarchs in the 1930s.

The Christ's instruction to render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar' and unto God the things that are God's was particularly problematic to implement in the Soviet Union. The atheistic nature of the Soviet regime notwithstanding, most clandestine clergymen attempted to apply a principle of division between the Church and the State as well as the Metropolitan Sheptytskyi's instruction to obey the state authorities without compromising Christian identity to the Soviet reality. The case of the underground Greek Catholic clergy in the Soviet Union can serve, therefore, as a good example of the survival of a banned religious tradition in the unfavorable conditions of the Communist rule.

## NOTES

- 1 The UGCC (also known as the Uniate Church) was founded at the Union of Brest in 1596, when a part of the Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Metropolitanate changed jurisdiction from Constantinople Patriarch to the Pope. Having accepted Catholic dogmas, the UGCC retained Byzantine Liturgy, Julian calendar, and married clergy. Since before 1596 the Kyiv Church was not in jurisdiction of Moscow Patriarchate, a term "reunion" is problematic.
- 2 Before 1939, the UGCC had 5 eparchies and 3040 parishes with more than 4, 283 mln believers (LYSENKO, O., "Do pytannia pro stanovyshche tserkvy v Ukraini u period Druhoi svitovoi viiny," v *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, No. 3, 1995, s. 73).
- 3 Founded on May 28, 1945, the Initiative group initially consisted of three Greek Catholic priests – Fr. Mykhail Mel'nyk, Fr. Antonii Pel'vetskyi, and Fr. Havryil Kostel'nyk. The latter priest, who was famous for his anti-Vatican views, became a head of the Initiative group.
- 4 It was not a legitimate council of the UGCC, since no Greek Catholic bishop was present there, and the members of the Initiative group Fr. Antonii Pel'vetskyi and Fr. Mykhail Mel'nyk were consecrated as the Orthodox bishops. For more details on the canonical illegitimacy of the council see: Bociurkiw, B. R., *The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and the Soviet State (1939–1950)*, CIUS Press, Edmonton-Toronto, 1996, pp. 181-182.
- 5 Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii [State Archive of Russian Federation] (hereafter GARF) 6991/1/33/192. The archival sources will be quoted as *fond/opis'/delo/list(y)* (Rus.), *fond/opys/sprava/arkush(i)* (Ukr.), *collection/inventory/file/leaf(leaves)* (Engl.).
- 6 Since a term "Uniate" has a pejorative connotation, in this article it is used exclusively to refer to the quotations from the Soviet sources.
- 7 Markus, V., "Religion and Nationalism in Ukraine", in Ramet, P. (ed.), *Religion and Nationalism in Soviet and Eastern European politics*, Duke University Press, Durham, 1989, p.153.
- 8 Chumachenko, T., *Church and State in Soviet Russia: Russian orthodoxy from World War II to the Khrushchev years*, M. E. Sharpe, Armonk, New York, 2002, p. 45.
- 9 GARF 6991/1/1585/25.
- 10 Markus, V., *Religion and Nationalism in Ukraine*, p. 155.
- 11 Naumescu, V., *Modes of Religiosity in Eastern Christianity: Religious Processes and Social Change in Ukraine*, Lit Verlag, Berlin, 2008, p. 124.
- 12 See review of historiography on the UGCC's abolition: Myshchak, I., "Likvidatsiia Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy v Ukraini u povoienni roky: istoriohrafii", u *Istoriografichni doslidzhennia v Ukraini*, vyp. 17, Instytut istorii Ukrainy NAN Ukrainy, Kyiv, 2007, ss. 270-287.

- <sup>13</sup> Bociurkiw, B. R., *The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and the Soviet State (1939-1950)*, CIUS Press, Edmonton-Toronto, 1996.
- <sup>14</sup> Pashchenko, V., *Hreko-katolyky v Ukraini (vid 40-kh rokiv XX stolittia do nashykh dniv)*, Poltava, 2002; Stotskyi, Ia. *Ukrainska Hreko-Katolytska Tserkva i relihiine stanovyshe Ternopilshchyny (1946-1989 rr.)*, Pidruchnyky i posibnyky, Ternopil, 2003; Andrukhiv, I., *Relihiine zhyttia na Prykarpatti: 1944-1990 roky. Istoryko-pravovyi analiz*, Ivano-Frankivsk, 2004; Voinalovych, V., *Partiino-derzhavna polityka shchodo religii ta relihiinykh instytutsii v Ukraini 1940-1960-kh rokiv: politolohichniy dyskurs*, Svitohliad, Kyiv, 2005; Andrukhiv, I., *Polityka radians'koi vlady u sferi religii ta konfesiine zhyttia na Prykarpatti v 40-kh-80-kh rokakh XX stolittia. Istoryko-pravovyi analiz*, Lileia-NV, Ivano-Frankivsk, 2006.
- <sup>15</sup> Shlikhta, N. "'Greek Catholic'-'Orthodox'-'Soviet': A Symbiosis or a Conflict of Identities?," in *Religion, State & Society*, Vol. 32, No. 3, 2004, pp. 261-273; Hurkina, S., Dvi doli: hreko-katolyts'ke dukhovenstvo i radians'ka vlada, u *Skhid/Zakhid. Istoryko-kulturolohichniy zbirnyk*, TOV "NTMT," Kharkiv, Vypusk 11-12, 2008, pp. 265-282; Hurkina, S., "'Obraz syly dukhu: hreko-katolytske dukhovenstvo Lvivskoi arkhieparchii pislia Druhoi svitovoi viiny i problema personifikatsii relihiinykh perekonan' ta identychnosty'," u *Ukraina Moderna*, Kyiv-Lviv, Chastyna 11, 2008, pp. 99-110.
- <sup>16</sup> Dmytryshyn, N., "Mizh oporom i prystosuvanniam: hreko-katolyts'ke pidpillia v systemi radians'koho totalitaryzmu", u *Kovchek. Naukovyi zbirnyk iz tserkovnoi istorii*, Misioner, L'viv, Chyslo 5, 2007, pp. 256-281.
- <sup>17</sup> Scott, J., *Weapons of the Weak. Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1985, p. 289.
- <sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 290.
- <sup>19</sup> See e.g.: Scott, J., *Domination and the Arts of Resistance. Hidden Transcripts*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1990, pp. 198-199.
- <sup>20</sup> Osokina, E., "O sotsialnom imunitete, ili Kriticheskii vzhliad na kontseptsiiu passivnoho (povsiednevnoho) soprotivlenia", v *Sotsialnaia istoriia: ezhehodnik 2010*, Alteia: SPb, 2011, ss. 284, 295.
- <sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, ss. 295-296. She offers to substitute a term "passive resistance" with "social immune system" (*Ibid.*, ss. 296-301).
- <sup>22</sup> Westhues, K., "The Church in Opposition", in *Sociological Analysis*, Vol. 37, No. 4, 1976, p. 303.
- <sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>24</sup> Here I allude to Vasyl Markus's categorization of religious groups in the Soviet Ukraine, which is following: 1) preferentially treated religious groups (ROC); 2) relatively restricted religious groups (Reformed Church of Transcarpathia, Evangelical Christians and Baptists); 3) excessively restricted religious groups (Catholics, Jews, Muslims); 4) banned religious groups (the Ukrainian Greek Catholics, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox,



the Pentecostals, the Adventists, and the Jehovah's Witnesses) (Markus, V., *Religion and Nationalism in Ukraine*, pp. 143-153).

25 On the role of Christian social ethics in Metropolitan Sheptytsky's relations with Austrian, Polish, Soviet and German authorities during 1901–1944 see: Krawchuk, A., *Christian Social Ethics in Ukraine: the Legacy of Andrei Sheptytsky*, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, Edmonton, 1997.

26 Quoted after: Krawchuk, A., *Christian Social Ethics in Ukraine*, p. 165.

27 These include the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church (established in 1943), Council for the Affairs of the Religious Cults (established in 1944), and Council for the Religious Affairs (hereafter CRA), which was established in 1965 as a result of merger of the former two institutions. The regional plenipotentiaries of the CAROC, CARC, and CRA sent reports about the religious situation to the Republican plenipotentiary in Kyiv, who, in turn, informed the Council in Moscow. This hierarchical structure worked also in a reverse order, when the instructions from Moscow were sent through Kyiv to regional plenipotentiaries. Since such system usually led to circulation of the same documents at different levels, I worked mostly with the material from the central archives, namely in Kyiv (Central State Archive of the Higher Organs of Power and Administration) and Moscow (State Archive of Russian Federation).

28 Likvidatsiia UHKTs (1939–1946). Dokumenty radianskykh orhaniv derzhavnoi bezpeky, PP Serhiichuk M.I., Kyiv, 2006.

29 The Archive, which is based at the Ukrainian Catholic University in Lviv, contains about 2, 200 interviews conducted during 1990s-2000s with various categories of Greek Catholics (clergy, monkhood, nunnery, laypeople). For this article, the interviews with the clandestine Greek Catholics were selected according to geographic criterion (Eastern Galicia) and thematic relevance.

30 Troeltsch, E., *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches*, Westminster/John Knox Press, Louisville, Kentucky, Vol. 1, 1992, p. 331.

31 Johnson, B., "On Church and Sect," in *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 28, No. 4, 1963, p. 540.

32 *Ibid.*, p. 542.

33 *Ibid.*, p. 543, fn. 15.

34 Stark, W., *The Sociology of Religion. A Study of Christendom. Part 1: Established Religion*, Routledge, London-New York, 2000, p. 3.

35 *Ibid.*, p.4.

36 Westhues, K., "The Church in Opposition," pp. 305, 311.

37 Ramet, P., "The Interplay of Religious Policy and Nationalities Policy in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe", in Ramet, P. (ed.), *Religion and Nationalism in Soviet and Eastern European politics*, Duke University Press, Durham, 1989, pp. 35-37.

38 Shlikhta, N., *Tserkva tykh, khto vyzhyv. Radians'ka Ukraina, seredyna 1940-kh–pochatok 1970-kh rr.*, Akta, Kharkiv, 2011, s.107.

- 39 See e.g.: Chumachenko, T. *Church and State in Soviet Russia*, p. 42.
- 40 Such expression was used by Stalin in September 1943 at the council that signified the ROC's restoration: MINER, S. M., *Stalin's Holy War: Religion, Nationalism, and Alliance Politics, 1941–1945*, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2003, p. 189.
- 41 Miner, S. M., *Stalin's Holy War*, p. 96. Steven Miner also maintains that the revival of the ROC was used to express gratitude to the Russian people for their struggle with the Nazis, and, as usually stated in historiography, to mobilize them for the further struggle (*Ibid.*, p. 68).
- 42 Stark, W., *The Sociology of Religion*, p. 214.
- 43 Eastern Galicia was a part of the Habsburg monarchy (till 1918), Russian occupation zone during First World War, Western Ukrainian People's Republic (1918–1919), Second Polish Republic (1919–1939), Soviet (1939–1941), German (1941–1944) and again Soviet occupation zones during the Second World War.
- 44 Volodymyr Tselevych was a secretary-general of the Ukrainian National Democratic Union, the largest Ukrainian party in the interwar Poland. The quoted statement comes from his report to the Soviet state security organs (1940). (*Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptytskyi u dokumentakh radians'kykh orhaniv derzhavnoi bezpeky (1939-1944 rr.)*, Ukrain's'ka Vydavnycha Spilka, Kyiv, 2005, s. 52).
- 45 GARF 6991/1/519/18.
- 46 The OUN emerged in 1929 out of several Ukrainian organizations. In 1940, it split into a more moderate wing headed by Andrii Melnyk and a more radical faction consisting of the younger adherents of OUN headed by Stepan Bandera. The anti-Soviet nationalist underground in the postwar Western Ukraine was led by a Bandera wing of OUN.
- 47 Likvidatsiia UHKTs, T.II, s. 663.
- 48 GARF 6991/1/1168/19.
- 49 Bociurkiw, B. R., *The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and the Soviet State*, p. 84.
- 50 *Ibid.*, pp. 94-95.
- 51 Likvidatsiia UHKTs, T.I, s. 365.
- 52 Though being in favour of Ukrainian national aspirations, Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytskyi always condemned the violent methods of Ukrainian nationalists. On the tensions between Metropolitan Sheptytskyi and Bandera movement see: Himka, J.-P. "Christianity and Radical Nationalism: Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky and the Bandera Movement", in Wanner, C. (ed.), *State Secularism and Lived Religion in Soviet Russia and Ukraine*, Oxford UP, New York, 2012, pp. 93-116.
- 53 *Ibid.*, pp. 93, 104, 110-111.
- 54 See e.g.: Likvidatsiia UHKTs, T.I, ss. 313, 332; Interview with Sister Andreia (Anna Shelvika) from 31.03.2001, Lviv. Interviewer: Marko, M. // Arkhiv

- Instituto istorii Tserkvy [Archive of the Institute of Church History] (hereafter AIITs), P-1-1-1126, p. 6.
- 55 Interview with Ms. Maria Nakonechna from 18.12.1992, Lviv. Interviewer: Smoliuk, S. // AIITs, P-1-1-24, p. 2.
- 56 *Ibid.* After the Second World War Fr. Guglevych, who did not join the ROC, was arrested and sent to a forced labour camp in Magadan (*Ibid.*).
- 57 Derzhavnyi arkhiv L'vivs'koi oblasti [State Archive of Lviv region, DALO] 1332/2/15/12-13; Likvidatsiia UHKTs, T.II, s. 267.
- 58 GARF 6991/1/519/150.
- 59 Fr. Ivan Dutkevych was sentenced to 10 years for lending money to the nationalist guerrillas, although the latter forced him to do so (Interview with Ms. Anastasia Lehun from 14.05.1994, Ivano-Frankivs'k region, Tys'menytsia district, village Stryhantsi. Interviewer: Pavlykivs'ka, N. // AIITs, P-1-1-389, p. 28).
- 60 Likvidatsiia UHKTs, T.I, s.454.
- 61 Interview with Fr. Mykola Syvyk from 25.03.1993, 02.04.1993, Lviv region, Zhydachiv. Interviewer: Gudziak, B. // AIITs, P-1-1-335, p. 20.
- 62 Stryker, S., Burke, P. J., "The Past, Present, and Future of an Identity Theory", in *Social Psychology Quarterly*, Vol. 63, No. 4, 2000, p.286.
- 63 *Ibid.*, pp. 285-286.
- 64 Integral nationalism often appeals to traditional religious values, however, as long as they do not contradict nationalist ideology. Its approach to traditional religion is always instrumental (ZAYTSEV, O. "Natsionalizm iak relihiia: pryklad Dmytra Dontsova ta OUN (1920-1930-ti roky)," u *Naukovi zapysku Ukrainskoho Katolyts'koho universytetu*, Chyso 2, seriia "Istoriia," vypusk 1, Lviv, 2010, s.167).
- 65 Likvidatsiia UHKTs, T.II, s. 63.
- 66 GARF 6991/1/103/59.
- 67 *Ibid.* According to the Soviet reports, about 10 "reunited" priests were killed in Galicia by Ukrainian nationalists during the years of the "reunion" campaign (GARF 6991/1/519/2,158). This list also includes Fr. Kostel'nyk who was murdered in September 1948. Allegedly assassinated by Ukrainian nationalists, he was presented as a "martyr for the reunion" during the Soviet period. According to the memoirs of Fr. Kostel'nyk's family, however, the priest was killed by the Soviet state security agents. (Bociurkiw, B. R., *The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and the Soviet State*, pp. 205-206).
- 68 GARF 6991/6/82/27; Likvidatsiia UHKTs, T.II, s.25; Bociurkiw, B. R., *The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and the Soviet State*, p. 133; Listed as a "reunited" priest against his will, Fr. Roman Lopatynskyi wanted to call back his signature, but was convinced by a member of OUN to keep the parish. Since a priest introduced no Orthodox elements to the Liturgy, delivered patriotic sermons and had connections with nationalist resistance, he was arrested in 1950. (Interview with Ms. Lidiia Zelenchuk-Lopatyns'ka from

- 11.11.1997, Lviv region, Stryi district, Morshyn. Interviewer: Ohorodnyk, T. // AITs, P-1-1-780, pp. 2, 8, 11-12).
- 69 GARF 6991/1/519/149.
- 70 Likvidatsiia UHKTs, T.II, ss. 10, 24, 69, 71, 243, 451.
- 71 *Ibid.*, ss. 9, 243; Interview with Fr. Marian Chorneha from 30.03.2002, Lviv region, Zhovkva district, village Krekhiv. Interviewer: Borys, V. // AITs, P-1-1-145, p. 5.
- 72 Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi arkhiv vyshchychk orhaniv vlady ta upravlinnia [Central State Archive of the Higher Organs of Power and Administration] (hereafter TsDAVO) 4648/1/165/302.
- 73 TsDAVO 4648/1/165/306.
- 74 GARF 6991/1/1168/21.
- 75 Likvidatsiia UHKTs, T.II, s.136.
- 76 *Ibid.*, ss. 97-99, 124.
- 77 *Ibid.*, ss. 9, 104, 136-137.
- 78 *Ibid.*, s. 71.
- 79 GARF 6991/1/1271/123.
- 80 Likvidatsiia UHKTs, T.II, s.100.
- 81 GARF 6991/1/ 1271/151.
- 82 GARF 6991/1/103/318.
- 83 GARF 6991/1/216/69.
- 84 GARF 6991/1/33/208, 210.
- 85 GARF 6991/1/33/210.
- 86 GARF 6991/1/216/63.
- 87 GARF 6991/1/216/65.
- 88 However, in December 1940 Metropolitan Sheptytskyi urged the priests from influencing believers before the election: Krawchuk, A., *Christian Social Ethics in Ukraine*, p. 166.
- 89 Weiner, A., "The Empires Pay a Visit: Gulag Returnees, East European Rebellions, and Soviet Frontier Politics", in *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 78, No. 2, 2006, p. 337. Till the end of 1956, 267 out of 344 Greek Catholic priests repressed during 1945–1950 were able to return to the Ukrainian SSR (Serhiichuk, V., *Neskorena tserkva: podvyzhnytstvo hreko-katolykiv Ukrainy v borot'bi za viru i derzhavu*, Dnipro, Kyiv, 2001, pp. 289, 297).
- 90 TsDAVO 4648/1/163/374.
- 91 GARF 6991/1/1378/140.
- 92 TsDAVO 4648/1/148/335.
- 93 TsDAVO 4648/2/216/6-7, 142-150; 4648/2/238/47.
- 94 The list included such groups as, for example, Jehovah's Witnesses, the Pentecostals, and genuine-Orthodox Christians. GARF 6991/2/306/6-7.

- 95 Andrukhiv, I., *Polityka radians'koi vlady u sferi religii*, p. 273; TsDAVO 4648/2/216/4.
- 96 TsDAVO 4648/2/37/42.
- 97 TsDAVO 4648/2/216/132.
- 98 TsDAVO 4648/1/180/90.
- 99 The expression "to speak Bolshevik," that is to use the rhetoric of the ruling party in order to make the message successful, belongs to a post-revisionist historian Stephen Kotkin: Kotkin, S., *Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1995.
- 100 Interview with Fr. Mykola Tsaryk from 27.02.1993, 5.02.1994. Lviv. Interviewer: Shcherba, H. AITs, P-1-1-315, p. 97.
- 101 Interview with Bishop Pavlo Vasylyk from 18.02.1994, Ivano-Frankivsk region, Kolomyia. Interviewer: Kachur, V. // AITs, P-1-1-455, pp. 15-16, 25.
- 102 *Ibid.*, p. 27.
- 103 Andrukhiv, I., *Relihiine zhyttia na Prykarpatti*, s. 105.
- 104 Interview with Bishop Pavlo Vasylyk, p. 30.
- 105 *Ibid.*, pp. 27-28.
- 106 *Ibid.*, p. 36.
- 107 *Ibid.*, p. 37a.
- 108 *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptytskyi: Zhyttia i diial'nist': Dokumenty i materialy. 1899-1944. T. II: Tserkva i suspil'ne pytannia. Kn.1: Pastyrs'ke vchennia ta diial'nist'*, Misioner, Lviv, 1998, ss. 486-501.
- 109 Likvidatsiia UHKTs, T.I, s. 685.
- 110 Interview with Fr. Oleksandr Bodrevych-Buts' from 25.09.1998, Lviv. Interviewer: Didula, P. // AITs, P-1-1-907, pp. 3, 6-7, 16, 33; Hurkina, S., *Dvi doli: hreko-katolyts'ke dukhovenstvo i radians'ka vlada*, ss. 271-272, 277. In 1961, when the ROC was targeted by Khrushchev's antireligious campaign and Fr. Bodrevych-Buts' for a short time became enthusiastic about socialism, he left priestly activities and began to work at the ethnographic museum. In 1970, he secretly came back to the clandestine UGCC, though he did not lead any religious activities (*Ibid.*, ss. 277-278; Interview with Fr. Oleksandr Bodrevych-Buts', pp. 20, 22).
- 111 TsDAVO 4648/1/165/308.
- 112 GARF 6991/1/1383/24.
- 113 Interview with Fr. Bohdan Nud from 26.12.2007, Lviv. Interviewer: Kolomyets', I. // AITs, P-1-1-333, p.4.
- 114 Shlikhta, N., "'Greek Catholic'-'Orthodox'-'Soviet,'" pp. 263-264.
- 115 Dmytrukh, S., *Zhyttia iak podvyh dlia Khrysta. Curriculum vitae monakha redemptorysta, mistsebliustytelia i pravliachoho arhiiereia Kyievo-Halytskoi mytropolii Volodymyra Sterniuka*, Svichado, Lviv, 2007, s. 12.

- 116 Interview with Fr. Stepan Stoliarchuk from 21.04.2002, Lviv. Interviewer:  
Nadopta, M. // AITs, P-1-1-1365, pp. 1-2, 4.
- 117 Interview with Bishop Mykhailo Sabryha from 30.03.1994, Ternopil.  
Interviewer: Stots'kyi, Ia. // AITs, P-1-1-321, pp. 1, 9-10, 22.
- 118 *Ibid.*, p. 10.
- 119 Interview with Bishop Mykhailo Sabryha, p. 4; Interview with Ms. Maria  
Smolins'ka from 01.10.2003, Lviv region, Obroshyn. Interviewer: Hirna, K.  
// AITs, P-1-1-1556, p. 5.
- 120 Interview with Sister Maria Rospopa from 21.04.2001, Ivano-Frankivsk  
region, Kolomyia. Interviewer: Hodovanets, M. // AITs, P-1-1-833, p.  
3; Interview with Sister Markiiiana (Maria Kolodii) from 13.01.1994,  
Ivano-Frankivsk. Interviewer: Pavlykivska, N. // AITs, P-1-1-270, p. 3;  
Interview with Ms. Maria Smolins'ka, p. 5; Interview with Mr. Vasyl Kobryn  
from 22.06.1993. Interviewer: Smoliuk, S. // AITs, P-1-1-160, p. 1.
- 121 Interview with Ms. Volodymyra Kandiuk from 30.11.1993, Ivano-Frankivsk.  
Interviewer: Pavlykivska, N. // AITs, P-1-1-360, pp. 2-3; Interview with Fr.  
Oleh Hovera from 30.11.1993, Ternopil region, Ternopil district, village  
Velyka Berezovytsia. Interviewer: Stotskyi, Ia. // AITs, P-1-1-236, p. 3.
- 122 Interview with Sister Khrystyna Obidniak from 15.10.1992, Lviv. Interviewer:  
Smoliuk, S. // AITs, P-1-1-1160, p. 3.
- 123 Andrukhiv, I., *Relihiine zhyttia na Prykarpatti*, s. 181.
- 124 *Ibid.*, s. 216.
- 125 Interview with Fr. Oleh Hovera, pp. 1-3, 7.
- 126 Young, G., *Power and the Sacred in Revolutionary Russia: Religious Activists  
in the Village*, Pennsylvania State University Press, Pennsylvania, 1997, p.  
88-90.
- 127 *Ibid.*, p. 91.